India: The Transfer of Power, 1942-47, Vol. 11

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THE TRANSFER OF POWER

1942-7

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Mr Attlee to Mr Churchill. Facsimile of his letter of 4 July 1947.
Document 504.

CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN BRITAIN AND INDIA

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

1942-7

Volume XI The Mountbatten Viceroyalty
Announcement and Reception of the 3 June Plan

31 May — 7 July 1947

Editor-in-Chief

NICHOLAS MANSERGH, Litt.D., F.B.A.

Fellow of St. John’s College , Cambridge

Editor

PENDEREL MOON, M A.

Assisted by

DAVID M. BLAKE, M.A., M.Litt. and LIONEL CARTER, M.Sc., Ph.D.

LONDON

HER MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE

© Crown Copyright 1982
First published 1982

isbn 0 11 580086 7*

Printed in England for Her Majesty’s Stationery Office
by Eyre & Spottiswoode Ltd, Thanet Press, Margate, Kent

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CONTENTS

Foreword

Page vii

Introduction to Volume XI

X

Abbreviations

xxxiv

Principal Holders of Office

xxxvii

Chronological Table of Principal Events

xli

Summary of Documents

xliii

Documents

1

Glossary

984

Index of Persons

987

Index of Subjects

1113

ILLUSTRATIONS

Frontispiece

Mr Attlee to Mr Churchill. Facsimile of his letter of 4 July 1947. Document 504.
(Crown Copyright , Public Record Office)

Between pages 3 62 and 563

Meeting with the Indian leaders, Viceroy’s House, 2 June 1947. Document
23. (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library)

Facsimile of Gandhi’s message to Lord Mountbatten written on the back of five
separate old envelopes on his day of silence. Document 24. (Trustees of the Broad-
lands Archives Settlement)

Gandhi and Pandit Nehru with refugees from the Punjab in a camp at Hardwar,
June 1947. Document 300, para. 2. (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library)

Foreword

On 9 March 1966 the Prime Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, announced in the
House of Commons that the closed period for official records was to be reduced
from fifty to thirty years. He stated that the Government also proposed that the
range of Official Histories, which had hitherto been confined to the two great
wars, should be extended to include selected periods or episodes of peacetime
history and considered that there was scope for extending to other Oversea
Departments the Foreign Office practice of publishing selected documents
relating to external relations. The Prime Minister hoped that both of these
subsidiary proposals, supplementing the reduction in the closed period to thirty
years, would be acceptable in principle to the Opposition parties, who would
be associated with their implementation.1

On 10 August 1966 the Prime Minister announced that a standing inter-party
group of Privy Counsellors was to be appointed to consider all such proposals2
and on 8 June 1967 that its members were, for the Government and to act as
Chairman, the Right Hon. Patrick Gordon Walker, Minister without Portfolio;
for the Official Opposition, the Right Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home; and for
the Liberal Party, Lord Ogmore.3

A project to publish documents from the India Office Records had been
under discussion for some years and on 30 June 1967 the Prime Minister, in
replying to a written question in the Llouse of Commons, announced that the
first of the new series of selected documents to be published was to relate to
the Transfer of Power in India. His statement was as follows:

As I informed the House on the 9th of March 1966, the Government have
decided to extend to other Oversea Departments the Foreign Office practice
of publishing selected documents concerned with our external relations, sub¬
ject to inter-party agreement through the Group of Privy Counsellors whose
composition I announced on the 8 th of June. I am happy to inform the
House that the Group have agreed that in view of the great interest now
being shown in historical circles in the last days of British rule in India the
first selection of documents to be published under the new arrangements
should be documents from the India Office records on the Transfer of Power
and the events leading up to it.

The scheme will follow closely the lines of the Foreign Office series of
Documents on British Foreign Policy from 1919 to 1939, and, as in that series,
the editors will be independent historians who will be given unrestricted
access to the records and freedom to select and edit documents for publica¬
tion. Professor P. N. S. Mansergh, Smuts Professor of the History of the

1 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 725, Written Answers to Questions, cols. 561-3.

2 Ibid., vol. 733, cols. 1706-7. 3 Ibid., vol. 747, col. 1291.

Vlll

FORE WORD

British Commonwealth at Cambridge, has expressed willingness to accept

appointment as Editor-in-Chief, and the scheme will be in full operation by

the end of the year.4

Mr E. W. R. Lumby was appointed Assistant Editor and fulfilled the duties of
that office until his death on 23 January 1972, by which time the first three
volumes in the Series had been published and the fourth was in an advanced
stage of preparation.

Sir Penderel Moon, O.B.E., sometime Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford,
was appointed Assistant Editor in September 1972 when Volume IV was about
to go to press and the editing of Volume V to begin.

Mr D. M. Blake, who from the time of his appointment in March 1968, and
Dr L. J. Carter from August 1970 to September 1980 when, the editing of this
volume then being well advanced, he left to become Secretary /Librarian in the
South Asian Centre in the University of Cambridge, have assisted in the
assembly, selection, preparation and indexing of documents for publication.
The Editors would like to place on record their warm appreciation of
Dr Carter’s many contributions to the work of the Historical Section in the
decade in which he served as a member of it.

The Editors once again have pleasure in thanking Miss Lois Atkin who has
undertaken the typing necessary for the production of the Volume.

The series will cover the period 1 January 1942 to 15 August 1947. The
Volumes so far published with their subtitles and dates of publication are as
follows :

Volume I The Cripps Mission January- April 1942 (1970)

Volume II ‘Quit India’ 30 April-21 September 1942 (1971)

Volume III Reassertion of authority, Gandhi’s fast and the (1971)

succession to the Viceroyalty 21 September 1942-
12 June 1943

Volume IV The Bengal Famine and the New Viceroyalty (1973)

15 June 1943-31 August 1944

Volume V The Simla Conference: Background and (1975)

Proceedings 1 September 1944-28 July 1945
Volume VI The post-war phase: new moves by the Labour (1976)

Government 1 August 1945-22 March 1946
Volume VII The Cabinet Mission 23 March-29 June 1946 (1977)

Volume VIII The Interim Government 3 July-i November 1946 (1979)

Volume IX The fixing of a time limit 4 November 1946- (1980)

22 March 1947

Volume X The Mountbatten Viceroyalty: Formulation of a (1981)

Plan 22 March-30 May 1947

FORE WORD

IX

The principles of selection, the arrangement of documents — which is in
chronological order throughout in so far as that has been ascertainable —
together with other details of presentation were explained in the Foreword to
the first Volume (pp. vi-x) with some further comments on particular points
added in the Foreword to Volume III (pp. viii-xii). There is no need, therefore,
to recapitulate what has been written on these matters here. It may, however, be
worth while restating the purpose of the Series. It is to make available to scholars
in convenient printed form the more important British historical records
relating to the Transfer of Power in India.

N. MANSERGH

Historical Section
India Office Records
March 1981

4 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 749, Written Answers to Questions, cols. 147-8.

Introduction to Volume XI

On 23 May 1947, the Cabinet had approved in principle the terms of a draft
Plan which, in the event of a failure to secure a compromise on the basis of the
Cabinet Mission Plan, the Viceroy was authorised to lay before the Conference
of Indian leaders convened for 2 June [Vol. X, Nos. 521 and 404] : on 30 May,
after a last meeting with members of the India and Burma Committee on
outstanding issues on 28 May [Vol. X, No. 553], the Viceroy had returned to
India. With his return years of debate and discussion on policy gave way to days
of decision, the Viceroy’s Conference with Indian leaders, begun on 2 and
resumed on 3 June, in fact determining the nature of the final Anglo-Indian
transfer settlement. The proceedings of the Conference, momentous in their
import, are recorded in Minutes [Nos. 23 and 39] in conjunction with which
reports of consequential conversations and related correspondence [e.g. Nos.
24 and 27] may profitably be read. So also may be the lively narrative account
of events in the round, as viewed from Viceregal vantage ground, and con¬
tained in Mountbatten’s Personal Report of 5 June [No. 91].

While the date — 2 June — of the Viceroy’s Meeting with the Indian leaders
was already settled some final arrangements had still to be made on his return
from London. First in importance was the question of attendance. On 13 May
Nehru had suggested that Acharya Kripalani as President of Congress should
be invited in addition to Nehru himself, Patel, Jinnah, Liaquat and Baldev
Singh, but the Viceroy on 17 May had explained his difficulty in acceding to
this request [Vol. X, Nos. 423 and 467]. Jinnah, when sounded, was most
averse to the idea: Nehru, on behalf of the Congress Working Committee,
insistent upon its adoption, the matter being finally resolved by the issue of an
invitation to Abdur Rab Nishtar on the League to balance one to Kripalani on
the Congress side [Nos. 4, 27 para. 6, and 91 para. 2; and 22 on possible addi¬
tional Sikh representation]. Procedure for the meeting was discussed with
Patel [No. 20] ; a draft for the Viceroy’s opening speech submitted by Ismay,
fmal amendments to the Plan and the text of the Viceroy’s post-Conference
broadcast further considered and sent off to London all on 3 1 May [Nos. 1, 2, 3
and 13], the Viceroy proposing the insertion in his broadcast as an apparent
‘aside’, of an understanding allusion to Gandhi’s objections, strongly voiced at
his Prayer Meetings, to the ‘vivisection of the motherland’ [Nos. 2 and 19], a
proposal which, however, did not commend itself to the Secretary of State or
the Prime Minister and was accordingly withdrawn [No. 30: for final text of
broadcast see No. 44].

While these arrangements were being made disturbing accounts of develop¬
ments in the Punjab continued to be received with the Governor writing of
communal tension throughout the Province being ‘extremely high’, amounting

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XI

to ‘mass hysteria’ and Liaquat Ali Khan making representations to the Viceroy
about what was happening especially in the Gurgaon district, (which the Vice¬
roy, with the Governor, visited on i June) and on the need for a prompt warn¬
ing to the rulers of certain Sikh States not to allow alleged participation by their
troops or civilians to continue [Nos. n, 12 and 16 and see also No. 5 and for
later comment Nos. 72, 179, 232 and 234, alsop. xx-xxi below] . With regard to
Bengal, the other Province likely to be partitioned, the nature of its govern¬
ment after the Announcement was the object of pressing enquiry from the
Viceroy to the Governor who felt that a coalition Ministry was the ‘obviously
ideal arrangement to manage Partition’ and indicated that he would not wish
to go into Section 93 [Governor’s rule], unless forced to do so in the interests of
law and order [Nos. 5, item 3, 10, 18 and 33].

The meeting of the Viceroy with the Indian leaders opened at 10 am on
2 June and lasted for two hours. At the outset the Viceroy remarked that he could
remember ‘no meeting at which decisions had been taken which would have
such a profound influence on world history’. He then gave an account of the
situation that existed as a result of his failure to obtain agreement on the Cabinet
Mission Plan which he still thought of as representing ‘the best solution’ and his
gradual recognition of a convergence of opinion on a partition, even though
partition was contrary to Congress principles and the League would not agree to
its application to Provinces [No. 23] . He had, he said, made clear ‘to His Majesty’s
Government the impossibility of fully accepting the principles of one side and
not of the other’. The Viceroy then dwelt upon particular problems consequent
upon an application of the principle of partition to individual provinces as well
as to the country as a whole — notably the position of the Sikhs (he did not think
‘that any single question’ had been discussed at such great length in London as
this) and the future of Calcutta. There was also the new and critically important
point of ‘Immediate Transfer of Power’ to meet Indian wishes. This last, the
Viceroy explained, was to be made possible under the Plan by an extension of
Dominion Status to the successor authorities that emerged, the Prime Minister
having ruled that in the event of its acceptability top priority was to be accorded
to the drafting of the necessary legislation and the leader of the Opposition,
Mr Churchill, having given an assurance that the Opposition would facilitate its
passage. It was understood on all sides that the new Indian government, or
governments, would be completely free to withdraw from the Commonwealth
whenever they wished.

Copies of the Plan were handed round to the Indian leaders, the Viceroy
asking that they should take them away for discussion with their respective
Working Committees, letting him know of their reactions by midnight. He did
not ask for specific agreement to the terms of the Plan but for assurances that
leaders and parties would ‘do their best to have it [the Plan] worked out
peacefully’.

Xll

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

In the discussion that followed Nehru sought elucidation of the difference
between agreement and acceptance while Jinnah explained that the constitu¬
tional procedures of the League precluded his entering into any immediate
commitment on its behalf, but adding in response to the Viceroy’s representa¬
tions, that while he felt unable to report the views of the League’s Working
Committee in writing he would make a verbal report to the Viceroy [Nos. 23,
27 for report to S/S, and 91, paras. 12-13].

Immediately after the meeting the Viceroy saw Gandhi who was observing a
day of silence. Gandhi handed the Viceroy a note written on the back of five
separate old envelopes; reproduced as the Centrepiece to this volume.
The Viceroy deemed what passed between them reassuring [Nos. 24, 27 and
91, paras. 14-15]. With Lord Ismay, he also saw Jinnah for an hour that evening
[Nos. 38 and 91, paras. 18-19: for brief for talk see No. 3].

The reactions of the Congress, the League and the Sikhs were conveyed
to the Viceroy late on 2 or early on 3 June, those of the Congress Working
Committee being in the form of a letter from the Congress President, J. B.
Kripalani [No. 35] : those of Jinnah being given verbally at the meeting men¬
tioned above and those of the Sikhs in a letter from Baldev Singh [No. 36]. The
Viceroy cabled the substance of these reactions to the Secretary of State, draw¬
ing attention to the key paragraphs in the letters from the Congress (para. 7),
the Sikhs (penultimate para) and repeating Jinnah’s verbal assurances that he
would support the Viceroy personally and ‘do his utmost to get the plan
accepted’, Jinnah’s delight at the Dominion status solution being described as
‘unconcealed’ [No. 3 8]. In the light of the expression of these views the Viceroy
further suggested to the Secretary of State that the formula for use in Parliament
should be that the Plan, including the offer of Dominion status, had been
‘favourably received by all three parties’ [No. 37].

When the meeting with the Indian leaders was resumed at 10 am on 3 June
the Viceroy reported initial reactions to the Plan and said he had been ‘very
happy and much relieved’ at the nature of them. The Indian leaders indicated
that the Viceroy had correctly represented their views [No. 39]. There followed
complaints from the Muslim leaders about the content of Gandhi’s speeches to
which the Congress leaders made rejoinder. The Viceroy then had circulated a
comprehensive paper, prepared by the Viceroy’s staff, entitled ‘The Administra¬
tive Consequences of Partition’, prefaced by a note by the Viceroy that it was
his intention that the Act transferring power to the new Dominions should be
brought into operation not later than 15 August [No. 28]. A very early date
was mentioned, he explained to the Secretary of State, for tactical reasons as he
was anxious to make the parties ‘realize that they must move quickly and that
vital decisions would have to be taken in the very near future’ [No. 53]. He
later recorded that the ‘severe shock that this [i.e. the paper on Administrative

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XIII

Consequences] gave to everyone present would have been amusing if it was not
rather tragic’ [No. 91, paras. 24-25].

Later that day, 3 June, the Viceroy telegraphed the Prime Minister to let him
know that while the three Indian leaders had not agreed to the Plan, ‘they had
virtually accepted it’, it being understood that their acceptance ‘stood subject
to ratification by the All-India Congress Committee and the All-India Muslim
League Council, meetings of both of which are being called with extreme
urgency’ [No. 40]. In the event such ratification was in essence forthcoming in
both instances, the Council of the League at its meeting on 9 June, while unable
to agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab, giving full authority to
Jinnah to accept the fundamental principles of the Plan as a compromise [No.
127; see Nos. 129 and 130 for Nehru and Patel’s critical reactions] while on 15
June the Congress Committee welcomed the decision of the British govern¬
ment on the early transfer of power and though regretting ‘the secession of
some parts of the country from India’ accepted such a possibility ‘in the
circumstances now prevailing’ [No. 205].

Meanwhile, still on 3 June, at 3.30pm the Prime Minister made his statement
in the House of Commons [for text see No. 45]. It was announced over All-
India Radio at the same time, preceded by the Viceroy’s broadcast and followed
by those of Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh [No. 41 : for texts see Nos. 44, 46,
47 and 48]. The Viceroy’s talk, relayed from Delhi and prefaced with an intro¬
duction by the Prime Minister, also went out on the B.B.C. Home and Light
Programmes in Britain that evening [No. 57].

The Prime Minister conveyed the congratulations of the whole Cabinet to
the Viceroy [No. 56; see also No. 75]. But possibly the Viceroy cherished even
more Gandhi’s allusion to ‘ “you and your magic tricks” in getting Congress and
the Muslim League to agree on anything’ [No. 69].

The Viceroy had invited Sardar Patel as Member for Information and
Broadcasting to preside at the Press Conference he was to give on 4 June [No.
50]. The number and range of questions put to the Viceroy at the Conference
may be seen from the considerable, though not complete, records of it that
survive and are reproduced in Nos. 59 and 60, while those parts of the An¬
nouncement which aroused the most interest or were most likely to be the
source of controversy in India may be inferred by a sharper concentration of
questioning upon them. Striking tributes were paid to the Viceroy’s mastery of
his complex subject and his handling of questions in a gathering of some 200
Press men whose reactions were described by Campbell-Johnson as ‘quite the
most enthusiastic I have ever known’ [Nos. 66 and 84].

With the Announcement made, the Plan unfolded, its principal features
explained in broadcasts and its implications elucidated in a Press Conference,
there remained urgent questions of how the settlement the Plan envisaged,

XIV

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

contemplating as its principal features the partitioning of historic provinces and
the transfer of power with consequential division of assets to two dominions,
was to be given effect within a period of six weeks between the end of June and
the target date of 15 August.

With regard to the first, the partitioning of Provinces, the Statement of
3 June declared that it was not the intention of H.M.G. to interrupt the work of
the Constituent Assembly but recognised that any constitution framed by it
could not apply to those parts of the country which were unwilling to accept it
[No. 45]. Accordingly the Statement had laid down a procedure by which the
wishes of the people in those areas might best be ascertained, the issue to be
submitted to them being whether their constitution should be framed in the
existing Constituent Assembly or in a new and separate Constituent Assembly
which would consist of the representatives of those areas which decided not to
participate in the work of the existing Constituent Assembly. ‘When this has
been done’, the Statement continued, ‘it will be possible to determine the
authority or authorities to whom power should be transferred’. The doing of it
was a matter of complexity involving, principally, the deciding of the issue in
four provinces, Sind and three critically poised, namely Bengal, the Punjab and
the North-West Frontier, to which were to be added Baluchistan and the
predominantly Muslim district of Sylhet in the predominantly non-Muslim
Province of Assam. The procedure outlined in the Statement contemplated
that in Bengal and the Punjab the members of the Legislative Assemblies should
sit in two parts according to Muslim and non-Muslim majority Districts for the
immediate purpose of deciding on partition, there being also provision for a
preliminary meeting of all members of the Legislative Assembly (other than
Europeans) to determine which Constituent Assembly the Province as a whole
would join if it were decided by the two parts to remain united. It was empha¬
sised that should a decision be taken in favour of partition Boundary Com¬
missions would be set up to demarcate the final boundaries ‘on the basis of
ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims’
with ‘other factors’ also to be taken into account. To meet ‘the exceptional
position’ of the North-W est Frontier Province it was provided that should the
Punjab decide on partition a referendum would be held there.

In the context of the partition assumed to be impending there were a number
of meetings between the Viceroy, his staff and Indian leaders designed to clarify
the issues and make recommendations on procedures to be adopted and a
programme of action to be pursued. The point of departure was the paper on
The Administrative Consequences of Partition copies of which, as has been noted,
were handed to the Indian leaders at the meeting on 3 June [No. 28]. The paper
came up for consideration in detail at The Viceroy’s Sixteenth Miscellaneous
Meeting on 5 June [No. 73]. One general question was posed which may
conveniently be indicated at the outset. It derived from a conceptual difference

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XV

about the nature of the partition that seemed certain to take place, Nehru
contending that while some parts of India were being given die opportunity to
secede, India as an entity would remain and the Government of India would
accordingly continue, inheriting the status, the treaty and other obligations of
its British predecessor, whereas Jinnah maintained that what would happen
would be not secession but division. The Viceroy noted that on any interpreta¬
tion there would have to be division in respect of the Staff of the Central Civil
departments and duplication of records relating to their work [No. 73]. As
regards the wider implications of the issue the Viceroy the same day (5 June) in
view of its ‘great importance’ sought a ruling from London [No. 7 6], and on
9 June forwarded a letter from Nehru [No. 116] reiterating his [Nehru’s] opinion
and asking if he might see in advance the text of legislation transferring power
on a dominion basis. ‘My own view’, the Viceroy commented to the Secretary
of State, ‘is that we shall meet far greater difficulties from Congress if we oppose
their view than from the League if we follow the Congress suggestion’ [No.

1 1 5]. The Secretary of State, in a memorandum dated 13 June and circulated to
the India and Burma Committee, likewise concluded that ‘on balance, the
advantage would seem to he, so far as concerns the international position, in
adopting the Congress doctrine and accepting Hindustan as the successor of the
former India’ [No. 188]. On 14 June the Viceroy, after a talk with Liaquat Ah
Khan, in the course of which Liaquat indicated that as ‘all he really wanted was
a fair proportionate division of assets and liabilities’ he did not wish ‘to waste
time arguing whether Hindustan should take the title of India or inherit
membership of U.N.O.’ [No. 202; see also No. 153], advised that the Congress
view on these questions of status should be accepted, with concurrent agreement
for division of assets and liabilities between Hindustan and Pakistan on an
equitable basis. ‘I am absolutely certain’, the Viceroy concluded, ‘that a wrong
approach to this issue will cause a complete breakdown in the present settle¬
ment’ [No. 202]. The India and Burma Committee on 17 June invited the
Secretary of State to inform the Viceroy that H.M.G. accepted Nehru’s view
‘that Hindustan will succeed to the position of India as an international entity’,
but assumed there will be ‘a financial adjustment of the assets involved’
[No. 244, Minute 2].

The Viceroy’s Miscellaneous Meeting of 5 June chiefly concerned itself with
the specifying of arrangements to deal with the more important consequences
that would follow from partition. It agreed in the first place upon the setting
up ‘forthwith’ of a Partition Committee/Tribunal (both terms were used)
consisting of four members of the highest status nominated by the party leaders;
in the second upon the need for the selection of an Umpire experienced in
judicial matters from names, again submitted by the party leaders; and in the
third upon the appointment of a Steering Committee of Experts to assume a
large share of detailed responsibility [No. 73]. Action on all these matters

XVI

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

followed in due course. But more immediately a question of the proper source
of authority for action arose.

At a meeting of the Interim Government on 6 June the Viceroy explained to
members the reasons that had prompted him to discuss the administrative
consequences of partition at the meeting with Indian leaders before putting the
paper on the subject to members of the Interim Government. With the target
date for transfer fixed for 15 August, he had felt that, given the near-certainty
that ‘the vote in the Provincial Legislatures would be for Pakistan’ and that
consequently there would soon be two sovereign Governments in existence
with the Congress and the League the only bodies which could in the meantime
be said to represent them, there were sufficient reasons for including their
Presidents in the discussions (neither Jinnah nor Kripalani were members of the
Interim Government) [No. 95]. He considered moreover that, since the time
factor was so pressing, the Partition Committee should be a whole time body
and therefore ‘separate from the Cabinet’. ‘We were dealing’ he said ‘with an
unprecedented problem. We had only 71 days in which to solve it.’ The Cabinet
decided, however, that such a Partition/Separation Committee1 should be set
up only when partition had been legally decided on and the members of the
existing Cabinet, i.e. the Interim Government, had resigned. In the meantime
they would agree to the appointment of a Cabinet Committee, with the
Viceroy as Chairman, to work out the machinery for implementing partition.
They also decided that a panel of umpires should be set up to whom otherwise
unresolved points of difference could be referred.

On 7 June at the next succeeding meeting — the Seventeenth Miscellaneous —
with the Indian leaders the Viceroy reported that the ‘Cabinet’ had shown ‘a
certain air of slight grievance’ — later he wrote of ‘obviously strained feelings’
[No. 162] — at not having been taken into confidence earlier and had further
expressed the view that until a decision on Partition was taken it was necessary
to go circumspectly [No. 100]. The Viceroy said his own wish was to preserve a
balance between meetings with Indian leaders and those of the Cabinet: he
wanted to get policy guidance at the former but the Cabinet provided the legal
authority for setting up government committees and for supplying secretariat.
Jinnah, however, maintained that it was the responsibility not of the Interim
Government but for the Crown and H.M.G. to set up the necessary machinery.
They should ‘with no delay, tackle the business of partition’. The Viceroy
‘could consult anybody that he liked; but it would be the Governor-General
and not the Governor-General-in-Council who would issue the orders’. It was
agreed to obtain a legal opinion on this point — which was done ; but Jinnah
dissented from it [Nos. 102, with enclosure, and 108] — and in the meantime the
Viceroy said he intended to proceed with the appointment of a special (Cabinet)
Committee consisting of two representatives of the Congress and two of the

1 In the event it was termed the ‘Partition Council’.

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XVII

League, all members ol the Interim Government, with the Viceroy as Chairman
with the responsibility of considering the steps to be taken to set up machinery,
including the formation of sub-Committees, for carrying out Partition and
that as soon as but not until a decision on Partition was known a Partition
Council should be established consisting of two ‘top ranking leaders of Congress
and two of the Muslim League’, the Viceroy being Chairman but without —
on this point he had been insistent throughout — having arbitral powers vested in
him [No. ioo ; see also No. ioi for further discussion with the League leaders
and 124 for a parallel talk with Congress leaders]. A narrative account of these
meetings and the tenseness of some of the proceedings will be found in the
Viceroy’s Personal Report of 9 June [No. 162].

The first meeting of the Special (Cabinet), generally referred to as the Parti¬
tion Committee, took place on 12 June with Patel and Rajendra Prasad as
Congress, and Liaquat and Nishtar as League, representatives [No. 152]. The
Committee agreed upon a two-man membership — H. M. Patel and Mohamad
Ali — of the Steering Committee, the terms of reference for which were defined,
the Steering Committee being thereupon given responsibility for the making of
recommendations in respect of terms of reference and membership of Expert
Committees, including that of the Armed Forces Committee, the relationship
of the last to the Partition Council and the Steering Committee to be exactly
similar to that laid down for the other Expert Committees. The recommenda¬
tions of the Steering Committee were circulated to members of the Special
Committee by H. M. Patel on 15 June [No. 210] and considered by the Com¬
mittee on 16 June [No. 217]. A paper by the Commander-in-Chief on the
problems involved in the division of the Forces was also before the Committee
and its adoption recommended. With reference to it, the Viceroy said that the
Commander-in-Chief, who had been ‘gloomy’ about the probable effects of
division on discipline and morale was now, as a result of the lead given by the
party leaders, ‘confident he could produce at the earliest reasonable moment
two Armies each of which would be as efficient as the existing one, provided the
advice of the experts on the question of divison was given due consideration’.
At the suggestion of the Viceroy, the Committee added to its more particular
conclusions the following Decision: ‘The Special Committee directed that the
work of partition should be undertaken in a spirit of friendship and goodwill,
and with the desire to give a fair deal to both sides’ [No. 217].

While these administrative arrangements were being worked out, discussion
proceeded about the Chairmanship of the Arbitral Tribunal, the League sug¬
gesting but Nehru dissenting from the idea that a member of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council be invited to serve [Nos. 101 and 175, item 3].
On 10 June, on representations from the Viceroy, the Secretary of State made
enquiry of the Lord Chancellor [No. 135]. The Lord Chancellor took soundings
and learned that Sir Cyril Radcliffe was prepared, subject to the fulfilment of

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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

certain conditions, to undertake the task Nos. 185 and 224]. The Prime
Minister was reported to have considered the idea 'eminently suitable’. The
Secretary of State telegraphed the Viceroy that 'if in fact you do require a
Chairman for the Arbitral Tribunal from this country I am convinced that you
could not do better than secure Radcliffe’ [No. 224, note 2].

However, consideration was also being given at this time to the membership
of and terms of reference for the Boundary Commissions to be appointed to
determine the line of division in each of the Provinces to be partitioned, the
Viceroy alluding to the possibility of U.N.O. nomination of members [No. 101] ,
Nehru at first feeling doubtful by reason of the delay likely to be involved
[No. 124] and finally coming down against and favouring instead an indepen¬
dent Chairman with two representatives each of the Congress and the League
No. 128]. The alternatives were laid before the Viceroy’s Eighteenth Miscel¬
laneous Meeting on 13 June which decided in favour of the second [No. 175],
and names of members were submitted [Nos. 207, 262 and 317]. On 23 June
Jinnah suggested that, in view of the difficulty in finding a Chairman for the
Boundary Commissions, whoever was appointed Chairman of the Arbitral
Tribunal might also undertake the Chairmanship of the Boundary Com¬
missions [No. 311]. The Viceroy informed Jinnah that Radcliffe had been
suggested for the former, and on 26 June put forward his name to the Partition
Committee as suitable for appointment as Chairman of the Boundary Com¬
missions [No. 354]. This carried Congress as well as League support [No. 369,
para 11] and the Viceroy, stressing the urgency of the situation, much hoped
Radcliffe would see his way to accept [No. 378]. He did so [No. 378, note 3] and
his services were thus secured for the Chairmanship of the Boundary Com¬
mission, while Sir Patrick Spens was appointed Chairman of the Arbitral
Tribunal, membership of which otherwise consisted of one representative each
of India and Pakistan [No. 516]. Draft terms of reference for the Boundary
Commissions reproducing the language used in the Statement of 3 June were
submitted by Nehru on 12 June [Nos. 45, 124 and 158], they were discussed at
the Viceroy’s Miscellaneous Meeting on 13 June [No. 175] and agreement on
them reached on 23 June [No. 311; for text see No. 369, para. 10]. The an¬
nouncement of terms of reference and membership was made on 30 June
[No. 415].

There is substantial documentation on the making of decisions in the three
Provinces the future of which was principally at issue. In each case there were
particular features and problems. In Bengal various possibilities had been can¬
vassed, autonomy or independence of the Province as a whole; partition with
Calcutta as a free city or partition tout simple. The Viceroy, on 1 June, took the
view that the Congress 'were determined to oppose any move towards an
independent but united Bengal’ : the Governor that it was too late (2 June) to
declare Calcutta a free City or a City under Joint Control, a possibility which

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XIX

Jinnah at one time was reported as favouring [No. io] and one that had also
been canvassed by the Premier (and others) in the event of a partition of the
Province [Nos. 18 and 33]. On 17 June the formation of a Coalition or regional
government for the interim period was explored by the Governor with the
Premier and the leader of the opposition K. S. Roy [No. 240] but a sounding of
Jinnah on 18 June on ‘whether he would be prepared to authorise Suhrawardy
to form a regional Ministry’ elicited ‘an absolute negative’ (No. 253; see also
Nos. 291 and 292]. The Governor concluded that there were ‘now only two
courses left — to continue present ministry ... or to go into Section 93 ’ and he
concluded, ‘now that Jinnah has apparently ruled out regional ministries, the
only way in which I can place the two parties on a level for the conduct of
partition negotiations seems to be by going into Section 93’ [No. 268]. On
20 June the Governor reported that members of the Bengal Legislative Assembly,
voting in accordance with prescribed procedure, had decided in favour of
partition with the amalgamation of Sylhet with East Bengal being agreeable to
the latter [Nos. 277, 278 and 369].

On 21 June the Governor, sensing acquiescence on the part of Suhrawardy in
the prospect of government under Section 93, sought the Viceroy’s concurrence
in proclaiming it [No. 289] but on representations from Jinnah action was
deferred [No. 291]. A paper by the Reforms Commissioner on the wider
implications of what was at issue concluded that either the Chief Minister
should reconstitute his Ministry acceptably to minorities or the Governor
should go into Section 93 as an assurance of an impartial caretaker in charge
[No. 306]. On 23 June Jinnah, after ‘hotly contesting’ the right of the Governor
to go into Section 93, was reported as having agreed to the Viceroy’s proposal
that the existing government should remain in office but that a shadow Cabinet
should be formed in West Bengal with a right of veto on all matters affecting
West Bengal [Nos. 311 and 379 and see p. xxiii-xxiv below].

In the case of the Punjab there was, as the Governor pointed out on 6 July,
little similarity to Bengal [No. 540]. There, there had been and was no question
of moving into Section 93, Governor’s rule being already in force and the
Governor having declined to accede to Muslim League requests earlier advanced
by the Nawab of Mamdot, its provincial leader, to be permitted to form a
government on the ground that the accession to office of what would in effect
be one party government, with at best a narrow majority, would provoke
protest and be likely to precipitate violence [see Vol. IX, Nos. 492-493, Vol. X,
Nos. 212, 248 and 335]. There was a report of a willingness on the part of one
Sikh leader, Giani Kartar Singh, to try to come to an agreement with Jinnah
for the inclusion of a Sikh ‘Khalistan’ in Pakistan [No. 22] but this was dis¬
counted altogether by Baldev Singh who in accepting the Statement of 3 June
on behalf of the Sikh leadership stated that Sikhs were unable to contemplate
being forced into a Sovereign state founded on Islamic principles against their

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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

will, acquiesced in the inevitability of partition and expressed concern that the
Boundary Commission should be instructed to ensure that as large as possible a
percentage of the Sikh population should be included in the Eastern Punjab
[No. 36; see also Nos. 38 and 105]. When on 6 June the Governor held meetings
separately with the provincial leaders of the three parties, the Congress, League
and Sikhs, to elicit views on timing and arrangements for a decision on parti¬
tion, and asked them how they would regard a “divisible” coalition govern¬
ment for the province in the short period remaining before partition, he
received no positive response, only indication of preference for a continuation
of Section 93 government from the Congress and Sikh leaders. ‘It will not be
easy’, the Governor noted, ‘to get a Ministry or a Partition Committee going;
but so far the Partition Committee appears to be the easier altemative\ The
Viceroy indicated his own reluctant acquiescence in the continuation of the
Section 93 regime adding that the cooperation of the parties ‘in a Partition
Committee is in any case essential’ [No. 97 with note 4; for the report of a
discussion between Abell and the Governor on the detailed arrangements see
No. 98 and for criticism of them by Mamdot see No. 144, with note 1, and for
Liaquat’s representations to the Viceroy see No. 145]. On 15 June the Governor
reviewed the situation in the Province, remarking that the Statement had had
no discernible effect on communal relations and commenting upon the
atmosphere of fatalism that prevailed — ‘it was ordained from the first that the
communities should massacre and loot one another’ — and noting that ‘the old
administrative machine is rapidly falling to pieces’ while it was difficult to get
the politicians ‘to take the business [of partition] seriously and to undertake the
really arduous work which it involves’. He concluded ‘here in the Punjab
the boundary is vital’ [No. 209]. On 16 June, following upon a meeting with
the Provincial party leaders at which they undertook to advise the Governor
on the composition and formation of Partition, Steering and Interim Com¬
mittees he struck a more sanguine note — ‘I think we shall be able to get things
going’ [No. 219]. On 17 June the three leaders reported their agreed decisions in
respect of these committees [No. 233]. That there would be a boundary was
settled in principle on 23 June when, ‘with large section of Lahore and scores of
villages throughout the Province fire-blacked ruins’, the members of the
Legislative Assembly meeting first in joint and then in separate session decided
in accord with the prescribed procedures that the Province be partitioned
[No. 304].

Meanwhile the law and order situation in the Province was a source of
mounting protest and concern voiced by the party leaders, Nehru being repor¬
ted as having been highly critical of the British administration in a speech to
All India Congress Committee on 15 June [see No. 218 enclosure, and for
Governor’s reaction to Nehru’s allegations see letter ibid], while on 17 June
Liaquat once again conveyed information about the situation in the Gurgaon

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XXI

area speaking of ‘the full-scale war of extermination’ being waged against the
Muslims there [No. 232 with enclosure], the Governor agreeing that while the
troops on the spot or arriving seemed adequate the district was in a very bad
way [No. 299]. On 22 June Nehru, after visiting a refugee camp at Hardwar
with Gandhi, wrote about Amritsar and more especially about Lahore ‘where
fires are raging’ and where at this rate ‘the city . . . will be just a heap of ashes in
a few days’ time. The human aspect ... is appalling to contemplate’ [No. 300].
On 24 June the Viceroy conveyed the substance of conversations he had had
with Jinnah and, separately, with Nehru, to the Governor, Jinnah asking for
utter ruthlessness in suppressing disorder in Lahore and Amritsar and Nehru
asking for a fresh approach with martial law declared forthwith in the two cities.
‘I entirely agree with Indian leaders’, commented the Viceroy to the Governor,
‘that something must be done’ and, subject to the Governor’s comments, he
proposed to raise the matter at the Cabinet [No. 320]. The Governor, supported
by the military commanders, did not think there was a case for introduction of
martial law, and contended that the real remedy was ‘active intervention' by
political leaders to control ‘their own goonda supporters’ [No. 327; see also No.
305 and for Ismay’s observations see No. 328]. The situation — ‘if we cannot
stop this arson’ was the Viceroy’s comment on it, ‘both cities will soon be burnt
to the ground’ [No. 369, para. 3] — and possible remedies were considered at a
meeting of the Indian Cabinet on 25 June at which the Viceroy, so he reported
two days later, was ‘violently attacked by leaders of both parties’ (ibid., para. 5)
but at which he finally obtained agreement that the Governor be invited to
form a Security Committee of the local leaders of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs
[No. 338; see also for sequel Nos. 339, 343, 357, 369 for the summary in the
Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 10, and 370]. The proposal regarding the forma¬
tion of a Security Committee was conveyed to the Governor immediatelv
[No. 343] and was followed by the Viceroy’s confirmation that he had pressed the
party leaders ‘to use their own influence to stop the trouble in Lahore’ [ibid.,
note 2 and No. 384], a decision that this would be done being recorded in the
Cabinet Minutes [No. 338]. On 6 July, despite action taken including formation
of a Security Committee [No. 357], the Governor reported the situation here
‘is generally explosive . . . Explosion may be touched off at any time and I
expect trouble when Boundary Commission reports’. This was one among
other reasons why he held to his view that the Punjab, much as he would
himself welcome a transfer of responsibility for law and order to Ministers,
could not follow the Bengal model of a Ministry with a shadow team to safe¬
guard minority interests [No. 540].

The Assembly vote in Sind, taken on 26 June, was, as anticipated, in favour
of the Province joining the new Constituent Assembly, i.e. in favour of parti¬
tion of India [No. 369, para 9]. In the North West Frontier the Statement of
3 June laid down that the question which of the two new dominions its people

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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

wished to join should be determined in a referendum. The issue, however, was
clouded by mounting criticism of the Governor by the Congress Ministry,
taken up by and raised to an All-India level by the Congress leadership, Nehru
advising the Viceroy on 4 June that ‘there has been progressive deterioration in
the relations between the Provincial Government and the Governor and it is
hardly possible to carry on the administration with this continuous conflict
going on’ [No. 61]. On 5 June the Premier, Dr Khan Sahib, discussed with the
Viceroy the question whether an independent Pathanistan should be a third
choice to joining India or Pakistan in the contemplated referendum — a possi¬
bility which the Viceroy ruled out; on which the Governor commented ‘reality
of case is that Frontier could never stand alone’ ; and which Jinnah summarily
dismissed [Nos. 81, 83 and 321; see also No. 228 for Kripalani’s backing for it
and the Viceroy’s reply No. 237]. At the same time Dr Khan Sahib maintained
that it was ‘absolutely necessary’ that Sir Olaf Caroe be replaced before the
referendum took place [No. 81]. On 6 June the Viceroy wrote to the Governor
saying that he felt the time had come when ‘I must . . . replace you as Governor
of the N.W.F.P.’ [No. 96 and for the Governor’s reply see No. 142; for
Liaquat’s reactions No. 143, and the Secretary of State’s Minutes to Prime
Minister on the appointment of a successor Nos. 148 and 223 ; see also Nos
1 8 1, 21 1, 227 and 237]. Gandhi advanced suggestions whereby, given the
cooperation of Jinnah, a referendum in the N.W.F.P. and ‘with it the risk of
bloodshed’ might be removed [No. 156; see also Nos. 99, 139, 176-177 and
239]. They did not bear fruit though Gandhi and Jinnah met the Viceroy to
consider them [Nos. 230 and 239]. On 28/29 June Gandhi conveyed to the
Viceroy news of the Redshirts’ intention to abstain from the referendum since
there was to be no option for a free Pathanistan [No. 396 and for Viceroy’s
reply see No. 422]. The Provincial Ministry set out their position in a statement
sent to the incoming Governor, Lieutenant-General Sir R. Lockhart, on 26 June
to whom they gave assurances of their desire that the referendum should
be peacefully conducted [No. 475]. The Viceroy’s misgivings about the likely
consequences of ‘persuasion’ to abstain were expressed to Gandhi on 4 July
[No. 496, for Gandhi’s reply see No. 515 and for the immediate sequel see Nos.
518, 530, 541]. The dates finally agreed upon for the holding of the referendum
were 6-17 July and its outcome, therefore, falls outside the period covered in
this volume.

When the Special/Partition Committee met on 26 June, the Viceroy noted
that Bengal, the Punjab and Sind, having all voted in favour of the partition of
India, the time had come when, in accordance with earlier decision [No. 100],
the Committee should be replaced by the Partition Council (the membership of
which was the same as that of the Committee with one notable exception,
namely that Jinnah came in, in place of Nish tar), the first meeting of which was
duly held the following day. The proceedings at the meetings of Committee

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XX111

[No. 354] and Council [No. 367] reflected renewed concern with the time table,
now that the question of partition was formally resolved. At the first meeting,
i.e. the last of the Committee, arrangements, including the supply of office
equipment, for the setting up of a new capital for Pakistan at Karachi, were
considered, not without acrimony [on this see also Liaquat’s earlier letter of
17 June to the Viceroy asking that the military authorities be requested to under¬
take provision of accommodation and furniture and the transportation of
stores to Karachi No. 231], it being decided that approved non-controversial
demands should receive top priority and that controversial items should come
before the Council on 27 June; a note by the Commander-in-Chief on the
retention of British officers in India in limited number and with a restricted role
in the service of the Dominion governments was agreed in principle; the actual
process of division of the armed forces and the administrative problems need¬
ing to be resolved in connection with it were reviewed, with the Viceroy
undertaking to prepare a paper for consideration by the Partition Council on
30 June; and the Viceroy also reported that, following discussions between
Field Marshal Montgomery and Pandit Nehru and Mr Jinnah, H.M.G. had
decided [see No. 381] that the withdrawal of British units should commence on
15 August and be completed by February 1948 at latest. (This was a question
which, at the request of the India and Burma Committee, had been considered
at the London end by the Chiefs of Staff whose observations rather different in
tenor were circulated on 26 June [No. 362].) The Viceroy’s note on the partition
of the Armed Forces [No. 372] was before the Partition Council on 30 June
where its recommendations on the procedures to be followed received general
approval [No. 416] the Viceroy later paying tribute to Sir C. Trivedi’s contri¬
bution to ‘one of the most important successes we have had to date, and
Auchinleck is delighted beyond measure’ [No. 506, para 21]. One of the most
important conclusions was for the setting up of a Joint Defence Council con¬
sisting of the Governor, or Governors, General, the two Defence Members and
the C.-in-C. India.

The future of the Interim Government was much at issue at the meetings of
Partition Committee and Partition Council on 26-27 June, at the first of which
the Viceroy noted that the reconstitution of the Bengal government was
inter-related with that of the Central government and said he was of the view
‘that the best way of handling the situation in Bengal was to appoint Congress
ministers for West Bengal, and to give them the right to veto any action . . .
likely to be harmful to the interests of West Bengal’ and that since ‘the position
at the Centre was no different from that in Bengal ... an identical course of
action should be pursued’ [No. 354]. In respect of Bengal, agreement was
reached at the Council’s Meeting the following day on instructions which were
sent to the Governor on 29 June [Nos. 367, 409, 410 for instructions and foot¬
note for action taken], but the analogy with die Centre was challenged, jinnah,

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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

noting, first, that it was only a matter of 40 odd days till transfer, appealed ‘to
the Congress to rise to the occasion and not put forward a proposal which may
be humiliating to either side’ [No. 367] but combining that appeal with a
restatement of his opinion that ‘legally and constitutionally the proposal was
wrong and untenable’. The Congress, who had accepted the Bengal arrange¬
ment only, according to the Viceroy, ‘on the understanding that I was going to
impose an identical set of conditions upon the League in the Interim Govern¬
ment at Delhi’, were quite uncompromising, threatening resignation unless the
Interim Government were reconstituted on the same lines [Viceroy’s Report
No. 506, paras 9 and 10; see also Nos. 73 and 80 for an early (5 June) indication
of Nehru’s view that it would be Very difficult to carry on as at present’ despite
the Viceroy’s feeling that with the shortening of the period before transfer the
seriousness of the position had diminished]. On 29 JuneJinnah followed up his
objection with a note setting out the basis of it, which the Viceroy forwarded to
the Secretary of State with a covering telegram saying he was sure he should go
ahead with reconstruction of the government provided the means contemplated
were not unconstitutional [Nos. 412 and 413 ; see also No. 433 for Secretary of
State’s and India Committee’s reactions]. On 30 June the Viceroy again alluded
to the possibility of Nehru’s resignation if he did not do so [No. 437; for an
earlier reference see No. 379], but the India and Burma Committee meeting on
the same day felt that while the Viceroy’s discretion should not be fettered he
should know Ministers felt there was ‘much force in the contentions in Mr Jinnah’s
note’ [No. 421]. The Prime Minister conveyed these reservations [No. 447]
while the Viceroy reported hopes of modifying Nehru’s views [No. 448].
‘Situation here incredibly explosive and more dangerous than any I have seen
to date’ the Viceroy cabled the Prime Minister on 2 July : ‘Congress leaders are
firmly united in their complete refusal to be dictated to by Jinnah any longer’
[No. 458]. But the Secretary of State’s reservations had ‘come as a Godsend’
since he (the Viceroy) could now point out that he had inadequate legal cover
for action until the Independence Bill was enacted. He went on to suggest the
terms of an appropriate telegram on this point to be sent him by the Prime
Minister. The possibility was considered by the India and Burma Committee on
the same day [No. 465] and in substance approved. The Prime Minister’s
telegram followed [No. 468]. Also on 3 July the Viceroy learned through
Krishna Menon that there was now a chance that the Congress would accept
continuation of the Interim Government for a further period [No. 478] and on
4 July at a meeting of the Cabinet, he asked his colleagues, the question of
partition being legally decided, to tender their resignations but coupled this
request with a statement of his intention to invite them to carry on with their
present portfolios until the Indian Independence Bill was passed, when he
would reconstitute his government [No. 493]. Legal opinion on the constitu¬
tional validity of reconstruction on the lines contemplated is set out in No. 454.

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XXV

In his telegram of 3 July [No. 468] the Prime Minister had stated that he was
taking every possible step ‘to ensure speeding up’ of the Bill through Parlia¬
ment, with 20 July as a target date for its enactment. Drafting of and consulta¬
tion on its provisions were a major preoccupation of the period and, as may be
seen from the Chapter in the Summary of Contents devoted to the Bill, the
documentation, which aims at being sufficiently comprehensive to enable the
reader to identify all the more important considerations which went to the
shaping of it, is substantial. The basic reason for this was evidently the range of
consultation with other departments, notably the Dominions Office and the
Ministery of Defence in Whitehall [e.g. Nos. 122, 13 1, 134, 186], and above all
with the Viceroy and his advisers in Delhi where the text of the Bill was exa¬
mined and commented upon clause by clause, as deemed necessary or desirable,
in seeking to give final legislative form to the unravelling of an historic and
complex relationship. A major point of difference to arise between Whitehall
and New Delhi concerned the question whether the Independence Act should
equip the new Dominions with as complete a transitional constitution as
possible. The Viceroy, prompted by V. P. Menon’s representations of Congress
opinion on the matter, urged strongly (and in the event successfully) that this
should be done. Prominent among his reasons was the hope that, if the interim
constitution provided by the Independence Act worked well, then this would
give Dominion Status a better chance of lasting [Nos. 255, 280, 286, 290, 293,
324, 347, 348; see also No. 419 for a subsequent opinion from the Attorney-
General (Shawcross) broadly in agreement with the Viceroy’s view].

On 31 May, on his return from London, the Viceroy had informed all
Governors that ‘the parliamentary draftsmen are already busy on the Bill’
[No. 15]. On 13 June a draft of the Bill [No. 191] was circulated to the India
and Burma Committee by the Secretary of State who explained that the aim
was to introduce the Bill not later than 7 July. He also summarised its more
important provisions [No. 190]. Copies were sent to the Viceroy with the
assurance that the India and Burma Committee would take no decisions until
his views were known [Nos. 189 and 214]. On 17 June the India and Burma
Committee gave first consideration to the Bill and approved the Prime Minis¬
ter’s suggestion that what had hitherto been entitled the ‘Indian Dominions
Bill’ should be called the ‘Indian Independence Bill’ [No. 244].

In a covering note sent with the Bill from the India Office to the Viceroy’s
Private Secretary attention was drawn to two points, one whether the Indian
political leaders should be consulted on the terms of the Bill and the other, the
extreme secrecy of the clause relating to the Andaman Islands [No. 189].

With regard to consultation Nehru had written to the Viceroy on 7 June
indicating his hope, and expectation, that the fullest opportunities would be
given to the Indian leaders to see and comment upon drafts of legislation on
matters so closely concerning the future of India [No. 116]. The Viceroy asked

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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

to be allowed to give a ‘categorical assurance’ that this would be so and on
receiving a temporising reply from the Secretary of State telegraphed ‘I
consider it absolutely essential that the Indian leaders should be shown the draft’
[N os. 1 15, 138 and 172]. In a Memorandum to the India and Burma Com¬
mittee die Secretary of State advised against showing the text of the Bill but in
favour of oral exposition to the Indian leaders [No. 193]. The India and Burma
Committee in turn decided that there should be consultation with the Opposi¬
tion before reaching any conclusion. In conveying the Committee’s view to the
Viceroy the Secretary of State noted that it would be contrary to Parliamentary
practice to show the text of a Bill to other than members of Parliament before
publication and essential to get Opposition concurrence for such a departure,
and favoured ‘at most’ perusal in the Viceroy’s presence [No. 257]. Nehru
remained firm in his expressions of a wish to be able to study the text of the
Bill in reasonable time, in consultation with colleagues and without undue
restrictions [Nos. 356, 397, 408, 41 1 and 435]. On 30 June the India and Burma
Committee, subject to Opposition concurrence, which was later forthcoming,
concluded that it would not be possible to refuse to comply with the wishes of
the Indian leaders and that it should reasonably be assumed that Parliament
would recognise the existence of special circumstances justifying a departure
from convention [Nos. 421 and 438]. The upshot was that after a certain
amount of correspondence as to who should study the text — Gandhi was
invited at Nehru’s suggestion — and where [Nos. 408, 423, 424, 425, 436 and
439] the Congress and League leaders on 1 July [No. 452] foregathered to do so
in adjoining rooms in the Viceroy’s House ‘for nearly three days (and nights !)’
[No. 506, para. 4] with their comments being forwarded by the Viceroy to the
Secretary of State on 3 July [Nos. 479, 480, 484 and 485; see also Nos. 441,
452, 460 and 463]. The draft Bill itself, as shown to Indian leaders, together with
the changes made to it in the light of their comments, may be studied in
Document No. 428.

The question of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands may be briefly stated. At a
meeting of the India and Burma Committee on 28 May 1947 the Minister of
Defence said the islands were of vital importance in the scheme of Common¬
wealth Defence and the Committee considered nothing should be done to
suggest H.M.G. accepted the view that they could be regarded as an organic
part of British India [Vol. X, No. 553]. It was noted on 10 June in the India
Office that a specific provision would be needed in the Bill if the islands were
not to pass under Indian sovereignty, together with observations on likely
Indian reactions if one were included [No. 132]. The Secretary of State sub¬
mitted the question to the India and Burma Committee [No. 165] and the
Viceroy commented that ‘any attempt by His Majesty’s Government to claim
the Andaman Islands as colonies, to be treated in the same way as Aden, will
cause an absolute flare-up throughout the length and breadth of India’ [No. 162,

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XXV11

para. 25]. Despite the representations of the Chiefs of Staff who pressed
strongly for the islands to be retained by Britain for strategic reasons [No. 221]
and the Minister of Defence, the India and Burma Committee concluded that
in the hght of the Viceroy’s opinion it would not be possible to pursue the
suggestion of separating the islands from India [No. 244; for League objection
to placing the islands under Indian as against Pakistani jurisdiction see Nos. 460
and 536].

The Princely States lay outside the scope of the 3 June Statement though
their future was bound to be greatly affected by the British withdrawal,
the transfer of power to Indian successor states and the ending of paramountcy.
On the day, 3 June, the Plan was made public, the Viceroy met with
members of the States Negotiating Committee and underlined some of its con¬
sequences, chief among them being firstly that it was improbable that the two
new dominions would have ‘such loose Centres as that at present envisaged by
the existing Constituent Assembly’ and secondly that the two new dominions
would be ‘voluntarily accepted into the Commonwealth’ which he believed
would be welcome to the States in view of their past associations and loyalties.
In reply to questioning the Viceroy said his instructions were that paramountcy
should lapse on transfer and it was his belief that its impending lapse made
negotiations possible by the States ‘on a basis of complete freedom, even at the
present time’ [No. 43]. On the same day the Nawab of Bhopal resigned as
Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes [No. 64] reputedly on the ground that
the Chamber had no further official authority [No. 68]. Nehru accepted that
this was so but maintained that some machinery had to continue to deal with
States’ problems during the transition period if complete administrative chaos
were to be avoided [Nos. 68 and 73].

Briefs were prepared by the Political Department on machinery for deahng
with the questions of common concern between the States and the successor
governments and submitted for consideration at the Viceroy’s ‘Miscellaneous’
Meeting with Indian leaders on 13 June [Nos. 146 and 175]. At its opening
Nehru remarked that this was the first time members of the Interim Govern¬
ment had been invited to discussions concerning the States. There were sharp
exchanges of view on the role of the Crown Representative and the Political
Department Nehru contending, and Sir Conrad Corfield, the Political Adviser,
disputing, that with the impending lapse of paramountcy all other matters dealt
with by them were Government of India matters and would continue. There
were also differences of opinion on whether any State could claim indepen¬
dence, Nehru maintaining this was precluded, Jinnah with Corfield, that it was
not. Agreement was reached upon the advantages firstly of the Government of
India setting up a new ‘States Department’ to deal with matters of common
concern and secondly on a ‘Standstill Formula’, information on both being sent
to Residents on 14 June [Nos. 197 and 198; see also Nos. 196 and 287].

XXV111

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

On 12 June the Nizam of Hyderabad had announced his intention not to send
representatives to either Constituent Assembly, and stated that on the departure
of the Paramount Power, he would in law become Sovereign with any rela¬
tionship to the successor states to be determined later [No. 163]. Sir Walter
Monckton, acting for the Nizam, expressed himself as very troubled about
how ‘shamefully’ H.M.G. were treating old friends and allies, something of
which the British people should know, and indicated that, while he had made
it plain to the Nizam that H.M.G. would not consider Hyderabad entering the
Commonwealth as a dominion, he asked for modification of the Viceroy’s
statement to the effect that there could be ‘no negotiation between H.M.G. and
the States’ [No. 199]. He discussed with Ismay the possibility of proceeding by
way of a Parliamentary question and answer, drafts of both being sent to the
Secretary of State [No. 261 ; see also No. 296]. On 17 June Jinnah reaffirmed his
view on States’ sovereignty [No. 225] and in face of Congress criticism the
Maharaja of Travancore decided upon a declaration of independence on the
lapse of paramountcy [No. 226, and see also No. 295]. On 19 June Nehru set out
Congress views in a letter to Lord Ismay so that ‘there should be clarity about
this matter’. It was, he wrote, of the highest importance that the States should
‘fit properly into the picture of India’ ; it was quite inconceivable for a State to
become independent in the legal sense; it was bad enough for India to be
partitioned without being ‘Balkanised’ [No. 264]. H.M.G.’s views on the lapse
of paramountcy were questioned on the grounds of excess rigidity on the
Congress side as may be seen in an exchange of letters between Rajagopalachari
and Cripps [Nos. 107 and 303]. On 20 June the Viceroy forwarded a letter from
the Nawab of Bhopal for the Prime Minister with the observation that while
Congress would never have agreed to the Plan if there had been more than two
dominions ‘some of the States feel very unhappy, particularly . . . Hyderabad
and Bhopal’ [No. 273]. A memorandum on the constitution of the proposed
States Department was sent to Nehru on 21 June [No. 288] and on 25 June the
Indian Cabinet decided that it should be established [No. 338]. On 26 Tune the
India and Burma Committee decided in respect of the proposed parliamentary
question and answer that no new statement should be made on the ground that
if H.M.G. admitted at this stage that they were prepared to maintain separate
relations with States they would be charged with disintegrating India [No. 360;
see also No. 326]. The Viceroy visited Kashmir 18-23 June, with accounts of
his conversations being given in a note of 22 June [No. 294], a record of an
interview with Nehru [No. 319] and in the Viceroy’s Personal Report of
27 June [No. 369, para 30]. Arrangements for a visit by Gandhi to Kashmir
were being made [Nos. 369, para 31, 386 and 387].

Matters arising from the forthcoming transfer of power were the subject of
communication with Tibet and Bhutan [No. 245] while Afghan expressions of
interest in the future of the North-West Frontier Province and its people elicited

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XXIX

uncompromising rejoinder [Nos. 140, 212, 272, 309, 377, 395, 431 and 483].

An issue of considerable constitutional moment, latent for some time, was
brought to the point of decision by the testing of an assumption implicit in the
provisions of the Bill. It related to the office of Governor-General in the two
new dominions. On 17 May Nehru had conveyed Congress wishes that Mount-
batten should continue as Governor-General of India and he hoped for an
interim period of both dominions. The Viceroy had indicated acceptance of the
invitation in respect of India but pointed out how difficult it would be for him
to remain on as Governor-General of one Dominion only. The Viceroy soun¬
ded outjinnah with Liaquat Ali Khan. Jinnah was opposed to the suggestion of
a common Governor-General and thought it would be better to have two
Governors-General with Mountbatten as a supreme arbitrator responsible for
the division of assets between the two Dominions. Mountbatten indicated
objections and said that he could not consider taking such a post, but asked
Jinnah to send him a letter giving a full description of his suggestion of a
supreme arbitrator. No such letter was ever written [No. 521 for summary;
see also Vol. X, Nos. 471 and 473]. On 18 June the Secretary of State in com¬
menting upon the text of the draft Bill suggested that the Viceroy should
consult appropriate representatives of India and Pakistan enquiring whether or
not they wished Mountbatten to serve as Governor-General of each of the new
dominions after 15 August [No. 256]. On 23 June the Reforms Commissioner,
V. P. Menon, pointed out that it was apparent from the relevant provision of
the Draft Bill that the India Office was assuming that the Viceroy would be
invited by Congress and League to become Governor-General of each of the
new dominions when power was transferred and advised that the correctness of
the assumption ought to be tested as far as Jinnah was concerned as a matter of
urgency [No. 308]. On the same day the Viceroy made enquiry of Jinnah of his
wishes both in respect of the first Governor-General of Pakistan and of Gover¬
nors of the Pakistan Provinces [No. 3 11]. Jinnah deferred an answer both then
and again, to the Viceroy’s astonishment, on 2 July [No. 457]. Eventually, on
the evening of 2 July, Jinnah told the Viceroy that while he wished to have
British Governors in every Province except Sind and had already agreed to the
heads of the Pakistan Defence Services being British he wished, partly by way of
counter-balance, to be himself first Governor-General of Pakistan [Nos. 470
and 506, paras. 23-25].

The advantages and disadvantages of the Viceroy staying on as Governor-
General of India alone and of other possible courses of action were set out at a
Staff Meeting on 2 July [No. 470]. The following day after spending four hours
trying to make Jinnah ‘realise the advantages that Pakistan would gain from
having the same Governor-General as India for the initial period, until partition
is complete’, the Viceroy cabled the Prime Minister to let him have fore¬
warning of ‘the appalling problem’ facing him of whether to accept Nehru’s

XXX

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

offer to stay on as Governor-General of India or 'whether to pull out on August
15th’ [No. 483; see also following telegram to Prime Minister No. 508]. The
Viceroy decided that Ismay should go to London taking with him a paper
setting out the history of the Governor-Generalship question as background
No. 521] and a second paper setting out the reasons for and against Mount-
batten’s staying on as Governor-General of India [No. 522]. Lady Mountbatten
contributed a further appraisal [No. 524; see also Nos. 545, 551, 557, 558, 561].
The Secretary of State composed a minute to which was attached a note from
the India Office on the Situation if there are Two Governors-General from 15th
August, for the Prime Minister [No. 562; see also No. 563 for a critique of the
India Office note by the P.M.’s P.S.] and the issue was considered by the India
and Burma Committee on 7 July, the Prime Minister remarking that it was no
easy matter for H.M.G. to decide what advice to give Lord Mountbatten but
that for his part he felt ‘there were decisive arguments in favour of pressing him
to accept the invitation of the Congress leaders to become Governor-General of
India’. Members of the Committee concurred and further agreed that a state¬
ment be made by the Prime Minister on the Second Reading of the Indian
Independence Bill and the Opposition consulted [No. 564].

The question that arose on the filling of the offices of Governor-General
derived its importance from the Commonwealth foundation of the 3 June
Statement. That had implications outside as well as within India. At the
constitutional apex there was the Prime Minister’s advice to the King that as
from the date of the transfer of power, when inter alia the Paramountcy of the
Crown over the Indian Princes would cease, the Royal Title should be varied
through provision of the Indian Independence Act by the omission of the
words ‘Emperor of India’, a change to which the King gave assent and which
under the Statute of Westminster further required the concurrence, which was
forthcoming, of dominion governments and parliaments [Nos. 164, 184, 203
and 322 with note 3]. At the first meeting of a newly appointed Cabinet
Committee on Commonwealth Relations held on 2 June there was approval of
the idea of the appointment of a Secretary of State charged with responsibility
for Commonwealth Relations which would include not only relations with the
existing dominions but also countries such as Ceylon, Burma and India if they
desired to retain a link with the Commonwealth [No. 31]. On 9 June at the
second meeting of the Committee, the Prime Minister suggested there should
be a review at Ministerial level of the status and inter-relationship of different
parts of the British Commonwealth with reference to the possibility that India
as a republic might desire membership [No. 118]. On 12 June the Prime
Minister enquired of dominion Prime Ministers whether they would be
agreeable to a change in the title of the Dominions Office to Commonwealth
Relations (or Affairs) Office which would have the advantage of making easier
the conduct of relations with India and possibly other Asian members [No.

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XXXI

1 66]. The proposal was ‘warmly welcomed’ by Dominion Governments as
well as being thought acceptable to successor Indian Governments [Nos. 443
and 451]. Dominion governments were kept informed of developments and
evinced a warmly welcoming interest in the 3 June Anno uncement with its
prospect of India’s Commonwealth membership [Nos. 62 , 63 with note, 87 and
89].

A further proposition was later laid before them. On learning that the Bill
was to be entitled ‘The Indian Independence Bill’ the Leader of the Opposition,
Mr Churchill, indicated ‘much concern’. The correct title, he thought, was
The Indian Dominions Bill’ [No. 445]. The India and Burma Committee
agreed that despite likely Opposition criticism no change should be made but
thought it would be very helpful if some expression of support could be ob¬
tained from the Dominion Prime Ministers [No. 465]. The Prime Minister
had enquiries made of his Dominion colleagues [No. 481] but with Mackenzie
King mindful of the diplomatic exertions required ‘to coax’ General Hertzog
out of the use of the word ‘independent’ in 1926 [No. 488] ; the Labour Prime
Ministers of Australia and New Zealand not happy in the first instance about the
use of the word and in the second about the opening it might give to the
Opposition [Nos. 492 and 494] and General Smuts finding the use in a South
African setting ‘regrettable and embarrassing’ [No. 531] there was nothing to
be done, despite assurances of dominion goodwill, but to withdraw as gracefully
as might be [Nos. 512 and 555].

The Bill was published on 4 July and the following day the Reforms Com¬
missioner held a Press Conference with Sardar Patel in the chair [No. 542]. It
was reported that first reactions in India were ‘extremely favourable’, the
Statesman commenting ‘there is that master stroke, the title: the Indian Inde¬
pendence Act, 1947’ [Nos. 542 and 543].

By far the greater part of the hitherto unpublished documents reproduced in
this volume, are drawn from the official archives of the India Office in the
custody of the India Office Records or from the Mountbatten Papers.

The documents reproduced from the India Office Records are from the
following series of which the three most important are asterisked :

Economic Department Files (including Communications and
Overseas Department)

Financial Department Collections
Information Department Files
Private Office Papers

Political Department Miscellaneous (including Governors’ Re¬
ports)

Political Department Files
Political Department Collections
Political Department Transfer of Power Papers

L/E/8

L/F/y

L/I/i

*L/PO
L/P Sc] Is

L/P&J/y
L/P &J/8
*L/P &J/10

XXX11

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

L/P &S/12 External Department Collections
L/P&S/13 Political ‘Internal’ Department Collections
L/S &G/ 7 Services and General Department Collections
L/WS/i War Staff Files
R/i Crown Representative’s Records

*R/3/i Papers of the Office of the Private Secretary to the Viceroy2
Every document in these series is referred to in the text by the appropriate
series notation followed by the number assigned to the particular file, collection,
or volume in which the document is filed or bound. Thus the notation L/P &J/
10/40 refers to the fortieth file in the series called Political Department Transfer
of Power Papers. Each document in a file, collection, or volume is identified
by a folio reference.

The Editors are indebted to the Trustees of the Broadlands Archives Settle¬
ment for the loan of their microfilms of those official and demi-official Indian
Papers of the Earl Mountbatten of Burma which are in their custody and for
permission to make copies of documents from those microfilms. Documents
from this source are cited in the present Volume as the ‘Mountbatten Papers’.

Some documents, not in any of these archives, have been obtained from
elsewhere, notably the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister’s Office.3 The
Editors have also consulted those papers of Sir Stafford Cripps which are now
in the keeping of the Public Record Office, and those of Sir John Tyson,
I.C.S., in the India Office Records, and one or two documents from these
sources have been included.

The most important categories of telegraphic communications between the
Secretary of State and the Viceroy were classified in the following ways. One
category of telegrams from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State carried the
letter ‘S’, or ‘S.C.’ if the Viceroy was at Simla or in Camp i.e. on tour. During
the Viceroy’s visit to Kashmir telegrams sent from there carried the suffix ‘K’
while those sent from Delhi by the Viceroy’s staff continued to carry the suffix
‘S’. Another category consisted of ‘U’ telegrams, which were reserved for the
most secret and personal matters, the letter ‘U’ indicating the nature of the
telegram, irrespective of whether it did, or did not, carry a ‘Secret’ or ‘Private’
prefix. ‘U’ telegrams could be enciphered or deciphered only in the Private
Offices of the Secretary of State or the Viceroy. Some ‘S’ or ‘S.C.’ telegrams
were marked ‘Superintendent Series’ which indicated to Superintendents of
Telegraph branches that especial care should be taken to safeguard their security.
Certain changes in the channels of communication between the Viceroy and the
Secretary of State, made at the beginning of Lord Wavell’s Viceroyalty, may
be studied in the Appendix to Volume IV, and a small alteration in these ar-

2 This series includes three files (R/3/1/176-8) from the Office of the Secretary to the Governor of the
Punjab.

3 A file (R/30/1/11) containing copies of these documents can be consulted in the India Office Records.

INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME XI

XXX111

rangements — made with regard to the likely wishes of members of an. Interim
Government — is recorded in the Appendix to Volume VIII.

It may also be helpful to mention that of the Papers and Minutes of the India
and Burma Committee of the Cabinet those relating solely to Burma are
excluded as treating of matters outside the scope of this Series.

In conclusion the Editors desire to acknowledge once again the friendly
assistance and advice they have received from the officials at the India Office
Library and Records, among whom they would like to mention the Director,
Mr B. C. Bloomfield, and the Deputy Archivist, Mr Martin I. Moir.

N. MANSERGH
PENDEREL MOON

A.D.C.

A.F.P.F.L.

A.F.R.C.

A.G.

A.G.G.

A.H.Q.

A.I.C.C.

A.I.S.P.C.

A.O.A.

A.O.C.-in-C.

A.P.S.V.

A.R.D.Tp

A. R.P.

B. B.C.

Bde Gps

B. T.I.

C. A.

C.-in-C.

C.C.C.

C.G.S.

C.I.D.

C.I.G.S.

Coy

C.P.

C. P.W.D.

c.v.s.

D. B.S.T.

D. C.G.S.
D.I.B.

D.I.G.

D.P.R.

D. P.S.V.

E. A. and
C.R.D.

E.C.O.

Abbreviations

Aide-de-Camp

Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (Burma)

Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee
Adjutant-General ; Accountant-General
Agent to the Governor-General
Army Headquarters ; Air Headquarters
All-India Congress Committee
All-India States’ People’s Conference
Air Officer in charge of Administration
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief
Assistant Private Secretary to the Viceroy
Army Remount Depot Troop
Air Raid Precautions

British Broadcasting Corporation
Brigade Groups
British Troops in India

Constituent Assembly

Commander-in-Chief

Central Constitutional Committee

Chief of the General Staff

Criminal Investigation Department

Chief of the Imperial General Staff

Company

Central Provinces

Central Public Works Department

Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff

Double British Summer Time
Deputy Chief of the General Staff
Director of the Intelligence Bureau
Deputy Inspector-General
Director of Public Relations
Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy

External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Department

Emergency Commission Officer

ABBREVIATIONS

XXXV

F.A.D. &S.

Financial Adviser Defence and Supply

F.O.

Foreign Office

G.C.M.G.

Knight Grand Cross of St Michael and St George

G.G.

Governor-General

G.H.Q.

General Headquarters

G.M.T.

Greenwich Mean Time

G.O.C.

General Officer Commanding

G.R.

Gurkha Rifles

G.S.

Governor’s Secretary; General Staff

H.E.

His Excellency

H.E.H.

His Exalted Flighness

H.H.

His Highness

H.M.

His Majesty; Honourable Member

H.M.G.

His Majesty’s Government

H.Q.

Headquarters

I. A.

Indian Army

I.C.S.

Indian Civil Service

I.D.C.

Imperial Defence College

I.E.F.C.

International Emergency Food Council

I.N.A.

Indian National Army

I.P.

Indian Police

I.S.T.

Indian Standard Time

J.P.S.V.

Joint Private Secretary to the Viceroy

M.F.A.

Minister for Foreign Affairs

M.L.A.

Member of the Legislative Assembly

M.S.V.

Military Secretary to the Viceroy

N.H.Q.

Naval Headquarters

N.W.F.P.

North -W est Frontier Province

P.M.

Prime Minister

P.Q.

Parliamentary Question

P.R.O.

Public Relations Officer; Public Record Office

P.S.V.

Private Secretary to the Viceroy

P. & T.

Posts and Telegraphs

Q.M.G.

Quarter-Master General

XXXVI

ABBREVIATIONS

R.A.F.

Royal Air Force

RAJ RIF

Raj pu tana Rifles

R.I.

Rex Imperator

R.I.A.F.

Royal Indian Air Force

R.I.N.

Royal Indian Navy

R.N.

Royal Navy

R.S.S.S.

Rashtriya Sway am Sevak Sangh

S.E.A.C.

South-East Asia Command

U.K.

United Kingdom

U.N.O.

United Nations Organisation

U.P.

United Provinces

U.S.A.

United States of America

U.S.S.R.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

V.C.I.G.S.

Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff

V.C.N.S.

Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff

V.C.P.

Viceroy’s Conference Paper

W.C.

Working Committee

W.M. &P.

Works, Mines and Power

Principal Holders of Office

United Kingdom

cabinet

Members of the India and Burma Committee are italicised.1

Prime Minister and First Lord of the
Treasury

Lord President of the Council and
Leader of the House of Commons
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Minister without Portfolio
Chancellor of the Exchequer
President of the Board of Trade
Minister of Defence
Lord Chancellor
Secretary of State for the Home
Department

Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs (Commonwealth Relations
from 3 July 1947) and Leader of the
House of Lords
Secretary of State for Scotland
Secretary of State for the Colonies
Secretary of State for India and for
Burma

Minister of Labour and National
Service

Minister of Fuel and Power

Minister of Health

Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries

Minister of Education

Lord Privy Seal

Mr Clement Attlee

Mr Herbert Morrison

Mr Ernest Bevin
Mr Arthur Greenwood
Mr Hugh Dalton
Sir Stafford Cripps
Mr A. V. Alexander
Viscount Jowitt
Mr J. Chuter Ede

Viscount Addison

Mr J. Westwood
Mr A. Creech Jones
Earl of Lis tow el

Mr G. A. Isaacs

Mr E. Shinwell
Mr Aneurin Bevan
Mr T. Williams
Mr George Tomlinson
Lord Inman

1 In addition the following were also members of the Committee: Mr Hugh Dalton (for financial
questions only), Mr C. P. Mayhew (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs),
Mr A. G. Bottomley (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs), Mr Arthur
Henderson (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India and for Burma), and Lord Chorley.
P.R.O. CAB. 21/1739.

XXXV111

PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF OFFICE

OTHER MINISTERS

Minister of Transport
Minister of Food
Minister of Works
Attorney-General
Parliamentary Secretary to the
Treasury and Chief Whip

MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME

Mr Alfred Barnes
Mr John Strachey
Mr. C. W. Key
Sir Hartley Shawcross
Mr W. Whiteley

INDIA

Secretary of State
Permanent Under-Secretary

Parliamentary Under-Secretary
Deputy Under-Secretary
Assistant Under-Secretaries

Private Secretary to the Secretary of
State

OFFICE

Earl of Listowel

Sir David Monteath

Sir Archibald Carter (from 25 June

1947)

Mr Arthur Henderson
Sir William Croft
Sir Paul Patrick
Mr G. H. Baxter
Mr R. M. J. Harris

Viceroy, Governor-General and
Crown Representative
Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff
Principal Secretary to the Viceroy
Private Secretary to the Viceroy

Reforms Commissioner

India

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten
of Burma
Lord Ismay
Sir Eric Mieville
Mr G. E. B. Abell (cr. K.C.I.E.

25 June 1947)

Mr V. P. Menon

INTERIM GOVERNMENT

External Affairs and Commonwealth
Relations
Finance

Home, Information and Broadcasting,
and (from 5 July 1947) States
Commerce
Food and Agriculture
Communications
Education and Arts
Industries and Supplies
Transport
Health

(executive council)
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel

Mr I. I. Chundrigar
Dr Rajendra Prasad
Mr Abdur Rab Nishtar
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad
Mr C. Rajagopalachari
Dr John Matthai
Mr Ghazanfar Ah Khan

PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF OFFICE

XXXIX

Defence

Labour

Works, Mines and Power
Law

Sardar Baldev Singh
Mr Jagjivan Ram
Mr C. H. Bhabha
Mr Jogendra Nadi Mandal

special (i.e. partition) committee (12-26 June 1947)
Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Dr Rajendra Prasad
Mr Abdur Rab Nishtar

PARTITION COUNCIL (from 27 JUNE 1947)

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mr Mohammad Ali Jinnah
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Dr Rajendra Prasad

GOVERNORS OF PROVINCES

Madras

Bombay

Bengal

United Provinces
Punjab

Central Provinces and Berar

Assam

Bihar

North-West Frontier Province

Orissa

Sind

Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald
Nye

Sir John Colville
Sir Frederick Burrows
Sir Francis Wylie I.C.S.

Sir Evan Jenkins I.C.S.

Sir Frederick Bourne I.C.S.

Sir M. S. A. Flydari I.C.S.

Sir Hugh Dow I.C.S.

Sir Olaf Caroe I.C.S.
Lieutenant-General Sir Rob
Lockhart (acting from 26 June 1947)
Sir Chandulal Trivedi I.C.S.

Sir Francis Mudie I.C.S.

PRIME MINISTERS (PREMIERS) OF PROVINCES

Mr O. P. Ramaswamy Reddiar
Mr B. G. Kher
Mr H. S. Suhrawardy
United Provinces Pandit G. B. Pant

Central Provinces and Berar Pandit R. S. Shukla

Madras

Bombay

Bengal

xl

PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF OFFICE

Assam

Bihar

North-West Frontier Province

Orissa

Sind

Mr Gopinath Bardoloi

Mr Sri Krishna Sinha

Dr Khan Sahib

Mr Harekrishna Mahtab

Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah

The Punjab was administered by the Governor under Section 93 of the Govern
ment of India Act 1935.

Chronological Table of Principal Events

June

1

2

3

4

5-7

9

12

13

15

17

18-23

1947

Mountbatten, accompanied by Governor of Punjab, visits riot
torn areas of Gurgaon District

Mountbatten meets Indian leaders and gives them
Partition Plan

Indian leaders indicate acquiescence in Partition Plan
at resumed meeting with Mountbatten
Mountbatten meets States Negotiating Committee
and gives them Plan

Mountbatten gives broadcast on Plan over All India
Radio

(3.30 pm Double British Summer Time)

H.M.G.’s Statement on Indian Policy containing
Partition Plan is broadcast over All India Radio and
read out by Prime Minister to House of Commons
and by Secretary of State to House of Lords
Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh give broadcasts on
Plan over All India Radio
Bhopal resigns as Chancellor of Chamber of Princes
Mountbatten gives Press Conference on Plan
Mountbatten discusses partition machinery with Indian leaders
and Indian Cabinet

All-India Muslim League Council authorise Jinnah ‘to accept the
fundamental principles of the Plan as a compromise’

First meeting of Partition Committee

Nizam of Hyderabad issues Firman announcing decision not to
send representatives to either Constituent Assembly
Agreement at meeting between Mountbatten and Indian leaders
that Government of India should set up a States Department
Draft ‘Indian Dominions Bill’ is circulated to India and Burma
Committee and despatched to Mountbatten
All-India Congress Committee ‘accepts the proposals embodied
in the announcement of June 3’

India and Burma Committee considers draft Bill for first time
and agrees, inter alia, to Attlee’s suggestion that it should be
called the ‘Indian Independence Bill’

Mountbatten visits Kashmir

10 am1

10 am

4 Pm
7 pm
7.10 pm

1 Indian Standard Time unless otherwise stated.

xlii

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS

June

20

21

23

25

26

27

29

30

July

1-3

2

3

4

5

7

Votes in Bengal Legislative Assembly result in decision that
Province should be partitioned
Gandhi and Nehru visit refugee camps at Hardwar, Punjab
Votes in Punjab Legislative Assembly result in decision that
Province should be partitioned
Indian Cabinet agrees to establish States Department
Sind Legislative Assembly decides that Province should join
Pakistan Constituent Assembly

Partition Committee agrees that it should be replaced by Parti¬
tion Council

Attlee reports to Cabinet that ‘the main lines of the Bill were now
settled’

Partition Council meets for first time

Representatives of Baluchistan decide that Province should join
Pakistan Constituent Assembly

Announcement of appointment and terms of reference of
Boundary Commissions for Bengal and the Punjab
Attlee discusses draft Bill with Opposition leaders
Partition Council agrees on establishment of Joint Defence
Council

Leaders of Congress and Muslim League examine draft Bill
Jinnah informs Mountbatten that he (Jinnah) wishes to become
Governor-General of Pakistan

India and Burma Committee finalise terms of Bill in light of
Congress and League comments
Indian Independence Bill is published

Announcement of appointment of RadclifFe as Chairman of both
Boundary Commissions

On coming into being of States Department, Patel makes
statement containing assurances to States regarding future
Ismay leaves for London to discuss with H.M.G. question whether
Mountbatten should remain as Governor General of India only
After discussion with Ismay, India and Burma Committee
express hope that Mountbatten would be prepared to accept
Congress nomination to become Governor-General of India

Summary of Documents

Chapter

1 The 3 June Plan . Meetings with Indian leaders; preliminary
discussions on arrangements for partition; League and Congress
resolutions on Plan: 31 May to 15 June 1947

2 Provincial Decisions on Partition. Continuing discussions on
partition arrangements; problems of law and order in the
Punjab; decisions on Plan in Bengal, Punjab and Sind Legislative
Assemblies: 16 June to 26 June 1947

3 Implementation of the Plan. Establishment of Partition Council;
crisis over reconstitution of Executive Council; question of the
Governor-Generalship: 26 June to 7 July 1947

4 The Indian Independence Bill

5 The States

Page

xliv

lxv

lxxviii

c

cxiv

xliv

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER I

The 3 June Plan . Meetings with Indian leaders; preliminary discussions on

arrangements for partition ;

League

31 May to 15 June 1947

Name and Number

Date

1947

May

1 Viceroy’s Conference Paper

3i

V.C.P. 58

2 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Fourth 31
Staff Meeting
Items 1-7

3 Ismay to Mountbatten 31

Minute

4 Nehru to Mountbatten 3 1

Letter

5 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Fifth 31
Staff Meeting
Items 2-3

6 Cabinet India and Burma 3 1

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)91

7 Cabinet India and Burma 31

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)94

and Congress resolutions on Plan :

Main subject or subjects Page

Circulates alternative versions of broadcast 1
to be made by Mountbatten on 3 June
depending whether it appears probable
that Bengal would be partitioned or remain
unified

(1) Viceroy’s broadcast; (2) prospects of 1

Bengal remaining united with status

similar to that of Indian State; future of
Calcutta; (3) movement of troops to
Punjab; (4) Gandhi’s recent utterances;

(5) appointment of Governor (s) General;

(6) Timetable of events; (7) best means of
persuading Jinnah to accept plan for transfer
of power

Submits draft briefs for (1) Mountbatten’s 6

opening speech at conference with Indian
leaders on 2 June; (2) his talk with Jinnah
Asks that Kripalani, as Congress President, 1 1
be invited to the Conference on 2 June
despite any objections raised by Jinnah;
offers to stand down himself to enable
meeting to be kept small

(2) Mountbatten accepts minimum force 12

rule in suppression of disturbances;

arranges question to be put at his Press
Conference to enable him to state that
Interim Govt unanimously of opinion that
violence could not be tolerated;

(3) government of Bengal after announcement
is made

Memorandum by Listowel commenting on 13
Nehru’s interview with Norman Cliff (Vol.

X, No. 560, Enclosure (iii))

Memorandum by Listowel drawing 15

attention to wide powers recommended for
Centre by reports of Union Powers and
Advisory Committees of Constituent
Assembly; suggests authors had given up any
idea of securing Muslim League
participation, and points out possible adverse
effect on willingness of States to adhere
to Union

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

xlv

Date

Main subject or subjects

Page

Name and Number

May

8 Mackenzie King to Attlee 3 1

Tel. 109 via Canadian High

Commissioner in London and
Dominions Office

9 Nehru to Mountbatten 31

Letter

10 Suhrawardy to Mieville 31

Letter

1 1 Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten 3 1
Letter

12 Jenkins to Mountbatten 31

Letter 678

13 Mountbatten to Listowel 31

Tel. 1221-S

14 Caroe to Mountbatten 31

Tel. CA/99

15 Mountbatten to Provincial 31

Governors
Tel. 1223-S

Sends assurance of Canadian Govt’s 18

goodwill; suggests Royal style and titles
might be discussed at conference of
Commonwealth P.Ms

Suggests that a Commission should meet the 19
Jirgas and a referendum be held in Quetta
Municipality to ascertain wishes of people ot
Baluchistan regarding future of that
Province

Reports points made by Jinnah in interview 20
with him, particularly need for referendum
in Bengal and for Calcutta to become a
free city

Has visited Gurgaon with Ghazanfar Ali 20

Khan; asserts that disturbances there are
pre-meditated plan to suppress Muslim Meo
community and that troops from Alwar
and Bharatpur are involved; urges that
Indian rulers should be warned to keep
their subjects out of disturbances, that more
military forces of mixed communal
composition should be sent to assist, and
that machine-gunning from air should be
considered

Communal tension amounting to mass 23

hysteria throughout Punjab ; situation in
Lahore and Amritsar, where during last
fortnight authorities defeated by incendiarism,
and Gurgaon; interviews with Liaquat,

Baldev Singh, Nehru (who thought there
might be a short ‘civil war’ in Punjab)
and Swaran Singh; visiting members of
Central Government behave ‘as communal
leaders and not as responsible Ministers’ ;
growth of communal feeling in Services
including High Court Judges ; conference
with senior military, police and civil
officers on security arrangements for 3 June
announcement; crime prevention; food
situation

Final amendments to text of draft 27

announcement

Reports on negotiations between Congress 28
and League leaders possibly for coalition
ministry

Outlines background to, and implications 29
of, accelerated programme for transfer of
power on basis of Dominion Status;
indicates action to be taken in particular
provinces

xlvi

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

Main subject or subjects

Page

1 6

17

18

19

20

22

23

June

Mountbatten to Liaquat Ali Kban 1

Letter 133/14

Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Sixth 1

Staff Meeting
Items 2 and 4

Mountbatten to Burrows 1

Tel. 1237-S

Mountbatten to Listowel 1

Tel. 1249-S

Unsigned Note undated

Thompson to Corfield 2

Minute

Minutes of Viceroy’s Meeting with 2
Indian Leaders
First Day

Refers to No. 11; has himself visited
Gurgaon and informed himself of position;
describes action being taken on two of
points mentioned in No. 1 1
(2) Procedure for British Baluchistan to
decide which Constituent Assembly it
would join; (4) Suhrawardy’s letter (No. 10)
Acknowledges No. 554 in Vol. X;
requests views on necessity of going into
Section 93 in Bengal ; prospects of forming
coalition government to work out
partition and Suhrawardy’s plea for
Calcutta to be made free city
Proposes to insert references to Gandhi in
his broadcast

Report of discussion between V. P. Menon
and Patel on: Calcutta; procedure at
meeting with Indian leaders; titles for
Princes; Interim Govt issue; States
Reports interview with Raja of Faridkot
in which latter stated that Kartar Singh was
ready to reach agreement with Jinnah for
inclusion of ‘Khalistan’ within Pakistan, but
admitted split in Sikh leadership
Mountbatten in opening speech refers
inter alia to following points : world
importance of occasion; terrific sense of
urgency in effecting transfer of power ;

Muslim League rejection of Cabinet Mission
Plan (Jinnah signifies assent) ; differing
views of parties on principle of partition
and its implications; Cabinet and opposition
views; position of Sikhs; reasons for rejecting
referendum in Calcutta; new para. 20 in
statement (No. 45) providing for early transfer
of power on Dominion Status basis;
procedure for appointment of Governors-
General. Copies of statement handed round
and Mountbatten asks for reactions of
Working Committees by midnight that
night; explains he does not ask either side
specifically for agreement to it, but
requests assurances from both that they
would do their best to help work it out
peacefully; Nehru states Congress did not
approve, but did accept, plan and Viceroy
would receive that evening letter giving
Working Committee’s reaction; Jinnah
states that his Working Committee could
not commit League as a whole to acceptance
which would have to come later but

3i

32

35

36

37

38

39

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

xlvii

Name and Number

Date

June

Main subject or subjects

23 (cont.)

24 Record of Interview between 2

Mountbatten and Gandhi

25 Rowlatt to Simpson 2

Letter

26 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Seventh 2

Staff Meeting
Item 2

27 Mountbatten to Listowel 2

Tel. 1258-S

28 Viceroy’s Conference Paper 2

V.C.P. 63

29 Listowel to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 7105

30 Listowel to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 66

31 Cabinet Committee 2

Gen. 186/ist Meeting

32 Cabinet India and Burma 2

Committee
I.B.(47)29th Meeting
Minutes 4-5

promises personal support for plan; feels
unable to report his Working Committee’s
opinions in writing but will report verbally
to Viceroy. Agreement that Mountbatten
Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh should
each make broadcasts following day
Gandhi observing day of silence; hands
Mountbatten a note in which he denies
having said ‘one word’ against him; wishes
to talk about one or two things ‘but not
today’ ; conveys Ghaffar Khan’s request for
Caroe’s removal, recommending it ‘If it
can be done decorously’

Encloses letter to Wilson Smith pointing
out that assumption apparently made in
C.-in-C.’s paper on division of Indian
Army (Vol. X, No. 547) that a common
Governor General could in some degree
be responsible to H.M.G. in London, cut
across fundamental conception of Dominion
Status embodied in draft India Bill
Consideration of procedures whereby
people of Baluchistan could make a choice
about adherence to the existing or a new
Constituent Assembly
Summarises No. 23 ; believes ‘God must
be on our side’ since it was Gandhi’s day
of silence (see No. 24)

Circulates paper on Administrative
Consequences of Partition listing matters
for decision to enable partition to be put
into effect and making proposals for
administrative machinery to perform task;
prefatory note indicates intention to
transfer power by 15 August
Arrangements to enable Ranee to inform
Aung Sang of general outline of
announcement before it is made public
Opposes insertion in Broadcast proposed
in No. 19.

Discussion of paper on Future of India
and Burma Offices and concurrence in its
recommendation that the work of these
Offices and Dominions Office should
become reponsibility of a new Secretary of
State for Commonwealth Relations
Note taken of amended text of
announcement; agreement on text of
Attlee’s broadcast

Page

48

48

5i

52

53

59

59

60

63

xlviii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

June

33 Burrows to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 142-S

34 Listowel to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 7132

35 Viceroy’s Conference Paper 3

V.C.P. 64

36 Viceroy’s Conference Paper 3

V.C.P. 65

37 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 1276-S

38 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 1277-S

39 Minutes of Viceroy’s Meeting with 3

Indian Leaders
Second Day

Main subject or subjects Page

Refers to No. 18; may be forced into 64

Section 93 position for short time;
indicates likely courses of action in other
eventualities ; now too late to declare
Calcutta a free city

To forestall questions in Parliament asks 65

for information as to Working Committee’s
acceptance of plan and attitude to transfer
of power on Dominion basis
Ciculates letter from Kripalani which 66

states : Congress has consistently upheld
unity of India and any separation of part
painful to contemplate, but Working
Committee accept proposed announcement
as variation of Cabinet Mission Plan and
in order to achieve fmal settlement ; this is
dependent on Muslim League acceptance
and on clear understanding no further
claims will be put forward ; draws
attention to particular points, including
the predicament of Sikhs, and need for
referendum in N.W.F.P. to provide for
independence option; Committee will
recommend ‘acceptance generally’ of
H.M.G.’s statement ‘as a settlement of our
political and communal problems’

Circulates letter from Baldev Singh which 69
states: Sikhs have always stood for a
united India and are unable to contemplate
being forced into sovereign state likely to be
based on Islamic principles ; plan for division
of India must ensure that Sikh community
is not irreparably injured; brings certain
matters to notice including Sikh fears
regarding formation of Interim Ministries in
Punjab and views on Boundary
Commission ; accepts ‘principle of division
as laid down in the plan’ with the hope
that views expressed above will be met in
Boundary Commission’s terms of reference
Refers to No. 34 and No. 38; suggests 71

formula for use in Parliament on reactions
of parties

Reports terms in which Congress Working 71
Committee and Sikhs have accepted plan
and on interview with Jinnah; summarises
reactions to para, on Dominion Status
Mountbatten reports reactions of Working 72
Committees to plan; Jinnah, Kripalani
and Baldev Singh state they consider he
has ‘correctly interpreted and recorded

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

xlix

Name and Number Date

June

39 (cont.)

40 Mountbatten to Attlee 3

Tel. 1282-S via India Office

41 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 317-G.T.

42 Cabinet 3

C.M.(47)5ist Conclusions

Minute 1

44 Text of Mountbatten’s Broadcast 3

45 Statement by H.M.G. on Indian 3

Policy

46 Text of Nehru’s Broadcast 3

47 Text of Jinnah’s Broadcast 3

48 Text of Baldev Singh’s Broadcast 3

Main subject or subjects Page

their views’ ; all concur in need to restrain
subordinates from making speeches of
recrimination; discussion of Gandhi’s
speeches; paper on The Administrative
Consequences of Partition handed round (see
No. 28, Annex II); initial reactions to it;
division of armed forces; agreement to
defer Sterling Balances negotiations
Reports virtual acceptance of plan by 78

leaders of all three parties

Transmits small amendment (made at 79

Jinnah’s request) to his broadcast;
indicates order of broadcasts that evening
Attlee communicates Mountbatten’s 79

report that plan had been favourably
received by Indian leaders

Explains background to plan; states that 86

need for earliest possible transfer of power is
reason for adoption of Dominion Status
solution; notes that special function of
India Office will no longer have to be
carried out; refers to freedom of new
Dominions to decide their relationship to
each other and to British Commonwealth;
appeals for peace

Full text of Statement as published 89

Reviews events since Interim Government’s 94
assumption of office; commends British
Government proposals ‘with no joy in my
heart’; appeals for end to violence; India
will seek to build anew relations with
England on friendly and cooperative basis
Appeals to every community and 97

particularly Muslims to maintain peace
and order; does not wish to prejudge
decision of League Council whether plan
should be accepted as compromise but
reaction in League circles in Delhi has been
hopeful; since plan provides for referendum
in N.W.F.P. calls for end of civil disobedience
there and for verdict in favour of Pakistan ;
appreciates sufferings of all Muslims who
had participated in movement, and hopes
for peaceful referendum

Comments on troubled background in 99

country to announcement of plan; commends
its acceptance as a settlement; urges all
communities to turn from past quarrels to
build for future; refers to strong measures
taken to enforce law and order; expresses

1

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

June

48 ( cont .)

49 Mountbatten to Nehru 3

Letter 1446/2

50 Mountbatten to Patel 3

Letter

51 Patel to Mountbatten 3

Letter

52 Bevin to Listowel 3

Letter F 6535/905/G

53 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 1284-S

54 Mountbatten to Burrows 3

Tel. 1287-S

55 Abell to Turnbull 3

Tel. 1288-S

56 Attlee to Mountbatten 3

Tel. 7185 via India Office

57 Text of Attlee’s Broadcast 3

58 Krishna Menon to Mountbatten 4

Letter

59 Proceedings of Mountbatten’s Press 4

Conference

60 Proceedings of Mountbatten’s Press 4

Conference

61 Nehru to Mountbatten 4

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

encouragement and support for servicemen
engaged in these duties

Asks him to tell Khan Sahib that C.-in-C. is 101
being asked to provide nine British Officers
to supervise referendum in N.W.F.P.

Invites Patel as Member in charge of 102

Information to take chair at Press

Conference

Protests at partisan references to N.W.F.P. 102
injinnah’s broadcast

Refers to Vol. X, No. 288, Minute 2 and 103
requests reconsideration of decision not to
include in treaty with India provision to
ensure future observance by India of
certain treaties concluded in the name of the
Crown or the U.K. Govt

Refers to No. 38; describes how he has 104

dealt with points raised by leaders between
the two meetings and summarises
proceedings at second

Refers to No. 33 ; now appears League will 106
acquiesce in scheme; hopes Burrows will be
able to persuade Suhrawardy to form
coalition

Congress will not object to use of term 107

‘Dominion’ in Bill

Refers to No. 40 and conveys Cabinet's 107

congratulations

Asserts that maintenance of Indian unity 107
has been a prime object of British policy
but that failure of Indian leaders to agree
makes partition inevitable; twofold purpose
of plan is to promote harmony between
Indian parties, and facilitate orderly and
early transfer of power by British; appeals
for calm consideration of proposals which
have ‘the full support of the British
Government’ ; assures Indians of British
goodwill whatever course they choose
Reports that Gandhi ‘is very disturbed’
and proposes to speak about his anxieties 109
that day; also that Nehru wants him
[Menon] to talk over some points of detail
and principle relating to the plan with the
Viceroy

Mountbatten’s opening remarks no

Questions and Answers 115

Acknowledges No. 49; urges change of 122

Governors in N.W.F.P.

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

li

Name and Number Date

June

62 Fraser to Addison 4

Tel. 109

63 Fraser to Addison 4

Tel. no

65 Caroe to Mountbatten 4

Tel. CA/105

66 Campbell-Johnson to Brockman 4

Minute

69 Record of Interview between 4

Mountbatten and Gandhi

70 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Eighth 4
Staff Meeting
Items 1-3

71 Listowel to Mountbatten 4

Tel. 7251

72 Jenkins to Mountbatten 4

Tel. 118-G

73 Minutes of Viceroy’s Sixteenth 5

Miscellaneous Meeting
Item 1

75 Mountbatten to Attlee 5

Tel. 1307-S via India Office

Main subject or subjects Page

Asks him to give Attlee No. 63 and his 123

congratulations

Transmits text of press statement on India 124

Refers to No. 15, para. 12; reports 126

discussion with Qazi Attaullah and Mehr
Chand Khanna who say: Ministry will
press that issue in referendum should be
between independent Pathanistan and
Pakistan; if Jinnah had agreed to this
Ministry would have agreed to coalition ; if
referendum is on choice between India and
Pakistan Khudai Khitmagars will boycott it.

Caroe will forward representation which
Ministry is preparing ; he urges early public
statement that referendum issue will be that
in No. 45, para. 4

Summary of reactions to Plan (No. 45) 127

and Press Conference (Nos. 59 and 60)

Gandhi suggests tripartite agreement 13 1

between Britain and two new Dominions;
speaks of Viceroy’s ‘magic tricks’ ;

Mountbatten says plan should be called
‘Gandhi Plan’, and describes how he has
followed Gandhi’s advice throughout;

Gandhi agrees he has not been averse to
Dominion Status in past. Krishna and V. P.

Menon subsequently report that line taken

with Gandhi has been successful

(1) Bhopal’s resignation; (2) interviw with 133

Gandhi (No. 69) ; question whether Gandhi,

Nehru or Mountbatten should visit

Kashmir; (3) consideration of No. 28, and

discussion of Nehru’s wish for

reconsitution of Interim Government

into two committees

Conveys comments by F.O. on proposals 135
made for appeals against decisions of
Boundary Commission

Situation in Lahore, Amritsar and 136

Gurgaon; first intelligence reports show
reception of partition plan ‘very mixed’
in Lahore and Amritsar

Meeting between Mountbatten and Indian 137
leaders on (1) Administrative Consequences
of Partition (No. 28) with agreement,
inter alia , to establish Partition Tribunal and
Steering Committee

Thanks for No. 56 and for personal 144

backing of Attlee and Cabinet during
negotiations

lii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

June

7 6 Abell to Turnbull 5

Tel. 1308-S

77 Mountbatten to Burrows 5

Tel. 1312-S

78 Listowel to Mountbatten 5

Letter

79 Mountbatten to Listowel 5

Letter 1446(16)

80 Nehru to Mountbatten 5

Letter

8 1 Record, of Interview between 5

Mountbatten and Khan Sahib

82 Mountbatten to Jenkins and Burrows 5
Tel. 1318-S

83 Caroe to Mountbatten 5

Tel. CA/106

84 Campbell-Johnson to Joyce 5

Tel. 1316-S

85 Caroe to Mountbatten 5

Tel. 192-CB

86 Hydari to Mountbatten 5

Letter (extract)

Main subject or subjects Page

Question whether Hindustan will inherit 144

India’s international personality or whether

two new states will be created

Suhrawardy states that Roy thinks forming 145

coalition for a few months is not worth

while

Congratulations; prospects of plan’s 145

ratification by All-India bodies of Congress
and League; good reception of
announcement in Parliament; coverage
given it by B.B.C.; favourable U.K. press
reactions ; Burmese reactions and need to
convince Indian and Burmese leaders of
advantages of Commonwealth; removal
of colour bar in recruitment to Royal
Navy and Army; Chundrigar’s London
visit; honours questions

Proposes that he himself, the Governors 148

and Chief Commissioners should off er
their resignations on date of transfer of
power

Refers to No. 73 ; does not like idea of 148

continuing in present way with Interim
Government; clarifies his ideas on
administrative machinery required for
partition

Refers to No. 65; Mountbatten explains 150
reasons against allowing option of
independent Pathanistan ;

Khan Sahib considers that Caroe should
be removed and referendum take place
under new Governor ; welcomes proposal
that military officers should run it and
promises cooperation

Refers to questions on boundaries at 1 5 1

Press Conference and emphasises need to
stress their provisional nature and that they
will not pre-judge work of Boundary
Commission

Refers to No. 65; reports Chief Secretary 15 1
and other officials suggest peaceful
referendum more likely if Pathanistan
issue is included; discusses pros and cons
of doing this

Summarises press reactions to Press 152

Conference

Reports cessation of Muslim League 153

agitation; League jubilant, minorities
depressed

Reactions of Assam Ministers to 153

announcement of 3 June

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

liii

Name and Number Date

June

87 Baring to Dominions Office 5

Tel. 168

88 Butler to Mountbatten 5

Letter

89 Clutterbuck to Dominions Office 5
Tel. 496

90 Mountbatten to Listowel 5

Letter

91 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 8, 5

paras. 1-9, 12-26, 28-34

92 Shone to Brook 6

Tel. IRKU 360

93 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Ninth 6

Staff Meeting
Items 11, 14

95 Indian Cabinet Meeting 6

Case 137/30/47

Main subject or subjects Page

Transmits text of statement by Smuts on 154
India

Writes from America to congratulate 155

him; Press there has carried very full
reports and Britain’s stock appears to have
risen

Transmits text of statement by Mackenzie 155
King on India and reports initial
Canadian press reactions

Jagjivan Ram’s visits to Geneva and 157

London; question of appeals to Privy

Council after transfer of power; Colville

as Acting Viceroy and Ramamurty as

Acting Governor of Bombay

Suhrawardy’s wish for Calcutta to be free 158

city and Patel’s reaction; Nehru’s insistence

that Kripalani should attend forthcoming

meetings ; Jinnah’s demand for referendum

of Scheduled Castes in Bengal; Gurgaon

riots; first meeting on 2 June with leaders

(No. 23); interview with Gandhi; Burma

Star reunion; reactions of Commanders-

in-Chief and Army Commanders to plan;

meeting with Jinnah on evening of 2 June;

Congress and Sikh letters on plan;

meeting with Nehru on morning of

3 June; second meeting on 3 June with

leaders (No. 39); meeting with Kartar

Singh; broadcasts; Press Conference;

Suhrawardy’s plans for Eastern Pakistan; third
meeting on 5 June with leaders (No. 73) ;

Caroe’s telegram, and Mountbatten’s
interview with Khan Sahib, on question
of securing N.W.F.P. Ministry’s cooperation
in referendum; number of people report
announcement has relieved communal
tension

Suggests possibility that a separate 165

British High Commissioner should be
appointed for Pakistan

(11) Pakistan’s diplomatic representation; 166

(14) Nehru’s letter on the administrative
consequences of partition (No. 80) ; role
of Krishna Menon

Discussion of administrative machinery 169

required to effect partition; relationship
of proposed Partition Committee to
Cabinet; agreement (i) to appoint
Cabinet Committee with Viceroy as
Chairman to work out machinery; (ii)
to set up Separation/Partition Committee

liv

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

June

95 (cont.)

9 6 Mountbatten to Caroe 6

Letter 1450

97

Jenkins to Mountbatten

6

Letter 680

98

Note by Abell on discussions with

7

Jenkins

99 Ismay to Mountbatten 7

Minute

100 Minutes of Viceroy’s Seventeenth 7

Miscellaneous Meeting
Items 1-5

Main subject or subjects Page

when question of partition legally decided
and members of existing Cabinet had
resigned; (iii) to set up tribunal to which
points of difference could be referred

Has recently been bombarded with 172

representations from Caroe’s detractors;
feels he must at any rate for the moment
replace him as Governor of N.W.F.P. ;
in view of possibility that Pakistan Govt
might reappoint him, suggests he should
go on leave till 15 August; points out
advantages of this course

Discusses arrangements for implementing 173

partition in Punjab and describes his talks
with party leaders on this subject

Arrangements for implementing 177

partition in Punjab; Jenkins is pessimistic
on question whether British officials in
Punjab will be willing to stay on after
transfer, Abell is less so ; Jenkins unwilling to
stay on in either of Punjab Provinces;

Annex: note by Jenkins on programme
he proposes for effecting partition

Comments on Gandhi’s suggestions (set 182

out in attached note) (1) that
Mountbatten should persuade Jinnah to
win over N.W.F.P. without a referendum;

(2) deal similarly with West Bengal and
East Punjab; (3) that Jinnah should be
encouraged to talk to Congress leaders
direct; (4) that H.M.G. should announce
their wish to have identical agreements
with Hindustan and Pakistan

Meeting between Mountbatten and 184

Indian leaders on (1) Administrative
Consequences of Partition with Jinnah
arguing that Governor-General, rather
than Govemor-General-in-Council, is
proper authority to give legal effect to
partition, and agreement, inter alia , to
obtain legal opinion (if possible that of
Chief Justice) on this point; and to set up
fact-finding Partition Committee consisting
of members of Interim Government,
followed (as soon as any one province
had decided on partition) by Partition
Council and Arbitral Tribunal ; (2) future
employment for Sir E. Jenkins; (3)
mistranslation of broadcasts ; (4)
inflammatory articles in press ; (5) the States

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

lv

Name and Number Date

June

i oi Record of Interview between 7

Mountbatten, Jinnah, Liaquat and
Nisbtar

102 Abell to Jinnah 7

Letter

103 Listowel to Mountbatten 7

Letter

104 Mudie to Mountbatten 7

Letter d.o. 45 3 /FR (extract)

105 Jenkins to Mountbatten 7

Tel. 121-G

106 Ismay to Monteath 8

Tel. 1354-S

108 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fortieth 9

Staff Meeting
Items 2-4, 6, 8-10

Main subject or subjects

Page

Selection of Chairman of Arbitral

190

Tribunal, and Chairmen and members of
Boundary Commissions; question of
agreements between H.M.G. and two
new Dominions; resolution on plan which
Jinnah would put before League Council;
meeting joined by Diwan of Bahawalpur;
discussion of position of that State;

Jinnah believes existing agreements with
States would be legally binding on
successor authorities

Encloses legal opinion by Spence on 19 1

question whether Governor-General, or
Govemor-General-in-Council, is
authority competent to confer requisite
powers on partition machinery; conveys
Mountbatten’s hope that Jinnah will let
him see draft resolution for League
Council

Reserves H.M.G.’s right to link question 192
of financial liability for payment of
compensation to negotiations on Sterling
Balances

Reaction in Sind to announcement of 193

3 June

Situation in Lahore, Amritsar and 194

Gurgaon; generally, Hindus in West and
Moslems in East are dissatisfied; Sikhs
pin faith on Boundary Commission and
say they will accept no western boundary
short of Chenab

Asks that King’s unofficial approval be 195

obtained for arrangements to replace
Caroe with Lockhart

(2) Dominion Status — question of 198

Mountbatten becoming Governor-General
of both Dominions for an interim period;
need to ascertain Jinnah’s views on this ;
position of a constitutional Governor-
General ; discussion of ways in which his
influence and good offices might be
useful in advisory capacity; (3) N.W.F.P. —

Khan Sahib to be shown list of officers
to run referendum ; change of Governors ;

(4) legal authority for partition —

Jinnah’s disagreement with Spence’s
opinion (Enclosure to No. 102) and
demand that Chief Justice’s opinion be
obtained; (6) ceremonies on date of
transfer of power; (8) Mountbatten to see
Congress leaders on Boundary

lvi

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

108 ( cont .)

1 1 3 Mountbatten to Jinnab
Letter 1446/16

1 14 Ismay to Mountbatten
Minute

1 15 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1358— S

1 16 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1368-S

1 17 Ismay to Monteath
Tel. 1359-S

1 18 Cabinet Committee
Gen. i86/2nd Meeting

1 19 Wylie to Mountbatten
Letter U.P. 83 (extract)

120 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1364-S

121 Cabinet India and Burma

Committee
I.B.(47)30th Meeting

123 Ismay to Mountbatten
Minute (extract)

124 Record of Interview between

Mountbatten, Nehru, Patel and

Kripalani

125 Mountbatten to Gandhi
Letter

126 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty First

Staff Meeting
Items 1-2, 4-5

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

Commissions and other matters ; (9)

Gandhi’s latest suggestions (Annex to No.

99); (10) Auchinleck to submit views on
withdrawal of British forces

9 Suggests he should prepare lists of persons 218
suitable for appointment as Governors,
Ambassadors, etc

9 Suggests Jinnah should be told of 218

decision to replace Caroe before public
announcement

9 Refers to No. 116; asks permission to 219

give Nehru assurance that party leaders
will be shown Bill ; recommends that
Nehru’s view on international position
should be supported

9 Repeats letter of 7 June from Nehru 220

outlining Congress view on continuing
entity of India and asking to see draft
legislation on this subject

9 Asks for material to dispel 221

misunderstanding about meaning of
Dominion Status and powers of
Governor-General thereunder

9 Discussion on structure of British 221

Commonwealth and agreement to appoint
Ministerial Committee, assisted by
Official Committee, to consider subject;
and to consult Dominions about change of title
of Dominions Office

9 Reactions in U.P. to announcement of 225

3 June

9 Discusses question of composition and 226

terms of reference of Boundary
Commissions

9 Burmese request for immediate transfer 226

of power on Dominion Status

10 Refers to No. 108, Item 2 and reports 230

discussion at staff meeting on question of
Mountbatten’s becoming constitutional
Governor-General of both Dominions
10 The States; composition and terms of 232

reference of Boundary Commissions;
Chairmanship of Arbitral Tribunal
10 Will mention suggestions made in Annex 235
to No. 99 to Jinnah; will follow up idea in
fourth para, with H.M.G.

10 (1) Jai Prakash Narain; (2) Dominion 236

Status — question of Mountbatten becoming
Constitutional Governor-General of both
Dominions; staff he would need;

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

lvii

Name and Number Date

June

12 6 ( cont .)

127

Liaquat to Mountbatten

10

Letter

128

Nehru to Mountbatten

10

Letter

129

Nehru to Mountbatten

10

Letter

130 Patel to Mountbatten 10

Letter

13 1 Machtig to Monteath 10

Letter

132 India Office Minutes 10/11

135 Listowel to Jowitt 10

Letter

136 Lowis to Abell 10

Tel. CA 108

137 Abbott to Abell 10

Tel. 1126-G

138 Listowel to Mountbatten 10

Tel. 7496

139 Gandbi to Mountbatten 10/11

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

withdrawal of British troops and division
of Indian Armed Forces; June 1948 date
now of no significance ; international
status of India and Pakistan; (4) N.W.F.P.

— Khan Sahib has no objection to officers
selected to run referendum; (5) Boundary
Commissions

Encloses resolution of Council of League 240

on H.M.G.’s statement of 3 June (No. 45)

Congress proposals for formation of 241

Boundary Commissions

Comments on Enclosure to No. 127 242

which ‘is not at all satisfactory’ ; demands
that Jinnah should now accept plan ‘in
its entirety as a settlement’ in writing on
behalf of League before date of meeting
of A.I.C.C.

Comments on Enclosure to No. 127 244

and on Intelligence Bureau report

(enclosed) of proceedings of League

Council; states that unless Jinnah issues

clear statement accepting plan there would

be difficulties at A.I.C.C. meeting

Encloses note by Dominions Office 250

on Structure of Commonwealth and

functions of Govemors-General

Line to be taken on question of 253

withholding Andaman and Nicobar

Islands from India

Asks him to consider who might be 258

suitable for appointment as Chairman of
Arbitral Tribunal

Reports objections of N.W.F.P. 259

Ministry to announcing dates of
referendum; considers they should be
announced at once

Transmits message from Jenkins for 260

Auchinleck suggesting that additional
troops be sent to Gurgaon

Refers to No. 115; must defer definite 260

answer about showing Bill to Indian
leaders until after India Committee have
considered it; fears that to do so might
give rise to delay

Believes that, before N.W.F.P. 261

referendum is held, Jinnah should visit
Province to explain Pakistan scheme and
that possibly Congress or Constituent
Assembly should do likewise in respect
of Hindustan; comments on other
matters including need for ‘homogeneous

lviii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

139 ( cont .)

140 H.M. Minister, Kabul to S.
Tel. 47

141 Mountbatten to Jenkins
Letter 133/14

142 Caroe to Mountbatten
Letter

143 Liaquat to Mountbatten
Letter

144 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter

145 Liaquat to Mountbatten
Letter 41-PSFR/47

147 Abell to Croft
Letter 1446/11

of S.

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

ministry’ at centre; states the attempt to
please all parties ‘is a fruitless and
thankless task’

11 Reports Afghan press and radio comment 262
expressing deep disappointment that
‘Afghans living between the Durand line
and River Indus’ had not been given
independence option; reports interview
with Afghan Foreign Minister in which
latter has expressed same opinion; asks
for instructions

1 1 Encloses letter from Patel criticising 263

handling by Deputy Commissioner
(Brendon) of disturbances in Gurgaon;
reports unanimous condemnation of D.C.
in Cabinet and feels ‘it may now be only
fair to Brendon to transfer him’

11 Refers to No. 96; accepts Mountbatten’s 265
judgement that, at any rate for a time,
an officiating Governor must be put in;
suggests that he (Caroe) should take
initiative and say that he wished to take
leave for two months to make clear his
determination that it should not be said
he had used his authority to influence
referendum

1 1 Outlines arguments against proposal to 267

replace Caroe during referendum; if
Mountbatten agrees to Congress request
for removal of Governor he should also
agree to League demand for removal of
Ministry; suggests he should discuss
matter with Jinnah before taking decision

11 Opposes Mamdot’s proposals for 268

composition of partition machinery in
Punjab indicating he would resign if
such arrangements were accepted;
enclosure: letter from Mamdot to Jenkins
of 10 June outlining case for selection of
official personnel of partition machinery
in consultation with representatives of
parties

11 Summarises controversy between Mamdot 270
and Jenkins regarding composition of
partition machinery in Punjab, and asks
Mountbatten to intervene

1 1 Reception of announcement ; utility of 279

V. P. Menon’s influence with Patel ; League
realisation that plan represented maximum
they could get out of H.M.G.

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

lix

Name and Number

148 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 88/47

152 Meeting of Special Committee
of Indian Cabinet
Items 1-3

153 Record of Interview between

Mountbatten, Patel and Liaquat

154 Mountbatten to Caroe
Letter

155 Mountbatten to Gandhi
Letter

156 Mountbatten to Gandhi
Letter

157 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

158 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

159 Auchinleck to Mountbatten
Letter D.O. No. 80/V-1/47/8

Date

June

11

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

Main subject or subjects Page

Refers to Vol. X, No. 417 and No. 106 280

in this Vol. and seeks approval for putting
in hand change of Governors in N.W.F.P.

(1) partition machinery in Punjab and 284

Bengal ; Governors to consult party

leaders ; (2) partition machinery at Centre ;

scope of Special Committee ; composition

and terms of reference of Steering

Committee; latter to make recommendations

for setting up Expert Committees;

provisional basis for division of officers

and staffs; (3) Armed Forces Committee;

its relationship to Special Committee/

Partition Council and Steering
Committee

Discussion of Enclosure to No. 127; 287

Mountbatten suggests Jinnah should

accept plan in letter to him which he

would pass to Congress; question of

international status of India and Pakistan

and division of assets of existing G. of I. ;

safety of Congress M.L.As in Bengal

Refers to No. 142; suggests decision on 289

change of Governors during referendum

should be made public by means of

exchange of letters between Caroe and

himself, and proposes draft of this

exchange

Thanks for No. 139 and will bear Gandhi’s 290
comments in mind

Refers to Annex to No. 99; Jinnah agrees 290
to suggestion he should visit N.W.F.P. to
put case for Pakistan, provided Gandhi
can obtain undertaking from Congress
not to interfere

Proposes that Arbitral Tribunal should 291

consist of three judges of Federal Court
and opposes suggestion that its Chairman
should be member of Judicial Committee
of Privy Council

Encloses Congress suggestion for terms 292

of reference of Boundary Commissions;
expresses desire to leave issues before
Commissions ‘as clear and simple as
possible’ ; explains why they do not wish
to include Thar Parkar (Sind) and Purnea
(Bihar) districts in terms of reference
Encloses paper on role of British troops 293

retained in India and Pakistan after grant
of Dominion Status; timing of their
withdrawal ; system of command

lx

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

Mountbatten to Kripalani

Letter

June

12

Mountbatten to Listowel

Letter

12

162 Viceroy’s Personal Report 12

No. 9

164 Attlee to Adeane 12

Letter

165 Cabinet India and Burma 12

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)97

Main subject or subjects

Page

Reports that, subject to A.I.C.C.

297

accepting plan, Jinnah has given his word
to sign joint document with Congress
accepting plan as settlement

Refers to No. 78; difficulties caused by 298

League resolution (Enclosure to No. 127) ;

Gandhi’s desire that H.M.G.’s agreements
with India and Pakistan should be the
same ; favourable reception of plan in
Parliament and India; work on
administrative consequences ; ‘transfer of
power’ honours; Caroe’s replacement,
gaffe by American Ambassador Elect;

Mountbatten to visit Simla and Kashmir

Reactions to 3 June announcement 301

continue to be favourable ; interview with
Gandhi ; announcement has eased tension
throughout country except in Gurgaon;
reactions in armed forces ; strong protests
from Congress against League resolution
(Enclosure to No. 127) and difficulties
about satisfactorily registering League
acceptance of plan; ‘very difficult’ Cabinet
meeting about high grade appointments;
agreement at meetings of Cabinet and
with Indian leaders (Nos. 95 and 100) to
set up partition machinery; discussions in
progress on composition of Arbitral
Tribunal and Boundary Commissions;
question of H.M.G.’s wish to retain
Andaman and Nicobar Islands ; progress
and prospects on setting up coalition
Governments and partition machinery in
Punjab and Bengal; tension in Calcutta
greatly eased by 3 June announcement;
difficulties expected in both Provinces over
Boundary Commission; prospects of
British officials staying on; Jenkins and
Burrows each believes he should not remain
as Governor of either half of his Province;

Caroe’s replacement

Asks him to lay before King proposals for 310
procedure for U.K. and Dominion
Parliaments to assent to alteration of Royal
Title, and for disposal of Indian crown

Memorandum by Listowel submitting 312

draft telegram to Mountbatten raising
question of possible repercussions if
Andamans and Nicobars are taken from
India before transfer of power

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

lxi

Name and Number Date

June

1 66 Attlee to Mackenzie King, Chifley, 12

Fraser and Smuts
Tel. D. No. 520 via British High
Commissioners

167 Ismay to Monteath 12

Tel. 1416-S

168 Abell to Monteath

12

Tel. 1418-S

169 Mountbatten to Jenkins

12

Tel. 1419-S

170 Abell to Lowis 12

Tel. 1420-S

1 71 Mountbatten to Listowel 12

Tel. 1414-S

172

Mountbatten to Listowel

12

Tel. 1421-S

173

Mountbatten to Attlee

12

Tel. 1422-S via India Office

174

Mountbatten to Listowel

12

Tel. 1423-S

175 Minutes of Viceroy’s Eighteenth 13

Miscellaneous Meeting
Items 2-5

176 Gandhi to Mountbatten 13

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

Requests views on proposed change of 313

titles of S/S for Dominion Affairs and
Dominions Office

Refers to No. 149; thanks for Enclosures 314
to No. 13 1 ; warns that any proposal to
reserve powers to Governor-General, or
that he should have any arbitral authority
whatever ‘would blow the whole scheme
sky high’

Question of possible appointment of 315

Rowlands to advise Pakistan
Summarises interview with Mamdot 316

regarding composition of partition
machinery in Punjab; has suggested
solution of adding Muslim members to
committees already set up and urges
Jenkins to accept this

Refers to No. 136; reports Mountbatten’s 317
agreement to announcement of dates and
outlines what should be said ; Mountbatten
agrees all delaying moves should be
resisted

Outlines India’s food position; requests 317

assistance from H.M.G. for crucial period of
July-Sept. 1947; ‘gesture by H.M.G. would
have very valuable results at this particular
juncture’

Refers to No. 138; considers it absolutely 318

essential to show Indian leaders draft Bill

Suggests visit by Montgomery should be 319

used to settle question of Gurkhas

Reports press comment on future of 319

Andamans and Nicobars; feels there can be

no question of raising this controversial

subject at present delicate stage of political

negotiations ; proposes to take line that

matter is one of many to be settled by

treaty or agreement

Meeting between Mountbatten and Indian 320
leaders on (2) Boundary Commissions —
agreement on method of composition ;
terms of reference to be further considered;

(3) Arbitral Tribunal — Patel and Liaquat
to consider further its composition; (4)
winding up of Calcutta Enquiry; (5)

N.W.F.P. election posters

Refers to Nos. 155 and 156; Jinnah’s 329

condition regarding his visit to N.W.F.P.
is ‘dangerous in its implication’; visit should
be to convert Ministers, Badshah Khan

lxii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

17 6 ( cont .)

177 Jinnah to Mountbatten
Letter

178 Kartar Singh to Mountbatten

179 Auchinleck to Jenkins
Tel. (unnumbered)

180 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter 681 (extract)

1 81 Caroe to Mountbatten
Letter

182 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

and Khudai Khitinatgars not a propaganda
tour; enclosure: letter to Jinnah stating he
does not understand condition
13 Encloses: (i) copy of Enclosure to No. 176; 330

(ii) copy of reply stating that he thought
it quite clear he meant Congress should
undertake not to interfere with people of
Frontier ‘in any way whatsoever’

13 Refers to question of safeguards for Sikh 331
interests ; premature to say anything in
respect of Western Punjab; many people
have moved to Eastern Punjab and before
demarcation of boundary impossible to
say how many Sikhs will remain in West;

Sikhs trust Boundary Commission will
maintain integrity of community in Eastern
Punjab; lists suggestions for safeguards
there and elsewhere

13 Refers to No. 137; explains why troops 332

in Gurgaon have been ‘thin on the ground’ ;
infantry brigade now taking over;
situation at present under control from
military point of view

13 Refers to No. 169; will deal with Mamdot 333
as desired by Mountbatten, but adds that
leaders of all parties must be consulted;
will form Partition Committee as soon as
possible and put point to them
13 Refers to No. 154; encloses letter on lines 334
suggested asking that, in view of wider
political considerations and to avoid
slightest suspicion over conduct of
referendum, he should be allowed to go
on leave for about two months
13 Refers to Nos. 90 and 91 ; has read 335

Nos. 23, 39 and 43 with great interest;

Radcliffe a possible candidate for
Chairmanship of Arbitral Tribunal;
composition of Boundary Commissions
and danger of parties staking out claims
in advance; Suhrawardy’s economic plans
for East Bengal and offers made by
American businessmen contrasted with
slower methods of British; Caroe; plans
to establish Commonwealth Relations
Office; draft Indian Bill; attendance of
Indian Officers at U.K. military colleges ;

India Office in close touch with British
commercial and industrial organisations
with interests in India; Govt of India’s
temporary scheme for handling its

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

lxiii

Name and Number

182 (cant.)

183 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 89/47

184 Adeane to Attlee
Letter

185 Jowitt to Listowel
Letter

186 Stapleton to Monteath
Letter

187 Chiefs of Staff Committee
Paper J.P. (47) 87 (Final)

188 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
Paper I.B. (47)99

192 Cabinet India and Burma

Committee
Paper I.B.(47)ioi

193 Cabinet India and Burma

Committee
Paper 133.(47)102

195 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 7673

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

diplomatic relations with smaller European
countries; excluded and partially excluded
areas of Assam; Burma likely to opt for
complete independence outside
Commonwealth

13 Refers to No. 79; thinks it inappropriate for 339
Mountbatten and Governors to resign on
day of transfer of power; suggests
alternative means of publicising fact that
persons appointed to these offices hold
them by wish of Indians ; believes
Mountbatten’s remaining as common
Governor-General would facilitate partition
13 King agrees with proposals contained in 340
No. 164, but points out that some
Dominions may raise question of further
changes in Royal Title; King hopes any
such discussion may be avoided at present
13 Refers to No. 135; has sounded Radcliffe 341
who is prepared to undertake task;
financial and other terms on which
Radcliffe would accept appointment
13 Chiefs of Staff note that draft Bill does 343

not appear to conflict with British military
requirements, but wish to be advised on
how negotiations concerning those
requirements are to be conducted
13 Report by Joint Planning Staff concluding 344
that Laccadive Islands should be transferred
from Govt of Madras to H.M.G. to ensure
that necessary facilities for air route to Far
East remain available

13 Memorandum by Listowel on the 345

International Status of the Indian
Dominions concluding that, on balance,

Congress doctrine should be adopted and
Hindustan accepted as successor of former
India

13 Memorandum by Listowel on assumption 375
of international obligations by successor
authorities supporting Bevin’s request
(No. 52) for reconsideration of question
13 Memorandum by Listowel opposing 377

Mountbatten’s recommendation that
Indian leaders should be shown draft Bill
and suggesting instead he should tell them
orally what its main provisions will be
13 Refers to No. 120 and conveys Foreign 38

Office views on method of constituting

O

Boundary Commissions

lxiv

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

June

Viceroy’s Conference Paper

14

V.C.P. 76

Krishna Menon to Mountbatten
Letter

14

202 Mountbatten to Listowel 14

Tel. I439-S

204

Abbott to Abell

Tel. 131-G

15

205

Resolution of All-India Congress
Committee

15

207

Nehru to Mountbatten

Letter

15

208

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1451-S

15

209 Jenkins to Mountbatten 15

Letter 683

2io Note by H. M. Patel 15

Main subject or subjects

Page

Circulates paper by V. P. Menon

388

reporting discussion with Nehru, Patel
and Krishna Menon on reconstitution of
Executive Council, and outlining proposals
for timetable and method of
reconstitution

Reports plan for transfer of power 390

encountered ‘heavy weather’ at A.I.C.C.

meeting; mentions his fears that Britain

still thought in terms of Empire and

hoped to use territory of North-West

Frontier and Kashmir as part of an

imperial strategy; if N.W.F.P. and

Kashmir go to Pakistan ‘all hopes of the

plan being a settlement will prove

fanciful’ ; enclosure : note by Menon

outlining his conception of how proposed

Parliamentary legislation should be

framed

Discusses question of international status of 394
India and Pakistan; advises that H.M.G.
should take view that India minus
Pakistan inherits international entity and
obligations of present G. of I. and that
agreement should be reached between two
new Govts regarding division of assets
etc. ; prophesies ‘untold trouble’ if course
he suggests is not adopted

Casualty figures in Punjab communal 397

disturbances, Nov. 1946-May 1947
Acceptance of FLM.G.’s statement of 397

3 June (No. 45)

Congress nominations for membership of 401
Boundary Commissions

Refers to No. 195 ; reports decisions 401

reached on composition of Boundary

Commissions in No. 175, Item 2; asks

that no further action be taken on

suggestion that U.N.O. be approached

Reactions in Punjab to 3 June plan; 402

doubtful whether many British officials

will wish to serve new Governments ;

reactions among Indian members of

Services ; ‘the old administrative machine

is rapidly falling to pieces’ ; difficulties which

Jenkins foresees in implementing partition;

situation in Lahore, Amritsar, Gurgaon

and elsewhere ; liaison with Army

Command

Circulates to members of Partition 406

Committee (1) Recommendations of

CH. I THE 3 JUNE PLAN

lxv

210 (cont.) Steering Committee regarding Expert

Committees, their terms of reference and
personnel; (2) Paper by Auchinleck on
Reconstitution of the Armed Forces in
India

21 1 Monteath to Ismay 15 Arrangements for announcement of 414

Tel. 7702 change of Governors in N.W.F.P. ;

Listowel and Attlee are opposed to
resumption of Governorship by Caroe
after referendum

CHAPTER 2

Provincial Decision on Partition. Continuing discussions on partition arrange¬
ments; problems oflaw and order in the Punjab; decisions on Plan in Bengal,
Punjab and Sind Legislative Assemblies: 16 June to 26 June 1947

Name and Number

212 S. of S. to PI.M. Minister, Kabul
Tel. 51

213 Ismay to Mountbatten
Minute

215 Abell to Mountbatten
Minute

216 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Third

Staff Meeting
Items 1 and 3

217 Meeting of Special Committee

of Indian Cabinet

218 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter 684

219 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter 685 (extract)

220 Colville to Mountbatten
Report No. 84 (extract)

Date

1947
June
1 6

16

16

16

1 6

Main subject or subjects

Refers to No. 140; reports representations
to Foreign Office by Afghan Minister in
London of his Government’s views on
question of N.W.F.P.

Criticises recommendations for withdrawal
of British troops made in Enclosure to
No. 159; Viceroy’s staff submit that
proper policy is to commence withdrawal
on 15 August and carry it out as rapidly as
possible

Question whether appeals should be
made to British officials in India or
Pakistan to stay on
(1) Mountbatten’s discussions with
Auchinleck on division of Armed Forces ;
suggestion that Trivedi should come to
Delhi to help with this matter; (3)
question of H.M.G.’s relations with any
Indian States declaring themselves
independent

Consideration of Enclosures to No. 210

Paoe

o

415

416

418

419

421

16 Defends British officers against attacks 427

made by Nehru in speech to A.I.C.C. on their
handling of disturbances; asks how far
Nehru’s views are endorsed by H.M.G.
and Viceroy

16 Encloses note on meeting with Punjab 430

Party Leaders on partition arrangements
in Punjab

16 Reactions in Bombay to announcement 43 1

of 3 June

lxvi

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

221 Chiefs of Staff Committee
C.O.S.(47)76th Meeting
Minute 4

Date

June
1 6

222 Attlee to Listowel
Minute M. 246/47

223 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 90/47

224 Listowel to Jowitt
Letter

227 Mountbatten to Caroe
Letter 1450

228 Kripalani to Mountbatten
Letter

230 Record of Interview between

Mountbatten, Gandhi and Jinnah

16

16

16

17

17

17

Main subject or subjects Page

Agreement that it was of utmost 432

importance for H.M.G. to retain Andaman,

Nicobar and Laccadive Islands but that

timing and method of approach was

matter for political decision; Annex:

minute by Hollis to Minister of Defence

reporting these views and drawing

attention to absence from draft Bill of any

provision for holding negotiations on

British military requirements

Encloses and asks for his views on exchange 435

of letters with Halifax in which latter

refers to importance of holding India in

Commonwealth, notes that Indians are

‘much more moved by sentiment than by

reason’, and suggests that King and Queen

should visit Delhi in autumn for purpose

of ‘formally saying goodbye, and

wishing them [the Indians] good luck’

Refers to No. 148 and reports on 436

arrangements for change of Governors in
N.W.F.P.

Is grateful for Jowitt’s efforts (see No. 185) 437

towards securing Radcliffe’s services for

chairmanship of Arbitral Tribunal

Refers to Enclosure to No. 181; is 439

convinced there is no truth in allegations

made against Caroe; latter’s offer to take

leave during referendum ‘will be widely

recognized as prompted by your public

spirit and your devotion to the people of

the Frontier’ ; will recommend Lockhart

as Acting Governor; sends ‘warmest

thanks’ for all Caroe has done

Refers to difficulties concerning Governor 440

in N.W.F.P. ; reviews position taken up by

Congress and Frontier Ministers on

question of N.W.F.P. ; Ghaffar Kban has

again represented that referendum should

be on issue of independence, failing which

he would advise his followers to abstain

from participating in it

Gandhi’s wish that Jinnah should visit 448

N.W.F.P. Congress leaders to woo them
for Pakistan and his dissatisfaction with
outcome of his correspondence with
Jinnah; meeting arranged between Gandhi,

Jinnah and Ghaffar Khan; Gandhi urges
Mountbatten not to make immediate
statement on position of States who
declared their independence

CH. 2 PROVINCIAL DECISIONS ON PARTITION

lxvii

Name and Number Date

June

231 Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten 17

Letter

232 Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten 17
Letter

233 Mamdot, Swaran Singh and 17

Sachar to Jenkins
Letter

234 Ismay to Ghazanfar Ali Khan 17

Letter

235 Ghazanfar Ali Khan to Ismay 17

Letter

236

Mountbatten to Kripalani

17

Letter 1446/3

237

Mountbatten to Nehru

17

Letter 1446/3

239 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Fifth 17
Staff Meeting
Items 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9

Main subject or subjects Page

Asks that the military authorities be 449

requested to undertake provision of
accommodation, furniture, telephones, etc.
for the Pakistan Govt at Karachi, and the
transportation thither of personnel and
stores

Encloses letter from Daulatana on 451

situation in Gurgaon area ; Muslims there ‘feel
helpless and unprotected against the
full-scale war of extermination which is
being waged against them’ ; repeats appeal
to Mountbatten that handling of situation
should not be left entirely to non-Muslim
troops and hopes he ‘will take more
personal interest in this matter’

Refers to Enclosure to No. 219; agreed 454

decisions of Punjab Party leaders regarding
partition machinery in Punjab
Encloses statement supplied by C.G.S. 456

showing class composition of troops
employed in Gurgaon area; is shocked
to fmd Muslim Company of 3/15 Punjab
regiment not due to arrive until after
1 July; Auchinleck is being asked to see
whether any other Muslim troops could be
moved to area in near future; C.G.S.
emphasises difficulty of dealing with
disturbances on communal basis
Refers to No. 234; comments pointedly 458

on fact that Muslim Company of 3/15
Punjab has been left behind; notes C.G.S.’s
remark but wdiole point of Muslim
complaint is that disturbances are actually
being dealt with on communal basis ; asks
whether British troops could be made
available; fears clashes between Muslim
villagers and troops unless reassuring steps
are taken

Refers to No. 228; not feasible to alter 459

terms of referendum; draws attention to
No. 237

Refers to No. 228 ; encloses copy of 459

exchange of letters with Caroe; points out

that both his (Mountbatten’s) and Nehru’s

position would be untenable if either of

them were to go back on arrangement

that Provinces should not have independence

option

(1) Mountbatten’s conversation with 463

Gandhi and Jimiali about N.W.F.P.;

(3) resignation of Governors;

lxviii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

239 (cont)

240 Burrows to Mountbatten
Tel. 159-C

241 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 92/47

242 Mountbatten to Nehru
Letter 1446/3

244 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
I.B.(47)3ist Meeting
Minutes 1-4

245 G. of I., External Affairs and

Commonwealth Relations Dept.,
to S. of S.

Tel. 4694

251 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)115

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

(5) reconstruction of Executive Council;

(6) withdrawal of British forces ; (8) Sir C.

Trivedi; (9) Dominions Office papers on
Dominion Status (Enclosures to No. 131)
to be sent to Indian leaders

17 Reports talks with Suhrawardy and Roy 470
on formation of coalition Government
(which neither wanted) and alternative of
regional Ministries proposed by Roy and
which Suhrawardy did not turn down;
partition machinery also discussed

17 Refers to No. 222; points out practical 471

difficulties of Royal visit to India and
Pakistan in current year; but thinks that,
given assurance of cordial welcome, visit
to inaugurate new Dominions might be
valuable, possibly in cold weather of
1948-9; until Princes have defmed their
relations with new Dominions, Royal visit
might cause embarrassment in that regard

17 Thanks for note about Kashmir; indicates 473
importance he attaches to meeting
arranged next day, with Ismay in chair,
between Gandhi, Jinnah and Ghaffar Khan
about N.W.F.P.

17 Consideration of (1) draft Bill (No. 191); 474

agreement on certain amendments including
suggestion by Attlee that it should be
called ‘Indian Independence Bill’ ;

(2) international status of new Dominions;
agreement that H.M.G. should accept
Nehru’s view that Hindustan would
succeed to India’s position as international
entity; (3) assumption of international
obligations by successor authorities;
agreement that assurance on this point be
sought from Interim Govt on behalf of
both future Dominions; (4) Andamans
and Nicobars ; agreement to omit clause in
existing form on these Islands from Bill and
to seek Mountbatten’s advice on alternative;
also to seek by negotiation facilities in
Laccadive Islands

17 Question of explaining to Govts of Tibet 483

and Bhutan effect of constitutional
developments in India on H.M.G.’s
relationships with those countries

18 Memorandum by Listowel on Indian 491

Food Situation; supports on political

grounds Mountbatten’s request (No. 171)
for gesture by H.M.G. to assist India;

CH. 2 PROVINCIAL DECISIONS ON PARTITION

lxix

Name and Number

251 [cont .)

252 Cabinet India and Burma

Committee
Paper I.B.(47)ii6

253 Mieville to Mountbatten
Minute

254 Mountbatten to Ismay
Tel. i-S.K.

257 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 7841

258 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 7842

259 Mountbatten to Ismay
Tel. 5-S.K.

262 Mountbatten to Jinnah
Letter

263 Mountbatten to Jenkins
Letter 1224/5

265 Cabinet India and Burma

Committee
I.B.(47)32nd Meeting
Minutes 1-2

266 Turnbull to Harris
Minute

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

suggests Australia and Canada might be
asked to assist as matter of Commonwealth
interest

18 Note by Listowel circulating Nos. 248 493

and 249; Annex: extracts from telegrams
exchanged in 1935 concerning India
Office building and its contents

1 8 Reports inconclusive result of meeting 494

between Ismay, himself, Gandhi, Jinnah
and Ghaffar Khan; also Jinnah’s refusal in
private conversation with Ismay to authorise
Suhrawardy to form Regional Ministry in
Bengal

18 Is ‘immeasurably shocked’ that his promise 495
to Liaquat that Muslim troops would be
sent to Gurgaon has not been honoured

18 Refers to No. 115 and communicates 500

India and Burma Committee’s views on
question of showing draft Bill to Indian
leaders

18 Refers to Nos. 174 and 162, paras. 24-25; 501

communicates India and Burma Committee’s
views on question of Andaman and

Nicobar Islands

19 Refers to No. 173 ; suggests despatch of 502

further telegram to London pointing out
advantage of getting Gurkha question

settled before Nehru discovers proposal to
exclude Andamans and Nicobars from India

19 Refers to No. 175, Item 2; outlines 506

position reached regarding composition of
Boundary Commissions; informs him of
names suggested by Nehru and asks for
his suggestions

19 Refers to No. 218; explains difficulties 508

with Nehru, and what he proposes to say
to him about onslaught on British officers;
neither he nor H.M.G. believe a word of
such charges

19 Consideration of (1) terms of service of 513

British Officers continuing to serve in
Indian Armed Forces; (2) Indian Food
situation

19 Refers to No. 161, para. 4; argues that any 517
statement on H.M.G.’s relations with
India and Pakistan ‘should be a little less
pro-Gandhi than the Viceroy’s formula’,
and should neither state that there can be
no question of differentiation between the
two new Dominions, nor refer to a
tripartite arrangement

lxx

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

267 Ismay to Mountbatten
Tel. 1497-S

268 Burrows to Mountbatten
Tel. 163-C

272 S. of S. to H.M. Minister, Kabul
Tel. 52

273 Mountbatten to Listowel
Letter 1446/18

274 Auchinleck to Ismay
Letter

Date

June

19

Main subject or subjects

19

269 Ismay to Mountbatten

19

Tel. 1503-S

270 Listowel to Mountbatten

19

Tel. 7893

20

20

20

Page

519

Refers to Nos. 256 and 257; staff are
considering former; communicates terms
of telegram they suggest Mountbatten
might send in reply to latter on question of
showing draft Bill to Indian leaders
Refers to No. 253, note 4; reviews 520

position in light of Jinnah’s rejection of
proposal to form Regional Ministries ;
suggests Section 93 may now offer best chance
of securing cooperation of both parties in
partition of Bengal

Comments on No. 256, paras. 6 and 20. 522

Refers to No. 115; communicates India 523

and Burma Committee’s decision that
H.M.G. should accept that Hindustan
would continue existing India’s international
personality, subject to equitable division
of central assets

Transmits gist of note received from 526

Afghan Minister in London, following
interview reported in No. 212, in which
he outlines his Government’s views on
question of N.W.F.P.

Encloses letter and note from Bhopal to 528

be passed to Attlee; has explained to
Bhopal and Zafrullah Khan that Congress
would never have agreed to plan if there
were to be more than two Dominions; but
some States, particularly Hyderabad and
Bhopal, feel very unhappy; enclosure:

Bhopal’s letter alleging that, if H.M.G.’s
treatment of States is based on hope of
conciliating Congress, that hope will
prove futile; that Congress will be
dominated by left wing whose socialism
‘is only a thin veneer covering a mass of
rank communism’ ; and that decisions
already made by Constituent Assembly
offer little incentive to States to join
Hindustan

Adheres to advice given in Enclosure to 530

No. 159 on withdrawal of British troops;
contests Ismay’ s statement that ‘handful’
remaining could do little to safeguard
British lives and requests his opinion be
conveyed to H.M.G. ; points out that
Indian Army will soon be undergoing
reconstitution; wishes to make it clear to
Viceroy and H.M.G. that he ‘can no
longer be responsible in grave emergency

CH. 2 PROVINCIAL DECISIONS ON PARTITION

lxxi

Name and Number

274 (cont)

275 Ismay to Mountbatten
Minute

276 Menon to Abell
Tel. 1504-S

277 Burrows to Mountbatten
Tel. 978-S

278 Burrows to Mountbatten
Tel. 979-S

279 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 8-S.K.

281 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

for the protection of British lives and
property’ once British forces have left

20 Reports talk with Liaquat on (1) despatch 532
of Muslim troops to Gurgaon; (2) his
request for assistance of military officer in
making plans for accommodation of
Pakistan Govt at Karachi; (3) his request
for help in fmding a ‘Controller of
Currency’ ; (4) composition of Arbitral
Tribunal; (5) composition of Boundary
Commissions; (6) question whether there
was to be common Governor General
and procedure for appointing Governors ;

(7) Governor General’s Bodyguard;

(8) Liaquat’s doubts about speed at which
Army was being partitioned and his and
Jinnah’s insistence that they would not
take over the reins of Government in
Pakistan without an Army on the spot
under their control; (9) Liaquat’s suggestion
that British troops should remain in India
while Indian Army was in process of
transition

20 Nehru now agrees that decision on future 535
of Baluchistan should be taken by Shahi
Jirga (excluding Sardars nominated by
Kalat State) and non-official members of
Quetta Municipality; Ismay is putting
proposal to Jinnah

20 Reports joint meeting of Bengal Legislative 536
Assembly has voted to join new
Constituent Assembly if Province remains
united

20 Reports West Bengal M.L.As have voted 536
for partition and to join existing
Constituent Assembly; East Bengal M.L.As
have voted against partition and to join
new Constituent Assembly and to agree to
amalgamation of Sylhet

20 Refers to No. 256, paras. 6 and 20; question 537
of consultation with Indian leaders on
particular points arising on draft Bill;
agrees with Reforms Office and Political
Dept in deprecating formal denunciation
of treaties with States

20 Refers to Nos. 161 and 162; A.I.C.C. 538

resolution on 3 June plan; need for Very
careful watching and handling’ of Gandhi ;
question of agreements between H.M.G.
and two new Dominions; change of
Governors in N.W.F.P.; Mountbatten’s

lxxii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

281 ( cont .)

284 Ismay to Mountbatten
Tel. 1512-S

285 Ismay to Mountbatten
Tel. 1513-S

289 Burrows to Mountbatten
Tel. 166-C

291 Ismay to Burrows
Tel. 1533— S

292 Ismay to Mountbatten
Tel. 1534-S

298 Jinnah to Ismay
Letter

299 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter

300 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

meetings with leaders on administrative
implications of partition and composition
of Arbitral Tribunal and Boundary
Commissions; intensity of work in New
Delhi and London; Congress pressure and
H.M.G.’s policy on States; food situation;
Ramamurty as Acting Governor of
Bombay

20 Refers to No. 258 and transmits draft 544

reply for Mountbatten to send to it,
pressing strongly for complete exlusion from
draft Bill of any reference to Andaman
and Nicobar Islands

20 Refers to No. 270 on international status 544
of India and Pakistan and transmits draft

reply for Mountbatten to send agreeing
with it

21 Refers to No. 268; reports discussion with 550
Suhrawardy at which latter appeared to
acquiesce in prospect of Section 93 and
promised full cooperation in processes of
partition; stresses cordiality of talk and,

since he is assured of cooperation of
League as well as Congress, seeks
Mountbatten’s formal concurrence in
Section 93 proclamation

21 Informs him of message from Jinnah that 553
Suhrawardy has telephoned saying that
Burrows ‘threatened’ him with Section 93
which Jinnah argues is ultra vires; indicates
to Burrows that he should take no final
decision until he hears from Mountbatten

21 Reports events described in No. 291 and 554
his instructions to Burrows

22 Is unable to approve proposal (see No. 559

276) for body to decide future of

Baluchistan

22 Reports on visit to Gurgaon; troops on 560

spot now seem adequate but district is in
‘a very bad way’; Brendon sent on leave;

Bharatpur Very seriously disturbed’ and
refugees from there may add to Punjab
problems

22 Describes conditions in Punjab, especially 561
Lahore; mentions inter alia allegations made
against police and that ‘insistent demand
is either for the military to take charge, or
for the withdrawal of the police and the
military so that the people can look after
themselves’ ; suggests appointment by
Central Govt of Relief Officer to collect

CH. 2 PROVINCIAL DECISIONS ON PARTITION

lxxiii

Name and Number

300 ( cont .)

301 Note by C. P. Scott

302 Note by I. D. Scott

3 04 Reuter report

305 Note by Jenkins

306 Viceroy’s Conference Paper
V.C.P. 88

307 Viceroy’s Conference Paper

V.C.P. 90

308 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Sixth

Staff Meeting
Items 1, 3-1 1

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

necessary data for formulation of relief
policy

23 Tyson has reported on telephone that 564

(1) Suhrawardy has written stating Bengal
League Party prefer Coalition or Regional
Ministry to Section 93 ; (2) Burrows has
asked whether Suhrawardy shares this
view; (3) great difficulty is being found in
drafting Section 93 Proclamation within
terms of Act

23 Tyson has reported on telephone that 565

Suhrawardy has replied to Burrows (see
No. 301) that, as between Section 93 and
Regional Ministry, he considers latter
‘lesser of two evils’

23 Joint meeting of Punjab Legislative 566

Assembly votes to join new Constituent
Assembly if Province remains united;

East Punjab M.L.As vote for partition and
to join existing Constituent Assembly;

West Punjab M.L.As vote against
partition

23 Record of conversation with Mamdot, 567

Sachar and Swaran Singh on: law and
order situation (Jenkins stresses contribution
parties could make by controlling their
followers; party leaders want British
officers in charge of disturbed areas
replaced by Indians) ; Constituent Assembly
elections; setting up of Partition
Committee. Separate talk with Sachar and
Swaran Singh on: League resolution
against Jenkins; alleged misconduct of an
official and difficulties facing Services
generally

23 Circulates paper by V. P. Menon on 570

position of Government in Bengal and
implications of decision there for Punjab,
N.W.F.P., and Centre

23 Circulates draft telegram on withdrawal 572

of British forces

23 (1) composition of body to decide future 573

of Baluchistan; (3) reconstitution of Govt
in Bengal; (4) reconstitution of Executive
Council; (5) Governor-Generalship of new
Dominions; (6) withdrawal of British
forces; (7) arrangements for showing draft
Bill to Indian leaders; (8) ceremonies on day
of transfer of power; (9) poster for N.W.F.P.
referendum; (10) Berar; (11) Hyderabad

lxxiv

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

309 H.M. Minister, Kabul to G. of I.,
External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations Dept
Tel. 51

310 Caroe to Mountbatten
Letter GH-93 (extract)

Date

June

23

Main subject or subjects

23

3 1 1 Record of Interview between
Mountbatten and Jinnah

23

312 Note by Auchinleck
C.-in-C.’s paper 4/47

23

313 Mackenzie King to Attlee

Tel. 122 via Dominions Office

314 Hydari to Mountbatten
Tel. 145-MSG

315 Montgomery to Simpson

Tel. 1547-S via Viceroy and India
Office

316 Viceroy’s Conference Paper

V.C.P. 92

23

23

23

24

Page

577

Refers to No. 272; reports further
interview with Afghan Foreign Minister
on Afghan interest in N.W.F.P. ; Afghan
Govt wish to send Mission to have talks
with Indian political leaders in Peshawar
and Delhi

Outlines policy he believes should be adopted 578
towards tribes ; Afghan interference and
need for successor authority to make it clear
that benefits tribes at present enjoy from
India will continue; asserts that most of
troubles in dealing with tribes date from
Nehru’s assumption of responsibility for
tribal affairs

(1) Governor-Generalship of Pakistan and 580
Governorships of Pakistan Provinces;

(2) terms of reference, composition and
chairmanship of Boundary Commissions;

(3) agreement on formation of shadow
Cabinet in Bengal with veto over
decisions affecting West Bengal;

(4) agreement on composition of body to decide
future of Baluchistan; (5) agreement on
suggestion that Jenkins should issue firm
statement on putting down violence in
Punjab; (6) Jinnah’s insistence on having

an army and an operational C.-in-C. under
Pakistan Govt orders by 15 August;

(7) proposal that first meeting of Pakistan
Constituent Assembly should be held in
Legislative Assembly Chamber in Delhi
Explains need for retention of British 583

Officers and other ranks and requests
public announcement on this subject by
Partition Committee; urges that Indian
leaders should ‘say publicly that they need the
help of British officers’

Refers to No. 166; indicates agreement 585

with proposed change ; prefers title
‘Commonwealth Relations’ to
‘Commonwealth Affairs’

Communicates Assam Ministers’ wish for 586

separate Boundary Commission for

Assam and recommends compliance

Reports discussions with Nehru on 586

withdrawal of British troops and

employment of Gurkhas

Circulates extract from telegram from 587

Jenkins on possibility of establishing
neutral zone in Punjab, with comments by
Abell and Menon doubting its feasibility

317

3i8

319

320

321

322

327

328

329

330

331

CH. 2 PROVINCIAL DECISIONS ON PARTITION

lxxv

Name and Number

Jinnah to Mountbatten
Letter

Shone to Tyson
Letter

Record, of Interview between
Mountbatten and Nehru

Mountbatten to Jenkins
Tel. 1569-S

Statement by Ghaffar Khan
Cabinet

C.M.(47)56th Conclusions
Minute 4

Jenkins to Mountbatten
Tel. (unnumbered)

Ismay to Mountbatten
Minute

Montgomery to Simpson
Tel. 1560-S via Viceroy and India
Office

Montgomery to Attlee
Tel. 1565-S via Viceroy and India
Office

Montgomery to Nehru
Letter

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

24 Refers to No. 262; discusses chairmanship 588
of Boundary Commissions and Arbitral
Tribunal; submits nominations for
membership of Boundary Commissions

24 Refers to Vol. IX, No. 552 and outlines 589

position regarding maintenance of law and
order and protection of British lives and
property during period before final
transfer of power

24 (1) Nehru’s alleged statements at Hardwar 591
regarding N.W.F.P. referendum;

(2) Sylhet referendum; (3) place of meeting of
Pakistan Constituent Assembly; (4) Kashmir

24 Reports discussion with Jinnah and Nehru 594
on situation in Lahore and Amritsar; both
demanded ‘utterly ruthless’ action to
suppress disturbances and latter proposed
declaration of martial law; subject to
Jenkins’s comments Mountbatten proposes
to raise this in Cabinet and issue
announcement

24 Announces boycott of N.W.F.P. 594

referendum

24 Note taken of need for U.K. and 596

Dominion Parliaments to give assent to
change in King’s title ; Govt of Eire to be
consulted also

24 Refers to No. 320; reports discussions 605

with military and police officers and party
leaders on possibility of declaring martial
law and outlines arguments against it;
argues ‘real remedy is active intervention
by political leaders’ to ‘bring genuine
private pressure to bear on their goonda
supporters’

24 Refers to No. 327; finds Jenkins’s 606

arguments convincing; suggests
Mountbatten should read expurgated
edition to Indian Cabinet and urge
necessity to control extremists through
local contacts

24 Refers to No. 315; reports discussion with 607
Jinnah on withdrawal of British troops

24 Reports Nehru’s agreement in principle 608

to employment of Gurkhas in British
Army

24 Has reported agreement in principle on 609

Gurkha question to Attlee and encloses
copy of No. 330; notes that they will plan
to begin withdrawal of British troops on

lxxvi

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

June

331

(cont)

332

Nehru to Montgomery

24

333

Listowel to Mountbatten

Tel. 8122

24

334 S. of S. to G. of I., External 24

Affairs and Commonwealth
Relations Dept
Tel. 8125

335 Mountbatten to Listowel 24

Tel. 1570-S

336 Burrows to Mountbatten 24

Tel. 170-S

337 Shone to Secretary to Cabinet 25

Despatch 61

338 Indian Cabinet Meeting 25

Cases 152 and 155/32/47

339 Jenkins to Mountbatten 25

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

15 Aug. 1947 and aim to complete it by
end of Feb. 1948

Acknowledges No. 331 609

Discusses question of assumption of 610

international obligations by new
Dominions; enquires whether assurance
on this point would be likely to be
forthcoming from Interim Govt on behalf
of both new Dominions

Refers to Vol. X, No. 219; H.M.G. will 612
not wish to maintain separate Mission at
Lhasa; discusses question of treaty relations
with Tibet and suggests G. of I. should
state that they will assume obligations
under 1914 Simla Convention
Conveys Auchinleck’s views on withdrawal 613
of British troops but, for wider ‘overriding’
considerations, recommends withdrawal
should start on 15 August; suggests terms
of announcement

Agrees to proposal for shadow Cabinet 615

for West Bengal provided his special
responsibilities (including that for food)
are not affected

Montgomery’s conversations with Nehru 616
on Gurkha question; enclosure: note of
conversation on 23 June on this subject,
and on withdrawal of British troops,
partition, and French and Portuguese colonies
in India

(1) Decision to establish States Dept of 620

Govt of India; (2) discussion of
communal situation in Lahore and
Amritsar; Mountbatten summarises expert
advice against imposition of martial law;
lack of confidence expressed in officers
handling disturbances; Gurgaon situation
considered; agreement that (i) Jenkins
should invite Punjab party leaders to make
agreed recommendations of officers to be
posted in Lahore and Amritsar, and to
form security committee of officials and
non-officials; (ii) Baldev Singh should again
examine composition of troops in Gurgaon;

(iii) party leaders should continue to use
influence to encourage local leaders to
stop violence

Analysis of situation in Lahore and 623

Amritsar and of reasons for failure to
control it; believes remedies are
(a) genuine effort by party leaders to stop

CH. 2 PROVINCIAL DECISIONS ON PARTITION

lxxvii

Name and Number

339 (amt.)

341 Menon to Abell
Letter D.O. 24-S/47-R

342 Caroe to Mountbatten
Tel. CA/126

343 Abell to Abbott
Tel. 1571-S

344 Minutes ot Viceroy’s Forty Seventh

Staff Meeting
Item 7

345 Hollis to Alexander
Minute

346 Hollis to Alexander
Minute

347 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
13.(47)3 5th Meeting
Minutes 1-2

352 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8185

353 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8194

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

trouble by pressure on their own goondas,

(b) better intelligence, and (c) speedier
justice; partition developments; signs of
dissension within Muslim League;
indications that Sikhs may go back on
partition plan or delay progress; Punjab
‘reasonably quiet’ outside Lahore, Amritsar
and Gurgaon

25 Reports position reached regarding 632

destruction of confidential records in
Reforms Office

25 Refers to No. 309; states there is reason 633

to believe Afghan move was to some
extent inspired by Frontier Congress
leaders ; interference by Afghan Mission in
Indian constitutional and political issues
seems ‘more than objectionable’ ; in no case
could it be given access to tribal territory or
Frontier States

25 Reports Mountbatten ‘has just had a very 633
difficult time in Cabinet over Lahore’, and
that it was unanimously agreed that he
should request Jenkins (i) to replace local
officials by ones agreed by all three parties
in whom they would undertake to repose
complete confidence, and (ii) to form
Standing Security Committee of local
leaders

25 Decisions that there should not be 634

separate Boundary Commission for Assam
and on miscellaneous points concerning
Commissions

25 Reports views he believes Chiefs of Staff 636
would wish to express on (a) Andaman
and Nicobar Islands; (b) relations of
H.M.G. with India and Pakistan

25 Reports views of Chiefs of Staff on 637

withdrawal of British forces, and that they
are ‘very worried’ about line taken by
Mountbatten on Andamans and Nicobars

25 (1) recruitment of Gurkhas to British 638

Army; (2) withdrawal of British forces

25 Discusses position of Governors of split 648

Provinces as from appointed day and in
particular question of whose advice should
be taken on filling new appointments

25 Refers to No. 284 and communicates 649

Cabinet Committee’s views on inclusion
of revised Clause on Andamans and

lxxviii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

353 (cont.)

June

369 Viceroy’s Personal Report

27

No. 10, paras. 7-9

Main subject or subjects Page

Nicobars in draft Bill to be shown Indian
leaders

Reports decisions on 20, 23 and 26 June of 679
Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and
Punjab in favour of partition, and of Sind
in favour of joining Pakistan

CHAPTER 3

Implementation oj the Plan . Establishment of Partition Council; crisis over
reconstitution of Executive Council ; question of the Governor-Generalship :
26 June to 7 July 1947

Name and Number

354 Meeting of Special Committee of
Indian Cabinet
Items i-ix

356 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

357 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter 687

Date Main subject or subjects Page

1947

June

26 (i) procedure for appointment of Provincial 650
Governors; (ii) replacement of Special
Committee by Partition Council ;

(iii) arrangements for setting up Pakistan Govt
at Karachi ; (iv) retention of British Officers
in Indian Army; (v) letter regarding option
to S/S’s Officers; (vi) division of Armed
Forces; agreement that two Dominions
should each have operational command of
their respective armed forces but that, for
an interim period, there should be joint
administrative control (possibly under a
Joint Defence Council) ; (vii) withdrawal of
British Army; (viii) Boundary Commissions;
suggestion by Mountbatten that Radcliffe
might be considered for Chairmanship;

(ix) reconstitution of Govts at Centre and
in Bengal ; members of Partition Council
asked to consider alternatives
26 Recalls that Indian leaders have been 658

informed that, before legislation to
transfer power is introduced, they will have
opportunity of examining it ; outlines his
conception of form such legislation should
take, emphasising in particular need for a
separate Act for each new Dominion
26 Refers to No. 343 ; in compliance with 659

instructions has asked party leaders to
suggest new teams of officers for Lahore
district, and has formed Security
Committee ; is not hopeful of quick
partition proceedings

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

lxxix

Name and Number Date Main subject or subjects

June

358 Auchinleck to Mountbatten 2 6

Paper 6/47

359 Note by Patel 26

360 Cabinet India and Burma 26

Committee
I.B.(47)36th Meeting
Minute 3

361 Cabinet 26

C.M.(47)57th Conclusions

Minute 4

362 Chiefs of Staff Committee 26

Paper C.0. 8.(47)134(0)

363 Burrows to Mountbatten 26

Tel. 174-S

364

Burrows to Mountbatten

26

Tel. 175-C

367

Partition Council Meeting

27

Case Nos. P.C.1/1/47 and 5/1/47

368 Mountbatten to Listowel 27

Letter

369 Viceroy’s Personal Report 27

No. 10, paras. 1-25 and 37-43

Refers to Nos. 315 and 329; asks for
official instructions on withdrawal of
British troops; comments on certain
points in No. 329

Refers to No. 103, note 4; considers
Indian Cabinet should restate their position
on question of linking liability for payment
of compensation to negotiations on
Sterling Balances

(3) agreement not to accede to Gandhi’s
request for an assurance that H.M.G.
would not differentiate between India and
Pakistan in agreements made with them
Report by Attlee on progress in drafting
Indian Independence Bill ; agreement that
he should discuss it with Opposition and
that Mountbatten should show it to Indian
leaders

Report by Chiefs of Staff concluding
(i) that British forces could only be
retained in India on request; (ii) if request
for retention was received from India and
Pakistan, or even Pakistan alone, it should
be accepted

For reasons indicated in No. 364 presses
that Chittagong Hill Tracts be treated, at
least temporarily, as part of East Bengal
pending negotiations between two
Dominions

Pvefers to No. 363 and discusses position of
Chittagong Hill Tracts
(1) consideration of question of
reconstitution of Govts at Centre and in
Bengal with agreement on arrangements
for Bengal (and Punjab) ; (2) Mountbatten
announces arrangements for enabling
Indian leaders to study draft Bill
Refers to Nos. 182 and 281; possible
appointment of Radcliffe as Chairman of
Arbitral Tribunal and of Boundary
Commissions; welcomes proposal to
establish Commonwealth Relations Office —
title ‘Dominion’ is becoming ‘almost
unpopular’ ; need for looser form of
Commonwealth association; Ceylon;
possible renewal of invitation to India to
participate in U.K. military colleges, etc;
‘transfer of power’ honours; late hours
worked

Internal situation much quieter except for
Punjab; disturbances in Lahore, Amritsar

Page

660

66 1

662

664

665

671

671

675

677

679

lxxx

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

369 (cont.)

370 Mountbatten to Jenkins
Letter

371 Moon to Ismay
Letter

372 Note by H. M. Patel

374 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 102/47

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

and Gurgaon; Very difficult’ Cabinet
meeting resulting in decision to establish
Security Committee of local Punjab leaders;
decisions in Legislative Assemblies of
Bengal and Punjab on partition, and in
Sind to join Pakistan; agreement on
Boundary Commissions’ terms of
reference and on appointment of
Radcliffe as Chairman; controversy over
Liaquat’s request for printing press;
conversion of Partition Committee into
Partition Council; Jinnah member of latter;
crisis over reconstruction of Interim
Government; stalemate over composition of
Arbitral Tribunal; method of election in
Baluchistan; sterile meetings among
Gandhi, Jinnah and Ghaffar Khan regarding
N.W.F.P.; position regarding S/S’s
Officers continuing to serve India or
Pakistan; Nehru’s alleged statement at
Hardwar regarding N.W.F.P. referendum;
rejection by Congress leaders of proposal
that Pakistan Constituent Assembly should
meet in Delhi; Montgomery’s visit; plans
for division of Army

27 Acknowledges No. 299; will not show 691

Nehru No. 218 as latter is in ‘rather a
difficult state of mind’ at present ; only
overriding necessity of achieving political
settlement compels Mountbatten to avoid
anything tending to a break with Indian
leaders

27 Explains possibility that Sikhs can be 692

brought to accept that East Punjab should
join Pakistan which will avert (otherwise
inevitable) civil war; suggests inter alia
that East Punjab should be given strongest
possible Sikh complexion by detaching
certain Flindu districts from it

27 Circulates to members of Partition Council 693
note by Mountbatten on Partition of Armed
Forces; Annexures: I: Outline proposals
for control of armed forces during
reconstitution (including proposal for
Joint Defence Council); II: Draft terms of
reference for Armed Forces Reconstitution
Committee

27 Refers to Nos. 373 and 366; attaches draft 701
of letter from Attlee to Lascelles explaining
position regarding procedure for

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

lxxxi

Name and Number

Date

374 (< :ont .)

June

376 Listowel to Mountbatten

Letter

27

377 H.M. Minister, Kabul to G. of I., 27

External Affairs and
Commonwealth Relations Dept
Tel. 52

378 Mountbatten to Listowel 27

Tel. 1610-S

379 Mountbatten to Listowel 27

Tel. 1616-S

381 Listowel to Mountbatten 27

Tel. 8284

382 Gandhi to Mountbatten 27/28

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

appointment of Governor-General and
Governors

Refers to No. 161, para. 4 and explains why 704
India Committee are unwilling to agree to
Gandhi’s request for an assurance from
H.M.G. that they would not differentiate
between India and Pakistan in agreements
made with them, or to state that they
desired tripartite arrangements; food
question; programme for discussion of
draft Bill with Opposition and Indian
leaders; Bhopal’s views on H.M.G.’s
policy towards States; Burmese goodwill
Mission and policy on Burma

Refers to Nos. 342 and 309; reviews 707

position of Afghan Govt and possible
courses of action open to it regarding
N.W.F.P.; suggests Afghan Mission might
be permitted to visit Delhi

Reports proceedings of Partition Council 708

regarding Chairmanship of Boundary
Commissions, and of Arbitral Tribunal;
requests that Radcliffe should be asked to
accept Chairmanship of both Boundary
Commissions

Reports proceedings in Partition 709

Committee and Partition Council (see
Nos. 354, Minute ix, and 367) and
private talks with Patel and Jinnah on
reconstitution of Governments at Centre
and in Bengal and Punjab ; explains he will
be telegraphing Jinnah’ s objections to
reconstitution at Centre for legal opinion,
asks for early reply, and indicates course of
action he intends to pursue

Refers to No. 335 and conveys H.M.G.’s 712
agreement to start withdrawal of British
forces on 15 August; discusses timing and
terms of announcement

Argues that Mountbatten must choose 713

between parties, taking his advisers from

League if he believes Jinnah is more

correct than Congress ; argues that there is

no need to ‘put a premium’ on ‘initial

mistake of the British being party to

splitting India into two’ ; contests view

that if partition had not been made during

British occupation, Hindus would never

have allowed it; belief that ‘Hindu society

by reason of its mere superiority in

lxxxii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

382 ( cont .)

June

383 Mountbatten to Jenkins

Letter 40/5

28

384 Mountbatten to Jenkins 28

Letter 133/14

388 Shone to Secretary to Cabinet 28

Despatch 63

389 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Eighth 28

Staff Meeting
Item 1

390 Mountbatten to Gandhi 28

Letter

391 Listowel to Mountbatten 28

Tel. 73

392 Nehru to Mountbatten 28

Letter

393 Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten 28
Letter

394 Tyson to Abell 28

Letter d.o. 113-C.R.

Main subject or subjects Page

numbers can crush millions of Muslims is
an outstanding myth’

Refers to No. 339; believes if all three 715

parties could agree on appointment of set

of local officials ‘it would make a great

deal of difference’ ; mentions proposal for

two sets of advisers in Punjab; is having

Jenkins’s proposals for speedier justice

examined but ‘formidable difficulties’

usually arise over proposals of this sort

Refers to No. 357; mentions he did press 716

party leaders in Cabinet to use their

influence to stop trouble in Lahore;

confirms Jenkins will be free to leave on

15 August but probably not before

Encloses note by Nehru on his talks with 720

Montgomery about withdrawal of British

troops, and employment of Gurkhas in

British Army

Refers to No. 382; Mountbatten states 726

Gandhi has misinterpreted what he had
said to him

Refers to No. 382; he (Mountbatten) must 727

have failed to make his meaning clear; is

glad letter has not been shown to others

since he would be sorry ‘that views should

be attributed to me which I did not, in

fact, express’ ; hopes they may discuss

these matters again

Refers to No. 352; enquires about 727

possibility of political leaders agreeing to

appointment of existing Governors of

Bengal and Punjab as Governors of both

halves of their respective Provinces

Refers to No. 356, note 2; points out that 728

legislation to transfer power is of ‘utmost

consequence to India’ ; thinks it ‘an entirely

wrong approach to proceed secretively’ ;

trusts that full opportunity will be given

them to consider Bill before it is

introduced in Parliament

Encloses draft terms of reference for 729

Boundary Commissions

Reports that Ghosh has rejected, but 730

Suhrawardy agreed to, proposals for
reconstitution of Government in Bengal
and Ghosh is flying to see Congress High
Command

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

lxxxiii

Name and Number Date

June

395 G. of I., External Affairs and 29

Commonwealth Relations Dept,
to S. of S.

Tel. 5047

396 Gandhi to Mountbatten 28/29

Letter

397 Mountbatten to Nehru 28/29

Letter

398 Mountbatten to Jinnah 29

Letter

399 Ismay to Mountbatten 29

Minute

400 Mountbatten to Dow 29

Letter 592/92

404 Cabinet India and Burma 29

Committee
I-B. (47)131

405 Abell to Harris 29

Tel. 1643-S

Main subject or subjects Page

Outlines Govt of India’s views, in the 730

light of Afghan Govt’s press campaign,
regarding the position of the peoples living
between the Durand Line and the Indus
river; suggests H.M.G. might consider
requesting U.S. Govt to utter an informal
warning to Afghan Minister in
Washington

Reports that Ghaffar Khan has written to 732
him stating his followers will abstain from
voting in referendum, and drawing
attention to certain other matters regarding
conduct of referendum

Refers to No. 392; encloses invitation 733

(already drafted) to study draft Bill ; trusts
Rau’s presence will meet need for
constitutional and legal advice ; Enclosure :
letter from Mountbatten to Nehru inviting
him to come to Viceroy’s House on 1 July
to study draft Bill; arrangements made for
Congress and League representatives to
study Bill in separate rooms; Patel,

Jinnah and Liaquat also invited; indicates

expert advisers who will be present

Refers to Nos. 399, Item 2, and 393 ; 735

reviews discussions regarding Boundary

Commissions’ terms of reference to which

he and staff have not had ‘a shadow of

doubt’ that League had agreed; notice is

being issued next day ; is sure Jinnah will

agree that delay resulting from re-opening

question should not be incurred

Reports talk with Jinnah and Liaquat 736

(on 28 June) on (1) reconstitution of

Interim Govt; (2) Boundary Commissions’

terms of reference; (3) Purnea; (4)

N.W.F.P. referendum; (5) possible
appointment of Cunningham as Governor
of N.W.F.P.; (6) proposed appointment of
Rowlands as Financial Adviser and general
administrator in Pakistan

Explains Boundary Commission’s work 738

will not include consideration of Bihar (or
Sind) boundaries

Memorandum by Listowel circulating 742

No. 379, a draft reply, and the relevant
statutory provisions governing conduct of
business in Executive Council

Attitude of Muslim League and Jinnah to 744
use by areas adhering to existing

lxxxiv

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

405 ( cont .)

June

406 Mountbatten to Listowel

29

Tel. 1650-S

407 Abbott to Abell 29

Express letter G.S. 401

408 Nehru to Mountbatten 29

Letter

409 Mountbatten to Burrows 29

Tel. 165 1 -S

410 Mountbatten to Burrows

29

Tel. 1652-S

41 1 Mountbatten to Listowel

29

Tel. 1653-S

412 Mountbatten to Listowel 29

Tel. 1655-S

413 Mountbatten to Listowel 29

Tel. 1656-S

415 Gazette of India 30

Extraordinary-

Notification by G. of I., Secretariat
of Governor-General (Reforms)

A lain subject or subjects Page

Constituent Assembly of title ‘India’ rather
than ‘Hindustan’

Refers to No. 391 ; no chance of 745

persuading parties to agree to Burrows
and Jenkins staying on temporarily as
Governors of both new halves of their
Provinces

Transmits note by Jenkins opposing 745

proposal to establish two bodies of
Advisers in Punjab

Refers to No. 397 and Enclosure; points 746
out legislation is going to affect future of
India vitally; complains they are only being
given chance to see draft at last stage; Rau’s
presence will be welcome, but they wish
to consult others ; Gandhi should also see
draft Bill ; if ‘willing assent of all parties
concerned’ is not obtained, object of Bill
‘is somewhat nullified’ ; earnestly requests
him to consider matter afresh and if
necessary consult H.M.G.

Refers to No. 410; this gives Burrows 747

exact instructions regarding reconstitution
of Govt in Bengal which he
(Mountbatten) is satisfied will be acceptable
to Congress

Transmits list of instructions referred to in 748
No. 409

Reports Nehru’s request in No. 408 that 748
Bill be shown to Gandhi and others in
addition to those already invited;

Mountbatten thinks request should be
granted, and hopes by so doing to carry
Congress leaders with him despite Nehru’s
protest at procedure adopted for
consideration of Bill

Refers to No. 413 ; is advised that his 749

proposal is legal; reports Jinnah’s remark
that legal objection was device to enable
Mountbatten to postpone reconstitution if
he wished; but Mountbatten believes he
‘must go ahead if the course proposed is
not unconstitutional, since Nehru in
particular is most insistent’

Refers to No. 412 and transmits text of 750

Jinnah’s note objecting to legality of
proposal for reconstituting Interim Govt
Announcement by Governor-General of 755
composition and terms of reference of
Boundary Commissions

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

lxxxv

416

417

Name and Number

Date

June

Partition Council Meeting

30

Case P.C.7/2/47

Record of Interview between

30

Mountbatten, Kartar Singh and
Baldev Singh

421 Cabinet India and Burma 30

Committee
LB. (47) 3 7th Meeting
Minutes 1-2

422 Mountbatten to Gandhi 30

Letter 1446/3

423 Mountbatten to Gandhi

30

Letter 1446/8

424 Mountbatten to Nehru

30

Letter 1446/8

425 Mountbatten to Jinnah 30

Letter 1446/8

426 Jenkins to Mountbatten
Letter (extract)

30

Main subject or subjects Page

Consideration and approval, subject to 756

minor amendments, of Mountbatten’s
note (No. 372) on partition of Armed
Forces

Mountbatten refers to No. 178; discussion 760
of weightage and safeguards demanded by
Sikhs; Kartar Singh refers to possibility of
partitioning East Punjab to enable separate
Punjabi-speaking Province to be formed;

Sikh demands regarding demarcation of
boundary and transfer of population, and
that Mountbatten’s broadcast (No. 44)
should be given to Boundary Commission;
Mountbatten undertakes to write to Indian
leaders to put Sikh point of view; Annex:
note by Kartar Singh on demarcation of
boundaries, transfer of population, and
safeguards demanded by Sikhs
(1) Future of India Office and its contents; 768
decision that this matter should be left for
negotiation with Indian Govt; (2) future
of Interim Govt; decision that
Mountbatten’s discretion in handling this
question should not be fettered but that he
should be informed that Ministers considered
there was ‘much force’ in Jinnah’s note
Refers to No. 396; is glad referendum will 772
proceed without interference by Ghaffar
Khan’s followers; is sending No. 396 to
Lockhart so that he may take any
necessary action on other points mentioned;
reports what he has done regarding
Kashmir

Invites him to meeting to see Indian 773

Independence Bill

Refers to No. 408; agrees to additional 773

persons mentioned therein attending
meeting to study draft Bill; emphasises need
to avoid any leakage; has told Jinnah he
could also increase his party

Is glad to know Jinnah is satisfied with 774

composition of his party to consider draft

Bill; emphasises need to avoid any leakage;

mentions invitation to Gandhi; refers to

clause enabling one person to be appointed

to both Governor-Generalships and asks

whom Jinnah wishes to nominate as

Governor-General of Pakistan

Meetings of Security Committee; Jenkins 775

thinks party leaders have ‘really tried to

restore peace’; discussions regarding

lxxxvi

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

426 (cont.)

430 Minutes by Erskine Crum, Abell

and Mountbatten

431 G. of I., External Affairs and

Commonwealth Relations Dept,
to S. of S.

Tel. 5078

433 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8360

435 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

selection of district staffs in Lahore and
Amritsar; membership of Punjab Partition
Committee; Steering Committee ‘seems to
be working all right’ ; proposal for two
teams of Advisers ; party leaders think
Jenkins’s proposals for special tribunals too
severe; interview that day with Mamdot
and Sadiq Hassan; Mamdot is ‘clearly not at
all happy about the communal position*
and ‘particularly sore’ at search operation
at Misri Shah, and wants another Muslim
added to Security Committee

30 Question whether to raise issue of 798

Chittagong Hill Tracts at meeting with
Indian leaders

30 Refers to Nos. 309, 377 and 395; contests 799
Afghan Govt’s claims regarding territory
between Durand Line and Indus River and,
in particular, rejects proposal to send
mission to India and suggestion that
territory should be free to join Afghanistan
or separate from both successor Govts ;
notes territory can claim ‘fullest
autonomy’ within framework of one of
successor Govts ; G. of I. desire ‘nothing
but friendship with Afghanistan’ ;
reiterates suggestion that friendly third
party, e.g. U.S.A., should be asked to put
in word of caution to Afghan Govt

30 Refers to Nos. 379, 412 and 413 and 801

conveys Ministers’ views thereon; comments
on obscurities in draft announcement on
reconstitution of Interim Govt; outlines
legal position indicating that something
on lines Mountbatten proposes can be
done provided it carries general agreement
of all Members of Council; Ministers
consider Jinnah has made out ‘strong case’
and that his alternative solution would be
preferable course to adopt; H.M.G.
authorise Mountbatten to deal with
situation as seems best to him but point out
Parliamentary importance of being able to
maintain that partition is being carried out
by agreement — ‘smooth and quiet passage
of bill . . . might turn on this’ ; discusses
arrangements for release of statement and
general line to be taken on reconstitution
of Govt

30 Thanks for No. 424; will convey 803

invitation to additional experts and

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

lxxxvii

Name and Number Date

June

435 [cont.)

43 6 Mountbatten to Attlee 30

Tel. 1675-S via India Office

437 Mountbatten to Listowel 30

Tel. 1677-S

438 Listowel to Mountbatten 30

Tel. 8380

July

439 Attlee to Mountbatten 1

Tel. 8393 via India Office

440 Listowel to Mountbatten 1

Tel. 74

441 Listowel to Mountbatten 1

Tel. 75

Main subject or subjects Page

lawyers to attend meeting; his intention
was however to consult Cabinet colleagues ;
gives assurance to make every effort to
prevent leakage and asks to have a copy of
Bill to show Cabinet colleagues; Gandhi
may not attend meeting as time is
inconvenient

Reports Krishna Menon has warned him 804

that Nehru threatens resignation unless

allowed to take away copy of Bill;

mentions Nehru’s promise to make every

effort to prevent leakage; requests

authority to use discretion to avert crisis

Refers to Nos. 412 and 413 ; reviews 805

position regarding reconstitution of

Interim Govt and in particular what

Jinnah could do if he decided to oppose it;

notes possibility of Jinnah contacting

Opposition and consequently of Bill not

passing this Session in which event ‘we

would be in an absolutely irretrievable

mess’; if, to avoid Nehru’s resignation, he

has to proceed with reconstitution,

suggests Opposition be kept fully in touch

to enable them to judge any approach from

Jinnah 806

Refers to No. 41 1; notifies Opposition

concurrence in Bill being shown Indian

leaders; Cabinet Committee feel that,

because of shortage of time, drafting

points cannot be considered but only points

of principle ; suggests arguments to counter

Nehru’s complaint that other Dominions

had opportunity for full consideration of

their Bills; opposes communique stating

that Indian leaders were being consulted

Refers to No. 436; agrees he may allow 807

Nehru to take draft Bill away; desirable

to give Jinnah similar facilities

Refers to No. 366; sends revision of proviso 808

relating to possibility of same person

being Governor-General of both

Dominions; has no objection to this

revision but feels it might be better to try

out proviso as it stands

Reports that Opposition leaders adopted 809
helpful attitude in discussions on 30 June;
main criticisms were on use of title India
for Hindustan and expression

lxxxviii

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

July

441 (cent.)

442 Report of remarks by Gandhi 1

443 Cabinet C.M.(47)58th Conclusions 1
Minutes 2, 6

444 Attlee to Churchill 1

Letter

445 Churchill to Attlee 1

Letter

447 Attlee to Mountbatten 1

Tel. 8402 via India Office

448 Mountbatten to Listowel 1

Tel. 1681-S

449 Cripps to Mountbatten 1

Tel. 78 via India Office

451 Carter to Ismay 1

Tel. 8413

453 S. of S. to H.M. Minister, Kabul 1

Tel. 56

454 Listowel to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 8453

Main subject or subjects Page

‘Independence Bill* rather than ‘Indian
(Self Government) Bill’

In an after prayer speech on 30 June 810

Gandhi commented on referendum in
N.W.F.P. and Ghaffar Khan’s attitude to
Pathanistan and Afghanistan
Dominions Office — change of title; 810

agreement not to change title of Indian
Independence Bill but special effort to be
made to explain implications of title
Has discussed Indian legislation with 812

Eden and others ; doubts whether he can
hold up Second Reading until Churchill
returns

Expresses concern that Bill is to be called 812
‘Indian Independence Bill’ ; says he only
supported Mountbatten proposals because
they establish the phase of Dominion status
which is not the same as independence
Refers to No. 437; Viceroy will see from 814
No. 433 that Ministers do not feel that his
Interim Govt proposals are fair to Jinnah;

H.M.G. will support Viceroy if it is
essential to reach decision next day, but
they hope he may secure more time; open
Congress-League split would endanger
passing of Bill

Refers to No. 433 ; considers there is still 815
slight hope that he can persuade Nehru not
to insist on reconstitution of Govt ; asks for
tel. expressing their doubts on legality of
procedure which he could show Nehru
Cripps sends message to be passed to Nehru 815
if Viceroy wishes; in message Cripps
appeals to Nehru not to jeopardise
independence date by insisting on particular
form of Interim Govt for remaining few
weeks

Explains that one reason for change in title 817
of Dominions Secretary and Dominions
Office is to prepare for different set-up of
S. of S. for India and India Office
Refers to No. 431; says H.M.G. wishes to 820
reply to No. 272 on the basis that the
area in question is an integral part of India
and H.M.G. cannot admit right of any
foreign govt to intervene; suggests answers
that should be given to Afghanistan’s specific
requests; asks for G. of I.’s views urgently
Says that legal advice he has received on 821
Viceroy’s proposals is to the effect that

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

lxxxix

Name and Number Date

July

454 ( cont .)

455 Mamdot to Jenkins 2

Letter

456 Baldev Singh to Nehru 2

Letter

457 Mountbatten to Jinnah 2

Letter

458 Mountbatten to Attlee 2

Tel. 1690-S via India Office

461

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1701-S

2

462

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1702-S

2

464 Mountbatten to Listowel 2

Tel. 1714-S

Main subject or subjects Page

they could be adopted provided there is
general agreement among Members of
Council on them

Outlines Muslim grievances on law and 822

order matters; says that before they
‘finally decide to sever our connection’
they desire: (1) an increase in the Muslim
members of the Security Council to two ; (2)
the ending of all repressive measures; (3)
an assurance that necessary measures will
only be adopted after consultation with
Security Council; (4) parity of Muslim
and non-Muslim Officers in Special
Police Staff

Expresses concern at provisions in draft 824

Bill relating to disputed districts in Western
Punjab; asks him to ensure amendments
are made so that administration of them
does not go over to Pakistan automatically
when Bill becomes law

Says he was astounded that Jinnah is 825

unable to let King have advice on future
Governor-General by 4 July; asks to see
him later that day

Says situation is incredibly explosive and 826
he is advised Congress will not compromise
on different system for Interim Govt; will
take line that he cannot legally put
proposals through until Bill has been
passed; Krishna Menon believes Congress
will accept a 20 July target date for
enactment of Bill; as League Members are
moving to Karachi on 7 August this would
mean they would only serve under new
conditions for fortnight; considers this
might prove acceptable compromise; says
tel. as in No. 468 would be of utmost help

Is delighted with invitations in No. 462; 830

has telegraphed Nye and Colville urging
them to stay on

Refers to No. 461 and sends text of letter 831
from Nehru in which he expresses hope
that Colville and Nye will stay on as
Governors in addition to Trivedi and
Hydari ; new Governors needed elsewhere

Reports discussion in Partition Council 833

on 30 June on partition of Armed Forces
and withdrawal of British troops; feels
time has come to issue announcement on
latter subject

xc

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

July

465 Cabinet India and Burma 2

Committee
I.B.(47)39th Meeting
Minutes 1-2

467 Listowel to Mountbatten 3

Tel. 8509

468 Attlee to Mountbatten 3

Tel. 8510 via India Office

470 Note by Erskine Crum 3

471 Draft Note by Campbell- undated

Johnson

472 Jenkins to Mountbatten 3

Express letter 689

473 Ismay to Baldev Singh 3

Letter

474 Ismay to Moon 3

Letter

Main subject or subjects Pages

(1) Consideration of No. 458; agreement 834

that tel. asked for by Viceroy should be

sent (see No. 468) but it should be

modified to emphasise need for immediate

finality on terms of Bill; (2) decision to

retain title ‘Indian Independence Bill’ ;

desirability of Dominions support for this

Refers to No. 458; explains changes to his 838

draft that have been made in No. 468

Explains that H.M.G. cannot sanction 838

reconstruction of Interim Govt until

legal position is assured by passing of Bill;

is speeding up passage of Bill to aim at

target date of 20 July; important they

should have Indian leaders’ comments on

draft Bill immediately

Note of Viceroy’s meeting on 2 July to 839

discuss Jinnah’s wish to be Governor-
General of Pakistan; courses considered
were : (A) to accede to request and for
Mountbatten to stay as G.-G. of India
alone ; (B) to accede to request and for
Congress to nominate someone other than
Mountbatten as G.-G.; (C) to devise
formula enabling Mountbatten to remain
G.-G. of both Dominions while satisfying
Jinnah’s vanity

With reference to No. 470, considers 842

course (C) offers best solution from every
point of view but feels course (A) would
be favourably received; course (B) would
not avoid serious criticism

Informs him of Mamdot’s resignation 843

from Security Committee; comments on
Mamdot’s grievances; outlines courses open
to them; favours carrying on as before
although he has suspended search
programme

Refers to No. 456; corrects Baldev’s 846

interpretation of discussion in Partition
Council regarding control of Armed
Forces in disputed areas; states possibility of
joint administration of disputed areas has
invariably been ruled out as impracticable
Thanks for No. 371; reports Viceroy’s 846

interview with Baldev Singh and Giani
Kartar Singh (No. 417); doubts very much
whether there will be any settlement
between Sikhs and Muslims; considers
things have now gone too far for H.M.G.
to adopt his proposal and feels that any

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

Name and Number

474 ( cont .)

475 Lockhart to Mountbatten
Letter GH 106

477 Smith to Ismay
Letter 191/CGS

478 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty First
Staff Meeting
Items 2, 3, 5

481 Commonwealth Relations Office to

British High Commissioners in
Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and South Africa
Tel. Z 37

482 Addison to Attlee
Minute

483 Mountbatten to Attlee

Tel. 1725-S via India Office

Date Main subject or subjects

July

redrawing of boundaries must be done by
successor authorities

3 Forwards statement by N.W.F.P. Ministry
on proposed referendum; has been unable
to persuade Ministers to modify para, in
which it is argued that referendum is
unnecessary; Ministers have assured him
of their desire that referendum should be
conducted peacefully

3 Sends copy of note from Auchinleck to
Baldev Singh with which Auchinleck sent
copy of his Minute in No. 476; Auchinleck
noted that if, after 15 August, a Dominion
Govt wished to use the armed forces to
coerce States, it would be necessary to decide
the position of the British Officers in
command; he is taking matter up with
Viceroy; Smith adds that in no circumstances
can British Officers in Pakistan and
Hindustan be used in operations against
each other

3 (2) Viceroy says that Krishna Menon had

told him that there was now a chance that
Congress would accept continuation of
present Interim Govt for further period ;
arrangements for Viceroy to approve
orders and appointments made by Members ;
(3) composition of Arbitral Tribunal;

(5) Governors of Provinces after
independence

3 Explains why it is considered essential that
Indian legislation is passed that month;

High Commissioners to ask Dominion
Prime Ministers whether the title ‘India
Independence Bill’ is acceptable; if it is,
H.M.G. would like to be able to say so
publicly

3 Sends text of formula agreed with de
Valera for use if they are asked in
Parliament whether Eire had been
approached on the omission of the words
‘Emperor of India’ from King’s Title

3 Reports that Jinnah told him previous
night of his wish to become Governor-
General of Pakistan; Mountbatten is
therefore faced with ‘appalling problem’
of whether to stay as Governor-General of
India or to leave on 15 Aug; suggests
Attlee takes no action at present

XC11

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

Juh

486 Cabinet India and Burma 3

Committee
I.B.(47)40tli Meeting
Minutes 1-4

487 Listowel to Mountbatten 3

Tel. 8560

488 Clutterbuck to Commonwealth 3

Relations Office
Tel. 572

489 Mountbatten to Listowel 4

Tel. 1732-S

490 Listowel to Mountbatten 4

Tel. 8578

492 Costar to Commonwealth 4

Relations Office
Tel. 193

493 Meeting of Indian Cabinet 4

Cases 162, 170 and 171/33/47

494 Hankinson to Commonwealth 4

Relations Office
Tel. 451

Main subject or subjects Page

(1) defence arrangements in India; (2) 866

consideration of No. 464; no announcement
on withdrawal of British Army to be made
in advance of Second Reading of Bill; (3)
consideration of tels. giving Congress’s
and League’s reactions to draft Bill;
amendments to meet points raised; (4)
relations with Afghanistan

Draws his attention to military and 871

defence questions which must be resolved
with the new Dominions; says H.M.G.
must decide: (1) on method of approach to
Indians; (2) on their detailed requirements;
seeks his views on (1) and on what should
be said in Parliament

Refers to No. 481 ; Mackenzie King feels 873
word ‘independence’ will be taken to
mean independence of Commonwealth ;
he cites 1926 precedent; he does not feel
Canadians will be unduly excited but
suggests title ‘India (transfer of Powers)

Bill’

Refers to No. 447; explain why he feels 874

his Interim Govt Plan is fair to League ;
forwards text of instructions to Burrows
which indicates how scheme would work at
Centre

Refers to No. 369, note 13; explains that 875
there is no longer any system whereby
H.M.G. can ensure priority for supply of
items like printing plant

Refers to No. 481; Fraser is consulting 876

others before replying but feels himself
that term ‘independence’ is unfortunate; he
much doubts whether Opposition will
agree in view of their attitude on the
change of the Dominions Office title

(1) Financial liability arising out of the 877

payment of compensation to the officers
of the Secretary of State’s Services; (2)

Afghan claims on the North West Frontier;

(3) Reconstitution of the Central Govt;
modifications to be made to procedure
under ‘standstill’ agreement

Refers to No. 481 ; reports that in 880

preliminary talk Chifley and Evatt felt
that while proposed title was unlikely to
create any real difficulty for Australia,
they were not happy about use of word
‘independence’ ; however they recognised

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

XC111

Name and Number Date

My

494 ( cont .)

495 Viceroy’s Conference Paper 4

V.C.P. 107

496 Mountbatten to Gandhi 4

Letter 1446/3

497 Mountbatten to Nehru 4

Letter 592/63

498 Mountbatten to Jinnah 4

Letter 592/63

499 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty Second 4

Staff Meeting
Item 2

500 Mountbatten to Jinnah 4

Letter 1446/16

502 Nehru to Vellodi 4

Tel. 5211

503 Jenkins to Mountbatten 4

Letter 690

504 Attlee to Churchill 4

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

problem and could not immediately think
of better word

Question of Mountbatten remaining 881

Governor-General of India only; need for
Jinnah to re-affirm that he would welcome
this; possible amendments to Bill
In the light of No. 396, trusts he will be 883
able to persuade Ghaffar Khan to implement
the policy of allowing referendum in
N.W.F.P. to take place without interference
by Red Shirts

Explains Sikh anxieties regarding their 884

position in Punjab and Union of India;
also their wish for special representation in
existing Constituent Assembly; and that
transfer of population should be considered;
says he much sympathises with the Sikhs
and hopes Nehru will be able to help them
Sends similar letter to No. 497; Sikhs urge 884
that transfer of population should be
considered; they also desire special
consideration in Central Legislature and
Government of Pakistan; Viceroy hopes
everything possible will be done to allay
Sikh fears

Consideration of No. 495; Mountbatten 885

decides to leave proviso in Bill allowing

for appointment of same person as

Governor-General of both Dominions

Asks him to send in writing immediately 887

name recommended for Governor-General

of Pakistan

Refers to No. 450; doubts whether agents 888

of Indian States in London can produce

much effect; outlines Congress position

on States; explains that decision of

Frontier Congress to boycott referendum

does not mean that it is demanding

separate, independent status for Province

Says that after that morning’s meeting of 890

Partition Council, Swaran Singh told him:

(1) that partition proceedings could not
go very far until boundary was finally
settled, and that Panthic Party would not
agree to installation of two new Govts on
basis of ‘notional’ boundary; (2) time
allowed for proceedings was much too
short

Refers to No. 445; does not agree with 891

point he makes ; feels term ‘independence’
emphasises the complete freedom of

XC1V

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

504 (cont.)

505 Mountbatten to Listowel
Letter

506 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 11

507 Mountbatten to Attlee

Tel. 173 6-S via India Office

508 Mountbatten to Attlee

Tel. 1743-S via India Office

Date

July

4

4

4

4

Main subject or subjects Page

members of Commonwealth from control
by others

Refers to No. 376; Attlee’s line on 892

Gandhi’s proposal for similar agreements
with both Dominions will have reasonably
good effect in India; is sorry Burma is
likely to leave Commonwealth; wonders
whether Burma could not go ahead on
basis of interim Dominion period; is glad
clause in draft Bill allows for continued
use of Privy Council; Nehru’s suggestion
for London discussion on position of
Indians in certain Empire countries;
difficulty of Interim Govt question

Trivedi’s role in persuading both parties 893
to accept scheme for partition of armed
forces; Nehru’s request (No. 462) for Nye
and Colville to stay as Governors ; discussions
with Congress and League on draft Bill;
situation generally quiet except in Punjab ;
Mamdot’s resignation from Punjab
Security Committee; Calcutta Riots
Enquiry Commission to be dissolved;
arrangements in Bengal during interim
period; background to Congress insistence
on reconstitution of Interim Govt; No. 468
finally convinced Congress of impossibility
of immediate reconstitution ; arrangements
for conducting business until Govt
reconstituted; Jinnah’s complaints on Sylhet
referendum; Baluchistan votes to join
Pakistan; Viceroy’s correspondence with
Gandhi (Nos. 382, 390 and 496); refugee
problem; cruiser for, and loan of Royal
Navy personnel to, Indian Navy;
discussions with Jinnah on proposal for
Mountbatten to remain as Governor-
General of both Dominions until 3 1
March 1948 (paras. 21-34); Mountbatten in
complete quandary as to what he should
do and is sending Ismay home to seek
guidance

Refers to No. 468; reports that Nehru has 900
been persuaded not to press matter until
Bill is passed; Cabinet that morning reacted
quite peacefully; is sending Ismay home to
explain difficulties of situation

Refers to Nos. 483 and 500; would be 901

grateful for guidance from H.M.G. on
Governor-General question; asks for

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

Name and Number

508 ( cont .)

509 Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten
Letter

510 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter

51 1 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1744-S

512 Commonwealth Relations Office to
Costar
Tel. 188

515 Gandhi to Mountbatten
Letter

516 Partition Council Meeting
Case No. P.C. 25/3/47

517 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8631

518 Mountbatten to Gandhi
Letter 1446/3

Date Main subject or subjects

My

Opposition to be brought into discussion
and hopes they will concur in advice

4 League tenders advice to King that Jinnah
be appointed Governor-General of
Pakistan; League would be glad if
Mountbatten decided to accept Governor-
Generalship of India

4 Indian Independence Bill presented in

Commons that morning; Congress insistence
on change in Interim Govt is considered
unreasonable in London but it is recognised
that they must try to meet it ; is pleased
with Radcliffe’s appointment; change in title
of Dominions Office; is pleased with
invitations to Colville and Nye to stay on

4 Refers to No. 381; outlines limited functions
he considers British troops should have
after 15 Aug; gives views on system of
command; explains why he feels all British
troops should be withdrawn by Dec. 1947

4 Refers to No. 492; appreciates Fraser’s
position but feels he should not consult
Opposition; informs Costar personally of
Mackenzie-King’s reaction in No. 488
and says there is no question of saying
publicly that Dominion P.M.’s favour
term ‘independence’; no change in title of
Bill now ‘possible’

5 Refers to No. 496; Ghaffar Khan and Red
Shirts are carrying on agitation to tell
people not to participate; there should be
no demonstration during voting days or
approach to voters during voting time ;
would be willing to refer to matter in these
terms at his evening prayer; will adopt
quicker means of reaching Ghaffar Khan if
Viceroy suggests any

5 Composition of Arbitral Tribunal

5 Refers to No. 463 ; explains that League’s
unwillingness to consider Pakistan successor
of all applicable treaty rights and obligations,
if adhered to, will undermine basis of reply
to Afghanistan on N.W.F.P.

5 Thanks for No. 515; would be grateful
if Gandhi could deprecate any agitation
before the polling days; thinks it
important that Ghaffar Khan has Gandhi’s
advice as soon as possible and will arrange
for it to be sent by air; Resident in Kashmir
to see Maharaja

xcv

Page

902

902

904

905

908

909

909

910

XCV1

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

July

519 Nehru to Mountbatten 5

Letter

521 Viceroy’s Conference Paper 5

V.C.P. 1 15

522 Viceroy’s Conference Paper 5

V.C.P. 116

523 Mountbatten to Attlee 5

Letter

524 Lady Mountbatten to Mountbatten 5

Note

526 Carter to Abell 5

Letter

527 Abell to Mountbatten 5

Minute

529 Abbott to I. D. Scott 5

Tel. 161-G

530 Gandhi to Mountbatten 5

Letter

531 Baring to Commonwealth Relations 5
Office
Tel. 202

Main subject or subjects Pages

Says he and colleagues would like to see 91 1
Slim become C. in C. of Army of Indian
Union

Circulates brief prepared for Ismay on 914

‘The history of the views expressed and
decisions reached by the Indian Leaders on
the appointment of Governor-General’

Circulates papers giving reasons for and 917

against Mountbatten staying on as
Governor-General of India

Explains background to Governor- 921

Generalship problem; considers situation
to be his own fault

Considers that Mountbatten should have 922

further discussions with Congress leaders
on Governor-Generalship in light of Jinnah’s
attitude; he should ascertain whether their
offer on the Governor-Generalship of Indian
Union is confirmed; Congress should be
in complete agreement on time limit
proposed for appointment

Refers to No. 451; describes probable 927

ministerial set-up in Whitehall for handling
relations with the two new Dominions
from 15 August 1947

Reports telephone conversation with 928

Abbott who said that Punjab Security

Committee had ceased to sit but League

were participating in most friendly way on

Partition Council; Jenkins would like to

carry 011 as he is for the moment but

wishes to be informed on position regarding

twin Cabinets in Bengal; Abell proposes to

fly to Calcutta and later to Lahore

Jenkins advises strongly against Radcliffe 93 1

staying at Government House as close

personal contacts between Governor and

Boundary Commission would be

misinterpreted

Refers to No. 518; says he has sent Ghaffar 931
Khan a message through a Khudai
Khidmatgar who visited him about noon;
part of the message is reproduced in a letter
he encloses (see No. 541) ; Mountbatten
may send this on if it covers new point
raised ; Gandhi hopes there will be no
disturbance by Ghaffar Khan and his
followers

Refers to No. 481; sends message from 932

Smuts saying that term ‘independence’ is
regrettable and suggesting substitution of

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

XCV1I

Name and Number

531 (cont.)

532 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8677

533 Record of Interview between
Mountbatten and Jinnah

534 Jinnah to Mountbatten
Letter

536 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1771-S

537 Extract from Letter of Tyson

Date Main subject or subjects

July

‘sovereignty’; Smuts suggests that
announcement of Dominion agreement
should be avoided ; he feels term may lead
Burmese to go for independence rather
than Dominion Status

Page

5 Sends text of Statement which might be 933
made in Parliament debate on succession
to the international personality of India
and to international rights and obligations ;
hopes they might be able to add that
Indian leaders accept views expressed; asks
whether League have reconsidered view
given in No. 463

5 Jinnah says he intends to accord Scheduled 93 5
Castes in Pakistan really fair treatment ;
question of Pakistan citizens being eligible
again for decorations ; Jinnah confirms he
would wish Mountbatten to be Chairman
of Joint Defence Council if he stayed as
Governor-General of India ; design of
Pakistan Flag; Mountbatten to attend
Farewell Ceremony in Karachi on 14 Aug;
venue for, and date of, Pakistan Constituent
Assembly; discussion of candidates to head
Pakistan Defence Services; Jinnah’s protest
on two matters relating to Independence
Bill; Jinnah denies writing to Maharaja of
Kashmir urging him to join Pakistan;

Viceroy warns Jinnah that he will be
compelled to reconstitute Interim Govt after
20 July

5 Encloses message in No. 536 and asks him 937
to send it to Attlee and Churchill; says he
is examining position regarding the
execution and enforcement of the partition
award and will wish to send message on this
on 7 July

5 Sends message from Jinnah complaining at 938
allocation of Andamans and Nicobars to
India in Bill and stressing that Pakistan’s
claim to them is very strong ; asks for this
injustice to be rectified in Parliament

5 Important point in published Bill is that it 939
names 15 August as date for British departure
regardless of whether partition is complete ;
Mountbatten’s tactic has been to ‘hustle’
everyone; believes British will withdraw
in fairly peaceful conditions and this will
make for better future relations between
Britain and India

XCV111

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

July

539 Listowel to Mountbatten 5

Tel. 8685

540 Jenkins to Abell 6

Tel. 163-G

541 Abell to Latimer 6

Tel. 1784-S

544 Mountbatten to Liaquat Ali Khan 7
Letter 1446/16

545 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty Third 7

Staff Meeting
Items 2-3

546 Record of Meeting of Special 7

Committee of Indian Cabinet

547 Nehru to Mountbatten 7

Letter

548 Jinnah to Mountbatten 7

Letter

549 Liaquat Ali Khan to Mountbatten 7
Letter

Alain subject or subjects Page

Sends text of Statement which might be 942
made in Parliamentary debate on position
of the tribal areas after 1 5 August
Explain why he does not consider Bengal 942
model of dual Cabinets could be followed
in Punjab; adds that any attempt to form
Ministry would divert attention from
partition work and risk inflaming law and
order situation which is ‘generally
explosive’ with ‘hatred and suspicion . . .
universal and undisguised’

Sends message for Ghaffar Khan from 943

Gandhi; in this Gandhi says Khudai
Khidmatgars should avoid every occasion
for clash with Leaguers ; there should be
‘no fuss, no procession, no disobedience of
any orders from authority’ ; boycott of
referendum by bulk of Pathans in such
circumstances would be moral defeat for
Pakistanis

Thanks for No. 509; wishes to make it 946

clear that he lias not yet decided whether
to stay as Governor-General of India
(2) Question of Mountbatten staying as 946

Governor-General of India; (3) course to be
adopted if League Members fail to send in
their resignations from Interim Govt
Position of members of non-S. of S.’s 949

Services (both Central and Provincial) ;

H.M.G. to be authorised to announce that
leaders of Indian Parties had guaranteed
existing terms and conditions of service of
all their employees including Europeans
Refers to No. 497; says they appreciate 951

Sikh anxieties but feel that weightage is a
fundamentally wrong principle ; transfer of
population must be seriously considered if
people concerned desire it

Refers to Nos. 534 and 536; sends further 951
message for Attlee and Churchill relating
to the enforcement of the Arbitral and
Boundary awards ; League considers that
H.M.G. alone is appropriate authority to
guarantee awards; Bill should be amended
to provide for this or declaration be made
during Parliamentary debate
Refers to Viceroy’s request in No. 493 953

for the resignations of League Members of
Interim Govt; asks to be told basis and
details of plan for reconstitution of Govt
so decision can be taken

CH. 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

XCV1X

Name and Number Date

July

551 Attlee to Mountbatten 7

Tel. 79 via India Office

552 Mountbatten to Listowel 7

Tel. 1798-S

553 Mountbatten to Listowel 7

Tel. 1799-S

554 Draft Memorandum, from Chiefs of 7

Staff to Minister of Defence

555 Commonwealth Relations Office 7

to Baring
Tel. Z 39

556 Mountbatten to Listowel 7

Tel. 1800-S

557 Mountbatten to Ismay 7

Tel. 1802-S via India Office

558 Mountbatten to Listowel 7

Tel. 1807-S

561

Bhopal to Mountbatten

7

Letter

562

Listowel to Attlee

7

Minute 115/47

Main subject or subjects Page

Refers to Nos. 483 and 508; Jinnah’s 956

position on Governor-Generalship is indeed
a surprise ; is glad he sent Ismay home ; feels
no one could have done more or better
than Mountbatten

Feels draft in No. 539 is satisfactory except 956
for one point

Agrees with terms of proposed statement 957
in No. 532 but feels it should be confmed
to an expression of H.M.G.’s view of the
situation

British strategic requirements in India and 957
Pakistan

Sends message for Smuts, in reply to his 961
message in No. 531, expressing regret if
term ‘independence’ had caused
embarrassment; other Dominion P.M.’s had
also expressed reservations and there w~as
no question of H.M.G. saying that term was
acceptable to Prime Ministers of other
Commonwealth countries; explains why
term was adopted

Refers to No. 487; agrees that provision 962
of military aircraft transit facilities must be
dealt with immediately ; explains difficulties
of beginning immediate negotiations on
external defence and British strategic
requirements; suggests procedure for
negotiations after transfer of power;
believes responsibility for safety of British
subjects must rest with Dominion
concerned; urges that no statement be made
in Parliament

Refers to Nos. 521 and 522; comments 964

critically on certain arguments in No. 522;
reports conversation with Auchinleck that
morning on question of whether he would
stay on; asks Ismay not to circulate these
papers in their present form

Suggests that Ismay takes Enclosure to No. 966
548 round to Churchill, and explains that
Jinnah was told from the outset that only
practical solution was a common
Governor-General who could secure fair
play and implementation of awards
Explains why he feels Mountbatten should 968
not stay as Governor-General of India only
Sends note by India Office on ‘Situation 971
if there are two Governors-General from
15 August’; discusses date when decision
to appoint separate Governors-General

c

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

July

563

Rowan to Attlee

7

Minute

564

Cabinet India and Burma

7

Committee I.B.(47)4ist
Meeting Minutes 1-2 (incorporating
Confidential Annex)

Main subject or subjects Page

might be made public; suggests statement
which might be made at opening of
Parliamentary Debate

Refers to No. 562; explains his anxieties 975
on suggested statement

Withdrawal of British Forces from India; 976

Govemors-General of the two Indian

Dominions ; Committee wishes

Mountbatten to accept Congress invitation

for nomination as Governor-General of

India; agreement on form of statement to

be made in Commons by Attlee on

situation; Attlee to consult Opposition

leaders

CHAPTER 4

The Indian Independence Bill

Name and Number Date Main subject or subjects Page

1947

June

59 Proceedings of Mountbatten’s 4

Press Conference

1 1 5 Mountbatten to Listowel 9

Tel. 1358-S

1 16 Mountbatten to Listowel 9

Tel. 1368-S

122 Turnbull to Stephenson 9

Letter

132 India Office Minutes 10/11

133 India Office Minutes 10

134

Stephenson to Turnbull

10

Letter

138

Listowel to Mountbatten

10

Tel. 7496

Mountbatten’s opening remarks ... on no

legislative programme

Refers to No. 116; asks permission to give 219
Nehru assurance that party leaders will be
shown Bill; recommends that Nehru’s
view on international position should be
supported

Repeats letter of 7 June from Nehru 220

outlining Congress view on continuing
entity of India and asking to see draft
legislation on this subject

Asks for comments on general layout of 229

draft India Bill and on two particular

points

Line to be taken on question of withholding 253
Andaman and Nicobar Islands from India
Possibility that clauses in draft Bill 255

dealing with Governor-General might lead
to creation of a Dominion with a President
not appointed by King

Refers to No. 122 and comments from 256

Dominions Office point of view on draft
India Bill

Refers to No. 115; must defer definite 260

answer about showing Bill to Indian
leaders until after India Committee have
considered it; fears that to do so might
give rise to delay

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

Cl

Name and Number Date

June

149 Monteath to Ismay 11

Tel. 7521

165 Cabinet India and Burma 12

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)97

167 Ismay to Monteath 12

Tel. 1416-S

172

Mountbatten to Listowel

12

Tel. 142 i-S

182

Listowel to Mountbatten

13

Letter, para. (7)

186

Stapleton to Monteath

13

Letter

189

Turnbull to Abell

13

Letter

190

Cabinet India and Burma

13

Committee

Paper I.B.(47)ioo

191

Draft Indian Dominions Bill

13

193 Cabinet India and Burma 13

Committee
Paper I. B. (47) 102

194 Monteath to Ismay 13

Tel. 7668

Main subject or subjects Page

Refers to No. 117; is sending copies of 281

Enclosures to No. 13 1; warns that Bill is
likely to make provision for exercise by
Governor-General, for limited period and
exceptional purposes, of powers otherwise
than on Ministerial advice

Memorandum by Listowel submitting 312

draft telegram to Mountbatten raising

question of possible repercussions if

Andamans and Nicobars are taken from

India before transfer of power

Refers to No. 149; thanks for Enclosures 314

to No. 13 1 ; warns that any proposal to

reserve powers to Governor-General, or

that he should have any arbitral authority

whatever ‘would blow the whole scheme

sky high’

Refers to No. 138; considers it absolutely 318
essential to show Indian leaders draft Bill
Draft Indian Dominion Bill 335

Chiefs of Staff note that draft Bill does 343

not appear to conflict with British
military requirements, but wish to be
advised on how negotiations concerning
those requirements are to be conducted
Sends copies of draft Bill; outlines 348

timetable for its consideration; encloses
explanatory note on some points in Bill
Memorandum by Listowel circulating 353

draft India Bill, summarising its main
provisions, and commenting on points to
which he thought Committee should give
particular attention

Draft of a Bill ‘to make provision for the 361
setting up in India of two independent
Dominions’ and for other consequential or
connected matters

Memorandum by Listowel opposing 377

Mountbatten’s recommendation that

Indian leaders should be shown draft Bill

and suggesting instead he should tell them

orally what its main provisions will be

Refers to Nos. 167 and 149; explains more 378

fully conception of special role of

Governor-General in transitional period

for which Bill makes allowance; Bill’s

silence on whether Governor-General’s

powers are exercised on advice or not

follows Dominion precedent; it is only in

practical application, not in anything

Cll

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

Main subject or subjects

June

194 (1 cont .)

203 Attlee to Chifley, Fraser and Smuts 14
Tel. via British High Commissioners

214 Abell to Mountbatten 16

Minute

216 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Third 16
Staff Meeting
Item 2

‘appearing on the face of the Bill’, that
differences from Dominion precedent will
appear

Explains background to proposed clause in
India Bill regarding alteration of King’s
Title; asks whether Dominion Govts are
prepared to take similar action and, if so,
whether they will authorise him to make
parliamentary statement to that effect

Reports arrival of draft India Bill,
circulation given to it and preliminary
timetable for its consideration

(2) Draft Bill — Menon to prepare draft
telegram on it; Mohammed Ali to be
shown Bill

221 Chiefs of Staff Committee
C.O.S.(47)76th Meeting
Minute 4

239 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Fifth
Stah Meeting
Item 2

244 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
I.B.(47)3ist Meeting
Minutes 1-4

248 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1480-S

16 Agreement that it was of utmost
importance for H.M.G. to retain
Andaman, Nicobar and Laccadive Islands
but that timing and method of approach
was matter for political decision; Annex:
minute by Hollis to Minister of Defence
reporting these views and drawing
attention to absence from draft Bill of any
provision for holding negotiations on
British military requirements

17 (2) Discussion of draft Bill

17 Consideration of (1) draft Bill (No. 191);
agreement on certain amendments
including suggestion by Attlee that it
should be called ‘Indian Independence Bill’ ;
(2) international status of new Dominions ;
agreement that H.M.G. should accept
Nehru’s view that Hindustan would
succeed to India’s position as international
entity; (3) assumption of international
obligations by successor authorities;
agreement that assurance on this point be
sought from Interim Govt on behalf of
both future Dominions ; (4) Andamans
and Nicobars; agreement to omit clause
in existing form on these Islands from Bill
and to seek Mountbatten’s advice on
alternative ; also to seek by negotiation
facilities in Laccadive Islands

17 Notifies dispatch of No. 249 and outlines
timetable for consideration of draft Bill,
including consultation with Indian leaders,
which he hopes to follow

Page

396

418

419

432

463

474

486

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

Clll

Name and Number

Date

Main subject or subjects

Page

June

249

Mountbatten to Listowel

18

Sends comments on, and proposes

487

Tel. 1481-S

amendments to, draft Bill

■255

Menon to Turnbull

18

Sends comments and suggestions

496

Tel. 1487-S

supplementary to No. 249, proposing
inter alia a clause to maintain in force

provisions of 1935 Act relating to
distribution of powers between Federal
and Provincial legislatures

256

Listowel to Mountbatten

18

Refers to draft Bill (No. 191) and

497

Tel. 7840

communicates points and amendments
made by India and Burma Committee
(No. 244, Minute 1)

2 57

Listowel to Mountbatten

18

Refers to No. 115 and communicates

500

Tel. 7841

India and Burma Committee’s views on
question of showing draft Bill to Indian
leaders

258

Listowel to Mountbatten

18

Refers to Nos. 174 and 162, paras. 24-25;

501

Tel. 7842

communicates India and Burma

Committee’s views on question of

Andaman and Nicobar Islands

265

Cabinet India and Burma

19

(3) Viceroy’s comments (No. 249) on draft

513

Committee

Independence Bill

I.B.(47)32nd Meeting

Minute 3

267

Ismay to Mountbatten

19

Refers to Nos. 256 and 257; staff are

519

Tel. 1497-S

considering former; communicates terms
of telegram they suggest Mountbatten
might send in reply to latter on question of
showing draft Bill to Indian leaders

269

Ismay to Mountbatten

Tel. 1503-S

19

Comments on No. 256, paras. 6 and 20.

522

270

Listowel to Mountbatten

19

Refers to No. 115; communicates India

523

Tel. 7893

and Burma Committee’s decision that

H.M.G. should accept that Hindustan
would continue existing India’s international
personality, subject to equitable division
of central assets

271

Listowel to Mountbatten

19

Reports that India and Burma Committee

524

Tel. 7897

have considered (No. 265, Minute 3)
Mountbatten’s preliminary comments (No.
249) on draft Bill and communicates their
conclusions

279

Mountbatten to Listowel

20

Refers to No. 256, paras. 6 and 20;

537

Tel. 8-S.K.

question of consultation with Indian leaders
on particular points arising on draft Bill;

agrees with Reforms Office and Political

Dept in deprecating formal denunciation of

treaties with States

280

Turnbull to Menon

20

Refers to No. 255 which arrived too late

537

Tel. 7944

for consideration by Committee; enlargement

of Bill proposed in No. 255 not considered

CIV

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

280 (cont)

June

282

India Office Minutes

20/21

283

Ismay to Mountbatten

Tel. 1511-S

20

284

Ismay to Mountbatten

Tel. 1512-S

20

286 Ismay to Mountbatten 20

Tel. 1514-S

290 Menon to Turnbull 21

Tel. 1528-S

293 Mountbatten to Listowel 21

Tel. 19-S.K.

308 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Sixth 23

Staff Meeting
Item 7

322 Cabinet 24

C.M.(47)56th Conclusions

Minute 4

323 Cabinet India and Burma 24

Committee
Paper 1. 6.(47)121

324 Cabinet India and Burma 24

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)122

325 Cabinet India and Burma 24

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)127

Main subject or subjects Page

desirable or necessary; comments on its
other points

Effect of deletion of Clause 19 (2) (a) from 542
draft Bill on disposal of records of S. of S.
in Council and S. of S.

Refers to No. 256 on draft Bill and 543

transmits draft reply for Mountbatten to
send to it

Refers to No. 258 and transmits draft reply 544
for Mountbatten to send to it, pressing
strongly for complete exclusion from draft
Bill of any reference to Andaman and
Nicobar Islands

Refers to No. 271 on draft Bill and 545

transmits draft reply for Mountbatten to
send to it, stressing inter alia the advantage
of starting new Dominions with as complete
a constitution as possible

Refers to No. 280; explains reasons for 552

equipping new Dominions with as complete
a constitution as possible; feels both
Congress and League would welcome
continuance of Governor-General’s,
transformed into Dominion, control over
Provinces

Explains background to insistence on 554

certain points mentioned in No. 286 is
Congress wish to continue present
distribution of powers between Centre and
Provinces but to be able to secure control
over Provinces in emergency

(7) arrangements for showing draft Bill to 573
Indian leaders

Note taken of need for U.K. and Dominion 596
Parliaments to give assent to change in
King’s title ; Govt of Eire to be consulted
also

Memoandum by Listowel circulating 597

summary of points regarding draft Bill on
which full agreement is still to be reached
with Mountbatten

Memorandum by Listowel discussing 599

points of major importance on draft Bill
requiring decision

Memorandum by Listowel discussing pros 603

and cons of including in Bill guarantee of
conditions of service to officers continuing
in service under future Govts in India

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

CV

Name and Number Date

June

347 Cabinet India and Burma 25

Committee
I.B. (47)3 5th Meeting
Minute 3

348 Listowel to Mountbatten 25

Tel. 8156

349 Listowel to Mountbatten 25

Tel. 8162

350 Listowel to Shawcross 25

Letter

351 Listowel to Mountbatten 25

Tel. 8184

353 Listowel to Mountbatten 25

Tel. 8194

356 Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

26

361 Cabinet 26

C.M.(47)57th Conclusions
Minute 4

365 Mountbatten to Listowel 26

Tel. 1598-S

Main subject or subjects

(3) consideration of points outstanding on
draft Bill

Refers to No. 286; Cabinet Committee
have agreed to substantial revision and
rearrangement of draft Bill to meet strong
views expressed in Nos. 255, 286, 290 and
293 ; explains that, because of pressure of
time table, Mountbatten must now choose
between this revision and existing layout
Refers to Nos. 246 and 247; explains why
it is felt Political Dept’s view must be
accepted that all agreements with States
must lapse and advocates retention of clause
to this effect in Bill
Explains position reached in preparing
draft Bill and invites his comments on it
and proposed amendments to it
Refers to No. 348 and communicates
Cabinet Committee’s conclusions on other
outstanding points regarding draft Bill
Refers to No. 284 and communicates
Cabinet Committee’s views on inclusion
of revised Clause on Andamans and
Nicobars in draft Bill to be shown Indian
leaders

Recalls that Indian leaders have been
informed that, before legislation to
transfer power is introduced, they will have
opportunity of examining it ; outlines his
conception of form such legislation should
take, emphasising in particular need for a
separate Act for each new Dominion
Report by Attlee on progress in drafting
Indian Independence Bill; agreement that
he should discuss it with Opposition and
that Mountbatten should show it to Indian
leaders

Gives his views on matters contained in
Nos. 348-9 and 351-3 ; states inter alia that
Provincial Governors will be appointed
after informal consultation between himself
and all-India leaders (see No. 352), that
Nehru ‘will vehemently protest’ against
denunciation of States’ treaties (see No.

349), that his advisers unhesitatingly accept
redraft of Bill (see No. 348), and that
clause on Andamans and Nicobars ‘will be
entirely unacceptable to Congress’ (see No.

Page

638

642

643

645

646

649

658

664

672

CV1

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and number

Date

June

366

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1600-S

26

367

Partition Council Meeting

Case No. P.C. 5/1/47

27

373

Listowel to Attlee

Minute 98/47

27

374

Listowel to Attlee

Minute 102/47

27

375

Beards to Attlee

27

Minute

376

Listowel to Mountbatten

27

Letter, para. 8

380

Listowel to Mountbatten

27

Tel. 8270

392 Nehru to Mountbatten 28

Letter

397 Mountbatten to Nehru 28/29

Letter

408 Nehru to Mountbatten 29

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

Proposes redraft of Clause in draft Bill 674

relating to common Governor-General

(2) Mountbatten announces arrangements 675

for enabling Indian leaders to study draft

Bill

Refers to Nos. 365 and 366; attaches 699

summary of outstanding points of
difference with Mountbatten on draft Bill
Refers to Nos. 373 and 366; attaches draft 701

of letter from Attlee to Lascelles explaining
position regarding procedure for
appointment of Governor-General and
Governors

Arrangements for Opposition leaders to 703

see draft Bill and for Attlee’s meeting
with them

Programme for discussion of draft Bill 704

with Opposition and Indian leaders

Refers to No. 100, Item 1; points out that 71 1

under draft Bill it is contemplated that

administrative consequences of partition

will be dealt with by Governor-General’s

order; suggests there is some practical

force in Jinnah’s contention that Interim

Govt is not suitable body to decide such

matters and that Mountbatten should seek

Indian leaders’ agreement to set up partition

machinery by method proposed in Bill

Refers to No. 356, note 2; points out that 72$

legislation to transfer power is of ‘utmost

consequence to India’ ; thinks it ‘an entirely

wrong approach to proceed secretively’ ;

trusts that full opportunity will be given

them to consider Bill before it is introduced

in Parliament

Refers to No. 392; encloses invitation 733

(already drafted) to study draft Bill; trusts
Rau’s presence will meet need for
constitutional and legal advice ; Enclosure :
letter from Mountbatten to Nehru inviting
him to come to Viceroy’s House on 1
July to study draft Bill; arrangements made
for Congress and League representatives to
study Bill in separate rooms; Patel, Jinnah
and Liaquat also invited; indicates expert
advisers who will be present
Refers to No. 397 and Enclosure; points 746
out legislation is going to affect future of
India vitally; complains they are only being
given chance to see draft at last stage;

Rau’s presence will be welcome, but they

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

CV11

Name and Number

408 ( cent .)

41 1 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1653-S

414 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1657-S

419 Shawcross to Listowel
Letter

420 Listowel to Attlee
Minute 103/47

421 Cabinet India and Burma

Committee
LB. (47)3 7th Meeting
Minutes 1 and 3

423 Mountbatten to Gandhi
Letter 1446/8

424 Mountbatten to Nehru
Letter 1446/8

425 Mountbatten to Jinnah
Letter 1446/8

428 Viceroy’s Conference Paper

V.C.P. 97

Date Main subject or subjects

June

wish to consult others ; Gandhi should also
see draft Bill ; if ‘willing assent of all
parties concerned’ is not obtained, object of
Bill ‘is somewhat nullified’ ; earnestly
requests him to consider matter afresh and
if necessary consult H.M.G.

29 Reports Nehru’s request in No. 408 that
Bill be shown to Gandhi and others in
addition to those already invited;
Mountbatten thinks request should be
granted, and hopes by so doing to carry
Congress leaders with him despite Nehru’s
protest at procedure adopted for
consideration of Bill

29 Proposes amendment to draft Bill to

enable new Dominion legislature to amend
Independence Act itself ; believes Congress
acceptance may depend on this issue

30 Refers to No. 350; prefers second version
of draft Bill ; does not consider it gives
wider powers than those enjoyed by
existing Dominions; legalistically minded
M.P.s could doubtless raise numerous
Committee points ; hopes Opposition will
be persuaded not to put down detailed
amendments in Committee

30 Briefs him on certain points regarding
draft Bill in readiness for meeting that
afternoon with Opposition Leaders

30 (1) Future of India Office and its contents;

decision that this matter should be left for
negotiation with Indian Govt; (3)
consideration of points outstanding on draft
India Bill

30 Invites him to meeting to see Indian
Independence Bill

30 Refers to No. 408; agrees to additional
persons mentioned therein attending
meeting to study draft Bill; emphasises
need to avoid any leakage; has told
Jinnali he could also increase his party

30 Is glad to know Jinnah is satisfied with
composition of his party to consider draft
Bill; emphasises need to avoid any leakage;
mentions invitation to Gandhi; refers to
clause enabling one person to be appointed
to both Governor-Generalships and asks
whom Jinnah wishes to nominate as
Governor-General of Pakistan

30 Draft Indian Independence Bill as
amended to 29 June

Page

748

754

765

7 66

768

773

773

774

779

CV111

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

June

429

Note on Indian Independence Bill

30

432

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1674-S

30

434

Listowel to Mountbatten

Tel. 8361

30

435 Nehru to Mountbatten 30

Letter

436 Mountbatten to Attlee 30

Tel. 1675-S via India Office

438 Listowel to Mountbatten 30

Tel. 8380

Main subject or subjects Page

Points for discussion with Indian leaders 795
Refers to No. 414 and explains main point 800
of amendment is to allow India to declare
independence by legislation
Refers to No. 414; points out inconsistency 803

of proposed amendment with intention
embodied in revised version of Bill to
limit powers of Dominion legislatures, but
agrees to it if Mountbatten judges it
desirable

Thanks for No. 424; will convey 803

invitation to additional experts and lawyers
to attend meeting ; his intention was
however to consult Cabinet colleagues ;
gives assurance to make every effort to
prevent leakage and asks to have a copy of
Bill to show Cabinet colleagues; Gandhi
may not attend meeting as time is inconvenient
Reports Krishna Menon has warned him 804
that Nehru threatens resignation unless
allowed to take away copy of Bill;
mentions Nehru’s promise to make every
effort to prevent leakage; requests
authority to use discretion to avert crisis
Refers to No. 41 1; notifies Opposition 806

concurrence to Bill being shown to Indian
leaders; Cabinet Committee feel that,
because of shortage of time, drafting points
cannot be considered but only points of
principle; suggests arguments to counter
Nehru’s complaint that other Dominions
had opportunity for full consideration of
their Bills; opposes formal communique
announcing that Indian leaders were being
consulted

439 Attlee to Mountbatten
Tel. 8393 via India Office

440 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 74

441 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 75

July

1 Refers to No. 436; agrees he may allow 807
Nehru to take draft Bill away; desirable to
give Jinnah similar facilities

1 Refers to No. 366; sends revision of proviso 808
relating to possibility of same person being
Governor-General of both Dominions ; has
no objection to this revision but feels it
might be better to try out proviso as it
stands

1 Reports that Opposition leaders adopted 809
helpful attitude in discussions on 30 June;
main criticisms were on use of title India
for Hindustan and expression ‘Independence

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

C1X

Name and Number Date

July

441 ( cont .)

443 Cabinet C.M. (47)58^1 Conclusions 1

Minutes 2, 6

444 Attlee to Churchill 1

Letter

445 Churchill to Attlee 1

Letter

452 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1684-S

456 Baldev Singh to Nehru
Letter

458 Mountbatten to Attlee

Tel. 1690-S via India Office

460 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1695-S

Main subject or subjects Page

Bill’ rather than ‘Indian (Self Government)

Bill’

Dominions Office — change of title; 810

agreement not to change title of Indian
Independence Bill but special effort to be
made to explain implications of title
Has discussed Indian legislation with Eden 812
and others; doubts whether he can hold up
Second Reading until Churchill returns
Expresses concern that Bill is to be called 812
‘Indian Independence Bill’ ; says he only
supported Mountbatten proposals because
they establish the phase of Dominion Status
which is not the same as independence
Has given Congress and League leaders 818

copies of draft Bill ; Jinnah’s preliminary
reactions were very favourable but Congress
raised three points ; these related to : (1)
insertion of words ‘this or’ in Clause (6)2
(see No. 434); (2) ability of Constituent
Assembly to include in fundamental laws
provision for accession of States; (3) the
wiping out of all treaties and agreement
with States

Expresses concern at provisions in draft 824

Bill relating to disputed districts in Western
Punjab; asks him to ensure amendments are
made so that administration of them does
not go over to Pakistan automatically when
Bill becomes law

Says situation is incredibly explosive and 826
he is advised Congress will not compromise
on different system for Interim Govt; will take
line that he cannot legally put proposals
through until Bill has been passed; Krishna
Menon believes Congress will accept a 20
July target date for enactment of Bill; as
League Members are moving to Karachi
on 7 August this would mean they would
only serve under new conditions for fortnight ;
considers this might prove acceptable
compromise; says tel. as in No. 468 would
be of utmost help

Sends note of points made informally by 829
League on draft Bill; these include: (1)
wish to insert a sanction respecting division
of property between the Dominions ; (2)
question of participation of representatives
of tribal areas in Constituent Assembly;

(3) objection to Andamans and Nicobars
being included in Dominion of India

cx

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

July

463 Mountbatten to Listowel 2

Tel. 1703-S

465 Cabinet India and Burma 2

Committee
I.B.(47)39th Meeting
Minutes 1-2

466 Listowel to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 8499

468 Attlee to Adountbatten 3

Tel. 8510 via India Office

469

Listowel to Mountbatten

Tel. 8511

3

479

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1719-S

3

480 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 1723-S

Main subject or subjects Page

Sends further note of points made informally 831
by League on draft Bill ; also reports that
League could not accept view that
Dominion of India would inherit
international personality of existing India ;
they would withdraw acceptance of Plan
if such a provision were inserted in Bill ;
they pointed out importance of Andamans
and Nicobars if India refused land passage
between East and West Pakistan

(1) Consideration of No. 458; agreement 834
that tel. asked for by Viceroy should be
sent (see No. 468) but it should be
modified to emphasise need for immediate
finality on terms of Bill; (2) decision to
retain title ‘Indian Independence Bill’ ;
desirability of Dominions support for this

Comments on points in No. 452; explains 836
why there are insuperable objections to
Congress request that treaties and agreements
with States should be continued in existence
by Parliamentary legislation

Explains that H.M.G. cannot sanction 838

reconstruction of Interim Govt until legal

position is assured by passing

of Bill; is speeding up passage of Bill to

aim at target date of 20 July; important

they should have Indian leaders’ comments

on draft Bill immediately

Refers to No. 468; sends text of amendment 839
to draft Bill to cover legal position about
reconstitution of Interim Govt

Sends text of Congress comments on 854

draft Bill; these include: (1) emphasis on
the importance of the new Dominion of
India continuing international personality of
existing India; (2) concern at complete
wiping out of all treaties with the Indian
States; (3) anxiety that powers and
functioning of Constituent Assemblies
should be placed beyond doubt

Sends text of League comments on draft 858
Bill; these include: (1) claim that
Andamans and Nicobars should be
allocated to Pakistan ; (2) request that it be
specifically indicated which would be
appropriate authority to negotiate with
each of tribal areas; (3) request that
provisions are included to make awards of
Boundary Commissions and Arbitral Tribunal

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

CXI

Name and Number Date

Main subject or subjects

Page

July

480 (cont.)

481 Commonwealth Relations Office to 3

British High Commissioners in
Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and South Africa
Tel. Z 37

482 Addison to Attlee 3

Minute

484 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 1728-S

485 Mountbatten to Listowel 3

Tel. 1729-S

486 Cabinet India and Burma 3

Committee
I.B.(47)40th Meeting
Minutes 2 and 3

488 Clutterbuck to Commonwealth 3

Relations Office
Tel. 572

491 Listowel to Mountbatten 4

Tel. 8587

492 Costar to Commonwealth Relations 4

Office
Tel. 193

494 Hankinson to Commonwealth 4

Relations Office
Tel. 451

495 Viceroy’ Conference Paper 4

V.C.P. 107

final and binding; H.M.G. should enforce
awards

Explains why it is considered essential that 861
Indian legislation is passed that month ;

High Commissioners to ask Dominion
Prime Ministers whether the title ‘India
Independence Bill’ is acceptable; if it is,

H.M.G. would like to be able to say so
publicly

Sends text of formula agreed with de 862

Valera for use if they are asked in

Parliament whether Eire had been

approached on the omission of the words

‘Emperor of India’ from King’s Title

Sends comments on points raised by 863

Congress (No. 479) on draft Bill

Sends comments on points raised by 865

League (No. 480) on draft Bill

(2) Consideration of No. 464; no 866

announcement on withdrawal of British

Army to be made in advance of Second

Reading of Bill; (3) consideration of tels.

giving Congress’s and League’s reactions to

draft Bill; amendments to meet points

raised

Refers to No. 481; Mackenzie King feels 873
word ‘independence’ will be taken to mean
independence of Commonwealth ; he cites
1926 precedent; he does not feel Canadians
will be unduly excited but suggests title
‘India (transfer of Powers) Bill’

Arrangements for publication of Bill; 875

explains that any further discussion of
points raised by Congress and League would
have imperilled passage of Bill that Session
Refers to No. 481; Fraser is consulting 876

others before replying but feels himself that
term ‘independence’ is unfortunate; he
much doubts whether Opposition will
agree in view of their attitude on the change
of the Dominions Office title
Refers to No. 481; reports that in 880

preliminary talk Chifley and Evatt felt that
while proposed title was unlikely to create
any real difficulty for Australia, they were
not happy about use of word ‘independence’ ;
however they recognised problem and
could not immediately think of better word
Question of Mountbatten remaining 88 1

Governor-General of India only; need for

CX 11

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

495 (cont.)

Date

July

499 Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty Second 4
Staff Meeting
Item 2

504 Attlee to Churchill 4

Letter

506 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 11,

paras. 4 and 5

507 Mountbatten to Attlee
Tel. 1736-S via India Office

510 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter, paras. 1 and 2

513 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8652

514 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8653

531 Baring to Commonwealth
Relations Office
Tel. 202

4

4

512 Commonwealth Relations Office to 4
Costar
Tel. 188

Main subject or subjects Page

Jinnah to re-affirm that he would welcome

this; possible amendments to Bill

Consideration of No. 495; Mountbatten 885

decides to leave proviso in Bill allowing

for appointment of same person as

Governor-General of both Dominions

Refers to No. 445; does not agree with 891

point he makes ; feels term ‘independence’

emphasises the complete freedom of

members of Commonwealth from control

by others

Discussions with Congress and League on 893
draft Bill

Refers to No. 468; reports that Nehru has 900
been persuaded not to press matter until
Bill is passed; Cabinet that morning reacted
quite peacefully; is sending Ismay home
to explain difficulties of situation
Indian Independence Bill presented in 902

Commons that morning; Congress
insistence on change in Interim Govt is
considered unreasonable in London but it is
recognised that they must try to meet it
Refers to No. 492; appreciates Fraser’s 905

position but feels he should not consult
Opposition; informs Costar personally of
Mackenzie-King’s reaction in No. 488 and
says there is no question of saying publicly
that Dominion P.M.s favour term
‘independence’ ; no change in title of Bill now
‘possible’

Notes that, despite objections in Nos. 349 906

and 466, standstill proviso covering
agreements with States has been inserted in
Bill; though precise legal result may be
disputable, proviso gives cover to a
standstill in practice when neither party has
done anything

Sends brief explanation of reasons why 907

India and Burma Committee did not feel
able to accept some of suggestions made by
Congress and League on Bill

Refers to No. 481; sends message from 932

Smuts saying that term ‘independence’ is
regrettable and suggesting substitution of
‘sovereignty’; Smuts suggests that
announcement of Dominion agreement
should be avoided; he feels term may lead
Burmese to go for independence rather
than Dominion Status

CH. 4 THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

CX111

Name and number Date

July

534 Jinnali to Mountbatten 5

Letter

535 Mountbatten to Listowel 5

Tel. 1767-S

536 Mountbatten to Listowel 5

Tel. 1771-S

542 Nicholls to Joyce 6

Tel. 1789-S

543 Mountbatten to Listowel 6

Tel. 478-GT

548 Jinnah to Mountbatten 7

Letter

550 Minutes by Croft and Turnbull 7

555 Commonwealth Relations Office 7

to Baring
Tel. Z 39

Main subject or subjects Page

Encloses message in No. 536 and asks him 937
to send it to Attlee and Churchill; says he is
examining position regarding the execution
and enforcement of the partition award
and will wish to send message on this on
7 July

Sends text of note received from Nehru on 937
points in Bill which Congress feel strongly
should be changed; these relate to: (1) the
continuation of the international personality
of India; (2) the proviso added to clause
7(i)(b) and (c); (3) the proviso to clause 19(3)

Sends message from Jinnah complaining at 93 8
allocation of Andamans and Nicobars to
India in Bill and stressing that Pakistan’s
claim to them is very strong; asks for this
injustice to be rectified in Parliament
Reports that first reactions to Bill have 945

been extremely favourable and British have
come out well; V. P. Menon’s Press
Conference held to explain Bill went off
well; main attack was on position of States
and, in particular, Berar

Refers to No. 542 ; sends extracts from 945

Press comments on Bill

Refers to Nos. 534 and 536; sends further 951
message for Attlee and Churchill relating
to the enforcement of the Arbitral and
Boundary awards; League considers that
H.M.G. alone is appropriate authority to
guarantee awards; Bill should be amended
to provide for this or declaration be made
during Parliamentary debate
Powers of the Central Executives of the 954

new Dominions under clause 8 of the Bill
Sends message for Smuts, in reply to his 961
message in No. 531, expressing regret if
term ‘independence’ had caused
embarrassment; other Dominion P.M.s had
also expressed reservations and there was
was no question of H.M.G. saying that
term was acceptable to Prime Ministers of
other Commonwealth countries ; explains
why term was adopted

CX1V

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER 5

The States

Name and Number Date Main subject or subjects Page

1947
Ad ay

7 Cabinet India and Burma 3 1

Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)94

Memorandum by Listowel drawing 15

attention to wide powers recommended
for Centre by reports of Union Powers and
Advisory Committees of Constituent
Assembly; suggests authors had given up
any idea of securing Muslim League
participation, and points out possible
adverse effect on w illingness of States to
adhere to Union

June

17 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Sixth 1

Staff Meeting
Item 1

20 Unsigned Note undated

21 Corfield to Abell 2

Letter

43 Minutes of Viceroy’s Meeting with 3

Members of the States Negotiating
Committee

45 Statement by H.M.G. on India 3

Policy para. 18

60 Proceedings of Mountbatten’s 4

Press Conference

64 Mountbatten to Bhopal 4

Letter

67 Abell to Mountbatten 4

Minute

68 Nehru to Mountbatten 4

Letter

(1) Mountbatten describes conversations 32

with Bhopal and Bikaner and indicates line

he will take in meetings with States

Report of discussion between V. P. Menon 37

and Patel : — titles for Princes ; States

Proposed amendment to sentence about 37

States in Viceroy’s broadcast

Mountbatten describes reasons for adoption 80
of present plan; points out implications for
States were that new Dominions would
have stronger centres than previously
envisaged, but would both be in
Commonwealth; discussion follows on date
of lapse of paramountcy; need for
standstill agreements with successor
Dominions and machinery for negotiating
them; relations of States with new
Dominions and nature of Committee(s)
required to negotiate on this subject;

Mountbatten concludes with need for States,

in coming to decisions, to consider likely
situation in India and the world in ten
years’ time

Policy towards States remains unchanged 89

Questions and Answers 115

Accepts, with regret, Bhopal’s resignation 125

as Chancellor of Chamber of Princes
Line to be taken on Nehru’s claim that 128

Central Government should inherit

machinery of paramountcy, particularly as
regards facilities such as buildings, etc.

Refers to Bhopal’s resignation and intention 129
to declare his State independent; outlines
continuing need for machinery to deal with

CH. 5 THE STATES

CXV

Name and Number

68 ( cotit .)

Date

June

70 Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Eighth 4
Staff Meeting
Items 1 and 2

73 Minutes of Viceroy’s Sixteenth 5

Miscellaneous Meeting
Item 2

74 Corfield to Abell 5

Letter

91 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 8, 5

para. 10, 11 and 27

94 Corfield to Abell 6

Letter

100 Minutes of Viceroy’s Seventeenth 7

Miscellaneous Meeting
Item 5

101 Record of Interview between 7

Mountbatten, Jinnah, Liaquat and
Nishtar

107

Rajagopalachariar to Cripps

Letter

8

108

Minutes of Viceroy’s Fortieth

Staff Meeting

Item 1

9

109

Nehru to Mountbatten

Letter

9

no Nehru to Mountbatten 9

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

administrative matters concerning States
and attacks Political Dept’s policy of
dismantling it; asserts that ‘it is impossible
for us to admit the right’ of any State to
independence

(1) Bhopal’s resignation; (2) interview with 133
Gandhi (No. 69) ; question whether Gandhi,

Nehru or Mountbatten should visit Kashmir
Meeting between Mountbatten and Indian 137

leaders on (2) the States — Mountbatten
describes meeting in No. 43, Nehru
complains that Political Dept’s policy
regarding lapse of paramountcy was likely
to lead to administrative chaos
Refers to No. 68; defends programme for 143
retraction of paramountcy; suggests
Mountbatten might consult Standing
Committee of Chamber of Princes
Conversations with Bhopal and Bikaner; 158
meeting with States Negotiating Committee
Refers to Nos. 74 and 68; summarises 167

discussion between Mountbatten and
certain representatives of the States at which
latter opposed location of agents of Central
Govts in their territories and proposed
appointment of own agents to Central
Govts

The States 184

Meeting joined by Dewan of Bahawalpur; 190
discussion of position of that State; Jinnah
believes existing agreements with States
would be legally binding on successor
authorities

Contests doctrine that ‘paramountcy’ ends 196
with transfer of power

(1) Hyderabad and Kashmir 198

Proposes establishment of some central 205

agency to deal with States problems on

behalf of Govt of India ; no further steps

should be taken to liquidate work of

Political Dept in Residencies without

consultation with Govt of India

Protests at steps being taken by Political 208

Dept to liquidate itself and hence relations

of Govt of India with States without

reference to G. of I. and in particular at

proposals for disposal of buildings, etc. in

CXV1

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

no ( cont .)

in Nehru to Mountbatten
Letter

1 12 Monckton to Ismay
Letter

124 Record of Interview between

Mountbatten, Nehru, Patel and
Kripalani

146 Corfield to Scott
Letter

150 Herbert to Corfield
Tel. R-59

15 1 Standing Committee of All India

States’ People’s Conference
Resolutions (2) and (3)

163 Firman issued by Nizam of
Hyderabad

175 Minutes of Viceroy’s Eighteenth
Miscellaneous Meeting
Item 1

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

States which may belong to G. of I. ;
suggests proposed return of cantonments to
States be considered with G. of I. before
action taken; proposes that representative
from G. of I. should visit Residencies to
inspect buildings etc. and report
9 Encloses note by Sir Alladi Krishnaswami 210
Iyer on ‘The disappearance of Paramountcy,
the emergence of Independent Sovereign
States and the Balkanisation of India’

9 Is worried about way States are being 214

handled; encloses note summarising
Hyderabad case ; if nothing is done will be
compelled to raise hypothetical question of
(independent) relations with H.M.G. and
return to London to pursue matter through
political channels 232

10 The States

11 Encloses briefs on (1) machinery for dealing 272
with questions of common concern

between States and successor Govts; (2)
interim standstill arrangements; (3) disposal
of Crown Representative’s records ; gives
his views on Nos. 109, no and in

n Regrets it has proved impracticable to 282

prevent issue of No. 163

n/12 (2) Position of States in regard to statement 282
of 3 June; (3) Administrative functions of
paramountcy

12 Announces decision not to send 308

representatives to either Constituent
Assembly; states that on departure of
Paramount Power he will in law become
independent Sovereign, but that question of
association or relationship between his

State and units of British India remains for
decision when their constitutions have been
determined

13 Meeting between Mountbatten and Indian 320
leaders on (1) the States — Nehru attacks

and Corfield defends Political Dept’s
policy for, and actions to implement,
withdrawal of paramountcy ; Nehru argues
that States cannot claim independence;

Jinnah asserts they are sovereign states
which Nehru contests; discussion of
Enclosures to No. 146 with agreement,
inter alia, on establishment of ‘States
Department’ of G. of I.; on despatch to

CH. 5 THE STATES

CXV11

Name and Number Date

June

175 ( cont .)

196 Corfield to Erskine Crum 14

Letter

197 Secretary to Crown Representative 14

to Residents
Letter F.45~R(S)/47

198 Secretary to Crown Representative 14

to Residents
Letter F.4<5-R(S)/47

199 Monckton to Mountbatten 14

Letter

206

Resolution of All-India Congress

15

Committee

225

Reuter Report

17

226

Fortnightly report of Madras States

17

Residency

229

Nehru to Mountbatten

17

Letter

238

Viceroy’s Conference Paper

17

V.C.P. 81

Main subject or subjects Page

States of draft standstill formula and on
holding meeting between Indian leaders and
representatives of States (probably in July)
to discuss it ; and on principles to govern
disposal of Crown Representative’s records
Refers to No. 175, Item 1; hopes that 381

Mountbatten will explain to Indian
Cabinet that jurisdiction over administered
areas (e.g. railways and cantonments) will
revert to States; that this reversion will not
be affected by standstill agreement; and
that negotiations for practical arrangements
for these areas, on basis of changed jurisdiction,
should not be delayed

Machinery for dealing with questions of 382

common concern: States Dept, to be

established; Residents to enquire whether

States would prefer successor Govts to

station Agents with them, or v ice versa

Standstill Formula: draft standstill 384

agreement enclosed; Residents to explain

it is only a ‘cockshy’ to provide basis for

discussion and negotiation at Conference

between representatives of States and

Successor Govts to be held at end of July

Is very troubled about way his Hyderabad 386

clients are being treated; outlines Nizam’s

viewpoint on apparent intention to deny

Hyderabad any direct relations with H.M.G.

and his difficulties in trusting in Hindustan

for his future; is being pressed by Nizam to

return to England; will feel reluctantly

bound to go to ensure that British public

are aware how ‘shamefully’ their ‘old

friends and allies’ are being treated

Statement of Congress views on position 399

of Indian States

Statement by Jinnah on Indian States 438

Controversy between Ramaswami Aiyar, 43 8
and Congress and States’ People’s Congress,
over Travancore’s decision to declare
independence on lapse of paramountcy
Encloses long note (reprinted in full) on 442

Kashmir

Circulates letter and proposals from Nehru 461
regarding constitution and functions of
proposed new Dept., possibly called the
States Dept., of Govt of India to deal writh
matters of common concern with States

CXV111

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

239 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Fifth
Staff Meeting
Items 4 and 7
241 Listowel to Attlee

Minute 92/47, para. 6

247 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1484-S

250 Secretary to Crown Representative
to Residents
Letter F.63-R(S)/46

260 Ismay to Mountbatten
Minute

261 Ismay to Mountbatten
Letter

264 Nehru to Ismay
Letter

273 Mountbatten to Listowel
Letter 1446/18

Date

June

17

17

Main subject or subjects

Page

243

Mountbatten to Listowel

17

Tel. 1482-P

246

Mountbatten to Listowel

17

Tel. 1483-S

17

18

19

19

19

20

(4) Nehru’s proposals for establishment of 463
States Department; (7) Bahawalpur

Refers to No. 222; points out practical 471

difficulties of Royal visit to India and
Pakistan in current year ; until Princes have
defined their relations with new Dominions,

Royal visit might cause embarrassment in
that regard

Requests extension of style ‘His Highness’ 474

to Rulers with salute of 9 guns

Conveys view of Reforms Office on 484

question whether agreements of commercial,

economic or financial character between

States and paramount power will continue

to be binding on States and successor

Governments

Refers to No. 246 and conveys Political 485

Dept.’s conflicting view

Authorises resumption of destruction of 490

ephemeral records and gives instructions
for transfer of certain confidential records
to U.K. High Commissioner by 15 August
1947

Following talks with Chhattari, Monckton 503
and Corfield, submits recommendations of
Mieville and himself on how to handle
Berar problem

Has had long discussion with Monckton on 504
drafting Parliamentary Question and
Answer on H.M.G.’s relations with States
after transfer of power which will be
sufficiently acceptable to Nizam to prevent
his sending Monckton home to mobilise
opinion on treatment of States; Monckton
is writing to Butler to get Question put;

Annex: letter to Montea th enclosing draft

Reviews position regarding States; 509

emphasises they must ‘fit in properly into

the picture of India’; it is ‘quite inconceivable

that a State can become independent’ and

have external relations; indicates trade is to

be regarded as part of external relations ;

trusts States Dept, will soon be constituted;

enclosure: note emphasisising need for

political arrangements to take place of

paramountcy as well as for arrangements

for matters of common concern

Encloses letter and note from Bhopal to be 528

passed to Attlee; has explained to Bhopal

and Zafrullah Khan that Congress would

CH. 5 THE STATES

CX IX

Name and Number Date

June

273 (cont.)

279 Mountbatten to Listowel 20

Tel. 8-S.K.

287 Secretary to Crown Representative 21
to Residents
Letter F.46-R(S)/47

288 Ismay to Nehru 21

Letter

294 Record of Interview between 22

Mountbatten and Kak

295 Nehru to Mountbatten 22

Letter

296 Monckton to Ismay 22

Letter

Main subject or subjects Page

never have agreed to plan if there were to be
more than two Dominions; but some
States, particularly Hyderabad and Bhopal,
feel very unhappy; enclosure: Bhopal’s
letter alleging that, if H.M.G.’s treatment of
States is based on hope of conciliating
Congress, that hope will prove futile; that
Congress will be dominated by left wing
whose socialism ‘is only a thin veneer
covering a mass of rank communism’ ; and
that decisions already made by Constituent
Assembly offer little incentive to States to
join Hindustan

Refers to No. 256, paras. 6 and 20; question 537
of consultation with Indian leaders on
particular points arising on draft Bill;
agrees with Reforms Office and Political
Dept in deprecating formal denunciation
of treaties with States

Refers to No. 198, para. 4; July Conference 546
on Standstill arrangements : Residents to
seek to ensure that (a) every State is
represented, (b) representatives are authorised
to sign agreement, (c) as many States as
possible combine to send joint representative;
there is no suggestion of ‘permanent
commitment’, but, to avoid administrative
dislocation, standstill agreement is
necessary

Refers to No. 238; encloses memorandum 548
on constitution and functions of proposed
States Dept which Mountbatten proposes to
include in agenda for Indian Cabinet
meeting next week

Mountbatten clarifies advice given to 555

Maharaja regarding future of Kashmir
In view of statements by or on behalf of 556
Ramaswami Aiyar regarding independence
of Travancore, Govt of India will not be
prepared to recognise Travancore’s Envoy
to Delhi ; considers statement that Pakistan,
on its establishment, will receive representative
of Travancore is ‘extraordinary in many
respects’ ; thinks Ramaswami Aiyar should
be informed that such statements are
‘mischievous and harmful’

Refers to Govt of India’s inaction in matter 557
of removing its troops from Hyderabad ; if
no reply to Hyderabad’s latest
representation is forthcoming P.Q. will be
put asking whether this ‘Army of

cxx

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

296 (1 tout .)

297 Nehru to Ismay
Letter

303 Cripps to Rajagopalachariar
Letter

308 Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Sixth
Staff Meeting
Items 10 and 11

319 Record of Interview between

Mountbatten and Nehru, para. 5
326 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)128

338 Indian Cabinet Meeting
Case 152/32/47
340 Nehru to Ismay
Letter

349 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8162

355 Mountbatten to Nehru
Letter 1446/32

360 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
I.B.(47)36th Meeting
Minute 2

365 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1598-S

369 Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 10,
paras. 26-36

Date Main subject or subjects Page

June

Occupation’ will be permitted to remain;
is under pressure from Kashmir to go there
for few days

22 Refers to No. 288; notes that memorandum 559
on States Dept does not cover need for
political arrangements with States and

suggests this might be dealt with in
Standstill agreement

23 Cannot concur in historical and 565

constitutional arguments in No. 107

regarding lapse of paramountcy but
recognises practical problems which he
feels call for ‘cooperation and goodwill on
the administrative level . . . like so much
of the business now before you all in
India’

23 (10) Berar; (n) Hyderabad 573

24 Kashmir 591

24 Memorandum by Listowel opposing 604

proposal made by Ismay and Monckton
(Annex to No. 261) for P.Q. about policy
towards States

25 (1) Decision to establish States Dept of 620

Govt of India

25 Encloses (1) amended draft of standstill 629

agreement with States, and (2) explanatory
notes on clauses

25 Refers to Nos. 246 and 247; explains why 643
it is felt Political Dept’s view must be

accepted that all agreements with States must
lapse and advocates retention of clause to
this effect in Bill

26 Refers to No. 264; agrees accommodation 657
between States and two Dominions is
most desirable; this must be reached by
parties themselves but will do what he can
to promote agreed settlement

26 (2) Agreement not to make statement on 662
Indian States in answer to P.Q. proposed by
Monckton and Ismay

26 States inter alia that Nehru ‘will vehemently 672
protest’ against denunciation of States’

treaties (see No. 349)

27 Difficult meeting about States; 679

establishment of States Dept and
forthcoming meeting between it and

States’ representatives; Mountbatten’s visit

Name and Number

369 (< cont .)

376 Listowel to Mountbatten
Letter, para. 9

385 Corfield to Mountbatten
Letter

386 Mountbatten to Kashmir
Letter

387 Mountbatten to Webb
Letter

401 Bhopal to Mountbatten
Letter

402 Bhopal to Mountbatten
Letter

403 Abell to Mountbatten
Minute

418 Mountbatten to Corfield
Letter 592/89

CH. 5 THE STATES

cxxi

Date Main subject or subject $ Page

June

to Kashmir; renewal of Nehru’s proposal to
visit Kashmir and Mountbatten’s suggestion
that Gandhi should go instead; interview
with Bhopal, Monckton and Zafrullah
Khan; Bhopal’s pleasure at Patel’s
appointment to States Dept

27 Bhopal’s views on H.M.G.’s policy 704

towards States

28 Suggests two amendments to draft of No. 716
386; also that Jinnah should be informed

of background to Gandhi’s proposed visit to
Kashmir to allay suspicion of it in Pakistan
27/28 Reports discussions with Nehru and 717

Gandhi about Kashmir; they now wish that
one of them should visit Kashmir ;

Mountbatten has agreed to put case to
Maharaja for visit by Gandhi; stresses need
for tactful handling of matter; Enclosure:
official letter from Mountbatten to
Maharaja (dictated in Gandhi’s presence)
suggesting that Maharaja should agree to
visit by Gandhi ; latter has given assurance
not to make speeches or any form of
propaganda

28 Asks him to warn Maharaja it will be 719

dangerous to postpone Gandhi’s visit to
Kashmir too long; Enclosure: letter written
earlier describing background to proposal

for visit by Gandhi

29 Protests at agitation ‘engineered against 739

Travancore’; urges that it is necessary for

each side to desist from action contrary to
3 June plan in order to create right
atmosphere for forthcoming talks between
States Dept and States on Standstill
arrangements

29 Asks Mountbatten to ensure that proposed 740
legislation clearly provides for lapse of
paramountcy after transfer of power

29 Submits advice, after consultation with 741

V. P. Menon, on action to be taken on

No. 340

30 Reports conversation with Raja of Bilaspur 764
about future of Punjab States and advice he

has given him regarding negotiation of
standstill agreements and accession of
States to one or other of two Dominions ;
has told Bilaspur that he (Mountbatten)

‘had made it a point of principle not to
advise any State which of the two
Dominions they should join’; asks Corfield,

CXX11

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number Date

June

418 {cont)

427 Qureshi to Davy 30

Letter d.o. No. 370

July

44 6 Record of Interview between 1

Mountbatten and Panikkar

450 Velio di to Nehru 1

Tel. 1016

452 Mountbatten to Listowel 1

Tel. 1684-S

459 Rajagopalachariar to Cripps 2

Letter

466 Listowel to Mountbatten 2

Tel. 8499

476 Minutes by Auchinleck and Abell 3-6

477 Smith to Ismay 3

Letter 191/CGS

Main subject or subjects Page

through V. P. Menon, to sound views of
India and Pakistan representatives in States
Dept

Communicates Bhopal Govt’s reply regarding 777
creation of States Dept and negotiation of
Standstill arrangements; raises certain other
matters, e.g. retrocession of jurisdiction over
railways and of railway lands, supply of
arms and ammunition, States’ share in
Sterling Balances; Bhopal Govt observes
that States are only party to suffer and be
neglected in programme for transfer of
power and trusts that Crown Representative
will take necessary action in these matters

Panikkar speaks of detrimental effect if 813

States’ agreement were to be terminated at
short notice under Standstill Agreement; he
suggests standstill agreements of two years
on more fundamental subjects; he says that
embarrassment would be caused by
disputed succession cases

Says there are signs that agents for Indian 817
States are active in London; object is to
mislead public on question of States’
independence ; seeks guidance on counter¬
measures

Lias given Congress and League leaders 818

copies of draft Bill; Congress raised three
points; these related to . . . (3) the wiping out
of all treaties and agreements with States
Refers to No. 303 ; feels H.M.G. has taken 828
on ultra-legalistic position on the States;
admits that H.M.G.’s obligations under the
Treaties may cease on independence but
believes that obligations between States
and G. of I. must continue; does not
consider that Parliamentary legislation on
matter should extend to new Dominion of
India

Comments on points in No. 452; explains 836
why there are insuperable objections to
Congress request that treaties and
agreements with States should be continued
in existence by Parliamentary legislation
Position if Travancore were to ask for 850

military assistance to deal with disorder
Sends copy of note from Auchinleck to 851

Baldev Singh with which Auchinleck sent
copy of his Minute in No. 476;

CH. 5 THE STATES

CXX111

Name and Number

477 ( cont .)

479 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1719-S

484 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1728-S

486 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
I.B.(47)40th Meeting
Minute 3

502 Nehru to Vellodi
Tel. 5211

513 Listowel to Mountbatten
Tel. 8652

520 Viceroy’s Conference Paper
V.C.P. 112

525 Cabinet India and Burma
Committee
Paper 1.6.(47)136
528 Text of Statement by Patel

533 Record of Interview between

Mountbatten and Jinnah, para. 10
538 Mountbatten to Listowel
Tel. 1777-P

Date

JulY

3

3

3

Main subject or subjects

Aucliinleck noted that if, after 15 August, a
Dominion Govt wished to use the armed
forces to coerce States, it would be
necessary to decide the position of the
British Officers in command; he is taking
matter up with Viceroy; Smith adds that in
no circumstances can British Officers in
Pakistan and Hindustan be used in
operations against each other
Congress comments on clauses 2(3) and
7(1 )(b) of draft Bill relating to States
Refers to No. 479 and recommends
something should be done to meet
Congress points

Committee are impressed by Congress
criticisms of clause 7(i)(b)

4 Refers to No. 450; doubts whether agents
of Indian States in London can produce
much effect; outlines Congress position on
States ; explains that decision of Frontier
Congress to boycott referendum does not
mean that it is demanding separate,
independent status for Province

4 Notes that, despite objections in Nos. 349
and 466, standstill proviso covering
agreements with States has been inserted in
Bill; though precise legal result may be
disputable, proviso gives cover to a
standstill in practice when neither party has
done anything

5 Circulates paper giving League’s comments
on Congress comments (No. 479) on Bill

5 Memorandum by Listowel on the position
of Berar and the Nizam’s probable
attitude towards negotiations

5 Statement issued on occasion of coming
into being of Indian States Dept; Patel
appeals for States to join Constituent
Assembly and assures them that nothing
more than a three subject accession is
sought; Congress have no desire to interfere
with the domestic affairs of the States;

States Dept will not conduct its relations
with States in any manner savouring of
domination

5 Jinnah denies writing to Maharaja of
Kashmir urging him to join Pakistan

5 Explains why he does not favour formal
dissolution of Chamber of Princes ;

Page

854

863

866

888

906

912

924

928

935

941

CXX1V

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS

Name and Number

Date

July

538 (cont)

542

Nicholls to Joyce

Tel. 1789-S

6

545

Minutes of Viceroy’s Fifty Third
Staff Meeting

Item 4

7

559

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1805-S

1

560

Mountbatten to Listowel

Tel. 1806-S

7

Main subject or subjects Page

recommends it should be allowed to die

natural and unobtrusive death

Reports that first reactions to Bill have 945

been extremely favourable and British have

come out well; main attack was on position

of States and, in particular, Berar

(4) V. P. Menon says he personally drafted 946

No. 528

Explains background to Note in No. 560; 966

says be had not realised position on petty
States ; is sending Note to Corfield
Sends text of Note by Rau expressing 967

concern over aspects of the Proviso to
Section 7(i)(b) and (c) of Bill as drafted; Rau
points out that Rulers of 327 petty States
would be given extensive powers they had
never enjoyed in the past; he suggests that
existing proviso be replaced by two
separate provisos

I

Viceroy's Conference Paper V.C.P. 58
Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, J1 May I947

THE VICEROY’S BROADCAST

1. Attached are copies of two alternative broadcast statements which His
Excellency the Viceroy recorded in London on 28th May.

2. One or other of these broadcasts will be played from London and made
by the Viceroy from Delhi on 3rd June.

3. Broadcast ‘A’ will be used if it appears probable that Bengal will be
partitioned: Broadcast ‘B’ if it appears probable that Bengal will remain
unified.1

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

1 Alternative ‘A’ was the same, except for minor amendments, as the Broadcast as made (No. 44).
Alternative ‘B’ was the same as ‘A’ except that an additional para, on Bengal was included after the
one on the Sikhs (No. 44, p. 87) which read as follows:

‘Bengal was one of the Provinces for whom partition was demanded, but the newly formed
Coalition Government of Bengal have asked for their case to be reconsidered; and this is reviewed
in the statement which is shortly to be read out.’

Also, the reference to ‘Bengal and part of Assam’ was deleted from the previous para, but one.

2

Minutes of Viceroy’s Thirty Fourth Staff Meeting , Items 1-7

Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s House, New Delhi, on 31 May
1947 at 11 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Sir J. Colville,
Lordlsmay , SirE. Mieville, Mr Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Captain Brockman
Mr I. D. Scott, Air Campbell-] ohnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum.

a

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Item l

THE VICEROY’S BROADCAST

his excellency the viceroy said that he had recorded in London two
alternative versions1 of the Broadcast which he intended to make directly before
the issue of the Announcement. One would be used if it appeared probable, on
the day, that Bengal would be partitioned; and the other if it appeared probable
that Bengal would remain united.

liis excellency the viceroy said that, in view of the fact that the Prime
Minister had decided that the Announcement should be made in Parliament at
3.30 p.m. D.B.S.T. on 3rd June, he would make his Broadcast over All-India
Radio at 7 p.m. I.S.T. It would last about eight minutes. The recorded Broad¬
cast in London would be introduced by a speech by the Prime Minister.
his excellency the viceroy —

(i) directed Pers. Sec. to draft, for his approval, a telegram to ask His
Majesty the King’s permission for him to include a message of goodwill
from His Majesty in his broadcast;

(ii) directed Press Attache to arrange for him to broadcast over All-India
Radio at 7 p.m. I.S.T. on 3rd June;

(iii) directed Press Attache to draft for inclusion in his Broadcast a reference —
as an apparent “aside” — to his basic agreement with Mr Gandhi that the
partitioning of India wTas wrong.

Item 2

BENGAL

his excellency the viceroy referred to a letter2 which he had received
from the Governor of Bengal, who asked him to grant an interview to Mr
Suhrawardy, and stated that both parties in Bengal were preparing to be
attacked if there was a decision in favour of the partition of that Province.
Such a situation was in his opinion very likely to lead to serious trouble.

his excellency the viceroy asked Sir Eric Mieville to arrange for him
to see Mr Suhrawardy that afternoon. He went on to point out that His
Majesty’s Government had declared themselves willing to agree to an indepen¬
dent Bengal — in fact willing to agree to any solution for Bengal with which the
Leaders of the principal parties agreed. Llowever, Pandit Nehru had stated that
he would not agree to Bengal being independent.3 Therefore the only profi¬
table line of negotiation at present was to find out whether the leaders would
agree to Bengal being given a status similar to that of an Indian State and being
allowed to negotiate its own separate agreements with either side.

sir john Colville stated that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan had told him that he
considered that the future of Calcutta was the most difficult point of all. his

MAY 1947

3

excellency the viceroy pointed out that His Majesty’s Government had
decided that it would not be practicable to declare Calcutta a free city. They
had also ruled that Dominion status would not be granted to Eastern Bengal
independently. In his opinion, Eastern Bengal was likely to be a great embarrass¬
ment to Pakistan. Presumably Pandit Nehru considered that Eastern Bengal
was bound sooner or later to rejoin India.

his excellency the viceroy stated that His Majesty’s Government had
agreed that the possible transfer of Purnea to Eastern Bengal should not be
considered in the present statement but should, like the transfer of parts of Sind,
form the subject of separate negotiations and consideration by a Boundary
Commission.1 2 3 4

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY!

directed Prin. Sec. to arrange for him to see Mr Suhrawardy that day.

Item 3

THE PUNJAB

sir eric mieville said that Sir Evan Jenkins had telegraphed that the whole of
4 Indian Division would not be in position in the Punjab by the date of the
Announcement. However, he had seen Lieut. General Sir Arthur Smith and it
had been arranged that the last trainload of the Division should arrive at Lahore
on 3rd June. There would be a total of 16 battalions in and around Lahore.

sir John Colville said that the reason why the Reconnaissance Regiment
of 4 Indian Division was not being sent to the Punjab was that there were other
armoured units there in sufficient quantity.

Item 4

MR GANDHI

rao bahadur menon said that it was Sardar Patel’s opinion that not too

1 See No. 1.

2 Vol. X, No. 554. For Lord Mountbatten’s discussions with the India and Burma Committee referring
to Bengal, see Vol. X, No. 485; No. 494, Minutes 2 and 4; No. 517, Minute 2; No. 525; and No.
553, Minutes 1-3 and 5(d).

3 See Vol. X, Nos. 552 and 560, Enclosure (iii).

4 See Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 5.

4

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

much account should be taken of the recent utterances of Mr Gandhi in favour
of a united India.5

sir john colville stated that he had recently seen Mr Gandhi. He did not
think that it was Mr Gandhi’s intention to sabotage the present Plan, nor that it
was his primary object to attempt to humiliate the British.

After consideration of various ways of issuing a counter-statement to what
Mr Gandhi had recently said, his excellency the viceroy decided that the
only action which it was desirable to take was for him to make some reference
to Mr Gandhi’s views in his Broadcast (see Conclusion (iii) of Item i above). At
the same time he pointed out that it was quite impossible (and Sir Stafford
Cripps had agreed with this) to impose the Cabinet Mission’s Plan by force, as
was apparently suggested by Mr Gandhi. The essence of that plan was agree¬
ment.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed Press Attache to consider the desirability of arranging for a
question to be asked at the Press Conference which he was going to hold
which would give him an opportunity to point out that the essence of the
Cabinet Mission’s Plan was agreement and that it could not be imposed.

Item 5

THE APPOINTMENT OF GOVERNORS GENERAL

his excellency the viceroy drew attention to the embarrassing situation
which would be created if any of the party leaders made public statements
during the coming weeks about whom they wished to nominate for the posts
of Governor General of the two different Dominions which it was intended to
set up. He pointed out that it would make matters much simpler if both
Dominions chose the same man for the two appointments. He made it clear
that he did not consider that, if this did happen, the Governor General should
have the powers of an arbitrator. He personally would in no circumstances
accept the appointment of arbitrator.

lord ism ay suggested that it should be pointed out to the leaders that it was
not customary for Prime Ministers of Dominions to say publicly whom they
wanted for Governors General before His Majesty had approved their nomina¬
tions. To make such a public statement would be most improper and dis¬
courteous.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

decided to make a personal appeal to the Indian leaders at the forthcoming
meeting to refrain from publicity on this matter; and to use the line
suggested by C.V.S.

MAY 1947

5

Item 6

TIMETABLE OF EVENTS
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

(i) directed C.V.S. to prepare for consideration at a Staff Meeting later that
day a draft timetable of events on June 2nd, 3rd and 4th;

(ii) directed Prin. Sec. to discuss the suggested timetable with Pandit Nehru
and with Mr Jinnah or Mr Liaquat Ali Khan.

Item 7

MR JINNAH

HIS EXCELLENCY the viceroy recalled that Sir Stafford Cripps had sug¬
gested, at a Cabinet Committee Meeting,6 that Mr Jinnah might be threatened,
if he appeared likely to reject the Plan, by a suggestion that the notional
partition would be drawn more in favour of the Sikhs, lordismay gave his
opinion that such a threat would be striking at the whole basis of the Plan and
that Mr Jinnah would not be taken in by it.

hisexcellencytheviceroy said that another possibility was to threaten
Mr Jinnah that the referendum in the N.W.F.P. would be run by the Provincial
Government and not by the Governor General if there was strife there, stirred
up by the Muslim League, lord ismay agreed that it might be possible to
threaten Mr Jinnah with this; but mrabell gave his opinion that it would not
be right to threaten Mr Jinnah at all.

his excellency the viceroy said that he considered that he would be
more likely to prevail upon Mr Jinnah by a display of “hurt feelings” rather
than by threats. With this view there was general agreement.

his excellency the viceroy said that he also intended to pass on to Mr
Jinnah Mr Churchill’s message that it was “a matter of life and death” for him
to accept the Plan.7 He would give Mr Jinnah permission to inform his Work¬
ing Committee of this message so long as it was not quoted in the newspapers.

5 According to The Times of India of 30 May, in a report dated 29 May, “Since his return to New Delhi
five days ago, Mr Gandhi has, every evening, at his prayer meeting, preached against Vivisection of
the motherland’ in terms disquietingly militant.” In the same issue it was also reported that Mr
Gandhi, at his prayer meeting on 29 May, had said: ‘that the Cabinet Mission’s statement of May 16,
1946, had been accepted by the Congress and the British Government, and if either of them went
back on it, it would be a breach of faith. He hoped that Britain would not depart from the letter and
spirit of the May 16 statement unless the parties, of their own free will, came to an agreement of any
variation’. On 31 May the same paper reported that Mr Gandhi after his prayer meeting on 30 May
had said: “I made it clear yesterday that if I had my will there would never be Pakistan before
peace, and certainly not through British intervention . . . Let Mr Jinnah establish peace, with or with¬
out my association, and afterwards convene a meeting of Indian leaders of all classes and communi¬
ties and plead with them the cause of Pakistan, and wait till he has carried conviction to them”.

6 See Vol. X, Nos. 517, Minute 2 and 553, Minute 1. 7 See Vol. X, No. 513.

6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

decided, in inducing Mr Jinnah to accept the Plan, not to use threats, but
rather to point out what an embarrassment to him personally Mr Jinnah’s
recent statement8 had been; and to pass on to Mr Jinnah Mr Churchill's
message.

8 Sec Vol. X, No. 502.

3

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

RI3I1I150: ff 151-8

31 May 1947

H.E.

I submit herewith briefs :

(a) For your opening speech at the Conference on 2nd June:
and

(b) For your talk with Mr. Jinnah subsequent to the Conference.

2. I have included a paragraph about the interim period [see para. 12], but
perhaps this should be omitted until you have decided on a definite plan?1

Enclosure 1 to No. 3

ISMAY

DRAFT BRIEF FOR H.E. S OPENING SPEECH AT CONFERENCE ON
2ND JUNE, I947

[announcement unchanged]2

1. The final text of H.M.G.’s announcement3 has been handed round to you.
You will find that, except for paragraph 20, it is exactly the same in substance
as the one which I discussed with each of you in great detail before I went to
London.4 A few amendments have been made on points of detail and these are
underlined in your copies.5 Their sole object is clarification, and if there is ob¬
jection to any of them, I shall not press for their inclusion.

[HELPFUL ATTITUDE OF H.M.G.]

2. I ought to mention that H.M.G. were extraordinarily kind and helpful
during my visit to London, and that they gave me first call on their time.
Considering the pressure under which they were working, this shows you how
much importance they attach to a satisfactory outcome of the India problem. I
am very pleased to say that they have approved in their entirety the proposals
which I put to them after discussion with you.

MAY 1947

7

3. I propose that we should have a few minutes silence to read the document
again, but, before doing so, may I make some preliminary observations.

[secrecy

4. First is the question of secrecy. FI.M.G. have emphasised that it will cause
them great embarrassment if the announcement leaks before it is made in
Parliament at 3.30 p.m., G.M.T. tomorrow, 3rd June, i.e. 7.0 p.m. Indian
Standard Time. Your Working Committees have come here, some of them
from very long distances, and I feel it only fair that you should be free to discuss
the plan with them as soon as this meeting is over, even though it is not going to
be given out to the world until tomorrow evening : but I must ask you to give
me your personal guarantee that you will impress upon every member of your
Working Committees that they must not give away anything to the Press
before that hour. Indeed, it is only on that understanding that I feel justified in
letting you have copies of the announcement to discuss with them.

[h.m.g. have finally approved]

5. In placing the plan before the Working Committees, I would ask you to
make it clear that it represents the result of all my discussions out here, and that
H.M.G. have finally approved and are determined to implement it.

[request for support of working committees]

6. Naturally I should like to have the complete agreement of your Working
Committees when we meet again at 10.0 a.m. tomorrow, but realise that time
is short. I sincerely trust, however, that they will, whether they agree with
every word of it or not, express their willingness to do their best to make it
work.

[appeal TO NEHRU AND JINNAH TO BROADCAST]

7. The announcement is to be broadcast from Delhi Station at 7.0 p.m.
tomorrow, i.e. simultaneously with its being made known to Parliament in
London. I shall myself make a short broadcast introducing the plan, and I
appeal most sincerely to Mr. Nehru and Mr. Jinnah to make broadcasts after
the conclusion of the announcement, calling on their followers to co-operate
in working the scheme. If they would consent to do this, and to draw attention
to the fact that H.M.G. have left the vital decisions to the people of India
themselves, they would make an enormous contribution towards putting an

1 Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Transfer of Power, Part IV(a) contains revised
versions of the two briefs. Differences (except for minor verbal ones) between these revises and the
drafts reproduced here are indicated in footnotes.

2 Pleadings in square brackets have been inserted from the revise.

3 See No. 45 in this Volume.

4 For the draft announcement as taken by Lord Mountbatten to London see Vol. X, No. 476.

5 For minor amendments made in London see Vol. X, Nos. 485, Item (a) and 516, Annex II. See also
No. 13 in this Volume.

8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

end to the existing conditions of strife and bloodshed and, what is more,
towards preventing the almost unlimited reign of violence to which the present
state of communal tension is leading.

[cabinet mission’s plan finally rejected?]

8. In saying what I have said I have assumed that there is now no possibility of
agreement on any form of Unitary Government for India. H.M.G. have always
beheved in a Unitary India and I myself shall say in my broadcast how strongly
I myself am of this opinion : and I would like you to confirm, before we go any
further, that there is no hope of agreement either on the Cabinet Mission Plan
or on any other plan for a Unitary India.

[dominion status]

9. The new paragraph 20 about Dominion Status is of course the important
addition to the Announcement since we last met.6 When I left India there was
general agreement that for the purpose of an early, or indeed an almost imme¬
diate, transfer of power, the two separate States which may emerge from the
plan should each be given Dominion Status. Though Mr. Jinnah has since said
that this would be a question for his Constituent Assembly,7 H.M.G. were very
glad to hear of this development, which gives a real chance of continuity and of
avoiding confusion during the transitional period. Both parties have demanded
an immediate transfer of power and H.M.G. have done their best to meet this
request by undertaking to legislate in the current session of Parliament, i.e. the
session which ends at the end of July or early in August. Considering their
tremendous programme of legislation and the necessity of securing the support
of the Opposition, this is a considerable undertaking on their part.

[much administrative work to be done]

10. If two separate administrations in India are to be set up by the end of this
summer, there is a tremendous amount of work to be done, and I think we
should get on to this as soon as possible and perhaps set up immediately a
Committee of the Cabinet to get the necessary administrative work started.8

[no premature comment on governors-general]

11. The question may be raised almost at once who will be the Governors-
General of the two new Dominions. They will of course be appointed on the
recommendations of the Heads of the two Governments. The respective Prime
Ministers will have to make their recommendations after the Governments
have been set up and I suggest that it would be both wise and courteous to
avoid any party commitments on this subject for, say, two months. At the end
of that time it will no doubt be known who the Prime Ministers will be and the
necessary recommendations can be made then.

12.9 I want to emphasise that under this scheme, though I should hke the
members of the present Interim Government to carry on, we shall be in a sort

MAY 1947

9

of caretaker period when all our main endeavour will be directed towards
securing an early and successful partition. I propose, therefore, to ask that each
member of the Interim Government should place his resignation in my hands,
though I shall certainly ask them to continue in office. I feel that for both the
major parties a move of this kind will be valuable as indicating our anxiety to
get on to the next and final stage of our work when the two Governments, if
there are to be two Governments by the will of the people, are set up.

13. I now propose that we should have a few minutes’ silence, so that you
may read the plan through again. We can then continue our discussion thereon.

Enclosure 2 to No. 3

DRAFT BRIEF FOR H.E.’s TALK WITH MR. JINNAH

I am sure that you will not be happy with the details of the plan contained in the
announcement, but at least it contemplates the partition for which you have
fought for so many years. Indeed, you have yourself said that you would
sooner have a few acres of the Sind desert, provided that it was your very own,
rather than have a united India with a majority rule. To that extent, therefore,
you must be satisfied.

[no reservations]10

2. That you will be much disturbed by the prospect of the partition of Bengal
and the Punjab goes without saying, but, honestly, neither I nor H.M.G. nor
indeed your many friends in the Opposition party in England could possibly
contest the justice of this arrangement. I beg, therefore, that in the interests of
the peace of India, and of the good relationship between Pakistan and Great
Britain, you should accept — I do not say ‘entirely agree with’ — the scheme as it
stands. If you should, at this stage, mention any reservations, it will give your
opponents the opportunity of saying that they too are not prepared to accept
this scheme, except as a final settlement: and we shall then be back exactly

6 For decision to include new paragraph 20 see Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 3, and entry for Dominion
Status in Index of Subjects in that Volume for question of Dominion Status generally.

7 See Vol. X, Nos. 489 and 493.

8 Following para. 10 in the revise there is a new paragraph, headed the sikhs, which reads as fol¬
lows : ‘There is one point in the announcement to which I should like to draw special attention. If
the people of the Punjab decide in favour of the partition of the Province the position of the Sikhs
will be a specially difficult one. They themselves have pressed for partition, though they have always
wanted it on the understanding that it would give them a larger territory than they are likely to
obtain by any application of the principle laid down in the Statement. There is provision for a
Boundary Commission on which the Sikhs will themselves be represented. I have discussed the
proposals in great detail with my friend Sardar Baldev Singh, and I do hope he will do all he can to
steady opinion among the Sikhs and to persuade them to support the scheme and co-operate in the
procedure laid down.’

0 This para, is omitted from the revise.

10 Headings in square bracke s inserted from the revise where they appear in manuscript in the margin.

10

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

where we started. After all, nothing is final in this world. You have often told
me that your experience as a lawyer leads you to believe that once a decision has
been made, both parties will forget their previous hostility and do their utmost
to make it work. So let it be with this scheme. There is nothing final in this
world, and I feel confident that, provided there is good will on both sides, all
equitable adjustments will become apparent with the passage of time and will be
duly made.

[dominion status]

3 . I now turn to the question of Dominion status. You have frequently told me
and members of my staff that it was your wish that Pakistan should remain
within the British Commonwealth. I was therefore very hurt when I saw an
account of the interview which you had given to Reuters.11 Only the previous
day12 I had, in the presence of Mr. Attlee, told Mr. Churchill and the Opposi¬
tion leaders of the possibility that both the League and Congress would wish, in
the interests of a very early transfer of power, to start on a Dominion status
basis: and they had welcomed the idea. Consequently, when your article
appeared, they could not but think that I had misled them. Fortunately Mr.
Chundrigar, who was in London, was able to assure me that the Muslim League
attitude towards Dominion status would, in the end, almost certainly be
favourable. I reported this to Mr. Attlee, and I also saw Mr. Churchill again.
The latter asked me to give you the following personal message: — “It is a
matter of life and death for Mr. Jinnah to accept this offer/’13 You are at liberty
to mention this message to your Working Committee, if you think there is
anything to be gained by it, though it is vital that it should not get into the
Press.

[heavy responsibility]

4. A very heavy responsibility now rests with you. In your hands, perhaps
more than anyone else’s in the world, lies the possibility of ending all this
bloodshed that is bringing so much suffering to India, and of achieving a
permanent and satisfactory solution of this long-standing problem.

11 Vol. X, No. 502.

12 No note of this interview has been traced, but see Vol. X, Enclosure to No. 513.

” See Vol. X, No. 513.

MAY 1947

II

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma 1

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Round Table Conference ,
Indian Political Leaders , etc., Issue of Invitations to

17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, Ji May lp 47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I hope you are not too tired after your strenuous labours in London and your
journey. Perhaps the short change to the pleasanter climate of England in May
was agreeable.

2. You will remember that I wrote to you on the 13 th May2 about the Presi¬
dent of the Congress representing the Congress formally at the conference of
the 2nd June. You replied to me on the 17th May3 stating that you appreciated
my point but felt that it would be better to see him separately on the same day.

3. We had a meeting of our Working Committee this afternoon and the
very first point that was raised there by a member was about the invitations to
your conference. Was the Congress represented in any way, I was asked, or
were only the members of the Interim Government represented ? If the latter
was the case, in what capacity was Mr Jinnah invited? Such questions were
raised. I told them that I had written to you in the matter and gave them the
purport of your reply. They were far from satisfied and felt that the exclusion
of the Congress President meant that Mr Jinnah disapproved of him or his
presence. It is a small matter whether anyone of us goes to your formal con¬
ference or not as we shall in any event discuss the subject at issue amongst
ourselves and possibly later with you. But a certain formal procedure has to be
adopted on formal occasions and the exclusion of the Congress President will
be felt as a slight on the Congress by a large number of persons. It will be his
business to give the lead to the Working Committee and to steer any pro¬
posals that are made through the Committee. The fact, if it is a fact, that Mr
Jinnah objects to his presence surely cannot be allowed to govern the normal
procedure. We have frequently had to vary this procedure because of Mr
Jinnah’s likes and dislikes and this has given rise to a great deal of resentment
among our people. You will remember how Mr Jinnah objected to Mr

1 This letter appears to have crossed one from Lord Mountbatten to Pandit Nehru of the same date
which read as follows: ‘I shall be glad if you will come to see me at 10 am on Monday morning
June 2nd. I am also inviting Messrs Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Patel and Sardar Baldev
Singh.’ Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Round Table Conference, etc.

2 Vol. X, No. 423.

3 Vol. X, No. 467.

12

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Kripalani’s signature being attached to the joint statement issued by Gandhiji
and Mr Jinnah.4

4. I have been asked by the Congress Working Committee to write to you
and request you to reconsider this matter in the light of what I have said above.
As it is your desire to keep the meeting as small as practicable, I would suggest
that I might be left out of this meeting and that I might see you separately on
that day. There will be nothing unusual about this as I often see you separately.
In the alternative we have no objection to any additional person being invited.
Both Sardar Patel and I would feel embarrassed if we have to go to this con¬
ference without Mr Kripalani.

5. The matters at issue, as you realise more than anyone else, are of grave
import and it will be unfortunate if anything is done to prejudice a fair examina¬
tion on the merits. I do not know what the final shape of the proposals is, but
some of the proposals made previously run counter to the outlook which the
Congress has had for a large number of years, and it will not be a simple
matter for the Committee to change this outlook. It may be necessary to
convene a meeting of the full All India Congress Committee to consider these
important proposals.

6. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to invite the Congress President,
Mr Kripalani, to your conference of June 2nd.5

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

4 See Vol. X, Nos. 125, 136, 140, 152, and 153.

5 For the outcome of this request see Nos. 27, para. 6, and 91, para. 2.

5

Minutes of Viceroy s Thirty Fifth Staff Meeting , Items 2-3

Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy s House , New Delhi , on 31 May
1947 at 3-45 Pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , Lord Ismay ,
Sir E. Mieville , Mr Abell , Captain Brockman , Mr I. D. Scott , Mr Campbell-
Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Item 2

THE USE OF FORCE TO SUPPRESS DISTURBANCES
his excellency the viceroy said that he wished to make it clear that he

MAY I947

13

had accepted the viewpoint that the present laws provided for the use of mini¬
mum force to suppress disturbances and that he had no intention of attempting
to change these laws.1

HIS EXCELLENCY the viceroy said that he had included in his Broadcast2
the words “We cannot afford any toleration of violence. All of us are agreed on
that”.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed Press Attache to arrange for a question to be put at his Press
Conference, asking him to define “all of us”; he would explain that this
referred to the unanimous opinion of the Interim Government.

Item 3

BENGAL

his excellency the viceroy said that it had not yet been decided how to
carry on the government of Bengal after the issue of the Announcement. Two
possibilities were to go into Section 93 Government; or for a Coalition Ministry
to be formed.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed P.S.V. to draft for his approval a telegram to the Governor of
Bengal asking for his proposals on this matter.

1 See Vol. X, No. 468, note 2. 2 See No. 44.

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper 1.5.(47)91
L/P& JI10I79: ff 12-13

Pandit Nehru’s Interview with Mr Norman Cliff

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

india office, 31 May 1947
The full text of this interview,1 to which the Viceroy referred at the last meeting
of the Committee,2 is attached.

2. I wish to draw my colleagues’ attention to the following points: —

(i) The very restricted wording of Nehru’s answers in regard to variation
of the Cabinet Mission’s plan. The conception advanced is that by a
variation of the Mission’s plan parts of India can opt out of the Union

1 Vol. X, No. 560, Enclosure (iii). 2 Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 2.

14

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

now instead of at a later stage, but that this would involve the partition
of the Punjab and Bengal. “Afterwards those parts which opted out
could deal directly with a Union of India in regard to future relations
and common subjects.” Though this phrase is consistent with partition
into two States it could also be consistent with the idea of small units
standing out separately and having individual relations with the Union
as opposed to two States of Pakistan and Hindustan.

(ii) The flat refusal to contemplate Bengal remaining united unless it stays
inside the Union.

(iii) Referendum. Nehru’s reply may indicate that Congress will demand a
referendum everywhere or nowhere.

(iv) The emphasis placed on the necessity of a final settlement as the con¬
dition of Congress agreement to any form of partition, and emphasis on
agreement to partition only by such agreement and not by imposition
by the British Government.

(v) India and the Commonwealth. Nehru emphasises in reply to a question
whether there will be a temporary association that India is going to be a
republic but that the form of its relations with the Commonwealth
cannot be defined now.

(vi) Bases. Nehru makes it clear that the establishment of British bases in
Pakistan would adversely affect relations with Hindustan.

(vii) Division of the Army :

“If any division takes place it will be fatal and weaken the Central
authority or the area which it controls.

If in case of division the Army also has to be divided it cannot be
controlled by some kind of dyarchial system that would make it useless at a
time of emergency such as the present .”

3. This interview is certainly disappointing and leaves opportunity on a
variety of subjects for the Congress to run out of the tentative agreement. Read
with the Statements made by Kripalani and Gandhi,3 it looks as if the latter was
mobilising his forces to frustrate partition.

L.

3 Vol. X, No. 560, Enclosures (i) and (ii).

MAY I947

15

7

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper LB. {47)94
LIP&JI10I65: ff 22-4

Constituent Assembly: Committee Reports

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 31 May 1947
I circulate for the information of my colleagues a note prepared in my Office
summarising the report of the Union Powers Committee of the Constituent
Assembly. This report and the Advisory Committee’s interim report on
justiciable fundamental rights were produced towards the end of April for
submission to the recent Session of the Assembly and are documents of con¬
siderable significance.1

2. The Report of the Union Powers Committee puts a very wide interpreta¬
tion on paragraph 15(1) of the Cabinet Mission’s statement of May 16th, 1946,
and would, in fact, convert the Union Centre into something very different
from what the Mission contemplated. For example, “Defence” is defined to
include “Defence Industries”, which under modem conditions may mean
almost all basic industries; and “Foreign Affairs” is defined to include the
implementing of treaties and of the decisions of international bodies, and also
“trade and commerce with foreign countries”. As regards finance, it will be
recalled that at the Simla discussions of the Cabinet Mission the Muslim League
contended that the Union should be financed by contributions from the Group
Governments; and Congress that it should have its own sources of revenue.2
The report wholeheartedly adopts the latter alternative, allotting to the Union
all the important existing Central sources of revenue. In addition, the powers
specified in the report as inherent in the express powers of the Union include the
Reserve Bank, Public Debt, Currency, and powers to deal with grave economic
emergencies in any part of the Union affecting the Union. It is also provided
under the heading “Defence” that the Union Government should have powers
similar to those contained in Sections 102 and 126- A of the Government of
India Act, which would give them control of Provincial affairs in times of
emergency. If all these recommendations are adopted, the effect will be to give
a Union Government almost all the powers of the existing Centre.

3. The interim report on fundamental rights discloses the same tendency.

1 Copies of the reports are on L/P &J/10/65 : ff 44-9.

2 See e.g. Vol. VII, Nos. 194 and 253.

1 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Thus, the justiciable rights with which the report is concerned would be incor¬
porated in the Constitution so as to be binding upon all authorities throughout
the Union; and they would abrogate all existing laws etc. in so far as these might
be inconsistent with them. Moreover, the list of rights includes rights for every
citizen to move freely throughout the Union, to settle in every part of the
Union, to acquire property and to follow any occupation; provision is also
made for freedom of trade and commerce between the Units. These stipula¬
tions, if adopted, would preclude Muslim areas from protecting themselves
from the activities of Hindu business men and money lenders, which they might
well wish to do. They would also invalidate such measures as the Punjab
Alienation of Land Act, which are designed to prevent agricultural land from
passing out of the hands of the actual cultivators into those of money lenders
and other non-agriculturists. The Punjab Act, for example, has afforded very
valuable protection to agricultural interests (not merely Moslem) against
urban and financial interests (mainly Hindu).

4. It has always been assumed that if the Congress and the Muslim League
were to set out to frame a workable constitution on the basis of the Cabinet
Mission’s scheme, they would probably find it impracticable in modern
conditions to adhere to a rigidly narrow interpretation of the list of Union
subjects formulated by the Mission. It has also been assumed that, given a
measure of good-will between the Hindu and Muslim territories of a future
Indian Union, the powers of the Centre would tend to increase as time went
on. But for Congress unilaterally to attribute such wide powers to the Union is
a very different matter, and suggests that the authors of these reports had given
up any idea of securing Muslim League participation in the framing of an
agreed constitution.3 Moreover the very wide powers proposed to be vested
from the outset in the Centre may have the effect of deterring Indian States, up
to now secure in the exercise of their internal sovereignty subject to benevolent
protection by paramountcy, from adhering to the Union without sweeping
reservations.

L.

Annex to No. 7

REPORT OF THE UNION POWERS COMMITTEE

Detailed recommendations are made as to the scope of the subjects proposed to
be allotted to the Union in paragraph 15(1) of the Statement of the Cabinet
Mission and the Viceroy of May 16th 1946. Inter alia, it is recommended that
“Defence” should include “defence industries”, atomic energy and powers
similar to those contained in Sections 102 and 126-A of the Government of
India Act 1935 (these would enable the Union to control the affairs of the Units
in times of emergency) ; that “Foreign Affairs” should include the implementing

MAY I947

1 7

of the decisions of international conferences, associations and other bodies, the
implementing of treaties and agreements with other countries, naturalization
and aliens, trade and commerce with foreign countries, and foreign loans ; and
that “Communications” should include airways, certain highways and water¬
ways, posts and telegraphs, the regulation and control of all telephones and
broadcasting, Union railways, the regulation and control of other railways in
certain respects, maritime shipping and navigation, and major ports. The
sources of the revenue required to finance these subjects should, in existing
circumstances, include customs and excise duties, taxes on income other than
agricultural income and, except in regard to agricultural land, taxes on capital
and succession and estate duties. In view, however, of the uneven levels of
industrialisation between British India and the States and among the States
themselves, the Constitution should provide that, for an agreed period, not
exceeding 15 years, after the establishment of the Union, uniformity of taxa¬
tion throughout the units need not be insisted upon and the administration in
the States Units of the taxes allotted to the Union should be subject to agree¬
ments between those Units and the Union Government.

The Committee, while considering it impossible to enumerate the powers
implied or inherent in or resultant from the express powers of the Union, has
specified 14 such powers, including the Union judiciary, the Reserve Bank of
India, currency, coinage and legal tender, and powers to deal with grave
economic emergencies in any part of the Union affecting the Union.

The Committee has added a list of subjects which, though outside the scope
of those whose allotment to the Union was recommended by the Cabinet
Mission, should in the Committee’s opinion be entrusted to the Union by
agreement. This list consists of insurance; company laws; banking; negotiable
instruments; patents, trade marks and designs, copyright; planning; ancient
and historical monuments and standard weights and measures.

3 The Union Powers Committee Report was dated 17 April 1947 and signed by Pandit Nehru,
Pandit Pant, Sir B. L. Mitter, Mr Jairamdas Daulatram, Sir N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Mr K. M.
Munshi, Sir V. T. Krishnamachari, Mr Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Mr Biswanath Das and Mr A. Krishna-
swami Ayyar.

The Interim Report on Fundamental Rights was dated 23 April and signed by Sardar Patel,
Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Minorities, Fundamental Rights, etc.

i8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

8

Mr Mackenzie King to Mr Attlee ( via Canadian High Commissioner in London and

Dominions Office)

Telegram , L/P &JI 10/81: f 369

immediate 31 May 1947 , 1.08 pm

top secret and personal Received: 2 June, 6pm

No. 109. Your Secret and Personal telegrams Circular D. No. 469 and 470 of
May 23rd,1 and Nos. 128 and 129 of May 28th.2 India.

Following for Prime Minister from Prime Minister. Begins.

1. I have read with much interest your messages in the above telegrams on
arrangements being worked out for the future of India by the two Govern¬
ments concerned. I realize how difficult and complicated the problem is for the
United Kingdom Government and how important it is for future peace and
prosperity in Asia, and indeed in the world, to find a solution which will meet
the desires of the Indian people for self-government and make its contribution
to the stabilisation and progress of the East. You will not, I am sure, expect me
to comment further on current developments in this matter except to assure
you and the United Kingdom Government of the good-will and sympathetic
understanding of the Canadian Government in your efforts to achieve the ends
mentioned above.

2. I need hardly add that, when agreement has been reached by Indian
leaders and the Indian people on the future political status of that country, it
can be expected that the Canadian Government will do nothing to impede or
delay the carrying out of the agreement. This, as regards India, would be
Canada’s attitude, even though we recognise that the agreement might have as
one result the enlargement of the number of member states within the Com¬
monwealth.

3. Regarding the deletion of “Emperor of India” from the Royal style and
titles, the Canadian Government instructed its High Commissioners some time
ago to consult with the other Commonwealth Governments on the desira¬
bility of discussing at the next conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers
the revision of the Royal style and titles. If our suggestion is acted upon, the
Indian suggestion3 could be considered along with other possible modifications.
Ends.

1 See Vol. X, No. 527.

2 Tel. 128 contained a message to Mr Mackenzie King in the same terms as the last two paras, of No.
555 in Vol. X. Tel. 129 contained the text of the paragraph on Dominion Status which was to be
inserted in the announcement (i.e. para. 20 of No. 45 in this Volume). L/PO/6/121: If 91, 95.

3 See Vol. X, No. 527, para. 5.

MAY 1947

19

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

^bl1 1155: ff 10-11

17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, J1 May 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Mr. Abell has written1 to me asking me to send proposals for obtaining a
representative for Baluchistan. I have no particular proposal to put forward at
this stage. I was under the impression that the first thing to be done was to
ascertain the wishes of the people of Baluchistan regarding the position of that
Province in the future set-up of India. This too becomes necessary in the event
of certain changes taking place in regard to the Punjab and Bengal.

2. You suggested to me in Simla, I think, that possibly a way of ascertaining
the wishes of the inhabitants would be to send a Commission to meet the full
Jirgas of the various Tribes and to report on their reactions to the proposals
made. I am inclined to think that some such procedure might be feasible and
desirable. A Commission might be appointed consisting of suitably chosen
senior judicial officers and possibly representatives of the External Affairs
Department. This Commission should arrange for full meetings of the Jirgas
and attend them explaining the points at issue. They may or may not take
votes. They should really find out the general sense of each meeting and report
accordingly. If necessary the Commission should split up into smaller sections
to meet some of the Jirgas.

3. The point is that they should consult as large a number of people as
possible and not confine themselves to the selected few of the Shalii Jirga.

4. As regards the people of Quetta Municipality, it should be possible to
take a referendum of them or at any rate of the voters in the Municipality.

5. The Commission should submit a consolidated report giving their views
of what the people of Baluchistan desire in the matter. They should also suggest
the best means of representation in the Constituent Assembly.

6. I discussed this matter today with Sir Geoffrey Prior, the AGG in Baluchi¬
stan, and he seemed to think that the method of appointing a Commission to
ascertain views would be feasible.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1 A reminder, dated 3 1 May 1947, referring to Vol. X, No. 461, and asking Pandit Nehru to send Lord
Mountbatten his proposals for obtaining a representative for Baluchistan as soon as possible.
R/3/1/155: f 8.

20

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

10

Mr Suhrawardy to Sir E. Mieville

Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Bengal , Situation in , Part 1(a)

SECRET 6 CANNING ROAD, May I947

Dear Sir Eric,

I have had an interview with Mr Jinnah. He asked me if I had seen H.E. and,
may the Lord forgive me, I told him “no” as I did not want him to think H.E.
had seen me.1 (Please show this to H.E.). He told me that if H.E. were to see me
tomorrow, I should impress upon him the necessity for ascertaining the wishes
of the people on the question of partition by utilising the electoral roll on the
basis of 1941 census.2 He says this is very important , and he does not know what
H.E. has brought back from London on this point. He says that getting the
wishes of the present members of the Legislature would not be fair, as the
opinion of the Scheduled Castes will not be expressed — and we must not let
the Scheduled Castes down. He seemed to think that we could create sufficient
atmosphere to maintain peace after the announcement. I hope the appeal of the
Leaders, accepting though not agreeing or even deliberating, will be simul¬
taneous with the announcement in the interests of peace. He insists that Calcutta
should be a free city,3 otherwise it will always remain a bone of contention. I
have made clear to him my views regarding the Commonwealth, and I have
every hope — all in good time. For this reason I am even reconciling myself to
partition (if it is inevitable) and if zone A does not come within the Common¬
wealth. If it does, then, of course, the Congress can have no objection if inde¬
pendent Bengal also comes into the Commonwealth : if it does not and Bengal
is independent, I shall have to work hard to get it in. I wonder if I am clear.4

Yours sincerely,

H. S. SUHRAWARDY

1 For an account of this interview see No. 91, para. 1.

2 cf. Vol. X, Nos. 256 and 463. 3 cf. Vol. X, Nos. 446 and 463.

4 No reply to this letter is on the file; see however No. 17, Item 4.

II

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Rhl1l9o: ff 122~3

NEW DELHI, 31 May 1947

Dear Lord Mounthatten,

Accompanied by my colleague the Hon’ble Mr Ghazanfar Ali Khan, I visited
certain parts of Gurgaon district today, including the District headquarters as

MAY 1947

21

well as the headquarters of the small military force which is assisting the civil
authorities in checking the widespread rioting in the District. We had an
opportunity of discussing the situation with the Deputy Commissioner and
certain other officials as well as with Muslims who came to us on hearing about
our arrival.

Our discussions with the local officials brought out a few points very clearly,
which deserve to be brought to your notice immediately.

(a) It is not merely a spontaneous flare-up of communal feelings in this part
of the country, but a planned, pre-meditated and well organised attack
that has been launched with the object of completely suppressing the
Muslim community of Meos numbering about one million and forming a
more or less compact Muslim belt in a predominantly Hindu area.
Possibly it is intended to pave the way for the establishment of a Jat
province by force. The idea of the Jat province has been openly favoured
not only by the Jat Hindu population on both sides of the Punjab-U.P.
border, but also by certain rulers of Indian States. A sinister aspect of the
present attack is that armed troops from the Indian States of Bharatpur
and Alwar have been frequently entering the Gurgaon district territory.
They have been noticed in uniforms. It is not improbable that a number
of them in plain clothes have been mixing up with the rioters during the
present trouble and using their modern weapons against the Meo villa¬
gers. The impression in Gurgaon district is widespread that arms and
ammunition are freely pouring into the riot affected areas from the Indian
States.

The present trouble started, according to all reports, with a treacherous
attack by Hindu jats on a Muslim village, Naurangpur, after an elaborate
series of meetings, held under official auspices, at which pledges and
undertakings were given for the maintenance of peace. From there the
disturbances have rapidly spread over a wide area and assumed the form
of an offensive on a very wide front against the Meo villages by large
crowds drawn from Hindu jats, Ahirs, and Gujars of several districts in
the Punjab as well as the U.P., among whom are no doubt certain number
of trained soldiers, carrying arms belonging to the Alwar and Bharatpur
States.

(b) The military force which has been sent to help in stopping this carnage is
altogether inadequate. It consists of four companies with a total strength
of about 500. One of them is a Gurkha Company. The other three until
today were the Rajputana Rifles. The Rajputana Rifles have a mixed
composition but, it is an unfortunate accident the three companies sent to
Gurgaon were all Hindu. Today they have been replaced by Sikh com¬
panies. There is no doubt that in a situation like this a military force of
mixed composition can alone ensure fairness and inspire confidence in the

22

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

population. What I regard as another unfortunate accident is that the visit
of the Hon’ble Members for Home and Defence to Gurgaon yesterday
should have been followed by replacement of the Hindu companies by
Sikh soldiers today. I know that there is no connection between the two,
but it is difficult to convince unintelligent and panic stricken villagers.

(c) It was explained to us that owing to its inadequate strength the military
force can make its presence felt only in one sector. This leaves killing,
looting and arson practically unchecked in other parts. An additional
reason for the inability of the forces to control the situation in these latter
areas is their inaccessibility and lack of motorable roads.

In view of the points mentioned above I would make the following submissions
for your immediate consideration :

(1) The rulers of Indian States clearly need a prompt warning to keep their
civilians and soldiers out of these disturbances. The need of such a
warning is also indicated by the fact that armed men and soldiers from
certain Sikh states in Central Punjab have recently been mixed up with
the disturbances in Lahore and Amritsar.

(2) More military force should be sent to the disturbed areas in Gurgaon
district immediately. It will be appreciated that an attack on a minority
on such a big and organised scale in the neighbourhood of India’s capital
may have most unfortunate repercussions in remoter parts of the country,
if it is not promptly checked. What is equally important is that the force
to be sent there should be of a mixed composition. This is a point on
which I cannot lay too much emphasis.

(3) In view of the inaccessibility of those areas where rioting, killing and
arson are now at their worst, the use of such cavalry as can be assembled
immediately and the need of machine-gunning from the air may also be
seriously considered. I would further submit that the rioting in Gurgaon
district must be controlled immediately, if the Meo community is to be
saved from almost complete effacement.

Yours sincerely,
LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

MAY 1947

23

12

Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

RI3I1I178: ff 58-61

SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, Ji May 1947

No. 678

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

During the second half of May serious communal disturbances continued in
Lahore and Amritsar, and there was a recurrence of the earlier trouble between
the Meos, who are Muslims, and various Hindu tribes in the Gurgaon district.
Communal tension throughout the Punjab is extremely high, and amounts to
mass hysteria. Nearly all districts report acute uneasiness, and in many districts
there have been incidents including bomb explosions, cases of arson and
communal murders.

2. In Lahore and Amritsar we were during the fortnight defeated by incen¬
diarism. In Lahore there has been practically no rioting, and the burnings and
stabbings have been carried out by individuals who are seldom seen or appre¬
hended. After the first day or two few buildings were fired at ground level —
nearly all the fires broke out in an upper storey. Various incendiary devices
have been used — usually fire balls or bottle bombs which are thrown from
adjoining roofs into open windows. In some cases it is suspected that incendiary
compounds with a delayed action have been employed. Many of the houses
were evacuated when trouble began, and our problems resembled those in
London during the fire blitz. Lahore is now gradually being provided with
defences resembling an A.R.P. service, and these arrangements coupled with
mass arrests under section 3 of the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947, have in some
degree caused the improvement of the past few days. But we have evolved no
real remedy for the kind of incendiarism with which we have had to deal.
Casualties in Lahore have been heavy — I should say by now about 120 dead
and perhaps 190 injured. The Muslims have been responsible for most of the
burning and for about two-thirds of the deaths. They have had something
approaching their proper share of the injured. There was one organised raid by
non-Muslims on a settlement of Muslim Gujars, in which firearms and incen¬
diary bombs were used.

In Amritsar our troubles resembled those in Lahore, and we have been no
more successful in dealing with incendiarism. The casualties have been on
approximately the same scale as in Lahore, and in Amritsar also there was one
organised raid on a Muslim suburb. We were able to trace some of the raiders
through the police dogs, and I hope that we may be able to arrest the whole
party.

24

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

There were two scares during the fortnight owing to the arrival in Lahore
of armed parties from the Faridkot and Nabha States. These incidents have been
reported separately, and it is now being made clear to the Governments of the
Punjab States that they must not send armed parties or service vehicles into the
Punjab without permission.

The Police at Lahore and Amritsar have had a very bad time. The maximum
shade temperature in Lahore averaged about 116 degrees for a week, and has
not, I think, dropped below 112 during the fortnight. It has been impossible to
arrange regular reliefs, and many policemen have been on duty continuously for
14 days with irregular meals and little sleep. In return for their efforts they have
had nothing but abuse from all communities. There have no doubt been cases
in both cities of apathy and indiscipline; the surprising thing is that the Police
have stood up so well to physical fatigue and to the vicious communal bom¬
bardment in which at least one Member of Your Excellency’s Government
has taken a prominent part.

3. I hope to accompany Your Excellency to Gurgaon on 1st June. It appears
that the trouble began on this occasion with an attack by Ahirs on a Muslim
village named Naurangpur not far from Gurgaon itself. This was followed by a
second attack on another Muslim village. The Meos then took the offensive on
a wide front and did considerable execution. The disturbances seemed to be
dying down by 29th May; but I learn today that a counter offensive has been
launched by the Hindus.

Gurgaon is always rather a special worry, because it relies for troops on the
independent Delhi District. It is impossible for me to be in close touch with the
Delhi District Commander, and whereas I have the fullest military information
about everything that happens in Northern Command, my news from
Gurgaon is always scanty. I understand that about a Battalion and a half of
troops are deployed in the district and that about 50 villages have been burnt. I
would have gone to Gurgaon a day or two ago if I had not been involved in
other urgent work here.

4. During the fortnight I have seen three Members of Your Excellency’s
Government — Liaquat Ali Khan, Baldev Singh and Jawahar Lai Nehru. Copies
of notes1 recorded by me on my talks with the first two were sent to Brockman.
Liaquat Ali Khan was full of the usual Muslim complaints ; on the bigger political
issue he said that the Muslim League would never agree to partition and added
at the end of our talk that the British could not “evade their responsibility” and
must give a decision and enforce it. I was left in some doubt as to what he really
meant— Jinnah’s intention may be to acquiesce in the plan without actively
accepting it. On the other hand, he may intend simply to pass the responsibility
to His Majesty’s Government.

Baldev Singh was also intensely communal. In his view Jinnah had no

MAY 1947

25

intention of accepting the plan, and he thought that if Jinnah rejected it, the
Congress would also reject it.

I had a very amicable conversation with Nehru,2 who was not inclined to
sponsor local complaints. He took a gloomy view about the prospects of a
settlement and said that the plan would be acceptable to Congress only if it
were in fact treated as a settlement. He thought that there was no sound middle
course between the enforcement of an award (which seemed to him imprac¬
ticable) and the abandonment of India. A plan which H.M.G. did not intend to
enforce and which the parties would not accept would be of little value. In the
long run the Indians must settle their disputes themselves, and if they could not
do so now, they must do so after the British left. He believed that there might
be “civil war” in the Punjab, but he did not think it would last for long.

Gandhi’s latest statement which appeared in the newspapers of 3 1st May is of
some interest.3 Like other statements of the kind, it has been carefully timed and
may be a prelude to the rejection of the plan by the Congress. The trouble
about Gandhi is that although he is “not even a four anna member”, his
personal interventions are almost always effective.

I have just had an interesting interview with S war an Singh, the former
Development Minister.4 I had let it be known that I thought the Sikh leaders,
including himself, were far too bellicose, and he assured me that they had no
intention of making trouble as long as the Section 93 administration lasted. Like
all other leaders, he is bitterly communal, and it is not easy to make him see
what a deplorable effect communal attacks must have on the services. He
brought me an astonishing letter from Master Tara Singh, who now thinks that
there is a conspiracy on the part of Muslim Police officers to murder him. I gave
this letter back to Swaran Singh and asked him to tell Tara Singh that it was
rubbish and that I would pretend that I had not seen it.

5. Visits by Members of Your Excellency’s Government are very far from
helpful. The Members who have come to the Punjab since the Muslim League
agitation started on 24th January have without exception behaved as com¬
munal leaders and not as reponsible Ministers. Nehru is a good deal better than
the others, because he keeps the Press at arm’s length, and while he listens to
communal complaints, he usually refrains from commenting on them. But
even Nehru has practically no contacts with the Muslims. Baldev Singh is
entirely mischievous. While he was in Lahore he listened to many com¬
munal complaints, which are largely or wholly untrue, and gave a long Press
interview which was intended to embarrass me and the Security Services. The

1 Vol. X, No. 537; a note of a further interview with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan on 26 May 1947 will be
found on R/3/1/176: ff 185-6.

2 A note of this interview on 30 May 1947 is on R/3/1/17 6: ff 187-9.

3 See No. 2, note 5.

4 A note of this interview on 31 May 1947 is on R/3/1/176: ff 190-1.

26

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

non-Muslim Members of the Central Government are showing an increasing
desire to interfere in provincial affairs, and there is much talk of Martial Law
and so on. Messervy, with whom I recently discussed this tendency, agrees
with me that what Baldev Singh really wants is to push the Provincial authori¬
ties on one side and to use the troops to suppress the Muslims. I strongly
suspect that Patel is of the same opinion. In fact the Central Government have
no more resources than those available to a Provincial Government — even
supposing that they assume control of the provincial machine. There are so
many policemen, so many troops available inside the Province, and so many
troops on application to G.H.Q. Baldev Singh incidentally is entirely ignorant
of military organisation, and told me blandly that he had “arranged to send me
four Divisions”. He was apparently unaware that the supply of troops had been
arranged under Your Excellency’s orders a month ago, and I did not think he
knew what troops were actually coming. (He had doubtless been told, but I
should say that he had not taken in the information given to him.)

6. I wrote separately5 to Sir John Colville about the growth of communal
feeling in the services. I see from a recent fortnightly letter6 from Wylie to
Your Excellency that a similar process of disintegration is beginning in the U.P.
In the Punjab Members of the Central Government are unquestionably to some
extent responsible for the growth of communal feeling. It is now common talk
that even the Judges of the High Court are affected. I notice that Teja Singh J,
who is hearing some habeas corpus applications of a communal kind, called on
Nehru while the latter was at Lahore. I do not suggest that Teja Singh J will
not decide the cases on the merits, but few Muslims are likely to believe that he
will do so. Our Chief Justice is closely related to Begum Shah Nawaz and others
who are actively concerned with Muslim League affairs. The belief that the
Punjab will be partitioned has intensified the communal split and most officials
are wondering who their new masters will be and how best they can secure
their own future. This is altogether a most unhealthy state of affairs.

7. I held a conference on the morning of 31st May with the Army Com¬
mander, the Commander Lahore Area, the Commander 4th Indian Division,
the Inspector General of Police, all Commissioners of Civil Divisions, all
Deputy Inspectors General of Police in charge of Ranges, and certain other
senior officials to go over our arrangements to prevent communal disturbances
when the expected announcement is made early in June. I think that our
resources will be adequate, though many Battalions are under-strength.
Detailed instructions have been issued to District Officers, and I think it has
been made clear to everyone that they will be supported in all bona fide action
to maintain order. Messervy is establishing his Tactical headquarters at Govern¬
ment House, Lahore, from the evening of 3rd June, and will be able to try out a
plan which he made some time ago for the control of serious disturbances. He

MAY 1947

27

will be in immediate touch with me and within easy reach of the three Major-
Generals commanding the Northern, Central and Eastern Areas. The Gurgaon
District, as I have noted above, comes under the Delhi Military District and is
not included in our general plan.

8. Crime is still unusually high, but the Police and the villagers in several
districts have recently had successful encounters with dacoit gangs. In one case
in the Muzaffargarh district some Hindus were attacked by a Muslim gang (not
for communal reasons) and were defended by a Muslim Pahlwan, who woun¬
ded one or two of the dacoits and so enabled the Police to follow them up and
arrest them. In a village in the Amritsar district the people turned out en masse
and fought a gang n strong under the notorious Puran Singh. The villagers
lost two killed, but killed six of the dacoits, and we hope to arrest the remaining
five. During the past two or three months there have been at least half a dozen
incidents of this kind, and it is encouraging that at times like these we are still
able to deal with dangerous criminals.

9. Special arrangements have been made to keep our food supplies going
during disturbances. By 5th June I hope to have nearly three months’ stocks in
all our rationed towns, and we are holding an emergency reserve of 4800 tons
in railway wagons to be shifted as required if there is any local shortage or if we
have a refugee problem.

Yours sincerely,

E. M. JENKINS

5 Not on file. 6 Report U.P. 81 of 18 May 1947, para. 3. L/P &J/5/276.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listoivel

Telegram , L/P &Jjiol8o: f 6 5

immediate new Delhi, 31 May 1947, 5.20 pm

Received: 31 May, 4.23 pm

1221-S. I have decided to incorporate amendments suggested in London in
announcement before discussing it with Indian leaders.

2. These amendments are detailed in the “Memorandum of Amendments 1
handed by Erskine Crum to Harris. They concern
(a) paragraphs No. 7, 9 and 15 of announcement.

1 This memorandum listed the amendments (including those to be made only at the Viceroy s dis¬
cretion after discussion with the Indian leaders) which had been agreed between the Viceroy and the
India and Burma Committee since the circulation of the draft announcement under reference I.B.
(47)74 of 20 May (see note 5 below). These amendments are contained in Vol. X, No. 516, Annex II,
and No. 553, Minute 3, passage sidelined ‘X’.

28

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(b) New penultimate paragraph, under heading “Immediate Transfer of
Power.” In this I am incorporating words “to one or two successor
authorities” and not “to such successor authorities.”2

3 . I have also decided to exclude all the Roman numerals from text. Thus the
announcement will no longer be in numbered parts ; the headings will of course
stay in.

4. Please also in paragraph No. 16 (A) delete “prospective” substitute
“respective.”

5. I have not yet decided on a procedure for British Baluchistan (paragraph
No. 12). I will telegraph as soon as I have.3

6. I suggest that you now have a new draft typed incorporating these
amendments. It is to this new draft, which for ease of reference let us call draft
“X”,4 and not to I.B. (47)74,5 that I shall refer in any future telegrams.6

2 In tel. 7067 of 2 June Lord Listowel suggested, in order to make new words fit into text of new para.
20, that passage should read: ‘to one or two successor authorities according to the decisions taken as a
result of this announcement’. Lord Mountbatten concurred, subject to agreement of Indian leaders
the following day, in tel. 1273 -S of 2 June. L/P&J/10/80: ff 64, 30.

3 See No. 17, note 5.

4 Not printed; for announcement as published see No. 45.

5 I.B. (47)74 of 20 May circulated the draft attached to No. 476 in Vol. X incorporating the amend¬
ments made to paras. 4 and 15 at the meeting of the India and Burma Committee on 19 May (Vol.
X, No. 485).

6 In tel. 1225-S of 31 May Lord Mountbatten transmitted an additional amendment inserting the
words ‘contained in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12th May 1946’ after ‘towards Indian
States’ in para. 18. L/P&J/10/80: f 62.

14

Sir O. Caroe (. North-West Frontier Province ) to Rear-Admiral ViscountMountbatten

of Burma

Telegram, Rfe/i/ifi: f 91

important 31 May 1947, 5.45 Pm

confidential Received: 3 1 May, 11.13 pm

No. CA/99. Following background may be useful. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and
Dr. Khan Sahib took with them by air to Delhi yesterday League leaders Abdul
Qayum and Samin Jan who were released on parole for the purpose. Apparently
this follows on the suggestion by the two League leaders to Jinnah that latter
should permit some kind of discussions between Abdul Ghaffar Khan and them¬
selves in Delhi. Local indications are that negotiations have been proceeding in

MAY 1947

29

Peshawar possibly for coalition with Abdul Qayum [and] Samin Jan holding
office. Both were at one time Congressmen.

2. Main body of League workers in Peshawar apparently distrust this
development and yesterday sent three representatives by train to Delhi to
contact Jinnah.

3 . Genuine coalition is what I have been urging on Ministry for long time
past and would go far to steady frontier if private armies at the same time were
allowed to disappear. Matters may be complicated by introduction of Pathan-
istan issue into discussions arising from 2nd [3rd] June announcement.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to all Provincial Governors

Telegram , Rfe/ 1/150: ff 132-4

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, May I947 , 11. 50 pm

SECRET

No. 1223-S. I have sent you by a separate telegram1 the important new para¬
graph 20 which is to be inserted in the announcement.

2. Before I left Delhi both the Congress and the League leaders told me that
they wanted to stay, for the time being at any rate, in the British Common¬
wealth.2 Both also have stated publicly their demand for an early transfer of
power.

3 . It was clear to me that if we waited till constitutions for both Hindustan
and Pakistan had been framed and all the negotiations about partition settled we
should have to wait a very long time, and things would get more difficult
instead of easier. There would be likely to be chaos in June 1948 if we could not
get a transfer of power to two Governments (or of course to one if the Partition
claim were dropped) on some basis which would facilitate a smooth transition,
and give India a chance of using our help in the armed forces. I therefore
pressed that H.M.G. should legislate at once and set up two dominion Govern¬
ments, if the people voted in favour of partition, each having a constitution
based on the Government of India Act 1935, but with the right to frame a new
constitution at any time.

4. Though the League withdrew their clear request for dominion status after
I had gone to London, H.M.G. accepted my views and decided to insert the
new paragraph 20 in the announcement.

1 Not printed. For decision to include new paragraph 20 see Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 3.

2 For question of Dominion Status generally see Index of Subjects in Vol. X.

30

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

5. The parliamentary draftsmen are already busy on the Bill — it will provide
for a separate constitutional Governor General for each dominion ; though the
same man may, if recommended by both new Governments, hold both posts.
The posts of Governors will continue but they may have to be replaced if there
is a demand for a change. In any case they will be constitutional Governors
acting on advice. If the Punjab and Bengal are partitioned there will have to be
new Governors for the two new Provinces.

6. It is hoped that the Bill will be passed through Parliament by the end of
July and that it should come into force as early as possible thereafter and in any
case not later than 1st October this year.

7. Much of the detail of the legislation will have to be done by Governor-
General’s Orders in Council, and the Act will provide for this.

8. This greatly accelerated programme will of course mean that an immense
amount of work will have to be done very quickly in dividing up the machin¬
ery, assets and services of the Central Government and of any partitioned
Provinces. It is therefore essential that the options provided under the announce¬
ment should be exercised at the earliest possible moment.

9. (To the Governor of Sind only). Please arrange to summon your legis¬
lature as soon as possible to take the decision indicated in para. 9 [10] of the
announcement. The summons should not of course go out before the announce¬
ment is made.

10. (To the Governors of the Punjab and Bengal only). I am sending
separately a draft notification laying down the procedure for ascertaining the
wishes of your legislature. As soon as you have accepted the draft I will put out
the notification and the legislature should then be summoned without delay. I
think 10 days notice should be enough. It is unfortunate that the N.W.F.P.
decision cannot be known till later but it cannot be helped.

11. (To the Governor of Bengal only). It looks as though the chances of an
agreement for a united and independent Bengal were now slender. The
announcement will however be changed if there is agreement.

12. (To Governor of the N.W.F.P. only). Please arrange for immediately
setting in train of preliminaries for referendum. Your telegrams Nos. GH-54
dated nth May and CA-89 dated 23rd May are being answered fully but
separately today.3 We must somehow get a result in six weeks. I realise what a
difficult time you are likely to have but will do my best to get the party leaders
to secure moderation.

13. Clearly the Secretary of State’s Services will cease to exist as such when
the new Governments are set up, but it should be possible to get essential men
to continue for a few months on special terms if they are wanted, even though

MAY 1947

31

they may not wish to stay on permanently, and H.M.G. naturally very much
hope that those who are wanted will carry on.

14. British troops will probably be withdrawn directly after the transfer of
power, but it is likely that with both Pakistan and Hindustan in the Common¬
wealth arrangements will be made to allow British officers to serve on in the
Indian Army and Navy if they are wanted; some R.A.F. personnel may be lent
too. A committee will shortly examine in the U.K. what arrangements can be
made. Probably all such British officers of the Indian armed forces will be
transferred first to the British service and then seconded.

15. (To Governors of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam only). We must go
ahead at once with provisional administrative plans for partition and I will
telegraph shortly about this.

16. (To all Governors except the Punjab). You may show the announcement
to your Premier only an hour before publication which is at 7 p.m. 1ST on the
3rd June, if you wish.

17. 1 have left H.M.G. in no doubt about the possible dangers and difficulties.
These are now fully appreciated at home. But H.M.G. are confident they can
rely on all of us to do our best, and I know we can rely on them to back us up.

3 These two telegrams from Sir O. Caroe and Lord Mountbatten’s reply in tel. 1230-S of 31 May 1947
dealt with arrangements for holding the referendum, in particular its legal basis and the question
whether fresh electoral rolls should be prepared for it. R/3/1/151 : ff 78, 82, 94.

16

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan

Rfa/ifco:/ 133

133/14 1 June 1947

Dear Mr Liaquat Ali Khan,

Thank you for your letter of the 3 1st May1 about the situation in Gurgaon. I
have been there myself today with the Governor of the Punjab, and have
informed myself of the position.2

1 No. 11.

2 In a situation report contained in tel. 115-G of 1 June Sir E. Jenkins reported on this visit to Gurgaon.
He stated that the position was ‘not satisfactory’, the area affected being about 800 square miles, with
raiding and counter raiding by Meos and Hindus on the Mewat border, and Hindus attacking
Muslim pockets in the Palwal area. He reported at least 50 villages destroyed, that casualties ‘must be
heavy’, and that police and military had had ‘to fire frequently’, adding that in his opinion the num¬
ber of troops employed (only 365) was inadequate. On 4 June Mr Abell informed the Governor’s
Secretary that ‘an extra battalion is going in, and a few cavalry from Remounts are being provided*.
R/3/1/90: ff 134, 139-

32

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

I saw Brigadier Vaughan, die District Commander, and he will go at once to
G.H.Q. to see about strengthening the garrison.

The reports of intervention by members of the Indian States forces from
neighbouring States are probably exaggerated, but I am instructing the Political
Department to draw the attention of the Resident to the reports, and do
everything possible to see that such intervention is prevented.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTJBATTEN OF BURMA

Minutes of Viceroy's Thirty Sixth Staff Meeting , Items 1-2 and 4

Mounthatten Papers

TOP SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's House, New Delhi, on 1 June
1947 at 4.1^ pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma, Lord Ismay,
SirE. Mieville, Mr Abell, Rao Bahadur V.P. Menon, Captain Brockman, Mr I. D.
Scott, Mr Campbell-Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Item 1

THE STATES

his excellency the viceroy said that he had seen the Nawab of Bhopal
that day and given him a general outline of the Announcement to be made by
His Majesty’s Government. The Nawab of Bhopal had pledged his word of
honour not to divulge this information. He had asked whether it was intended
that Dominion status should be granted to the States, his excellency the
viceroy said that he had explained that this was not the intention of His
Majesty’s Government and the reasons for their decision.1 The Nawab of
Bhopal had thereupon complained that His Majesty’s Government had once
more let the States down. He had pointed out that the Cabinet Mission Plan
had always been adhered to by the States; and had complained that, if there was
partition, the two new Constituent Assemblies would have very “tight”
Centres. The Nawab of Bhopal had expressed the fear that 60% of his revenue
would be taken by the Centre and had declared that he would not j oin either
Constituent Assembly in these circumstances.
his excellency the viceroy said that he had later discussed this matter

JUNE 1947

33

with the Maharaja of Bikaner. The latter had explained to him the great
welcome which had been extended by Congress to those States which had sent
representatives to the Constituent Assembly; and had given his opinion that the
rulers of the States which did not send representatives had been activated purely
by selfish reasons. He had pointed out that the States were not committed to
accept a “tight” Centre but were at liberty to negotiate the degree of attach¬
ment. his excellency the viceroy said that he had asked the Maharaja
of Bikaner to give him in writing a resume of the position of the States to date.
It appeared that Travancore, Mysore, Hyderabad and Bhopal were almost the
only ones which were not likely to join one or other Constituent Assembly.

his excellency the viceroy said that he intended to see the States
Negotiating Committee a second time on 4th June. He had invited the Maha¬
raja of Bikaner to come half an hour before that meeting. He had also asked the
Nawab of Bhopal to come and see him twenty minutes before the first meeting
with the States Negotiating Committee, and had asked Sir Conrad Corfield to
come early. These timings would have to be confirmed.

hisexcellencytheviceroy said that he did not intend, as was suggested
in the brief1 2 which had been approved by H.M.G., to make a formal statement
before the members of the States Negotiating Committee that he hoped that
the States would join one of the two new Dominions. He would give this
advice separately and personally to the various rulers.

his excellency also drew attention to the sentence in this brief which read
“On the other hand, should any State eventually not enter into relationship
with a Dominion, we should in fact be forced to consider a separate relationship
with it.” He said that he would answer any questions from the representatives
of the States on this matter by saying that this was a purely hypothetical ques¬
tion which, when it arose, he would refer to H.M.G.

sir eric mieville pointed out that if a State failed to join either Con¬
stituent Assembly it would be outside the British Commonwealth and no
longer eligible for decorations.

his excellency the viceroy:

(i) invited the Reforms Commissioner to find out what were the likely
Congress reactions to the continued award of decorations to the States;

(ii) directed P.S.V. to arrange for him to meet the members of the States
Negotiating Committee a second time on 4th June; and to confirm the
separate interviews which he had promised to the Maharaja of Bikaner,
the Nawab of Bhopal and Sir Conrad Corfield.3

1 See Vol. X, Nos. 517, Minute 6; 523; 533; and 553, Minute 4.

2 Vol. X, No. 533 (circulated to the Viceroy’s staff as V.C.P. 57).

3 Lord Mountbatten saw the States Negotiating Committee on 3 June (see No. 43) but there appears to
be no record of a second meeting on 4 June or of the separate interviews referred to here.

34

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Item 2

BRITISH BALUCHISTAN

MR abell read out a letter4 which had been received from Pandit Nehru
concerning possible methods of finding out which Constituent Assembly
British Baluchistan wanted to join. Pandit Nehru suggested the possibility of
sending a Commission to meet the Jirgas and of holding a referendum in the
Quetta municipality, mr abell said that he had spoken concerning these
suggestions to Sir Geoffrey Prior, who had considered that a non-official
Commission would be out of the question. Sir Geoffrey Prior was also opposed
to the idea of an official Commission and had put forward the suggestion that
one representative elected from each tribe should meet together in Quetta to
make the decision. He was going to send in detailed recommendations when he
returned to British Baluchistan.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed Con. Sec. to draft a telegram to the Secretary of State saying that
the present Paragraph 12 of the Announcement would have to remain
in.5

Item 4

BENGAL

Reference was made to a letter6 addressed to Sir Eric Mieville by Mr
Suhrawardy. The two points which Mr Suhrawardy stressed were:

(a) The necessity for holding a referendum in Bengal, so that the true wishes
of the Scheduled Castes could be ascertained, and

(b) the desirability of Calcutta being a free city, if only for a limited period.
rao bahadur menon said that Congress reaction against any suggestion of

Calcutta becoming a free city was likely to be extremely strong. However,
Congress might consider it if it was only for a limited period and under a
neutral authority, preferably the Governor General.

MR abell said that he considered that any changes in the Draft Announce¬
ment at this stage, to deal with either the opinions of the Scheduled Castes or
special arrangements for Calcutta, would prejudice the chance of Congress
accepting the Plan as a whole.

his excellency the viceroy said that he entirely shared this viewpoint.
The question of Calcutta could come up after the main meetings. If, however,
he was attacked on this point or on the Scheduled Castes at these meetings, it
was essential that he should be properly briefed to give the right replies.
his excellency the viceroy:

directed P.S.V. to obtain, either by telegram or telephone, the views of the

JUNE I947

35

Governor of Bengal on the possibility of Calcutta being a free city for a
limited period7 and the question of the opinion of the Schedules Castes.8

4 No. 9.

* In tel. 1247-S of 1 June Lord Mountbatten informed Lord Listowel that, as it would not be possible
to decide on a procedure for British Baluchistan before the issue of the announcement, the present
wording of para. 12 would have to remain. He also replied to Pandit Nehru’s letter (No. 9) saying
that he thought the paragraph would have to be left as it stood for the moment. R/3/1/155: ff 14-15.

6 No. 10.

7 See No. 18, para. 5.

8 In tel. 1248-S of 1 June Lord Mountbatten asked Sir F. Burrows for material for ‘turning down’ Mr
Jinnah’s request for a referendum to ascertain the opinion of the Scheduled Castes. Mountbatten
Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Bengal, Situation in, Part 1(b). The Governor’s reply has not
been traced, but possibly a brief on the Scheduled Castes circulated under reference V.C.P. 61 of
2 June was based on material supplied by him. The record of Lord Mountbatten’s remarks on
Calcutta in No. 23 closely follows the wording of this brief.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir F. Burrows ( Bengal )

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence
Files: Bengal , Partition of Part 11(a)

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 1 June 1047

SECRET

No. 123 7-S. Thank you for your secret letter of 28th May1 and copy of your
admirable broadcast2 which I have seen on my return.

2. I shall do all I can to get Jinnah and Nehru to broadcast on the lines you
suggest.

3 . It looks as if the Congress were determined to oppose any move towards
an independent but united Bengal. If this idea has to be abandoned do you think
it will be necessary to go into Section 93 and if so at what stage? I doubt myself
whether you need go into Section 93 until it is known that the decision is in
favour of partitioning the Province. Are you in favour of going into Section 93
then ? If so what are your prospects (a) if the League acquiesce in the Plan and
(b) if they do not?

4. Alternatively can any form of coalition government be formed to work
out partition ?

* Vol. X, No. 554.

2 Sir F. Burrows enclosed a copy of this broadcast (not printed) in his letter of 28 May, remarking that
he had given it the previous evening ‘with a view to steadying public opinion’.

36

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

5. Suhrawardy would like Calcutta to be declared a free city3 or at any rate
under joint control for the interim period whilst partition is being worked out,
to avoid bloodshed and in the hopes of better sense prevailing later. Request
your views.

3 cf. Nos. 10, 17, Item 4, and 91, para. 1.

19

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/3/1/150:/ 168

most immediate new Delhi, i June 1947, 10 pm

SECRET

PRIVATE

No. 1249-S. Reference your telegram No. 65 of 31st May.1

1. The text of my broadcast was submitted to you and the Prime Minister2
and was redrafted by me on the Prime Minister’s instructions3 and then passed
by him. I much regret that in the great pressure of my last day in London the
final redraft was not shown to you before the record was made.4 I agree to the
omission of the clause in question.

2. In view of the line which Gandhi has been taking recently, I propose to
make the following additions to the text of my broadcast:5

(a) In the sentence in which the omission occurs6 after the words “in my
opinion” insert “which I share with that great fighter for India’s freedom,
Mahatma Gandhi”.

(b) Fifty three words later after “but there can be no question” insert “as,
once again, I know Mahatma Gandhi agrees”.

3. I presume that it will not be possible to include these additions in the
recorded version, if that has to be used. But please include them in the copies of
my broadcast which you will issue to the Press, and let theB.B.C. know of these
amendments.

1 See Vol. X, No. 557 and its note 4. 2 See Vol. X, No. 507.

3 See Vol. X, No. 532. 4 See Vol. X, No. 557, note 1.

s See, in this Volume, No. 2, Item 1, conclusion (iii), and Item 4.

6 i.e. the second sentence of para. 5 of No. 44.

JUNE 1947

37

20

Unsigned Note 1
R/3l 1/150: f 204

POINTS DISCUSSED WITH PATEL

(1) Calcutta — Not for 6 hours.2

(2) Procedure3 — H.E. to make introductory remarks, hand over document —
decision to be communicated in 24 hours. If Jinnah raises any question,
H.E. to reply that the W.C.’s decision should be communicated in 24
hours. This is only for the information of H.E. It has been practice with
Jinnah to wait for the Congress decision and then make up his own mind.
Congress would not allow him to do so this time. In other words, Jinnah
should come out with his decision independently of the Congress.

(3) I raised Bikaner and the question of title. He saw no objection to con¬
ferring titles on Ruling Princes but he was not quite enthusiastic about it.

(4) Congress would not raise the issue of Interim Govt in these discussions.

(5) He raised the question of States and I did not say anything to him.

1 Possibly by V.P. Menon; at all events it reports a talk between Menon and Patel: see No. 91, para. 1,
last sentence. A manuscript note, dated 2 June 1947, by Mr Scott states that: ‘V.P. Menon has told
H.E. the above’.

2 See No. 91, para. 1. 3 i.e. the procedure at the meeting with the Indian leaders (No. 23).

21

Sir C. Corfield to Mr Abell
R^/i/ijo:/ 179

TOP SECRET POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 2 June I947

Dear George,

I did not realise that changes could be made at this stage in the enclosure to
V.C.P. 581 or I would have made the suggestion to H.E. on Saturday evening
that the sentence about States should read as follows:

“I have made no mention of the Indian States, since the new decisions of His
Majesty’s Government are concerned with the transfer [of] power in British
India.”

1 i.e. the draft of the Viceroy’s broadcast circulated by No. 1 in which the sentence about the States
read: ‘I have made no mention of the Indian States, since the new decisions of His Majesty s Govern¬
ment do not affect their position’.

38

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

It is not correct that ‘the position of the States’ is not affected, but the
sentence as redrafted evades this issue without making a mis-statement.2

Yours,

CONRAD

2 Mr Abell replied on 2 June indicating that the broadcast would be amended as proposed by Sir C.
Corfield. The India Office was informed of the amendment in tel. 1267-S of 2 June and they in turn
notified the Prime Minister’s Private Office. L/PO/6/124: ff 6- 7.

22

Mr Thompson to Sir C. Corfield

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Round Table Conference , Indian

Political Leaders , etc., Issue ofi Invitations to

SECRET POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, 2 June I947

The Raja of Faridkot came to see me at 9.40 a.m. this morning. Giani Kartar
Singh, President, Shiromani Akali Dal, is staying with him at Faridkot House
and at breakfast time had agreed that if invited to His Excellency’s conversations
with political leaders today, he would do his utmost to come to an amicable
agreement with Mr Jinnah in regard to the inclusion of “Khalistan” within
Pakistan.

2. Raja argued that since Messrs Jinnah and Kripalani, as Presidents of the
League and Congress, were invited it was only logical to invite Giani Kartar
Singh also. He admitted, however, that there was a split amongst the Sikhs with
Master Tara Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh in one camp and Kartar Singh in
the other. On the other hand Mr Jinnah was agreeable to the inclusion of the
Sikh States within Pakistan, giving them a very substantial measure of inde¬
pendent action. Further Mr Jinnah had promised not to give any statement on
any such question without first consulting the Raja.1

J. H. THOMPSON
Resident on special duty

1 Sir C. Corfield put this note up to Lord Mountbatten who minuted: ‘I will see Giani Kartar Singh at
245 pm on 3rd. M of B 2/6.’ For some account of this interview see No. 91, para. 26.

JUNE 1947

39

Minutes of the Meeting of the

Viceroy with the Indian Leaders , First Day

LlP&Jliol8i:Jf 401-9

CONFIDENTIAL

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy s House , New Delhi , on 2 June
1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Pandit Nehru ,
Sardar Patel , Mr Kripalani, Mr Jinnah , Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , Mr Nishtar , Sardar
Baldev Singh , LorJ Ismay,1 Sir E. Mieville; Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
( Secretariat )

His Excellency’s Opening Remarks

his excellency the viceroy explained that he asked the minimum num¬
ber of party leaders to come to the meeting so that it could be held in a friendly
atmosphere round a small table. He said that, during the last five years, he had
taken part in a number of momentous meetings at which the fate of the war had
been decided; but he could remember no meeting at which decisions had been
taken which would have such a profound influence on world history as those
which were to be taken at the present meeting. The way in which power was
transferred would affect not only India, but the whole world.

The Necessity for Speed

Before he had left for India in March, he had been given no indication in
London of the necessity for speed in formulating proposals for the transfer of
power. He had been led to believe that, if his recommendations were submitted
in time for legislation to be introduced by the beginning of 1948, that would be
time enough. However, from the moment of his arrival a terrific sense of
urgency had been impressed upon him by everybody to whom he had spoken.
They had wanted the present state of uncertainty to cease. He had come to
realise that the sooner power was transferred the better it would be.

The Cabinet Mission’s Plan

He had tried at first to obtain agreement on the Cabinet Mission’s Plan. His
Majesty’s Government set great store by that Plan. At different times all
parties had agreed to it. He had, however, now had to report to His Majesty’s
Government the view of Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League that they could

1 In a letter dated. 2 June, presumably sent just before this Meeting was due to begin, Lord Ismay wrote
to Lord Mountbatten:

‘This is like D day 1944 — and not less exciting: and I just want to send you this line of good cheer
and good luck.’

Mountbatten Papers, Papers of Special Interest, (5) of 1947-

40

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

not withdraw their rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan and that they felt that
it could not be made to work. He asked Mr. Jinnah whether, in this, he had
reported him correctly.

mr. jinnah signified assent.

his excellency the viceroy went on to say that he still thought that
the Cabinet Mission Plan represented the best solution. It meant a great deal to
the States, the majority of which set much store by it.

The Principle of Partition

his excellency the viceroy said that gradually, over the course of the
last two and a half months, he had begun to see the degree of acceptance by the
different parties of the various alternative plans. Mr. Jinnah had stated a claim
for complete Pakistan. From discussions which he had had with Pandit Nehru
and Sardar Patel, on the other hand, it was clear to him that the partition of
India was fundamentally contrary to Congress principles. But Congress had
now accepted the principle that no area which contained a majority of Muslims
should be coerced into joining the existing Constituent Assembly. In doing so
they had made it clear that they could only see their way to accepting the
principle of Partition so long as it was applied also to the non-Muslim majority
areas which had been included in the original Pakistan plan. Mr. Jinnah, on the
other hand, had pointed out that he could never agree to the partition of
Provinces, which he considered fundamentally wrong. Thus he himself was
faced with the position that Congress would not agree to the principle of the
partition of India (although they accepted the principle that Muslim majority
areas should not be coerced) ; while Mr. Jinnah, who demanded the partition of
India, would not agree to the principle of the partition of Provinces. He had
made clear to His Majesty’s Government the impossibility of fully accepting
the principles of one side and not of the other.

His Excellency’s Recent Visit to London

his excellency the viceroy stated, that during his recent visit to London,
he had attended a number of Cabinet Committee meetings.2 At these the whole
question of the Cabinet Mission Plan had once again been thrashed out; the
principle of partition, and to what extent it should be applied, had been con¬
sidered. He had tried to put forward what he believed to be the points of view
of both parties on the different matters — not only at the Cabinet Committee
meetings, but also separately to the Prime Minister, Sir Stafford Cripps and to
members of the Opposition, including Mr. Churchill.3 He explained that he
had been most distressed (as a non-Party man) to find, when he had been
appointed Viceroy, that India had, to some extent, become a matter of Party
Politics in the United Kingdom. Therefore he had all the more welcomed the
opportunity of meeting members of the Opposition; and he was happy to state

JUNE 1947

41

that they were broadly in agreement with the policy which His Majesty’s
Government intended to adopt. In fact both parties in the United Kingdom
were united in their desire to help India. He himself had been very impressed in
London by the intense feeling of goodwill for India, which extended from His
Majesty the King (who had spoken to him on the subject almost every evening
with a great understanding and well-wishing) down to his friends in all walks of
life.

The Sikhs

the viceroy, continuing, said that he was most distressed about the position
of the Sikhs. He did not think that any single question had been discussed at
such great length in London as this. He had repeatedly asked the Sikhs whether
they desired the partition of the Punjab, as they were so spread over that Pro¬
vince that any partition would necessarily divide their community, and they
had repeatedly replied that they did. Different formulae had been tried, but it
was apparent that there would be frightful difficulties if attempts were made to
work, for the notional partition, on any principle other than division between
the majority Muslim and majority non-Muslim areas. It had therefore been
agreed that the notional partition would be entirely provisional. The Boundary
Commission, on which Sikh interests would of course be represented, would
have to work out the best long-term solution.

Calcutta

his excellency then turned to the question of Calcutta. This was another
problem which had been given careful consideration in London. The question
had arisen as to whether a referendum should be held in Calcutta4 as, according
to Mr. Mandal’s views, the vote of the Scheduled Castes there might result in a
decision in favour of Calcutta joining Eastern Bengal. He had sought the
Governor’s advice on this point5 and it had transpired that, out of the ii
million Hindus in Calcutta, only 55,000 were recorded as Scheduled Castes in
the last census (the Muslim population was 498,000). It was true that about f of
the Hindus did not record their caste — and some of these might be Scheduled
Castes ; but there were indications that the number of Scheduled Castes was in
any case not large enough to affect the issue. In 1936 the population figures were
examined to decide how many seats should be reserved for the Scheduled
Castes. In all Bengal 30 seats were reserved for Scheduled Castes; but it was
not considered necessary to earmark one single seat for the Scheduled Castes
in Calcutta. There were two Scheduled Castes seats in the neighbouring
district of 24 Parganas. Both had gone at the last election uncontested to
the Congress. Many of the poorer Hindus in Calcutta came from “up-

2 Vol. X, Nos. 485, 494, 517, and 553. 3 Vol. X, No. 513.

4 See e.g. No. 10. 5 See No. 17, note 8.

42

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

country” (Bihar, the United Provinces, etc.). A proportion of these were
Scheduled Castes but there was nothing to suggest that they would prefer
Muslim to Hindu rule. During the disturbances in Calcutta the Scheduled
Castes had contributed their full share of the casualties on the Hindu side. It
would be impossible to hold a referendum of the Scheduled Castes in Calcutta
at short notice because there was no separated Scheduled Castes Electoral Roll;
because, on the Hindu Roll, there were many cases where caste was not entered
or needed checking ; because the police and military were so stretched that an
elaborate referendum in Calcutta itself was out of the question; and because the
principle, if applied in Calcutta, would have to be applied elsewhere — which
would result in endless complications.

He had done his best, while in London, to be advocate of the different party
issues on Calcutta, but the definite decision of the Cabinet6 had been that no
exception to the general rule could be made in this case.

The India Office

the viceroy said that he had represented to the Cabinet Committee that the
new arrangements would involve the abolition of the India Office. This view
had been accepted and details were now being worked out.7

The Transfer of Contiguous Areas

his excellency recalled that he had been asked by both parties, before
leaving for London, to consider arrangements whereby certain contiguous areas
in which there was a majority of the opposite community should be transferred
from one side to the other. This applied particularly to the Purnea district and
to parts of Sind, his excellency the viceroy said that this matter had
been omitted from the present Announcement. It would have to be dealt with
separately, by agreement between the two parties and through the medium of
the Boundary Commission.8

Dominion Status

his excellency said that there was included in the Statement one new
presentation — the new Paragraph 20 under the heading “Immediate Transfer
of Power”.9 He recalled that it had always been impressed upon him by all the
leaders present at the meeting, that they wanted partition (if it was decided
upon) and, thereafter, the transfer of power to take place with the utmost
speed. Moreover, he felt that the British owed it to the Indians, to give them
all the help which they required after the transfer of power. This could only be
done if it were arranged that the transfer should take place not only before
June 1948, but also as long before that date as possible. Therefore, after dis¬
cussion with the leaders, he had taken it upon himself to ask for legislation to
be rushed through during the present Parliamentary session to give Dominion

JUNE I947

43

status to the successor authorities that would emerge. The Prime Minister had
given orders that this should have top priority and the Lord Chancellor and
Law Officers of the Crown had set to work at once.10 Mr. Churchill had given
a written assurance11 to the Prime Minister that the Opposition would facilitate
the passage of this Bill. It was hoped that it would create an all time world¬
wide legislative record, as the present session of Parliament was due to end in
late July or early August. Power would, therefore, be demitted on a Dominion
status basis in the first instance. Thereafter the new Indian Government or
Governments would be completely free to withdraw from the Commonwealth
whenever they so wished. The only objection which he could see to such an
early transfer of power was a possible accusation that the British were “quit¬
ting” on their obligations. Therefore, it was abundantly clear that British
assistance should not be withdrawn prematurely if it was still required. He
considered that it was the duty of the British to continue to help — not to rule —
India. They would stay at the disposal of the Indians for as long as the latter
wished.

The Need for Secrecy

the viceroy said that the Prime Minister had particularly impressed upon
him the supreme need for secrecy concerning the Statement until it was made
in the House of Commons. He therefore asked that every possible step should
be taken to prevent a leakage before the following afternoon. This applied
particularly to the new Paragraph 20. There had already been speculation in the
Press on the possible grant of Dominion status, but this had been somewhat
wide of the mark. He asked the Indian Leaders for their assurances that they
would do their best to prevent their Working Committees from “leaking”.
pandit nehru and mr. jinnah signified assent.

Defence Arrangements & Treaties

his excellency the viceroy said that, on another point which had been
raised, His Majesty’s Government had expressed a wish to be associated in any
defence agreement or treaty between the two new States which were to be set
up.12 They felt that it would be an impossible situation if either of these States,
having British officers and equipment, were to allow other nations to come in
and establish bases on their territories.

The Appointment of Governors-General

the viceroy then explained the procedure for the appointment by Dom-

6 See Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 4. 7 See Vol. X, Nos. 517, Minute 4, and 521.

8 See Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 5.

9 For decision to include new paragraph 20 see Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 3; see Dominion Status in
Index of Subjects in Vol. X for question of Dominion Status generally.

10 See Vol. X, Nos. 485, Conclusion (2); 494, Minute 2; and 553, Minute 5.

” Vol. X, Enclosure to No. 513. 12 See Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 6.

44

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

iiiions of consitutional Governors-General. He said that it fell to the Heads of
the Governments of such States (presumably the Prime Ministers) to recom¬
mend to His Majesty the King whom they wanted for Governor-General. It
was customary for His Majesty the King always to accept this advice. It was
similarly the custom for Dominion Premiers in no circumstances to disclose the
names of their nominees until the consent of His Majesty had been accorded.
Obviously one of the first matters on which speculation would start would be
the names of the new Governors-General. his excellency the viceroy
asked the Indian Leaders to bear in mind the custom of not disclosing their
intentions in this respect.

British Officers and Officials

his excellency the viceroy said that His Majesty’s Government were
willing and anxious to help with the continued supply of British officials and
of British officers for the Indian Armed Forces ; but it was far more difficult to
persuade British officers to serve on at the present time than it had been a
year previously. The principal reason for this was the increase in communal
warfare and strife. However, before he had left London, a Committee had been
set up under the Minister of Defence13 in order urgently to examine how it
would be possible to make available to the two new States in India the greatest
possible number of British officers and officials that they wanted to keep. In the
case of officers, it was probable that they would be transferred to the British
Service and then loaned back to the Dominion Governments. The same
principle had applied to the Australian Navy. It was, however, obviously
going to be a difficult problem.

His Majesty’s Government’s Statement

his excellency the viceroy pointed out that he had formulated the plan
as a result of many talks with five of the seven Indian Leaders present at the
meeting. It had been changed to meet their wishes during the last few days
before he had left for London,14 and he had been agreeably surprised then to
find that the majority of suggestions made by one side had not been rejected by
the other. He explained that there were small drafting alterations in the State¬
ment since it had last been seen by the Indian leaders. These were designed
purely for clarification and it had been agreed by His Majesty’s Government
that they should not be included unless he and both the major Indian parties
agreed. He had His Majesty’s Government’s authority to strike out any pro¬
posed amendment that was not agreed.15

Copies of the Statement16 were then handed round to the meeting, his
excellency the viceroy reiterated that five of those present at the meeting
had been associated with him in the drafting of the statement. He was gratified
to feel that their support would continue. At this juncture, mr. jinn ah,

JUNE 1947

45

MR. LIAQUAT ALI KHAN, PANDIT NEHRU, SARDAR PATEL and SARDAR

baldev singh all signified assent.

his excellency the viceroy asked the Leaders to take copies of this
Statement to their Working Committees and discuss it with them that day. He
asked them to let him know by midnight that night what their Working
Committees thought of it. He did not intend to ask either side specifically to
agree to the terms of the Statement, but requested assurances from both that
they would do their best to have it worked out peacefully. He explained that
he felt that it would be asking the Indian Leaders to go against their con¬
sciences if he requested full agreement. He was, however, asking them to
accept it in a peaceful spirit and to make it work without bloodshed, which
would be the inevitable consequence if they did not accept it.

pandit nehru asked for a further definition of the difference between
agreement and acceptance, his excellency the viceroy explained that
agreement would imply belief that the right principles were being employed.
He had had to violate the principles of both sides, so could not ask for complete
agreement. What he asked was for acceptance, in order to denote belief that the
plan was a fair and sincere solution for the good of the country, pandit
nehru stated that there could never be complete approval of the plan from
Congress, but, on the balance, they accepted it. mr.nishtar pointed out that
acceptance of the plan really implied agreement to make it work, his excel¬
lency the viceroy agreed with this.

MR. jinnah said that it was perfectly true to say that neither side agreed
with certain points in the plan. Its formal acceptance by the Muslim League,
which would have to come later, and the Constitutional procedure of the
League had to be considered. The decision could not be left to the leaders and
the Working Committee (of which there were 21 members) alone. There were
many important people outside the Working Committee. The leaders and the
W orking Committee would have to bring the people round. Much explana¬
tion would be necessary. Rather than a few representatives of the Muslim
League immediately committing themselves, he would rather say that the plan
had been fully examined and that they would do their best to see that the
proposals were given effect to peacefully and without bloodshed.

his excellency the viceroy said that he was willing to take the risk of
accepting the words of the leaders and the backing of their Working Com¬
mittees. He was completely confident in the loyalty and straightforwardness of
the leaders. He would be happy so long as he knew that they were loyally

13 Ibid., Minute 8.

14 For the plan as taken to London by Lord Mountbatten see Vol. X, No. 476.

15 For minor amendments made in London see Vol. X, Nos. 485, Item (a) ; and 516, Annex II. See also

No. 13 in this Volume.

16 See No. 45.

46

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

trying to get the Plan accepted. But he had to ask for the preliminary agree¬
ment of the Working Committees to support the Plan.

MR. jinn ah said that he could speak only for himself. He entered into the
spirit of the proposals but he would like the Viceroy to consider that, in order
to give a definite answer, it was necessary to make the people understand. The
Muslim League was a democratic organisation. He and his Working Committee
would have to go before their masters, the people, for a final decision.

his excellency the viceroy said that there were times when leaders
had to make vital decisions without consulting their followers and trust to
carrying them with them at a later stage. In democratic countries, Parliaments
could always disagree with the decisions taken by Prime Ministers and by
Cabinets. A decision taken at the top and afterwards confirmed by the people
would be in accord with democratic processes.

MR. jinnah said that, if a ready-made decision was put before the All-
India Muslim League Council, which he could convene in a week, they would
declare that they had already been committed without having been given an
opportunity to express their views. They would be upset. They would ask why
they had been called. He thought that he would succeed in obtaining their
support, but felt that it was a better way not to pre-determine the issue. He
would do his best. In the meanwhile he would make every effort to see that the
people remained calm and that no disturbances to the peace took place any¬
where. He emphasized that he would go to his masters, the people, with no
intent of wrecking the Plan but with the sincere desire to persuade them to
accept it. He could only give his personal assurance that he would do his best.
He would try in his own way to bring round the people. The Viceroy wanted
him to do it, and he would do his best — in the way which was best for him, in
the manner which would ultimately result in what the Viceroy wanted.

his excellency the viceroy said that he presumed that Congress were
confronted with the same problem as that stated by Mr. Jinnah.

pandit nehru pointed out that he and Sardar Patel had been committing
themselves, step by step, to the present plan and had given their personal
assurances. It had been difficult for them to go ahead as individuals and in their
representative capacities without consulting their colleagues, including the
Congress President. The Congress Working Committee had also considered
the broad outlines of the Plan. He would let the Viceroy know what that
Committee felt of it later that day. The next stage would be a meeting of the
larger body, the all-India Congress Committee. This body might feel hurt that
they had not been consulted earlier. But owing to the peculiar nature of the
case, the leaders themselves had had to make decisions. They had had to take the
responsibility on their own shoulders. The difficulty lay in the circumstances.
He and his colleagues were caught in the tempo of events. The urgency of the
situation made it difficult for them to be vague.

JUNE I947

47

MR. kripalani signified agreement with what Pandit Nehru had said.

pandit nehru said that a letter would be sent in to the Viceroy that
evening giving an account of the Congress Working Committee’s reaction to
the Statement.

MR. jinnah said that he felt unable to report the opinions of the Muslim
League Working Committee in writing. He would, however, come and see the
Viceroy and make a verbal report.

the viceroy said that he would be satisfied with this. He summed up by
thanking the leaders for their loyalty and honesty. He much appreciated the
support which they were all giving him. He understood the difficulties which
Mr. Jinnah had mentioned concerning procedure.

Broadcasts

his excellency the viceroy said that he intended to make a broadcast
over All-India Radio at 7 p.m. the following evening. This would be recorded
in London and relayed by a “hook-up” system all over the world. He said that
he would be most grateful if Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah would follow him
by broadcasting immediately after the Announcement. They might give their
personal assurances of support for the Plan and say that they would use their
best endeavours to ensure a full peaceful acceptance of it by their respective
parties.

MR. jinnah agreed to make such a broadcast, although he said that it would
be difficult for him. pandit nehru also agreed to do so and said that he would
be definite in his broadcast, pandit nehru also made the suggestion that
Sardar Baldev Singh should broadcast, sardar baldev singh at first
demurred. He felt that he would have nothing to say. He could not make up
his mind about support for the Plan until he knew that Congress and the
Muslim League were going to support it. But he eventually agreed to make an
appeal for bloodshed to cease.

his excellency the viceroy said that he was prepared to let the leaders
know what he was going to say in his broadcast the following day.

sardar patel pointed out, with a smile on his face, that the general rule
was for the scripts of broadcast speeches to be submitted to the Honourable
Member for Information and Broadcasting before they were used! mr.
jinnah said that he would say in his broadcast what came from his heart.

It was finally agreed that Pandit Nehru, Mr. Jinnah and Sardar Baldev Singh
should bring their scripts to the meeting the following day and read them out
there.

48

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

24

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma and

Mr Gandhi

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy's Interview No. 142

secret 2 June 1947, 12. jo pm

I saw Mr. Gandhi immediately after the first session of the meeting with the
seven Indian Leaders. As this was a Monday, he was observing his day of
silence; and he apparently did not consider the occasion of sufficient impor¬
tance for him to break this rule, so he satisfied himself by handing me the
attached note. The original of this is in my possession; it is written on the back
of five separate old envelopes and will be, I feel, a document of some historic
importance.1

Enclosure to No. 24

I am sorry I can’t speak; when I took the decision about the Monday silence I
did reserve two exceptions, i.e. about speaking to high functionaries on urgent
matters or attending upon sick people. But I know you do not want me to
break my silence. Have I said one word against you during my speeches r If you
admit that I have not, your warning is superfluous.

There are one or two things I must talk about, but not today. If we meet each
other again I shall speak.

Badshah Khan is with me in the Bhangi Colony. He said “Do ask the Viceroy
to remove the Governor. We won’t have peace till he is gone”. I don’t know
whether he is right or wrong. He is truthful. If it can be done decorously, you
should do it.

1 For further accounts of this meeting see Nos. 39 and 91, paras. 14-15.

Mr Rowlatt to Mr Simpson
L/P&Jlioli2j:ff 418-20

SECRET 2 June 1947

My dear Simpson,

I enclose a letter I have written to Wilson Smith, after speaking to Turnbull. It
represents the horrid thoughts that occurred to me when I read the Com-
mander-in-Chief ’s paper1 over the weekend. I feel that I owe you, [as] well as

JUNE 1947

49

Wilson Smith, an apology for butting in like this but, in the circumstances, I am
sure you will forgive me. It would, I think, be a great pity if Wilson Smith
went ahead without being fully aware of the difficulty, to put it mildly, of the
solution propounded by IB (47) 89, 2 if the safeguards proposed are conceived of
as resting on any legal basis.

Yours sincerely,

J.R.

Enclosure to No. 25

SECRET AND PERSONAL 2 June 1$47

Dear Wilson Smith,

Your India Committee.3 You will forgive me for butting in on what is at first
sight not directly my affair but time is short and I am writing to you direct by
arrangement with Turnbull at the India Office who is instructing me about the
expected India Bill. In connection with that Bill I have read, amongst other
things, IB (47) 89 and I see, or think I see, a formidable misunderstanding arising
which it seems to me is not likely to be as obvious to anyone serving on your
committee as it is to me.

16(47)89 began by stating its assumptions, one of which is a common Gover¬
nor-General, but this statement is incomplete. The paper also assumes a com¬
mon Governor-General who can, in some degree, be responsible to H.M.G.
here. I have no doubt that the authors of the paper took it for granted, quite
naturally, that the later assumption flowed from the former. When one is
drafting a Bill about it, it hits one in the eye that it does nothing of the kind but
that, legally speaking, it cuts across the fundamental idea; and, what is more
important, I strongly suspect that for once the legalities of the situation corres¬
pond pretty closely to the realities.

Just think where we are by way of going to. The basic assumption of all is
that, in a few months’ time, there will be two self-governing member States of
the British Commonwealth. It is, of course, perfectly true that they cannot by
then have their affairs completely disentangled and that there will have to be
some kind of joint administration and control of certain matters, if there is not
to be chaos. From this it follows that, if they have any sense, they will for some
time have a common Governor-General with a white face and leave a good
deal to his individual discretion. This, so long as either of them can at any
moment they want demand a separate Governor-General, or demand a com¬
mon Governor-General who is acceptable to both of them and not necessarily
acceptable to His Majesty’s Government is not, in legal theory, inconsistent
with the establishment, in a few months’ time, of “two self-governing member

1 and 2 Vol. X, No. 547.

3 See Vol. X. No. 553, Minute 8.

50

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

States of the British Commonwealth” ; and I had, in fact, provided for it up to a
point in the first draft of my Bill. But when you once say that the common
Governor-General is to do what he is told in any respect from London, the
concept of “self-governing members” which Ministers regard as carrying with
it even if need be the right to secede, is immediately destroyed. In drafting the
Bill, the point hits one in the eye almost in every line. The whole structure of
what I had got was that, after the appointed day, which would take place in a
few months’ time, they could each of them, if they really wanted to, do what
they liked about anything, though, inasmuch as they will not be ready with
their own separate mechanisms, we provide (up to a point) a provisional legal
framework for them to be going on with until they get round to framing
something better. All this goes completely by the board if the Act is going to
force on them a common Governor-General appointed from London on
English advice and responsible to London on one of the most crucial subjects of
all.

Of course in my Bill I can say that it shall be so, because, so far as words go,
one can say anything. I think, however, that I ought to point out that the mere
fact that words to the effect in question are found in my Bill when it is intro¬
duced and when it becomes an Act is extremely unlikely to influence the course
of events in India in that direction. No one, after the great day, will pay the
slightest attention to what Parliament has said, just because Parliament has said
it; indeed, the tendency will be the other way — the fact that Parliament has
said a thing will be prima facie evidence that exactly the opposite ought to
happen. All paper “safeguards” can do is to give grounds for accusations by the
Indians of bad faith on the part of His Majesty’s Government. Of course, if you
could get a real agreement from the Indian leaders, that the position should be
as required by IB (47) 89 (an agreement, that is, which you could be sure they
could and would honour) it would be another matter : we would not have to
say anything in the Bill and my difficulties would not arise. But I allow myself
to say that I suspect, from what I have heard, and from what, using my intelli¬
gence, I can guess, that you would be well-advised not to assume too readily the
possibility of such an agreement.

As I said at the beginning, I hope you will forgive me for writing to you on
this subject, especially as I am aware that the above observations are not
helpful. It is, however, unavoidable that the India Office representatives on
your committee should be persons much more interested in and conversant with
the requirements of the Indian Army than the political side of the picture, and
though everyone knows, of course, the general nature of the dilemma, I am
not sure that the exact location of the point at which the ways part is equally
obvious.

I am sending copies of this letter to Turnbull at the India Office (who is

JUNE 1947

51

instructing me on the Bill) and to Simpson at the India Office who is in charge
of their military department.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN ROWLATT

Minutes of Viceroy s Thirty Seventh Staff Meeting , Item 2

Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's House , New Delhi , on 2 June
1947 at 4 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burmay Lord Ismay,
Sir E. Mieville , Mr Abell , Rao Bahadur V.P. Menonf Captain Brockman , Mr I. D.
Scott , Mr Christie , Mr Campbell-Johnson , Sir G. Prior , Lieutenant-Colonel
Erskine Crum

BRITISH BALUCHISTAN

sir Geoffrey prior said that he had been considering different procedures
whereby the people of British Baluchistan could make their choice whether to
adhere to the existing Constituent Assembly or to join the new one. The
object, as he understood it, was to devise a body which would make the
decision and elect a representative to the Constituent Assembly; and that this
body should be based on a more popular platform. He pointed out that the
Shahi Jirga was to some extent hereditary, although a number of members
owed their position in it to their leadership in their tribes. It might be possible
to get a wider franchise starting at a level just above the village headmen. The
result would be a body similar to the Shahi Jirga but without the hereditary
members of the latter body.

sir Geoffrey prior went on to say that he considered that the issues at
stake should be reduced to writing and sent round to the headmen of the
sub-section [s]. They would then gather together in the agency headquarters
and elect representatives for the Jirga — about ten representatives per agency.
The Jirga would gather at Quetta.

his excellency the viceroy said that he considered that a solution on
the lines suggested by Sir Geoffrey Prior would probably be acceptable to
Pandit Nehru. He intended to ask Pandit Nehru officially to obtain Sir Geoffrey
Prior’s views after the latter had returned to British Baluchistan. A question
that arose was how either party was to make their appeal. Possibly accredited
representatives of Congress and the Muslim League might visit British Baluchi¬
stan and put their case. Money would play an over-riding part in the decision.
British Baluchistan cost a crore a year. The question arose as to whether Pandit

52

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Nehru would consider it worth while offering such a sum. Sir Geoffrey Prior
should see Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and explain the financial aspect to him.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed P.S.V. to keep the question of the procedure in British Baluchi¬
stan under consideration.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl oj Listowel

Telegram , R/j/ 1/150: ff 185-6

most immediate ne w delhi, 2 June ig47, 5 pm

secret Received: 2 June, 1.50 pm

No. 125 8-S. The meeting with the Indian leaders started at 10 a.m. today and
lasted for two hours. It was all that I could possibly hope for. The full min¬
utes1 will follow by bag.

2. Both Nehru and Jinnah gave me their personal assurances, which were
endorsed by the other members of their respective parties who were present,
that while they could not agree to the plan, they were prepared to do their
utmost to make it work in a practical and peaceful spirit, and, above all, without
bloodshed. They also undertook to do their utmost to persuade their Working
Committees to adopt the same line.

3. They have taken copies of the plan away with them to discuss with their
Working Committees. The Congress Leaders prophesied that their Working
Committee would be in favour of acceptance, and undertook to let me have
their views in writing tonight. Mr Jinnah was rather more difficult on this
point. He said that the Muslim League Working Committee would not be able
to commit themselves to any formal resolution without prior reference to the
All India Muslim League Council. He undertook to convene this Council in a
week’s time. I said that we could not possibly afford a day, much less a week,
and eventually he promised to give me a verbal account of the reactions of his
Working Committee tonight.

4. We shall meet again at 10 a.m. tomorrow, by which time I shall have had
a few hours to consider the reactions of the Working Committees.

5. I am glad to say that Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh have all agreed to
broadcast after the announcement has been given out, and have allowed me to
announce this in this morning’s communique.

6. I ought to mention how Kripalani and Nishtar came to be present. Nehru
approached me the day before yesterday and urged that Kripalani, as President

JUNE I947

53

of the Congress, should be invited.2 He offered to stand down himself if
necessary. I told him that this was out of the question and asked Jinnah, who was
at the same party, whether he would agree to Kripalani coming as an additional
member. He said that he would do so, provided the Muslim League could also
have a third member and nominated Nishtar.

7. So far so good, but we must remember that in the past difficulties have
often arisen in the second and subsequent rounds.

8. God must be on our side, since Gandhi, who came to see me after the
conference (presumably to implement his declared policy of stopping the
present agreement)3 was afflicted by a day of silence. But he wrote me a friendly
note of personal regard.4

1 No. 23. 2 See Nos. 4 and 91, para. 2. 2 See No. 2, note 5.

4 See No. 24 and its enclosure.

Viceroy s Conference Paper V.C.P. 63
Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 2 June I947

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION

The attached paper has been redrafted on His Excellency The Viceroy’s
instructions.1

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

Annex I to No. 28

You will see from Paragraph 20 of the Announcement that Parliamentary
legislation setting up two Dominions, in the event of partition, will be intro¬
duced in Parliament during the current session, i.e. about the beginning of
August. The Act will contain a provision enabling the Governor-General to
bring it into operation at any time thereafter. It is my intention that the Act
should be brought into operation at the earliest possible date after its enactment,
in any case not later than 15 th August, 1947.

It is also my intention, as soon as the issue of partition is decided, to call for

1 The previous draft had been circulated as V.C.P. 60 of 1 June 1947 and discussed at the Viceroy’s 3 7th
Staff Meeting on 2 June at 4 pm. The covering note on the earlier draft stated that it had been
prepared by J.P.S.V. (Mr Christie) ‘as a result of discussions over a period of a month’, and that ‘the
general plan contained in this paper is in accordance with an outline scheme discussed and agreed by
P.S.V. in April with the Governor of the Punjab. P.S.V. points out that the latter has exceptional
knowledge of central and provincial administration’.

54

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

the resignation of my colleagues in order that prospective leaders of the new
Government or Governments may be free without embarrassment to select
their colleagues. Meanwhile the Members of the present Executive Council
will, I hope, continue on the present basis as a Caretaker Government.

If we are to move according to this programme, we must move quickly, and
vital decisions must be taken in a very short time. The task ahead is formidable,
as is shown by the paper attached, which I have decided to circulate to my
colleagues for discussion at the next meeting of Cabinet.

Annex II to No. 28

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION

I. This paper is written on the assumption that the decision will be in favour of
partition, including the partition of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam.

2. Before partition can be fully effective, decision, by agreement or if
necessary by arbitration, will have to be reached on the following matters : —

(i) Final demarcation of boundaries.2

(ii) Division of the formations, units and personnel of the Indian Armed
Forces.

(iii) Division of the staff , organisations and records oj Central Civil Departments ,
services and institutions , including , Railways, Posts and Telegraphs,
Broadcasting, Civil Aviation, Meteorology, Public Works, Income
Tax, Customs, Central Excise, Accounts and Audit, Scientific services,
Central Waterways and Inland Navigation Board and Central Power
Board.

(iv) Division of the assets and liabilities of the Government of India including
fixed installations and stores of the Defence Services, assets and pro¬
perty of the departments, services and institutions listed in (iii) above,
public debt funded and unfunded, Pensions, Provident funds etc.

(v) Division of Assets and Liabilities of the Reserve Bank including Currency,
Rupee securities, bullion and foreign exchange.

(vi) Economic Relations including freedom of trade and commerce, dis¬
tribution of food resources, use of port and railway facilities.

(vii) Jurisdiction of the High Courts and Federal Courts.

(viii) Determination of Domicile.

(ix) Diplomatic representation abroad.

3 . Similar decisions will be necessary as between parts of Provinces.

4. A ‘carry-on’ agreement will be necessary, as a first step, between the main
political parties, because it is clearly impossible to reach final agreement on all
these complicated matters before the transfer of power, and also because it is
necessary to preserve the continuity of administration. In respect of certain

JUNE 1947

55

essential subjects such as boundaries, the armed forces, administrative organisa¬
tion and staff, and finances, decisions must be reached before the date of trans¬
fer of power, for without decisions on these points the separate governments
will not be able to function.

In the course of examination of the subjects it should become possible to
determine more closely their relative degree of urgency, and the action which
may be desirable or essential by way of either interim adjustments or fmal
decisions, before the transfer of power.

5. The next step would be to set up machinery for examining the problems
involved and making recommendations, for co-ordinating and progressing this
process, and for deciding the terms of the agreements on each subject which will
be submitted for the ratification of the successor Governments.

It is suggested that such machinery should be under the control of an Inter-
Party Partition Committee , consisting of two members of the Congress, two of
the Muslim League and one minority representative, all from the present
Interim Government. This Committee will effectively represent the successor
authorities. It will be under the Chairmanship of the Governor General.

The machinery will consist of

(a) an Executive organisation, in the form of a Partition office or Steering
Committee, and

(b) Expert official committees.

The machinery should be such that the work relating to partition is kept
separate as far as possible, from the current administrative work of Government,
and that it should proceed without obstruction or delay. In view of the urgency
it should be recognised that the requirements of work relating to partition
should have absolute priority over those of the current administrative work of
Government.

The functions of the Partition Committee, and the functions and composition
of the Partition Office and Expert Committees are examined in more detail
below.

6. The functions of the Partition Committee will be to decide what adminis¬
trative measures and adjustments, final or intermediate, are necessary to make
fully effective the division of India into more than one sovereign state, and to
prepare agreements for the ratification of the successor Governments. It will
also decide all questions of policy and procedure relevant to its function.

The Partition Committee will appoint the Partition Office (Steering Com¬
mittee), [and] the Expert Committees (except the Committee for the Armed
Forces, vide (8) ii below). It will frame the terms of reference for these com¬
mittees, prescribe procedure, and fix dates by which reports must be sub¬
mitted.

2 Words italicized here are underlined in the original.

56

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

In case an agreed decision cannot be reached by this Committee, the Gover¬
nor-General will be empowered to give a final decision, if he thinks fit.

7. The Partition Office or Steering Committee.

This will have a function of extreme importance and must be composed of
men of undoubted ability, integrity and impartiality. It will direct and co¬
ordinate the work of the Expert Committees, and submit reports and recom¬
mendations in a form that will facilitate quick decisions by the Partition Com¬
mittee.

So long as it remains in being, it will also supervise the implementation of
decisions reached.

It will also be prepared to assist Provincial Committees with information and
advice if required.

The head of this organisation should have considerable latitude in the conduct
of his business and the choice of his staff. Quick results will require flexibility
and improvisation.

8. The Expert Committees.

(i) Demarcation of Boundaries.

The question of boundary delimitation may arise in the Punjab, Bengal
and Assam. Under the terms of Paragraph 9 of the Announcement,
Boundary Commissions will be set up by the Governor General, but he
will consult the Partition Committee about the membership and terms
of reference of the commissions.

(ii) Defence Committee for the division of the Indian Armed Forces.

This Committee will be set up by the Commander-in-Chief with as
many sub-committees as may be necessary and will report direct to the
Partition Committee. It should, however, keep the Partition office
(Steering Committee) in close touch with the progress of its work, and
should be directly associated with the Finance Committee dealing with
the division of installations and stores of the Defence Services. (See

(iii)(c) below).

(iii) Expert Committees.

Expert official committees will be set up to make recommendations on
the subjects enumerated below\ The terms of reference suggested are
provisional and intended only to indicate the scope of the respective
enquiries.

These Expert Committees will not be subject to the authority of the Depart¬
ments with which they are associated, but of the Partition office (Steering
Committee).

(a) Staff & Organisation , Records & Documents.

A committee empowered to call for information from all Departments of the
Central Government and the Central Board of Revenue, or alternatively a

JUNE I947

57

series of committees associated with the several Departments, should report to
the Partition office, by a given date, on the following terms of reference: —

(i) the basis on which existing staff should be divided;

(ii) the actual division of staff;

(iii) duplicate organisation of offices and departments;

(iv) requirements of buildings, furniture, stationery;

(v) separation or duplication of records and documents, international
agreements, etc.

(b) Railways , Communications & Miscellaneous Central Services & Institutions.

In the case of Railways, Posts and Telegraphs, Civil Aviation, Meteorology
and other Central Services and Institutions, the terms of reference will in¬
clude : —

(vi) division of the administrative organisation of the services passing
through or situated in the divided territories.

(c) Assets and Liabilities.

A Finance Committee will deal with the division of the assets and liabilities of
the Government of India and of the Reserve Bank. It is essential that this
committee should include in its scope the Armed Forces as well as the Civil
departments, so that it may obtain a fully integrated picture of all assets and
liabilities. Where information is not available in the Finance Department, the
committee should be empowered to obtain the information from the depart¬
ments concerned.

The terms of reference of this committee should include : —

(i) the division, final or provisional, of Treasury and Bank balances;

(ii) the arrangements for the collection and distribution of Customs and
Income Tax and other items of revenue which are now central;

(iii) to ascertain the note issue liabilities of the two new Governments ;

(iv) facilities for transfer of funds from one area to another ;

(v) the effect of partition on exchange control;

(vi) currency arrangements for a smooth transition;

(vii) the basis for division of assets and liabilities ;

(viii) the enumeration and assessment of assets and liabilities ;

(ix) responsibility of each area for the public debt held by its nationals ;

(x) the nature of the financial settlements between respective govern¬
ments.

(d) Economic Relations.

An Economic Relations Committee associated with the appropriate Depart¬
ments should be set up to make recommendations on: —

(i) matters relating to freedom of trade and movement between the
territories of the new governments ;

(ii) effect of partition on the administration of existing controls, and alterna¬
tive arrangements necessary;

58

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(iii) the pooling and distribution of food resources, and other commodities
in short supply;

(iv) the sharing of port and railway facilities.

(e) Jurisdiction oj the High Courts & Federal Courts.

The Chief Justice of India should be invited to examine the effect of partition
on the jurisdiction of the High Courts and Federal Courts, and to make
recommendations.

(f) Domicile.

A special committee associated with the Home Department should examine the
effect of partition on the question of domicile and nationality.

(g) Foreign Relations.

A committee, associated with External Affairs Department and Common¬
wealth Relations Department, should make recommendations regarding the
effect of partition on diplomatic representation in foreign countries, and the
position of Indian nationals in Commonwealth countries.

9. As regards the partition of Provinces, the problems which would arise
would be in connection with : —

(1) delimitation of boundaries ;

(2) division of administrative and judicial services;

(3) division of financial assets and liabilities;

(4) division of material assets, e.g., buildings, food stocks, irrigation;

(5) jurisdiction of High Courts;

(6) Public Service Commissions;

(7) Educational, Medical, Research and Training Institutions.

As in the case of the Central Government, a ‘carry-on’ agreement would be
necessary.

Items (1) and (5) above would be covered by the action proposed above to be
taken by the Central Government. For the other matters, committees would
have to be appointed, probably by the Governor, who would stand in the
same relation to a Joint Committee representing the two parts of the Province,
as the Governor-General to the proposed Cabinet Committee.

10. The decision of Council is required on the setting-up of a Partition
Committee with the composition, functions and powers proposed in Para¬
graphs 5 and 6 above.

JUNE I947

59

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram , jR/3/1/150:/ 198

most immediate 2 June 1947, 4.41 pm

secret Received: 2 June , 10.13 pm

PERSONAL

No. 7105. We have been discussing with Ranee reactions of proposed Indian
announcement on Burma. We have asked him to see Aung San after your final
meeting with British Indian leaders but before any announcement is made and
to give him general outline. We are informing him that your second meeting
with leaders will be at 10 a.m. on 3rd June and that you propose at 7 p.m. 1ST
to broadcast over All India Radio. We assume you will have concluded your
discussions with British Indian leaders by say 1 p.m. 1ST on Tuesday 3rd June
and can at once let Ranee know that you have done so and their outcome. I
suggest that you arrange a code word direct with him for this purpose and that
if there is a telephone to Rangoon you also telephone a message. It is essential
that before any public announcement is made he should see Aung San and
should have time for conversation with him. If your discussions are concluded
by say 1 p.m. it would be possible we assume to let Ranee know this by say
2 p.m. 1ST. He would then have up to 7 p.m. 1ST for his talk with Aung San.

We would be grateful if Ranee in any event would make a provisional date
with Aung San for say 3.30 or 4 p.m. 1ST on 3rd June without at this stage
disclosing what conversation is to be about.1

Addressed Viceroy repeated Government of Burma No. 1255.

1 Lord Mountbatten replied in tel. 1278-S of 3 June, drawing attention to No. 38 which had been
repeated to Sir H. Ranee, and promising to try to get information of any further developments that
day to him in time. He added that he had ‘kept in personal touch with Ranee during negotiations’.
R/3/1/150: f 229.

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/PO^I 124: ff 4-3

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 2 June 1947 , 4.30 pm

private Received: 3 June , 10.13 pm

66. Your 1249-S.1 Many thanks for making the omission from your broadcast.
The record is being corrected by the B.B.C. accordingly.

1 No. 19.

6o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Quite apart from technical difficulties, I feel that it would be preferable not to
make the two insertions you propose. We do not feel sure that Gandhi would
unreservedly accept either proposition and experience in the past suggests that
it is dangerous to attribute opinions to him. It seems that Gandhi is at logger-
heads with the Working Committee at the moment and it may be that any¬
thing you achieve will be the result of the Working Committee rejecting
Gandhi's opinions. If that is the position, your references to him may give
Gandhi a platform for some public reply which will embarrass the Congress
leaders and may even endanger2 the stability of any settlement. I have consulted
the Prime Minister, who concurs. Please let me know whether you agree.3

2 ‘endanger’ deciphered as ‘harden’.

3 Lord Mountbatten telegraphed agreement in tel. 314-GT of 3 June. R/3/1/150: f 230.

31

Cabinet Committee Gen. i86jist Meeting
Future of the India and Burma Offices
MSS. EUR. D. 714/81

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.W.i, on 2 June 1947 at
5 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Herbert Morrison , Mr Ernest Benin , Mr
Hugh Dalton, Viscount Addison, Mr A. Creech Jones, the Earl of Lis towel, Sir E.
Bridges, Mr M. E. Dening; Mr W. S. Murrie, Mr S. E. V. Luke ( Secretariat )

The Meeting had before them a memorandum1 by an Official Committee
about the arrangements to be made for handling the relations of His Majesty’s
Government with India and Burma after their attainment of independence,
whether within or without the Commonwealth.

The memorandum pointed out that public opinion in those countries would
not accept any solution under which this responsibility would continue to
rest with the Secretary of State for India and the Secretary of State for Burma.
The Official Committee had considered tentatively a suggestion that, as a
transitional measure, a new Secretary of State should be appointed to handle the
relations of His Majesty’s Government with India and a group of adjoining
countries, selected on a geographical basis irrespective of their exact constitu¬
tional status. It was thought, however, that such an arrangement would be
viewed with suspicion by the peoples of India and Burma, and the alternative
favoured by the Committee was that there should be a Secretary of State
charged with responsibility for Commonwealth Relations, to whom would be
assigned not only the duties at present entrusted to the Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs, but also the affairs of Ceylon, Burma and India, if those

JUNE I947

6l

countries, on attaining independence, desired to retain a link with the Com¬
monwealth. Even if Ceylon was the only one of these countries to wish to
preserve some form of association with the Commonwealth, there would still
be good grounds for the establishment of a new office on those lines as a tangible
proof of the sincerity of our policy of promoting gradual evolution towards
self-government and independence. The Official Committee had also reached
the conclusion that if the whole of India elected for independence outside the
Commonwealth, with the result that the Foreign Secretary had to handle our
relations with India, the volume of work involved would be such as to call for
the establishment of a special sub-department of the Foreign Office under the
charge of a Minister with the standing of the Minister of State. If, however, the
Foreign Secretary had to handle our relations with a part of India only, it might
be possible to arrange that many of the quasi-administrative problems arising
from the termination of British rule in India should be handled, for the whole of
India, by the organisation under the Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations which was handling our relations with that part of India which re¬
tained an association with the Commonwealth.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS Said that he Was in
general agreement with the conclusions of the Official Committee. If, however,
a change on the lines proposed was to be made, it would be most desirable to
consult the Governments of the existing Dominions at an early stage. In par¬
ticular, he hoped that the creation of a new Commonwealth Relations Office
would not be conspicuously associated with the grant of Dominion status to
the successor States in India, since this would inevitably prejudice Dominion
Governments against the idea from the outset. It would be far more acceptable
to Dominion opinion if we were able to represent this as a proposal which had
originated quite separately from the development of the Indian situation.

the foreign secretary said that it would be most inadvisable to make
public any proposals for a change in the existing arrangements until firm
decisions had been reached about the future of India. A voluntary decision by
the successor States in India to accept Dominion status would undoubtedly have
a great effect on public opinion both in the Dominions and throughout the
world, and the proposal for the establishment of a Commonwealth Relations
Office would obviously have a more sympathetic reception against that back¬
ground. Such a development would also render easier the task of counteracting
the propaganda campaign which the Russians would no doubt at once launch
in response to any change in the existing system of Commonwealth relations.
Fie therefore thought that it would be inadvisable at this stage to consult the
Dominion Governments; there would, however, be no objection to acceptance
of the Committee’s report as a basis for planning purposes. As regards the

Dated 20 May 1947. Mss. Eur. D. 714/81

62

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

internal composition of the proposed Commonwealth Relations Office, it
might possibly be found advisable to create three distinct sections reponsible
respectively for our relations with the existing Dominions; with the Asiatic
territories (India, Burma and Ceylon) now approaching a position of inde¬
pendence within the Commonwealth ; and with certain Colonial territories in
the Middle East and Far East which would be in close political, economic and
defence relationship with the countries in the second group.

the secretary of state for India said that it seemed likely that the
Indian political leaders would agree to accept Dominion status as an interim
arrangement. They disliked, however, the title “Dominion” and would cer¬
tainly greatly prefer to have dealings with a Commonwealth Relations Office.
The establishment of such an Office might therefore influence them to remain
permanently in the Commonwealth.

Other points made in discussion were : —

(a) It had hitherto been the practice for major proposals affecting Common¬
wealth relations to be discussed in the first instance at a Commonwealth
Conference. Would it not be preferable to hold this question over for
such a Conference?

As against this, it was noted that at present there would be an initial
difficulty in deciding which members of the Commonwealth should be
invited to take part in such a Conference. Moreover, discussion of the
proposal by a Commonwealth Conference would invite attempts at a
more precise definition of the Commonwealth relationship from which
no advantage could be expected. Apart from this, the summoning of a
Commonwealth Conference would involve extensive discussions on such
matters as defence for which we were not at present ready.

(b) There were indications that the Dominion Governments were in¬
creasingly inclined to feel that the title “Dominion” implied some degree
of subordination, and that they would wish to discuss at some suitable
opportunity the possibility of an alternative title. For the same reason, the
possibility of a change in the Royal Title would no doubt also be raised ;
indeed, the Canadian Government had already made it clear, in a state¬
ment in the Canadian Parliament, that this question would be raised at a
suitable opportunity.

(c) In discussion with the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, the ques¬
tion of the precedence accorded to Dominion High Commissioners had
also been raised. Dominion Governments were very critical of the
existing arrangements under which their High Commissioners were
accorded precedence below the representative of the smallest foreign
State. Proposals had been made that the Dominion High Commis¬
sioners should be given the title of Ambassador; this, however, was open
to the objection that the latter title implied representation of a foreign

JUNE I947

63

country. It would clearly be necessary to consider sympathetically how to
meet the Dominion wishes in this matter.

(d) There was general agreement with the view expressed in paragraph 6 of
the Official Committee’s report that it would not be feasible to create a
department for the special purpose of handling the relations of His
Majesty’s Government with India and a group of adjoining countries.

The general opinion of the Meeting was that the Official Committee’s
report should be accepted as a basis for planning and that a detailed scheme
should now be worked out on the lines proposed by the Committee. The
matter would have to be further considered in the light of the decisions reached
in regard to the transfer of power in India; and at that stage the question of
consultation with Dominion Governments could be taken up.

JL.

The Meeting : —

(1) Agreed that the report of the Official Committee on the future of the
India Office and the Burma Office should be accepted as a basis for
planning purposes.

(2) Invited Sir Edward Bridges to arrange for the preparation of a detailed
scheme for the establishment of a Commonwealth Relations Office on
the lines suggested in the Committee’s report.

32

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee LB. {47) 29th Meeting , Minutes 4-3

L/POI6/121 : ff 44, 47

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.W.i , on 2 June 1947 at
9 pm were: Mr Attlee {in the Chair), Sir S. Cripps, Mr A. V. Alexander, Viscount
Addison, the Earl of Listowel, Mr C. P. Mayhew, Mr A. G. Bottomley, Mr A.
Henderson, Lord Chorley

Also present were: SirE. Bridges, Sir G. Laithwaite, Sir D. Monteath; Mr S. E. V.
Luke, Mr G. M. Wilson, Mr A. F. Morley {Secretariat)

[Minutes 1-3, regarding Burma, omitted.]

Minute 4

Transfer of Power in India

(Previous Reference: I.B. (47)28^ Meeting, Minute i)1
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for

1 Vol. X, No. 553.

64

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

India (I.B.(47)95)2 covering the text of the announcement to be made in
Parliament on 3rd June on the arrangements for the transfer of power in
India. They also had before them telegram No. 1258-S of 2nd June3 from the
Viceroy reporting on his meeting with the Indian leaders that morning. In this
telegram the Viceroy pointed out that, so far, the position was very satisfactory
and that the Indian leaders had agreed to broadcast after the statement was made
public.

The Committee:

Took note of the position as set out in the memorandum by the Secretary
of State for India (13.(47)95), and the Viceroy's telegram No. 1258-S.

Minute 5

Broadcast by the Prime Minister

the prime minister handed to the members of the Committee a draft of the
broadcast which he proposed to make on 3rd June, immediately before the
broadcast of the Viceroy’s speech.

After discussion, the text of the proposed broadcast was agreed as follows :
[For text of broadcast: see No. 57

2 Not printed; it noted amendments to the proposed announcement made in recent telegrams (see No.
13 and notes thereto) and circulated a revised text incorporating them. L/P&J/10/80: ff 33-48. For
announcement as issued see No. 45.

3 No. 27.

Sir F. Burrows (Bengal) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:

Bengal, Partition of, Part 11(a)

immediate 2 June 1947, 10.50 pm

secret Received: 3 June, 9.30 am

No. 142-S. Your telegram No. 123 7-S of June 1st1 paragraph 3. 1 do not want
to go into Section 93 at all if it can be avoided but in interests of maintaining
order I might be forced into Section 93 position for a short time at all events by
difficulty which I foresee in securing obviously ideal arrangement to manage
partition viz. a Coalition Ministry. As soon as it becomes clear that partition of
Bengal is probable I should expect that the Suhrawardy Ministry will resign
either of its own volition or by Jinnah’s order and in that case I may fmd it
impossible to get Muslim League here to participate in a Coalition. I should
then have to contemplate relying on a Minority Ministry and I should not wish
to do this till after meeting of Legislative Assembly likely to be called in

JUNE I947

65

pursuance of paragraph 7 of today’s state paper,2 as it is not free from doubt
whether meeting would be one at which a vote of no confidence could be
moved (vide my immediately succeeding telegram No. 143-C).3 1 might there¬
fore have to go into Section 93 for a short time almost straight away.

2. As I see it, probable course of action would be as follows : I postulate that
I can only retain a Ministry that will agree to work H.M.G.’s plan of today and
that a Coalition is the ideal to aim at if that plan admits of possibility of parti¬
tion of Bengal.

3. ( a ) If League acquiesces in the scheme offering possibility of partition,
Suhrawardy should be asked at once to form Coalition Ministry to work
scheme out from start in atmosphere of impartiality.

(b) If he fails to form Coalition in reasonable time he must be asked to resign
and if he refuses he must be dismissed. In either alternative Kiran Shankar Roy
must be invited to form a Ministry with Muslim representatives if possible but
otherwise without.

4. If League refuses to work plan involving the possibility of partition
Suhrawardy should be asked to resign and if he refuses he must be dismissed
and Roy must be asked to form a Ministry.

5. If under paragraph 3 (b) or 4 above Roy is invited but fails to form a
Ministry I should have to go into Section 93 for so long as deadlock lasted.

6. Your paragraph No. 5. I regard it as now too late to declare Calcutta a
free City or a City under Joint Control even for some interim period as such a
course if adopted now, instead of avoiding bloodshed, would almost certainly
precipitate it.

1 No. 18. 3 i.e. No. 45.

3 This telegram discussed the question whether a meeting of the Bengal Legislative Assembly sum¬
moned for the limited and extra-constitutional purpose of electing representatives to a Constituent

Assembly, and not including its European members, should be regarded as a formal summoning of

the Bengal Legislative Assembly as such.

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &Jlio/8o: f 29

most immediate India office, 2 June 1947* 10.50 pm

Received: j June , 4.30 am

7132. As question is certain to be asked P.M. and I are anxious to forestall it by
prefacing our reading of statement in either House by saying that plan has

66

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

agreement of parties. At present we have para. 2 of your 125 81 which is very
useful as far as it goes but we should like to know from you after your morning
meeting Tuesday what we can say as to Working Committees also having
accepted plan and about their co-operation in working it successfully and their
attitude to decision to transfer power on Dominion basis.

1 No. 27.

35

Viceroy's Conference Paper V.C.P. 64
LlP&Jlio/8i: ff 396-400

TOP SECRET THE VICEROY^ HOUSE, NEW DELHI, J June 1947

CONGRESS REACTIONS TO H.M.G.’s STATEMENT

Attached is the letter received by The Viceroy from the Congress President at
0015 hours on 3rd June, 1947.

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

6 JANTARMANTAR ROAD, NEW DELHI, 2 June 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,

The Congress Working Committee have considered the statement which
H.M.G. propose to make tomorrow1 and a copy of which you were good
enough to give me this morning.2

2. The proposals contained in this statement are of far reaching importance
and affect the whole future of India. These envisage the possibility of certain
parts of India seceding from the rest.

3. As you know, the Congress has consistently upheld that the unity of
India should be maintained. Ever since its inception, the Congress has worked
towards the realisation of a free and united India. Any proposal, therefore,
which might bring about separation of a part of India from the rest is painful
to contemplate and, in the opinion of the Congress, is harmful to all the parties
concerned. Such a proposal would normally have to be considered by the
All-India Congress Committee. The Working Committee would make its
recommendations to that Committee, but the final decision would rest with the
All-India Congress Committee, or the full session of the Congress itself.

4. We have realised, however, that in the peculiar and abnormal situation of
today it is not possible to delay matters and decisions have to be reached rapidly.
There has been far too much uncertainty in the country and this has led to

JUNE 1947

67

instability and to violence on a large scale. We have also appreciated that the
negotiations that have been going on for some time between you and Indian
leaders had of necessity to be secret.

5. My Committee considered the principles underlying the present pro¬
posals about a month ago and generally accepted them. This acceptance was
conveyed to you in paragraph 12 of the letter dated 1st May 19473 which Shri
Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to you.

6. As we have stated on many occasions, we accepted in its entirety the
Cabinet Mission’s Statement of 16th May 1946 as well as the subsequent
interpretation thereof dated 6th December 1946. We have indeed been acting
in accordance with it and the Constituent Assembly which was formed in
terms of the Cabinet Mission’s Plan has been functioning for nearly six months.
W e are still prepared to adhere to that Plan. In view, however, of subsequent
events and the situation today, we are willing to accept as a variation of that
Plan the proposals now being made.

7. I do not wish to enter into any detailed examination of the proposed
statement of H.M.G. It has been produced after considerable consultation and I
am desired to say by my Committee that we are prepared to accept it and to
recommend to the All-India Congress Committee to do likewise. We do so in
the earnest hope that this will mean a settlement. We feel that the situation in
India, political and economic, as well as communal, demands more than ever a
peaceful approach to all our problems. These problems cannot be solved by
methods of violence, and there can be no submission to such methods.

8. While we are willing to accept the proposals made by H.M.G. , my Com¬
mittee desire to emphasize that they are doing so in order to achieve a final
settlement. This is dependent on the acceptance of the proposals by the Muslim
League and a clear understanding that no further claims will be put forward.
There has been enough misunderstanding in the past and in order to avoid this
in the future it is necessary to have explicit statements in writing in regard to
these proposals.

9. We believe as fully as ever in a united India. The unity we aim at is not
that of compulsion but of friendship and cooperation. We earnestly trust that
when present passions have subsided our problems will be viewed in their
proper perspective and a willing union of all parts of India will result there¬
from.

10. There are some matters, however, to which I should like to draw your
attention. My Committee realise that the proposals being put forward may
result in injury to the Sikhs unless great care is taken and their peculiar position

1 No. 45. 2 See No. 23. 3 Vol. X, No. 267.

68

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

in the Punjab is fully appreciated. We are aware that HMG and you are anxious
to protect all legitimate Sikh interests. The matter will have to be considered by
the Boundary Commission provided for and we earnestly trust that all other
factors, apart from population, will be taken fully into consideration. The
Sikhs have played a vital role in developing a considerable part of the Punjab.
They have been pioneers in the canal areas and have converted by their labours
the desert into the richest part of the Punjab. It has been made clear in the
document that the notional partition is of a purely temporary character and the
final boundaries will be determined by the Boundary Commission.

11. In the last sentence of paragraph 9 it is stated that “until the report of the
Boundary Commission has been put into effect, the provisional boundary as
indicated in the appendix will be used”. It is not quite clear to what this refers
and what the use will be. It is well-known that the notional division ignores
other important factors and that the Sikhs are distressed by it. If any further use
is made of this notional division for administrative or other purposes, this will
inevitably affect the final division and will give rise to a great deal of appre¬
hension in the minds of the Sikhs. We would, therefore, urge you not to apply
that notional division for any administrative purpose during the interim
period. This would be in keeping with the spirit of the document and with
what you conveyed to us this morning.

12. In paragraph 11 of the Statement reference is made to a referendum in
the N.W.F. Province. There has been a growing demand in the Province for
independence and subsequent decision as to their relation with the rest of
India. The referendum should also provide for this.

13. In paragraph 20 of the Statement, which we are told is an addition to the
original draft, the last sentence refers to the right of the Constituent Assemblies
to decide in due course whether or not India or any part of it will remain
within the British Commonwealth. It seems to us extremely undesirable and
likely to lead to friction if the relations of Britain with the Indian Union and the
seceding parts of it are on a differential basis. We should, therefore, like to make
it clear that we cannot be consenting parties to any such development.

14. In view of the importance of the proposals and decisions being made, my
Committee intend to convene a meeting of the All-India Congress Com¬
mittee at an early date. They propose to recommend the acceptance generally
of the Statement of H.M.G. as a settlement of our political and communal
problems.

Yours sincerely,

J. B. KRIPALANI

JUNE 1947

69

36

Viceroy s Conference Paper V.C.P. 63
L/P&Jlio/8i: ff 386-8

TOP SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, J June 1^47

SIKHS ’ REACTIONS TO H.M.G.’s STATEMENT

Attached is a letter received by The Viceroy from the Sikh Leaders on the
morning of 3rd June, 1947.

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

SECRET I BHAGWAN DAS ROAD, NEW DELHI, 2 June 1Q47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have discussed with Sikh leaders the Statement which H.M.G. propose to
make tomorrow,1 a copy of which you were good enough to give me at this
morning’s Conference.2

The proposals in the Statement are of far-reaching character, envisaging the
possibility of a division of India into two sovereign States in both of which the
Sikhs will have vital stakes. As you know, we as a community have always
stood for a United India and all we have desired is that our particular interests
should be adequately safeguarded. The plan now made implies that a sub¬
stantial part of our community may go to the Muslim dominated area, where a
sovereign State based ostensibly on Islamic principles is likely to be established
as conceived by the spokesman of the Muslim League. The Sikhs have been
unable to obtain any coherent and acceptable guarantee of their security in such
a set-up and are therefore unable to contemplate being forced into it against
their will. I have made this clear to you. Recent happenings in the Western
Punjab have further proved that we can expect no security whatever under
Muslim domination.

You will therefore appreciate the anxiety of my community and their
demand that in the event of the division of India as contemplated, the plan
must be so devised as to ensure that Sikhs as a community are not subjected to
irreparable injury.

I must say that judged by this simple test the plan as it stands is far from
satisfactory. My Sikh friends and I, however, do appreciate that the principle
of the partition of the Punjab has been accepted and the anxiety you have
expressed to help the community. There are certain matters in this connection
which I consider it my duty to bring to your notice. These are: —

(i) In para 9, the last sentence of which reads: “Until the report of a

1 No. 45.

2 See No. 23.

70

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Boundary Commission has been put into effect, the provisional boun¬
daries indicated in the appendix will be used” it is not clear what this
refers to and in what respects this boundary is to be used. In this con¬
nection you will remember that in my previous letters, I have insisted
that nothing should be done to prejudice our case before the Boundary
Commission. My fear was that the proposed notional division would
prejudice the final partition of the Province. I now see it has been made
clear that the notional division is purely a temporary arrangement. If,
however, it is used for setting up of Interim Ministries it will embitter
communal relations and prove highly injurious to us, as I have already
explained. Such interim Ministries functioning at the time when the
Boundary Commission is also making its enquiries will make a fair
examination of our case impossible. It is imperative therefore that till
such time as the Boundary Commission has finished its work, no
Interim Ministries in either part of the Punjab should be formed. If,
however, it is considered expedient to form Interim Ministries, the
Eastern Punjab should have in addition to the Divisions of Ambala and
Jullundur, the three districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Lahore in the
Lahore Division.

(ii) The plan suggests that the Boundary Commission will take “other
factors” into consideration when making its enquiries. This is far too
vague. It should be made clear that these other factors include exchange
of population with property and the basis of land revenue paid by
non-Muslims. Special note should also be taken of the religious and
cultural institutions of the Sikhs and the historic role played by them in
the Punjab.

(iii) As the partition of the Province has been necessitated to meet the Sikh
demand clear instructions should be given to the Boundary Commission
to ensure that as large a percentage of Sikh population as possible is
included in the Eastern Punjab.

I should like to bring to your notice that though assurances have been given
to us that we shall have equal rights with the two other major communities
for the safeguard of our communal rights and privileges, nothing tangible has
so far been done to give effect to these assurances. Our community is now in
danger of being riven in two. We have so far not been assured equal rights with
others in either the existing or the proposed new Constituent Assembly. We
request you to see that this is done.

You mentioned during the Conference that in the interests of India, the
Cabinet Delegation Plan of May 16, 1946, was still the best solution. You know
the conditions on which the Sikhs provisionally accepted the Plan and joined
the Constituent Assembly. If the major parties now revert to this Plan, the
Sikhs will be prepared to accept it only if they are given the same right in

JUNE I947

71

communal matters as has been accorded to the other two major communities.

Finally, my Sikh friends and I accept the principle of division as laid down in
the plan with the hope that in order to make it fully acceptable to my com¬
munity, care will be taken to meet the views expressed in this letter when
framing the terms of reference for the Boundary Commission.

Assuring you of my endeavour to help you in solving the difficult problems,
I remain

Yours sincerely,

BALDEV SINGH

37

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, Rfe/ 1/150: f 209

most immediate new Delhi, 3 June 1947, io am

confidential Received : 5 June, 9.10 am

No. 1276-S. Your telegram 7132 of 2nd June.1

2. Reactions of parties are given in my immediately succeeding telegram.
Suggest formula for use of [?in] Parliament should be that Plan, including
offer of Dominion Status, has been favourably received by all three parties.

1 No. 34.

38

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, R/j/ 1/150: fj 227-8

most immediate new Delhi, 3 June 1947, 10 am

secret Received: 3 June, 10.50 am

No. 1227-S. Jinnah saw me for an hour from 11 last night, and I had letters
during the night from the Congress and the Sikhs. All three naturally empha¬
sised points which they did not like, but their conclusions were generally
favourable.

2. In a long letter from Kripalani the operative paragraph reads as follows :

[There J olio ws the text of No. 35, para. 7]

3 . Baldev Singh finishes up :

[There follows the text of the penultimate para, of No. 36 \

72

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

4. Jinnah1 reiterated that he would support me personally and promised to
do his utmost to get the plan accepted. He said his Working Committee were
hopeful that the plan would be accepted by the All-India Muslim League
Council, which meets next Monday, but constitutionally they could not reply
now 011 behalf of the Council.

5. Dominion Status

Jinnah’ s delight was unconcealed. Congress included in their letter the fol¬
lowing point, which I hope to resolve this morning :

[There follows the text of No. 33, para. if\

Repeated to Governors and Governor of Burma.

1 For further accounts of this interview with Mr Jinnah see Nos. 39, 2nd para., 53, para. 6, and 91,
paras. 18-19.

Minutes of the Meeting of the Viceroy with the Indian Leaders , Second Day

HP &J/i oj$i : ff 379-85

CONFIDENTIAL

Those present at this Meeting1 held at The Viceroy's House, New Delhi, on 3 June
1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma, Pandit Nehru,
Sardar Patel, Mr Kripalani, Mr Jinnah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Mr Nishtar, Sardar
Baldev Singh, Lord Ismay, Sir E. Mieville ; Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
(< Secretariat )

His Majesty’s Government’s Statement

his excellency the viceroy handed round copies of an amendment,2
which had been suggested by the Secretary of State for clarification purposes,
to Paragraph 20 of the Statement. There was unanimous agreement with this
amendment.3

Reactions of Working Committees

the viceroy said that he had been very happy and much relieved on receiving
the reports from the party leaders of the reactions of their Committees to the
Statement. Mr. Jinnah had come to see him at 11 o’clock the previous night and
stayed until midnight.4 They had had a long and frank talk, at which Lord
Ismay had also been present; and Mr. Jinnah had explained, to his (The Vice¬
roy’s) satisfaction, the procedure which the Muslim League invariably adopted
on occasions such as the present one — namely that the Working Committee

JUNE I947

73

would meet the All-India Muslim League Council without any formal written
resolution, but with the line which they intended to take clear in their minds.
Mr. Jinnah had given him a personal assurance that he would do all in his
power to persuade the All-India Muslim League Council to accept the Plan as a
settlement in its entirety. Mr. Jinnah had also undertaken to broadcast a per¬
sonal appeal that the Plan should go forward peacefully. The All-India Muslim
League Council was being convened as a matter of urgency for Monday, 9th
June, and would be able to give its formal answer on Tuesday, 10th June.

He hoped that all present at the meeting would agree with him that he had
been right in making up his mind to accept this procedure. He had only done so
after considerable thought and he trusted that everybody would have faith in
him to see the matter through.

his excellency went on to say that Mr. Kripalani, on behalf of Congress,
had written him a letter5 saying that the Congress Working Committee were
prepared to accept the Plan and to recommend to the All-India Congress
Committee to do likewise, mr. kripalani stated that the All-India Congress
Committee would meet in a fortnight’s time, the viceroy stated that Sardar
Baldev Singh had also, in a letter,6 expressed acceptance of the principle of
division as laid down in the Plan.

theviceroy added that all three parties had raised a number of points in the
Plan with which they felt that they could not be in complete agreement. This
was only natural, since had it been otherwise, the present negotiations would
have been unnecessary. A particular point was the Sikh request concerning the
terms of reference of the Boundary Commission. It was not possible to include
details of this kind in the Announcement, but clearly the terms of reference to
the Boundary Commissions would be drawn up in co-operation with all
parties. Everyone would agree that there was a great danger of using
the notional partition of Provinces in such a way as would lead to the supposi¬
tion that it was final. This danger would apply to both sides. It would be
misleading to the inhabitants. He therefore accepted the principle of trying to
avoid using the notional partition, except for voting purposes, and intended to
ask the Governors concerned to work out means of giving the right impres¬
sion.

his excellency said that another question which would arise would be
how to carry on the Government of the Provinces which might be partitioned.
In his opinion it would be best to form Coalition Governments in each. He was

1 See also Nos. 53, paras. 1-5 and 91, paras. 22-23, for Lord Mountbatten’s interview with Pandit

Nehru immediately before this Meeting.

2 See No. 13, note 2.

3 Lord Mountbatten notified Lord Listowel in tel. 315-G.T. of 3 June, 12.30 pm. He added: ‘There

are no repeat no more amendments. This is the last word.’ R/3/1/150: f 231.

♦ See Nos. 38, 53, para. 6, and 91, paras. 18-19.

5 No. 35. 6 No. 36.

74

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

much opposed to Government under Section 93, as were His Majesty’s
Government.

his excellency concluded with the observation that the Plan represented
as near 100% agreement as it was possible to get, and that in his judgement,
what was being done was in the best interests of the people of India.

MR. JINNAH, MR. KRIPALANI and SARDAR BALDEV SINGH all Stated that
they considered that The Viceroy had correctly interpreted and recorded their
views.

Speeches of Recrimination

his excellency the viceroy asked those present at the meeting to request
their subordinate leaders to refrain, from now on, from speeches of recrimina¬
tion which were likely to produce violent reactions. If the past could now be
buried, the prospect of building a fine future, would be opened up.

All those present at the meeting signified concurrence.

Mr Gandhi

MR. liaquat alikhan said that he fully agreed that it might be possible to
control the speeches of subordinate leaders. In addition, however, there should
be a request for restraint on the part of “super leaders” — for example Mr.
Gandhi at his prayer meetings. It was true that Mr. Gandhi preached “non¬
violence”, but that many of his speeches could be taken as an incitement to
violence.

the viceroy said that he had talked to Mr. Gandhi the previous day.7 He
had laid before Mr. Gandhi, very clearly, the steps which had led up to the
present situation. He had pointed out those steps taken as a result of Mr.
Gandhi’s advice; those points on which it had not been possible to follow
his advice; and the reasons for this. Mr. Gandhi’s emotions were those of a man
who had worked, lived and prayed for the unity of India. He (The Viceroy)
thoroughly understood and responded to Mr. Gandhi’s feelings. He had made
clear to Mr. Gandhi the immense effect which the speeches at his prayer meet¬
ings had. It had been Mr. Gandhi’s day of silence but he had written a friendly
note at the meeting. It was to be hoped that he would help the situation. He
always made it very clear that he was not even a 4 anna member of the Congress
Party.

MR. kripalani said that he was surprised at Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan’s
complaint, as all that Mr. Gandhi said was in advocation of non-violence. All
members of Congress held to the idea of a united India. All Mr. Gandhi’s
activities were non-violent.

the viceroy said that he was ready to agree with this if Mr. Gandhi’s
speeches were analysed carefully. But surely the emotion engendered by Mr.
Gandhi, particularly in the more unintelligent people, was to the effect “this
partition is wrong; we must resist it; we must not give in”.

JUNE 1947

75

sardar patel said that he considered that, once the decision was taken, Mr.
Gandhi would accept it loyally.

the viceroy said that he too was sure that Mr. Gandhi would re-empha¬
size the principle of non-violence, whatever the decision might be.

MR. liaquat ali khan pointed out that Mr. Gandhi had recently em¬
ployed words to the effect that the people should not look to the Viceroy and
the leaders for a decision. They were told instead to “do as they felt”. That kind
of statement was bound to give an indication to the people that they should go
ahead on their own lines if they personally felt that India should not be divided.
sardar patel thought that no such inference could be drawn.
mr . jinnah gave his view that, if Mr. Gandhi went on with his present line,
the impression would be created that the people should not submit to what was
being decided by the present conference. He himself did not think that Mr.
Gandhi’s intentions were bad. They might be of the best, but in fact the
language which he had adopted recently had insinuated that the Muslim League
were going to get Pakistan by force, mr. jinnah said that he had deliberately
refrained from criticising Mr. Gandhi in public.

the viceroy said that he thought that this particular subject had now been
ventilated sufficiently. On the one hand he accepted the special position of
Mr. Gandhi ; but on the other he was sure that the Congress Leaders would see
the point of what had been said and use their best endeavours.

The Administrative Consequences of Partition

Copies of a paper entitled “The Administrative Consequences of Partition”,8
were handed round, his excellency the viceroy suggested that there
might now be preliminary consideration of this paper before it was put up to
a Cabinet Meeting. (In using the word “Cabinet” The Viceroy was referring to
the Indian “Cabinet” or Interim Government. This was not realised by Mr.
Jinnah but was cleared up as a result of a question).

mr. liaquat ali khan asked how the Cabinet was concerned with the
questions raised in this paper.

his excellency suggested that this seemed the only sensible procedure. It
was obviously undesirable to set up an ultra vires body outside the Cabinet. He
considered that his own responsibility was to give all possible assistance, backed
up by his own small staff. Delegations and representatives of what were to be
the two new States would have to be brought together to decide the various
points. He emphasized the necessity for speed. Not a day should be wasted.
He, on his part, would continue to draw attention to those points which would
have to be settled and to be of what service he could.

MR. jinnah said that he did not wish to express any definite opinion on this
paper before he had studied it more carefully, but one general principle did

7 No. 24.

8 See No. 28.

7 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

strike him. The proposals would be examined between the parties, but finally
it would be the Cabinet which would decide. Possibly, there would be com¬
plete agreement. On the other hand there might be differences of opinion. He
asked whether the Cabinet would over-rule any points on which there was
agreement, the viceroy said that this was, of course, not the intention, mr.
jinn ah then expressed the view that, if there were points of disagreement, the
Cabinet in the United Kingdom was too far away to be the deciding authority.

It was then explained to Mr. Jinnah that The Viceroy was referring to the
Indian Cabinet or Interim Government, mr. jinnah complained that he had
been misled. “You mean the Viceroy’s Executive Council !” A spade should be
called a spade. His mind worked in constitutional terms.

mr.liaquat alikhan referred to the suggestion on Page 3 of this paper9
that an Inter-Party Partition Committee should be set up, consisting of two
members of the Congress, two of the Muslim League and one minority
representative. He asked how a decision would be taken if there was disagree¬
ment within this Committee. Would a majority vote decide the issue?

his excellency replied that it would not. There would have to be nego¬
tiation on the basis of what was fair. The representatives of what were to be
the two new States would come together with sovereign rights, and meet as an
international conference would meet. He did not want to begin by assuming
that impasses would be reached, but that negotiations would go forward on a
basis of friendship. After the main issue of partition had been finally settled, he
was sure that a new spirit would enter into the discussions.

mr.liaquat alikhan said that he did not think that it was a question of
a new spirit. There were unquestionably likely to be serious differences of
opinion.

his excellency explained that he had put this paper to the present meeting
so that the party leaders, Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Kripalani, could give their views
before it went up to the Interim Government. He suggested that they might all
meet again on the morning of Thursday, 5 th June at 10 a.m. in order to get the
broad principles settled. This suggestion was agreed to.

Finally, mr. jinnah emphasized his view that a machinery would have to
be devised whereby somebody would be empowered to make a definite and
final decision in the event of differences of opinion.

his excellency the viceroy said that he would consider this point
and asked the leaders to do so also.

Division of the Armed Forces

the viceroy then turned to the question of the division of the Armed
Forces. The previous day he had held a conference with the Commander s-in-
Chief and the Army Commanders, and pointed out to them that, if the votes in
the Provinces produced partition, the logical consequence would be the divis-

JUNE I947

77

ion of the Armed Forces; and this would have to take place in such a way as not
so far to weaken the Armed Forces that the maintenance of internal security
would be compromised. All the officers whom he had met had emphasized the
serious danger that the present feeling of uncertainty among the Armed Forces
might have a most damaging effect on their morale. It had therefore been
suggested that Field Marshal Auchinleck should make a broadcast to set their
minds at rest on certain questions, his excellency pointed out that nothing
restored confidence so quickly as taking people into one’s confidence. With
this lord ism ay agreed. There was general agreement that it would be desirable
for Field Marshal Auchinleck to make a broadcast.

his excellency the viceroy said that the sort of question on which
Field Marshal Auchinleck would be able to announce a decision might be
whether the Army was to be divided on a communal or on a territorial
basis.

MR. kripalani pointed out that this was intimately connected with the
question of nationality. With this MR. jinn ah agreed. Fie said that it would be
his intention in Pakistan to observe no communal differences. All those who
lived there, regardless of creed, would be fully-fledged citizens.

MR. kripalani signified that the same principle would apply to their
territory too. the viceroy said that he was sure that this was the right prin¬
ciple. It was after all only elementary justice and common sense. However, the
question of the transfer of citizenship was one which would have to be settled.

the viceroy suggested, and it was agreed, that Sardar Baldev Singh should
circulate a fist of questions on which the Commander-in-Chief would require
guidance, together with suggested answers. This list could be considered at the
meeting on Thursday, 5th June. The following basis might be taken: —

(i) There would be an appeal for discipline in units, and loyalty to their
Command, wherever the units were, and until they were split up and
serving their new countries ;

(ii) The division would be made on the basis of citizenship, which in its turn
would be based on geographical considerations;

(iii) An opportunity might be given to volunteers, if they were now resident
in that part of India in which their community was in a minority, to
transfer their homes and citizenship to the other part.

Sterling Balances

On pandit nehru’s suggestion it was agreed that the Sterling Balances
Delegation should not leave for London on the planned date, his excellency
the viceroy said that he would inform the Secretary of State of this pre-

9 Ibid., para. 5.

78

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

liminary decision by telegram. It should then be confirmed at the Cabinet
Meeting on Friday, 6th June, 1947.10

10 It had been intended that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, with two other Members of the Indian Cabinet,
should lead a delegation to London for negotiations on the question of India’s Sterling Balances.
Following the decision recorded above, the Secretary of State for India was informed by the Vice¬
roy’s tel. 1289-S of 3 June and by the Government of India, Finance Dept’s confirmatory tel. 4446
of 7 June that, in view of the political developments now taking place, it would be impossible for
any Cabinet Member to leave India for the present. In the event, a party of Indian officials visited
London in July to make interim arrangements. L/F/7/2869.

40

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Attlee (via India Office)

Telegram , Rfe/i/ifo: f 238

most immediate new Delhi, 3 June 1947, 1.30 pm

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1282-S. Please pass following to Prime Minister.

1. I informed meeting this morning1 that the replies I had received from all
three leaders indicated that although they did not agree to the plan, as indeed I
had anticipated, they had virtually accepted it. I explained Mr. Jinnah’s diffi¬
culty about it being only a personal assurance, but said I was personally pre¬
pared to accept that assurance.

2. I said that I had authority from H.M.G. to accept any amendments agreed
to by all the leaders but could not accept any others. I therefore did not intend
to discuss at this meeting the various points which each had raised. I asked them
to agree to extend their acceptance to the printed plan as it stood subject to
ratification by the All-India Congress Committee and the All-India Muslim
League Council, meetings of both of which are being called with extreme
urgency. This was accepted and I am going ahead with the broadcast followed
by Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev.

1 No. 39.

JUNE I947

79

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/j/ 1/151: f 255

most immediate new Delhi, 3 June 1947, 2pm

en clair Received: 3 June , 1.50 pm

No. 3 17-GT. At request of Jinnah I am making following small amendment to
my broadcast1 in paragraph 10.

For “predominately Muslim” read “Muslim majority”.

2. If it is necessary to play recorded version2 of my speech in London there is
no need to amend record.

3. Please ensure however that printed copies of broadcast issued to press etc.,
are amended accordingly.

4. This evening’s broadcasts3 will be in the following order.

(a) Viceroy in English.

(b) Announcement in English.

(c) Nehru in English.

(d) Jinnah in English.

(e) Baldev Singh in English.

(f) Translation of Viceroy’s Speech and Announcement.

(g) Nehru in Hindustani.

(h) Translation Jinnah.

(i) Translation Baldev Singh.

1 No. 44.

2 i.e. the recording made by Lord Mountbatten while still in London. In the event, it appears that this
recording was not used; instead the B.B.C. played a recording of the broadcast as relayed from New
Delhi. L/PO/6/124: f 6.

3 Nos. 44-48.

42

Cabinet C.M.[47)5ist Conclusions, Minute 1
L/PO/6/i2i: f 28

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.i , on 3 June at 11 am
were: Mr Attlee [in the chair), Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Ernest Bevin, Mr Arthur
Greenwood, Mr Hugh Dalton, Sir S. Cripps, Mr A. V. Alexander, Viscount
Jowitt, Mr J. Chuter Ede, Viscount Addison, Mr. J Westwood, Mr A. Creech

8o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Jones , the Earl of Lis towel, Mr G. A. Isaacs , Mr E. Shinwell , Mr Aneurin Bevan ,
Mr T. Williams, Mr George Tomlinson, Lord Inman
Also present were: Viscount Hall, Mr F. J. Bellenger, Mr P. J. Noel-Baker, Mr

INDIA

Constitutional Position

(Previous Reference: C.M.(47)50th Conclusions)1

the prime minister informed the Cabinet that the Viceroy had reported2
that the plan for the transfer of power in India had been favourably received by
the leaders of the three political parties.

The Cabinet: —

Invited the Prime Minister to convey to the Viceroy on their behalf a
message of congratulation on the successful outcome of his negotiations.

1 Vol. X, No. 521. 2 See Nos. 37 and 40.

Minutes of the Meeting of the Viceroy with Members of the States

Negotiating Committee1
L/P&Jlio/Suff 389-95

CONFIDENTIAL

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy s House, New Delhi, on 3 June
ig47 were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, the Nawab of Bhopal,
the Maharaja of Patiala, the Maharawal of Dungarpur, the Maharaja Jam Saheb of
Nawanagar, the Raja ofBilaspur, Sir Mirza Ismail, SirB. L. Mitter, Sir R. Mudaliar,
Rai Bahadur Ramchandra Kak, Mr M. A. Srinivasan, Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar,
Sir V. T. Krishnamachari, Sardar K. M. Panikkar, Sir Sultan Ahmed, Sardar D. K.
Sen, Mir Maqbool Mahmood, Lord Ismay, Sir C. Corfield, Sir E. Mieville; Lieu¬
tenant-Colonel Erskine Crum ( Secretariat )

His Excellency’s Opening Remarks

his excellency the viceroy said that, although the negotiations which he
had been holding with the political leaders of British India in no way altered
the Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum of 12th May, 1946, 2 the outcome of these
negotiations could but have a certain effect on the position of the States. There¬
fore, he was anxious to report to representatives of the States, in person, the
way in which these negotiations had been carried out and how the Plan had
been devised. The Plan had now been broadly accepted by the Indian Leaders

JUNE 1947

8l

themselves. He was going to make a broadcast that evening, followed by Pandit
Nehru, Mr. Jinnah and Sardar Baldev Singh.

Account of Negotiations

his excellency said that it was not until he first arrived in India as Viceroy
that he realised that a speedy decision was required above all. There had been
no indication in London, before he left to take up the appointment of Viceroy,
of a need for urgency. He had been told there that it would be soon enough if
legislation was introduced at the beginning of 1948. However, since his arrival
he had acted as quickly as possible. He had tried first to get the Cabinet Mission
Plan accepted because he sincerely believed that that Plan was the best for the
future of India; and because, in his opinion, it was fairest to the States as it gave
them an opportunity of joining the sort of Centre which they could most
easily accept. It had proved impossible to obtain agreement on the Cabinet
Mission’s Plan — and the essence of that Plan was agreement. It could not be
imposed, the viceroy said that he had then started to find out what views the
different parties had in common. Mr. Jinnah wanted Pakistan. His prescription
for this was “a surgical operation”. He (The Viceroy) had tried to persuade
Congress that it was valueless for them to have, in their own territories, a large
section of the population which was bitterly hostile to them. This would only
be embarrassing to their own development. Congress had come round to the
view that they would accept Pakistan on the condition that no large non-
Muslim areas were forced into it. This involved the partition of the Punjab and
Bengal, the viceroy explained that he was as much opposed to the partition
of Provinces as he was to the partition of India as a whole. It would be a retro¬
grade step, but nobody who had seen the communal bitterness prevalent in the
country with riot, bloodshed, massacre and torture could believe that this
strong feeling could be healed. It was no good appealing to logic or reason. The
only way whereby the peoples of India could eventually live together would be
to split them now and start afresh.

the viceroy said that he was so bitterly opposed to any form of partition
that he had refused to take the responsibility for such a decision himself. He had
recommended to H.M.G. that the responsibility should be placed on the
shoulders of the people of India. It was unfortunately impracticable to hold a
plebiscite all over the country; but, in view of the special circumstances, there
would be plebiscites in the N.W.F.P. and Sylhet.

his excellency went on to say that both parties, particularly Congress,
had declared their desire for the transfer of power to take place as soon as
possible. Moreover, his own position at the present time was one of responsi-

1 Lord Mountbatten sent Lord Listowel a summary of this meeting in tel. 1294-S of 4 June 1947.

L/P&J/10/81: f 359.

^ Vol. VII, No. 262.

82

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

bility without the authority to fulfil it. His first idea had been to transfer power
before June 1948, on the basis of complete independence, but this was out of the
question as it would mean handing over to Units without Constitutions. The
only way in fact that power could be handed over in the immediate future was
on the basis of the 1935 Act with Dominion status. This solved many problems.
For example, the British would be enabled to remain as the servants of India for
so long as they were wanted.

his excellency then gave an account of his recent visit to London. He
emphasized that he had found the utmost goodwill in England towards India.
The main result of his visit had been that it had been decided to pass legislation
through Parliament this session. For this object the support of the Opposition
had been obtained.

his excellency stressed particularly the difficulties of dividing the Armed
Forces, especially from the morale viewpoint. He said that Field Marshal
Auchinleck was going to broadcast on this subject during the next few days.

He went on to state that the main consequences of the new Plan on the States
would be twofold. First, it was improbable that the two new Dominions
would have such loose Centres as that at present envisaged by the existing
Constituent Assembly. Secondly, the fact that two separate Dominions were to
be voluntarily accepted into the Commonwealth would, he hoped, represent a
measure of compensation to the States who were the old allies and friends of
Britain.

his excellency explained that he had that day put before the Indian
political leaders a proposal that power should be demitted on 15th August
(this was, of course, a secret and the date should not be repeated). It meant that
the leaders themselves would have to work night and day, but he felt that it
was in their own interests not to delay.

Copies of His Majesty’s Government’s statement,3 to be made later that day,
were then handed round the meeting.

The lapse of Paramountcy

sirc. p. ramaswami aiyar said that he wished to appeal to His Excellency
that paramountcy should be loosened or allowed to lapse in advance of the date
of the transfer of power. Such a course would enable the States to negotiate on
equal terms with the prospective Governments of the two Dominions. He felt
that there might be States which were not likely to join up with either Domin¬
ion. It was even more essential for the bargaining powers of these to be im-

his excellency the viceroy said that, in his opinion, the fact that
paramountcy was about to lapse made possible negotiations by the States on a
basis of complete freedom, even at the present time. His instructions were that
paramountcy should lapse on the transfer of power. He would, however,

JUNE 1947

83

consider the premature lapse of paramountcy in special cases if it could be
proved to him that its continuation constituted a handicap to negotiation.

sir conrad corfield gave his opinion that a number of States would be
glad to see paramountcy continue to function until the transfer, even though it
was relaxed before that date, the nawab of bhopal confirmed this view
subject to any opinion expressed by the Standing Committee of the Chamber.
sir conrad corfield pointed out that paramountcy was already in process
of retraction.

Economic and Commercial Agreements, Claims

and Contracts

sir b. l. mitter asked what would happen to economic and commercial
agreements when paramountcy lapsed, his excellency the viceroy said
that, in order that there might be no administrative vacuum, interim arrange¬
ments would be required for the period between the lapse of paramountcy and
the conclusion of fresh or modified agreements. These interim arrangements
could best be made on a stand-still basis with such modifications as were
necessitated by the reversion to the States of the rights surrendered by them to
the Crown. I11 negotiating these interim arrangements, he and the Political
Department would give all the assistance they could during the short remaining

the nawab of bhopal said that, apart from negotiations in regard to
agreements, there were also certain claims which would have to be settled in
advance of the lapse of paramountcy. He suggested that an ad hoc organisation
should be set up to deal with these, sir ramaswami mudaliar pointed out
that the need for agreement to be reached in all these matters was as essential
from the point of view of the two new Dominions as from that of the States.

sir conrad corfield gave some examples of the way in which interim
arrangements on a stand-still basis could be made. He said that, when the
Central Government had decided to abolish the salt duty, they had also decided
to continue to observe the terms of existing agreements and to make payments
due under these agreements until such time as new agreements were made.
That was an example of standstill interim arrangements. He next exampled
Posts and Telegraphs. When paramountcy lapsed, the States would be free, for
example, to imprison the Postmaster of an Imperial Post Office. If they did so,
however, they would run the risk of cutting themselves off from All-India
communications, so they would presumably agree to treat Post Offices with
sufficient consideration to ensure their continued functioning. Another example
was Railways and Cantonments in Indian States, where the Crown Representa¬
tive had at present the powers ofjurisdiction. These powers would revert to the
States on the lapse of paramountcy. Efforts were being made to persuade the

3 No. 45.

84

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Interim Government to negotiate arrangements whereby the reversion of
jurisdiction would not affect the working of the Railway and the accommoda¬
tion of the Indian Army pending the conclusion of fresh agreements, sir
conrad c orfield said that he was not clear to what claims the Nawab of
Bhopal referred. Claims arising out of the lapse of paramountcy would be a
matter of negotiation, and any decisions by the Crown Representative in such
matters would have no sanction behind them after the lapse of paramountcy.

sir c. p. ramaswami aiyar pointed out that there were a certain number
of agreements into which the States had entered which were not with the
Crown Representative. He suggested that it would be necessary for machinery
to be set up to deal with these, sir conrad corfield said that efforts had
been made to establish an All-India Consultative Committee for such purposes,
but the Interim Government had not agreed to this. He stated that existing
contractual agreements would be a matter for discussion with the opposite
party. There had already been a number of conferences with the relevant
Departments of the Central Government, regarding ‘paramountcy’ agree¬
ments. He had explained to these Departments that jurisdiction was about to
return to the States and had suggested that they should make interim arrange¬
ments based on that assumption. He understood that the Viceroy was going to
explain the matter to the Cabinet.

sir v. t. krishnamachari advocated the necessity for machinery for
joint consultation in regard to existing agreements, sir conrad corfield
said that efforts had been made to find a formula which would embody a
general stand-still agreement. If these were successful joint consultation for
fresh agreements could be arranged either within each Constituent Assembly or
by ad hoc negotiating committees.

Relations between the States and the two new Dominions

the raja of BiLASPUR asked whether the entry of States into either Domin¬
ion Constituent Assembly was a matter of free choice. This the viceroy
confirmed, the raja of bilaspur then asked whether Constitutions were
likely to be drafted by the respective Constituent Assemblies before or after the
lapse of paramountcy. his excellency replied that the broad outlines of the
Constitution drafted by the existing Constituent Assembly for Hindustan were
likely to be ready before that date. In the case of the Pakistan Constituent
Assembly, he believed that Mr. Jinnah had been working on Heads of a
Constitution, but these would probably only be a guide and nothing concrete
would have appeared before the lapse of paramountcy. In any case para¬
mountcy would lapse as soon as the new self-governing Dominions came into
being: these would be set up under the 1935 Act (amended for this purpose).

the raja of bilaspur then asked what was likely to happen to States which
decided to join neither Constituent Assembly. Did His Majesty’s Government

JUNE 1947

85

envisage further relations with them? his excellency the viceroy stated
that, until it was known what shape the two Dominions would take, this was a
hypothetical question which he was not prepared, at the present stage, to refer
to His Majesty s Government; but it was clear that the first step should be for
these States to enter into practical negotiations for administrative arrangements
with one or other or perhaps both of the successor Dominion Governments of
British India. Whether a State actually joined either Dominion or not, it was
obvious for geographical and economic reasons that such arrangements would
be essential.

In answer to a further question, his excellency the viceroy said that
it was intended to recommend to the respective Dominions that their Con¬
stituent Assemblies should act as their Parliaments. The existing Legislative
Assembly would presumably be abolished; but he was not prepared to state
whether the new Governments would in fact make these decisions.

s 1 r r a m A sw ami mudaliar asked whether, in the event of the Constituent
Assemblies ta king over legislative functions, the States’ representatives could
withdraw from them for legislative purposes and remain only for Constitution
making, his excellency the viceroy said that the States were not
committed one way or the other on this point. He emphasized that the question
of any new functions for the Constituent Assemblies was still only in the pro¬
posal stage.

the viceroy enquired regarding the desirability of the States Negotiating
Committee remaining in being so that, during the next two and a half months,
a body would be available to consider the various broad principles of the
problems which were bound to arise. Perhaps it would be better to call the
States Negotiating Committee by another name.

sir c. p. ramaswami aiyar said that there was a practical difficulty in this
suggestion. Such a Committee had been suggested to the Interim Government
but the objection had been raised that the present States Negotiating Com¬
mittee was unrepresentative as the States people were not represented on it.
While all the members present were ready and willing to place their experience
at the disposal of the Viceroy, the reactions of the rulers of the two Dominions,
which it was proposed to set up, should first be ascertained.

the vi ceroy pointed out that the greater demand would be for a committee
of representatives of those States which were likely to adhere to the Hindustan
Constituent Assembly. Perhaps two Committees might be set up; one to
consider negotiations with each Constituent Assembly.

With this view there was general agreement — on the condition that the
Interim Government agreed to such proposals, thenawabof bhopal said
that he would put up the suggestion before the Standing Committee of the
Chamber of Princes and inform the Viceroy of their opinions.

Finally, the viceroy said that, whereas he did not wish to give any official

86

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

advice on what steps should be taken by States which were doubtful of whether
or not to join either Constituent Assembly, he would be willing to give
personal advice to anybody who came and asked him for it. He had one sug¬
gestion to make now. This was that, in coming to their decisions, the represen¬
tatives of the States should cast their minds forward ten years and consider what
the situation in the country and in the world as a whole was likely to be at that
time.

44

Text of Broadcast by Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma on 3 June 1947

at 7 pm I.S.T. 1

Rfe/i/ifo: f 232

A statement2 will be read to you tonight giving the final decision of His
Majesty’s Government as to the method by which power will be transferred
from British to Indian hands. But before this happens, I want to give a personal
message to the people of India, as well as a short account of the discussions
which I have held with the Leaders of the political parties and which have led
up to the advice I tendered to His Majesty’s Government during my recent
visit to London.

Since my arrival in India at the end of March I have spent almost every
day in consultation with as many of the leaders and representatives of as
many communities and interests as possible. I wish to say how grateful I am
for all the information and helpful advice they have given me.

Nothing I have seen or heard in the past few weeks has shaken my firm
opinion that with a reasonable measure of goodwill between the communities
a unified India would be by far the best solution of the problem.

For more than a hundred years 400 millions of you have lived together
and this country has been administered as a single entity. This has resulted in
unified communications, defence, postal services and currency; an absence
of tariffs and customs barriers; and the basis for an integrated political economy.
My great hope was that communal differences would not destroy all this.

My first course, in all my discussions, was therefore to urge the political
leaders to accept unreservedly the Cabinet Mission plan of 16th May 1946.
In my opinion, that plan provides the best arrangement that can be devised
to meet the interests of all the communities of India. To my great regret it
has been impossible to obtain agreement either on the Cabinet Mission plan,
or on any other plan that would preserve the unity of India. But there can be
no question of coercing any large areas in which one community has a majority,

JUNE I947

87

to live against their will under a Government in which another community
has a majority. And the only alternative to coercion is partition.

But when the Muslim League demanded the partition of India, Congress
used the same arguments for demanding in that event the partition of certain
Provinces. To my mind this argument is unassailable. In fact neither side
proved willing to leave a substantial area in which their community have a
majority under the Government of the other. I am, of course, just as much
opposed to the partition of Provinces as I am to the partition of India herself
and for the same basic reasons.

For just as I feel there is an Indian consciousness which should transcend
communal differences so I feel there is a Punjabi and Bengali consciousness
which has evoked a loyalty to their Province.

And so I felt it was essential that the people of India themselves should
decide this question of partition.

The procedure for enabling them to decide for themselves whether they want
the British to hand over power to one or two Governments is set out in the
statement which will be read to you. But there are one or two points on
which I should like to add a note of explanation.

It was necessary in order to ascertain the will of the people of the Punjab,
Bengal and part of Assam to lay down boundaries between the Muslim
majority areas and the remaining areas, but I want to make it clear that the
ultimate boundaries will be settled by a Boundary Commission and will almost
certainly not be identical with those which have been provisionally adopted.

We have given careful consideration to the position of the Sikhs. This
valiant community forms about an eighth of the population of the Punjab,
but they are so distributed that any partition of this Province will inevitably
divide them. All of us who have the good of the Sikh community at heart
are very sorry to think that the partition of the Punjab, which they them¬
selves desire, cannot avoid splitting them to a greater or lesser extent. The
exact degree of the split will be left to the Boundary Commission on which
they will of course be represented.

The whole plan may not be perfect; but like all plans, its success will depend
on the spirit of goodwill with which it is carried out. I have always felt that
once it was decided in what way to transfer power the transfer should take
place at the earliest possible moment, but the dilemma was that if we waited
until a constitutional set-up for all India was agreed, we should have to wait
a long time, particularly if partition were decided on. Whereas if we handed
over power before the Constituent Assemblies had finished their work we
should leave the country without a Constitution. The solution to this dilemma,
which I put forward, is that His Majesty’s Government should transfer power

1 Indian Standard Time. It was 3.30 pm in the United Kingdom (Double British Summer Time).

2 No. 45.

88

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

now to one or two Governments of British India each having Dominion
Status as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made. This I hope will be
within the next few months. I am glad to announce that His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment have accepted this proposal and are already having legislation prepared
for introduction in Parliament this session. As a result of these decisions the
special function of the India Office will no longer have to be carried out, and
some other machinery will be set up to conduct future relations between His
Majesty’s Government and India.

I wish to emphasise that this legislation will not impose any restriction on the
power of India as a whole, or of the two States if there is partition, to decide in
the future their relationship to each other and to other member States of the
British Commonwealth.

Thus the way is now open to an arrangement by which power can be trans¬
ferred many months earlier than the most optimistic of us thought possible,
and at the same time leave it to the people of British India to decide for them¬
selves on their future, which is the declared policy of His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment.

I have made no mention of the Indian States, since the new decisions of
His Majesty’s Government are concerned with the transfer of power in
British India.

If the transfer of power is to be effected in a peaceful and orderly manner,
every single one of us must bend all his efforts to the task. This is no time
for bickering, much less for the continuation in any shape or form of the
disorders and lawlessness of the past few months. Do not forget what a narrow
margin of food we are all working on. We cannot afford any toleration of
violence. All of us are agreed on that.

Whichever way the decision of the Indian people may go, I feel sure any
British officials or officers who may be asked to remain for a while will do
everything in their power to help implement that decision. His Majesty as
well as his Government have asked me to convey to all of you in India their
sincere good wishes for your future and the assurance of their continued
goodwill.

I have faith in the future of India and am proud to be with you all at this
momentous time. May your decisions be wisely guided and may they be
carried out in the peaceful and friendly spirit of the Gandhi-Jinnah appeal.3

3 Vol. X, No. 152.

JUNE 1947

89

Statement of 3 June 1947 [as published)1

Cmd. 7136
Indian Policy

INTRODUCTION

1. On 20th February, 1947, 2 His Majesty’s Government announced their
intention of transferring power in British India to Indian hands by June
1948. His Majesty’s Government had hoped that it would be possible for
the major parties to co-operate in the working-out of the Cabinet Mission’s
Plan of 1 6th May, 1946, 3 and evolve for India a constitution acceptable to all
concerned. This hope has not been fulfilled.

2. The majority of the representatives of the Provinces of Madras, Bombay,
the United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces and Berar, Assam, Orissa
and the North-West Frontier Province, and the representatives of Delhi,
Ajmer-Merwara and Coorg have already made progress in the task of evolving
a new Constitution. On the other hand, the Muslim League Party, including
in it a majority of the representatives of Bengal, the Punjab and Sind, as also
the representative of British Baluchistan, has decided not to participate in the
Constituent Assembly.

3. It has always been the desire of His Majesty’s Government that power
should be transferred in accordance with the wishes of the Indian people
themselves. This task would have been greatly facilitated if there had been
agreement among the Indian political parties. In the absence of such an agree¬
ment, the task of devising a method by which the wishes of the Indian people
can be ascertained has devolved on His Majesty’s Government. After full
consultation with political leaders in India, His Majesty’s Government have
decided to adopt for this purpose the plan set out below. His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment wish to make it clear that they have no intention of attempting to frame
any ultimate Constitution for India; this is a matter for the Indians themselves.
Nor is there anything in this plan to preclude negotiations between communi¬
ties for an united India.

THE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED

4. It is not the intention of His Majesty’s Government to interrupt the work

1 This statement was made by Mr Attlee in the House of Commons and by the Earl of Listowel in the
House of Lords at 3.30 pm (Double British Summer Time) and was published in India at the same
time.

2 Vol. IX, No. 438. 3 Vol. VII, No. 303.

90

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

of the existing Constituent Assembly. Now that provision is made for certain
Provinces specified below, His Majesty’s Government trust that, as a con¬
sequence of this announcement, the Muslim League representatives of those
Provinces, a majority of whose representatives are already participating in it,
will now take their due share in its labours. At the same time, it is clear that
any Constitution framed by this Assembly cannot apply to those parts of the
country which are unwilling to accept it. His Majesty’s Government are
satisfied that the procedure outlined below embodies the best practical method
of ascertaining the wishes of the people of such areas on the issue whether their
Constitution is to be framed —

(a) in the existing Constituent Assembly; or

(b) in a new and separate Constituent Assembly consisting of the represen¬
tatives of those areas which decide not to participate in the existing
Constituent Assembly.

When this has been done, it will be possible to determine the authority or
authorities to whom power should be transferred.

BENGAL AND THE PUNJAB

5. The Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab (excluding
the European members) will therefore each be asked to meet in two parts,
one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other the rest of the
Province. For the purpose of determining the population of districts, the
1941 census figures will be taken as authoritative. The Muslim majority
districts in these two Provinces are set out in the Appendix to this Announce¬
ment.

6. The members of the two parts of each Legislative Assembly sitting
separately will be empowered to vote whether or not the Province should
be partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decides in favour of partition,
division will take place and arrangements will be made accordingly.

7. Before the question as to the partition is decided, it is desirable that
the representatives of each part should know in advance which Constituent
Assembly the Province as a whole would join in the event of the two parts
subsequently deciding to remain united. Therefore, if any member of either
Legislative Assembly so demands, there shall be held a meeting of all members
of the Legislative Assembly (other than Europeans) at which a decision will
be taken on the issue as to which Constituent Assembly the Province as a whole
wou Idj oin if it were decided by the two parts to remain united.

8. In the event of partition being decided upon, each part of the Legis¬
lative Assembly will, on behalf of the areas they represent, decide which of
the alternatives in paragraph 4 above to adopt.

JUNE 1947

91

9. For the immediate purpose of deciding on the issue of partition, the
members of the Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab will sit
in two parts according to Muslim majority districts (as laid down in the
Appendix) and non-Muslim majority districts. This is only a preliminary
step of a purely temporary nature as it is evident that for the purposes of
final partition of these Provinces a detailed investigation of boundary questions
will be needed ; and, as soon as a decision involving partition has been taken for
either Province, a Boundary Commission will be set up by the Governor-
General, the membership and terms of reference of which will be settled in
consultation with those concerned. It will be instructed to demarcate the
boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the
contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. It will also be in¬
structed to take into account other factors. Similar instructions will be given
to the Bengal Boundary Commission. Until the report of a Boundary Com¬
mission has been put into effect, the provisional boundaries indicated in the
Appendix will be used.

SIND

10. The Legislative Assembly of Sind (excluding the European members)
will at a special meeting also take its own decision on the alternatives in
paragraph 4 above.

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

11. The position of the North-West Frontier Province is exceptional. Two of
the three representatives of this Province are already participating in the
existing Constituent Assembly. But it is clear, in view of its geographical
situation, and other considerations, that, if the whole or any part of the Punjab
decides not to join the existing Constituent Assembly, it will be necessary to
give the North-West Frontier Province an opportunity to reconsider its
position. Accordingly, in such an event, a referendum will be made to the
electors of the present Legislative Assembly in the North-West Frontier
Province to choose which of the alternatives mentioned in paragraph 4 above
they wish to adopt. The referendum will be held under the aegis of the Gover¬
nor-General and in consultation with the Provincial Government.

BRITISH BALUCHISTAN

12. British Baluchistan has elected a member but he has not taken his seat in
the existing Constituent Assembly. In view of its geographical situation, this
Province will also be given an opportunity to reconsider its position and to
choose which of the alternatives in paragraph 4 above to adopt. His Excellency
the Governor-General is examining how this can most appropriately be done.

92

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

ASSAM

13. Though Assam is predominantly a non-Muslim Province, the district of
Sylhet which is contiguous to Bengal is predominately Muslim. There has
been a demand that, in the event of the partition of Bengal, Sylhet should be
amalgamated with the Muslim part of Bengal. Accordingly, if it is decided that
Bengal should be partitioned, a referendum will be held in Sylhet district,
under the aegis of the Governor-General and in consultation with the Assam
Provincial Government, to decide whether the district of Sylhet should con¬
tinue to form part of the Assam Province or should be amalgamated with the
new Province of Eastern Bengal, if that Province agrees. If the referendum
results in favour of amalgamation with Eastern Bengal, a Boundary Com¬
mission w ith terms of reference similar to those for the Punjab and Bengal will
be set up to demarcate the Muslim majority areas of Sylhet district and con¬
tiguous Muslim majority areas of adjoining districts, which will then be
transferred to Eastern Bengal. The rest of the Assam Province will in any case
continue to participate in the proceedings of the existing Constituent Assembly.

REPRESENTATION IN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES

14. If it is decided that Bengal and the Punjab should be partitioned, it will be
necessary to hold fresh elections to choose their representatives on the scale of
one for every million of population according to the principle contained in the
Cabinet Mission's Plan of 16th May, 1946. Similar elections will also have to be
held for Sylhet in the event of its being decided that this district should form
part of East Bengal. The number of representatives to which each area would be
entitled is as follows : —

Province

General

Muslims

Sikhs

Total

Sylhet District

1

2

Nil

3

West Bengal . .

15

4

Nil

19

East Bengal . .

12

29

Nil

4i

West Punjab . .

3

12

2

17

East Punjab . .

6

4

2

12

15. In accordance with the mandates given to them, the representatives
of the various areas will either join the existing Constituent Assembly or form
the new Constituent Assembly.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

16. Negotiations will have to be initiated as soon as possible on administrative
consequences of any partition that may have been decided upon : —

(a) Between the representatives of the respective successor authorities
about all subjects now dealt with by the Central Government, including
Defence, Finance and Communications.

JUNE I947

93

(b) Between different successor authorities and His Majesty’s Government
for treaties in regard to matters arising out of the transfer of power.

(c) In the case of Provinces that may be partitioned as to administration of all
provincial subjects such as the division of assets and liabilities, the police
and other services, the High Courts, provincial institutions, &c.

THE TRIBES OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

17. Agreements with tribes of the North-West Frontier of India will have to
be negotiated by the appropriate successor authority.

THE STATES

18. His Majesty’s Government wish to make it clear that the decisions
announced above relate only to British India and that their policy towards
Indian States contained in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12th May,
1 946, 4 remains unchanged.

NECESSITY FOR SPEED

19. In order that the successor authorities may have time to prepare themselves
to take over power, it is important that all the above processes should be
completed as quickly as possible. To avoid delay, the different Provinces or
parts of Provinces will proceed independently as far as practicable within the
conditions of this Plan, the existing Constituent Assembly and the new Con¬
stituent Assembly (if formed) will proceed to frame Constitutions for their
respective territories : they will of course be free to frame their own rules.

IMMEDIATE TRANSFER OF POWER

20. The major political parties have repeatedly emphasised their desire that
there should be the earliest possible transfer of power in India. With this
desire His Majesty’s Government are in full sympathy, and they are willing
to anticipate the date of June 1948, for the handing over of power by the setting
up of an independent Indian Government or Governments at an even earlier
date. Accordingly, as the most expeditious, and indeed the only practicable,
way of meeting this desire His Majesty’s Government propose to introduce
legislation during the current session for the transfer of power this year on a
Dominion status basis to one or two successor authorities according to the
decisions taken as a result of this announcement. This will be without prejudice
to the right of Indian Constituent Assemblies to decide in due course whether
or not the part of India in respect of which they have authority will remain
within the British Commonwealth.

FURTHER ANNOUNCEMENTS BY GOVERNOR-GENERAL

21. His Excellency the Governor-General will from time to time make such
4 Vol. VII, No. 262.

94

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

further announcements as may be necessary in regard to procedure or any other
matters for carrying out the above arrangements.

APPENDIX

Muslim Majority Districts of Bengal and the Punjab

according

i. Bengal

Chittagong Division
Chittagong.
Noakhali.

Tippera.

Dacca Division
Bakarganj.

Dacca.

Faridpur.

Mymensingh.

Presidency Division
Jessore.
Murshidabad.
Nadia.

o the 1941 Census

2. The Punjab

Lahore Division
Gujranwala.
Gurdaspur.
Lahore.
Sheikhupura.
Sialkot.

Rawalpindi Division
Attock.

Gujrat.

Jhelum.

Mianwali.

Rawalpindi.

Shahpur.

Rajshahi Division
Bogra.
Dinajpur.
Malda.

Pabna.

Rajshahi.

Rangpur.

Multan Division
Dera Ghazi Khan.
Jhang.

Lyallpur.

Montgomery.

Multan.

Muzaffargarh.

46

Text of Broadcast by Pandit Nehru on 3 June 1947

L/P&Jliol 81 : f 363

Friends and comrades, nearly nine months ago, soon after my assumption of
office, I spoke to you from this place.1 I told you then that we were on the
march and the goal had still to be reached. There were many difficulties and
obstacles on the way, and our journey’s end might not be near, for that end

JUNE 1947

95

was not the assumption of office in the Government of India, but the achieve¬
ment of the full independence of India and the establishment of a cooperative
Commonwealth in which all will be equal sharers in opportunity and in all
things that give meaning and value to life.

Nine months have passed, months of trial and difficulty, of anxiety and
sometimes even of heartbreak. Yet, looking back at this period with its suf¬
fering and sorrow for our people there is much on the credit side also for India
has advanced nationally and internationally, and is respected today in the
councils of the world.

In the domestic sphere something substantial has been achieved though the
burden on the common man still continues to be terribly heavy and millions
lack food and clothes and other necessaries of life. Many vast schemes of
development are nearly ready, and yet it is true that most of our dreams about
the brave things we were going to accomplish have still to be realised. You
know well the difficulties which the country has had to face — economic,
political and communal.

These months have been full of tragedy for millions and the burden on those
who have the government of the country in their hands has been great indeed.
My mind is heavy with the thought of the sufferings of our people in the areas
of disturbance, the thousands who are dead and those, especially our women¬
folk, who have suffered agony worse than death. To their families and to
innumerable people who have been uprooted from their homes and rendered
destitute, I offer my deep sympathy and assurance that we shall do all in our
power to bring relief. We must see to it that such tragedies do not happen again.
At no time have we lost faith in the great destiny of India which takes shape
even though with struggle and suffering. My great regret has been that during
this period owing to excess of work I have been unable to visit the numerous
towns and villages of India as I used to do to meet my people and to learn their
troubles at first hand.

Today, I am speaking to you on another historic occasion when a vital
change affecting the future of India is proposed. You have just heard an an¬
nouncement on behalf of the British Government. This announcement lays
down a procedure for self-determination in certain areas of India. It envisages
on the one hand the possibility of these areas seceding from India; on the other
it promises a big advance towards complete independence. Such a big change
must have the full concurrence of the people before effect can be given to it, for
it must always be remembered that the future of India can only be decided by
the people of India and not by any outside authority, however friendly.

These proposals will be placed soon before representative assemblies of the
people for consideration. But meanwhile the sands of time run out and decis-

1 On 7 September 1946. Printed in Independence and After: A collection of the more important speeches of
Jawaharlal Nehru from September 1946 to May 1949 (New Delhi, Govt of India, 1949), pp 339-43.

96

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

ions cannot await the normal course of events. While we must necessarily
abide by what the people finally decide we have to come to certain decisions
ourselves and recommend them to the people for acceptance. We have,
therefore, decided to accept these proposals and to recommend to our larger
committees that they do likewise.

It is with no joy in my heart that I commend these proposals to you, though
I have no doubt in my mind that this is the right course. For generations we
have dreamt and struggled for a free and independent united India. The
proposals to allow certain parts to secede, if they so will, is painful for any of us
to contemplate. Nevertheless, I am convinced that our present decision is the
right one even from the larger viewpoint.

The united India that we have laboured for was not one of compulsion and
coercion, but a free and willing association of a free people. It may be that in
this way we shall reach that united India sooner than otherwise and that she will
have a stronger and more secure foundation. We are little men serving great
causes, but because the cause is great, something of that greatness falls upon us
also. Mighty forces are at work in the world today and in India, and I have no
doubt that we are ushering in a period of greatness for India. The India of
geography, of history and traditions, the India of our minds and hearts cannot
change. On this historic occasion each one of us must pray that he might be
guided aright in the service of the motherland and of humanity at large.

We stand on a watershed dividing the past from the future. Let us bury that
past in so far as it is dead and forget all bitterness and recrimination. Let there be
moderation in speech and writing. Let there be strength and perseverance in
adhering to the cause and the ideals we have at heart. Let us face the future not
with easy optimism or with any complacency or weakness, but with confidence
and a firm faith in India. There has been violence — shameful, degrading and
revolting violence-— in various parts of the country. This must end. We are
determined to end it. We must make it clear that political ends are not to be
achieved by methods of violence now or in the future.

On this the eve of great changes in India we have to make a fresh start with
clear vision and a firm mind, with steadfastness and tolerance and a stout heart.
We should not wish ill to anyone, but think always of every Indian as our
brother and comrade. The good of the 400,000,000 of India must be our
supreme objective. We shall seek to build anew our relations with England on a
friendly and cooperative basis, forgetting the past which has lain so heavily
upon us. I should like to express on this occasion my deep appreciation of the
labours of the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, ever since his arrival here at a
critical juncture in our history.

Inevitably on every occasion of [crisis and difficulty we think of]2 our great
leader, Mahatma Gandhi, who has led us unfalteringly for over a generation
through darkness and sorrow, to the threshold of our freedom, to him we once

JUNE I947

97

more pay our homage. His blessing and wise counsel will happily be with us
in the momentous years to come as always. With firm faith in our future I
appeal to you to cooperate in the great task ahead and to march together to the
haven of freedom for all in India. Jai Hind.

2 Words in square brackets supplied from the Statesman, 4 June 1947, p. 8, col. 1.

47

Text of Broadcast by Mr Jinnah on 3 June 1947
L\P f 364

1 am glad that I am afforded the opportunity to speak to you directly through
this radio from Delhi. It is the first time, I believe, that a non-official has been
afforded an opportunity to address the people through the medium of this
powerful instrument, direct, to the people on political matters. I hope that in
the future I shall have greater facilities to enable me to voice my views and
opinions, which will reach directly you, life warm rather than in the cold print
of the newspapers.

The statement of Government, embodying the plan for the transfer of power
to the peoples of India, has already been broadcast and will be released to the
press and will be published here and abroad tomorrow morning. It gives the
outline of the plan for us to give it our most earnest consideration. We have to
examine it coolly, calmly and dispassionately. We must remember that we
have to take the most momentous decisions and handle grave issues facing us
in the solution of the complex political problem of this great sub-continent
inhabited by 400,000,000 people.

The world has no parallel of the most onerous and difficult task which His
Excellency had to perform. Grave responsibility lies particularly on the shoul¬
ders of Indian leaders. Therefore we must galvanise and concentrate all our
energies to see that the transfer of power is assisted in a peaceful and orderly
manner. I most earnestly appeal to every community and particularly to
Moslems in India to maintain peace and order. We must examine the plan, its
letters and spirit and come to our conclusions and take our decisions. I pray to
God that at this critical moment He may guide us to enable us to discharge our
responsibilities in a wise and statesmanlike manner having regard to the sum
total of the plan as a whole.

It is clear the plan does not meet in some important respects our point of
view, and we cannot say or feel that we are satisfied or that we agree with
some of the matters dealt with by the plan. It is for us to consider whether the
plan as presented to us by His Majesty’s Government should be accepted by us

98

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

as a compromise or a settlement. On this point I do not wish to prejudge. The
decision of the Council of the All India Moslem League which has been sum¬
moned to meet on Monday, 9th June, and its final decisions can only be taken
by the conference according to our constitution precedents and practice.

But so far as I have been able to gather, on the whole, reaction in the Moslem
League circle in Delhi has been hopeful. But for us the plan has got to be very
carefully examined in its pros and cons before a final decision can be taken. I
must say that I feel that the Viceroy has battled against various forces very
bravely — and the impression that he has left on my mind is that he was actuated
by the highest sense of fairness and impartiality, and it is up to us to make his
task less difficult, and help him, as far as lies in our power in order that he may
fulfil his mission of the transfer of power to the peoples of India in a peaceful
and orderly manner.

Now that plan has been broadcast already, and makes it clear in paragraph
eleven that a referendum will be made to the electorate of the present Legis¬
lative Assembly in the N.W.F.P., who will choose which of the two alterna¬
tives in paragraph four they wish to adopt.

The referendum will be held under the aegis of the Governor-General, in
consultation with the Provincial Government. Hence it is clear that the verdict
and the mandate of the people of the Frontier Province will be obtained as to
whether they want to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or the Hindustan
Constituent Assembly. In these circumstances I request the Provincial Moslem
League of the Frontier Province to withdraw the employment of peaceful civil
disobedience which they had perforce to resort to, and I call upon all the leaders
of the Moslem League and the Mussalmans generally to organise our people to
face this referendum with hope and courage, and I feel confident that the people
of the Frontier will give their verdict by a solid vote to join the Pakistan
Constituent Assembly.

I cannot but express my appreciation of the sufferings and sacrifices made by
all classes of the Mussalmans, and particularly the great part that the women of
the Frontier played in the fight for our civil liberties. Without a personal bias,
and this is hardly the moment to do so, I deeply sympathise with all those who
have suffered and those who died and whose properties were subjected to
destruction, and I fervently hope the Frontier will go through this referendum
in a peaceful manner, and it should be the anxiety of everyone to obtain a fair,
free and clean verdict of the people of the Frontier.

Once more I most earnestly appeal to all to maintain peace and order.
Pakistan Zindabad.

JUNE 1947

99

Text of Broadcast by Sardar Baldev Singh on 3 June 1947

L/P &Jlio/8i : f 363

You have just heard the broadcasts of His Excellency the Viceroy and two of
our distinguished countrymen, Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah. You also know
the terms of the plan which his Majesty’s Government have formulated to end
the long drawn political deadlock that has stifled us these many months and
years.

It is a great day today. The occasion is historic. We have closed a dreary
chapter. A new leaf is now turned. We seem to see gleaming on it the fulfil¬
ment of what till yesterday was but a dream. Today we enter the heritage that
was ours. The heritage of freedom we have found as our birthright.

It would be idle for me to pretend that the day is bright and joyous as indeed
we might well have hoped it would be. It would be untrue if I say we are
altogether happy. Seldom, perhaps, has a settlement like this been tarnished
with so much of fear and sorrow. I say seldom because, even though we
struggled and even though the struggle was long and heavy, our common
quest for freedom need never have divided and torn us asunder one from
another. This has actually taken place.

The shadow of our differences has thrown a gloom over us. We have let
ourselves be rent apart. We witness today, even on the day of our freedom,
fears of mutual conflict and all the horrors that conflict brings, in so many parts
of India. Neighbour has risen against neighbour. Thousands of innocent lives
have been lost. Men, women and children roam from one place to another,
homeless and without shelter.

Untold losses — financial, cultural and spiritual — have been inflicted in wide
areas. We look as if we are a house divided against itself. The day indeed finds
us an unhappy people. It is not necessary for me today to go into the reasons
for this affliction. We each have our faults — let us own it — we each need advice
on what is priceless — the willing surrender of our best for the common good of
us all. That is why we fell foul of one another. But that was yesterday. Till
yesterday, we were preoccupied with our little selves. The plan that has now
been announced steers a course obviously above the conflicting claims.1 It is not
a compromise : I prefer to call it a settlement.

It does not please everybody, not the Sikh community, anyway. But it is
certainly worths while. Let us take it. Taken in that spirit, this plan should
halt the dismal gloom that shrouds our Motherland and so many other stricken
spots today. In that spirit, we shall find in it the many tasks that await us in

1 ‘case’ in text on file; the word ‘claims’ lias been taken from the Statesman, 4 June 1947.

100

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

every sphere of our national life — tasks that need doing not only to repair the
damage we have inflicted on ourselves, but to raise us in stature before the
nations of the world.

We are poor. Let us not forget that we have no apology to let poverty
continue to afflict our people now that we shall be masters of our affairs.

We have tasks big and small of reconstruction on our hands. Let us remember
that it is only when the minds of our leaders are not deflected by internal
quarrels that they can effectively handle these tasks for our common good. Our
people have many needs that have lingered unmet for years : let us settle down
to meet these needs and relieve the distress that haunts us. Meanwhile, whatever
our own preferences, let us grow above our petty outlooks and work together
to put our country on the way to greatness that certainly belongs to it.

We too have to live as brothers or as neighbours. We all do want to live in
peace and strive for the modicum of ease and comfort in our homes, whether
in villages or in towns. We have had enough of quarrels and troubles. Let us
now turn from an ugly past and help one another to build a great and glorious
future.

This is my counsel to men and women of goodwill — Hindus, Moslems,
Sikhs, Christians and others. For thousands of years our ancestors lived together
in this land in tolerance and neighbourly relations. Let us restore the old glory
of our traditions in order, as I have said, that we may equip ourselves to face the
bright future that has now opened.

I believe with all my heart that the divisions which tend to keep us apart now
will not last long. I believe, also, that even though we should choose to remain
apart at present, we have so much in common — economically, geographically
and even spiritually — that the very blueprint of our plans so soon as we view it
with care, will bind us together. We have to forget the unhappy past to see this
with precision. Let us concentrate on the common interests. I say this with all
honestness.

I will add that, while making this appeal, I am not unaware of the existence
in our midst of those discordant elements who are inhuman enough to imagine
that their prosperity lies in the misfortune of their fellow men and women.
Such people should be shown that they will, in fact, soon meet their fate.

As you must have heard, we have taken the strongest measures to enforce law
and order and to apprehend the mischief-makers wherever we can lay our
hands on them. During the last few weeks, large contingents of armed troops
have been deployed in various parts of the country to aid the civil administra¬
tion. These troops consist of trusted men. They will give succour to those in
need and act also as stern keepers of the peace in troubled areas. I want you to
look upon the soldier as your friend. He will not fail you. And to you, sailors,
soldiers, airmen also, I must say a few words. You are obviously not unin¬
fluenced by the greatest events that are taking place in India today. These

JUNE I947

IOI

include many political changes which will concern you. As trained men,
trained in life by discipline and fortitude, you will obviously not allow your¬
selves to be needlessly perturbed. Let me say with all the authority I can
command that your interests will in no circumstances be allowed to suffer. You
have earned a name for yourselves throughout the world by your valour and
high tradition. India will not and cannot forget the debt it owes to you. Some
of you, today, are having to perform unpleasant duties on internal security
work. No-one is more conscious of this than I. Our Motherland is passing
through a period of transition and strain. Your patriotism and high sense of
loyalty will help you to steer clear through these difficult times. Do not forget
that India’s honour is your honour.

Serve India in her hour of trial with good conscience and to the best of your
ability and remain confident that we stand by you today as we have done in the
past.

The Commander-in-Chief will, in the next few days, broadcast a special
message to you. He will deal with some of the specific problems that may now
be impressing your minds. Meanwhile, I have no doubt that whatever political
conditions may shape the future of India, your interests will be protected by all
sides.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru

Rfel 1/151: f 105

1446/2 3 June ig47

Dear Mr. Nehru,

Will you please tell Dr Khan Sahib that I am asking the Commander-in-Chief
to provide nine British Officers of the Indian Army to supervise the referendum
in the N.W.F.P.1

2. It is, of course, a matter of great urgency to get the referendum carried out
in the least possible time, and I hope to arrange that the officers will join in
Peshawar in a few days’ time.

1 On 2 June Mr Abell, after consulting Mr Menon, had put up a note stating that they both agreed
with Sir O. Caroe (with whom arrangements for the Referendum had been under discussion) that
there must be a completely British staff to conduct it. ‘Any Indian is likely to be accused of partiality.
Mr Menon suggests that the best thing would be to get one senior British military officer to be in
charge of the Referendum and eight military officers of the rank of about Major to compose the
staff in the Districts. I think this is very sound as military officers would be regarded by the Congress
as less likely to be prejudiced than members of the I.C.S. or the Political Service. Lord Mountbatten
had accepted this proposal at the Staff Meeting on 2 June. R/3/1/151: f 100.

102

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Governor’s Secretary, N.W.F.P.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

50

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sardar Patel

Rl3li/i5o:f 245

3 June 1947

My dear Sardar Patel,

I very much hope that as the Member of Cabinet in charge of Information and
Broadcasting you will do me the honour of taking the chair at my meeting
with the Press to-morrow, in the same way as the Minister for Information
does in London. The meeting is at 10 a.m. to-morrow morning in the Council
House.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA1

1 Sardar Patel replied on 4 June saying he much appreciated Lord Mountbatten’s invitation and would
‘be delighted to come’. R/3/1/150: f 257.

Sardar Patel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

R/3j 1/150: / 253

MEMBER OF COUNCIL, INFORMATION & BROADCASTING,

new Delhi, 3 June 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am deeply distressed at the abuse by Mr. Jinnah of the hospitality extended to
him by the All-India Radio1 and his breach of the rules of broadcast which, as
you are aware, are almost as inviolable as the laws of the Nature. I had not seen
the script before the broadcast but I noticed later that not only did he depart
from the script but he has also committed a sacrilege by making a political,
partisan and propagandist broadcast. Had I known it in time I would certainly
have prevented him from turning the All-India Radio into a Muslim League
platform by not only justifying a movement which has resulted in so much
bloodshed and destruction of property but also by appealing to Frontier voters
to vote according to League persuasion. I am sure you will agree that this was
grossly unfair to the Frontier Ministry.

JUNE 1947

103

I fully realise that you yourself did not expect, or had not sufficient notice to
prevent it, but I am really disappointed that he should have taken undue
advantage of the courtesy and consideration extended to him by you, particu¬
larly on a solemn occasion when India and the whole World were watching us.
I only hope that its consequences will not be equally mischievous and that he
stood before the listeners self-condemned.

Yours sincerely,

VALLABHBHAI PATEL2

1 See No. 47.

2 Dr Khan Sahib also wrote on 3 June to Lord Mountbatten protesting at the references to the N.W.F.P.
in Mr Jinnah s broadcast. Lord Mountbatten acknowledged Sardar Patel’s letter on 5 June remarking
that they had discussed the matter at the Press Conference (see No. 59). He acknowledged Dr Khan
Sahib’s letter on 9 June mentioning that he had discussed the subject with Sardar Patel. R/3/1/150:
ff 255-6, 282, 284.

52

Mr Bevin to the Earl oj Listowel
LlPOfilug: f 27

SECRET FOREIGN OFFICE, J June I947

F 6535/905/G
Dear Listowel,

My attention has been drawn to a decision reached on the 2nd May by the
India and Burma Cabinet Committee, on which at that time we were not
represented, which conflicts with the advice given by the Foreign Office as a
result of discussions between your department and my Legal Adviser.

2. The decision in question, which deals with the proposed treaty providing
for matters arising out of the transfer of power, is contained in paragraph 2(b)
of the meeting on the 2nd May I.B.(47)20th Meeting.1 It is to the effect that the
extent to which the Government of India would assume international obliga¬
tions would be a matter for them to decide and that it would be inadvisable to
include any general provision in this treaty regarding the observance by the
Government of India of obligations under treaties (concluded in the name of the
Crown or of the United Kingdom Government) which can only be fulfilled
in India or only wholly fulfilled if India observes them.

3 . The advice given by my Legal Adviser, in consultation with your depart¬
ment, is contained in paragraph IV(b) of I.B.(47)422 which your predecessor
submitted to the Committee. It is as follows: “ . . . The specific undertaking of

1 Vol. X, No. 288, Minute 2, para. (b).

2 The reference should be to Section A(iv) para. 6 of 1.13.(47)42. L/P &J/10/90: ff 12-42.

104

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

the new Indian Government should be obtained by Treaty provision that they
will accept and observe all treaties with foreign states concluded in the name of
the Crown or of the Government of the United Kingdom, including those
made by the East India Company, which can only be fulfilled in India or only
wholly fulfilled if India observes them”. This advice was based on the opinion
he gave gave in March 1946 at the request of the India Office (“State Succession
in the matter of Treaties: Obligations of a future Indian Government”) for the
guidance of the Cabinet Mission.3 It also follows the practice we found it
expedient to adopt in the case of our Treaties with Iraq and Transjordan. We
consider that without such an undertaking diplomatic claims and political
difficulties of a grave character were likely to arise for His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment. Our two departments had already, in the circumstances, gone some way
towards producing a draft clause which might be suitable for India.

4. I think you will agree that this is a matter in which it is right that weight
should be given to the experience of our department. I therefore very much
hope that you may be able to persuade the Prime Minister, as Chairman of the
Committee, to have this decision reconsidered and to approve of the adoption
of the procedure recommended in paragraph IV(b) of I. B. (47)42.

Yours sincerely,
ERNEST BEVIN

3 See Vol. VI, No. 528.

53

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , Rfc/ 1/130: jf 239-41

immediate new Delhi, 3 June 1947, 10.20 pm

confidential Received: 3 June, 10.30 pm

No. 1284-S. My telegram 1277-S.1 Congress point contained in paragraph 5 2
seemed to me so dangerous that it might well have wrecked the whole chance
of agreement, since it was clear that Congress wanted HMG to give an assur¬
ance that Pakistan would be expelled from the Commonwealth if the rest of
India wished to secede.

2. V. P. Menon — whose services in all these negotiations have been beyond
price — rushed round to Patel and pointed out that HMG could never be expec¬
ted to agree to such a proposal which negatives the whole principle of Dom¬
inion Status, and urged him to drop it.

3. I sent for Nehru half an hour before the meeting and told him the same

JUNE I947

105

thing.3 I told him that I did not even intend to mention at the meeting that this
suggestion had been made. Both Patel and Nehru agreed to this course.

4. In the Congress letter the following paragraph also appeared:4 “In para-
graph 11 of the Statement reference is made to a referendum in the N.W.F.
Province. There has been a growing demand in the Province for independence
and subsequent decision as to their relation with the rest of India. The referen¬
dum should also provide for this.” V. P. Menon pointed out to Patel and I
pointed out to Nehru that since it was at Nehru’s own request that I had
dropped the original proposal to allow every province to vote for Pakistan,
Hindustan or independence, they could hardly expect me to reintroduce it at
this stage. Nehru quite openly admitted that the N.W.F.P. could not possibly
stand by itself, and it became clear to me that this was a device to free Khan
Sahib’s party from the odium of being connected with Congress during the
Referendum period, since Nehru spoke about Khan Sahib wishing to join the
Union of India at a subsequent stage. I told Nehru I had no intention of raising
this at the meeting, and he accepted my ruling on this.

5. He also asked that the Referendum should be based on Adult Franchise. I
told him that this was quite impracticable in the time available, and rejected it.

6. Jinnah’s great point was that a Referendum should be held in Bengal in
order to give the Scheduled Castes the chance of showing that they sided with
the Muslims and not Caste Hindus. I presented him with all the arguments
against this with which Burrows had provided me, and told him I had no
intention of raising this at the meeting.5 He accepted my ruling.

7. Baldev Singh wanted the instructions to the Boundary Commission
included in the printed plan, and wished them to take Sikh interests more fully
into consideration.6 I rejected this at the meeting and he accepted my ruling.

8. One of my difficulties has been to prevent the leaders from talking too
much. For example, Liaquat started an attack on Gandhi in the second meeting7
which nearly wrecked the proceedings. When I think of the number of points
over which the meetings could have been shipwrecked, I realise how miracu¬
lously lucky we have been.

9. At the end of the meeting I handed them a copy of a paper on the adminis¬

trative consequences of partition,8 much on the lines I left with you drafted by
Christie to which I had added a preliminary statement9 to the effect that
parliamentary legislation setting up two Dominions would be introduced in
Parliament during the current session and that the Act would contain a pro-
1 No. 38. 2 i.e. No. 35, para. 13.

3 For a further account of this meeting with Pandit Nehru see No. 91, para. 23.

4 No. 35, para. 12. 5 See No. 91, para. 18. 6 See No. 36. 7 No. 39.

8 Annex II to No. 28. 9 Annex I to No. 28.

io6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

vision enabling me to bring it into operation at any time thereafter. It was my
intention that the Act should be brought into operation not later than August
15 th 1947. I purposely mentioned a very early date for tactical reasons as I am
anxious to make them realize that they must move quickly and that vital
decisions would have to be taken in the very near future. I have given them
copies of the paper to take away with them and I have arranged to meet them
again at 10 o’clock on Tursday morning, June 5th, in order to have a general
discussion on the items contained therein, before taking it in Cabinet at 6 p.m.
on Friday.

10. The meeting agreed that Auchinleck should be invited to broadcast in
the near future a steadying message to the armed forces giving them a broad
outline of their future. I told the leaders that the working committees would
have to give Auchinleck answers on several points such as whether the Army
was to be divided on a geographical or communal basis, and whether a Muslim
soldier living in Bombay would serve the Hindustan or Pakistan army, and if
the latter, whether he would have to transfer his domicile. It was clear from the
reactions at the meeting that none of the leaders present had even begun to
think of the complications with which we are all going to be faced. Perhaps this
is lucky, since it will enable us to hold the initiative in Viceroy’s House during
the coming difficult period.

Repeated to all Governors and to Governor of Burma.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir F. Burrows [Bengal)

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:

Bengal , Partition of Part 11(a)

important new Delhi, 3 June 1947 , 10 pm

CONFIDENTIAL

1287-S. Your 142-S of 2nd June.1 It now appears that League will acquiesce in
the scheme. I hope you will be able to persuade Suhrawardy to form a Coalition
Ministry. I may be able to see him myself before he returns to Calcutta and if
so will work on him.

1 No. 33.

JUNE I947

107

55

Mr Abell to Mr Turnbull
Telegram , Rffij 1/130: f 242

important new Delhi, 3 June ig47, 10 pm

confidential Received: 3 June , 11.43 pm

1288-S. Menon has ascertained that Congress will not repeat not object to use
of term Dominion in draft bill.

56

Mr Attlee to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma ( via India Office)

Telegram , L/POI6/i2i: f 30

most immediate India office, 3 June 1947, 7.23 pm

Received: 4 June , 2 am

No. 7185. Following personal from Prime Minister.

Your telegram No. 1282-S1 arrived in time for me to announce this very
good news to Cabinet this morning.2 We agreed that I should send you on
behalf of the whole Cabinet a message of sincere congratulations. We all realise
how much the success achieved to date is due to your own great efforts.

Statement was well received in both Houses this afternoon.3 Winston made a
useful reply.

1 No. 40. 2 No. 42.

3 Pari Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 438, 3 June 1947, cols. 35-46, and H. of L., vol. 148, 3 June 1947,
cols. 19-28.

57

Text of Broadcast by Mr Attlee on 3 June 1947 at 9 pm D.B.S. T.1

Rffio/i/n: Jf 8-9

announcer: This afternoon the Viceroy broadcast a personal message to the
people of India. Before broadcasting a recording of the Viceroy’s message,2
here is an introduction to it, recorded today by the Prime Minister:

1 The Broadcast went out at 9 pm (Double British Summer Time) on the B.B.C/s Home Service and
at 10 pm (D.B.S.T.) on the Light Programme.

2 No. 44 (the recording began with the second para.).

io8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

prime minister: India, after many centuries of internal disunion, was
united under British rule. It has been a prime object of British policy to main¬
tain the unity which has for so long preserved peace in that great sub-continent.
It has been our hope that this unity might continue when India attained the full
self-government, which has been, for long years, the goal of British policy in
India.

The Cabinet Mission’s plan,3 which we still believe offers the best basis for
solving the Indian problem, was designed to this end. But, as Indian leaders
have finally failed to agree on a plan for a united India, partition becomes the
inevitable alternative, and we will, for our part, give to the Indians all help and
advice in carrying out this most difficult operation. The two-fold purpose of
the plan4 which is now put forward is to make possible the maximum degree of
harmony and cooperation between the Indian political parties, in order that
the partition of India, if decided upon, may involve as little loss and suffering as
possible. And, secondly, to enable the British Government to hand over its
responsibilities in an orderly and constitutional manner at the earliest oppor¬
tunity.

It will, I am sure, be obvious to you all — Indians and British alike — that the
decision having been made to hand over power, the sooner new governments
can be set up to take over the great responsibilities which they are assuming,
the better. In order to accomplish this, the plan provides for the handing over of
power this year to one or two governments of British India, each having dom¬
inion status.

I would make an earnest appeal to everyone to give calm and dispassionate
consideration to these proposals. It is, of course, easy to criticise them, but weeks
of devoted work by the Viceroy have failed to find any alternative that is
practicable. They have emerged from the hard facts of the situation in India;
they are the result of long discussions by the Viceroy with the Indian political
leaders, who will later be broadcasting on the plan. And in putting them forward
the Viceroy has the full support of the British Government. The Indians will, I
believe, recognise that they’re put forward solely in the interests of the Indian
people. They may be assured that whatever course may be chosen by India,
Great Britain and the British people will strive to maintain the closest and
friendliest relations with the Indian people, with whom there has been so long
and fruitful an association.

3 Vol. VII, No. 303.

4 No. 45.

JUNE I947

109

58

Mr V. K. Krishna Menon to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

R/31 1/156: ff 13-14

VERY URGENT 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 4 June ig47

STRICTLY PERSONAL

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I do hope you feel that your efforts have been successful, and that the first
bridge has been crossed.

(1) Gandhiji had a rather long talk with me yesterday. He is very disturbed.
He has asked to speak to you about certain matters. Some of the difficulties
could have been dealt with, without prejudice to whatever has been achieved,
if we had thought about it. It is important that he should be assured that the
perils on which he is distressed is [are] in your mind. I think that much can be
done to allay his reasonable anxieties.

(2) It is rather a pity that he will speak about them today before I have seen
you and you have time to send for him again. But this cannot be helped and
perhaps will have to be remedied in some other way.

(3) Jawaharlal also had talks with me about the “hereafter” and wants me to
talk them over with you. They involve detail and important issues of principle
which are vital to the furtherance of the success you have achieved. I hear
matters are causing some anxiety.

I shall keep myself available and come over whenever required. Perhaps you
will let me know some time today.

Yours sincerely,

KRISHNA

no

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Proceedings of a Press Conference held in the Council House , New Delhi , on 4 June

ig47 at 10 am

Opening Remarks by Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma1

R/j/i/i^o: ff 261-8

Gentlemen, I should like to begin by thanking the Honourable Member for
Information and Broadcasting for coming here and taking the chair at this
Press Conference today.2 1 have no prepared address to deliver nor have I any
notes. I have already delivered my prepared address on the Radio last night.3
Today I propose to confine my few introductory remarks to clear the back¬
ground and then answer any question that you may care to ask.

When I suddenly found myself going to India, we had some preliminary
discussions in London and we settled on a programme that I should spend the
first six months in becoming acquainted with the problems4 and then I should
send my recommendations to HMG to enable them in due course to prepare
the necessary legislation for introduction early in 1948 in Parliament. But when
I arrived out here I discovered almost at once that the one point on which every
community was agreed and on which all the British officials were agreed and
with which I very soon agreed myself was that a decision at the earliest possible
moment as to how we were to transfer power was a prime necessity if we were
to put a stop to communal strife and bring back the atmosphere of peace and
friendliness without which no progress can possibly be made. So, I set to work
harder than I ever remember having done during the war. I saw as many people
as possible. First of all, I gave them background information and then I asked
for their views. My own feeling was that a united India was, of course, the
right answer but only if communal feeling and goodwill allowed it. So, while I
did my very best to get the Cabinet Mission scheme accepted, a scheme which
at one time had been accepted by every community, the riots and bloodshed
throughout the country made the prospects of its acceptance obviously pretty
remote. The Cabinet Mission plan is not an enforceable plan. It depends on
goodwill and mutual cooperation. You cannot make the Cabinet Mission plan
work any more than you can make a horse drink after taking him down to the
water. So, when it became clear that it could not be made to work with the
complete free-will of at least one of the major communities, I started to find
out an alternative. All the Muslim League leaders to whom I spoke made it
absolutely clear that they desired partition. Once that fact was inescapably
established in my mind, my next point was to see whether the Congress would
agree to abandon the principle of unity for which they had stood for so long to
the extent of allowing those areas that did not wish to stand for unity to form a

JUNE I947

III

separate Constituent Assembly. I found that they stuck by the principle of
non-coercion. They said that any province or area which did not wish to come
into the existing Constituent Assembly could form a separate Constituent
Assembly, but they very naturally insisted that no large non-Muslim areas
should be brought into the new Constituent Assembly. When I spoke to Mr
Jinnah and the other Muslim League leaders on that point, they were, of course,
as much distressed as were the Congress leaders at the prospect of the partition.
Mr Jinnah then asked5 whether the same principle would be extended beyond
the Punjab and Bengal. I accepted that, of course. The idea was that if Assam
was to be partitioned, then Sylhet and possibly contiguous areas in which there
is a definite Muslim majority should be separated. I felt from every point of
view that the people of India should take it upon themselves to make up their
own minds what they wanted to do for the future of their country. The next
problem was how to produce the mechanism to ascertain the will of the
people. Clearly the adult franchise plebiscite, would be the democratic idea. But
such a process was utterly impracticable at this moment when we wanted a
very quick answer and speed was the one thing which everybody desired.
Elections were held last year and the Legislative Assemblies appear to me
to be the right people to give a quick decision as to the wishes of the people.
And so we devised the scheme the details of which you have read in the
statement6 made by His Majesty’s Govt. But I want to point out that at every
stage and every step when this plan was developed I worked hand in glove with
the leaders with whom I was ultimately going to discuss the plan. The plan
came as no shock to them and no surprise to them, for although I did not
actually produce a written plan, I continued to make notes when they saw me
and I asked them whether this was the right way or whether that was the right,
and together we gradually constructed a plan which obviously cannot meet the
complete approval of everybody because if it did my services would have been
quite unnecessary. Ages ago the solution would have been found between the

1 The text of Lord. Mountbatten’ s remarks reproduced here is taken from his tel. 324-G.T. of 4 June
to Lord Listowel. The India Office was informed that this text had not been checked by the Viceroy
and was not for publication but could be used for guidance. Important answers to questions would
follow (see No. 60), the delay being due to ‘faulty shorthand recording’. On 9 July in reply to an
enquiry from the Governor’s Secretary, Punjab, the Viceroy’s Private Office explained that they had
‘no verbatim report of the Press Conference’ but enclosed copies of Nos. 59 and 60, adding that the
best press account was contained in the Statesman of 5 June. Campbell-Johnson to Joyce, tel. 323-
G.T. of 4 June; C. P. Scott to Abbott, 9 July 1947. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence
Files: Transfer of Power, Publicity Arrangements for Announcement of. A copy of the speech,
together with the Questions and Answers (No. 60), edited from transcripts of several shorthand
versions, will be found in Time Only to Look Forward. Speeches of Rear Admiral The Earl Mountbatten
of Burma, (London, Nicholas Kaye, 1949), pp 19-48.

2 See No. 50. 3 No. 44.

4 See e.g. Vol IX, Enclosure to No. 543, fifth para.

5 Possibly a reference to Vol. X, No. 116, eighth para.

6 No. 45.

1 12

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

leaders themselves. The only service I can claim has been to try as honestly and
as impartially as possible to reconcile the various points of view and find out to
what extent their views meet the views of the other parties.

There are two main parties to this plan — the Congress and the Muslim
League, but another community much less numerous but of great importance —
the Sikh community — have of course to be considered. I found that it was
mainly at the request of the Sikh community that Congress had put forward the
Resolution on the partition of the Punjab,7 and you will remember that in the
words of that Resolution they wished the Punjab to be divided between pre¬
dominantly Muslim and non-Muslim areas. It was therefore on that Resolution,
which the Sikhs themselves sponsored, that this division has been provided for.
I was not aware of all the details when this suggestion was made but when I
sent for the map and studied the distribution of the Sikh population under this
proposal, I must say that I was astounded to find that the plan which they had
produced divided their community into two almost equal parts. I have spent a
great deal of time both out here and in England in seeing whether there was any
solution which would keep the Sikh community more together without
departing from the broad and easily understood principle, the principle which
was demanded on the one side and was conceded on the other. I am not a
miracle worker and I have not found that solution. All I have been able to say
is that the leaders of the respective communities shall appoint a committee
which will draw up the terms of reference of the Boundary Commission which
has been suggested in the Plan.8 The Boundary Commission shall have repre¬
sentatives of all the parties. So far as it is humanly possible there will be no
interference or dictation by the British Government. If we can be of service in
advancing impartial views and helping in this work, we shall not be afraid to do
so, but this is your country and it is up to you to decide what to do with it. The
most gratifying part of the whole procedure has been the absolute determina¬
tion of every responsible leader with whom I have spoken that whatever the
solution finally adopted it was going to be adopted peacefully and without any
bloodshed, and they were going to throw all their weight to stop any further
trouble. Every single member of my Cabinet individually and together has
expressed to me the strongest possible wish that the Armed Forces of India
should be used to ensure that there was no further bloodshed, and that is the
reason and the only reason why the Defence Member, Sardar Baldev Singh,
announced last night the transfer of additional troops particularly into the areas
about to be partitioned, the most important being the move of the Fourth
Infantry Division into the areas which are about to be partitioned in the Punjab.
I do not need to tell you that this is not a British move.

Now comes probably the most interesting of all the developments in the
course of these very high-speed talks. After a while it became apparent to me
that next to an acceptable solution or settlement all leaders wanted speed in the

JUNE 1947

113

actual transfer of power. All leaders were anxious to assume their full responsi¬
bility at the earliest possible moment, and I was anxious to let them do so,
because once the decision has been taken, why should we wait? Waiting would
only mean that I should be responsible ultimately for law and order whereas in
point of fact however much you may talk about responsibility it is never the
same thing unless you are really legally and completely in control.9 How to
produce that very quickly was a legal conundrum of the first order. You cannot
transfer power to one or two separate Governments unless those Governments
have a constitution. One of the Governments was not even in being, nor was it
certain it was coming into being. The other Government would presumably
take some time in framing their constitution because [a] constitution is a thing
which should not be hurried as it has to be there for all time. Therefore I was
faced with the first difficulty : was I to turn over to two Governments without a
constitution? If not, was there any other constitution which can be possibly
used for the time being, and I do not think I need tell you, because you have
studied this problem very closely, that the Government of India Act 1935
provided the obvious answer. Some of the best brains had framed that Act.
When the Secretary of State, Sir Samuel Hoare, was in the Witness Box of the
Joint Select Committee, he answered up to 15,000 questions on this Act and
he was able to answer every one to the satisfaction of the questioner without
having to alter the framework of the Act. That is a very remarkable achieve¬
ment, and that is the Act which will ultimately confer Dominion Status. That is
the Act under which the Government has been functioning up-to-date and
that is the Act which will be worked until such time as the two respective
Governments have made up their minds in regard to what sort of constitution
they want and what sort of amendments they will require in the Act in the
meanwhile. I rather labour this point because I would not be a bit surprised if
some of you would get up and say quote the British are not going to quit at all ;
they are just dropping us into Dominion Status unquote. You are entitled to
think that until I have given my explanation. I hope you will not think in that
strain after I have given my explanation. I can assure you that it is the only
solution of the problem, and if you want a proof of that, do you imagine for a
moment that the responsible political parties could accept such a suggestion if it
was not the only sound solution on which we could proceed ? The curious part
is, as you know, that independence through Dominion Status is complete and
the different administrations are at liberty to opt out of the Commonwealth
whenever they please. Therefore, I mean it most sincerely when I say that power

7 See Vol. IX, Enclosure to No. 511, Item 3. 8 See No. 28, Annex II, paras. 5 and 8(i).

9 According to the Statesman this passage read:

‘Waiting would only mean that I should be responsible ultimately for law and order and the
general conduct of Government. In point of fact, however much you might use the Interim Govern¬
ment, it would never be the same thing unless they were legally in control of the responsibility.’ cf.
the Statesman , 5 June 1947, p. 7, col. 5.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

114

will be transferred as completely this year as it ever would have been by June
1948. It is a true anticipation of the transfer of power and I hope with this
added advantage that instead of the British having — I mean the officials — to
get out by a certain date, whether the Indians wanted it or not — and I put it to
you that although in theory some of the officers might have remained if you
asked them — they would have had to resign their commissions and they would
not have been re-employed back home.10 So in practice this solution enables the
Indians to pick whom they want to stay here, for how long, on what terms of
service and the rest of it. The British will leave whenever they are told to leave.
It may be we shall all be out by the end of this year. It may be that it may be
useful for some of the British to stay on. But the one thing [that] would have
been wrong to say [was] that we are going out and we are going to leave you in
this mess and we are not going to give you any help. That would have been
inexcusable. This means that the British will stay so long as they can be of use
and when they are not wanted they will go exactly when they are asked to go.
I cannot really put it in a fairer proposition, I fear, to the people of India, [sic] .

Now there is a third party to all these negotiations and that is the party
which sits in London, Whitehall, and are legally and constitutionally respon¬
sible. I refer to His Majesty’s Government. And so I took the opportunity of
flying home to see them. I arrived home at lunch time on a Monday, some
sixteen days ago. By tea time I was right in the midst of the India-Burma
Cabinet Committee11 going strong. The idea of a Dominion Status solution
was completely novel because it had originally nothing to do with this plan
wdiich never contained paragraph 20. I brought it home as a surprise. The
immediate answer was that it would take six or seven months to frame the
necessary Act, to introduce the legislation, to pass it through the whole Com¬
mittee stages and get it accepted. I asked the Prime Minister if he would
kindly produce the necessary legislation in this session — that means within the
next two months. The session finishes in about two months time.12 He said he
would do his best and invited me to come back the following day. The Lord
Chancellor and the Law Officers of the Crown were there13 with the first
rough outline of the new Act on which they had worked all night. The only
thing that will delay the working of this Act is the uncertainty about what the
provinces are going to decide. Until, in fact, the people of India have outlined
their own future and the shape of any separate State, the final terms of the Act
cannot be drawn. But they can all keep the Act ready in skeleton form, filling
in the bits of information that come. Then by agreement of the Opposition —
as you heard in the statement made in the House by the Leader of the Opposi¬
tion14 — this Bill will be rushed through in record time. If in fact a complete Act
of Parliament of this complexity and importance can be framed and passed into
law from start to finish in a matter of two months, I am told it will be a legis¬
lative record, and I think it is because of the measure of extreme goodwill that

JUNE I947

US

exists among all parties in England today and the sincerity of the feeling they
have for the good of India that this can be achieved.

10 This passage is not grammatical, but Lord Mountbatten’s meaning evidently was that, instead of
British officials having to leave, they would be able to continue in service (if the Indians wanted
them) without difficulty because they would be serving a Dominion under the Crown rather than
a foreign power.

11 Vol. X, No. 485.

12 The Times of India (5 June 1947, p- i» col. 5) reported Lord Mountbatten as having said that: ‘He
expected to see the legislation passed in Parliament by August 15 this year’.

13 Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 2.

14 For Mr Churchill’s statement see Pari Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 438, 3 June 1947, cols. 41-3.

Proceedings of a Press Conference held in the Council House, New Delhi,

on 4 June 1947

Questions and Answers1

jR/j/ 1/150: ff 272-81

Q. Is Your Excellency in a position to say whether Mr. Jinnah has accepted the
plan ?

A. The position about Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League is this. By the
Constitution and precedents of the Muslim League no final decision is taken
until the Muslim League Council has an opportunity of taking that decision. I
am not going to say anything today to prejudice the free discussion of that
Council. I will put it this way. I took full personal responsibility for men¬
tioning about it in my broadcast after my conversation with Mr. Jinnah. I do
not want you to twist that in such a manner as to make it difficult for the Muslim
League.

Q. Reference the Indian States, in view of the fact that there are two Con¬
stituent Assemblies likely to come into existence, is it open to any of the
Indian States to choose to come into either or into neither if they wish to remain
units of the British Commonwealth?

A. The answer is that the policy about the Indian States is contained in
Para 18.2 That is to say, that the policy of HMG remains unchanged and that
has been made clear in the declaration of May 12, 1946, 3 and if you read that

1 The text of the Questions and Answers reproduced here is taken from Lord Mountbatten’s tel.
326-G.T. of 5 June to Lord Listowel. The same limitations on its use applied to it as to the Viceroy’s
opening remarks (see No. 59, note 1), and the India Office was further informed that the Questions
and Answers contained in it were ‘only a selection of the more important ones.’ Campbell-Johnson
to Joyce, tel. 1313-S of 5 June and tel. 331-G.T. of 6 June. L/I/1/768: ff 271-2.

2 Of No. 45. 3 Vol. VII, No. 262.

ii 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

memorandum you will see that by the time the date comes to transfer power, it
will be my duty to hand back paramountcy to each of the States.

After that the States are free agents to enter either Constituent Assembly or
make such other arrangements as they deem necessary.

I think you also asked me whether they could enter the Commonwealth
separately as Dominions. The answer is that they cannot, as Dominions. If you
ask me whether they can have any relations with the Commonwealth apart
from that, that is a hypothetical question, which has not yet arisen. If it does I
will have to refer it to HMG.

Q. I do not want to embarrass Your Excellency. Even the Congress Working
Committee has also to consult the All India Congress Committee and we find
that Master Tara Singh, the Akali leader, has stated that the statement is not
very satisfactory. My point is whether His Excellency has received from each
of the three leaders the Congress, the Muslim League, and the Sikhs, that
measure of support which gives him the satisfaction that when these matters are
referred to their bigger bodies they will receive satisfactory ratification or
whether H.E. is feeling more satisfied in the case of one and less in the case of the
other?

A. Let us put it this way. I am the person who is carrying the responsibility
of going ahead with tills business. If I have gone ahead it is because I feel that
that was the right thing to do. If you are trying to find out what was given to
me in confidence I am not going to be taken in for the simple reason that I do
not want to prejudice the deliberations that may be carried out by the various
parties. The main point is and I repeat it, that I have gone ahead and I have
taken, if you like, the risk in doing so but I have spent the last five years in
taking what you might call calculated risks.

Q. Will it be open to any Province which may be participating in either
Constituent Assembly to feel free, after the constitution is framed, to vote itself
out of one union and join the other or join neither?

A. The answer is that after discussing this particular point with the leaders of
both the parties I find that the leaders do not wish to have any other option
than to join one or the other of the constituent assemblies for the good and
sufficient reason that they do not wish this plan to encourage what I might call
‘Balkanisation’.

Q. I should like Your Excellency to clear up a point of procedure. The object
of the Boundary Commissions is to carry out the wishes of the individual areas
concerned. I should have thought that the proper authority for doing this would
be the Constituent Assemblies of the two States. It is for them to assume this
responsibility.

A. The question is a good one but the Answer is ‘Speed’. To begin with, it is
not certain how long it would take to set up Constituent Assemblies for the two
parts of India. The function of the committee4 which will be set up in this

JUNE I947

II 7

connection is to give instructions. It will not prejudge the issue at all. I should
take the Chair at the first meeting of the Committee and I shall probably
express no views at all about it. All the way through, what I am trying to do
with my staff is to be of service in working the mechanism. I do not like to take
the driver’s seat myself. I will give you an example. The first thing I did
yesterday before broadcasting was to hand round a paper5 to the leaders which
simply showed them the necessary decisions which will have to be taken on
points of detail in regard to partition and the subjects which I suggested they
should take up. This is in relation to what I may call the administrative con¬
sequences of partition, although partition is not yet decided upon. If there is no
partition the problem is comparatively simple. I am really trying to get ahead
and be of the best possible service to you. I am only thinking out the problems.
It is for you to say how you would like them to be solved and we can help you
in the process. I want to assure you that there are two reasons why I sincerely
want the Indians themselves to settle this problem. The first is that this is your
own problem and secondly there is absolutely no desire on our part to interfere
in any way with the most suitable method that Indians themselves may adopt
for this purpose.

Q. The question is how to keep the integrity of the Sikh community intact.
What is the provision that you have made in this plan to keep the integrity of
the Sikh people intact ?

A. I must point out that the people who asked for the partition were the
Sikhs. The Congress took up their request and framed the Resolution6 in the
form they wanted. They wanted the Punjab to be divided into predominantly
Muslim and non-Muslim areas. I have done exactly what the Sikhs requested
me to do through the Congress. The request came to me as a tremendous shock
as I like the Sikhs, I am fond of them and I wish them well. I started thinking
out a formula to help them but I am not a magician. I am an ordinary human
being. I believe that it is the Indians who have got to find out a solution. You
cannot expect the British to solve all your problems. I can only help you to
arrive at the correct solution. A lot can be done by a Chairman but he cannot
impose a decision on anyone. It is up to the Sikhs who are represented on the
Committee to take up the case. It is not I who is responsible for asking for
partition.

Q. Howr is it that in the case of Bengal and the Punjab the legislators have
been asked to decide which Constituent Assembly they should join, but a
different procedure has been proposed in the case of the N.W.F.P. where the
electors wrill have to decide the issue ?

A. The reason for that is contained in the paragraph7 which has been
appropriately worded and in addition to that please remember that in the case

4 See No. 28, Annex II, para. 5. 5 See Nos. 28 and 39.

6 Vol. IX, Enclosure to No. 511, Item 3. 7 i.e. para. 11 of No. 45.

1 1 8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

of the N.W.F.P. there is the heaviest weightage for the minority community
which is not to [be] found in any other province of India. So much so, that out
of fifty six seats twelve or thirteen have been given to the minorities, although
they represent only something like five per cent. In fact, you have got a weight-
age of four times the number of minorities. That is one reason. The other reason
is that it is a perfectly straightforward referendum on this particular question.

Q. The referendum will be held under the aegis of the Governor General
and in consultation with the provincial Governor [? Government].8 Does the
Provincial Governor [ ? Government] mean the Governor [ ? Government] in
consultation with the Ministry or the Governor alone ?

A. It means that I am going to send up officers whom I am going to select
myself.9 1 am proposing to select British officers in the Indian Army who speak
the language and who never had anything to do with politics ; so far as I know,
they have no interest in politics. I am trying to get such impartial men to go
out to these places to assure a complete impartial referendum.

Q. If the result of the referendum in the N.W.F.P. goes against the Muslim
League and the League consequently tries to withdraw its acceptance, then may
I know whether Your Excellency would advise the British Government to
force this plan, or alter the same to suit the sweet will of the Muslim League ?

A. The question as far as I can make out is this : If the referendum in the
N.W.F.P. goes in favour of the Congress instead of the Muslim League, will I
agree to the Muslim League going back on this plan. The answer is that
referendum in the Frontier Province is a matter of six to eight weeks. Long
before the referendum to the N.W.F.P. is finished, the Muslim League will
have taken its decision.

Q. Will ‘negotiations on the administrative consequences’ also include
immediate negotiations with reference to Indian States ?

A. The Indian States will be given every facility to negotiate as quickly as
they desire. In my opinion, for what it is worth, it will have to be done on the
interim basis of standstill agreement. Let me give you a very simple example in
history. The last partition of this sort occurred in Ireland. After the division
between Northern and Southern Ireland was complete, you will be surprised to
hear that the Irish have not finished making all their agreements. Among others
there was no agreement over the railways. But you think one train stopped on
that account? They ran on. The General Managers rang each other up and said
we would go on the basis of a standstill agreement. Gradually the thing has
been built up. The world is really a sensible place once you get heat out of it
unless I have a complete wrong estimate of the Indian Cabinet.

Q. If communal strifes in provinces do not subside in spite of HMG’s
announcement of their plan and Your Excellency’s appeal to the people of
India, will Your Excellency allow the Centre to intervene for quelling the
disturbances ?

JUNE I947

119

A. I have already discussed this. With the knowledge of the Home Member
I am in a position to tell you that there has been a unanimous decision in the
Cabinet that we shall not allow any more violence or strife.8 9 10 Sardar Baldev
Singh broadcast as Defence Member on that point yesterday.11 There have been
many times when there have been more troops. Now we know the bad spots
and there the troops are being sent. The Centre has therefore already inter¬
vened in the most effective way possible by passing a unanimous decision in the
Interim Government not to tolerate any more violence.

Q. When you withdraw paramountcy, would you regard that sovereignty
would thereafter vest with the princes or the people of the States, because there
is the British Labour Party in power?

A. It is no question of parties in power. It is a question as to with whom the
treaties were made. This is a matter for lawyers. I must know exactly what the
legal position is. Please remember that treaties if they are going to be honoured
must be honoured in the letter.

Q. You are aware that some of the States have joined the Constituent
Assembly. What will be their position after this statement of HMG, whether
they will be free to join either Constituent Assembly and they will be allowed
to do so?

A. The States are at liberty to send their duly qualified representatives to the
existing constituent assembly or if they so desire to the other constituent
assembly if formed. If they are already in the existing constituent assembly they
have come into it to take part in the work of framing the constitution. In
passing I would refer to the “Hindustan Times'’ report today on the question
whether the Legislative Assembly or the Constituent Assembly would be the
body to deal with this matter. In my opinion it can only be the Constituent
Assembly. The Legislative Assembly contains European Members whereas the
position will not be so in the Constituent Assemblies. The weightage will be in
exact proportion to the populations of the territories which form the two States.
It automatically provides the same amount of representation for such States as
join the Constituent Assemblies. So, I assume that the two Constituent Assem¬
blies will deal with this — I say I assume because these things have still got to be
considered.

Q. In view of the decision to leave and to partition India I feel that it is
absolutely essential that on the question of Dominion Status there should be a

8 cf. No. 45, para. 11, last sentence.

9 See No. 49.

10 On 6 May 1947, at the conclusion of a discussion on a scheme of insurance against civil commotion

and riot risks, the Indian Cabinet ‘agreed that if violence broke out in any part of the country in

future it should be put down with a firm hand, and that His Excellency should take the necessary
action to this end, consulting the Cabinet beforehand where time permitted.’ Mountbatten Papers,
Minutes of Indian Cabinet Meetings, Case No. 129/28/47. See also Vol. X, No. 354, para. 26.

No. 48.

11

120

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

declaration which is more specific than is contained in paragraph 20. In fact
paragraph 20 is perhaps the only disappointing paragraph in the plan. It is
possible that it is a matter of drafting. It is absolutely essential that it should be
made quite clear that in regard to Dominion Status you make no overtures to
or accept no overtures from fragments of India.12

A. If you people meet together and ask for one single Dominion Status that
can be done. But if you insist on two States what are we going to do? I do not
quite follow. I am not trying to be funny. If there is one India then we can
transfer power to one India. If there are two parts, then we must transfer power
to two parts. What else can we do?

Q. I am sorry I did not make myself clear. There is a great potential for
mischief in regard to Dominion Status once you are prepared to deal with
different parts of India in regard to the final choice about membership of the
Commonwealth.

A. What you mean is that [ ? what happens if] as a result of paragraph 20, one
part comes in and the other does not.

Q. You should reject any offer on the part of any single individual State to
become a Dominion. You should not also make any efforts to induce any
separate state of India to come into the Commonwealth. You should insist on
India as a whole coming to a decision on the question of membership of the
Commonwealth or not.

A. That is exactly the point. We won’t allow any separate part of India to
come into the Commonwealth. But if the whole of India decides to break into
two independent states, they could both come in. Before this paragraph was
framed I had most careful talks with the leaders of parties. It was only then that
I discovered that this particular solution was one that commended itself as a
fair and just one — the only solution for speedy transfer of power which both
parties desired. I must say that I do honestly think that we have done everything
in our power to meet the very point you have mentioned.

Q. It is said here13 that the respective constituent assemblies have the right
to ultimately elect to remain within the British Commonwealth or not. I want
to point out that there is mischief in that provision ?

A. I absolutely disagree. The British Commonwealth of Nations is a com¬
pletely free association of peoples. Each State is completely independent. There
is absolutely no sort of power that I know of to force them to stay in if they
want to go out. The whole essence of independence is that you must have
complete freedom to do what you like. I would again repeat that the British
Commonwealth of Nations is a free association of different nations and the
British Government have no control over them. The only connecting link is the
King. I honestly think that we have done all we can to transfer power and to
give each of the Indian States the greatest possible measure of freedom.

Q. May I know whether the Congress leaders and the League leaders have

JUNE I947

121

agreed, as was pointed out by Mr. Devadas Gandhi in the particular sentence
which he quoted, that the two States can remain members of the British
Commonwealth, because Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru very recently made it
emphatically clear that they would not like any foreign power to have bases in
any part of India. I would like to know whether that particular clause in this
statement has the approval of the party leaders ?

A. It is good that you have put that question. It is known all over the world
that so far as the British Commonwealth of Nations is concerned, you cannot
compel any part to remain inside it, if it wants to go out.

Q. Nobody objects to interim dominion status. Suppose there are two
constituent Assemblies. Is it open to one of them to declare itself absolutely
independent and the other to declare itself a dominion? That is the point that
Mr. Devadas Gandhi made.

A. If you grant independence and at the same time try to impose restrictions,
the independence becomes a mockery.

Q. Will the Governor General be appointed on the advice of the Dominion
Governments ? If so, is there any bar against there being separate Governors
General for the two States?

A. The moment any State acquires dominion status, it chooses its own
Governor General. That Governor General is chosen by the Prime Minister of
the Government or [? of] the Dominion concerned. He submits his name to the
King, who being a constitutional monarch may discuss it but finally acts on the
advice of the Government concerned. We have many examples of that. It is
complete and absolute freedom to do exactly what you like.

There is one more point which I was asked and which I have not
yet answered. I was asked whether HMG were to make no provision for the
protection of the minorities, because it is not referred to in this pact [plan]. [The
position about minorities is that since the desire of the British to quit power is
not going to be effected quickly, there is some reason that the British can afford
protection to the minorities. But I should like to add that on the question of the
minorities I have talked to the principal leaders and I am absolutely certain that
so long as the power rests with me to look after the interests of the minorities,
I will use it as a matter of conscience, honour and fair play.]14 1 have also talked

12 cf. No. 35, para. 13. The questioner here and for the next two or three Questions was probably Mr
Devadas Gandhi: see A. Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mounthatten, (London, Robert Hale Ltd.,
1951), p. 109.

13 i.e. in the last sentence of No. 45, para. 20.

14 The report in the Statesman , 5 June 1947, p. 7, col. 6, corresponding to the passage in square brackets,
reads as follows :

‘The British decision to quit was not insincere. Since this was so, they had no legal means to
enforce any protection for the minorities. But he had talked to the leaders of the country and was
absolutely certain that, so long as they were in power, “they personally mean to look after the
interests of the minorities as a matter of conscience, honour and fair play.” ’

122

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

to them and told them if I could help them in any way. I have told the leaders
of the minorities to see me while I am here and I will do my best to help them. I
have got great faith in the future of India and that faith remains. I do believe
that the minorities are going to have fair play and a decent chance in the
country.

Q. May I ask whether each Dominion will have full responsibility for its own
defences ?

A. Basically, each State, when it gets its independence, is wholly and solely
responsible for its own defence. I must tell you that the process of partition of
forces, if it is to be done in a way that will not cause the collapse of the morale
and the disintegration of the army, must be done in an orderly and well-
disciplined manner. When the partition has taken place, the States are absolutely
at liberty whether they want to get together and have a combined plan for the
defence of India or whether they want to make their own simple plan for co¬
ordination. From all the questions that have been asked, there is one thing
which I sincerely believe is not yet clear to the people. Somehow people seem
to have some doubts about this word “Dominion Status”. It is absolute inde¬
pendence in every possible way, with the sole exception that the Member
States of Commonwealth are linked together, in effect they look for support
from each other and they are pulled together in mutual trust and in due course
affection.

I would like to conclude with one more word. 1 am really sincere in my
desire to help the Sikhs; I really believe that the leaders of both the parties are
equally sincere and intend to do what they can to help them. In fact I think there
will be a revolution in feeling; whereas before there was mistrust and strife. I
think we are going to see the leaders come together in a friendly spirit of
co-operation.

One more word. In putting out your news and your leading articles [? I
hope] you will all aim at one thing — peaceful, quick and speedy settlement
which all of us so sincerely desire.

6 1

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rfe/i/i 70: f 18

SECRET AND PERSONAL 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 4 June I947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 3rd June1 about the referendum in
the N.W.F.P. I have informed Dr. Khan Sahib of what you have written.

2. Dr. Khan Sahib’s immediate question was about the change in Governors

JUNE I947

123

in the N.W.F.P. This matter has been before you for some time now.2 There
has been progressive deterioration in the relations between the Provincial
Government and the Governor and it is hardly possible to carry on the adminis¬
tration with this continuous conflict going on. You know how strongly the
Provincial Ministry feel about this.

3. Quite independently of that Ministry and for reasons connected with
External Affairs Department, I have been suggesting a change of Governors
even before you assumed charge of the Viceroyalty.3 My experience during the
last nine months has convinced me of this and I feel that any delay in this is
harmful. Indeed this applies to some other senior officers also serving in the
Tribal Areas. I have had personal experience of them both during my visit to
the Frontier and later, and I feel that they are totally unsuited for their present
positions.

4. For the present, however, I should like to draw your particular attention
to the case of the Governor. You will find, if you have the opportunity to do so,
that there is very wide-spread feeling in this matter quite apart from any party
or group. This exists in many circles which have come in contact with the
present Governor of the N.W.F.P. during the past years in Delhi and else¬
where.

The part that Sir Olaf Caroe played as Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar in
193 o4 when there was large-scale shooting and killing of peaceful demonstrators
still evokes bitter memories.

5. I would beg of you, therefore, to give urgent consideration to this matter.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1 No. 49. 2 See e.g. Vol. X, Nos. 108, para. 7, 114, 133 and 325.

3 Vol. IX, No. 549.

4 For an account of the incident which may have been in Pandit Nehru’s mind see: Transcript of

B. B.C. recording of an autobiographical memoir by Sir O. Caroe, pages 90-91 (MSS. EUR.

C. 273/5) in conjunction with the India Office file No. 1897 of 1930 (L/P &J/6/2003).

62

Mr Fraser to Viscount Addison
Telegram , L/P &Jjioj8i: J 367

immediate 4 June 1947, 4.32 pm

Received: 4 June , 8.30 am

No. 109. Addressed Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, (repeated High
Commissioner for New Zealand in London).

124

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

No. 993.

I have just given statement contained in my immediately following message
to the press. Would you please give a copy to Mr Attlee, and convey to him
my congratulations on the success which has attended the announcement by the
Viceroy and himself?

63

Mr Fraser to Viscount Addison
Telegram , L/P&Jlio/Si: f 368

mmedi ate 4 June 1947, 5.18 pm

Received: 4 June , 10.30 am
No. no. Addressed Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs London No. no,
repeated High Commissioner for New Zealand in London No. 994.

Following is text of press statement on India. Begins.

In commenting upon the Viceroy’s statement on India, the Prime Minister,
Right Honourable P. Fraser, said that the New Zealand Government had been
following recent developments with close attention, and particularly those
relating to the process by which India is to assume independence. “I consider”,
said Mr. Fraser, “that as a means to expedite that process the United Kingdom
Government are taking the right course in proposing to introduce legislation
during the coming session for the transfer of power on the basis of Dominion
status. As a member of the British Commonwealth, New Zealand is naturally
and deeply interested in any decision designed to give India or parts of India
the same privileges as we ourselves enjoy. It is, however, not for us to advise
India as to whether she should remain within the fellowship of the Common¬
wealth or separate herself from it. On behalf of the New Zealand Government,
however, I would like to make it abundantly clear that we in New Zealand
would welcome the continuation of our partnership with India on this new
basis. I would like to add”, said Mr. Fraser, “that the people of the British
Dominions do not regard Dominion status as an imperfect kind of indepen¬
dence. On the contrary it is independence with something added, and not
independence with something taken away. It carries with it membership of a
free and powerful association, from which every element of constraint has
vanished, but one in which a way has been found for the practice of mutual
confidence and co-operation in the full respect for the independence, sovereignty
and individuality of each member. The New Zealand Government therefore,
in acclaiming the approaching consummation of India’s independence, express
the hope that that independence may be exercised within the British Common-

JUNE 1947

125

wealth of Nations, to the greatly increased benefit of all members of the
Commonwealth and of the whole world, and they assure the people of India
in all circumstances of their friendship and goodwill.” Ends.1

1 For General Smuts’s statement commenting on the announcement of 3 June see No. 87. Reports of
statements made by the Canadian Prime Minister on 3 June and by the Australian Minister for
External Affairs on 6 June may be found on L/PO/6/121: ff 7-9. Mr Mackenzie King said that:
‘The peoples of India may be assured of the sympathetic understanding and good will of the Govern¬
ment and people of Canada in their efforts to achieve self-government’. Dr Evatt commented,
inter alia , that: ‘Australia’s view on broader problems confronting India must remain as expressed in
my statement to House on 26th February last when I said that Australia, as member of British
Commonwealth enjoying status of complete freedom of autonomy in both domestic and foreign
policies, looked forward to achievement by India of similar status and similar freedom. Peoples of
India could pursue all their national aspirations while maintaining link by which all members of
British Commonwealth are bound together. Complete severing of links which join British and
Indian peoples would be greatly prejudicial to them both and to all mankind.’

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Nawab of Bhopal
Mountbatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: States , Relations with , Part 1(b)

4 June 1947

My dear Nawab Sahib,

I write to acknowledge Your Highness’ letter of the 3rd June, 1947, 1 tendering
your resignation of the Chancellorship of the Chamber of Princes. I am very
sorry to learn of the decision at which Your Highness has arrived, but I presume
that you did not reach it without a very full and careful consideration of the
whole position. In the circumstances I feel that the only course open to me is to
accept Your Highness’ resignation, though I do so with regret.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 Not traced.

126

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

65

Sir O. Caroe (. North-West Frontier Province ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten

of Burma

Telegram , i^/3/1/151: ff 110-11

important 4 June 1947 , 4.4s pm

confidential Received : 5 June , 4 am

No. CA/105. Your telegram 1223-S of 31st May para. No. 9.1

Premier is still absent but I have discussed with Qazi Attaullah and Mehr
Chand position arising in this province as a result of announcement.2 As
anticipated they have taken position suggested in my telegrams CA 92 of 27th
May and 98 of 30th May.3 They say that Ministry will never accept issue as
stated in para. No. 4 of announcement. They have decided against joining
Hindustan and issue for them is between (a) independent Pathanistan and (b)
joining new Constituent Assembly for Pakistan.

They add that release of Abdul Qayum and Samin Jan referred to in my
telegram CA 99 of 3 1st May4 was result of negotiations with these League
Leaders in hope that revised issue as Ministry wished it to stand should be put
before Jinnah, in which case they would have agreed to coalition. They add that
if referendum is on issue as stated in para. No. 4 of announcement Khudai
Khidmatgar Party (it is significant that they no longer refer to it as Congress)
will decline to take part in voting. They are preparing representation to be sent
to Governor-General. They envisage separate Constituent Assembly for
NWFP with a larger number of members which according to them would
place province in stronger position to make good bargain with Pakistan.

2. I informed them that issue whether NWFP could stand alone had already
been considered, with result that definite decision had been reached that it
could not, and I saw no hope of revision. They referred to para. 21 of announce¬
ment, and asked me to (gr. om.) [^forward] views of Ministry, which I under¬
took to do.

3 . I have no doubt that Premier, when he returns, will take same line, and it
is unlikely that Governor-General will be able to secure cooperation of Ministry
in putting referendum through. Qazi Attaullah also (gr. om.) that holding of
referendum on present issue might lead to Ministry’s resignation. I should
expect them in any case to use private army to reduce as far as possible number
of voters at poll.

M5 Question of legality of referendum without legal cover was also raised.
I said that point had already been examined by law officers6 and it had been

JUNE 1947

127

decided that legality could not be challenged. Point that referendum was
dependent on Punjab decisions mentioned in para. 11 was also made and
countered by my saying that this did not prevent activity going ahead without
delay.

5. Ministry’s representation will be fo warded as soon as received, but it seems
that time should not be lost in public statement that issue (? gr. om.) (?is) that
stated in para. 4 of statement.

6. Qazi Attaullah added that Ministry considered making point on receipt of
Viceroy’s letter 1446 (3) of 10th May,7 but did not do so. Fact that they did not
take this opportunity is weak point in their case, for substantial issue was clearly
stated in that letter.

1 i.e. No. 15, para. 12. 2 No. 45.

3 In these telegrams Sir O. Caroe warned that there might be an attempt to interpret the terms of the
announcement as allowing the N.W.F.P. the option to vote for a separate N.W.F.P. Constituent
Assembly. R/3/1/151: ff 86, 88.

4 No. 14.

5 New para, should presumably begin here, though number not shown in original.

6 See No. 15, note 3.

7 This was a letter from Lord Mountbatten to Sir O. Caroe in similar terms to his letter of the same
date to Pandit Nehru (Vol. X, No. 384). R/3/1/151: f 47.

Mr Campbell-] ohnson to Captain Brockman
RI31I1I156: f 12

4 June ig47

Captain Brockman

I. FIRST REPORTS OF WORLD REACTIONS JUST COME IN FROM REUTERS

Acceptance of Plan1 front page news in all American Press.

Paris says : —

“Leading French Government Officials are saying it is a great triumph
for British Statesmanship.”

Smuts has said : —

“The approval of Churchill2 stamps the Settlement as a National one,
and I assume it will be approved by the British Commonwealth.

2. reactions to h.e.’s press conference3 are quite the most enthu¬
siastic I have ever known.

1 No. 45.

2 For Mr Churchill’s statement see Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 438, 3 June i947> cols. 4I-3-

3 Nos. 59 and 60.

128

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Mellor of the Daily Herald describes himself as “stunned by the
performance”, and has never heard anything like it, and does not expect to
do so again.

Stimson of the B.B.C. said it made a most tremendous impression on
Indian and foreign Correspondents, in particular on the Americans, who
have been deeply impressed by the argument that Dominion status pro¬
vided the best constitutional means for transfer of power, and spelt
genuine freedom for India, and was not just a device enabling the British
to hold on.

Perhaps the thing that impressed the Correspondents most of all was
H.E’s mastery of his subject, and his capacity to quote facts and figures
without a note.

Britter of The Times described it as a “ tour deforce' ’.

Among Correspondents there was a certain amount of malicious
satisfaction that H.E. was able to deal some blows at Durga Das, who is
not popular with his Indian and foreign colleagues.

A. CAMPBELL-JOHNSON

67

Mr Abell to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten ofB urma

RI3I1I136: f 195

4 June 1947

I gather that Pandit Nehru gave notice that he would raise at to-morrow
morning’s meeting the question of the Central Government inheriting the
machinery of the political department.

2. There are three claims that are liable to get mixed up : —

(a) the claim to inherit paramountcy ;

(b) the claim to inherit secret files about matters between the British adminis¬
tration and the States;

(c) the claim to inherit facilities, such as buildings and clerical staff.

3. (a) and (b) have, I think, been finally turned down.1 There remains (c).
On this I have consulted the Political Adviser, and he will put up a considered
brief.

4. Meanwhile, the position is as follows. Many of the offices of residents,
political agents, etc. are in State buildings which cannot be inherited by the
Central Government as a matter of course. Similarly, the clerks are often housed
in State buildings. This brings one to the obvious fact that if the Central

JUNE 1947

129

Government, after the transfer of power, are to have their own representatives
in the States it can only be done by agreement with the States. In other words,
whereas it is for you, as Crown representative, to turn down the first two claims
mentioned above, the decision on the third claim is really one to be negotiated
with the States; and without their consent no action by the political department
can be effective.

5. It seems to me quite likely that those States which intend to be represented,
or are already represented, in the existing Constituent Assembly, may be
perfectly willing to grant the facilities which Pandit Nehru wants. They will
all, however, probably want to make it clear that paramountcy cannot be
inherited by the Central Government, and for this reason they may be sticky
at first.

6. I gather that a list of the buildings owned by the Government of India,
that will become available, has already been furnished to the Department of
Works, Mines and Power, which deals with accommodation.

7. The line to take is, therefore, that you will look into the matter, and
naturally want to facilitate the work of the new Government, but that you
cannot be expected to commit yourself at once, since you do not know the full
facts, and since the agreement of the States will be required.

G. E. B. ABELL

1 Lord Mountbatten minuted in the margin here: ‘(b). Surely not. After scrutiny they should be
available for historical records — but previous S. of S. concurrence is needed. M.’ Mr Abell noted:
‘(b). I meant by secret the ones that on scrutiny would be eliminated on the ground that they would
cause embarrassment if handed over. N[o] A[ction]. G.A. 5/6/ For previous correspondence with
Pandit Nehru on the disposal of Political Department records see Vol. IX, Nos. 496, 535 and 542,
and Vol. X, Nos. 266 and 304.

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rhlili37:ff 3~4

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 4 June I947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am informed that His Highness the Nawab of Bhopal has written to you1
tendering his resignation from the office of the Chancellor of the Chamber of
Princes on the ground that the Chamber will now become functus ojficio.2
Further he has stated that Bhopal State would, as soon as paramountcy is
withdrawn, be assuming an independent status.

1 The Nawab of Bhopal’s letter has not been traced; for Lord Mountbatten’s reply see No. 64.

2 ‘having served its purpose’ ; ‘of no further official authority .

130

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

It seems clear that the Chamber of Princes, as constituted, cannot continue to
exist for long. But it is also clear that unless complete administrative chaos is to
be avoided, some machinery has to continue to deal with States problems as a
whole during this transition period and before other arrangements are made.

I have written to you on several occasions previously about certain steps being
taken by the Political Department in regard to the winding up of Residencies,
Agencies, etc. in the States.3 I have pointed out that while these Residencies
represented the Paramount Power in regard to certain matters, they also
represented the Government of India in regard to a very large number of other
matters. If these Agencies suddenly disappear, there will be no point of contact
left between the Government of India and the numerous States, and adminis¬
trative chaos will result. If you so wish I can send you a fuller note on this
subject. For the present I would point out that there are numerous matters such
as Railway jurisdiction in the States, Customs, etc., distribution of food, cloth,
etc., extradition and so on, which will be difficult for anyone to handle if these
Agencies disappear and the States suddenly consider themselves independent.
Innumerable pockets will be created in India which would encourage smug¬
gling and criminal activities.

It has been proposed that each State should deal direcdy with the various
Departments of the Government of India. This is an extraordinary proposal, for
no Department will be able to deal with hundreds of letters from a large
number of units. And even if it could deal with them, there would be no
common coordinated policy. There has therefore to be not only some centra¬
lised Agency of the Government of India to deal with all such matters at
headquarters, but also their Agents in the various States. They may cease to be
Residents answerable to the Paramount Power, but they will continue to be
Agents of the Government of India till such time as other arrangements are
made. The whole administrative structure dealing with the vast number of
complicated matters cannot be wound up in this way without having something
to take its place.

The whole policy of the Political Department has caused us a great deal of
uneasiness. It can only be described in Mr. Winston Churchill’s language as
operation scuttle. It seems to be deliberately intended to break up the adminis¬
trative unity of India which the Government of India and paramountcy have
maintained. It must be remembered that paramountcy matters are very limited
in scope and at least 95% of the dealings of the States through the Residents are
with the Government of India. If this policy of the Political Department is
pursued, it can only mean introducing anarchy into India by the back door.
Some machinery must be created to deal with these matters and till this is
created, the present machinery should carry on with necessary alterations. We
have today to deal with Railways, Posts & Telegraphs and so many other

JUNE I947

131

matters. Are Railways to stop when they cross States' boundaries, or is the
postal system not to operate in certain States ?

The States are so situated that if they are independent entities they can create
very great difficulties in the administration of even the rest of India. It is
impossible for us to admit the right of any of these States to independence and to
do just what they will. That affects the whole of India’s administration,
defence and other problems. We are prepared to deal with them in as friendly a
manner as possible, but we cannot admit the right of a declaration of indepen¬
dence by a State such as Bhopal apparently intends to do. It must be remem¬
bered also that the right of protection which the States possess will also go with
paramountcy.

I am writing to you more or less briefly on an intricate problem about which
a very great deal can be said. But I want to draw your attention urgently to
these developments that are taking place at the instance of the Political Depart¬
ment and without any reference to the Government of India. This is going to
lead to a great deal of friction and possibly to worse consequences.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

3 See Vol. X, Nos. 266 and. 541; also Nos 102, 218 and 236.

69

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten ol Burma and

Mr Gandhi

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy's Interview No. 143

secret 4 June 1947t 6 pm

In connection with the last sentence in Paragraph 20 of His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment’s statement,1 Mr Gandhi suggested the possibility of a tripartite agreement
between Great Britain and the two new Dominions — or two bi-lateral agree¬
ments.

Mr Gandhi also spoke to me of “you and your magic tricks” in getting
Congress and the Muslim League to agree on anything.

Mr Gandhi said that he was very keen on going to Kashmir. I pointed out
that Pandit Nehru had also declared such an intention and suggested that
perhaps the best course might be for me myself to go.

Addendum to No. 69

I had received an urgent letter2 from Krishna Menon warning me that Mr
Gandhi was in a very unhappy and emotional mood, and that some of the

1 No. 45.

2 No. 58.

132

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Congress leaders feared he might denounce the plan and its acceptance at his
prayer meeting that evening.

I immediately sent a message inviting Mr Gandhi to come and see me at any
time before the prayer meeting. He arrived at 6 with the prayer meeting due at
7 p.m.

He was indeed in a very upset mood and began by saying how unhappy he
was.

I replied immediately that whilst I could quite understand and indeed shared
his upset feehngs at seeing the united India he had worked for all his life
apparently destroyed by the new plan, I hoped to convince him that this plan
was nevertheless the only possible course.

I told him that although many newspapers had christened it “The Mount-
batten Plan”, they should really have christened it “The Gandhi Plan”, since all
the salient ingredients were suggested to me by him. I enumerated these as
follows :

(a) Mr Gandhi advised me to try and get the Cabinet Mission Plan or any
other plan retaining the unity of India accepted by all the leaders provided it did
not involve coercion or violence. I had bent every effort to follow the first part
of his advice; but when no agreement could be reached I had followed the
second part of his advice and not insisted on a plan which would involve
coercion with its attendant risk of violence.

(b) Mr Gandhi had advised me to leave the choice of their own future to the
Indian people. It was therefore he who gave me the idea for letting the Provin¬
ces choose, and the method proposed seemed the simplest and fairest way of
carrying out his suggestion.

(c) Mr Gandhi had told me that the British should quit India and transfer
power as soon as possible and not later than the end of this year. I told me [him]
that this had been the most difficult of all of his ideas to carry out, and I was
very proud to have found a solution.

(d) I told him that I had understood that in his earlier days he had not been

averse to dominion status. Mr Gandhi was kind enough to say that this was
indeed so, and that even during the war he had expressed himself as not being
against it; and he later sent me an extract from Harijan dated i6th December
1939, in which appeared the words: “Similarly, I have said to a friend that if
dominion status was offered, I should take it, and expect to carry India with me.”
Note: I subsequently reported this conversation to both Mr Krishna and Mr
V. P. Menon, and asked them to work on similar lines in talking to Mr Gandhi.
Both reported that the line I had taken had been remarkably successful, since
Mr Gandhi now felt that I had honestly tried to follow his advice, and that he
had taken a far greater part in shaping the future of India than had at first sight
appeared to him from the way the Plan was worded. m.of b.

8/6/47

JUNE 1947

133

Minutes of Viceroy s Thirty Eighth Staff Meeting

Mountbatten Papers

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's House , New Delhi, on 4 June
1947 at 7.30 pm1 were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Lord Ismay,
Sir E. Mieville, Mr Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Captain Brockman, Mr I. D.
Scott, Mr Campbell-Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Item 1

THE NAWAB OF BHOPAL

his EXCELLENCY the viceroy said that it was with regret that he had
received a letter2 from the Nawab of Bhopal resigning his position as Chan¬
cellor of the Chamber of Princes. This letter was addressed to him (the Viceroy)
as President of the Chamber of Princes. He said that he had made every effort
to convince the Nawab of Bhopal of the folly of this action, and of declaring
that his State would adhere to neither of the Constituent Assemblies.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —

directed Press Attache to issue to the Press suitable information concerning
the resignation of the Nawab of Bhopal.

Item 2

MR GANDHI

his excellency the viceroy stated that Mr Gandhi had come to see him
at 6 p.m. that evening.3 In connection with the last sentence in Paragraph 20
of H.M.G.’s statement, Mr Gandhi had suggested the possibility of a tripartite
agreement between Great Britain and the two new Dominions — or two bi¬
lateral agreements. Mr Gandhi had also spoken to the Viceroy on “you and
your magic tricks” in getting Congress and the Muslim League to agree on
anything !

Mr Gandhi had been very keen on going to Kashmir. The Viceroy pointed
out that Pandit Nehru had also declared such an intention. Perhaps, as either of
these visits was bound to lead to complications, the best course might be for he
himself to visit that State.

1 The original has ‘19.70 hours’; according to A. Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten , p. hi,
the meeting took place at 7.30 pm.

2 Not traced. 3 No. 69.

134

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Item 3

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION (v.C.P. 63)

The meeting had before them the paper4 on this subject which had been
handed to the Indian Leaders at the meeting on Tuesday, 3rd June,5 and
was to be reconsidered with them the following day.

his excellency the viceroy stated that Mr Krishna Menon had told
him6 that Pandit Nehru was most upset because there was no indication in this
paper of the suggestion that the Cabinet might be split into two committees.7
Mr Krishna Menon had said that Pandit Nenru felt that it was of the utmost
importance that this step should be taken at the earliest possible moment. He
(the Viceroy) had replied that he would look further into the proposition.
lord is may stated his belief that Pandit Nehru’s worry was all due to a

j

misunderstanding. He pointed out that the paper under discussion referred to
highly technical matters. Moreover, it had been put up only as a basis for
discussion.

rao bahadur menon stated that Sardar Patel’s opinion was that there was
no point in reconstructing the Interim Government during the two and a half
months left before it was intended to transfer power. .Moreover, it was ob¬
viously out of the question to take tills step before the decision on Partition had
been made. As this was not likely to be done for a month, the remaining period
would then be only six weeks. Other objections to reconstruction of the
Government were that all the members were likely to be extremely busy on the
problems of Partition over the coming period; and that the Muslim League
Ministers would object very strongly to such a step as they would after it have
no portfolio worth the name, rao bahadur menon suggested that the two
new Governments should be formed on or about 1st August.

rao bahadur menon stated that Sardar Patel had told him that he thought
that Mr Krishna Menon was becoming a busybody. He pointed out that
Sardar Patel and Pandit Nehru were invariably in complete agreement on
fundamental issues, his excellency the viceroy said that he was not
altogether surprised at Sardar Patel’s opinion. This was a very possible solution.

The meeting then took the paper paragraph by paragraph and decided on the
line to be taken at the Conference with the Indian Leaders the following day.

4 No. 28. 5 No. 39.

6 Lord Mountbatten bad presumably bad a talk with Mr Krishna Menon following receipt of No. 58.

7 See e.g. Vol. X, Nos. 406, para. 21; 466, Item (6); 471; 472; 517, Minute 7; and Enclosure to No.

JUNE 1947

135

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &J/ 10 Ji 17; ff 213-14

immediate India office, 4 June 1947, 8.40 pm

secret Received: 5 June , 6 am

7251. Foreign Office have drawn attention to following points in memorandum
1.13.(47)87 of 27th May1 about Interim Government of which I assume you
have a copy. Points are as follows : —

(i) Suggestion in (v) for appeal to U.N.O. or Hague Tribunal.2 Foreign
Office presume that International Court of Justice is meant and point out that
this Court would not be able to settle a boundary dispute for following
reasons —

(a) Boundaries in such a case are not a question of international law to which
the Court is confined.

(b) Court can only decide disputes between parties already recognised
internationally as States.

Reference to U.N.O. would presumably be to Security Council. This would be
possible under Article 3 8 of the Charter but matter would not be free from
difficulty for similar reasons to (b) above. The Sikhs, though an interested
community, will not be a State and Pakistan will only be in course of becoming
a State.

(ii) Foreign Office consider arbitral tribunal under (k) best solution3 but feel
that proposal in regard to its composition should be developed. They consider
it essential to provide how a neutral Umpire shall be selected failing agreement.
This could be by President of International Court or by Security Council.
Former is probably preferable. Foreign Office also suggest that as tribunal deals
with cases on appeal from Boundary Commission in a case where latter has
only reached decision by Chairman’s casting vote, there will be much to be said
for having a slightly larger tribunal with two neutral members so as to give its
decision greater weight. These should be persons chosen from outside India. In

1 Vol. X, No. 545.

2 Para, (v) proposed that, in the event of any decision of the Boundary Commission being carried only
by the Chairman’s vote or by his casting vote, the minority might appeal to U.N.O. or the ‘Hague
Tribunal’.

3 ‘(k) best solution’ deciphered as ‘it would not be best solution’. Para, (k) of Vol. X, No. 545 proposed
the setting up of an Arbitral Tribunal to decide matters of dispute arising from the processes of
partition, and in para, (w) it was suggested that if U.N.O. and the ‘Hague Tribunal’ both refused to
entertain appeals against decisions of the Boundary Commission, then the minority might appeal to
this Arbitral Tribunal. It was proposed (para, (k)) that the Tribunal should consist of three arbitrators
of high judicial standing — one chosen by each of the three Governments (the paper assumed an
independent Bengal) — and an Umpire selected by agreement by these three arbitrators.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

any case they suggest increasing membership from 3 to 5 though this was on
assumption that Bengal would be a third independent State and that it would be
suitable to have 3 Indian and two neutral members.

2. I telegraph these comments in case you are talking to leaders on these
subjects on Thursday.4 I agree with Foreign Office that arbitral tribunal should
be final authority but I see difficulty in increasing its size. With total of 3 you
can have 1 Hindu, 1 Muslim, t neutral. In any larger figure one must I think
bring in a Sikh. If so, at least two neutrals must be included but I doubt if
quality of5 tribunal as a whole would be as good.

4 i.e. at the meeting on 5 June (No. 73). 5 ‘quality of’ deciphered, as ‘international’.

Sir E. Jenkins {Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , R^/i/go: f 137

immediate 4 June 1947 , 11.30 pm

confidential Received: 3 June , 9 am

No. 118-G. Lahore reports five dead one injured and five fires.

2. Amritsar has had two communal riots and four fires. Casualties four dead
nine injured apparently due to firing by police and troops.

3. Gurgaon disorders still widespread. People still resentful and truculent.
Total number of villages burned now estimated at sixty. Casualties unknown
since parties removed dead and wounded. Known dead over one hundred
including sixty three brought into hospitals and about forty three disposed of
by magistrates in villages. Troops not yet reinforced.

4. General situation unchanged. Reception of partition plan very mixed in
Lahore and Amritsar. Hindus acquiesce. Sikhs angry and bellicose; statement1 by
Tara Singh in morning papers has not helped. Muslims also angry and critical
of their leaders and threatening to destroy Amritsar completely. These are only
first intelligence reports which may prove wrong as I hope they will. Reactions
from other districts not yet reported.

Addressed Viceroy repeated to Secretary of State, Governor U.P., Governor
of Sind, Governor N.W.F.P.

1 In a statement on 4 June 1947 Master Tara Singh complained of the ‘total lack’ of any provision in the
plan to give the Sikhs ‘any power or status anywhere, or for safeguarding their position and interests’.
He went on to state that the ‘ultimate acceptance or rejection’ of the plan by the Sikhs would depend
a good deal on the terms of reference of the Boundary Commission; that the Sikhs would not be
satisfied ‘unless the dividing line is the River Chenab;’ that they would continue the struggle till
their objective was obtained; that the ‘very existence’ of the Sikhs was at stake; and that the Khalsa
would ‘prove to the world that the spirit of Guru Govind Singh still lives in them’. Times of India ,
5 June 1947, p. 7, col. 2.

JUNE 1947

137

Minutes of Viceroy's Sixteenth Miscellaneous Meeting

L/P &J 1 10/81 : jf 370-8

CONFIDENTIAL

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy s House , New Delhi , on 3 June
1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma, Pandit Nehru,
Sardar Patel, Mr Kripalani, Mr Jinnah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Mr Nishtar, Sardar
Baldev Singh, Lord Ismay, Sir E. Mieville ; Lieutenant-Colonel Er shine Crum
(Secretariat)

Item 1

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION

The Meeting had before them a paper1 entitled “The Administrative Con¬
sequences of Partition”, copies of which had been handed to the Indian Leaders
at the meeting on Tuesday, 3rd June.2 his excellency the viceroy
emphasized that this paper was only a basis for discussion.

Matters on which a decision will have
to be reached

Paragraph 2 of this paper gave a list of matters on which a decision by agree¬
ment or, if necessary, by arbitration, would have to be reached, his excel¬
lency the viceroy asked whether it was considered that these matters were
correctly set out here. He pointed out that the list was not necessarily exclusive.

pandit nehru said that he did not understand the reference to a “division
of the staff, organisations and records of Central Civil Departments”. As he
saw it, there was at present an Entity of India. Certain parts of India were being
given the opportunity to secede from this Entity. The functions of the Govern¬
ment of India would continue. The seceding parts would have to build up their
own Government.

mr jinnah said that he and Pandit Nehru were starting off from com¬
pletely different premises. It was not a question of secession, but of division.

pandit nehru said that he did not agree. It was a fundamental point that
India, as such, would continue.

Concerning Pandit Nehru’s misunderstanding of Paragraph 2, his excel¬
lency the viceroy explained that it would be necessary for those members
of the staff of Central Civil Departments who lived in Pakistan to transfer to the
Pakistan Service. Similarly, British officials would have to be divided between
the two States. Back files would have to be copied. It was to be presumed that
many of the laws at present in existence for India as a whole would be left in

2 No. 39.

1 See No. 28.

138

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

force in Pakistan until they were replaced. Copies of files appertaining to such
matters would obviously have to be made available to the Pakistan Govern¬
ment.

Government in the Interim Period

pandit nehru asked how it was intended to carry on Government during the
period from the decision on Partition, which would probably take place
towards the end of June, until the two new Dominion Governments were set
up — a period of say six weeks. When the Partition decision was reached, a
vital change would have taken place. The two new States would already then
come into existence in embryo. When this happened, the whole nature of the
Government of India would change. Some arrangements would then have to be
made immediately, as certain members of the Interim Government would be
interested in one State and some in the other. There would be a complete
division of interest. It would become very difficult to carry on as at present.
Arrangements would have to be made so that neither side would feel that the
other was interfering in their business. The question definitely arose as to how
the processes of Government could be carried on from then onwards.

his excellency the viceroy said that this point had been stressed to him
by the Congress Leaders before he had left for London.3 But now that the
interim period before the transfer of power was to be so much shorter, the
seriousness of the problem had diminished. He felt that this question should be
considered separately at a later stage.

Decisions in connection with the partition

of Provinces

Paragraph 3 of the paper before the meeting read “Similar decisions will be
necessary as between parts of Provinces”, pandit nehru gave his opinion that
the problem of the division of Provincial subjects was part of the main central
problem. He did not agree that the Governors of the Provinces concerned
should be solely responsible.

The Partition Tribunal

MR jinnah said that there were many things to do. He wanted to try to
understand which was the first. They could not all be done at once.

his excellency suggested that the first step should be to set up a Partition
Committee. (It was subsequently provisionally decided to call this the ‘Partition
Tribunal’; and it will be referred to as such in these Minutes). The Partition
Tribunal would decide the order of priority with which to deal with the various
other matters.

At first mr jinnah took the line that no steps could be taken, not even with
regard to setting up the Partition Tribunal, until the respective Constituent

JUNE 1947

139

Assemblies were complete. Later, however, he agreed to the suggestion that the
Partition Tribunal should be set up forthwith. He referred to the representatives
appointed by either side to the Partition Tribunal as ‘"quasi-arbitrators”. He
was, at first, in favour of only one member being nominated by each side, but
later agreed to two; and that a third substitute should be nominated in case of
sickness, pandit nehru also agreed with this. It was further agreed that the
members of the Partition Tribunal should be the highest political leaders. MR
jinn ah was violently opposed to ?the proposal that] there should be a
fifth member of the Tribunal in the shape of a minority representative.

MR jinnah gave his view that the Partition Tribunal should be the supreme
and final authority. It should not be responsible to the present Interim Govern¬
ment. He visualised that the present Government would continue to work only
on a caretaker basis. Neither the present Executive nor the present Legislature
could undertake any question of policy or planning.

HIS excellency the viceroy said that the question of to whom the
Partition Tribunal should be responsible was a very interesting constitutional
point. In his opinion, it could be resolved by saying that, in the first instance,
it would be responsible to the Governor-General in Council, but that all its
decisions should later be ratified by the two Governments after power had been
transferred.

pandit nehru said that he disagreed that the functions of Government
could be completely stopped during the interim period, as he had understood
Mr. Jinnah to suggest. He further stated that he considered that the All-India
Congress Committee and the All-India Muslim League Council should ratify
the appointment of the members of the Partition Tribunal and of the Umpire.

mr. jinnah suggested that the decisions reached by the Partition Tribunal
should be signed by the members thereof, who would afterwards be bound to
see that their respective Constituent Assemblies ratified them.

the viceroy pointed out that the existing Constituent Assembly could
immediately ratify agreements on behalf of Hindustan, pandit nehru agreed
that the Hindustan Constituent Assembly might want to have a say in the
matter. He asked what would happen to the Partition Tribunal after Dominion
status had come into operation. The general feeling of the meeting was that the
two new Governments would then have to decide whether to continue the
previous system, or whether to change it.

The Umpire

his excellency the viceroy stated that His Majesty’s Government had
declared themselves averse to him acting as Umpire,4 empowered to give a
final decision. He also was averse to this procedure. The Umpire would

3 See e.g. Vol. X, Nos. 406, para. 21, 471 and 472.

4 Possibly a reference to Vol. X, No. 545, para. (k).

140

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

undoubtedly very soon become the subject of considerable odium. Without
any disrespect to either party, he wished to point out that completely impartial
decisions were very seldom welcomed by both sides. The Umpire should be
somebody agreed to by both sides — somebody who was willing to give true
and fair service, his excellency suggested that a man experienced in
judiciary affairs would be most suitable. With this suggestion there was general
agreement, his excellency said that he was prepared to enter the discus¬
sions if required by both sides, but not to give final decisions. All the Leaders at
the meeting expressed their complete agreement that His Excellency should not
be the Umpire, his excellency asked them to send him a list of names in
order of preference for those whom they suggested should be appointed to this
position.

The Steering Committee

It was provisionally decided that the next highest Committee should be called
the “Steering Committee”.

lord ismay put forward the suggestion that this intermediate body,
instead of being called “Steering Committee”, should be a Joint Secretariat.

mr. jinn ah expressed himself in favour of this suggestion. He thought that
a highly efficient secretariat would be sufficient. There was not, in his opinion,
any question of the intermediate body taking preliminary decisions. Eventually,
however, he appeared to give his consent to the formation of a Steering
Committee.

pandit nehru was opposed to the suggestion that ajoint Secretariat should
take the place of the Steering Committee. He considered that the Partition
Tribunal would be unable to cope with its task unless there was a whole-time
intermediate Committee immediately subordinate to it to undertake all func¬
tions except the final decision.

MR. liaquat ali khan suggested that the Steering Committee should
consist of experts or officials.

pandit nehru said that he considered that reference to “officials” or
“non-officials” was confusing. He agreed, however, that the Steering Com¬
mittee should be composed of experts. It was, he suggested, up to the two sides
to nominate anybody they wished to serve on this Committee.

lord ismay suggested a further alternative — that the Steering Committee
should consist of two political leaders as joint chairmen and, for its members,
the chairmen of the sub-committees. The general feeling of the meeting was
opposed to this suggestion although it was considered that the chairmen of the
sub-committees might well be ex officio members of the Steering Committee.

his excellency the viceroy said that he was inclined to agree with the
Congress viewpoint that something more than a Joint Secretariat would be
required. He felt that a Steering Committee of experts was the right solution.

JUNE I947

141

He suggested that the Steering Committee might consist of three members
from each side, including perhaps a minority representative from each.

The meeting agreed that the Viceroy should give an account of the decisions
reached, in the form of a written paper, at the Cabinet Meeting the following
day.

Resignation of Members of the Interim Government

his excellency the viceroy asked whether both sides agreed that he
should call, after the decision on Partition, for the resignation of the members
of the Interim Government in order that the prospective leaders of the new
Governments or Government might be free, without embarrassment, to select
their colleagues, mr. jinnah emphasized that he did not consider himself
responsible nor a party to anything which the Executive Council or the
Governor-General in Council might decide.

The Constituent Assembly

In answer to a question from His Excellency, mr. jinnah said that he agreed
that the Muslim League representatives of the Provinces of Hindustan should
take their places in the existing Constituent Assembly if Partition was decided.

The Boundary Commissions

his excellency suggested that the Boundary Commissions should not, as
was envisaged in the paper before the meeting, report through the Steering
Committee and the Partition Tribunal to the Governor-General, but rather
that it should report direct. This suggestion was generally accepted, his
excellency also suggested that one Sikh representative from either half of
the Punjab should be appointed to the body which would set up terms of
reference for the Western Boundary Commission. He said that he would
confer with the different parties in turn concerning these terms of reference,
before convening a full meeting.

his excellency the viceroy added that the State of Bahawalpur would
have to give evidence before the Western Boundary Commission, in connection
with arrangements for water supplies for that State.

IT WAS AGREED : —

(i) That a Partition Tribunal should be set up forthwith; that it would
consist of four members (with a reserve from either side in case of
sickness) ; they would be chosen from among the highest political
leaders; and that Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah would forward the
names of their choice to The Viceroy;

(ii) That, after the transfer of power, the two new Governments would
consider whether to continue the Partition Tribunal procedure, or to
introduce a new one;

142

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(iii) That the Governor-General should not be the Umpire, but that a
man experienced in judiciary affairs should be chosen for this appoint¬
ment; and that Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah should send to the Viceroy
a hst of nominees for this post;

(iv) That a Steering Committee, consisting of experts, should be set up ;

(v) That the Viceroy should inform the Cabinet the following day of the
decisions reached at this meeting; and that The Viceroy’s Staff would
prepare a paper for this purpose;

(vi) That the Boundary Commissions should report direct to the Governor-
General ; and that His Excellency should consult the different parties in
turn before convening a full meeting to consider the terms of reference
of the Boundary Commissions;

(vii) That a further meeting would be held at io a.m. on Saturday, 7th June,
1947.

Item 2

THE STATES

his excellency the viceroy gave a brief account of his meeting with
members of the States Negotiating Committee on Tuesday, 3rd June.5 He
said that he had done nothing to encourage any of the States to stand out alone
and to join neither Constituent Assembly. He had given no official advice on
this point, but was prepared to give his personal advice if and when he was
asked for it. He said that he had advocated the desirability of arrangements
being made for interim agreements on a stand-still basis pending the ratification
of existing agreements or the preparation of new ones. Both mr. jinnah and
pandit nehru declared themselves in favour of this.

pandit nehru complained that the procedure at present being adopted by
the Political Department in connection with the lapse of paramountcy was
sabotaging all the existing machinery and was likely to produce administrative
chaos. He pointed out that by far the greater part of the work done by the
Residents was not in connection with paramountcy, but to do with the Govern¬
ment of India. Some machinery was essential to carry on this co-ordination.
There was a degree of such machinery in existence for those States which had
joined or would join the Constituent Assembly; but it was essential for the
Government of India to have contacts with all the States after the lapse of
paramountcy.

his excellency the viceroy said that he would give the points raised
by Pandit Nehru his serious consideration.

5 No. 43.

JUNE 1947

143

74

Sir C. Corfield to Mr Abell

Rl3lili37: f 6

SECRET POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 5 June ig 47

My dear Abell,

Please refer to your endorsement, No. 592(89) without date, forwarding a copy
of a letter dated the 4th June 19471 from Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to H.E. the
Viceroy about the Political Department and retraction of paramountcy.

Pandit Nehru’s letter contains so many misconceptions, which we have
attempted to clarify in correspondence with Lord Wavell and His Excellency
during the last eight months, that I feel it would be valueless to comment on the
contents of this letter in detail.

The programme for the retraction of paramountcy in all its aspects has been
carefully and thoroughly examined, has been approved by the Crown Repre¬
sentative and the Secretary of State, and has been in operation for two months.2
The whole object of the programme was to ensure that the least possible
administrative chaos resulted therefrom. This object is well on the way to being
secured except in regard to questions over which the Central Government
refuse to cooperate and which I have already reported3 to His Excellency. If
there is a counter-attack on this programme as a whole as well as non-coopera¬
tion on particular aspects, there will certainly be administrative chaos, which I
shall be powerless to prevent.

As regards the specific proposal that the Central Government should take
over the machinery of paramountcy for the purpose of coordination, I have
already stated more than once4 the objections. If these are inadequate, I suggest
that His Excellency should see the Standing Committee of the Chamber of
Princes some time tomorrow and sound them on this proposal.

Yours sincerely,

C. L. CORFIELD

1 No. 68.

2 See Vol. X, Enclosure to No. 556 for a full summary by Sir C. Corfield of the development of the
Political Department’s policy.

3 Ibid., para. 9.

4 See e.g. Vol. X, Enclosure to No. 25, and Enclosure to No. 556, paras. 4 and 12.

144

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

75

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Attlee ( via India Office)

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:

Transfer of Power , Part IV (b)

important new Delhi, 5 June 1947* 3-30 pm

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1307-S. Please pass following to Prime Minister.

2. I am most grateful for the message of congratulations1 from the whole
Cabinet which you have sent me.

3. I can never tell you how much your personal backing and that of the
whole Cabinet has meant to me in these difficult negotiations.

1 No. 56.

76

Mr Abell to Mr Turnbull

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:
International Status of the New India

immediate new Delhi, 5 June ig47, 3.30 pm

secret Received: 5 June , 4.30 pm

No. 1308-S. It is already clear that Nehru holds strongly that Hindustan will
succeed to India’s position as an entity in international affairs1 and will be
represented automatically at U.N.O. I believe that official view is that two new
states will be created and that neither of them can claim to be India.

The matter is obviously of great importance and likely to lead to trouble
here. Can you get any advice on this ?

1 cf. No. 73, 3rd para.

JUNE 1947

145

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir F. Burrows [Bengal)

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files:

Bengal, Partition of Part II [a)

important new Delhi, 5 June 1947, 3.30 pm

SECRET

No. 1312-S. I saw Suhrawardy to-day.1 He said lie had spoken to K. S. Roy,
who did not think it worth while forming a coalition for a few months. No
doubt you will discuss the matter further with leaders after Suhrawardy’s
return.

1 See No. 54.

78

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary of State

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, 5 June 1947

Dear Mountbatten,

I would like first of all to add to the message1 from the Cabinet already tele¬
graphed to you by the Prime Minister an expression of my personal congratula¬
tions on what you have achieved. Although no well-informed person would be
so foolish as to minimise the risks attendant upon the policy that has been
announced or the scope for mischief still left to fanatics and those elements in
Indian politics which do not sincerely desire a settlement broadly acceptable to
all the main parties, there can be no denying that at the present moment the
prospects of such a settlement appear to be more real than they have ever been
before and we are all deeply conscious of the degree to which this is due to you
personally. I greatly hope that during the coming critical months you may be
enabled to complete the work which you have so successfully begun.

2. It was of the utmost value that the Prime Minister and I were able to
preface our reading of the announcement in Parliament by saying that the plan
had been received favourably by the leaders of all parties.2 It was, of course,
only after the announcement had been made that we received your telegram3
reporting in detail the course of your meeting with the leaders of the three
parties on the morning of 3rd June and learnt of the awkward corners you had

2 See Nos. 34, 37, and 40.

1 No. 56.

3 No. 53.

146

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

had to turn with each of them and of the help you received from V. P. Menon
in dealing with Nehru and Patel. It looks very much from here as if Gandhi,
having failed in his efforts to sabotage agreement on this occasion, has now
thought it wise to try and get in on the ground floor before it is too late; but,
even if this is the correct interpretation of his actions, his support will be no less
valuable for that. There would seem to be good ground for hoping that
acceptance of the plan will now be ratified by the All-India Committees of
Congress and the Muslim League since a failure to ratify on the part of either
would involve the throwing over of its Working Committee and an immediate
prospect of large scale civil strife. If the plan is ratified, the broadcast appeals4 of
all three leaders should contribute substantially to the preservation of order
during the transition period.

3 . Thanks to the promptitude with which you informed us of the changes in
the text of the announcement,5 all the arrangements went very smoothly at this
end and we actually succeeded in getting the White Paper released immediately
after the actual making of the announcement.6 You will doubtless have seen
full press reports of the reception of the announcement in both Houses and
will, I know, share my pleasure at the compliment paid by Winston Churchill
to the Prime Minister, which created a very favourable impression in the
House.7 I hope you noticed the pleasant tributes paid you in the Lords by
Bobbety Salisbury and Perth.8 Thanks very largely to Joyce’s efforts, the pub¬
licity arrangements at this end proved most satisfactory and the maximum
possible coverage was obtained both from the B.B.C. and the Press. Perhaps
you were able to listen to the B.B.C.’s 9 p.m. broadcast which contained an
excellent summary of the plan besides the Prime Minister’s broadcast9 and relays
of your broadcast10 and of extracts from the broadcasts by the Indian leaders.11
The press reactions have been uniformly favourable, save only for the “Daily
Worker” !

4. As you have pointed out in one of your telegrams,12 it will be of vital
importance to ensure that there is no “resting on oars” now that the announce¬
ment has been made but that all necessary consequential action is pressed ahead
as fast as possible. You may rest assured that we shall do all we can at this end
to help you retain the initiative and make full use of the advantage gained.

5. I was very grateful to you for keeping Ranee in touch with developments
in Delhi in the final stages.13 We have just received a telegram14 from him
reporting the first reactions of his Council to the Indian announcement which
are not unpromising. If, as we really believe, it would be as advantageous to
India and Burma themselves as to this country that they should remain within
the Commonwealth, everything will depend on our ability to bring home to
the leaders of both countries during the next few months the validity of this
belief.

JUNE 1947

147

6. To turn to other matters, you will be glad to hear that, on a joint mem¬
orandum from the Colonial Secretary and myself, the Cabinet this week agreed
to raise the ban on the admission of persons of non-European descent to per¬
manent engagements in the Royal Navy and the British Army and an an¬
nouncement to this effect was made in Parliament yesterday.15 This change of
policy is, of course, of much greater significance to the Colonies than to India
but, so far as India is concerned, it will be a real gain both in principle and
because it will enable Indians resident in this country to join all three Services.

[Paras. 7-9, on re-employment prospects for members of the Indian Forest
Service; and para. 10, on preparations for the Indian Art Exhibition, omitted.]

11. I understand that it was at your suggestion that Chundrigar originally
decided to visit London on his way to Geneva. You will be glad to hear that
we secured agreement to his being treated as a guest of H.M.G. during his stay
and that, before leaving for India, he wrote me a letter which showed that he
had enjoyed his visit. A number of social functions were arranged in his
honour.

12. At your request Ismay brought to my attention while he was in London
your desire to obtain a generous allotment of honours for the next two lists
and I assured him that, although proposals of this kind have to be submitted for
the approval of the Committee on the Grant of Honours, Decorations and
Medals, I would consider your proposals when they are received with the
utmost sympathy and give them all the support I could. You will no doubt
have already realised that the likelihood that the successor authorities in India
will have obtained Dominion status before the end of the present year has a
bearing on this question and that it may be that your wishes in regard to
honours will have to be met by a special “Transfer of Power List” in advance of
the next New Year List. Doubtless I shall be receiving your recommendations
on this matter before long.

[Para. 13, on recommendations for honours for members of the British
mercantile community in India, omitted.]

4 See Nos. 46, 47 and 48. 5 See Nos. 13 and 39, note 3.

6 See No. 45 and its note 1 .

7 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 438, 3 June 1947, col. 43.

8 Ibid., H. of L., vol. 148, 3 June 1947, cols. 26-7.

9 No. 57. 10 No. 44. 11 Nos. 4 6, 47 and 48.

12 No. 53, para. 9. 13 See No. 29. 14 Not printed.

15 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 438, 4 June 1947, c°l- I9°-

148

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

LIP&JI10I141: f 180

TOP SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 5 June ig 47

1446(16)

My dear Listowel,

I am proposing to send a letter on the following lines to the Provincial Gover¬
nors1 and should be glad to know if this is correct and in agreement with the
wishes of the King and His Majesty’s Government.

“On the date of the transfer of power to the two new Indian Dominions I
intend to offer my resignation as Viceroy and Governor-General of India to
His Majesty. I should like you to send me an offer of resignation of your
Governorship, which I shall forward at the same time as mine. When the
time comes you should inform your Chief Minister of the action you are
taking.”

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 [Note in original by Lord Mountbatten:] and, of course, Chief Commissioners.

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Mounthatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: Partition, Administrative

Consequences of

SECRET AND PERSONAL 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 5 June ig 47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have given a great deal of thought to the talks we had at this morning’s
conference1 and I feel that it would be desirable to clarify the position further.
I am afraid I do not like at all the idea of carrying on more or less in our present
way for another two months. This [is] not merely a question of time, but
deeper issues are involved. I shall, of course, discuss this matter with V. P.
Menon when he comes to see me. May I suggest to you to discuss this matter
with Krishna Menon who might perhaps be able to help? I understand that
some discussions on these subjects took place with him in London.2

2. I have had occasion to discuss briefly with a few of my colleagues the
proposals to form Partition Councils and the like. Their reactions confirmed

JUNE 1947

149

my own way of thinking 011 the subject. We propose to consider this matter
more fully tomorrow with our colleagues, and if necessary I shall let you know
what they think about it. It is obviously a vital matter and it may make a great
deal of difference.

3 . As I view it, we are trying to provide a procedure for two Governments
or two embryo Governments to settle this cjuestion of division. We should,
therefore, follow the normal procedure in such cases, i.e., representatives of
Governments should meet together and come to political decisions. Essentially
most of the decisions will be political and only some of a judicial character. In
case of lack of agreement on a particular point, the matter might be referred to
a Tribunal which may be created previously for this purpose. I should like to
separate the Tribunal from the high-powered supervising political committee
representing the two embryo States. Mixing the two functions up does not
appear to be desirable.

4. The representatives of the two embryo States may for the present be
representatives of the major parties. They should function normally as such
representatives do, that is to say they will take their directions from their
principals whenever necessary. Those principals may even change their repre¬
sentatives if they consider it necessary just as representatives of Governments
may be changed. This will give reality to the picture and the committee or
council will be in close touch with the forces that matter in dealing with political
problems. To appoint a permanent committee with full powers would be to
isolate it from those forces.

5. Thus I would suggest that there should be a Partition Council consisting
of four persons or some such number. This council will be the final authority
subject to disputed matters being referred to a separate Tribunal of say three
senior Jud ges whose decision 011 those points should be final. Then there would
be a Steering Committee and the other committees as proposed this morning.

6. This would involve a separation of the judicial and political functions and
instead of an umpire we would have a small ad hoc judicial tribunal for special
purposes referred to it.

7. These are my personal suggestions for the present. As I have said above, I
am discussing this matter more fully with my colleagues.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1 No. 73.

2 See e.g. Vol. X, No. 551.

150

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and Dr

Khan Sahib

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy’s Interview No. 144

secret 3 June 1947 , 6.30 pm

(Note: — Lt. Colonel Erskine Crum was in attendance during the latter half of
this interview and dictated the record.)

I showed Dr Khan Sahib the telegram1 which had arrived from Sir Olaf Caroe
that afternoon, saying that he had seen two members of the N.W.F.P. Govern¬
ment who said that they refused to accept paragraph 4 of the Announcement2
and would not in any circumstances co-operate in the referendum unless a third
choice for an independent Pathanistan was included. I explained to Dr Khan
Sahib that this third choice had been excluded for all Provinces on the express
request of Congress ; and that I had asked Pandit Nehru how he suggested that a
Province of three million people could stand out alone with a reasonable chance
of success. I told him that Pandit Nehru had agreed that it could not and would
have to join one or other of the new States after a while. I had asked Pandit
Nehru why it should not do so now. He had seen my point.

Dr Khan Sahib said that I should take no notice of this telegram from the
Governor. He said that he would go straight back to the N.W.F.P. and let me
know what the true situation was. He seemed to grasp the reasons for my refus¬
ing to change paragraph 4 but he stated categorically that the N.W.F.P. would
never join Pakistan. He said that he did not understand how Pakistan was going
to be run. I pointed out to him that the fact that the Western Punjab would be
between the N.W.F.P. and the rest of Hindustan in no way made it impossible
for the N.W.F.P. to join Hindustan. A similar situation prevailed as between
Western and Eastern Pakistan.

He told me that he considered it absolutely necessary that Sir Olaf Caroe
should be replaced before the referendum took place. He felt that the appoint¬
ment of a new Governor would make an immense difference to the way the
referendum was carried out.

I recalled that Dr Khan Sahib had previously told me that he would not trust
I.C.S. officers to run the referendum. I informed him that I had arranged for 9
British officers of the Indian Army to be made available for this purpose. He
appeared very pleased about this and said that he “preferred military people”.3

Finally, I asked him whether he would really co-operate in the running of the
referendum. He replied quite sincerely “I will do my best”.

1 No. 65. 2 No. 45.

3 On another copy, Lt. Col. Erskine Crum noted ‘for the edification of PSV, DPSV and APSV :

“Wise man”.’ Mr Abell rejoined: ‘I wonder he didn’t ask for sailors.’ R/3/1/151: f 118.

JUNE I947

151

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) and

Sir F. Burrows [Bengal)

Telegram, R^/i/i^pf 3

immediate new Delhi, 5 June 1947, 9pm

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1318-S. At my press Conference there were a good many questions about
the provisional nature of the boundaries in the Punjab and Bengal. Although it
may be impossible to get the decisions of any Boundary Commission imple¬
mented before the transfer of power it is important that in your conversations
you should stress the provisional nature of the boundaries, and the fact that the
notional partition has only been used in order to enable us to get ahead with the
necessary speed. It should also be stressed that the Boundary Commission will
obviously not consider the matter pre-judged by the fixing of these arbitrary
boundaries, but will go into the merits.

83

Sir O. Caroe (North-West Frontier Province) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten

ofB urma

Telegram, R/j/ 1/131: f 113

immediate 5 June 1947, 10 pm

secret Received: 6 June, 6 am

No. CA/106. My telegram CA/1051 para. No. 5.

2. My Chief Secretary and other officials have suggested that peaceful
referendum would be far more likely if the three issues of Hindustan, Pakistan
and Pathanistan could be put before electors. Apart from probability that
alteration of this kind would secure ministerial cooperation it is argued that
introduction of new issue might split vote on both sides.

3. I understand that Your Excellency in press interview yesterday said that
you were willing to consider Pathanistan issue if all parties agreed.2 From my

1 No. 65.

2 At his Press Conference on 4 June, Lord Mountbatten, in the course of exchanges with press repre¬
sentatives on the demand for an independent Pathan State, was asked: ‘Are the Frontier people free
to select the issue on which they will vote in the referendum?’ He replied: ‘If they can get the High
Commands of the two parties to agree to it, and if they want to vote for independence, I will agree.
If on the other hand only one wishes it, then we stick to what we agreed on originally.’ The Statesman ,
5 June 1947, p. 7, col. 5.

152

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

limited knowledge it seems to me impossible that League could agree and that
introduction of third choice might upset large measure of agreement already
secured between the parties on all-India basis. Moreover reality of case is that
Frontier could never stand alone.

4. Since however those in favour of Pathanistan will carry opposition to
great lengths if issue stands as at present I think considerations here given should
be fully weighed. I think too many advocates of Pathanistan are sincere and
some of Jinnah’s local supporters are not without sympathy for this idea. As
matters stand I shall naturally give no encouragement to suggestions on these
lines.

84

Mr Campbell-] ohnson to Mr Joyce

Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Transfer of Power ,

Publicity Arrangements for Announcement of

important new Delhi, 5 June 1947, 10.20 pm

confidential Received: 5 June, 10.4s pm

No. 1316-S. His Excellency’s Press Conference1 was a tremendous success, and
has done much to clarify and stabilise the situation and control the whole tone
of press comment.

Over 200 correspondents were present, and their reactions were quite the
most enthusiastic I have ever experienced. His Excellency’s performance was
described as a Quote tour de force Unquote.2 He spoke throughout without a
note, and his mastery of his subject made the deepest impression. The Statesman
reports Quote It was a remarkable performance, physical, rhetorical as well as
logical, and a great majority of the journalists must have come away deeply
impressed by the Viceroy’s evidently profound understanding of the Indian
problem. Unquote. Leader comment in the Statesman called it Quote An
Extraordinary achievement of intellect and personality, and by it many lurking
misconceptions should be removed from the public mind. Unquote.

Two critical comments should be noted : —

(1) Hindustan limes, whose Leader states Quote We still hope that it will be
made quite clear in due course that membership of the Commonwealth would
be open only to India as a whole. Unquote. This Leader, undoubtedly inspired
by Devadas Gandhi who asked H.E. the first question on these lines regarding
para. 20 at the Press Conference.3 This subject will need careful background
treatment.

(2) Indian News Chronicle, which stressed Balkanisation danger, arising from

JUNE I947

153

future partition of the States, the argument being that if there is no independent
choice for the NorthWest Frontier Province on the grounds of Balkanisation
danger, what about the States. His Excellency is asked to throw the whole
weight of his influence Quote on the side of progress and fair play, and prevent
the States Ruler [s] playing an anti-national role. Unquote.

On present form, I consider these are likely to be the two most dangerous
points of criticism at this end.

Partition of Punjab as it affects Sikhs, Calcutta and support of Pathanistan
claims in North West Frontier Province will also need watching.

Many thanks for your 7 194, 4 delighted all went so well your end. Release
plans worked very smoothly here and broadcast reception apparently excellent,
your prompt help and advice invaluable.

1 Nos. 59 and 60. 2 See No. 66, penultimate sentence.

3 See No. 60, note 12.

4 In tel. 7194 of 3 June, Mr Joyce described the favourable reception given to the announcement by
the House of Commons, and reported on the smooth operation of the publicity arrangements.
L/I/1/768: f 342.

85

Sir O. Caroe (North-West Frontier Province ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten

of Burma

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: North-West Frontier

Province , Situation in , Part 1(b)

immediate 5 June 1947, 11.10 pm

confidential Received: 6 June , 9 am

192-CB. Moslem League agitation officially called off throughout province by
provincial War Council. No activities 4th except picketing Mansehra where
instructions apparently arrived late. Moslem League jubilant but depression
continues among minorities.

Addressed to Viceroy, Secretary of State, Governor of Punjab, Governor of
Sind.

86

Sir A. Hydari (Assam) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma (Extract)

Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Governor of Assam

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, SHILLONG, 3 June I947
2. I am very sorry that what in recent months seemed inevitable, namely the
rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan, has in fact happened and the unity of
India has at least for some time to come been broken; but my Ministers, while

154

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

regretting in principle the partition of India, were relieved at the rejection of
the Cabinet Mission Plan with the possibility of Assam having to join a Group
with Bengal. They, both Hindu and Muslim (these belong to the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema), were pleased with the Announcement and Assam’s share in it. Mooker-
jee, B. K. Das, Abdul Rashid and Abdul Matlib Majumdar, who all belong to
the Surma Valley, are confident that Sylhet will elect to remain with the rest of
Assam. Medhi and the others do not mind if Sylhet goes to Eastern Bengal;
in fact I suspect that Medhi would be quite pleased if it did. I put the chances at
fifty-fifty.

87

Sir Evelyn Baring 1 to Dominions Office
Telegram , LlP&Jlioj8i: f 333

en Clair 3 June 1947, 6.43 pm

Received: 3 June, 10.23 pm
No. 168. Following is text of statement on India by General Smuts in House of
Assembly 4th June. Begins .

In spite of India’s recent attitude towards South Africa, I hope that she will
not resent my expression of deep interest in settlement2 which Mr Attlee has
just announced in British Parhament. The approval of Mr Churchill3 stamps
that settlement as a national one, and I assume that it will also be approved by
British Commonwealth as a whole. Its principal feature is that British Parlia¬
ment will without delay pass Legislation conferring Dominion status on India,
whether as one state, or as partitioned into two states. The new India will
therefore start as a member of British Commonwealth, but with all freedom
which Dominion status implies. Whether India will be united or divided into
Hindustan and Pakistan will be a decision for Indians themselves to make. Even
the Pakistan Provinces may elect to remain as they are, or to be partitioned
according to their communal affiliations. In these stormy and uncertain times it
must be a matter of no small importance to India that she starts her career
within the grand community of Commonwealth with all the stability and
prestige which that fact implies, and it may well be that, whether as one or as
two Dominions, she may find the advantages of the Commonwealth associa¬
tion outweigh all other considerations and inducements to charter her future
course alone. In that association she will have all the goodwill, sympathy and
co-operation from her fellow members, which may be a precious asset in the
dangerous years to come, and the vast changes they may bring. Ends.

1 British High Commissioner in South Africa. 2 No. 45.

3 For Mr Churchill’s statement see Pari. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 438, 3 June 1947, cols. 41-3.

JUNE I947

155

Mr R. A. Butler to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Mountbatten Papers. Demi-Official Correspondence Files:

Misc. BU-BY

RACQUET AND TENNIS CLUB, 37O PARK AVENUE,

new york, 5 June 1947

My dear Viceroy,

I write from America to congratulate you on what appears from this distance
to have been a most successful start for the future.

The American Press has “carried” very full reports indeed and our country’s
stock appears to have risen.

Please give my regards to Edwina.

Yours sincerely,

R. A. BUTLER1

1 Lord Mountbatten replied on 17 June thanking Mr Butler for his congratulations. He added:

‘I am trying to keep up the momentum of our good start, and hope to be able to carry the thing
through without any major troubles.

I was interested in what you say about the reactions in the American Press. That country is,
generally speaking, more alive than most to the magnitude and complexity of the Indian problem.’

89

Sir A. Clutterbuck to Dominions Office
Telegram , L/POI6li2i: f 9

5 June 1947 , 8.04 pm
Received: 6 June , 7.40 am

No. 496. Your telegram Z. No. 31 of 3rd June.1 India.

Prime Minister released statement to Press on 3rd June and repeated this in
reply to Parliamentary question on following day. Following is text. Begins.

The peoples of India may be assured of the sympathetic understanding and
good will of the Government and people of Canada in their efforts to achieve
self-government.

It is of the utmost importance to the future peace and prosperity of other
countries, as well as of India, that this end should be peacefully achieved, and it
may be taken for granted that once the Indian people as well as their leaders
have reached agreement on their future political status they will find Canada

1 Not traced. Probably a circular notifying text of statement.

156

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

generously pre-disposed towards self-government. The result may be to enlarge
the number of states within the British Commonwealth. Ends.

2. In reply to supplementary question as to whether Canada has “consented”
to new proposals for India, Mr Mackenzie King said that in accordance with
general procedure Canadian Government had been kept fully informed and had
been asked if they wished to make any comment, but that this to his mind meant
something different from consultation. The reply given to the United Kingdom
Government would be clear from the statement he had just read.2

3 . Full text of Prime Minister’s remarks follows by air mail.3

4. Initial comments of press in Eastern Canada generally express great
pleasure at the possibility of India remaining in the Commonwealth, though
there is some anxiety about the prospects of partition. Warm praise is given to
the Prime Minister and to the Viceroy. Editorials emphasise this further proof
of Britain’s sincerity, saying that the Prime Minister’s announcement “is
stamped indelibly with good faith of Britain” ( Ottawa Journal). The Montreal
Daily Star commenting on the offer of Dominion status says “They will be as
free in the Commonwealth as they would be outside and at the same time enjoy
the inestimable advantages of close association with Britain and the Dominions.
Our experience can help India to find peace and unity even if it should be
necessary to find them in diversity of Government”. News reports have given
prominence to tributes to Mr Attlee and Viceroy and to Mr Churchill’s
expression of satisfaction at the latest developments.

5. The only hostile criticism so far appeared in the insignificant and Com¬
munist controlled Daily Tribune which declared that the new plan is a deliberate
manoeuvre to retain British imperial control and that its outstanding achieve¬
ment “is to assure that the vast treasures of India will continue to pour into
British coffers”.

6. I will report further on press reactions.

2 On 7 June 1947 Sir E. Maclitig sent a copy of this telegram to the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary
drawing attention to para. 2, and adding : ‘It establishes that we should have run into considerable
difficulties if our statement [No. 45] had contained the words “after consultation with Dominions”,
as was at one time proposed.’ [see Vol. X, No. 518]. R/30/1/11: f 96.

3 For the full text of Mr Mackenzie King’s remarks, see the Canadian House of Commons Debates , 4 June
1947.

JUNE 1947

157

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary of State

PRIVATE AND TOP SECRET 5 June I947

I see from his letter of the 26th May1 that Sir John Colville kept you in the
picture during my time in England of what was happening out here. My letter
this week will be brief as I naturally have none from you to answer, and the last
few days have been fully occupied with the meetings with the Indian leaders,
to which I have referred in the attached Personal Report.2

2. I think you will like to know that the Honourable Mr. Jagjivan Ram, the
Labour Member, is leading the Indian Delegation to the next Session of the
International Labour Conference at Geneva on the 19th June, 1947. This will be
his first visit abroad and Sir John Colville, who saw him recently, told me that
he was quite excited about it. He is particularly looking forward to his visit to
London and I should be very grateful if he could be given the opportunity to
meet people and to see something of London, where I gather he intends to be
from 27th June to 2nd July. He is a charming little man and quite remarkable
for an “untouchable”.

3. The question of dealing with outstanding appeals from the Privy Council
after demission of power has been exercising attention out here. This is a matter
for which provision must be made in the future constitutions drawn up by
successor authorities and also I suggest might appropriately be included in any
Treaty drawn up by H.M.G. with such authorities.

4. If the whole or any part of India remains within the Commonwealth then
I understand that it is possible by agreement for the Privy Council to be used by
Commonwealth members as the final appellate authority. This matter cannot
be the subject of a definite recommendation at present, but I thought it might be
useful if I mentioned it to you, in order that you could have a preliminary
examination made at your end.

5. Sir John Colville returned to Bombay on Sunday; this is the fourth time
he has officiated in the absence of the Viceroy in England and I have heard from
all sides since my return that he has officiated once again with his customary
ability and charm. I think Ramamurty had a very good fortnight’s experience
at Bombay and I have just received a useful fortnightly report from him, of
which I think you have a copy.3 I understand that he brought 16 members of
his family to live in Government House during his fortnight and had all three
Government houses in the Bombay Presidency opened, and entertained
lavishly.

1 Vol. X, No. 542. 2 No. 91. 3 Dated. 30 May 1947* L/P &J/5/168: ff 51-6.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

91

Viceroy's Personal Report No. 8l
L/POI6/12J: ff 114-21

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET 5 June I947

I got back from London late on the night of Friday the 30th May, but decided
I would not see any leader, formally, before the meeting on Monday. It was
essential, however, to find out the latest position about Bengal, so I arranged
for Mieville to see Suhrawardy and bring him into me (so that the interview
would not appear in the Court Circular).2 I was distressed to learn from
Suhrawardy that Kiran Shankar Roy had been unable to persuade the Congress
High Command to allow Bengal to vote for independence. Suhrawardy
pleaded for Calcutta to be allowed to be a free city during the period of
partition, since he felt that in this period communal bitterness would thus be
relaxed and sufficient confidence might be re-established for the Congress
eventually to decide to leave it a free city. Otherwise he feared that nothing he
could do would prevent riots and great damage in the City before partition. I
sent V. P. Menon to see Patel to obtain his agreement to six months joint
control of Calcutta. Patel's reply was very firm: “Not even for six hours !”

2. On Saturday evening I attended a cocktail party given by the new Chinese
Ambassador, which gave me an opportunity of meeting all the political leaders
socially. They were not slow to attack. Nehru insisted that the Congress
representation at the meetings should include Kripalani, and he said that if I
would not increase the numbers he would himself stand down in favour of
Kripalani.3 I then tackled Jinnah and Liaquat, who were most averse from
allowing Kripalani in. Finally, however, all-round agreement was reached that
Kripalani should be added to the Congress team and Nishtar to the League.

3. Jinnah tackled me on the need for a referendum on the question of Bengal
or at least Calcutta, to give the Scheduled Castes the chance of expressing their
dissatisfaction with Caste Hindus. I refused to be drawn.

4. My wife bought a series of small presents in London for the women folk
of all the leaders which were despatched on Saturday and received the most
enthusiastic letters back on Sunday.

5. Very bad riots were in full swing once more in the Gurgaon District of
the Punjab, not far from Delhi. I sent an aeroplane for the Governor, Jenkins;
met him at Palam airfield ; and motored with him to the riot areas.4 The trouble
appears to have been started by the Hindus this time, who, four days after a
Peace Committee meeting, which was reported to have passed off very satis¬
factorily, attacked a Meo village. (The Meos are the aborigines of this district

JUNE I947

159

and Muslims by religion). Naturally, this led to reprisals by the Meos and
fighting was at that time in full swing up and down a 50 mile front; with only
three companies of Sikhs and one of Gurkhas to try and quell it. I visited the
Battalion and two Company Headquarters, and talked to a young officer who
with half a dozen men had dispersed an armed crowd of 5000.

6. A new feature of the fighting has been the increase in the use of fire arms
and home-made trench mortars, and direct unprovoked attacks on soldiers.

7. The District Commissioner reported to me that the Home Member,
Patel, and the Defence Member, Baldev Singh, had visited the battlefront two
days previously and had invited the District Commissioner to stamp out this
lawlessness ruthlessly. The District Commissioner took them to a village which
at that time was ablaze and the two Members found that it was the Hindu
community which was busy setting the village on fire.

8. However, each community appears to have destroyed almost an equal
number of the other’s villages, the total now exceeding sixty. I could not help
feeling that this renewed outbreak of violence, on the eve of the meeting with
the leaders, might influence them to accept the plan which was about to be laid
before them.

9. We went round the Baptist Mission hospital at Palwal, where there were a
lot of horribly wounded and mutilated casualties from the fighting. The
hospital was not equipped for such an additional influx and my wife, who had
accompanied us, arranged to have all their shortages and supplies made good as
soon as possible.

10. On my return from Gurgaon I had the Nawab of Bhopal and the
Maharaja of Bikaner to lunch and saw them separately afterwards.5 Bikaner of
course was delighted to hear the way things were going and said that the pros¬
pect of Dominion Status would make the greatest difference to the feeling of the
Princes who had joined, or were about to join, the Constituent Assembly.

11. The Nawab of Bhopal, after I had explained the plan to him said “Once
more His Majesty’s Government have left the Princes in the lurch, because we
could have joined the weak Centre envisaged by the Cabinet Mission scheme,
but now there will be a tight Centre, whichever Dominion we join, which will
utterly destroy us.” I tried to impress on him that the only certain destruction of
the Princes’ personal position would be if they tried to stand out as independent

1 On 10 June Mr Attlee sent Lord Mountbatten the following personal message: ‘I have read your
personal report No. 8 with great interest. I am impressed with the great skill you have shown in these
critical proceedings. We are working hard on the draft legislation/ India Office tel. 7463 of 10 June
1947. P.R.O. PREM 8/578.

2 See Nos. 2, Item 2, and 10. 3 cf. No. 4.

♦ On 1 June 1947. 5 See No. 17, Item 1.

i6o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

areas; but nothing I could say could shake him from his intentions to do so.

12. On Monday at io o’clock the first meeting6 of the Indian leaders took
place in my study, with the following present : —

Congress: Nehru, Patel, Kripalani.

League: Jinnah, Liaquat, Nish tar.

Sikhs : Baldev.

The eight of us sat round a small table, while Ismay, Mieville and my Conference
Secretary sat immediately behind me. The atmosphere was tense and I got the
feeling that the less the leaders talked the less the chance of friction and perhaps
the ultimate breakdown of the meeting. After a tense beginning the atmos¬
phere became generally friendly and distinctly hopeful; particularly when I
reported on the most helpful attitude of His Majesty’s Government and the
Opposition.

13. I asked the leaders to let me have their replies before midnight. Kripalani
and Baldev promised me letters and Jinnah said he would come in person at
11 p.m. after they had seen their Working Committees. I kept back Jinnah
after the meeting on Monday morning, both to counter-balance the fact that I
was seeing Gandhi separately (he never comes with the Congress leaders), and
to impress on him that there could not be any question of a “No” from the
League.

14. Since Gandhi returned to Delhi on the 24th May, he has been carrying
out an intense propaganda against the new plan, and although I have always
been led to understand he was the man who got Congress to turn down the
Cabinet Mission plan a year ago he was now busy trying to force the Cabinet
Mission plan on the country.7 He may be a saint but he seems also to be a
disciple of Trotsky. I gather that the meetings of the Congress Working
Committee have been most acrimonious in consequence, and I believe the
leaders were quite apprehensive of my seeing Gandhi on Monday. I certainly
was. Judge then of my astonished delight on finding him enter the room with
his finger to his lips to indicate that it was his day of silence !8

15. I spent 45 minutes explaining to him why the Cabinet Mission plan
could not be enforced against the will of any community, and generally trying
to break down his resistance to the new plan. He scribbled me a few notes on
the back of used envelopes, of a friendly nature, but once more called on me to
remove Caroe from the N.W.F.P., a request which has now been renewed by
both Nehru9 and Khan Sahib10 (the Premier of the N.W.F.P.).

16. On Monday evening between the two meetings by a happy coincidence
General Slim and I had arranged large reunions of the holders of the Burma
Star to take place simultaneously in London and Delhi. I collected over a
thousand of all ranks, all services and all communities — British and Indian. We

JUNE I947

l6l

exchanged messages of goodwill with the London gathering, which received
favourable publicity in Tuesday’s Delhi press and which helped to create a good
atmosphere for His Majesty’s Government’s announcement.

17. I had invited the Commanders-in-Chief and Army Commanders to
come to this party and gave them dinner after it. I then had a meeting with
them, gave them the plan, and discussed the steps which would be needed to
ensure the maintenance of law and order in the interim period and also how to
carry out partition of the armed forces without loss of morale. I need hardly
say that the plan proved a great surprise to everybody (except of course to
Auchinleck) and was enthusiastically received as the only possible solution to the
problem.

18. At 11 o’clock that night Jinnah came round.11 He spent half an hour
conveying the protest of his Working Committee against the partition of the
Provinces and saying that if His Majesty’s Government were really going to
insist on this scandalous move, then his Working Committee hoped most
strongly that they would at least do justice to the Scheduled Castes in Bengal
by insisting on a proper referendum. I reminded him that I had explained at
great length at the meeting that morning the Governor’s reasons against a
referendum and that I did not in any case intend to accept any amendment of
the printed plan unless it was agreed to by all parties.

19. I then asked him straight out whether his Working Committee were
going to accept the plan. He replied that they were “hopeful”. I then asked
him whether he intended to accept it himself, to which he replied that he would
support me personally and undertook to use his very best endeavours to get the
All-India Muslim League Council to accept it. He had called an urgent meeting
next Monday for this purpose. I finally asked him whether he felt I would be
justified in advising the Prime Minister to go ahead and make the announce¬
ment, to which he replied very firmly “Yes”. Ismay, who was present, and I
both felt that this was as much of an acceptance as we should ever get out of
him until his Council met.

20. Shortly after Jinnah left, the letter12 came on behalf of the Congress
Working Committee from Kripalani. It was quite a long letter, a copy of which
has been sent home. Although it contained various objections and reservations
it was a firm acceptance on behalf of the whole Congress Working Com¬
mittee; subject of course to general ratification by the All-India Congress
Committee in about a fortnight’s time.

21. Baldev Singh’s letter13 was only received on Tuesday morning and also

6 No. 23. 7 See No. 2, note 5. 8 No. 24. 9 No. 61.

10 No. 81. 11 See Nos. 38 and 53, para. 6. 12 No. 35. 13 No. 36.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

162

contained reservations about instructions to the Boundary Commission on
behalf of the Sikhs, though it accepted the plan in other respects.

22. I called an early morning meeting14 of my Staff to discuss the two main
objections raised by Congress, and I despatched V. P. Menon to see Patel,15
and invited Nehru to come at 9.30 a.m. to see me before the meeting.

23. The line I took about these two points with Nehru was as follows: —

(a) The Congress request to allow the N.W.F.P. referendum to include a
third choice — for independence — could not be accepted unless the Muslim
League leaders agreed to it, which Nehru admitted was out of the question. I
further pointed out that it was at Nehru’s own request that I had removed the
choice of independence in the case of Bengal and other provinces to avoid
“Balkanisation”. I expressed surprise that he should have been a party to such a
manoeuvre, the more so since he admitted that this Province could not stand on
its own, and would eventually have to join up with one side or the other in any
case.

(b) The last sentence of the new paragraph 20 produced a strong reaction.
This reads as follows: —

“This will be without prejudice to the right of the Indian Constituent

Assemblies to decide in due course whether or not the part of India in respect

of which they have authority will remain within the British Common¬
wealth.”

It may be remembered that this was the sentence which I thought in London
might give trouble and which I had favoured omitting.16 Nehru began by
saying he did not doubt my sincerity or that of His Majesty’s Government, but
that this sentence drew attention to the fact that Pakistan would be allowed to
remain within the Commonwealth even if Hindustan wished to withdraw. I
pointed out that what the sentence really drew attention to was the fact that
either side could withdraw whenever they liked. Nehru replied “But everybody
knows that; why did you have to draw public attention to the fact that one
side could stay in if the other side withdraws?”.

I replied that this was done from motives of honesty. He argued that His
Majesty’s Government could not be a party to allowing Pakistan to remain in
the Empire if Hindustan wished eventually to withdraw7. 1 pointed out that His
Majesty’s Government did not run the Commonwealth; that all the States in
it were free and equal partners; and that the only method open to him for
getting Pakistan out would be either by persuading them to withdraw at the
same time as Hindustan, or raising the matter at a Commonwealth conference
and getting the other Dominions to agree to this course. Finally I told him that
I had no intention of raising such a controversial matter which would only
infuriate Mr. Jinnah. We then went into the meeting.17

24. Once more at this second meeting I was afraid to let the leaders speak and

JUNE I947

163

so I spoke for each of them in turn, pointing out that as we had all expected
all three parties had grave objections to the various points in the plan, and that I
was gratified to find that they had aired them to me. Since, however, I knew
enough of the situation to realise that not one of the suggestions would be
accepted by either of the other parties I did not propose to raise them at this
meeting, and asked all the leaders to signify their consent, which they did.

25. The very moment I felt that I had got enough agreement on which to
go ahead I announced this decision and then threw on the table copies of a
lengthy paper prepared by my staff entitled “The Administrative Consequences
of Partition”.18 The severe shock that this gave to everyone present would have
been amusing if it was not rather tragic. I arranged to call another meeting on
Thursday to consider it, and then broke up the meeting as quickly as I could.

26. On Tuesday afternoon I saw Giani Kartar Singh. He surprised me by
saying that when the bitterness had died down he would be prepared to see Mr.
Jinnah and make the best terms he could for the Sikhs, who would come into
Pakistan. Needless to say I much encouraged this. He also promised that the
Sikh community would not fight so long as the British were present. While
expressing my gratification at this, I pointed out that they would be hit just as
hard by the Indian armed forces after the transfer of power as before, and I
hoped the Sikhs would not be so foolish as to commit virtual suicide.

27. At 4 o’clock on Tuesday afternoon19 I saw the fourteen members of the
States Negotiating Committee and gave them the printed plan, and explained
it. It was surprisingly well received considering the difficulty pointed out by the
Chancellor, His Highness of Bhopal.20 In general the Committee agreed that
the next two months must be utilised for negotiating temporary agreements on
a stand-still basis to allow time for proper agreements to be entered into in due
course.

28. The three leaders had promised to broadcast that evening after me,
asking that the plan should be accepted as peaceably as possible by their
followers. At 7 o’clock I met them at the All-India Radio studio, and we made
our broadcasts.21 The faces of the Muslim Leaguers when Nehru talked about
allowing parts of India to secede from the Union were matched only by the
expressions of dismay on the faces of the Congress members present when
Jinnah made a violent electioneering speech about the N.W.F.P. However, I
succeeded in jollying them out of their gloom.

14

15

16

17

20

There appears to be no record of this meeting among the Minutes of the Viceroy’s Staff Meetings
in the Mountbatten Papers.

See No. 53.

The relevant India and Burma Committee Minute (Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 3) does not record
Lord Mountbatten’s view on this point, but cf. Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 2, p. 918.

No. 39. 18 No. 28.

See above, para. 11.

19 No. 43.
Nos. 44-48.

21

164

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

29. At ten o’clock on Wednesday morning I held a Press conference in the
Constituent Assembly Hall, attended by upwards of 200 press men.22 For two
and a quarter hours I was under violent cross-fire on every conceivable subject,
but mostly about the Sikhs, about the States, and about Pakistan being allowed
to retain dominion status. I luckily knew my subject pretty well, having been
immersed in it for two months, and feel I was able to answer all the questions
to most people’s satisfaction. At all events the follow up in all sections of today’s
press has been more favourable than the most sanguine of us could have hoped
for.

30. Suhrawardy came to see me again after the announcement.23 For a
Muslim leader living in West Bengal he showed surprising courage and
determination to build a worthwhile Eastern Pakistan. He was already full of
plans, the principal one being to mortgage the whole of the jute crops of Bengal
to acquire the necessary machinery, power plants etc., to put Eastern Bengal
on its feet. He said he had already had a number of interesting offers from
American business men, but had been disappointed that no British interests
had come forward. I arranged for Mieville to put him in touch with Shone
since I pointed out that I was not here to look after British interests myself.

31. This morning24 I held my third meeting with the leaders to discuss the
paper on the administrative consequences of partition. We made very slow
progress as each side appeared to be anxious to make political speeches. Jinnah
was at pains to explain that both States would be independent and equal in every
way. Nehru pointed out that the whole basis of approach must be different;
India was continuing in every way the same, and the fact that dissident Pro¬
vinces were to be allowed to secede must not interrupt the work of the Govern¬
ment of India or its foreign policy. Feeling was very tense.

32. Both sides were still very anxious to obtain my services as arbitrator in
all matters of dispute in working out the partition. But I pointed out that since
both sides were already approaching the problem from such widely divergent
points of view it was clear that I should have to give a decision which one side
or the other side would dislike practically every day, and however much they
now professed to believe in my impartiality, such a procedure could not fail to
undermine their confidence in me within a very short time. I therefore felt I
should not be of much use to them in this capacity and I am glad to say they
agreed to try and find a mutually acceptable High Court Judge to fulfil this
role.

33. This afternoon I received a telegram25 from Caroe saying that in the
absence of the Premier he had seen two members of the Government who said
they refused to accept paragraph 4 of the announcement and would not in any
circumstances co-operate in the referendum. I immediately sent for Khan

JUNE 1947

Sahib26 and told him that I could not possibly accept his attitude and he
promised to fly back to the Frontier to-morrow and get their people to accept
paragraph 4 and help with the referendum.

34. A number of people whom I have met since the announcement have all
told me they believe the communal tension to have been greatly relieved by
this announcement and that a new feeling of hope and expectancy was abroad,
at all events throughout Delhi. I am under no illusion that to retain this spirit
will require the most careful handling of the situation; for the smallest high
level incident could upset it again.

M OF B

22 Nos. 59 and 60. 23 No record of this interview has been traced.

24 No. 73. 25 No. 65. 26 No. 81.

92

Sir T. Shone to Sir N. Brook
Telegram , L/E/^/4^75: ff 161-2

no cop new Delhi, 6 June 1947, 2.30 am

personal and confidential Received: 6 June , 11.40 am

IRKU 360. Your UKRI 292.1

I fully agree with what you say in paragraph 1 about importance of post which
will presumably have to be set up in capital of Pakistan and was about to write
to you on the subject. (Indeed I have been wondering whether it may not prove
impracticable to have one High Commissioner for the whole of India as a
permanent arrangement in the conditions which seem likely to develop). It had
also occured to me that Gfrafftey] Sfmith] might now be better placed in
Pakistan (wherever its capital is to be), than in Calcutta. I also think we shall
need an outpost in Pakistan at Karachi (if it is not the capital) at an early date
and probably Peshawar or Rawalpindi as well. If Eastern Bengal is to be
covered, I do not think this can be done from Calcutta if Calcutta is in Hin¬
dustan. We may therefore need an outpost at Chittagong.

2. Even if Hindustan and Pakistan stay in the British Commonwealth, I
think they will present very different problems from those in any other

1 Tel. UKRI 292 of 3 June dealt with the provision of staff for outposts of the U.K. High Commission
in Calcutta and elsewhere in the sub-continent. Its first para, stated that: ‘Foreign Office are bringing
Gfrafftey] Sfmith] home from Jedda with a view to his taking up post at Calcutta. Recent develop¬
ments in the Indian situation, however, make it likely that in addition to the posts to be filled at
Calcutta and Bombay, there will be a post at Lahore or elsewhere in N.W. Pakistan of at least equal
political status and importance to that of Calcutta and it may be that G.S. would be suitable for this
post.’ L/S &G/7/1285.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

1 66

Dominion. We ought not I feel to appear to be treating Pakistan scurvily in
comparison with Hindustan especially as it will have more need of help to get
on its legs — at least economically — for which I imagine it will look primarily to
us. And its position on the map gives it strategic importance. These are only
first thoughts about what is admittedly a rather uncertain future, but I think it
as well to let you have them.

Paras. 3-6, on the provision of staff for various outposts in India and
Pakistan, omitted.]

Minutes of Viceroy s Thirty Ninth Staff Meeting , Items 11 and 14

Mountbatten Papers

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's House, New Delhi, on 6 June
ig47 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Lord Ismay,
Sir E. Mieville, Mr Abell, Mr Christie, Captain Brockman, Mr L D. Scott, Mr
Campbell-Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Item 11

Pakistan's diplomatic representation
his excellency the viceroy said that it was his hope that Pakistan, which
was bound to be a poor country, at any rate in the initial stages, would not set
up diplomatic missions in too many foreign countries. They would probably
wish to have their own representation in the United Kingdom, U.S.A. and
certain Middle East Muslim countries; but it was to be hoped that they would
share either British or Hindustan representatives elsewhere.

Item 14

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION

Copies were handed round of a letter1 which had been received from Pandit
Nehru that morning concerning the previous day’s discussion in a meeting2
with the seven Indian Leaders, of the paper entitled “The Administrative
Consequences of Partition”.3 In this letter Pandit Nehru also reiterated his
view that he did not like the idea of the Interim Government carrying on in the
present manner for another two months.

his excellency the viceroy said that he had arranged for Rao Bahadur
Menon to discuss this matter with Pandit Nehru. He noted that in his letter the

JUNE 1947

167

latter suggested that he (The Viceroy) should discuss it with Mr Krishna
Menon. He pointed out that Pandit Nehru was continually asking him to see
Krishna Menon. Whatever the merits of using the latter as a “contact man”
might be, it was clear that Mr Krishna Menon was Pandit Nehru’s right-hand
man.

lord ismay gave his view that such contact through Mr Krishna Menon
had been extremely useful in London, where political issues had been under
discussion and where Pandit Nehru was not available. On the other hand,
Pandit Nehru was nearly always available in Delhi and the present discussions
were on administrative and not political matters. Perhaps The Viceroy might
wish to point this out to Pandit Nehru and to suggest that Mr Krishna Menon’s
services as a link were no longer of such value as they had been.

Copies were then handed round of two notes by The Viceroy’s Staff on the
Administrative Consequences of Partition. Copies of one4 of these had been
circulated to Honourable Members for discussion at the Cabinet Meeting that
evening. It was intended to circulate the other5 to the seven Indian Leaders for
discussion at the conference the following day. To the latter The Viceroy
dictated certain amendments. He said that he would see Mr Jinnah and Mr
Liaquat Ali Khan after the meeting the following day, for a preliminary
discussion of the personnel and terms of reference of the Boundary Commis¬
sions.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

invited C.V.S. to circulate to the seven Indian Leaders the note prepared
by the Staff on the Administrative Consequences of Partition, for the
meeting the following day; and to invite the Muslim League representa¬
tives to stay behind after the meeting for a preliminary discussion of the
personnel and terms of reference of the Boundary Commissions.

1 No. 80. 2 No. 73, Item 1. 3 No. 28.

4 This note explained the conclusions reached in No. 73, Item 1. Mountbatten Papers, Official Corres¬
pondence Files: Partition, Administrative Consequences of.

5 Not traced.

94

Sir C. Corfield to Mr Abell

R/3l1l137: f $

SECRET POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI , 6 June 1 947

My dear Abell,

Please refer to my secret letter of the 5th June1 dealing with Pandit Nehru’s
objections2 to the States dealing directly with the various Departments of the
Central Government.

1 No. 74.

2 No. 68.

i68

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The question was discussed by His Excellency today with certain Rulers and
Dewans,3 and it was agreed that His Excellency should explain to Pandit
Nehru that the unanimous view of States was that for the purpose of such
dealings they would be opposed to the location of agents of the Central or
Dominion Government in their territories, but that if any additional liaison was
considered necessary by those Governments, beyond that already being ar¬
ranged by direct correspondence ( vide Political Department Memorandum, No.
F.24-R(S) / 47 of the 17th April 1947 of which a copy is enclosed)4 they would be
prepared to locate their own agents at the headquarters of the appropriate
Government, to represent either a single State or a group of States as they
thought best.

It was mentioned during the discussion that the appointment of local agents
in States by a Dominion Government would lead inevitably to paramountcy
being inherited by that Government : that States had the right of first refusal for
the purchase of any property in States now belonging to the paramount
power: that though this property had been acquired at the cost of Central
Revenues, those revenues were subscribed to by States through the payment
of tribute and other indirect contributions to the Central exchequer : and that
this property would in many cases be required for administrative purposes by
individual States and by the joint organizations which they were setting up for
regional groups.

It was suggested that as soon as these representatives had been located at the
headquarters of the appropriate Government paramountcy could well lapse in
respect of the States so represented, i.e. in advance of the 15th August. It should
be possible to make these appointments by the 1st July and it was all the more
necessary therefore that the arrangements for retroceding jurisdiction in States
should be expedited.

His Excellency thought it might be as well, after warning Pandit Nehru, to
discuss this question with the seven British Indian political leaders as a general
issue affecting both Dominions. After that discussion a letter on the lines of the
enclosed draft5 (which was considered suitable by Sir Ramaswamy Mudaliar
and Mr Sreenivasan) could issue to Residents.

Yours sincerely,

C. L. C ORFIELD

3 Those present at this meeting were: Lord Mountbatten, the Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, the Raja of
Bilaspur, Sir R. Mudaliar, Mr Sreenivasan, Sir C. Corfield, Lord Ismay and Sir E. Mieville. Note by
Sir E. Mieville, 6 June 1947. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Interviews (2).

4 R/3/1/136: f 56.

5 This draft explained to Residents that, as doubt had been expressed whether direct correspondence
would ensure adequate liaison between the States and the Central Governments, it was suggested
that each State or group of States should appoint an officer to be located at the headquarters of the
appropriate Government. Residents were asked to enquire whether States would be prepared to do
this, and the draft concluded by stating that it had been suggested that the only satisfactory alternative
would be the location of agents of the Central Governments in the territories of the States.

JUNE I947

Meeting of the Indian Cabinet Case No. 1 37/30 / 47

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Partition , Administrative

Consequences of

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held on 6 June 1947 at 6 pm were: Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , Pandit Nehru, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Patel,
Mr Chundrigar, Dr Rajendra Prasad, Mr Abdur Rab Nishtar, Maulana Azad, Mr
Rajagopalachari, Dr Matthai, Mr Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Sardar Baldev Singh, Mr
Jagjivan Ram, MrBhabha, Mr Mandal; Mr Abell, Mr H. M. Patel, Mr Osman Ali
(. Secretariat )

Case No. 137/30/47. Administrative Consequences of Partition

MINUTES

His Excellency said that he wished to explain the reasons that prompted him to
discuss the paper on the administrative consequences of partition at his meeting
this morning1 with the 7 Indian leaders before putting it to his colleagues. Speed
was of the essence since the target date fixed was the 15th August both for
putting through the Parliamentary legislation and for the work that had to be
done here, and he thought it would help in setting up the requisite machinery
with the utmost expedition, if he could ascertain the views of the leaders, five of
whom were, in any case, members of the Cabinet. It was almost certain that the
vote in the Provincial Legislatures would be for Pakistan. Consequently, we
should very soon have two sovereign Governments in existence. The only
bodies which at present could be said to represent them were the Congress and
the League. He had, therefore, felt that there were good and sufficient reasons
for including the respective Presidents of those organisations in those discus¬
sions. He had now taken the earliest opportunity of placing before the Cabinet
the paper2 prepared by his staff on the administrative consequences of partition
as revised in the light of those talks.

Continuing, His Excellency said that the time factor was so pressing that he
considered it essential that the proposed partition committee should be a whole
time body and, should, therefore, be separate from the Cabinet. He sought the
approval of his colleagues to its being given plenary powers by means of an
order in Council to call for such information as it required and to take decisions.
He himself would offer the benefit of his own experience and that of his per¬
sonal staff to assist in working out and putting in a clear form before those who

1 Actually the previous morning: see No. 73, Item 1.

2 See No. 93, note 4.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

170

would have to make the decisions, the details and possible alternatives which
they would, of course, be at liberty to accept or reject. A possibility which had
since occurred to him was that it might be desirable to have both a partition
committee and a tribunal of carefully selected judges.

In the course of subsequent discussion the following points were made : —

(1) The Partition Committee, which might more appropriately be called a
Separation Committee, would deal with an existing Government on the one
hand and an embryonic State on the other. Partition, moreover, would cover
the whole range of Governmental activity, and it would create an anomalous
position for the Cabinet to have a Committee independent of itself. The
Committee should, therefore, be formed by and derive its powers from the
Cabinet. Its composition would, of course, have to be decided by agreement
between the parties.

(2) Differences, when they arose, would be very largely on a political plane,
and it would be more expeditious if the Committee were to be presided over by
His Excellency the Viceroy. If these differences were referred to a Judge
Umpire or a judicial tribunal, there would arise serious delay.

His Excellency did not, however, wish to be placed in a position when he
would have to arbitrate. With the best will in the world, very soon, he would
displease one or the other, if not both parties, since the tendency inevitably
would be for each side to forget decisions given in its favour, and only to
remember those given against it ! His Excellency would, of course, be prepared
to assist by presiding and in his capacity as Chairman endeavour to get the
differences resolved by argument and discussion, and when agreement proved
impossible, at least to get the differences reduced to a minimum, and thereafter
to refer them to a judicial tribunal, which would be an impartial body (but not
a higher authority) and which would be directed to give its decision within a
specified period of time.

(3) it was inadvisable to create a new standing tribunal to which every one
would look for final decisions. If it was considered desirable to refer any
particular problems to the tribunal for a decision, an ad hoc body could be set
up for that purpose. The composition of such a tribunal or tribunals would, of
course, have to be settled beforehand so that it or they could be called into being
at a moment’s notice. It was essential that the embryonic Governments should
bind themselves to accept the decision of such a tribunal.

(4) Since the Committee would have to enquire into the business of the
Government of India which was only in official knowledge, it was undesirable
that outsiders should be associated with it. Moreover, the tendency would be
for the Secretariat staff to regard the Committee as a supreme body and it would
not be possible for Hon’ble Members to carry out their ordinary administrative
duties in that atmosphere. Consequently, if any persons had to be appointed on
the Committee who were not already members of the Cabinet, they should

JUNE 1947

171

first be made members of the Cabinet. It was contended that the Committee
would only be collecting material and no question of divided allegiance among
the Secretariat staff need arise.

(5) Prior to the legal decision on the question of partition it would be odd to
set up a body composed of persons not in the Cabinet, thereby giving to the
world the incorrect impression that division had already been decided upon. It
would, however, be in keeping with normal practice for the Cabinet to appoint
a Committee of its own. This could proceed to create the detailed machinery
necessary but need not take decisions until the question of partition had been
legally decided by the vote of the Provincial Legislatures, and a Partition
Committee set up.

Summing up, His Excellency said that we were dealing with an unprece¬
dented problem. We had only 71 days in which we had to solve it. He would
put the procedure which appeared generally to be agreed upon before the
leaders tomorrow for their acceptance.

DECISION

The Cabinet agreed:

(1) that a Committee of the Cabinet should be appointed with H.E. the
Viceroy as Chairman to work out the machinery for implementing the parti¬
tion (and that H.E. should consult the leaders informally regarding its composi¬
tion).

(2) that the Committee’s report should be completed as early as possible and
placed before the Cabinet for consideration, (and that H.E. should, if possible,
obtain the leaders’ reaction to it beforehand).

(3) that when the question of partition had been legally decided, and after the
members of the existing Cabinet had resigned, a Separation Committee should
be set up by His Excellency in consultation with the leaders, with H.E. as
Chairman. It was noted that H.E. would not act as arbitrator in this Committee
but would merely assist in resolving differences between the two parties or at
least in reducing them to the minimum.

(4) that there should be set up along with the Separation Committee a
standing tribunal or a panel of umpires to whom points of difference, which
could not be resolved, could be referred.

(5) The material collected by the Cabinet Committee and details of the
machinery set up will be placed before the Partition Committee for ratification.

172

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

96

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir O. Caroe (North-West

Frontier Province)1

R/jI 1/170: ff 21-2

strictly personal 6 June 1947

No. 1450
Dear Sir Olaf,

When we first met2 in India, I gave you my assurance that I would give you my
utmost support and backing so long as you held your present difficult appoint¬
ment: but I thought it only fair to give you warning that circumstances might
arise in which I should be compelled to ask you for your resignation, since, in
these momentous days, personal considerations are a small thing compared to
the public weal.

I am afraid that I have recently been bombarded again by representations3
from your detractors (whom I need not name) to the effect that there is no hope
of peace, nor of a fair and orderly referendum, in the NWFP so long as you
hold the reins of office. I do not have to tell you that I myself have a high
opinion of your capacity, integrity and selfless devotion to duty under an
immense strain: but I feel that the time has come when I must, for the moment
at any rate, replace you as Governor of the NWFP.

On the other hand, I am most anxious that this grave step should be taken so
far as possible without injury to yourself, and without closing the door to your
further employment in India if you were so to desire: and in this matter
developments have presented me with the possibility of a satisfactory solution.

I am aiming at transferring power to Hindustan and Pakistan by 15 th August,
and shortly before that date I shall call on all the present Governors and Chief
Commissioners to place their resignations in my hands. It will then be a matter
for the Governments of the two new States to reappoint those Governors
whom they wish to retain. My proposal, therefore, is that you should go on
leave as soon as it can be arranged for your temporary successor to arrive, and
that you should remain on leave until 15th August, or such date as the two new
Governments are in a position to select the new Provincial Governors. It is
clear to me that if Congress win the NWFP, there would not be the slightest
chance that they would reappoint you as Governor. On the other hand, if the
Province goes to Pakistan, it may very well be that the Pakistan Government,
who, I believe, share my high opinion of you, would ask for you to be re¬
appointed.

I suggest to you that the course that I propose has solid advantages. In the
first place, it will strengthen my hand with Congress, who will not hesitate to

JUNE 1947

173

say, if you are Governor during the referendum and if they lose, that you
enabled the League to win with a view to your remaining as Governor on the
League s advice. Secondly, it will give you the respite that you have richly
deserved. Thirdly, it does not close the door to your future employment.
Fourthly, it will mean that the referendum will be carried through entirely by
soldiers, since I am proposing to H.M.G. that General Lockhart should be
seconded— not retired — from the Army in order to officiate as Governor,
NWFP, until the transfer of power.

I am sure that you will understand my motives in making this suggestion and
I shall be glad to have your reactions as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 When Lord Ismay submitted the draft of this letter he stated that it had been agreed by Sir E. Mieville
and Mr Abell. R/3/1/170: f 20.

2 Vol. X, No. 143. 3 See Nos. 24, 61 and 81.

97

Sir E. Jenkins [Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Part 11(a)

SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 6 June 1Q47

No. 680

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Abell will no doubt have told Your Excellency of our discussion on the
evening of 5th June1 about the further time-table for proceedings in the Punjab
under the partition plan.

2. I have today sanctioned the appointment of a Partition Commissioner, a
member of the Indian Civil Service named Sachdev, who will, I think, do very
well. Sachdev has recently been employed as Secretary of our Civil Supphes
Department, and I can ill-spare him for the new appointment. But the Depart¬
ment has a capable Additional Secretary who will, I hope, be able to carry on.
I had thought of securing Mr. Justice Cornelius of the Lahore High Court, a
very able Indian Christian who has been Legal Remembrancer, and I told
Abell of this. But on further reflection I felt that it might be embarrassing to a
judge to be involved in what may be highly controversial discussions.

This morning I held a conference with the Heads of Departments and set up
a number of expert committees to initiate the examination of the main partition

1 See No. 98.

174

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

problems. Each committee has been given a time limit within which its first
report must be ready.

3. This afternoon I saw Sachar, Mamdot and Swaran Singh separately in
that order, and put three questions to them, which are set out in the enclosure
to this letter, together with their replies.

On these replies I hope to despatch the summons to Members of the Legis¬
lative Assembly on 10th June for meetings of the two separate halves of the
Assembly2 on (say) 19th June. Mamdot obviously did not wish me to despatch
the summons until the Muslim League Council had ratified the Plan, and I do
not think I can exceed the fastest pace of the slowest horse.

The replies to my question about the formation of a Coalition Ministry were
interesting. I explained that a great deal of work had to be done in a very short
time, and that there must be political guidance at all stages. Such guidance
could clearly be given by a Coalition Ministry, and the Ministry might be
formed in such a way that it could, when the time came, be divided into two
parts for the Western and Eastern Punjab respectively. Sachar, without promp¬
ting from me, said that a Ministry would lose itself in squabbles about law and
order and other controversial matters. The Muslim League Ministers would
wish to withdraw all criminal proceedings against their followers and to cancel
other punitive measures. Though he was attracted by the idea of a “zonal”
Ministry (I told him I thought this quite impossible in the conditions prevailing
and in the time available) , his own personal opinion was that we should remain
in section 93 , and that the political guidance required in partition matters should
be given by a special Partition Committee representing the parties.

Mamdot seemed hardly to comprehend the question and said he would have
to consult his colleagues and see me again.

Swaran Singh took the same view as Sachar and, as I expected, urged that
very little could be done until the Boundary Commission had reported. I
gathered from him that the Sikhs might be satisfied if the terms of reference to
the Boundary Commission seemed favourable to them. But Swaran Singh’s
main argument was that it would be impossible to apportion assets and lia¬
bilities, to distribute the services, and so on until the boundary between the two
new Provinces was accurately known. I argued that we could certainly proceed
on the “notional” boundary in order to determine the principles of the division,
and that comparatively simple adjustments could be made as soon as the
Boundary Commission reported. Swaran Singh was very friendly, as he
always is, but I am almost sure that the Sikhs will refuse to commit themselves
on the administrative aspects of partition until the boundary is known. They
will argue, as Swaran Singh argued in his talk with me, that H.M.G. have made
it clear that the “notional” boundary is simply a device to ensure a quick
decision on the principle of partition and is not to be used for any other purpose.

JUNE I947

175

Swaran Singh mentioned letters to Your Excellency from Nehru and Baldev
Singh on this subject.2 3 If we are to wait for the report of the Boundary Com¬
mission and the “notional5’ boundary cannot be used for the purpose of
preliminary calculations of the financial adjustments, etc., we shall be unable to
get through our work by 15 th August next — in fact partition may be delayed
indefinitely.

Both Sachar and Swaran Singh asked me to see them again after Mamdot had
had his further talk with me, and I agreed.

4. To sum up, it seems that it should be possible to get the decision of the
two halves of the Assembly by about the end of the third week in June. It will
not be easy to get a Ministry or a Partition Committee going ; but so far the
Partition Committee appears to be the easier alternative. Swaran Singh told me
that he did not think that the Committee would agree on anything at all, and
began talking about the representation of the parties on it. I said that the
Committee, if formed, could obviously not proceed by individual votes — it
would exist simply to give two equal parties an opportunity to negotiate, and I
thought it should be as small as possible, provided that the representatives of the
parties had the full confidence of their followers. Swaran Singh’s doubts about
the Committee’s proceedings and his views about the Boundary Commission’s
report show that there may be various troubles ahead of us.4

Yours sincerely,

E. M. JENKINS

2 See No. 45, paras. 5-9.

3 Presumably the letters from Congress (actually signed by Mr Kripalani) and Baldev Singh accepting
the plan: see Nos. 35, para. 11 and 36; also Lord Mountbatten’s remarks in No. 39, p. 73.

4 Lord Mountbatten acknowledged this letter on 8 June. He noted what Sir E. Jenkins said about the

attitude of the three leaders to a coalition government, agreed with the programme for summoning
the Legislative Assembly outlined in para. 3, and also remarked that: ‘I suppose we shall have to put
up with a continuation of the Section 93 regime in the Punjab if the parties refuse to co-operate in a
coalition but clearly their co-operation in a Partition Committee is in any case essential.’ Mountbatten
Papers, loc. cit.

176

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

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Committee. Said that the
Partition Committee could do
little until the Boundary-
Commission had reported.

JUNE 1947

177

Note by Mr Abell on a discussion with Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab)
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Part 11(a)

7 June 1947

I flew to Lahore yesterday evening1 and had a long talk with the Governor
after dinner. I flew back to Delhi this morning before breakfast.

2. I attach a copy of a note by the Governor.2 The main points are discussed
below.

3. I promised that 1 would ask H.E. to speak to the Leaders on Saturday
about the question of summoning the two halves of the Assembly in advance of
formal ratification. I think myself that public opinion expects immediate
invitations and that these might go out immediately after the acceptance by the
League on Monday. If the Sikhs are going to cut up rough I rather doubt
whether the fact of summoning them now will make much difference. The
Governor was prepared to accept this view provided the Leaders in Delhi were
agreeable.

4. Coalition Government. I said the Governor’s intentions were exactly in
accordance with what, I thought, H.E. wanted.

5. Administrative Work on Partition. It is satisfactory that the Governor is
working on the same plan as ourselves. I took the Minutes of H.E. ’s Meetings
with me and described the latest developments to the Governor. I said I was
sure that a lot of work at the official level could be done before the decision
about partition was reached and the Governor agreed.

6. The Services. What the Governor said about this subject was the most
important part of the discussion. He said that the behaviour of Punjab people
in the recent disturbances had been so revolting that very few British officials
were now prepared to stay on at all after the transfer of power. He is very
doubtful whether appeals would move them because many of them feel it is
morally wrong to do the work which they will probably be expected to do or
to get involved in disturbances between the communities which are likely to
occur, even in the best circumstances, in the disputed areas. The British mem¬
bers of the Services are also tired of being told that they are to blame for any
riots that take place and that the worst disturbances only happen where there
are British officials.

I tried to point out to the Governor how the matter was viewed in London
and throughout the commonwealth. He said he would do his best but

1 Actually on evening of 5 June: see No. 97, para. 1.

2 See Annex.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

neither he nor his Secretary were optimistic about the results of asking men to
stay on even for a few months after the transfer of power.

Incidentally, General messervy has his Headquarters in Government House
and the view was expressed by a British member of his Staff and supported by
him (though this should not be quoted to the Commander-in-Chief) that only
about one in 400 British officers of the Indian Army will be likely to stay on
after the transfer of power.

Though the Services have done splendidly in the Punjab during the
disturbances they are evidently fed up at the moment and I think the very
strong reactions I have quoted may be temporary. It is probable that if a strong
appeal is made a better response will be forthcoming than the Governor
suggests. I do not believe that men would insist on going immediately if they
were told that to stay on for a few months would be a real service to the
empire and to India. It is not, however, yet certain that the new Govern¬
ments will want men just for a month or two.

7. Two new Governors. Sir Evan jenkins was most emphatic that he must
make it known very soon that he would not serve on in either of the Punjab
Provinces after the transfer of power. He has to judge between the communities
every day and it must be clear to everyone that he has no personal axe to grind
at all. I tried to shake him about this but he was quite immovable and I do not
think he would yield to persuasion to stay on in either of the two Provinces,
since to do so would identify him with one community or the other.

8. Programme oj Action in the Punjab. I agreed generally to the Governor’s
programme, subject to the possibility of advancing the date for the meeting of
the two halves of the Assembly.

9. Boundary Commission. I explained the difficulties about timing to the
Governor. The Bill which will be presented in parliament will have to
define the territories of the two Dominions, though it will of course say that
they are subject to adjustment as the result of the Boundary Commission.
There is, however, no hope that the Boundary Commission will reach results
and these be accepted in time for them to be incorporated in the Bill. I antici¬
pate myself considerable delay over the framing of the terms of reference and
the securing of a neutral Chairman. It seems to me to follow that the Boundary
Commission will not report, or at any rate that accepted decisions will not be
available, until after the transfer of power or at any rate that we must go ahead
on the assumption that this may happen and that the notional boundaries must
stand as the administrative boundaries until the report is accepted. I put this to
the Governor as my own idea. He said that the Sikhs had been led to suppose
that no important action would be taken on the basis of the notional boun¬
daries but he admitted the difficulty about the time factor. He also admitted
that it would be practically impossible for the Boundary Commission to reach a

JUNE 1947

179

decision that was acceptable to the Sikhs, so that it was not necessarily an
advantage to have that decision at an early date; it might be better to face the
matter when the two Governments had settled down a little.

10. As the result of these discussions I suggest the following action:

(i) Party Leaders should be told on Saturday3

(a) to express a view whether the two halves of the Punjab Assembly
could be summoned at once ; and

(b) that the Governor of the Punjab felt he could not continue as
Governor after the transfer of power and that therefore early steps
should be taken to nominate two Governors.

(ii) Steps should be taken to ascertain the attitude of both the major parties
about keeping on members of the Civil Service and Police for a few
months, even if they did not want to stay on permanently. It was
suggested at CVS’s Staff Meeting yesterday that letters might be
written immediately to Pandit nehru and the Finance Member but I
would prefer, if there is no objection, to make informal enquiries first.

(iii) The question of the Services should be discussed further by me with
H.E. the Governor of Bengal on Monday.

G. E. B. ABELL

3 See No. 100, Item 1, conclusions (vii), and Item 2.

Annex to No. gS
Note by Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab )

SECRET 5 June 1947

The transfer of power may now take place as early as 15 th August 1947. If we
are to complete within a period of 71 days the very complicated measures
necessary to settle and give effect to the partition of the Punjab, we must be
clear about our time-table.

2. The essential measures to be taken are as follows : —

(a) The summoning of the two halves of the Assembly and the taking of the
initial decision for or against partition (it may be assumed that the decision will
be for partition) ;

(b) The appointment of the Boundary Commission, the conduct of pro¬
ceedings by the Commission, and the decision on the Commission s recom¬
mendations.

Before going further it must be stated that the timings of (a) and (b) require
great care. It does not seem that the two halves of the Assembly can be sum¬
moned until all parties have formally ratified the acceptance by their leaders of
H.M.G.’s announcement. It is clear that ratification by the Muslim League will

i8o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

not take place before 9th June. I have heard, though this has not been con¬
firmed, that ratification by one of the Congress bodies (presumably the
A.I.C.C.) may be expected about i6thjune. The Sikhs, to be in the fashion, may
also decide on formal ratification of some kind. It may therefore be impossible
to summon the two halves of the Assembly until 16th June or even later, and
the meetings could hardly be held until 26th June or 28th June.

An added complication is that the Sikhs probably and the Muslims possibly
may decline to cooperate in (a) until (b) has been completed. It would be a
great mistake to summon the two halves of the Assembly until we are clear
that the parties will cooperate.

In the circumstances I propose to consult the Party Leaders in a preliminary
way tomorrow, 6th June,4 or as soon as possible thereafter, and to secure the
earliest dates I can for the meetings of the Assembly Members. The question for
decision is whether I am to force the pace and risk a crisis or give the parties
reasonable time.

(c) The establishment (if possible) of a “divisible” Coalition Government.

A partition settlement could be effected by a committee of the Party leaders

with myself as Chairman, but it could be effected more simply, and I think
more amicably, by a committee of Ministers. I propose to sound the Party
leaders on the possible formation of a Coalition Government to see us over the
short period now remaining, and to provide a committee to deal with the
partition settlement. A “zonal” arrangement would be far too complicated and
distracting to be effective. The kind of Coalition I have in mind is a “divisible”
one consisting of Ministers who could, when the time comes, fall into two
groups and form, perhaps with certain additions, the Ministries of the two new
Provinces.

(d) The negotiation and conclusion of the “partition settlement”.

I propose to follow the model laid down by the Viceroy at the Centre. I hope
to complete my plan by tomorrow and to appoint the personnel of the expert
committees, but little real work can be done until either a Coalition Govern¬
ment or a committee of politicians has been appointed to control policy. If the
Party Leaders are sticky about the ratification of their acceptance of H.M.G.’s
announcement and will not co-operate with one another until the two halves
of the Assembly have met, it seems improbable that serious work can begin
until about 1st July at the earliest. This will reduce the period available to 46
days.

(e) The financial adjustments and the reorganisation of the services necessi¬
tated by the partition settlement.

Much will depend on how far the Party Leaders are prepared to accommo¬
date one another, e.g. by maintaining joint cadres for a limited period and
leaving details for more leisurely decision. One difficulty will be that in the
Punjab few, if any, British officers will be prepared to stay on after the transfer

JUNE I947

l8l

of power. The Inspector General of Police has told me that no British officers
will wish to stay on, and I have reason to think that sentiment is much the same
among British officers of the I.C.S. The time available for reorganising the
services, and particularly for the elimination and replacement of British officers,
will be very short. There is no legal method by which British officers can be
coerced into staying on. H.M.G. cannot compel them to serve under a Dom¬
inion Government; nor does it seem that the Dominion Governments can
coerce them in any way.

(f) The installation of two new Governments including two new Governors.

If I am able to secure a “divisible” Coalition Government, the nucleus of a
Ministry for each of the two new Provinces should be available and the
Ministers should have at least some experience. Governors are not easy to come
by and will have to be laid on without delay.

3. To sum up, it seems that of the 71 days available something like 25 may
be consumed in formalities, and that this period may be even longer if the
Sikhs insist on the Boundary Commission reporting before they vote on
partition. Once the formalities are over, everything will depend on the willing¬
ness of the Party Leaders to co-operate v/ith one another either in a Coalition
Government or in some independent committee under my chairmanship. We
cannot count on any British officers remaining after the date on which power is
transferred for any purpose whatever. I frankly do not see how the work is to
be done in the time, and if any Party insists on a postponement of the sum¬
moning of the two halves of the Assembly, the work cannot be done in the
time. Provisionally I propose to try for the following programme: —

(1) Summoning of the two halves of the Assembly . . . 17th June for (say)
26 th June.

(2) Meeting of the two halves of the Assembly . . . 26th June.

(3) Decision on the principle of partition (allowing time for joint meeting if
demanded) . . . not later than 30th June.

(4) Formation of Coalition Ministry . . . Any date, but not later than 1st

July-

(5) Negotiation of “partition settlement” (essential items only) by 31st July
(the expert work can be put in hand now, though it cannot be effective
without policy guidance).

(6) Paper reorganisation of services (to be carried on during negotiation of
partition settlement) by 12th August.

(7) Transfer of power . . . 15th August.

This assumes that an acceptable report by the Boundary Commission will
have been presented some time before 15th August.

E. M. j.

4 For the results of Sir E. jenkins’s consultation with the party leaders, see No. 97, para. 3 and its

Enclosure.

182

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Interviews ( 2 )

7 June 1947

H.E.

I submit herewith the results of my talk with Mr Gandhi last night. You will
see that when we got down to reducing his suggestions to writing, they were
very different from your first impression of them.1

2. I cannot really think that anything could be gained by Your Excellency
speaking to Mr Jinnah about the NWFP on the lines that Mr Gandhi suggests:
nor do I see how the resignation of the Ministry in that Province would avoid a
referendum.

3 . As regards the question of agreements or treaties between HMG and the
two Indian Dominions, I have now had a talk with Mr V. P. Menon, who has
just come back from two hours with Mr Gandhi, which included a reference to
the above.

Mr V. P. Menon and I both feel strongly that it would only arouse suspicion
if you were to issue an announcement on this subject out of the blue. The time
and place for such an announcement would be the debate in the House of
Commons on the new Bill, and we have no doubt that a categorical assurance
by the Prime Minister or Sir Stafford Cripps to the effect that there was no
intention whatsoever of differentiation between the two Dominions would do
the trick.

4. I am sending a copy of the enclosure to Mr Gandhi as he particularly asked
for it.

Annex to No. pp

ISMAY

mr gandhi’s suggestions to h.e. the viceroy
1. NorthWest Frontier Province

Mr Gandhi suggests that H.E. should speak to Mr Jinnah in the following
sense :

“I am extremely anxious lest the referendum in the NWFP should lead to
bloodshed and blood feuds between brother and brother pathan, and I have
been wondering whether it could possibly be avoided. Now that you have got
your Pakistan, would it not be wise for you to go to the NWFP and speak to
the people of the Province of whatever party they may belong, including the
present Ministry and their followers. You could explain what Pakistan, which

JUNE I947

183

has hitherto been a vague expression, really is, and present your case in an
attractive manner, in the hope that you will be able to woo them to become a
Province of Pakistan, with perfect freedom to frame their own provincial
constitution.

If you are successful in your persuasion, the proposed referendum and all that
it involves would be avoided. If you felt disposed to adopt this suggestion, I
could, I think, give you a positive assurance that the Khan brothers and their
followers would meet you as friends and give you an attentive hearing/ ’

Mr Gandhi asked that if this appeal to Mr Jinnah was unsuccessful, he (Mr
Gandhi) might be informed of the fact, in order that he might consider the
position again. Mr Gandhi added that Abdul Ghaffar Khan was so anxious about
the permanent blood feuds which would result from the referendum, that he
would go to almost any lengths, consistent with honour, to avoid it. In the last
resort, he would be prepared to advise his brother and his colleagues in the
Ministry to resign, and then to ask the Viceroy to put the NWFP under Section

93.

Mr Gandhi emphasised that he had not discussed the above with his col¬
leagues, and therefore that it should not be mentioned to anyone at this stage.

2. Bengal and the United Provinces [? Punjab]

Mr Gandhi suggested that Mr Jinnah should be advised to try to win over
West Bengal and Eastern Punjab to Pakistan by the same methods.

3. Co-operation between Mr Jinnah and the Congress Leaders

Mr Gandhi suggested that H.E. the Viceroy should speak in the following
sense to Mr Jinnah, when he found him in the right mood to listen :

“I am here to help both parties to reach agreement in any way that I can, and
I regard this task not only as a pleasure, but as a duty. You must remember,
however, that I cannot, in any event, be here forever. Now, therefore, that the
decision has been made and you have your Pakistan, why do you not go your¬
self and talk with the Congress Leaders as friends, and try to get a settlement
between yourselves on all the various points at issue. This would make for a
much better atmosphere than adhering to the practice of only meeting together
under my Chairmanship.”

4. Agreements between HMG and the two Indian Dominions

Mr Gandhi said that there was a lot of loose talk going about that HMG might
have different agreements with Hindustan and Pakistan which would possibly
tend to favour one over the other. It was, therefore, important that an an¬
nouncement should be made to the effect that it was HMG s wish either to

1 These suggestions were evidently made at an interview between Lord Mountbatten and Mr Gandhi
on 6 June: see Times of India, 7 June 1947.

184

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

enter into tri-partite arrangements with both the Dominions, or to have identi¬
cal bi-lateral agreements with each of them : and that, in any event, there would
be no question of differentiation.

IOO

Minutes of Viceroy's Seventeenth Miscellaneous Meeting

Mounthatten Papers

CONFIDENTIAL

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s House , New Delhi , on 7 June
1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten oj Burma, Pandit Nehru,
Sardar Patel, Mr Kripalani, Mr Jinn ah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Mr Nishtar, Sardar
Baldev Singh, Lord Ismay, Sir E. Mieville; Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum
( Secretariat )

Item 1

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTITION

his excellency the viceroy said that he wished to explain, for the benefit
of those leaders who had not been present at the Cabinet Meeting the previous
evening,1 that the Cabinet had shown a certain air of slight grievance that it had
not been taken into confidence with regard to the previous discussions2 on the
Administrative Consequences of Partition. He said that he had taken full
responsibility for having handled the matter as he had. The Cabinet had also
felt that, until a decision on Partition was taken, it was necessary to go circum¬
spectly. It had been pointed out that, until it was known that Partition was an
accomplished fact, it would be acting prematurely if the highest tribunal and
council to deal with Partition were set up. He had accepted this view, but there
was so much spade- wrork to be done in the meanwhile that it had been proposed
that a Cabinet Committee should be formed of four members, possibly two
from Congress and two from the Muslim League, who should prepare the
mechanics for setting up the other bodies. The paper produced by this Com¬
mittee would be discussed with the leaders before it was considered by the
Cabinet. In fact, the only new proposal arising from the Cabinet Meeting the
previous evening was that the preliminary work to establish the mechanism
should be done by a Cabinet Committee, the viceroy said that he wanted
to keep the balance between meetings with the Indian Leaders and Cabinet
Meetings. He wanted to get policy guidance at the former, as they consisted of
a body of men who would be responsible for picking the Governments of the
two new States which were to come into existence. On the other hand, the

JUNE I947

185

Cabinet provided the legal authority for setting up Government Committees
and the Secretariat that would be required.

PANDIT NEHRU, SARDAR PATEL, MR LIAQUAT ALI KHAN and MR
NISHTAR stated that they considered that His Excellency had correctly reported
what had happened at the Cabinet Meeting the previous evening.

mr jinnah said that he could not agree that this matter had been handled
correctly in the Executive Council. It was first necessary to get a clear concept.
Under the Plan contained in His Majesty’s Government’s Statement, it was the
Crown and His Majesty’s Government who proposed to transfer power to the
successor authorities. With regard to the method, and the machinery which was
to be set up for the transfer of power, there should be an independent body. The
Interim Government was working under the present Constitution. It was for
the Crown and His Majesty’s Government to set up such machinery as would
go [sic] to carry out the division of all assets and liabilities which were vested by
the Government of India Act, 1935, so far as it had come into operation. For
this partial transfer under the Act, the Government had been given certain
powers for certain purposes. The Government could only carry on within these
limitations. After the announcement of the Plan, it could undertake no new
policy or legislation. If there was a crisis it would be for His Excellency as
Governor-General, in collaboration with his Executive, to take such steps as
were considered necessary ; but, barring that exception, no planning or policy,
administrative or legislative, could be undertaken because it was clear that it
was a question of only two or three months. The Interim Government must not
assume a status of power which they did not possess. The Interim Government
must realise its own position first. Therefore, the Crown and His Majesty’s
Government should, with no delay, tackle the business of partition. He could
not see how the Interim Government came into this at all.

his excellency the viceroy emphasised that, until Partition was
legally settled, the issue should not be predetermined. Such anticipatory action
as he took must be confined to what he was empowered to take as Governor-
General-in-Council. Any instructions which were issued must be in the form
of Orders in Council.

MR jinnah said that the point was which authority was really responsible for
making all the arrangements — the Interim Government or His Majesty’s
Government, the viceroy said that he believed that legally it was the
Govemor-General-in-Council. MR jinnah said that he disagreed. It was
entirely the responsibility of His Majesty’s Government, sardar patel
pointed out that much of the property to be divided was vested in the Central
Government of India.

pandit nehru said that there were various authorities in law — for instance
His Majesty’s Government, the Governor-General and the Governor-General-
1 No. 95. * See Nos. 39, and 73, Item 1.

i8 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

in-Council. In law, however, the Presidents of Congress and the Muslim League
counted for nothing. They only came into the discussions because they repre¬
sented powerful forces. Therefore, Mr Jinnah was out of court.

sardar patel remarked that Mr Jinnah only “came into court” at all by
civil disobedience, mr jinnah retaliated “in which you are an expert”. He
said that if the Governor-General-in-Council went beyond the limits of the
Government of India Act, he, as a citizen, would come in and challenge his
authority, pandit nehru said that this question might arise if and when any
legal action was taken, but meanwhile it did not arise, mr jinnah said that he
had not insinuated that it was intended to do anything illegally. He was quite
sure that nothing illegal would be done, but the point was, which authority
had the power and responsibility to carry out the Plan, mr liaquat ali
khan pointed out that in Paragraph 21 of His Majesty’s Government’s State¬
ment3 it was laid down that the Governor-General would from time to time
make such further announcements as might be necessary, his excellency
the viceroy said that he, as Governor-General, would indeed make such
announcements — but not the decisions.

MR jinnah repeated that it was the Governor-General who had the authority
and the responsibility and the power, pandit nehru pointed out that, if the
Governor-General went beyond the scope of the Government of India Act, he
could be called to account. If he interfered with any Department of the Govern¬
ment beyond the limit of his powers, he would be infringing the Act.

the viceroy said that it seemed absolutely clear to him that it would be
for the Governor-General-in-Council to issue whatever orders were necessary.
He would naturally, however, consult the leaders before so doing, mr jinn ah
said that His Excellency could consult anybody that he liked; but it would be
the Governor-General and not the Governor-General-in-Council who would
issue the orders.

MR v. P. menon was then called in and gave his opinion that the responsi¬
bility lay with the Governor-General-in-Council. He quoted Section 314 of
the Government of India Act. mrjinnah said that this was entirely the wrong
section and referred to the Act of 1919. He suggested, and it was agreed, that
the matter should be referred to the Chief Justice.

mr jinnah said that he wished to assure the Congress representatives that
he had not been giving the foregoing advice as a partisan. He did not wish to
minimise the work of the Executive Council or to undermine it. He wanted to
do the right thing.

sardar patel said that since the formation of the present Government Mr
Jinnah had continually taken up the attitude of challenging its status and
powers. The Government had promises from H.M.G. that it would function
as a Dominion Government. If this authority was then challenged and its
members were insulted, they were led to thoughts of resignation, mrjinnah

JUNE 1947

IS?

said that he did not mean what he had said as an insult. He was purely giving
his view, to the best of his ability. He never meant to insult anybody.

his excellency said that one of these days he would get Mr Jinnah on to a
Naval Committee and then defeat him properly, mr jinnah said that in such
circumstances he would be utterly ignorant and would talk nonsense.

HIS excellency the viceroy said that, pending the decision on the
legal point, he intended to set up a Committee containing two representatives
of Congress and two of the Muslim League — all of whom should be members
of the Interim Government. He would act as Chairman himself. With this
course of action there was general agreement.

mr liaquat ali khan said that he understood that the duties of the
Committee would be to prepare a scheme for consideration later by the
Partition Council, mr jinnah said that he understood that the Committee
would be a fact-finding body and would make its recommendations to the
superior body. The latter would be the entity which would take decisions. He
made it clear that he did not accept calling the Committee a “Cabinet Commit¬
tee”. There was general agreement that the Committee should be a fact-finding
body and make proposals ; but that it should not take final decisions.

His excellency pointed out that immediate action was necessary on the
provision of Secretariat accommodation; the securing of clerical staff, type¬
writers and stationery ; and consultation with Departments so that personnel for
Expert Committees were put on special duty and given facilities at once. He
asked whether the Leaders would agree to the Cabinet Secretariat undertaking
this preliminary work. With this there was general agreement.

There was also general agreement on the names “Partition Council” and
“Arbitral Tribunal” for the bodies to be set up as soon as a decision on partition
was known, mr liaquat ali khan asked whether by this it was meant when
all Provinces had expressed their view, his excellency said that this was not
his intention; that this time would come when one Province had declared in
favour of joining a new and separate Constituent Assembly.

his excellency the viceroy said that it had been suggested that he
should take the chair for the administrative work of the Partition Council ; but
he would only agree to do this if the leaders endorsed this request and did not
ask him to act as arbitrator, mr jinnah said that he would like the Viceroy to
take the chair at meetings of the Partition Council. It would work better that
way. There was general agreement on this point.

mr liaquat ali khan suggested that the Arbitral Tribunal should be the
final authority for matters not agreed by the bodies set up for Partition of the
Provinces, and there was general agreement with this suggestion. It was pointed
out, however, that the Partition Council would have no jurisdiction in dealing
with matters connected with the Partition of the Provinces.

3 No. 45.

1 88

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

It was agreed that there would be no objection to the Governor of the
Punjab issuing invitations to the members of his Legislative Assembly forth¬
with.

his excellency said that the question of how to deal with the Interim
Government, after the decision on Partition had been made, also arose. He
had asked the members of the Interim Government to take no action which
they felt might have implications on one or other of the future Governments,
without referring to the representatives of the latter. He said that he would have
to ask, at a suitable time, either party to select names for their future Govern¬
ments. He asked to whom he should address himself. It might be possible to
set up two Sub-Committees of the Cabinet. It would be desirable to pass the
minimum amount of legislation during the interim period. In any case this
time would be almost wholly occupied by the processes of Partition.

IT WAS AGREED : —

(i) that a legal opinion, if possible that of the Chief Justice, should be obtained
on the issue whether it was the Governor-General, or the Governor-General-
in-Council, who was the responsible authority for making the necessary
arrangements and issuing the various orders with regard to Partition;

(ii) that a Committee 4 should be set up forthwith consisting of two represen¬
tatives of Congress and two of the Muslim League, all of whom should be
members of the Interim Government, and with His Excellency as Chairman ;
that Pandit Nehru and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan should send in to His Excellency,
as soon as possible, the names of the representatives of Congress and of the
Muslim League, respectively, to be appointed to this Committee; that the
duty of this Committee should be to make an examination of the steps to be
taken to set up machinery, including the formation of Sub-Committees, for
carrying out Partition; and that this should be a fact-finding body, whose duty
it will be to make proposals and not to reach final decisions;

(iii) that the present Cabinet Secretariat should undertake the immediate
action which was necessary in regard to the provision of secretariat accommoda¬
tion; the securing of clerical staff, typewriters, stationery, etc; and consultation
with Departments so that personnel for expert Committees were put on special
duty and given facilities at once;

(iv) that, as soon as a decision on Partition was known (i.e. immediately any
one Province had declared in favour of joining a new and separate Constituent
Assembly), a Partition Council should be set up; that it should consist of two of
the top ranking leaders of Congress and twro of the Muslim League; that His
Excellency should be Chairman of it, with no arbitral functions ; and that the
recommendations of the Partition Committee above should be subject to
acceptance by the Partition Council;

(v) that an Arbitral Tribunal should be set up at the same time as the Partition
Council; that it should consist of three members, all men of great judicial

JUNE 1947

experience; that the composition of it should be settled by the Partition
Committee; that Sardar Baldev Singh should consult the other Sikh leaders
about the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal, and inform the Partition
Committee of their views; and that the services of the Arbitral Tribunal should
be offered to the Provinces which were to be partitioned;

(vi) that Pandit Nehru and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan should inform the Viceroy
as soon as possible to whom he should address himself in calling for names for
the two Governments which would be set up (if there was Partition) when
Dominion status was granted;

(vii) that there was no objection to the Governor of the Punjab issuing
preliminary invitations now to the members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly
to meet to decide the issue of the partition of that Province.

Item 2

SIR EVAN JENKINS

his excellency the viceroy explained that it was his intention to ask all
Governors to resign on the date of the transfer of power. He had asked the
Secretary of State to sanction this course.5 He stated that Sir Evan Jenkins had
declared his intention of leaving India altogether; this was regrettable, as he
was a highly competent man. Whilst agreeing with Sir Evan that he should not
serve either new State individually after the transfer of power, his excel¬
lency said that he was wondering whether there was any job in connection
with partition which Sir Evan might fill.

Item 3

BROADCASTS

sardar baldev singh said that the broadcast which he had made on 3rd
June6 had been translated entirely wrong. It was after hearing the incorrect
translation that Master Tara Singh had made his statement to the press;7 he
had afterwards apologised for this, on hearing the correct version in English.
pandit nehru stated that his broadcast had also been badly translated.
sardar patel said it was the responsibility of those who broadcast to
translate their speeches themselves.

Item 4
the press

his excellency the viceroy drew the attention of the Indian Leaders to
certain objectionable and inflammatory articles which had appeared in the

4 Words in italics are underlined in the original. 5 No. 79.

6 No. 48. 7 Possibly a reference to the statement summarized in No. 72, note 1.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

190

Press recently, and asked them to redouble their efforts to the best of their

j 7

ability to prevent such articles being published in future,
the Indian leaders agreed to do this.

Item 5

THE STATES

his excellency the viceroy said that he [had] received a most logical
letter8 from Pandit Nehru containing suggestions to prevent administrative
chaos in the relations between the two new Governments and the States. He
said that he intended to send a letter to all the States asking for their concurrence
that there should be an over-all stand-still order on all present agreements after
the transfer of power, until it was possible to frame new agreements or confirm
the existing ones ; and asking for them to inform him whether they would send
representatives to the new capitals of the Dominions or would prefer that the
Dominions should set up representation in the States.9

There was general agreement that such a letter would be helpful.10

8 No. 68. 9 cf. No. 94, note 5.

10 The same day Mr Abell wrote to Sir C. Corfield quoting the above minutes on the letter which
Lord Mountbatten intended to send to the States, and asking for the necessary action to be taken.
R/3/1/137: f 12.

IOI

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and Mr

Jinnah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan and Mr Nishtar

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy’s Interview No. 143

7 June 1947 , 11.43 am

The Dewan of Bahawalpur was present for the latter half of this interview.

Lord Ismay and Sir Eric Mieville were also present. Lt Col Erskine Crum was
in attendance and dictated the record.

This interview lasted 2 hours.

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan suggested that the chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal
should be a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, preferably
without previous experience of India. I said that I would consult the Congress
Leaders about this, and put up the suggestion to H.M.G.

Mr Jinnah suggested that the Chairmen of the Boundary Commissions should
be people with experience of the broad principles whereby boundaries were
demarcated. I agreed to this, and said that I would suggest to the Congress
leaders that all three members of each Boundary Commission should be pro-

JUNE 1947

191

vided by U.N.O. Representatives of Congress, the Muslim League and other
interested parties would be in attendance on the Commissions as expert assessors
— probably 3 from each side of each partitioned Province. I asked Mr Jinnah
to suggest the paragraph in the terms of reference of the Western Boundary
Commission which would refer to the Sikhs.

I put forward the suggestion that H.M.G. and the two new Dominions
should enter into tripartite agreements. Mr Jinnah objected to the word
“tripartite”; he preferred the expression “identical bilateral agreements”.

I asked Mr Jinnah to show me the terms of the resolution which he intended
to put before the All-India Muslim League Council at its meeting on 9th June.
He replied that this resolution would probably be short, and contain the
following points: —

(a) We accept the plan as the only possible solution.

(b) We can never agree to an united India.

(c) We do not agree to the partition of the Punjab and Bengal, but we have
to take the plan as a whole into account when considering this.

The Dewan of Bahawalpur then entered and gave an account of the diffi¬
culties which that State would face as a result of the partition of the Punjab.
These difficulties were in connection with water supply and irrigation. I asked
Sir Eric Mieville to keep in touch with him. He also suggested that there should
be a time limit of, perhaps, five years for the continuation of present agreements
with the States.

Mr Jinnah was strongly of the opinion that existing contractual agreements
with the States would be legally binding on the successor authorities. I said that
I would take this point up with Congress and ask for a ruling from the Secretary
of State.

102

Mr Abell to Mr Jinnah

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Partition, Administrative

Consequences of

7 June IQ47

Dear Mr Jinnah,

H.E. asks me to send you the enclosed copy of a legal opinion by Sir G. Spence.

He hopes you will be good enough to let him see the draft resolution for the
All-India Muslim League Council.

Yours sincerely,

G. E. B. ABELL

192

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Enclosure to No. 102

I understand that a question has arisen regarding the authority competent to vest
the contemplated Partition Tribunal and various ancillary committees with the
authority which they are designed to exercise. I understand further that the
Partition Tribunal is designed to be authorized to take binding decisions and
require the Departments of the Government of India to take action on those
decisions as if they were decisions of the Government of India.

2. I understand the contention to have been advanced that the authorization
of the Tribunal and the committees should emanate from the Governor-
General and not from the Governor-General-in-Council. I am very clearly of
opinion that this contention is untenable. The vesting of an extra governmental
body or bodies with power to issue binding directions on Department [s] of the
Central Government clearly involves the exercise of the executive authority of
the Central Government and that executive authority is required by sub¬
sections (1) and (3) of Section 313 of the Constitution Act to be exercised by the
Governor-General-in-Council.

3 . It has, I understand, been suggested that authority to issue the authoriza¬
tion accrues to His Excellency the Governor-General from paragraph 21 of the
statement of the 3rd June 1947. 1 This suggestion is very clearly untenable.
Paragraph 21 embodies merely a statement of fact that His Excellency the
Governor-General will from time to time make such further announcements as
may be necessary and it will of course be open to His Excellency to make an
announcement of the fact that the Partition Tribunal has been constituted and
authorized in the manner proposed. But paragraph 21 manifestly does not
purport, and cannot operate, to render exercisable by the Governor-General
functions which under the Constitution Act cannot be exercised otherwise than
by the Governor-General-in-Council.

G. H. SPENCE

7.6.47

1 No. 45.

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

R/jI 1/188:/ 7

India office, 7 June

Dear Mountbatten,

In the proceedings of the Special Committee of your Cabinet held on the 24th
April, 1947 (No. 90/CF/47),1 at which the compensation question was dis¬
cussed you are reported as having said that —

JUNE I947

193

“there was in any case no question of linking up any further talks that there
may be on the subject of responsibility for the payment of compensation with
the negotiations in regard to sterling balances”.

As a matter of fact it was agreed at the meeting of the India and Burma
Committee here on the 13 th March (at which you were present) that —

“if the Government of India declined to accept the expenditure involved as a
charge on Indian funds, it should be made clear to them that such expenditure
would have to be taken into account in connection with the negotiations for
the settlement of India’s sterling balances”.2

Pethick-Lawrence also referred to the probable advantage of thrashing the
matter out in the sterling balances context in paragraph 2 of his private tele¬
gram No. 42 dated 4th April3 about the composition of the Indian sterling
balances delegation.

We have not yet finally made up our minds whether to link the two matters
together, and it might well be that we should not do so until the sterling
balances negotiations were actually in progress. If, however, we raised the
matter and the Indian delegates were still under the impression given by your
statement, they might well feel aggrieved and be unnecessarily difficult. We
should be grateful, therefore, if you would take such steps as you think fit to let
those concerned know4 that H.M.G. do not 5 regard themselves as debarred
from raising, during any negotiations relating to the sterling balances, the
questions of financial liability arising out of paragraph 10 of the Prime Minister’s
Statement of 30th April.6

Yours sincerely,

LISTOWEL

1 L/S &G/7/914: fF 171-5. 2 Vol. IX, No. 529, Minute 3, Conclusion (3), p. 936.

3 L/F/7/2869: fF 256-7.

4 On 25 June Lord Mountbatten circulated a note to the Indian Cabinet informing them of the gist of
this letter. R/3/1/188: fF 10-11.

5 Emphasis in original. 6 Cmd. 7116.

104

Sir F. Mudie (Sind) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma (Extract)

Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Governor of Sind

D.0.NO.453 /fr government house, Karachi, 7 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I had hoped to be able to give you an account of the reaction to HMG’s latest
statement, but I find it extraordinarily difficult to do so. The local press has been
particularly futile. I think that it was just too much for them. Also they are not

194

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

quite certain which way the cats of their respective High Commands are to
jump. My general impression however is that the Sindhi Muslim is very
pleased. Pirzada Abdus Sattar issued quite a good statement urging acceptance.
There is some pro forma criticism of the partition of the Punjab and of Bengal,
but Sindhis care little about the Punjab and nothing at all about Bengal.

The Hindus are, I think, resigned, a little hurt that the Congress has done so
little for them. Their press is less truculent. I attach some significance to the fact
that one or two prominent Hindus who had previously refused nomination to
the Sind University Senate, in response to Congress agitation against it, have
now accepted. There is some movement of bank balances to “Hindustan” and a
certain fall in the value of real property in Hindu areas. There is also vague talk
about emigration to Hindustan. Some Gujeratis, Kachchis and other non -
Sindhis may retire to their original homes, but I don’t expect many real Sindhis
to leave the Province. There are signs of a growing feeling that the proper line
for the Hindus in Sind is to co-operate with and not to continue to fight the
League on all fronts. There are some, though not very definite, signs of a
response.

The British community and the Muslims are very pleased about Dominion
Status. They recognise that it is the only possible alternative to the civil war,
which everyone, until your latest announcement, assumed to be inevitable.

The great thing is that the tension is over. Some decision has been arrived at
and the main political parties have agreed or at least acquiesced. No one is
prepared to go back to the old state of affairs.

105

Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , R/j/i/go: f 144

immediate 7 June 1947, 11 pm

confidential Received: 8 June , 6 am

Tel. No. 121-G. Lahore reports 3 killed 2 wounded and 3 fires and Amritsar 2
killed 2 wounded and 9 fires.

2. Lull in hostilities continues in Gurgaon but Commissioner who is on spot
reports that, at meeting of Assembly members of district, Hindus were sullen
and uncooperative and Moslem “numbed and hopeless” but prepared to fight
to a finish. Commissioner thinks that, with reinforcements provided or in view,
further large scale attacks should be prevented.

3 . General situation unchanged and unsatisfactory. Reactions to partition are
now clearer. Hindus in West and Moslems in East are dissatisfied but Congress

O

JUNE I947

195

and Moslem League both claim that plan is master-stroke of their respective
leaders and that all will be well in the end. Sikhs pin their faith on Boundary
Commission and say they will accept no western boundary short of Chenab.
Moslem League will be faced with minor revolt against Jinnah which he will
probably suppress with ease.

Addressed Viceroy reptd. S/S, Governors [of] U.P., Sind and N.W.F.P.

106

Lord Ismay to Sir D. Monteath
Telegram, Rfe/i/iyo: f 23

immediate new Delhi, 8 June ig47, 1.30 pm

secret Received: 8 June , 2.10 pm

1354-S. On 9th May I sent you a minute1 asking whether the Secretary of
State would agree to Sir Olaf Caroe being replaced by General Lockhart at a
time to be determined by the Viceroy. We subsequently discussed this question,
but you did not give me a firm reply before I left London.

2. Situation has now become urgent as Viceroy has decided that Sir Olaf
Caroe must be replaced as Governor of the N.W.F.P. as soon as possible. Fie
has suggested2 to him that he should take leave as soon as his relief arrives,
without prejudice to the possibility of his being asked by the Pakistan Govern¬
ment, if they win the referendum, to resume his Governorship of the Province
at the end of his leave.

3 . Caroe has not yet replied, but Viceroy considers it most important that
King’s unofficial approval should be obtained, so that action can be taken
immediately he thinks the moment ripe.

4. As you know, Commander-in-Chief has agreed, but Defence Member
will, of course, be consulted before any announcement is made.

1 Not printed; but see Vol. X, No. 417 and its note 2.

2 No. 96.

196

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

107

Mr Rajagopalachariar to Sir S. Cripps

LjP&Jlylio88g: f 8

NEW DELHI, 8 June 1947

My dear Sir Stafford,1

I need hardly tell you that I more than share the general satisfaction felt over
the solution now officially accepted and feel that a great incubus is off our
chests.

However, there is one point which is fraught with great potentiality for
immediate mischief and about which I wish to write to you. This is private, but
I would like you to share it with any friends and colleagues who can help. The
doctrine laid down without consulting us, that with the withdrawal of British
Sovereignty ‘paramountcy’ ends and that as a consequence the 565 Indian
States automatically attain a chaotic independence is indefensible. Legally,
historically, politically and morally it is wrong. Until 1935 there was no
distinction drawn between the Crown and the Governor-General in Council
in regard to the treaties and obligations between the Indian rulers and the
Paramount authority. A new doctrine of distinction was invented in 1935 in
view, I believe, of the unavoidable and progressive transfer of power from
Britain to the people of India.

It is not correct to say that the treaties entered into by the Indian Princes were
with the Crown, irrespective of British Indian governance. The Crown did not
act in that context in an abstract capacity or in the capacity of Sovereign of
England. The Governor-General acted with reference fully and exclusively to
the governance of India. The treaties do not create a personal right or obliga¬
tion, but impose obligations on the rulers for the time being of the Indian
States and of India. Under the earlier Government of India Acts the existence of
political relations between the Executive Government of British India and the
Indian States was clearly contemplated and the Government of India was fully
empowered to transact business with the Indian States. The entire expenditure
incurred in the exercise of these functions was and is charged to the revenues of
British India. An incorrect doctrine has been incorporated and is being re¬
enforced by repetition without adequate discussion or investigation. Many of
the Indian States which are now encouraged by this pronouncement to claim
independence did not exercise it or claim it before they came under British
Sovereignty. The British withdrawal cannot suddenly become the basis for a
status which they had not in history. Yet by parity of application 565 indepen¬
dent States are brought into being, every one of which can claim the right to
bargain individually and to resist the imposition of outside authority except on
its own terms.

JUNE 1947

197

Paramountcy came into being as a fact and not by agreement and on British
withdrawal the successor authority must inherit the fact along with the rest of
the context. The East India Company acquired territory by conquest or other¬
wise and they chose to assume direct authority over some areas and preferred
to hold paramountcy over other areas. A single paramount power was evolved
which was responsible to the British Parliament.

The relations of the Crown with Indian States comprise a large number of
important matters which are really relations between Indian States and British
India, e.g. Railway Agreements, Jurisdiction over Railway lines in regard to
civil and criminal administration, unification of Posts and Telegraphs, system
of Currency and Coinage, etc. It cannot be contended that all these are matters
of no concern to the successor Government of British India and that they can
be terminated at the will of H.M.G. when they withdraw their authority from
India. The right to wage war and to determine external relations cannot be left
in a chaotic condition for each one of the 565 States. It would endanger the
peace of India and cannot be tolerated.

It can be argued that it is open to the successor Governments to make terms
and enter into treaties, but the question of policy as to what should be the
attitude of the British Government at the time of their withdrawal is very
important. Encouragement to disruption has to be avoided.

Indian States have had no international status, and is H.M.G. now going to
sponsor them and create conditions which they themselves had regarded as
impossible when they were in charge of the Government of India? All these
thirty years no major modification was contemplated except on the basis of a
Federation or a Union consisting of both British India and the Indian States.
There is no reason now for evolving a disruptive doctrine and for bringing to
sudden termination all existing relations which are based on contract or
circumstance.

If indeed existing relations between British India and Indian States are
traceable to the Crown in England and not to the Government of India, one
might ask why on the establishment of British India as one or two independent
States, it is necessary for the Crown to terminate its relations with the Indian
States. Those relations ought to be capable of being continued irrespective of
what has happened to British India. H.M.G. have admitted that this would not
be possible. The real fact of the matter is that the so-called relations between the
Crown and the Indian States are matters of vital concern to the Government of
India on the one hand and the Indian States on the other. The Crown in the
United Kingdom has no interest in them except as long as it was the paramount
authority in British India. It follows therefore that that interest must devolve
on the successor Government. The enormity of the new doctrine that para-

1 Sir S. Cripps sent a copy of this letter to Lord Listowel asking the latter to let him have an answer.

L/P &J/7/10889: f 7.

198

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

mountcy should end and cannot be handed over to the successor Government
will be obvious if it is realised that out of the 565 States, more than 350 are just
estates. The so-called rulers of these States have not exercised powers beyond
an ordinary Third Class Magistrate. Is it suggested that all the residuary juris¬
diction which had been exercised by the Crown in India should now ‘revert' in
an illegal manner to these chiefs who had never exercised them before ?

Something should be done to prevent this chaos and discourage tendencies
on the part of more powerful States to declare what they call ‘Independence’.
If the people of these States had been behind the rulers, the position could be
understood, though not favoured, but as things stand these ambitions on the
part of some of the rulers of the States cannot but lead to widespread disorders.
It camiot be the intention of H.M.G. to create such a condition in India. It
should therefore be considered an obligatory duty to prevent such declarations
of independence on the part of Indian States by every legitimate means.

I have written a somewhat rambling letter. I hope you will bestow your
attention on this subject and do something immediately to prevent what I
gravely apprehend.

Yours sincerely,

C. RAJAGOPALACHARIAR

108

Minutes of Viceroy s Fortieth Staff Meeting , Items 1-4, 6 , 8-10

Mounthatten Papers

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's House , New Delhi , on 9 June
ig47 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma, Lord Ismay ,
Sir E. Mieville , Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon , Mr Christie , Captain Brockman , Mr
I. D. Scott , Mr Campbell-] ohnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Item 1

HYDERABAD AND KASHMIR

his excellency the viceroy said that it had been preliminarily arranged
for him to visit Hyderabad from 10th- 14th July.

his excellency the viceroy said that he had seen reports in the Press
that Mr Thompson was to be appointed Dewan of Hyderabad. He stated that
he strongly disapproved of an Englishman taking such an appointment.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —

(i) directed D.P.S.V., in consultation with the Political Adviser, to draft

JUNE 1947

199

for his approval a telegram to the Residents in Hyderabad and Kashmir,
asking them to make every effort to ensure that the Rulers of those
States did not make any public announcement, before he had visited
them, that their States were going to be independent and join neither
Constituent Assembly;1

(ii) directed Prin. Sec. to find out whether it was true that Mr Thompson
had been offered the appointment of Dewan of Hyderabad; and, if it
was true, whether he had yet accepted this appointment.2

Item 2

DOMINION STATUS

HIS excellency the viceroy said that he felt that it was essential for the
Legislation, which was going to be introduced amending the Government of
India Act to confer Dominion Status upon Hindustan and Pakistan, to include
provision for the two Dominions to have the same man as Governor-General,
at any rate in the initial stages. It would have to be made clear that only an
interim period was envisaged, and that this could be brought to an end on the
wish of either party. He was equally sure that in this matter his name should in
no way be mentioned. A decision on whether Mr Jinnah was willing to have
the same man as Governor-General of Pakistan as Governor-General of
Hindustan would have to be made within a month, for planning purposes.
his excellency said that, after careful consideration, he had come to the
conclusion that it would not be possible for him to stay as Governor-General of
only one of the two Dominions; but it would be quite fatal for Mr Jinnah to
know that he had taken this decision.

His excellency the viceroy said that, if it was to be assumed that his
present staff was indisputably essential if the processes of Partition were to be
completed within a year or two, it would be necessary to work in the interests of
India, regardless of personal interests, in order to bring these processes to a
successful conclusion.

sir eric mieville said that he was not sure that it was fully realised exactly
what the powers of a Governor-General under Dominion Status were. These
had been defined by the Imperial Conference which had taken place in 1926.
He read an extract from the decisions there reached, which made it clear that a
Constitutional Governor-General could not communicate with His Majesty’s
Government, sir eric mieville said that the staff of the normal Constitu¬
tional Governor-General of a Dominion was extremely small compared with

1 Political Adviser’s tel. 1372-P of 9 June instructed the Residents in Hyderabad and Kashmir ‘if
suitable opportunity occurs’ to use their ‘verbal influence’ with their ruler to postpone any con¬
templated public announcement on this subject until after Lord Mountbatten had visited them.
Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: States Negotiating Committee.

2 No record of enquiries by Sir E. Mieville on this point has been found. Mr Thompson was not
appointed Dewan of Hyderabad.

200

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

the Viceroy’s present staff. Normally the staffs of Constitutional Governors-
General were paid by the Dominions concerned. The biggest, he believed, was
in Canada, where the Governor-General had one Secretary, a Comptroller, and
four As.D.C.

rao bahadur menon said that he agreed that, so far as communications
with H.M.G. were concerned, the Governor-General would after the transfer
ofp ower have no official position. Nevertheless there could still be a channel
for personal correspondence. He emphasized his belief that in the initial stages
the influence of the Governor-General would be very great indeed.

his excellency the viceroy pointed out that the Duke of Gloucester,
when Governor-General of Australia, had had a very much bigger staff than
that quoted by Sir Eric Mieville for Canada — including a Major General as
Chief of Staff. He said that he had already spoken to the Prime Minister about
this matter. He had explained to him that, if he was asked to stay on, the basic
reason for this request would be because, as a manoeuvre to separate warring
people, and in view of the fact that the emotional position had become un¬
tenable, Dominion Status had been rushed through in two or three months,
whereas normally it would have taken two or three years to introduce. The
processes of Partition would nevertheless have to go on. his excellency said
that he had explained to Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel that there would be
only a Constitutional Governor-General after the introduction of Dominion
Status. But Pandit Nehru had replied that the holder of this particular appoint¬
ment would be in a very different position from a normal Constitutional
Governor-General; and that, in the initial stages, at least, his influence would
count for a great deal. Pandit Nehru had further expressed doubt whether the
processes of Partition would work satisfactorily if His Excellency did not stay
personally.3 the viceroy went on to say that he had told Mr Attlee that, in
the event of his remaining as Constitutional Governor-General, he would
clearly not want as big a staff as he had at present; but he would require a team
of high level experts if he was to be required to give advice and guidance, to
act as a mediator, and to bring the two sides together.

rao bahadur menon said that, as he saw it, in the present situation both
sides went to Great Britain for a decision. The next step would be for them both
to go to a British representative for friendly advice. They would wish to use
His Excellency’s good offices for this purpose. There was also the problem of
the States to be considered. Here an independent advisor and guide would be of
the greatest benefit. Even Mr Gandhi had said that he would be entirely guided
by the decisions of any Committee of which Lord Ismay, for example, was
Chairman.

lord ismay gave his opinion that, if it was decided to have two separate
Governors-General, all the work of His Excellency and his present high-level
staff would be finished. But, if the Viceroy remained as Governor-General of

JUNE 1947

201

both Dominions, the only reason for this would be so that he could help with
advice. The two Dominions would probably invest him, through goodwill,
with great power in an influential and advisory capacity. He and his high-level
staff would, of course, do nothing executive. If the two Dominions rejected the
advice continually, the position would probably become untenable.

the viceroy pointed out that Pakistan would be the Dominion which
would gain most advantages if he stayed behind as Governor-General of both
Dominions. In fact, if he had his own separate Governor-General, Mr Jinnah
might well wreck his prospects.

mr scott said that he thought that it was important that the two new
Dominions should not get into the frame of mind wherein they would always
look to the Governor-General for a decision, rao bahadur menon said that
there was no question of this. All they would want would be His Excellency’s
good offices in an advisory capacity.

mr scott gave his opinion that the Governor-General should not be
Chairman of any Committee with executive or political responsibility after the
date of the transfer of power, his excellency said that he agreed that it
would be out of the question for him to take the Chair at meetings of either
side separately. But it was necessary to dismiss precedent in these matters
altogether. If he personally was the only man holding office in both Dominions,
it might well be possible for him to take the Chair at meetings between them,
without a vote and only in order to guide the discussions.

sir eric mieville emphasised the necessity for putting the whole onus of
the decision to use the good offices of a Constitutional Governor-General in
any special way onto the Indians themselves, rao bahadur menon said that
the necessary legislation could be so drafted to give this effect, lord ismay
suggested that the next step should be the issue of an agreed statement by the
two parties.

rao bahadur menon emphasised that special provision would definitely
be necessary in the legislation for one Governor-General to serve both Dom¬
inions. This was not possible, for example, in Australia and New Zealand at
present.

mr Christie suggested that His Excellency might be Chairman of a Com¬
mittee consisting of representatives of both Dominions in the capacity of a
Minister of State, the viceroy said that this would be most undesirable and
rao bahadur menon stated that it would be unacceptable.

the viceroy said that Sir Walter Monckton should be asked to interview
Mr Jinnah concerning the latter’s choice of a Governor-General; and to point
out to him the advantages for the initial period of sharing one with Hindustan.

3 No record of these exchanges with Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel on the position of a constitutional
Governor-General has been traced, but possibly they took place at the interview on 17 May recorded
in Vol. X, No. 472; see also Vol. X, No. 471, para. 18.

202

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

mr campbell-johnson drew attention to a report in a newspaper from
London to the effect that a Government spokesman had said that it was hoped
in Whitehall that it might be possible for Lord Mountbatten to remain as
Governor-General for the whole of India.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY: —

(i) directed Press Attache to point out to Mr Joyce the undesirability of
such statements by Government spokesmen being made at the present
time ;4

(ii) invited C.V.S. to arrange for a paper to be prepared, setting out the
advantages of Pakistan and Hindustan having the same man as
Governor-General ;

(iii) invited C.V.S. to prepare, for his approval, a brief for Sir Walter
Monckton’s meeting with Mr Jinnah;

(iv) invited C.V.S. to consider what the next step in this matter should be
if Sir Walter Monck ton's interview with Mr Jinnah was unsuccessful,
bearing in mind that it was essential to have Mr Jinnah’s decision
within a month, for planning purposes ;

(v) directed the Reforms Commissioner to prepare a draft of the legisla¬
tion which would be necessary to allow both Pakistan and Hindustan
to have the same man as Governor-General; this legislation should
make it clear that this arrangement was only intended for an interim
period, which could be brought to an end on the wish of either party;
and should be so drafted as to put onto the Indians themselves the
onus of any decision to use the good offices of a Constitutional
Governor-General in any special way.

Item 3

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

MR scott said that Sardar Baldev Singh had suggested5 that the names of
the Army officers who were to help run the referendum in the N.W.F.P.
should be referred to the Government of that Province for their comments, in
view of the fact that the referendum was to be held “in consultation with the
Provincial Government”, mr scott suggested that this request might be
refused on the grounds that there would be no time to change the officers who
had been selected.

lord ismay said that he considered that this would be a very weak excuse.
In his view the list of the officers chosen should be shown to Dr Khan Sahib,
who should be asked to give the exact reasons for any objections he had, and
who should be informed that his objections would be subject to be over-ruled
by The Viceroy.

his excellency the viceroy said that he shared the opinion that the
list of officers should be shown to Dr Khan Sahib.

JUNE 1947

203

HIS EXCELLENCY the viceroy said that he wished Lord Ismay to take all
the necessary action concerning the possible change of Governors in the
N.W.F.P.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY: —

(i) directed D.P.S.V. to draft, for his approval, a personal letter from
him to Dr Khan Sahib, containing a list of the names of the Army
officers chosen to run the referendum in the N.W.F.P. ; asking whether
he had any objections to these officers, and if so, the exact reasons
therefor; and making it clear that any objections which he raised
would be considered, but could be over-ruled by The Viceroy;

(ii) directed D.P.S.V. to inform Sardar Baldev Singh that he was going
to write to Dr Khan Sahib ;

(iii) directed C.V.S. to take all necessary action concerning the change of
Governors in the N.W.F.P.; including consultation, at the appro¬
priate moment, with Sardar Baldev Singh concerning the secondment
of General Lockhart ; and the drafting, for his approval, of a letter from
himself to General Lockhart concerning his appointment ;

(iv) directed Press Attache, at the appropriate moment, to issue an an¬
nouncement to the Press concerning the change of Governors, saying
that Sir Olaf Caroe was going on leave at his own request and that
General Lockhart would officiate, seconded from the Army.

Item 4

s'

THE LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR PARTITION

his excellency the viceroy recalled that Mr Jinnah had, at the meeting
with the Indian Leaders on Saturday, 7th June,6 expressed the opinion that it was
the Governor-General and not the Governor-General-in-Council who had the
authority and responsibility to give orders in connection with the processes of
Partition. This issue had been referred to Sir George Spence, who had given an
opinion in contradiction to Mr Jinnah.7 Mr Jinnah had now replied8 that he
did not agree with Sir George Spence and had reiterated his view that the matter
should be referred to the Chief Justice.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —

directed D.P.S.V. to refer this issue to the Chief Justice, Sir Patrick Spens,

for an opinion.

4 Mr Campbell-Johnson informed Mr Joyce of the press report, which had appeared with a London
dateline in the Hindustan Times of 7 June, in tel. 1369-S of 9 June 1947- hfe pointed out that dis¬
cussions on the Governor-Generalship were in a ‘delicate stage’ and official comment of any kind,
particularly along such lines, ‘might well have effect of producing a result which is exact contrary to
the hope expressed in this Hindustan Times report’. Mr Joyce replied in tel. 7477 of 10 June that the
report was not inspired by the India Office, that some speculation was inevitable, but that he had
asked responsible correspondents to avoid reference to the subject. L/I/1/768: ff 233-4.

5 R/3/1/151: f 132. 6 No. 100, Item 1. 7 Enclosure to No. 102. 8 Not traced.

204

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Item 6

CEREMONIES ON THE DATE OF THE TRANSFER OF POWER
HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —

directed Pers. Sec. in consultation with M.S.V. to prepare a paper on all
the ceremonial action which would be required on the date of the transfer
of power.

Item 8

HIS excellency’s MEETING WITH THE THREE CONGRESS LEADERS
his excellency the viceroy said that he wished Pandit Nehru, Sardar
Patel and Mr Kripalani to be invited to come and see him at io a.m. the fol¬
lowing day.9 He intended to talk to them about the Boundary Commissions
and other matters.

rao bahadur menon said that he believed that the Sikhs would have to
have a transfer of population and property in the Punjab. He suggested that the
Legislative Assemblies of the Punjab and Bengal should be asked to meet
together to settle their difficulties, particularly the Sikh and Muslim Leaders in
the Punjab.

his excellency the viceroy said that possibly the first draft of the
terms of reference for the Boundary Commissions might be made by the
Provincial Legislative Assemblies. This proposal was worth looking into.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —

(i) directed D.P.S.V. to arrange a meeting with the three Congress
Leaders at io a.m. the following day;

(ii) instructed Con. Sec. to issue an agenda for this meeting ;

(iii) directed C.V.S. to consider the possibility of the preliminary work on
the terms of reference of the Boundary Commissions being done by
the Provincial Legislative Assemblies concerned; and, if he con¬
sidered that this was a desirable course of action, to draft telegrams
to the Governors of the Provinces concerned asking them to arrange
the necessary meetings ; and to inform Mr Jinnah, Pandit Nehru and
Sardar Baldev Singh that this was being done.

Item g

MR GANDHI

hisexcellencytheviceroy said that at his last meeting1 0 with Mr Gandhi
the latter had suggested that he should talk to Mr Jinnah about certain points.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —

directed Pers. Sec. to draft for his approval a letter1 1 to Mr Gandhi saying
that he would raise these points with Mr Jinnah, except for that concerning
tripartite or identical bilateral agreements between His Majesty’s Govern-

JUNE 1947

205

ment and die two new Dominions, on which he was going to suggest
that the Prime Minister should give an assurance in the House of Com¬
mons.

Item 10

BRITISH FORCES

lord ismay said that Field Marshal Auchinleck had agreed to let the Viceroy
have his views concerning the date on which British Forces should be with¬
drawn from India.

9 See No. 124. 10 See No. 99. " See No. 125.

109

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rhl 1 1 137: ff 23-5

secret new delhi, 9 June 1 947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

You were good enough to discuss with us1 possible arrangements as between the
Government of India and the States to deal with matters of common concern.
I have given some more thought to this matter and consulted some colleagues.

It seems to us that it is not merely necessary to have some of the Government
of India’s representatives in the States and some of the States representatives in
Delhi. What is important is to have some Central Agency on behalf of the
Government of India to deal with States problems in a uniform way. Not to
have this will lead to confusion and chaos in administration. As I have pointed
out to you2 there are innumerable common problems as between the States
and the Government of India. This has nothing to do with paramountcy and its
offshoots. If the States correspond directly with each Department of the
Government of India, there will be no uniformity of procedure or policy and
conflicting decisions may well be arrived at, apart from the great increase in
work of each Department. It is therefore desirable to have this common
Agency or channel.

The Political Department has thus far served as such a common Agency. The
proper course would have been for this Department to continue for the time
being minus its paramountcy functions and for the Department to be put
directly under the Government of India. It would also have been desirable for
the local Agencies of the Political Department in the States to continue for the

No. 100, Item 5.

I

2 No. 68.

20 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

time being as Agents of the Government of India and not for purposes of
paramountcy.

If this is not possible, then it is necessary to create a new Agency immediately.
The Department dealing with matters of common concern between the Indian
States and the Government of India should be created and put in charge of a
Secretary who should function under some Member of Government. Corres¬
pondence dealing with Indian States and the Government of India should be
pooled in the Secretariat of this Department, a common policy pursued with
the concurrence of the Member in charge, and particular cases could be referred
to the various Departments of the Government of India.

The main functions of this Secretariat should be —

(a) Arrangements in substitution of existing ones for dealing with Agency
functions discharged on behalf of the Government of India by the
Political Department and its officers.

(b) Negotiations for reviewing —

(i) economic and financial agreements ; and

(ii) steps to be taken to systematise the political relationship between
Indian States and the Government of India until their entry into the
Federation.

All this relates to the present period, that is from now onwards to the
establishment of Dominion Status. The second period will be from Dominion
Status to the functioning of the new constitution. It will be necessary to make
some additional arrangements then. Probably it might be desirable to have a
Minister in the Dominion Cabinet in charge of Indian States affairs, assisted by
Advisers from Indian States.

This is a brief indication of what I think should be done very soon in order
to provide for a smooth change-over from present conditions and in order to
give effect to the policy you have enunciated in regard to the States. This does
not involve any radical change but only provides machinery for carrying on
present arrangements and for consideration of possible changes. We must have,
as is generally agreed, stand-still agreements with the States till such time as
new agreements have been made. Meanwhile even though stand-still agree¬
ments require some central machinery to function and to start negotiations
for review of those agreements, you were good enough to say to the States
that you would be glad to put them into contact with the appropriate authori¬
ties of the Government of India for the purpose of enabling them to estab¬
lish new relations with the latter. The machinery I suggest would enable this
to be done.

The Political Department, it is said, will be wound up by the 15th August.
Meanwhile it will gradually liquidate itself. There will be a period from now
onwards when there might be some overlapping between the new Department
of the Government of India that I suggest and the Political Department. This

JUNE 1947

207

need not lead to any confusion or trouble. Indeed the proper course would be
for part of the staff of the Political Department to be transferred to the new
Department and for the Political Department to give every assistance to the
new Department in supplying information and advice.

As I have said above, all this does not relate to paramountcy functions, but to
matters of common concern between the Government of India and the States.
The new Department will gradually take over all the correspondence between
the Indian States and the Government of India. The States should be requested
to deal directly with this Department and not with each separate Department
of the Government of India.

Following up the same procedure, local officers of the Political Department
in the States should deal more and more with this new Department of the
Government of India. Even if the Residents leave, those officers should con¬
tinue for the time being under some junior officer. This will maintain a con¬
tinuity of work and can lead easily to the new arrangements that might be
arrived at without any hiatus. The States can have no objection to this as this
does not involve any decision of policy in regard to their future, but gives
facilities to them to deal with the Government of India. I know as a fact that
many States would welcome this procedure. I see no way for the Government
of India escaping this responsibility and burden. If no arrangements such as
suggested above are made now, the result will necessarily be delay and con¬
fusion. In any event the Government of India will have to set up some such
Department and the sooner it is done the better.

The necessary consequence of what I have suggested above is to suspend
various activities that are going on to liquidate the work of the Political
Department in the Residencies. I would point out again that these activities
concern the Government of India intimately. No steps should be taken without
consultation with the Government of India. No property belonging to the
Government of India should be disposed of without its prior concurrence. The
present staff and equipment, except for some senior officers, should continue
till fresh arrangements have been made.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU3

3 Lord Mountbatten acknowledged this and the following letter [No. no] on 10 June. He stated that
he would have a paper prepared dealing with Pandit Nehru’s suggestions as well as the points agreed
at No. 100, Item 5, and that, ‘since the Pakistan Government will be equally concerned in the case of
such States as decide to join them’, he felt the matter must be discussed at a further meeting of the
leaders. R/3/1/137: f 28.

208

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

IIO

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rbff37pff 20-21

SECRET NEW DELHI, p June ig47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am writing to you separately1 about a proposal to set up immediately a
Department of the Government of India to deal with matters of common
concern with the States. This has become a matter of extreme urgency because
changes are taking place from day to day which will come in the way of any
future arrangements that may be made with the States. I have repeatedly
pointed out to you and previously to Lord Wavell, that the Political Depart¬
ment is functioning without any consultation with the Government of India,
although the Government of India is intimately concerned with all these
matters.

The special prerogative of the Crown Representative, as exercised through
the Political Department, relates to paramountcy. The Government of India
at present is not concerned with this question, but it is concerned with its
numerous relations with the States. And it seems to us extraordinary and
highly improper for the Political Department to continue to take various steps
to liquidate itself and at the same time to liquidate all our relations with the
States without reference to us. This is unconstitutional and many things are
being done which might well be challenged in a Court of Law. We think that
by this method the Government of India is being treated not only casually but
with discourtesy.

I should like to draw your particular attention to the property in the States
belonging to the Government of India. There are numerous buildings with
their furniture, equipment, etc. Many of these buildings were built and
furnished by the Government of India and belong completely to the Govern¬
ment of India. Some of the buildings were given by the States on a perpetual
lease to the Government of India and were furnished by us. Some buildings
have been lent by the States. It is also understood that some of this property has
been vested in the Crown Representative. What exactly is the legal significance
of this vesting in the Crown Representative has to be enquired into. But it
seems to me that the right of the Government of India in this property cannot
be extinguished in this way.

This property in the States is of various kinds and may have to be dealt with
in different ways. No part of it is at the disposal of the Political Department
to do what it chooses. At the most the legal position in regard to part of this
property requires further consideration.

JUNE 1947

209

I understand that it is proposed by the Political Department to offer certain
properties to the State Governments and only in the case of their refusal to take
them, to dispose of them otherwise. This question of offer to the States does
not arise till the matter has been settled with the Government of India which
either owns the buildings and furniture or has a prior right to them. If the
Government of India do not choose to keep this property or furniture, only
then will the question arise of giving the first refusal to the States. I do not think
that the Government of India should part with any property, furniture or
equipment either owned by us or leased to us because we are likely to require
them for our own purposes in the future. What the Government of India may
do with them later is a matter for them to take up with the States. The Political
Department cannot settle it over the heads of the Government of India.

I shall therefore request you to issue directions that no property of any kind
owned or possessed under lease by the Political Department can be sold,
transferred or handed over to any authority other than the Government of
India. I am quite sure that if any such action is taken it will give rise to serious
complications, for the Government of India will not accept it or agree to it.

It is proposed, I understand, to hand over certain Cantonment areas in the
States to the State Governments. I would suggest that this matter should also be
considered with the Government of India before any action is taken. Isolated
action is not desirable. In any event the Government of India’s property in
these areas which might be receded, will continue to belong to the Government
of India and will not be given up to the States, though I understand that in the
past this has sometimes been done. The Political Department has a reputation of
acting completely irresponsibly and has acted in such a manner in the past.
There is no reason why it should be permitted to do so while it is in process of
liquidation. It cannot be vicariously generous at the Government of India’s
expense.

What I have written above applies to records also and to the staffs of the
various Residencies and Agencies. The Political Department is functioning with
unseemly hurry to present us with accomplished facts. No amount of protests
from us during the past few months seems to have had any effect on it. I would
beg of you to stop this process before irreparable harm is done.

In view of the problems raised in regard to property, buildings, furniture,
records and staff, I think it is desirable that some representative of the Govern¬
ment, preferably of the W.M.P. or Home Departments, should visit immedi¬
ately these Residencies and inspect the buildings, records, etc. and report on
them. I shall be grateful if you will kindly let me know if we may proceed to
do so immediately.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1 No. 109.

210

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

III

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Rl3l*li37: ff 29-36

17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, p June I947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I enclose a note by Sir Alladi Krishnaswanii Iyer on Paramountcy and the
States. Sir Alladi is one of our most eminent lawyers and jurists. He has written
this note for publication. But on seeing it I thought it might interest you.

2. There is an article on the same subject by Mr. C. Rajagopalachari in
today’s Hindustan Times. In case your attention has not been drawn to it, I am
enclosing a cutting.1

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Enclosure 1 to No. 111

The disappearance of Paramountcy, the emergence of
Independent Sovereign States and the Balkanisation of India

by Sir Alladi Krishnaswanii Iyer

While the voluntary withdrawal of the British is a supreme and unparallelled
act of statesmanship on the part of the British power in India and redounds to
the credit of His Majesty’s Government, there is no denying the fact that the
simultaneous announcement of the withdrawal of Paramountcy and the
interpretation put upon such a withdrawal by some of the Rulers and their
ministers has created a situation of complexity unanticipated perhaps by the
authors of the declaration, especially when one remembers that the Para¬
mountcy of the Crown has been invoked not merely for the purpose of
determining dynastic succession and intervention in cases of misrule, but also,
in the case of smaller States especially, for their performing properly the
functions of Government and generally adjusting financial and economic
relations in the interests of India as a whole.

Prior to the Act of 1935, the view was entertained by some of the most
distinguished Indian lawyers that in as much as almost from the commence¬
ment of British connection with India, the right of the British Crown in
relation to the Indian States was exercised through the agency of the Govern¬
ment of India, the Crown prerogative in this regard must be treated as one
relating to the governance or the Government of India. That the Crown
prerogative may be inter-related with the government of a particular territory
and therefore treated as an adjunct to its governance is a familiar concept of

JUNE I947

21 1

English Constitutional Law. In the Federal Constitutions of the British Dom¬
inions, one frequently comes across the power of the Crown in the right of the
Dominion as contrasted with its power in the right of the Province. Though in
abstract theory the Crown in one sense is entire and indivisible, the particular
aspect of the Crown function depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction
involved and the sphere in which the jurisdiction has to be exercised. There
was a strong section of Indian legal opinion to the effect that as a consequence of
the government of British India passing into the hands of popular representa¬
tives, that Government must thereafter exercise the prerogative which was
vested in the Crown prior to the transfer of power. Just prior to the enactment
of the Government of India Act of 1935, however, the States were able to
secure legal opinion in England supporting the contrary view by treating
Paramountcy as an incident of the prerogative of the English Crown. The
Butler Committee set its seal of approval on this view by suggesting the
bifurcation of the functions of the Crown Representative and those of the
Governor-General,2 though the necessary link between the two was not and
could not be avoided so long as the Crown retained its connection with India.
The Act of 1935 gave effect to this suggestion. But it is common knowledge
that even after the bifurcation the correspondence relating to matters and
engagements between the Government of India and the Indian States and the
correspondence relating to what is appropriately the sphere of the Crown
Representative’s functions relating to Paramountcy were carried on through the
same agency, the Resident or the Agent of the Crown Representative acting as
the common channel of communications, the Political Relations Department
passing on to the Departments of the Government of India such correspondence
as in their opinion concerned the Government of India. Different considerations
now arise as the result of the avowed intention of the British Crown and the
British Parliament to withdraw entirely from the field, recognising the
independence of India and a part of India.

When making the Declaration of the withdrawal of Paramountcy on
1 6. 5. 1 946, 3 His Majesty’s Government naturally expected the States to get into
the orbit of the Indian Union or by treaty or other similar arrangement to be
linked in some way or other with the Indian Union as then contemplated.
Now that the present plan envisages the setting up of two independent govern¬
ments in India, the States by parity of reasoning will have to enter into con¬
stitutional or quasi-constitutional relationship of the nature of Paramountcy
with that independent government or State which is nearest or closest to them
by geography or the affinity of its people. His Majesty’s Government could

1 Not printed. Mr Rajagopalachari’s article was on similar lines to No. 107.

2 See Report of the Indian States Committee, 1928-1929 (Cmd. 3302), paras. 38, 58, 59-67 and 106.
Appendix III contains the legal opinion (by Sir Leslie Scott and others, dated 24 July 1928) secured
by the States.

3 Vol. VII, No. 303, para. 14; see also No. 262 in that Vol.

212

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

never have contemplated the emergence of independent States irrespective of
size, population and of previous history spread over the length and breadth of
India and the assumption by these States of sovereign powers which a good
number, if not most of them, never enjoyed in the whole course of their
history. Any such position, if sound, would lead to the Balkanisation of India
and might result in mutual feuds and internecine wars among units spread over
the great continent of India and might easily threaten the peace of India and of
Asia. As is pointed out by the Butler Committee in their Report, “It is not in
accordance with historical fact that when the Indian States came into contact
with the British, they were independent each possessed of full sovereignty and
of a status which a modern International lawyer would hold to be governed
by the rules of International law. In fact, none of the States even [ever] held
International status. Nearly all of them were subordinate or tributary to the
Mughal Empire, the Mahratta Supremacy or the Sikh Kingdom and dependent
upon them.”4 Some were rescued and others were created by the British. The
States might have enjoyed varying degrees of sovereignty but were never in the
position of independent sovereign States. The States themselves are of varying
degrees of size extending from a few acres only to hundreds or thousands of
square miles. Some of the States are no better than estates and jagirs and none
enjoys or ever enjoyed an international existence. The position, therefore, taken
in certain quarters that the mere withdrawal of Paramountcy and its assumed
non-transferability at once clothes the States with plenary sovereign authority
which they never enjoyed is radically unsound. The history of India shows that
Paramountcy or what is equivalent to Paramountcy over neighbouring States
enjoying a certain degree of sovereignty is a natural or logical consequence of
the existence or the emergence of an undoubted and supreme sovereign
authority in their midst. The sole and unquestionable authority of the British
as the Paramount power in India is traceable to this source. While treaties and
sail ads might, to some extent, explain this relationship, it is an acknowledged
fact that the relationship could not be purely interpreted in the terms of treaties
and sanads. The scope of the Paramount power has been interpreted to extend to
interfering with even domestic affairs of the smaller States on the analogy of the
greater powers of Europe having the right and duty to interfere in the pacifica¬
tion and settlement of disputes among minor States in spite of their theoretical
independence to prevent the little independent States hastening towards utter
anarchy — vide para 54 of the Butler Committee’s Report. The British Crown
as the Paramount Power in India up till now in regard to the States owes an
obvious duty both to the Indian Union and to the peoples of the States to help
in making the necessary arrangements and adjustments consequent on their
withdrawal from the field. The conditions prevailing under the Act of 1935 are
different from the conditions now obtaining as the result of the recognition of
Indian Independence. Under the Act of 1935, the British did not sever their

JUNE I947

213

connections with India and they were in a position, therefore, to exercise their
rights and duties both in regard to the Indian States and the peoples of these
States. Now that they have decided to withdraw, the duty devolves upon them
to safeguard the interests of the peoples of the States and to see that the with¬
drawal does not threaten the peace and tranquillity of India including the States.
A unilateral act of withdrawal without reference to these considerations, and
leaving the States and their peoples to their fates and to the mercy and idio-
syncracies of individual Rulers cannot be justified on any question of principle.
There is an obvious duty on the part of the British Government as a corollary
to their voluntary withdrawal to see that the States come into line with the
rest of India or that they accept the hegemony of or quasi-constitutional
relationship with the Indian Union.

It is an accepted principle of International Law and Jurisprudence that the
people of every independent State have a natural and inherent right to change
the structure of the State and the forms of Government under which they live,
even by rebellion. This natural and inherent right of rebellion has been kept in
suspense during the subsistence of British Paramountcy; the British Govern¬
ment taking upon themselves a certain degree of responsibility for the sound¬
ness of the administration of Indian States and for using their good offices in the
Ruler effecting constitutional changes in the government of the States. In the
words of the Butler Committee,5 if the Paramount power was bound to
maintain the rights, privileges and dignity of the Princes, it was equally their
duty to suggest such measures as would satisfy their demand without elimina¬
ting the Princes. A unilateral withdrawal by the British without bringing about
some kind of nexus between the Indian Union and the States might con¬
ceivably result in widespread anarchy and trouble throughout the country if the
Rulers of States do not realise the wisdom of joining the Indian Union or
placing themselves under the protection of the Indian Union in some form or
other by whichever name their protective link is called.

The voluntary withdrawal of the British power from India cannot clothe the
Indian States with an independent or International status which they never
possessed and it is inconceivable that the U.N.O. or any other International
organization would concede to them such a status. The public law of India and
its long history is against any such recognition. Even in the case of independent
States, the rules of Public International Law have been interpreted and moulded
so as to take note of the peculiar conditions obtaining in a particular part of the
world. The Monroe doctrine6 in its early phases amply illustrates the above

4 Cmd. 3302, para. 39. 5 Ibid., para. 50.

6 The Monroe Doctrine, enunciated by President James Monroe in his annual message to the United
States Congress on 2 December 1823, asserted the principle (which, by implication, the United
States would enforce) that henceforth the American continents should be regarded as closed to
further colonization by European powers and to European interference in independent Governments.

214

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

statement. The public law of India and the position of the Indian States during
the British rule and earlier cannot be ignored in any consideration of their
status consequent on the withdrawal of the British power from the rule and
hegemony in India.

This review of the situation arising from the withdrawal of British Para-
mountcy will bear out that there are only two courses open to the Indian
States at the present juncture — to enter into constitutional relationship with the
Indian Union and become integral parts of the Indian Union or to enter into
quasi-constitutional relationship of the nature of Paramo untcy with the Indian
Union. There is no tertium quid7 possible. If the Rulers of the States do not
respond to the political needs of the situation, it is up to the peoples of the
States to take steps not merely to effect a change in the constitution of the
States themselves, but also enter or compel the Rulers to enter into Constitu¬
tional relationship with the Indian Union.

A. KRISHNASWAMI

7 Lit.: ‘third something’ (third course).

1 12

Sir W. Monckton to Lord Ismay

Mountbatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: Hyderabad , Part 1(a)

PRIVATE GOVERNMENT GUEST HOUSE, HYDERABAD, p June 1947

My dear Pug,

I am worried about the way the States are being handled. There is considerable
resentment among the Moslems here and, although the Hindus are in a great
majority, there are more than i million Moslems in the City and more than 2
million in the State — they have the dynasty, the administration, the Army and
the tradition of 200 years’ rule plus the treaties. I have tried in the accompanying
note to summarise in an orderly and less vehement manner what they say and
feel. I am bound to say I think there’s a good deal in it and I should like to be
sure that the points are considered even if they have to be rejected. Can you
ensure this and also have the document treated as entirely confidential? The
reason is that in my view our most important, immediate negotiations (how¬
ever little we like it) must1 be with Hindustan and H.E.H. genuinely intends
them to be real and effective. They would be ruined in advance if this document
were disclosed to Congress.

I think the main issues raised by the Note are short and could be discussed
when I return to Delhi with Chhatari in the near future. I am desperately
anxious to avoid a political conflict in all this with H.M.G. and above all with

JUNE I947

215

H.E. whom I want wholeheartedly to help. But if nothing can be done, I shall
in a short time be compelled by pressure here to raise the hypothetical question
about relations with the British Government which H.E. indicated2 he would
refer to H.M.G. and go back and pursue the matter in London. But I honestly
loathe the idea of ventilating our grievance through political channels and I
think reference home would inevitably lead to that.

It is being difficult to avoid a declaration of independence but I think we shall
hold the folks here to an announcement very much on the lines I showed you3
about the C.A. only, and that probably on Wednesday.4 Jinnah and H.H. of
Bhopal will be disappointed and annoyed.

I don’t want to have to go to England because I think I am needed here —
that may be a false sense of one’s own importance, which is easily engendered.
But I do believe I know my Nizam better than the others and he trusts me. And
he will have to make up his mind quickly and often in the next 3 months.

Life’s not being easy — for me anymore than for you !

Yours ever,

WALTER

Enclosure to No. 112

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE ON THE POSITION OF HYDERABAD, 7 JUNE 1947
In the chorus of well-merited approval which H.M.G.’s present efforts in
India are receiving, there is a danger that the way in which some of the major
States, and in particular Hyderabad, are being treated, will be over-looked.
Success in handling British India has been triumphant up to now and the
triumph is quite certainly a personal triumph for H.E. But this means that his
personal views, interests and sympathies assume a first-class importance.
Naturally, his main interest has been concentrated hitherto on British India.

He has on all subjects (including those principally affecting the States) been
in full and constant consultation with Mr Nehru and his associates. But until
after his recent announcement of 3 June he had not been in similar consultation
with representatives of Hyderabad or indeed the other major States on the
points in the announcement specially affecting their future. The States are
regarded by the British Indian leaders whom he has mainly consulted, as an
inconvenient and anachronistic heritage to be pressed or cajoled, whether they
wish it or not, into the pattern which British India has chosen — a pattern which
no one would regard as ideal for themselves, much less for any one else.

But the States cannot in fairness be so regarded. They represent more than
1/3 of India in area and more than a fourth in population. They have a culture

1 Words in italics underlined in original.

2 Presumably a reference to Lord Mountbatten’s answer to a question on the States at his Press Con¬
ference: see No. 60, p. 115. See also No. 43, p. 80.

3 No record of this interview has been traced. 4 See No. 163.

216

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

and tradition of their own. In many cases and in many ways their administra¬
tion compares favourably with British India. It is interesting that in spite of
grave shortages in e.g. Mysore, the food famine in Bengal, with its appalling
consequences, found no parallel in the Indian States. I have known many of the
States long and Hyderabad in particular well for many years. I honestly believe
that, if fairly treated, they have a sounder hope of survival than the brittle
political structure of the Congress party after they have attained independence.
There is a real, personal loyalty to the Ruler even if of a different faith and even
if sometimes he does not wholly deserve it. This is a point of stability which in
part accounts for the fact that there has been less acute communal division so far
in Indian, than in British India : though the poison is gradually seeping in from
British India. How little bloodshed there has been in the States. Contrast the
Punjab, Bihar and Bengal. It is perfectly true that it is high time that the people
were more actively associated in Government, but there is a great deal of
nonsense talked about this. In local administration, in Panchayats, in the villages
the people are associated in administration now. It is ridiculous to assume that it
is automatically wise and expedient to introduce into the States Western ideas
of responsible government on the British model. What sort of democracy on
these standards exists in British India ? I suppose not more than 6 or 7 per cent
of the population is represented in the Legislature of Bengal.

Let me now consider the case of the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar.
Hyderabad has more inhabitants than any British Dominion, including Canada ;
in area it roughly approximates to France. It has been the Faithful Ally of the
British Government for more than a century. In the two World Wars the
Nizam at critical moments proclaimed and proved his loyalty to the British,
when Congress took a very different line.

He is now being told that he cannot have dominion status and that he can
only have relations with the British through one or other of the proposed new
Dominions. Moreover he is in effect being urged on geographical grounds to
join Hindustan. No sort of opportunity for discussion was afforded to him
before these decisions were taken and made public, though at no stage was any
step taken without full prior discussion with Congress who (as everybody
knows) are urging the Viceroy to press Hyderabad into Hindustan whether the
Nizam wishes it or not.

The dynasty, a Muslim one with a predominantly Hindu population, would
in my judgment commit suicide by joining Hindustan. Congress leaders have
repeatedly said that the days of the Princes are numbered, though they are
cynically postponing the day of execution. Some of them individually have
told me in the recent past that there will soon be a day of reckoning for H.E.H.

The treaties, which entitle Hyderabad to call upon the British Crown for
effective defence of the State and dynasty against external aggression and
internal disorder, are indisputable. They were made more than a hundred

JUNE 1947

217

years ago, but have been reaffirmed as “inviolate and inviolable” times without
number during recent years. In 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps and in 1943 Lord
Wavell5 each solemnly reaffirmed the sanctity of the treaties. Hyderabad was
thus taught to rely upon British arms and the British word. Moreover, she was
prevented, and still is, from raising an army adequate to protect herself in the
event of the withdrawal of the British troops. She was equally prevented from
making provision for the arms and equipment without which such an army is
valueless. She has, moreover, been compelled to keep her industrial develop¬
ment within the limits prescribed by the Central Government.

Hyderabad is being told in common with the other Princes that Paramountcy
will go with the British and will not be inherited by the successor Government
or Governments. But, with the limited military resources to which she has been
restricted and with access denied to H.M.G., and probably with large Indian
Army contingents within her dominions against her will, Hyderabad is being
left to her own resources. She is, in effect, driven to accept the fact that, though
Paramountcy technically and de jure goes, all the rights of interference, direct or
indirect, hitherto associated with Paramountcy will remain in the hands of one
or the other of the new Dominion Governments.

You will have noticed how eager Congress are to make sure that they can
(if they wish) get out of the British Commonwealth and, if possible, drag
Pakistan out with them. The policy of the Nizam has always been and still is to
retain and increase the ties which bind him to the British. Can you be surprised
if, in these circumstances, he cannot bring himself to trust in Hindustan for his
future, for they have proved themselves no friends of his or ours? He asks: Am
I really to be kicked out of the British family without discussion? Will you
really just denounce the treaties, refuse me political and economic arrangements
with H.M.G. and otherwise leave me to my fate?

I think this rather a shameful performance. How ready we are to appease our
enemies at the expense of our friends. Is it because the latter have no nuisance
value ?

WALTER MONCKTON

5 It is difficult to identify these references with certainty. The first may refer to Sir S. Cripps’s answer
to Question 5 at his meeting with the Indian States Delegation on 2 April 1942 (Vol. I, p. 649), and
the second to para. 3 of the letter of 25 June 1943 from the Secretary to the Crown Representative to
the Resident in Hyderabad (Vol. IV, No. 20) though Lord Linlithgow, not Lord Wavell, was Crown
Representative at that date.

218

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Jinnah

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Partition, Administrative

Consequences of

1446/16 g June ig47

Dear Mr Jinnah,

I hope you will not consider that I am intervening in what is your concern but
I feel it might help if I sent you the suggestion that you should take the earliest
opportunity of preparing a list of vacancies and persons whom you consider
suitable for high appointments such as Governor, diplomatic representative
abroad, etc. The matter will be particularly urgent in regard to Governors if
your party desire to replace any or all of the existing Governors on the transfer
of power.

It always takes a little time to settle a high appointment, as you know, and I
am sure it will be advisable to think this out in advance.1

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 Mr Jinnah thanked Lord Mountbatten on 1 1 June saying that he was thinking about persons suitable
for high appointments. He added: ‘Please don’t think that I shall look upon any friendly suggestions
or advice that you may be pleased to give me any time, as an intervention in what is my concern’ ;
and asked to have a talk before he finally made up his mind. Mountbatten Papers, loc. cit.

114

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of B

urma

Rl3jili7o:f25

g June ig47

H.E.

When I was discussing the question of the replacement of Sir Olaf Caroe by
General Lockhart with the Commander-in-Chief, he suggested, and I entirely
agree, that Mr. Jinnah should be told of the decision before it is publicly
announced, lest he should think that Congress have succeeded in liquidating a
man of whom he (Mr. Jinnah) has a high opinion.

2. I therefore submit that when The King’s informal approval and Sir Olaf
Caroe’s resignation or application for leave have been received, you should tell
Mr Jinnah that as soon as you saw Sir Olaf, you were convinced that the state of

JUNE 1947

219

his health and of his nerves rendered him unfit to continue in his present
employment; but that you were reluctant to get rid of him lest it should be
thought that you had done so under the pressure of Congress. That this is the
absolute truth is borne out by the letter which you wrote to the Secretary of
State very shortly after your arrival.1

3. Alternatively, since you may not be seeing Mr. Jinnah in the normal
course of events within the next two or three days, perhaps you would author¬
ise either Sir Eric or myself to give him the above explanation.2

4. I also mentioned to the Commandcr-in-Chief Sardar Baldev Singh’s
letter to you about the British officers selected to carry out the referendum.
He entirely agreed with the terms of the letter which you propose to write to
Khan Sahib on this matter.3

ISMAY

1 Presumably a reference to Vol. X, No. 165, para. 34.

2 Lord Mountbatten minuted: ‘CVS — will you please do this. M.’

3 See No. 108, Item 3.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/j/ 1/133: f 46

immediate new Delhi, 9 June 1947, 12.10 pm

secret Received: 9 June , 1.30 pm

1358-S. My succeeding telegram repeats letter, dated 7th June, from Pandit
Nehru.

2. Abell has already telegraphed Turnbull asking for advice on this point. See
his telegram No. 1308-S dated 5th June.1

3 . May I give categorical assurance to Nehru that party leaders will see the
Bill ? I am sure they should see it.

4. So far as I can see Jinnah is merely damaging the prospects of Hindustan
by objecting, as he does, to Nehru’s view that Hindustan succeeds to the
international position of India.

5. Could your experts advise (1) what are the disadvantages for Hindustan if
we accept Jinnah’ s view that two new States are created, and (2) are there any
positive advantages which Pakistan gains in that case ?2

1 No. 76.

2 In tel. 7439 of 9 June Mr Turnbull informed Mr Abell that the Foreign Office were being consulted
urgently on the international status of India and Pakistan respectively. L/P &J/10/123 • f 380.

220

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

6. My own view is that we shall meet far greater difficulties from Congress
if we oppose their view than from the League if we follow the Congress
suggestion. Pakistan at the most is unlikely to contain more than 70 millions
of the entire population of India and if the rest of India will take over all the
International obligations of the present government of India I feel it will solve
many difficulties. Further all the Diplomatic Representatives of India are
nominees of Nehru. I believe the President of the Board of Trade supports this
view.

ii 6

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , L/P &J I ioj8i : f 334

immediate new Delhi, 9 June ig47, 8.23 pm

Received: 9 June, 7.13 pm

No. 1368-S. Following is repeat of Pandit Nehru’s letter dated June 7th
referred to in my telegram No. 1358-S of today.1 Begins: Dear Lord Mount-
batten, You have informed us that Parliamentary legislation is being (? under¬
taken) for establishment of Dominion status in India. The nature of this legisla¬
tion will, no doubt, depend upon decisions to be taken in some Provinces in the
course of this month.

2. We are proceeding upon basis of Government of India Act being so
amended as to give full Dominion powers and independence status to Govern¬
ment or Governments functioning as Dominions. In view of possibility of
secession of certain parts of India, it is important how this matter is referred to
in proposed legislation. In one case there will be a continuing entity from which
certain parts have seceded, and in the other a number of seceding parts might be
grouped together to form a Dominion. We are naturally interested in exact
language of this proposed legislation and I hope that nothing will be done
without full consultation and reference to us. It would be (? unfortunate) if
any part of legislation was objected to subsequently. I trust, therefore, that full
opportunities will be given to us to see drafts being prepared and to make our
own suggestions in regard to them. Yours sincerely, Jawahar Lai Nehru. Ends.

1 No. 115.

JUNE I947

221

II?

Lord Ismay to Sir D. Monteath
Telegram , fi/j/i/jjj; / 47

immediate new Delhi, 9 June 1947, 1 pm

confidential Received : p June , 2.10 pm

I359~S. There is good, deal of misunderstanding in this country about the
meaning of Dominion Status and the powers thereunder of the Governor
General. The Viceroy thinks it would be very helpful if this misunderstanding
could be dispelled, and he might, for example, take an opportunity of doing so
in his next public speech.

2. We would be very grateful for some material. I have no doubt thatMachtig
has something ready made. Could we have this by the next airmail bag.

Cabinet Committee Gen. 186 /2nd Meeting
Commonwealth Relations
Mss. Eur. D. 714/81

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.W.i, on 9 June 1947 at
12 noon were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Ernest Benin,
Sir S. Cripps, Viscount Jowitt, Viscount Addison, Mr A. Creech Jones, Sir E.
Bridges ; Mr W. S. Murrie, Mr S. E. V. Luke ( Secretariat )

The Meeting had before them a minute by the Prime Minister (M.221/47)1
suggesting that there should be a review of the status and inter-relationship of
the different parts of the British Commonwealth, and a note prepared by the
Dominions Office (C.R.(47) i)2 on the structure of the British Common¬
wealth.

the prime minister said that recent events seemed to justify a review of the
kind that he had suggested. Theoretically there was a broad division between
the self-governing states of Great Britain and the Dominions on the one side
and the Colonial Empire on the other, the former group having their equality
of status defined by the Statute of Westminster. This status was regarded as the
final stage of evolution already reached by some and to be reached ultimately

1 Vol. X, No. 436.

2 P.R.O. CAB 21/1803; for an abbreviated version see Enclosure i to No. 131.

222

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

by others of the constituent parts of the Empire. In fact, however, this
pattern had already been broken. Eire was in an anomalous position as an
independent republic; and the Dominions, notably South Africa and Canada,
disliked the term “Dominion status”, which was moreover not attractive to
the leaders of political opinion in the Asiatic countries of the Common¬
wealth. It seemed necessary to find a formula which would enable the
greatest number of independent units to adhere to the Commonwealth
without excessive uniformity in their internal constitutions or in their relation¬
ships to Great Britain, the Commonwealth and one another. He suggested that
the problems involved might be considered first by a small Committee of
Ministers under his own Chairmanship, the other members of which might be
the Foreign Secretary, the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs. This Committee would consult other Ministers as necessary
and it might be assisted by a Committee of Officials, under the Chairmanship
of the Secretary of the Cabinet. It would also be desirable to seek advice from
outside experts.

There was general agreement with the proposal that a Committee of Minis¬
ters, on the lines suggested by the Prime Minister, should be set up and that this
Committee should be assisted by a Committee of Officials and by outside
experts.

In discussion the following points were made : —

(a) Future Title of the British Commonwealth

The Prime Minister had suggested in his minute that a suitable title for the
Commonwealth might be “The Associated States of the Commonwealth”; a
phrase of this nature would provide for variety of relationship and internal
constitution, and would meet those sections of Commonwealth opinion who
were critical of the continued retention of the terms “British” and “Dominion”.
The general view of Ministers was, however, that whatever form of words
might be decided upon, it would be essential to retain the word “British” ; and
the president OF the board of trade suggested that a suitable title
might be “Commonwealth of British and Associated Nations”. This was
generally approved.

[Sub-para, (b), on question of precedence to be accorded to Dominion High

Commissioners in London, omitted.]

(c) Question of Resident Ministers

the president OF the board of trade said that the expression “High
Commissioner” was not popular; and the foreign secretary suggested
that the term “Resident Minister” might be substituted for it.

the prime minister recalled that difficulties had arisen during the war over
the claims that Resident Ministers (e.g. of Australia) should have a right to
attend the United Kingdom Cabinet.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS Said that no SUg-

JUNE 1947

223

gestion of this kind had been made during his tenure of office and that, in
his view, such claims were not likely to be made in peacetime.

(d) Membership oj the Commonwealth

It was agreed that it would be necessary to consider whether possession of
full responsible government should be regarded as an essential qualification
for membership of the Commonwealth. There were certain territories, such
as Southern Rhodesia and Malta, whose claims to membership would have
to be considered. It would also be necessary to examine the procedure under
which membership would be achieved. Clearly, the existing Dominions had
a right to be consulted, but it could not be accepted that any Dominion
Government should have a right of permanent veto.

the secretary of state for the colonies said that many Colonial
territories were too small to be acceptable as separate members of the Com¬
monwealth. This difficulty might, however, be met by the formation of larger
political groups within the Colonial Empire.

(e) Relation of the Dominions to the Colonial Empire

the prime minister said that it was most desirable that the Dominions should
take more interest in and accept more responsibility for the Colonial Empire.

the secretary of state for d ominion affairs said that the Dominion
Governments were showing an increasing interest in the Colonial Empire and
that they no longer regarded Colonial affairs as solely the interest and responsi¬
bility of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. There was close
collaboration, for instance, in tackling Colonial problems in the Pacific. It
might be assumed, therefore, that the Dominions would adopt a responsible
attitude towards the constitutional advance of Colonial territories towards
membership of the wider Commonwealth.

(f) Recognition of the Crown

It was pointed out that the question would be sooner or later raised whether an
independent sovereign republic could be accepted as a member of the Com¬
monwealth of British and Associated Nations. It was possible that a request of
this nature might be made by India; and the problem had already arisen,
though in a very special form, by the action of the Eire Government.

There was general agreement that it would be necessary to insist that
membership of the Commonwealth should imply recognition of the Crown,
at least to the extent at present accorded by the Eire Government, i.e. in the
sphere of external relations.

(g) Constitutional Terminology

the secretary of state for the colonies suggested that the current
constitutional terminology should be examined with a view to considering
how far it was productive of international misunderstanding. It was clear, for
instance, that the meaning attached by the United States to the word “indepen-

224

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

dence” was very different from its meaning in British constitutional language.

(h) Relations between Dominion Governments and Foreign Countries

the foreign secretary said that inconvenience and embarrassment had
been caused by the absence of any accepted procedure for handling the relations
between Dominion Governments and foreign countries. Dominion Govern¬
ments maintained Embassies or Legations in a limited number of foreign
countries ; and in so far as direct relations with those countries were maintained
in this way no difficulty arose. The position became difficult when His Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom were called upon to deal on behalf of
Dominion Governments with foreign countries ; there were also such questions
as the position of Dominion Governments in relation to the peace treaties. The
respective functions of the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs were imprecise, and it was desirable that the position should
be clarified.

the secretary of state for dominion affairs said that it had been
accepted that all dealings with foreign countries on behalf of Dominion
Governments should be handled by the Foreign Secretary. He agreed that the
procedure needed clarification, but he hoped that, whatever procedure was
agreed upon, the existing machinery for Commonwealth consultation would
be preserved.

(i) Titles of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and the Dominions Office

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS Said that he Would like
to take an early opportunity of informing the Dominion Governments that
His Majesty’s Government had in mind a change in the titles of the Secretary of
State and of the Dominions Office. This matter had already been considered by
Ministers3 when the conclusion was reached that these titles should be changed
to “Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations” (or “Affairs”) and
“Commonwealth Relations” (or “Affairs”) Office respectively.

It was agreed that Dominion Governments should be consulted on this point
at once.

The Committee: —

(1) Agreed that a Ministerial Committee, consisting of the Prime Minister,
the Foreign Secretary, the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs, should be appointed to consider the future structure of
the British Commonwealth.

(2) Agreed that a Committee of Officials, under the Chairmanship of the
Secretary of the Cabinet, should be appointed to assist the Ministerial
Committee.

(3) Invited the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to circulate to the
members of the Ministerial Committee the draft of the communication
which he proposed to send to Dominion Governments about the sug-

JUNE I947

225

gested alteration in the titles of the Secretary of State and the Dominions
Office.

3 No. 31.

119

Sir F. Wylie (United Provinces)

to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
(Extract)

Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Governor of U.P.

secret governor’s camp, 9 June 1947

u. p. 83

2. You will wish to know, first of all, the local reactions to the “plan”. I have
not heard enough yet to be definite but so far, they seem to be very favourable
indeed. Our Muslims had been getting very tough lately. They took a thor¬
oughly belligerent line over our Panchayat Raj bill (para 4 of my letter of
May 18 th);1 there was much talk of fights to the death for Pakistan, much
marching and counter-marching of National Guards, while communal tension
was at a dangerous pitch all over the Province. I have no news from the districts
yet, but our Leaguers in the Legislature have suddenly begun to coo like doves.
Half a dozen of them have been to see me lately about various local matters ;
they were all smiles; seemingly the whole attitude now is that in the U.P. we
must forget the past and become all brothers together. This is of course excellent
and I have been careful to endorse every word so spoken. The truth is that, as I
have often pointed out in these letters, Pakistan is of little use to the U.P. Our
Muslim League leaders too are all right wing people and the last thing they want
is real trouble. They have been pretending to show their teeth during the last
months, I think, under Jinnah’s orders. It had to be got across that the Muslim
League everywhere was in favour of Pakistan and that nothing less than a
“national home” for the Muslims would meet the case. Now that the said home
is almost certainly to be provided, our Leaguers quite obviously feel that they
can drop out of the fight and look after their own local and more personal
interests. Whether they will be able to persuade our urban and usually very low
class Muslim populations to take the same line remains to be seen. Savage
instincts have been aroused — on both sides — which it will take some time to
still. Nevertheless I am very hopeful that this Province will stay quiet provided
that events elsewhere do not upset us unduly. When I write next, I shall be able
to give you a more accurate account of what the Province feels about the plan.
For the moment the above is all that I feel able to commit myself to.

1 Not printed in Vol. X

226

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

120

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R[j/i / 157: f 8

immediate new Delhi, 9 June 1947, 8.10 pm

secret Received: p June, 6.20 pm

No. 1364-S. The composition and terms of reference of the two Boundary
Commissions are going to be very tricky problems. I intend to consult the two
parties individually in the first place, and then try to marry their ideas. In other
words, to proceed in the same way as I did for the recent announcement.

2. I had talk with the Muslim leaders yesterday1 and Jinnah is going to let
me have a draft terms of reference. On the subject of the composition, the
Muslim leaders thought the best arrangement would be to have three entirely
impartial Non-Indians with experience of this kind of work, e.g. perhaps an
American, a Frenchman and an Englishman, to form the Commissions them¬
selves, and for the various interested parties to have expert assessors attached to
the Commissions.

3. They suggested that perhaps UNO might be able to help, and personally
I cannot think of any better arrangement. The trouble is the time factor, since
it is extremely important that the Commissions should report before 15 th
August.

4. I will consult the Congress leaders at the first opportunity but meanwhile
I thought you would like to know how my mind is working, and it would be
immensely helpful if you would start thinking about how the necessary experts
are going to be provided in time, observing that two Commissions will be
necessary — one for the Punjab and one for Bengal.

1 No. 101.

121

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. I.B.(47)joth Meeting
L/P &JI 10/81 :ff 321-3

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.i, on 9 June 1947 at
6 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Hugh Dalton , Sir S. Cripps, Mr A. V.

JUNE 1947

227

Alexander, the Earl of Listowel, Mr C. P. Mayhew, Mr A. G. Bottomley , Mr A.
Henderson, Lord Chorley

Also present were: Mr A. Creech Jones , Sir D. Monteath , Sir G. Laithwaite;
Mr S. E. V. Luke, Mr D. F. Huhback ( Secretariat )

BURMA POLICY

(Previous Reference: 1.13.(47) 29th Meeting, Minute i)1
The Committee had before them Telegrams2 Nos. 212, 213 and 13 of 8th and
9th June from the Governor of Burma to the Secretary of State for Burma.

the secretary of state for Burma said that the Governor had
reported that his Executive Council had asked that terms similar to those
granted to India should now be extended to Burma, i.e. that power should be
transferred immediately on the basis of the grant of Dominion status, and that
this should be done without prejudice to the ultimate decision of the Con¬
stituent Assembly in regard to Burma’s future constitution. The Council
further wished to send U Tin Tut to the United Kingdom immediately to
discuss with His Majesty’s Government the ways and means of transferring
power. At the same time, Aung San had informed the Governor that the first
Session of the Constituent Assembly would open on iothjune, and that on 13 th
June he would himself move a resolution that Burma should become a Sover¬
eign Independent Republic. The Governor had pointed out that this could only
mean Burma would not remain within the British Commonwealth, and Aung
San had admitted that this was the case. The Governor had informed Aung San
that if the word “State” were substituted for “Republic”, and if the Executive
Council were prepared to give Dominion status a fair trial, His Majesty’s
Government might consider the extension to Burma of the terms offered to
India. Aung San had replied that his intention, when in London, had been to
try to persuade his Government to accept Dominion status; he had found, on
his return, however, that the forces of public opinion were too strong for him,
and that his Party were determined to accept nothing less than complete inde¬
pendence. Acceptance of Dominion status would split his Party, and drive its
left-wing elements into the hands of the Communists.

The Committee were agreed that there could be no question of granting
Dominion status to Burma merely as a device for expediting the transfer of
power; if power was transferred on this basis and Burma then left the Com¬
monwealth within a few weeks, the whole conception of Dominion status
would have been brought into contempt.

the president of the board of trade suggested that the Executive
Council should now be given a clear choice between alternative courses of
action. On the one hand, Burma might have her full independence outside the
Commonwealth as soon as her new constitution had been drafted and the

1 and 2 Not printed.

228

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

necessary legislation had been enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament. It
should be made clear to the Council that this would inevitably take time. On
the other hand, Dominion status might be granted to Burma at the same time
as to India and power transferred immediately on this basis. But His Majesty’s
Government would agree to this course only on the understanding that
Dominion status so achieved would have to remain unaltered for a period of
time. It was just possible, having regard to the analogy of the acceptance of
Dominion status by the Congress leaders, that Aung San might be able to
persuade his Party to accept the second alternative. There seemed little doubt
that he himself was anxious for Dominion status; the political forces pressing
for complete independence were, however, very strong and it was not, there¬
fore, possible to be optimistic about the outcome of this proposal. But if the
Burmans were prepared to accept Dominion status on these terms, there was
every hope that the pressure for complete independence would gradually
diminish. The arguments put forward by the Governor in his telegram No. 13
constituted a strong case for making one final effort to retain Burma within the
Commonwealth.

the secretary of state for the colonies said that there need be no
anxiety about the reactions on Malaya of the developments in Burma. He was,
however, greatly concerned about their effect on Ceylon. The political situation
in Burma has been very closely watched in Ceylon, where there was a strong
feeling that the Burmans had gained more by resort to disorder and the threat
of force than had the Ceylonese by strict adherence to constitutional methods.
He had now been informed by the Governor that the statement of policy
regarding further constitutional advance in Ceylon, which had recently been
approved by the Cabinet, had proved unacceptable to Mr. D. S. Senanayake,
and the whole position would have to be reconsidered. It would be most
unfortunate if, during the next fortnight, any steps should be taken which
would make it obvious that Burma would in due course leave the Common¬
wealth.

The Committee agreed generally that the alternative courses suggested by
the President of the Board of Trade should be put to the Executive Council.
They thought that the proposal that U Tin Tut should visit this country should
be welcomed, though they felt that he ought to be accompanied by Thakin Nu,
or some equally prominent political personality, since discussions would more
likely be profitable if they were conducted with some one who carried political
weight within the A.F.P.F.L. Party. They also considered that the Governor
should be asked to make every effort to persuade Aung San and the A.F.P.F.L.
Party to postpone the tabling, or at any rate the discussion, of the Motion in
favour of the full independence of Burma until after the discussions in London.
In the meantime, the Governor might continue to stress with Aung San and
others the disadvantages which would follow from Burma’s withdrawal from

JUNE I947

229

the Commonwealth, and in particular that the financial arrangements hitherto
entered into would, in that event, have to be reconsidered.

The Committee: —

(1) Invited the Secretary of State for Burma to submit to the Prime Minister
the draft of a reply to the Governor’s telegrams Nos. 212, 213 and 13 on
the lines agreed by the Committee.

(2) Invited the Secretary of State for Burma to inform the Governor of
Burma that his telegram No. 13 might be repeated to the Viceroy of
India and the Governor-General of Malaya.3

3 Mr Attlee reported this meeting of the India and Burma Committee to the Cabinet next day. The

Cabinet ‘took note of the Prime Minister’s statement on the present political situation in Burma’.

C.M.(47)53rd Conclusions, Minute 4 of 10 June 1947. L/P&J/10/81: ff 319-20.

122

Mr Turnbull to Sir J. Stephenson
LIP&JI10I123: f 362

SECRET INDIA OFFICE, £ June 1Q4J

Dear Stephenson,

I enclose a copy of the second draft1 of the India Bill. This is being gone
through and a lot of alterations will have to be made. The hope is to circulate it
to Ministers at the end of this week for approval in principle, simultaneously
to circulate it to all Departments in Whitehall and despatch it to India. It would
then come up in the India and Burma Committee early next week. Their views
would be telegraphed to the Viceroy who would have about a week to com¬
ment. Thereafter the Bill w’ould be revised and brought up in the I. and B. and
the Cabinet for final approval. Introduction must be by 7th July.

We shall be glad as soon as may be to have your comments on the general
lay-out of this Bill. But you may prefer to reserve them until you get the next
version, I hope about Thursday or Friday. If, however, you have any general
comment which might affect the third edition I should be very grateful if you
could let me have it tomorrow. There are, however, two particular points on
which we should be glad of your advice. These are: —

1. Line 3 of Clause i.2 Should this read “each of which is hereby recognised
by the Parliament of the United Kingdom as an independent Member of the
British Commonwealth of Nations”?

1 Not printed. For the draft bill as circulated to Ministers see No. 191.

2 As drafted this clause read: ‘As from the appointed day, two Dominions of the Crown shall be set up
in India, to be known respectively as India and Pakistan, each of which shall be an independent
member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.’ L/P &J/10/123 : f 366.

230

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

2. Clause 4.3 Can you tell us whether there is any essential minimum pro¬
vision which in the case of other Dominion constitutions is not alterable by
Dominion Parliaments? I suppose that this varies according to the constitution
of the Dominion and that in the case of Eire they have either been granted or
have seized power to amend everything. Have you any view as to whether any
minimum provision should be included which would not be alterable by Indian
Legislatures, e.g. succession of the Crown and the Royal Title?

Yours sincerely,

F. F. TURNBULL

3 Clause 4 laid down the powers of the Legislature of each of the Indian Dominions. Ibid.: f 367.

123

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma ( Extract )

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Commonwealth , Retention of

India within , Part I ( b )

10 June ig47

Y.E.

At a Staff Meeting on the afternoon of Monday, 9th June, we went through the
Minutes of your Meeting that morning.1 There are a number of very important
points arising from these Minutes and we would ask for a further Viceroy’s
Meeting to discuss them at 4 p.m. on Tuesday, 10th June.

May I now deal with the different items in the Minutes one by one.2
ITEM 2 DOMINION STATUS

(a) We discussed the principles which should serve as a guide in connection with
your position and that of your staff after Dominion status has been granted and
you have become a Constitutional Governor-General.

We suggest that the general principles which should govern the situation, on
the assumption that you are appointed Governor-General of both Dominions,
are as follows : —

(i) In no circumstances should you have any executive functions what¬
soever;

(ii) Clearly you will have important advisory functions but these must be
limited to those which the Governments of the two Dominions invite
you to undertake in your personal capacity;

(iii) The “normal” Viceroy’s Staff should be reduced to the absolute mini¬
mum from the moment you become Constitutional Governor-General.
Most of the Cypher Staff, the Press and the clerical staff would disappear.
There must remain at least: —

JUNE 1947

231

One Private Secretary and possibly one Assistant Private Secretary to
the Governor-General in each Dominion (two out of the four of
these might be Indians).

One Military Secretary to the Governor-General and/or one Comp¬
troller in each Dominion.

Two or three As.D.C. (possibly all Indians).

(iv) You would perhaps at once offer the Governments of both Dominions
to dispense with the special staff which you brought out to deal with the
particular problem which confronted you; in making this offer, how¬
ever, you would point out that, if you are likely to be called upon for
much advisory work in the initial stages, you would want to retain some
high-level advisers. H.M.G. would probably be prepared to pay for this
team, if both Dominion Governments wished them to stay for a period
of from 3-6 months. By the end of that time the machinery of both
Governments would be running properly and the service of the high-
level Advisers could be dispensed with. But of course every one of us is
prepared to stay as long as we are wanted or alternatively to go when¬
ever you wish.

(b) With reference to Conclusion (ii) of Item 2. We have considered the
advantages of Hindustan and Pakistan having the same man as Governor-
General. We suggest that they are broadly as follows: —

(i) You personally have earned the confidence and trust of both parties.
This is by far the most important factor;

(ii) There will be an immense number of standstill orders and although both
Dominions will become autonomous, it will be essential for certain
matters to be run on an unified basis until they can be separated. A broad
example of this is the Army. In all these matters your personal assistance
towards enabling an agreement to be reached would be of the utmost
benefit;

(iii) If there were separate Governors-General, one for each Dominion, they
and their Governments would look at all problems purely from their
own point of view. There would be nobody whosoever in India as a
whole capable of taking a completely impartial viewpoint. Incidentally,
two Governors-General would be more expensive than one;

(iv) Pakistan would stand to gain even more from your continued presence
than would Hindustan, because they are the weaker party and because
Hindustan at present has the nine points of the law.3

(c) Reference Conclusions (iii) and (iv) of Item 2. We came to the conclusion
that a preliminary “exploration of the ground” by Sir Walter Monckton would
not be advantageous. This question of how many Governors-General there are

1 No. 108. 2 Only Lord Ismay’s comment on Item 2 of No. 108 is on the file.

3 ‘Possession is nine points of the law’ (Eng. prov.).

232

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

going to be is one which, although there has been no Press speculation, has,
without any possible doubt, been exercising the minds of the Indian Leaders.
We feel that there is no doubt but that Mr Jinnah’ s mind is already made up
so far as it can be one way or the other, and that the services of an intermediary
will reap no advantages. Therefore we suggest that a member of your Staff
should be the person to see Mr Jinnah; that he should find out which way the
wind is blowing; that he should point out the immense advantages which
Pakistan would gain from having the same man as Governor-General as
Hindustan; and that finally he should show Mr Jinnah Mr V. P. Menon’s draft
of Legislation — a draft which would have the same effect of making up Mr
Jinnah’s mind on this issue as the draft suggested by Lord Listowel made up his
mind on the issue of Dominion status.4 Mr Menon will bring a copy of this
draft to the Staff Meeting tomorrow.

4 See No. 38, para. 5.

124

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and

Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel and Mr Kripalani

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy s Interview No. 146

secret 10 June 1947, 10 am

(Lord Ismay and Sir Eric Mieville were also present. Lt. Colonel Erskine Crum
was in attendance and dictated the record.)

The States1

I gave an account of my meeting the previous Saturday morning, 7th June,2
with the Muslim League leaders and explained that the Dewan of Bahawalpur
had also been present, and had raised the question of the legal validity, after the
transfer of power, of contractual agreements with the States, quoting the
position of Bahawalpur as a test case. Mr Jinnah had expressed the view that it
would be legally binding upon the successor authorities to continue these
contractual agreements. I stated that I had given directions for the legal obliga¬
tions to be looked into and would discuss the matter further, together with
other matters with regard to the States, at a meeting with the seven Indian
Leaders on Friday, 13 th June.

Sardar Patel considered that one of the agreements with the States which
would have to be put on a standstill basis was that concerning the supply of
arms by the Defence Department. He suggested that it was particularly neces-

JUNE 1947

233

sary for these agreements to continue in operation so that the States should not
be allowed to bring in arms from abroad. He also raised the question of the
lease of property at Mount Abu.1 2 3 I said that both these matters could be dis¬
cussed at the meeting on 13 th June, and suggested that we might then also
consider the suggestion that the interim period, during which there would be a
standstill order on present agreements, should last for two years.

I emphasised that H.M.G. had formally decided to stand by their Statement
of May 12th, 1946, 4 with regard to the States and that I was tied by the policy
set down therein. Pandit Nehru put forward the view that the May 12th
Statement was an integral part of the Cabinet Mission’s Plan as a whole; but I
pointed out that it had been specifically ante-dated so that, in the event of
rejection of the Cabinet Mission’s Plan of May 16th, it should stand by itself.

Pandit Nehru declared that he entirely disagreed with the idea of complete
independence for the States. They had never had an independent existence
before. He advised me to read Mr Edward Thompson’s “History of the Indian
States”.5 With regard to Hyderabad, he said that this State had grown up
through treachery and had always been in the wake of the victors to gather the
spoils. The States had come into the Government of India system before the
Crown had.

I explained that, from conversations with representatives of the States, I had
got the impression that the reason why some of them had not yet joined the
Constituent Assembly was because they feared that there would be a much
tighter centre under the existing plan than under the Cabinet Mission’s Plan.
Sardar Patel stated that, so far as the States were concerned, the Centre would
only be strengthened with their consent. He further said that he thought that I
was much mistaken in thinking that the States were moving towards more
representative Government. When I disagreed with this, Pandit Nehru flared
up and said that he challenged, from the highest constitutional basis, the idea
that any ruler could decide himself whether or not to join the Constituent
Assembly. He said “I will encourage rebellion in all States that go against us”.
Mr Kripalani said more quietly “The people must have some say in the matter”.
I replied that I myself had no doubt what would happen in the end. Some
Rulers to whom I had spoken had already seen sense and some were fast
beginning to.

1 Lt.-Col. Erskine Crum sent a copy of this Item to Sir C. Corfield remarking that ‘it will enable you
to see the sort of line which Congress are going to take at the meeting with the seven Indian leaders
on Friday next.’ R/3/1/137: f 37.

2 No. 101.

3 The lands occupied by the civil and military station on Mount Abu in the State of Sirohi were made

over to the British Government under a permanent lease in an agreement concluded in October
1917. 4 Vol. VII, No. 262.

5 Probably a reference to Edward J. Thompson, The Making of the Indian Princes (London, O.U.P.,
1943)-

234

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Boundary Com m issi o 1 1

The Congress Leaders agreed that I should ask the Governors to call together
the interested political leaders in the Punjab and Bengal with a view to arriving
at some measure of agreement between themselves as to the partition of their
respective Provinces. I said that after consulting the Muslim League and Sikh
leaders I would telegraph to the Governors, asking them to go ahead with this.

About the suggestion that each Boundary Commission should consist of
three persons obtained through U.N.O. plus three expert assessors, Pandit
Nehru at first seemed doubtful. He felt that much delay would be involved,
but when I pointed out that we could telegraph off to U.N.O. straight away and
get the chosen representatives flown to India, he said that he would further
consider the matter and let me know his views.

It was suggested that the number of assessors should be five in the Punjab
Boundary Commission and four in the Bengal Boundary Commission. In
detail these would be — in Punjab, one Muslim representative from Western
Punjab; one Hindu representative from Eastern Punjab; one Sikh representa¬
tive, one representative from Pakistan as a whole and one representative from
Hindustan as a whole. In Bengal the composition would be the same, mutatis
mutandis and without of course the Sikh representative.

I asked Pandit Nehru to send me in the Congress suggestions for the terms of
reference for the two Boundary Commissions and this he agreed to do. He
agreed that the basic principle should be a majority population basis.

I pointed out the difficulties with regard to the Sikhs. They represented only
13% of the population (here Sardar Patel remarked that he thought that the
correct figure was 18%) and an enormous transfer of population would be
required to build up even one district into a Sikh majority area. I said that I had
discussed all the Sikh considerations in London and suggested that the Boundary
Commission might be empowered to recommend such transfer of population
and property as might improve the position of the Sikhs. I said that I thought
that Mr Jinnah would agree to th e basis of transfer of population which might
be a way of taking Sikh interests into account. Sardar Patel said that he agreed
that the Sikh problem must be adjusted somehow.

Pandit Nehru said that he was opposed to the principle of population trans¬
fers. He considered that one of the secondary factors to be taken into account
should be religious questions. It was impossible to transfer holy places. The canal
regions were another important consideration. The Sikhs had built up this area
largely by their own work. He had discussed this question with the Governor
of the Punjab and they had agreed that it would be essential to have a joint
Irrigation Board. I said that I agreed with this suggestion. Both sides would
stand to gain by it. I further informed them that Mr Jinnah had promised that
he would guarantee freedom of access into religious places. Sardar Patel said
that he doubted the validity of such an undertaking.

JUNE 1947

235

I asked Pandit Nehru to include in his proposed terms of reference a para¬
graph to deal with the possible exchange of territory outside the Punjab and
Bengal themselves. The areas concerned were part of Thar Parkar in Sind, and
part of Purnea in the United Provinces [Bihar].

Arbitral Tribunal

Pandit Nehru said that he would let me have his opinion on the suggestion that
the Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal should be a member of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council.

Mr Jinnah

Pandit Nehru told me that Mr Jinnah had sold his house in Bombay to Mr
Dalmia for Rs 21 lakhs !

125

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Gandhi

Rl3jiji56:f48

10 June 1947

Dear Mr Gandhi,

Thank you so much for the admirable suggestions1 which you handed to Lord
Ismay. It is quite clear that Mr Jinnah is very preoccupied at the present time,
owing to the Muslim League meetings in Delhi, but I will, of course, take the
earliest opportunity of mentioning to him the points you made.

I will do my best to convince him, but I hope you will not count too much
on my intervention.

I think the idea in the fourth paragraph of your note is a good one, and I will
follow it up with H.M.G. Perhaps the Prime Minister would give an assurance
in debate in Parliament.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 Annex to No. 99.

236

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

126

Minutes of Viceroy's Forty First Staff Meeting , Items 1-2 , 4-5

Mounthatten Papers

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's House , New Delhi , 0// 10
1947 4 pm mere: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma , LerJ Ismay,

Sir E. Mieuille , £00 Bahadur V. P. Menon , Colonel Currie , Captain Brockman ,
Mr I. D. Scott , Mr Campbell-] ohnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Item 1

JAI PRAKASH NARAIN

his excellency the the viceroy said that Jai Prakash Narain had refused
to come and see him. He had sent a personal message explaining his reasons for
this, which he (His Excellency) fully appreciated.1

Item 2

DOMINION STATUS

his excellency the viceroy recalled that he had suggested, at the Staff
Meeting the previous day,2 that Sir Walter Monckton should be asked to
interview Mr Jinnah concerning the latter’s choice of a Governor-General.

There was before the meeting a brief3 from Lord Ismay on this subject,
which made the alternative suggestion that a member of the Viceroy’s staff
should be the person to see Mr Jinnah. the viceroy stated that he considered
that this would indeed be the better course; both Lord Ismay and Sir Eric
Mieville should go and see Mr Jinnah in a few days time to find out his inten¬
tions. They should see Mr Liaquat Ali Khan first; and should also brief Sir
Walter Monckton on the matter in case he went and saw Mr Jinnah and it was
raised in the course of conversation.

A draft, prepared by Rao Bahadur Menon, of the legislation required to
enable both Dominions to have the same man as Governor-General, was then
handed round.4 his excellency the viceroy said that this draft might
serve as a basis for discussion with Mr Jinnah; but he considered that it would
not be desirable eventually to include it in the legislation.

his excellency the viceroy said that after the transfer of power
(assuming that he remained as Governor-General of both Dominions), Vice¬
regal Lodge, Simla, might be considered as a neutral territory. In any event
there would have to be a convention whereby any Ministers of one State were
enabled to come and see him in the other at any time. There would have to be a
provision in the Act which was being drafted which would make it clear that
the Headquarters of the Governor-General were wherever he was residing at
any specific moment.

JUNE I947

237

his excellency the viceroy said that, (still assuming that both the two
new Dominions asked him to stay on as Governor-General), he would have to
find out from the two Prime Ministers what were their wishes regarding his
staff. He realised that it would be desirable for many members of his staff after
the date of transfer of power to be Indians; but felt that it would be necessary,
in view of the fact that the supply of competent Indian administrators generally
would be unlikely to meet the demand, that certain of the more important
positions should be held by British.

sir eric mieville stated that the Governor-General of Canada had honor¬
ary As.D.C., mostly with the rank of Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel, in many
of the big cities in Canada, his excellency said that a similar system might
work well in India.

rao Bahadur menon said that he did not believe that the Congress
leaders would object to any staff which His Excellency selected. Furthermore,
Sardar Patel had agreed that the existing expenditure should continue to be
charged to the revenues of the future Dominion.

his excellency said that he felt that it would be particularly difficult for
him to conduct delicate negotiations if he did not have Lord Ismay and Sir
Eric Mieville available to help, particularly by going to see the various political
leaders. He explained that Mr Attlee had given an undertaking that H.M.G.
would pay for the special staff which he had brought out with him until June
1948.

rao Bahadur menon drew attention to the danger, if the special staff
remained behind after the transfer of power, of socialist propaganda being
started to the effect that the British had not withdrawn at all but intended to
remain indefinitely in India, his excellency the viceroy said that the
position would have to be made quite clear in a statement. The temporary
nature of any additional appointments would have to be stressed and it would
have to be made clear that it was with the agreement of the Indian leaders that
the special staff was remaining.

sir eric mieville said that he felt that the withdrawal of British troops
would be taken by many in India as a symbol of the withdrawal of the British
rule, lord ismay said that he had written5 to Field Marshal Auchinleck asking
him for a new plan for the withdrawal of British troops. He felt that an an¬
nouncement on this should be made as early as possible, the viceroy asked
Lord Ismay to stress the urgency of reaching a decision to Field Marshal
Auchinleck. He said that he himself would see Field Marshal Auchinleck

1 The reason which Jai Prakash Narain gave was that it might have appeared to the public, if he had
come, that he was supporting or even contributing to the partition of India. See Lord Mountbatten’s
Report on the Last Viceroyalty , Part A, para. 47. L/P &J/5/396/3-

2 No. 108, Item 2. 1 2 3 No. 123. 4 See Appendix ‘A’.

5 R/3/1/81: f 136.

238

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

concerning this matter and the plan for the division of the Indian Armed
Forces which the latter had prepared.6

his excellency said that he believed that there was considerable confusion
in Pandit Nehru’s mind concerning the date June 1948. Pandit Nehru was
working at great pressure to get the new Constitution ready before that date,
and had emphasised that this was his object to such an extent that he might do
himself irreparable damage if he did not succeed in it. his excellency
pointed out that the date of June 1948 now had no significance whatsoever.
This point should be stressed in background information given to the Press.

his excellency the viceroy said that a matter upon which a decision
would shortly have to be taken was whether it was to be stated that the Pro¬
vinces which were to make up Pakistan were seceding from India, or whether
India was going to be divided into two. Pandit Nehru had throughout empha¬
sised to him that the only basis on which he would ever agree to the formation
of Pakistan was that, by means of a variation of the Cabinet Mission Plan,
certain Provinces had been allowed to opt out. Pandit Nehru had always
stressed the continuity of India as such, the viceroy said that he had tried to
impress on Mr Jinnah the point that, if the latter obtained his sovereign inde¬
pendent State and extracted the assets to which he was entitled, he should be
satisfied. He would do his best to make Mr Jinnah see the point that it was not
worth fighting Congress on this issue. All ambassadors appointed by Pandit
Nehru would presumably continue in their appointments. The ambassadors
already appointed by various countries to India would presumably look after
the interests of both successor authorities. Sir Terence Shone was asking for a
second High Commissioner for Pakistan.7

his excellency the viceroy said that, to his mind, Pakistan was break¬
ing away from India. He did not see that they stood to lose anything by starting
afresh. In any event it was impossible to prevent Congress using the word
“India” for their Dominion if they wanted to.

rao bahadur menon said that, as he saw it, it would be up to Pakistan to
apply for membership of U.N.O.

mr scott said that, in his view, all international obligations would be
succeeded to by both States.

lord ismay said that this issue was not really for us to decide. It had been
referred8 to the Secretary of State, who had now stated9 that the Foreign Office
were being consulted urgently, lord ismay added his view that the word
“secession” was highly derogatory.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —

(i) directed C.V.S. and Prin. Sec. to go and see Mr Jinnah in three or
four days’ time in order to find out his intentions concerning his
choice of a Governor-General after the transfer of power; also to see
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan about this as soon as possible; and to brief Sir

JUNE I947

239

Walter Monckton on the subject before the latter next saw Mr

(ii) approved the draft (at Appendix ‘A’ to these Minutes) as a basis of
discussion with Mr Jinnah; but not for eventual inclusion in the
legislation ;

(iii) directed the Reforms Commissioner to ensure that provision was
included in the legislation to the effect that, if one man was Governor-
General of both Dominions, his Headquarters would be wherever he
was residing at any specific moment, regardless of in which Dominion
that might be;

(iv) directed C.V.S. to inform the C. in C. that a plan for the withdrawal
of British troops should be drawn up as a matter of urgency, so that
an announcement on this could be made within the next ten days, if

(v) directed D.P.S.V. to arrange for him to see the C. in C. himself about
the withdrawal of British troops and the C. in C/s plan for the divis¬
ion of the Indian Armed Forces ;

(vi) directed Press Attache to emphasize, in background information to
the Press, that the date June 1948 no longer had any significance
whatsoever;

(vii) directed C.V.S. further to consider, in consultation with the rest of
the staff, whether the process, whereby two separate States, both
Dominions of the British Commonwealth, were to come into being
as the successor authorities in what was at present the entity of India,
should be referred to as partition of that entity or, alternatively,
continuation of that entity and secession of certain parts thereof.

Item 4

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

lord ismay stated that a list of the suggested names of fifteen Army officers
to help run the referendum in the N.W.F.P. had been shown to Dr Khan
Sahib. He had agreed that all these were suitable and that any eight out of the
fifteen should be selected.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —

instructed Con. Sec. to include on the agenda of his next meeting with the
seven Indian Leaders, the paper concerning posters for use in this referen¬
dum.

6 This draft has not been traced; see, however, Enclosure 2 to No. 210 tor the plan as submitted to the
Partition Committee.

7 See No. 92.

8 See Nos. 76 and 115.

9 See No. 115, note 2.

240

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Item 5

BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS

lord ismay said that he considered that it would be essential to obtain the
agreement of the Indian Leaders that they would abide by the decisions of the
two Boundary Commissions.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY! —

(i) invited Prin. Sec. to obtain Sardar Baldev Singh’s verbal views on the
composition and the terms of reference of the Western Boundary
Commission;

(ii) directed Con. Sec. to amend a draft telegram (handed round at the
meeting)10 to the Governors of the Punjab and Bengal concerning the
possibility of Provincial Leaders coming to some agreement over
boundaries ; and to put this draft telegram on the agenda for his next
meeting with the seven Indian Leaders.

Appendix A’ to No. 126

SECRET

GOVERNORS-GENERAL — DRAFT LEGISLATION

“The Governor-General of each of the said Dominions shall be appointed by
His Majesty.

Provided that until some other person is appointed by His Majesty to be
Governor-General of either of the said Dominions the person holding the
office of Governor-General of India immediately before the commencement of
this Act shall be Governor-General of both the said Dominions.”

1 0 This draft telegram has not been traced.

127

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Rl3li/i56:ff 49-50

ALL INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE, DELHI, 10 June I947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am herewith enclosing for your information a copy of the Resolution passed
by the Council of the All India Muslim League at its meeting held on the 9th
of June, 1947 regarding the Statement of His Majesty’s Government dated the
3rd of June, 1947.1

Yours sincerely,

LIAQUAT ALI KHAN2

JUNE I947

24I

Enclosure to No. 127

RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE ALL
INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE AT ITS MEETING HELD AT
DELHI ON MONDAY, THE 9TH OF JUNE, 1947

The Council of the All India Muslim League after full deliberation and con¬
sideration of the Statement of His Majesty’s Government dated the 3rd of
June, 1947, laying down the plan of transfer of power to the peoples of India,
notes with satisfaction that the Cabinet Mission’s Plan of May 16th, 1946 will
not be proceeded with and has been abandoned. The only course open is the
partition of India as now proposed in HMG’s Statement of the 3rd June.

The Council of the All India Muslim League is of the opinion that the only
solution of India’s problem is to divide India into two — Pakistan and Hindu¬
stan. On that basis, the Council has given its most earnest attention and con¬
sideration to HMG’s Statement. The Council is of the opinion that although it
cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab or give its consent to
such partition, it has to consider HMG’s Plan for the transfer of power as a
whole.

The Council, therefore, hereby resolves to give full authority to the President
of the All India Muslim League, Qaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah, to accept the
fundamental principles of the Plan as a compromise and to leave it to him, with
full authority, to work out all the details of the Plan in an equitable and just
manner with regard to carrying out the complete division of India on the basis
and fundamental principles embodied in HMG’s Plan including Defence,
Finance, Communications etc.

The Council further empowers the President, Qaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah,
to take all steps and decisions which may be necessary in connection with and
relating to the Plan.

1 No. 45.

2 On 12 June Lord Mountbatten acknowledged receipt of this letter remarking that he had spoken to

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan about the resolution that day. R/3/1/156: f 69.

128

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rl3l*l*57:ff 11-12

SECRET AND PERSONAL 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 10 June I947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

At this morning’s meeting1 three possibilities were suggested for the formation
of the Boundary Commissions. The first one stated that each Commission

1 No. 124.

242

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

should consist of three persons obtained through UNO plus three expert
assessors from each side of each partitioned Province.

2. We have thought over this matter and we think that this suggestion is not
feasible or practicable. This would involve considerable delay. The UNO
Headquarters would probably have to communicate with each member
Government and a long time would elapse before a choice could be made. It is
possible that the ultimate choice might not be a very suitable one. There are
other considerations also which militate against this proposal. We, therefore,
would not welcome it.

3. The second proposal is that each Commission should consist of an
independent Chairman and four other persons of whom two would be
nominated by the Congress and two by the Muslim League. This proposal,
with some slight modification, seems to 11s suitable. The modification we would
suggest is that the four persons nominated by the Congress and the Muslim
League should be persons of high judicial standing. These four should elect
their own Chairman. If there was any difficulty about their electing their
Chairman, the two parties could themselves suggest him.

4. The third proposal has been partly incorporated in the second and,
therefore, I need not say anything about it.

5. We thus approve of the second proposal, as stated above, for the com¬
position of the Boundary Commissions.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

129

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

R/3l1l15^: ff 53-4

SECRET 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 10 June I947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have just seen the text of the resolution of the All-India Muslim League.1 I am
afraid this resolution is not at all satisfactory. It begins by saying that the Coun¬
cil ‘Totes with satisfaction that the Cabinet Mission’s Plan of May 16, 1946,
will not be proceeded with and has been abandoned”. It is true that this Plan
bas been modified to a large extent. But, as a matter of fact, we are still func¬
tioning in many ways in accordance with that Plan. Thus our Constituent
Assembly has been meeting and will continue to meet under that Plan. The

1 Enclosure to No. 127.

JUNE I947

243

Muslim League members from certain Provinces are also now joining the
Constituent Assembly. Thus it is incorrect to say that the Plan has been aban¬
doned, and indeed the Muslim League is itself going to conform to it to some
extent.

2. The second paragraph of the Council’s resolution is the most important
one. It states that the Council approves of the division of India into two parts,
and it proceeds to say that the Council cannot agree to the partition of Bengal
and the Punjab or give its consent to such partition, though it has to consider
HMG’s Plan as a whole. Thus the Council has definitely rejected one of the
basic provisions in the new Scheme.

3. In the third paragraph it is said that the Council accepts the fundamental
principles of the Plan as a compromise. It is not clear what they consider the
fundamental principles to be. They may consider the fundamental principle to
be one of division of India and not of the division of Bengal and the Punjab.
Whatever this may be, it is accepted as a compromise. Of course it is a com¬
promise, but the point is whether it is accepted as a settlement or not. The
reports of the speeches delivered at the Council meeting lead to the conclusion
that this was looked upon as a step only to be utilised for enforcement of further
claims.

4. The Council has given full authority to its President, Mr Jinnah, to take
all steps and decisions which may be necessary in connection witli and relating
to the Plan. The position thus is this: — The Council itself has not accepted the
Plan as a settlement but has given authority to the President to do so if he so
chooses. This is leaving matters where they were. The least that can be done
now is for Mr Jinnah to accept the Plan in its entirety as a settlement 011 behalf
of the All-India Muslim League. Unless this is done clearly and in writing, there
is every likelihood of difficulties arising in the near future. We have had vague
resolutions of the Muslim League in the past which were capable of more than
one interpretation and many of our problems have been due to this fact. Very
soon, as you know, the All-India Congress Committee will be meeting, and the
fact that the Council of the Muslim League has not clearly accepted the Plan
is sure to be pointed out and will affect people’s decisions. I trust that before that
happens, Mr Jinnah will express his full agreement with HMG’s Scheme as a
settlement of our communal problems and that this will be done in writing.
Unless this is done the presumption will be that he does not wish to commit
himself to the Plan and does not wish to treat it as a settlement.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

244

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

130

Sardar Patel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rl3li/i56:ff 55, 58-63

TOP SECRET AND IMMEDIATE HOME MEMBER OF CABINET,

new Delhi, 10 June 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

Perhaps you have already received a copy of the Resolution passed by the All
India Muslim League Council.1 In case you have not, I am sending a copy for
your ready reference.

2. You will notice that the Resolution is contradictory and there is studied
evasion of straightforward acceptance. At one place, it says it cannot agree to
the partition of Bengal and the Punjab or give its consent to such partition. At
another place, it says it accepts the fundamental principles of the plan of June
3rd as a compromise. You have to judge the Resolution in the light of the
speeches at the Council Meeting. I have been able to obtain a copy of the
proceedings through a source of the Intelligence Bureau. I am enclosing a copy
of the same. From these proceedings, it is quite clear that the Pakistan of the
statement of June 3rd would merely be a spring-board for action against
Hindustan, and that there is no possibility of a settlement on this basis. The
position is such as is bound to fill us with grave apprehension.

3. In these circumstances, unless Mr. Jinnah issues a clear statement accepting
the plan, there are bound to be difficulties at the A.I.C.C. meeting.

Yours sincerely,

V ALL ABHBH AI PATEL

Enclosure to No. 130

The Council of the All-India Muslim League met on June 9th, 1947, at the
Imperial Hotel in New Delhi at 10.30 a.m. under the Presidentship of Mr. M.
A. Jinnah. After the recitation of some portions of the Quran by Maulana
Abdul Hamid of Badaun, U.P., Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan asked the permission
of the House to pass a condolence on the deaths of Begum Mohd. Ali,

,2 Mr. Ismail.

After this, Mr. Jinnah read out portions of HMG’s plan and said that the
plan was being placed before the house so that if the house wanted to accept it,
it may do so otherwise not. He added: “Those who want to have any points
regarding this plan explained, are permitted to put questions”. Whereupon, the
representatives from Orissa, the U.P., Bengal and Bombay questioned Mr.
Jinnah regarding the powers of the proposed Boundary Commission and
regarding the safe-guarding of the rights of Muslims in Muslim minority

JUNE 1947

245

provinces. I11 reply to these questions, Mr. Jinnah said that he could disclose
nothing beyond his personal opinion that the safeguarding of the rights of
Muslim minorities would depend upon the future relations between Hindustan
and Pakistan.

The house requested Mr. Jinnah to permit the members, if any of them
wanted to do so, to move a resolution regarding the acceptance or rejection of
the plan. Mr. Jinnah said that the question of moving resolutions and debating
upon them did not arise at all. He added that the question before the house was
whether it wanted to accept the plan as a whole, and that if the house was
agreeable a unanimous resolution, embodying the acceptance of the plan could
be accepted by the house. The house agreed to this.

Speeches

Prof. Abdul Rahim (Bengal) : He strongly opposed the resolution and said that the
plan would ruin the Muslims of India, that as a result of which there could
never be any lasting peace in the country, that Muslims would not benefit by it
and that the proposed division of Bengal and the Punjab will always give rise
to mutual quarrels between Hindus and Muslims. He added that the Eastern
Bengal and the Western Punjab would be economically and industrially weak,
and that the total income ofWestern Bengal is three times that of Eastern
Bengal and went on to say that the Eastern Punjab contained the best districts
in the Province. He exhorted the Muslims to continue to fight for their original
conception of Pakistan and demanded that the plan be totally rejected. He said
that the truncated Pakistan, which was being offered now, had been offered by
the Congress leaders even four years back and that if the Muslims were willing
to accept it now there was no sense in all the bloodshed which had taken place.
He wound up his speech by a fervent appeal to the house to reject the plan.

Ghulatn Hussain Hidayatulla , Premier of Sind: He dilated upon the existing
internecine quarrels in the country and said that Pakistan was being offered in
such a truncated form to them that there was no life left in what they were
getting and added that from the geographical point of view the best and most
prosperous portion of Pakistan had been taken away. He added: “I have three
main objects before me, on the basis of which I appeal to you to accept this plan;
(1) that because of international considerations, the Britishers are quitting India
and that they are bound to hand over power to someone before leaving the
country. It is clear that after the British had left, we could have battled with an
armed and powerful nation and wrested Pakistan, because it is not possible for
any power to keep ten million men subdued for any considerable time, but
there could be no guarantee that even then you could have obtained the full
recognition of your demand even after bloodshed on a much more extensive
scale. (2) On a matter of principle you can get only those areas in which Muslims
arc in a majority. You may acquire these areas either today or tomorrow after a
1 Enclosure to No. 127. 2 Left blank in original.

246

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

fight. Even in the original resolution demanding Pakistan, it had been laid down
that the Muslim majority areas should be included in the proposed Muslim
State. This is true that the Pakistan which is being offered to you today is weak
but you must remember that now you have been acknowledged as a separate
nation. Such a nation will be sovereign in its own country, and will solve its
own problems. I wish to assure you on behalf of Sind that we have been work¬
ing very hard to bring about numerous improvements in the province and vast
constructive schemes are under consideration, as a result of which our pro¬
vince will soon become prosperous. I would also request that if any of you have
any constructive ideas, you may let us know about them. We will rapidly
industrialise our country and will provide a haven of refuge to Muslim traders
and craftsmen who would choose to migrate into Sind from the Muslim
minority provinces. We have removed the consideration of Sindhi or non-
Sindhi from our province and we will see that Sind will soon progress far.

Zahir-ul-Hasan Lari (U.P.): The plan which has been put before us is
extremely disappointing. We should never accept it and if we accept it will be a
major catastrophe. In our Bombay session, we had rejected3 the Cabinet
Mission’s proposal only because the Congress had opposed grouping and had
not accepted it in the sense in which the Cabinet Mission intended it to be
implemented. The Congress had thereby insisted that Assam should not be
included in the Pakistan and we never wanted that Assam should be separated
from Pakistan. When we have once rejected the Cabinet Mission plan on this
basis, the question now arises whether today we will get Assam according to
HMG’s plan or not. I want to tell the house that not only not we get Assam but
also that large portions of the Punjab and Bengal have been divided and they
will be lost of Pakistan, which will greatly weaken the proposed new State.
In fact, the British Government have not accepted even one of our demands;
they have all along tried to placate the Hindus. For instance, in the Gandhi-
Jinnah talk,4 in Rajagopalachariar’s formula,5 in Dr. Rajendra Prasad’s book
“Divided India”6 a division of the country has been proposed on the same lines
which have now been embodied in HMG’s proposal. The Pakistan which is
being offered to us will be from every point of view so weak that we will find
ourselves in serious difficulties.

My second objection is that if on a matter of principle it is correct that Bengal
and the Punjab be divided, then the Muslims who oppose the Congress
Government in Bombay Presidency and the U.P. should be similarly given a
separate homeland, because they in numbers far exceed the Sikh community.
We undertake to transfer population in such a way that we would establish our
majority in all the districts which may be given to us in a divided U.P. The fact
remains that the British Government has only tried to please the Congress.
When we rejected the Cabinet Mission’s proposal, it did not seem to affect the
British Government, but as soon as the Congress demanded the division of

JUNE I947

247

Bengal and the Punjab, HMG’s Government immediately brought out a
proposal embodying their demands. This has happened in spite of the fact that
some responsible Hindu leaders of Bengal have been agitating to retain the
unity of Bengal. The Britishers have, however, chosen to disregard their
agitation only because they are anxious to propitiate the Congress. The Muslim
nation is being trifled with. If you were willing at last to accept this mutilated
Pakistan, I put you the question why did you create so much agitation in the
country; you could have arrived at a compromise with the Congress on the
basis of what you are willing to accept now. The Britisher has befooled you.
What safeguards are there for the protection of the rights of Muslims in Muslim
minority provinces. Should we now form two Muslim Leagues, one for Pakis¬
tan and the other for Hindustan. I declare that the Mussalmans of Hindustan
will establish a separate Muslim League and with the strength of the sacrifices
on the basis of which they have helped you to get Pakistan, they will protect
their rights themselves. I strongly oppose this plan.

Ghulam Ali (Amritsar) : I oppose the ideas put forward by my predecessor,
Mr. Lari, who is apprehensive about the safeguarding of the rights of Muslim
minorities. I can quote the example of our Prophet who entered into even more
unequal agreements with the infidels. This was opposed by the Mushms of that
period but our Prophet had agreed to the compromise because on the basis of
that agreement Muslims had been recognised as a nation. The plan which is
before us for consideration should be viewed in the same light. Though this plan
is defective and though it contains many features obnoxious to the Muslims, it is
good in the sense that Mushms have been recognised as a nation and that they
would get the opportunity to rule as a sovereign body over the country. Mr.
Lari should not be so apprehensive, like him I also belong to a Muslim minority
area and am a resident of Amritsar. In spite of this, I am not weak. The situation
today is that if the Sikhs murder a few Muslims, we immediately take revenge
and kill more Sikhs. I assure you that we have the best soldiers with us, we were
only short of arms which has now been made good by the grant of Pakistan to
us. I assure you that the Pakistan Government would always be ready to avenge
wrongs of Muslims anywhere in India, and, if necessary, the Muslims will cross
their frontiers to take revenge. We do not at all care for the portion of the
Punjab which has been cut away from Pakistan; as soon as the British quit that
area will either be voluntarily evacuated or it will be completely destroyed. I
assure you that we will take the full revenge for all the operations which are
being perpetrated on Punjabi Muslims by Hindu States, give us only the
opportunity to breathe in the atmosphere of freedom once. When we have
proved ourselves irresistible though we are in bondage, nothing would be
able to stop us once we are free. I appeal to you to accept this plan.

3 See Vol. VIII, No. 86. ♦ See Vol. V, No. 30. 5 See Vol. IV, No. 576.

6 Rajendra Prasad, India Divided , (Bombay, Hind Kitabs, 1946).

248

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Mazhar Ismail (Madras) : I belong to a Muslim minority province. We have
undergone sacrifices for the achievement of Pakistan and if Qaid-e-Azam thinks
it proper that we should accept the plan, then we can have no objection to it.
There is no communal quarrel in our province. The Moplas of Madras are
organising themselves and there is no cause for worry on account of the
Muslims of Madras.

Pir Sahib Zakoori Sharijj (Frontier) : I belong to the Frontier and I wish to
speak to you on behalf of the Muslims of that province and on behalf of the Pir
of Manki, who is sitting here. We are Pathans and are an intensely practical
people. We do not know how to deliver long speeches like you do. We prefer
to act. When I met Qaed-e-Azam after the League had been beaten in the
elections by the Khan Brothers, he told me that he was ashamed of us. On
hearing these words, I dared not show my face to Qaed-e-Azam and started
working in the Frontier for all I was worth. In the beginning, the Khan
brothers wielded much influence in the Frontier and we considered the Con¬
gress as our organisation while we thought that the Muslim League was a body
consisting of the creatures of the British, but when we saw the atrocities which
the Congress perpetrated on the Muslims, we were disillusioned and the spell
which the Khan brothers had cast over us was broken. Even today we hate
Congressmen so intensely that the more propaganda they do in the N.W.F.P.
the surer we shall be of our victory in the referendum. We have to make sure
that in the referendum, the Muslims of NW.F.P. side with the League. My
brothers here told me that the Hindus would try to corrupt the Pathans and
would buy votes. Perhaps my friends do not know the Pathans yet. The
Britishers poured money into the N.W.F. and tried to corrupt the Pathans but
the Pathans are still bitter enemies of the British. Let the Hindus spend their
money, we would accept the money yet we would vote for the League and we
would be successful in the referendum. We know now what the Muslim League
is and what the reality of the Congress is. The Muslim minorities should have
no fears. The Pathans are true to their worth and considered it a matter of pride
to be able to sacrifice their life for the sake of their brothers. Today when
Pakistan is being founded and when this session is being held in this room, I
have come to make a promise to my brothers. I promise and declare that on the
slightest hint from Qaed-e-Azam I would prepare an army of armed Pathans
hundred thousand strong. They will be such brave soldiers that their names
would be written in golden letters in the history of the world. I again assure the
Muslim minorities that they should have no fears. It is premature to talk, but I
have no doubt that the Pa than of the Frontier will translate into action what¬
ever is in his heart now. We shall only need your moral support. We were
prepared to shed our blood for the Congress, which was a foreign body, what
would we not do to establish a Muslim kingdom and to establish the rule of our
own race?

JUNE I947

249

Maulvi Abdul Rahman (C.P.) : On behalf of the Muslims I request you to
accept HMG s plan. Even if the defects, which have been pointed out by the
previous speaker, are embodied in the plan we should have no fears on that
account. After all, we will have more land than what they have in Afghanistan,
Iran, Arabia, Iraq, Yaman and Palestine. We have more wealth than they have.
We have industry and agriculture, therefore if those countries can be happy and
free, I have no doubt that Pakistan would also be prosperous and free. I appeal
that this plan be accepted.

Abdul Hamid (Assam) : I belong to a Muslim minority province and according
to the new plan I will be a resident of Hindustan; yet I support the plan. If,
according to this plan, the majority of the Muslims become free, I prefer to
remain as a slave. I urge that the plan be accepted.

The meeting adjourned till 7.30 p.m.

The proceedings were resumed at 7.30 p.m. under the Presidentship of Mr.
M. A. Jinnah and Mr. Jinnah, in the course of his speech, stated that various
points of view in favour of and against the plan had been put before the house.
16 speakers have yet been left out. If you want to decide the issue today, we will
have to stop the debate; otherwise the session will have to continue tomorrow.
I ask your opinion on this point. Upon this, the house gave a majority vote in
favour of closing the debate. Following this, the proposal for the acceptance of
the plan was put to vote. 8 men, including Maulana Hasrat Mohani, voted
against the acceptance of the plan; while the remaining 460 voted for it. The
plan was accepted. Thereafter, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan read out a resolution and
obtained the approval of the President. According to this resolution, the plan
was accepted under protest and Mr. Jinnah was authorised to take further
necessary action.

In the end, Mr. Jinnah addressed the Muslim minority provinces and declared
that it was only because of their sacrifices that Pakistan is being realised today.
He said that the Muslim majority provinces had been oblivious of the issue.
Now it is time that the provincial distinctions of Sindhi, Punjabi, etc., should be
removed and the Muslims should pull their weight together. He said that his
work had been completed, and that he had mainly to get a separate kingdom
and separate army and a separate country for the Muslims of India. The secret
of your progress lies in unity.

At this stage, some Khaksars who were said to be about 20 in numbers,
attempted to enter the Imperial Hotel. The Police and the Muslim National
Guards stopped them.

250

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

131

Sir E. Machtig to Sir D. Monteath
L/P&Jlio/Si.’ff 311-15

SECRET AND IMMEDIATE DOMINIONS OFFICE, DOWNING STREET,

s.w.i, 10 June 1947

My dear Monteath,

In response to your telephone request earlier this morning,1 I enclose herewith
two Dominions Office notes on (a) Dominion status and (b) Dominion Gover-
nors-General respectively, which you might, perhaps, look at in case you think
that they would be of any use to Ismay.

The former is an abbreviated version of the Dominions Office Note ciculated
to the Cabinet Committee on Commonwealth Relations as CR. (47) 1 on 21st
May,2 which accounts for its form and date. The second is a new memorandum
which we have hurriedly constructed.

Yours sincerely,

ERIC MACHTIG

Enclosure to No. 131

The Structure of the British Commonwealth

NOTE BY THE DOMINIONS OFFICE

The structure of the British Commonwealth rests on the proceedings of the
Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930 which were confirmed and given statu¬
tory effect where necessary by the Statute of Westminster 1931. They can
conveniently be considered under two aspects — form and substance.

2. Form. The Imperial Conference of 1926 described the “group of self-
governing communities composed of Great Britain and the Dominions” as
“autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way
subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs,
though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations”. The report added “Every
self-governing member of the Empire is now the master of its destiny. In
fact, if not alway s in form, it is subject to no compulsion whatever”.

This description was completed by the enactment of the Statute of West¬
minster which removed certain existing restrictions on the legislative com¬
petence of the respective Dominion parliaments. The Statute defines the
expression “Dominion” as meaning in this Act 3 the Dominion of Canada, the
Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Union of
South Africa, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland. The only inequality of
status remaining is a residuary power left to the United Kingdom Parliament to
legislate for a Dominion with the request and consent of that Dominion. The
retention of this power was necessary since Canada, and, to a limited extent,

JUNE 1947

25I

New Zealand, have no power to alter their existing constitutions without the
intervention of the United Kingdom Parliament.

The formal position therefore is that of a group of countries each with a
parliament possessing full powers to legislate on all matters affecting the
country, (subject to the reservation outlined above) and recognising the King
as Sovereign of that country and taking all formal action in the King’s name.

3. Substance. The report of the Imperial Conference of 1926 contains the
following statement. “The British Empire is not founded upon negations. It
depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions
are its lifeblood. Free co-operation is its instrument. Peace, security and pro¬
gress are among its objects . . . Though every Dominion is now, and must
always remain, the sole judge of the nature and extent of its co-operation, no
common cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperilled”.

The procedure for ensuring that there should be this full co-operation and
consultation on all matters of common interest is discussed in detail in various
sections of the reports of the two Conferences. The general principle under¬
lying it is that membership of the Commonwealth implies an obligation to
consider one another’s interests, to make every effort to ensure that pursuit of
individual needs and interests is adjusted wherever practicable to considera¬
tion of the needs and interests of other members of the Commonwealth, and to
give mutual support where practicable in all essential matters.

4. The general picture therefore is that of a group of States standing in a
certain constitutional relation to one another by reason of their acceptance
of the King’s sovereignty and working together in an informal understanding
for mutual co-operation.

5 . As regards the inclusion of other countries in membership of the Com¬
monwealth on an equal basis with the existing members, the simplest solution
would clearly be that they should qualify for membership under the same
conditions as the existing members, i.e. they should recognise the King’s
sovereignty, they should have complete autonomy (which could be secured by
the grant to them of powers equivalent to those conferred by the Statute of
Westminster and need not involve amendment of the Statute for the purpose)
and they should undertake the general obligations of consultation and mutual
co-operation which the existing members recognise. As a matter of form, it
would be appropriate that acceptance of new countries as equal members of the
Commonwealth on this basis should be agreed to by all the existing members.
But there is no reason to doubt that such assent would readily be granted
provided that the above conditions were fulfilled.

Dominions Office,
May, 1947

1 Evidently made as a result of No. 117. 2 P.R.O. CAB 21/1803. 3 Emphasis in original.

252

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Enclosure 2 to No. 131

DOMINIONS OFFICE NOTE ON DOMINION GO VERNORS-GENERAL

The position of the Governor-General of a Dominion was defined by the
Imperial Conference of 1926 as being that of the representative of the Crown,
holding in all essential respects the same position in relation to the administra¬
tion of public affairs in the Dominion as is held by His Majesty the King in
Great Britain, and not the representative or agent of His Majesty’s Government
in the United Kingdom or any Department of that Government.

The Governor-General is appointed by the King on the advice of Dominion
Ministers. The office is constituted by standing Letters Patent under the Great
Seal, which provide for the individual appointment to be made by Commis¬
sioner under the Sign Manual and Signet. (The Commission is counter-signed
by the Prime Minister of the Dominion).

The Governor-General’s functions are defined partly in the Letters Patent and
in standing Royal Instructions issued under the Sign Manual and Signet, but
chiefly in the various Dominion Constitutions. They include the summoning
and dissolution of Parliament, the appointment of Ministers and Judges, the
issue of Statutory Orders in Council, and the giving of the Royal Assent to
Bills. (A copy of the latest version of the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions
in the case of the Union of South Africa is attached as a specimen).4

Certain functions in relation to Dominions are performed by the King
personally and have not been delegated to the Governor-General. Apart from
such matters as the award of honours or other marks of Royal favour such as the
grant of the title “Royal”, these relate chiefly to foreign affairs, e.g. the appoint¬
ment of Dominion Ambassadors and the issue of Exequaturs5 to foreign Consuls.
In these matters the submission to the King by Dominion Ministers is normally
made through the Governor-General.

The Governor-General in the exercise of his functions acts in accordance
with the advice of Ministers. Constitutionally a Governor-General is con¬
sidered to have a discretion (such as His Majesty is held to possess in this country)
to decline to accept such advice, but such discretion could be exercised only in
very exceptional circumstances (e.g. refusal, exceptionally, of a dissolution of
Parliament) and in such a case the exercise of the discretion must depend upon
his finding Ministers who accept responsibility for his action.

Dominions Office,
June, 1947.

4 Not printed.

5 Lit.: ‘he may perform’. An official recognition of a consul by the government of the country to
which he is accredited authorising him to exercise his functions. O.E.D.

JUNE I947

253

India Office Minutes
L/p&jiioi^o: ff 44-5
Minute by Mr Turnbull

10 June 1947

Sir W. Croft

Sir D. Montea th

(Copy to General Scoones)1

I attach a draft memorandum2 to the India and Burma Committee covering a
draft telegram to the Viceroy about the Andamans. This is in accordance with
instructions from Sir D. Monteath, also a letter to the S/S for the Colonies.3

My own understanding of the I. and B. proceedings4 was that a firm decision
was taken that the Andamans should not pass under the sovereignty of the new
Dominion of India. The Committee perhaps did not appreciate that this can
only be prevented by specific provision in the Bill, and that if the Congress
blow up about the Andamans they will blow up when the Bill is published or
when it is shown to them. But we are surely now coming to the point at which
we have cast so much of the bread upon the waters that we are beginning to
find a little again. Does it really matter if the Indians do get hot under the collar
about the Andamans when we are on the point of introducing the Bill giving
them everything else, and what can they do about it?5

For this reason my own feeling is that the decision ought to be not 6 to raise
the matter with Indians at all, and that this is one strong argument why the
previous decision of the Committee7 that the draft Bill should not be shown to
the Indian leaders or any attempt made to agree it with them should be firmly
adhered to notwithstanding Nehru’s request.8 There are other powerful reasons
in the same direction which are not relevant to the present issue.

The draft, however, does not take this line because my instructions were to
put it to the Viceroy how the matter should be handled with the Indians.

It seems to me to be a matter of extreme urgency to get administrative
arrangements made for controlling and supplying the Andamans after the date
of separation. The Viceroy having publicly announced that he has taken a
ticket home for the 16th August, it is going to be very difficult to appear not to

1 A note by General Scoones is at L/P &J/10/140: f 47.

2 For the memorandum as circulated see No. 165.

3 Not printed. 4 Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 5, para. (a).

5 Sir D. Monteath noted here: ‘No it does not — provided we are not going to be disturbed thereby’.

6 Emphasis in original.

7 Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 2, para. (j). 8 See Nos. 115 and 116.

254

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

transfer power on or about that date. The separation of the Andamans must
then take place before that. We have, therefore, roughly two months in which
to get the whole matter cleared up and the Colonial Office, vide Sir T. Lloyd’s
letter below,9 are wanting to look before they leap in the matter. The trouble is
we have not anything for them to look at. I should have thought they would
have to be told loudly by Ministers that they have got to do the job. I have
therefore added a letter to the S/S for the Colonies.

F. F. TURNBULL

Minute by Sir W. Croft

11 June 1947

If this and other points have to be discussed with the Indian parties before the
Bill is published, surely it will be a serious addition to the difficulties of the time
table. It would not be impossible to introduce amendments while the Bill is in
passage if that is found necessary to meet Indian reactions after its publication.

w. d. c.

Minute by Sir D. Monteath

11 June 1947

I entirely agree that any discussion of this matter with Indian leaders will
endanger the time-table. But it is just because Congress leaders are so likely to
blow up when they see in the Bill when introduced that the Islands are to be
taken away from them that it seems to me desirable to make sure that Ministers
and the Viceroy see their way to handle that situation when it arises.

I agree too that probably the best course is just to go ahead on our own line:
but it seems important to be sure that we are carrying the Viceroy with us on
that. I am in touch with Sir C. Waterfall who will come to London before the
week is out.

D. T. M.

Minute by Mr Henderson

11 June 1947

Secretary of State

Reference attached file. I have only one comment to make, and that is on the
proposed draft telegram to the Viceroy. I would suggest the deletion of the
sentence “We ourselves doubt whether we need pay undue regard to these
reactions as we are on the verge of transferring power.”10 There certainly will
be very strong reactions if we seek to legislate for the exclusion of these
Islands, but it may be necessary because of defence requirements to do so
whatever reaction there may be. But I do not think the fact that we are “on the

JUNE 1947

255

verge of transferring power” should, be put as a reason for ignoring such
reactions. I would, therefore, recommend you to delete this sentence; it is not
essential to the telegram.11

A. H.

9 L/P &J/i;o/x4o: f 51.

10 For the draft telegram as circulated see Annex to No. 165. The sentence which Mr Henderson
recommended should be deleted followed the one ending ‘strong reactions from Congress’ in
para. 4.

11 Lord Listowel approved the drafts of the India and Burma Committee Paper, the telegram to the
Viceroy, and the letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, subject to the omission from the
telegram of the sentence referred to by Mr Henderson. L/P &J/10/140: f 44.

133

India Office Minutes

LlP&Jlio/8i:ff 317-18
Minute by Sir G. Laithwaite

secret 10 June 1947

Sir D. Montea th

Mr. Dibdin tells me that in the discussion on the draft Indian Dominions Bill
in Committee to-day,1 a question arose over the terms of clauses 15 and 16 as
to the Governor-General or Govemors-General, which seems to bear very
directly on the decisions taken by Ministers in the I. & B. Committee last
night2 as regards Burma.

2. The effect of 15(1) is to provide for a Governor-General etc. ‘‘carrying on
the government of the Dominion on behalf of and in the name of His Majesty 3 by
whatever title he is designated”,4 and 16(1) provides that “unless and until other
provision is made by the law of the Dominion the Governor-General of each
of the Indian Dominions shall be appointed by His Majesty.”5

3 . It will be perfectly possible, of course, on this basis, for one of the new
Indian Dominions or both to legislate to provide that the Chief Executive
should be a President who should not be appointed by His Majesty: and from
the point of view of general Dominion policy, if the contention were to be that

1 Presumably a Committee of officials. 2 No. 12 1.

3 Words in italics underlined in original.

* As drafted Clause 15(1) read: ‘References in this Act to the Governor-General of either of the
Indian Dominions shall be construed as references to the Governor-General for the time being or
other the chief executive officer or administrator for the time being carrying on the government of
the Dominion on behalf of and in the name of His Majesty, by whatever title he is designated.’
L/P &J/10/123 : f 370V.

5 Clause 16(1) has been quoted here in full.

256

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

in that event the Dominion which took such action were still to be a Dom¬
inion, it seems to me that this cuts very deep and is a point of principle which
ought not to be conceded without discussion with the Dominions Office.

4. From the point of view of Burma it seems to me equally dangerous, and
inconsistent with the line taken by Ministers last night, though I recognise that
the form of any Burman legislation might differ from that of the proposed
Indian legislation.

5. I would like to suggest strongly in these circumstances that we should
consider this further because of its possible repercussions. I quite appreciate that
the draftsman’s object has probably been to leave the door open for circum¬
stances that might arise in the future ; but apart from any Indian reactions we
cannot overlook that this draft will receive close attention in Burma (and
possibly in the Dominions).

6. I am sending a copy of this note to Mr. Turnbull (and also to Mr. Harris
as it has a Palace slant).

Minute by Sir D. Monteath

j. G. L.

10 June 1947

Mr Turnbull

Sir G. Laithwaite has sent you a copy of this note. I have spoken to him and he
is content on the understanding that the implications of cl: 15(1) read with
16(1) are fully exposed — as we intended they should be — to D.O. and Ministers.

If Ministers adhere to the line which they took last night a propos Burma that
Dominion status is to be legislated on the basis that the head of the State must
be by the King’s representative and appointed by him, the simple course would,
presumably, be to knock out 16(1). I should expect D.O. to protest strongly
against opening the door so wide as the two clauses read together do for an
Eire situation?

D. T. M.

i34

Sir J. Stephenson to Mr Turnbull

LlP&Jlioli23:ff 358-9

SECRET AND IMMEDIATE DOMINIONS OFFICE, DOWNING STREET,

s. w. i , 10 June 1947

Dear Turnbull,

We have been through the draft Bill enclosed with your letter of 9th June.1

JUNE I947

25 7

There are some points here which seem to us of importance from our point of
view.

Clause 1. We do not regard membership of the British Commonwealth as a
thing to be conferred by United Kingdom legislation: to imply this might
provoke awkward repercussions in the existing Dominions. We suggest that
the point could be covered by inserting a Preamble on the following lines : —
“Whereas it is desired to constitute two Dominions in India to be recog¬
nized as independent members of the British Commonwealth of Nations”,
and then continue

I (1) “As from the appointed day there shall be constituted in India two

Dominions to be known respectively as India and Pakistan”.

You will note that we have omitted the expression “of the Crown”. The
phrase “Dominions of the Crown” is new, and, again, we are not sure that it
may not lead to re-action in the existing Dominions. Our preamble would, we
think, make it unnecessary.1 2 We should like to see it omitted from the title of
the Bill also.

Governor-General. Do we not need, e.g. after clause 4, 3 provision for the
Executive Government on the new basis? The form of clause might be: — -
“The Executive Government of each of the Indian Dominions is vested in the
King and shall be administered by a Governor-General as His representative”
(cf. Section 8 of South Africa Act 1909). This might be followed immediately
by what is contained in Clause 16 of the draft with the omission of the words in
16 (1) “unless and until other provision is made by the law of the Dominion”
(and omitting the side-note).4 We appreciate the reason for the inclusion of the
words which we would omit, but it seems to us essential not to express the
point in this way, as it implies that there could be a Dominion with a Governor-
General not appointed by His Majesty. If there were a Governor-General who
was not the King’s Representative, Dominion status would disappear. If, on the
other hand, it is desired to provide explicitly for the possibility of either of the
two Dominions ceasing to have Dominion status, some other provision seems

1 No. 122.

2 Mr Rowlatt was sent a copy of this letter and commented as follows: ‘. . . I am very much against
having a preamble if we can possibly help it. Once a preamble gets in, Ministers are sure to insist that
it is expanded so as to bear something like the correct artistic proportion to the size and weight of the
rest of the Bill. This can only be done by including matter which is in its nature rhetorical — I do
not use the word in any unduly deprecating sense — and which may easily be made by subsequent
events — perhaps even events occurring before the Bill is law — to look highly inappropriate. I hope I
have done enough therefore to meet the needs of the situation without a preamble.’ Rowlatt to
Turnbull, 11 June 1947. L/P &J/10/123 : f 345.

3 Making provision for the Legislature.

4 As drafted Clause 16(1) read: ‘Unless and until other provision is made by the law of the Dominion,
the Governor-General of each of the India Dominions shall be appointed by His Majesty/ The
side-note read: ‘Transitional provisions as to Governor-General of India Dominions.’ L/P &J/10/123 •
1*371*

258

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

to be required not resting on the mode of appointment of the Governor-
General.

We agree with you that the only restrictive provision requiring consideration
would be one relating to the succession to the Throne and the Royal Title. This,
in the case of the existing Dominions, is to be found in the Preamble to the
Statute of Westminster and is there expressed not as a limitation, but as a right.
In the circumstances, while it would, perhaps, be tidier if the matter were
covered in the Bill (presumably by a further recital in the Preamble on the lines
of that in the Statute of Westminster), we should not ourselves regard this as
essential, and it would certainly read rather awkwardly in the context of the
present Bill.

The above are the chief points that occur to us on a hurried reading of the
Bill; but we will continue to study it in case we have any further comments.

Yours sincerely,

J. E. STEPHENSON

The Earl of Listowel to Viscount Jowitt
L/P &JI7I12500: f 95

10 June 1947

Dear Lord Cfhancellor],

I enclose a copy of a telegram1 I have just received from the Viceroy in which
he says that it is contemplated that an arbitral tribunal may have to be set up in
India to deal with matters arising out of the partition. You will see that the
Viceroy says that he may have to ask for the services of a member of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as Chairman, and that men with
previous experience of India would not be acceptable.

I am circulating this telegram to the India and Burma Committee, but I do
not think we can do more at this stage than draw up a list of possible people,
and, perhaps, take some soundings of those whom we think most suitable as to
whether they would be available. You will see that the Viceroy refers to 6
months in the first instance as the term of service, but I feel convinced myself
that any Chairman of such a tribunal will have work to do in India for at least
18 months if not for two years or possibly longer. It will be essential that he
should be a person of the highest standing, but even though the Viceroy says
that the tribunal will work in Simla in the hot weather, I should think that the
person chosen ought not to be over 60 and preferably about 55. I doubt if we

JUNE 1947

259

need limit ourselves to the Judicial Committee but we should need somebody
of a recognised high status and at least that of High Court Judge.

I am clear that any such appointment must be paid from Indian funds and I
should be glad of your advice as to what emoluments you think should be
offered. Probably the best course would be to give the same salary as is drawn
here with substantial allowances for Indian conditions.

Would you please consider who there is who might be suitable for this work.
I should be glad to discuss the matter with you if you would like to talk it
over.

LISTOWEL

1 In tel. 1348-S of 7 June 1947 Lord Mountbatten reported the decision to set up an Arbitral Tribunal
(No. 100, Item 1, conclusion (v)), and gave advance warning that, though its composition was not
yet settled, he might have to ask for a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as its
Chairman, adding that ‘men with previous experience of India, such as Jayakar and Beaumont,
would not be acceptable’ (cf. No. 101). L/P &J/7/12500: f 98.

136

Mr Lowis ( North-West Frontier Province) to Mr Abell
Telegram , R/j/ 1/151: f 140

immediate 10 June 1947, 7.20 pm

Received: 10 June , 9.20 pm
No. CA 108. Personal for Abell. Ministry are raising objection to announcement
of dates of referendum on grounds that vide paragraph No. 11 of announce¬
ment1 Punjab has as yet made no decision about joining existing Constituent
Assembly or not and that Minorities have not yet returned.2 Understand that
Premier has addressed Governor-General on this latter subject.

2. Request orders of Governor-General on these two points and clarification
of my position vis-a-vis the Ministry in the event of further delaying tactics or
actions which in my opinion are likely to prejudice the fair conduct of refer¬
endum.

3. Propose holding referendum 2nd to 1 6th July and consider essential to
announce dates at once.

1 No. 45.

2 Lord Mountbatten noted in the margin against this sentence: ‘This objection is valid against the
holding of the referendum but barely against preparations.’

2 6o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

137

Mr Abbott to Mr Abell
Telegram , U/3/1/00: f 133

immediate io June 1947, 9.35 pm

confidential Received: 11 June , 6 am

No. 1126-G. Please pass following personal for Commander-in-Chief from
Governor. Begins. Commissioner Ambala now at Gurgaon reports strength of
troops in his opinion inadequate to deal with armed bands roaming about the
district. According to Commissioner present strength including recent rein¬
forcements is 6 companies. Disturbed area must be anything up to 1000 square
miles. I cannot find police reinforcements as police reserves heavily involved in
Lahore and Amritsar and men are exhausted owing to inadequate relief. Shall
be grateful if such additional troops as you think necessary can be sent to
Gurgaon at an early date. Ends.1

1 Lord Mountbatten noted on this telegram: ‘What action is being taken?’ Mr Scott noted on n June
1947 that he had been informed by the C.G.S. that, according to plans already made, a brigade
would take over responsibility for the Gurgaon area. No extra troops over and above this would be
posted. For the reply to Sir E. Jenkins see No. 179.

138

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , LjP &Jlioj8i: f 333

immediate india office, 10 June 1947, 9 pm

Received: 11 June , 6 am

No. 7496. Your telegram 1358-S, dated 9th June,1 paragraph 3. It would be
difficult to give you a definite answer until my colleagues have had an oppor¬
tunity of considering draft bill and time-table in respect of it. I hope it will be
all right from your point of view if answer is deferred until after meeting of
Cabinet Committee arranged for Monday next. You will remember that at our
last discussion with you opinion in the Committee was against showing Bill to
the Indian leaders2 and I fear that to do so might well give rise to controversy
which would prevent Bill passing this Session.

2. Other question raised in your telegrams 1358-S and 1368-S3 is under
urgent consideration and will be considered by my colleagues at same meeting.

2 Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 2, para, (j) 3 Nos. 115 and 116.

1 No. 115.

JUNE 1947

261

139

Mr Gandhi to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma

Rblili5i:ff 143-6

new Delhi, io\n June 1947

Dear Friend,

The Raj Kumari has given me the purport of your conversation with her.1

Though you have been good enough to tell me that I could see you at any
time I wanted to, I must not avail myself of the kindness. I would like, how¬
ever, to reduce to writing some of the things I hold to be necessary for the
proper and swift working of the scheme.

1. As to the referendum in the Frontier Province I must confess that my idea
does not commend itself to Pandit Nehru and his colleagues. As I told you, if
my proposal did not commend itself to them, I would not have the heart to go
any further with it.

2. This, however, does not in any way affect my proposal that before pro¬
ceeding with the referendum you should invite Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah to proceed
to the Frontier Province and to woo the Ministers including Badshah Khan and
his Khudai Khidmatgars who have made the Province what it is — better or
worse. Before he goes, no doubt he should be assured of a courteous hearing
from them.

3. Whether he favours the idea or not Qaid-e-Azam should be asked to give
a fair picture of the Pakistan scheme before the simple Pathan mind is asked to
make its choice of Hindustan or Pakistan. I fancy that the Pathan knows his
position in Hindustan. If he does not, the Congress or the Constituent Assembly
now at work should be called upon to complete the picture. It will be unfair, I
apprehend, to choose between Hindustan or Pakistan without knowing what
each is. He should at least know where his entity will be fully protected.

4. There is as yet no peace in the Frontier Province. Can there be a true
referendum when strife has not completely abated? Minds are too heated to
think coherently. Neither the Congress nor the League can disown liability for
disturbances by their followers. If peace does not reign in the land, the whole
superstructure will come to pieces and you will, in spite of division, leave
behind a legacy of which you will not be proud.

5. The sooner you have a homogeneous ministry the better. In no case can
the League nominees work independently of the whole cabinet. It is a vicious
thing that there is no joint responsibility for every act of individual members.

1 No record, of this interview with Raj kumari Amrit Kaur has been traced.

262

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

6. The only way to keep the wonderful time table made by you is to antici¬
pate the future and ask your special staff to work out all the items presented by
you, without reference to the Cabinet and then when the time comes, the
report should be presented to the respective parties for acceptance, amendment
or rejection.

7. The more I see things the more firmly I believe that the States problem
presents a variety of difficulties which demand very serious and fearless treat¬
ment on your part.

8. The problem of the civil and military services, though in a way not
equally difficult, demands the same firm handling as the States. Gurgaon strife
is an instance in point. So far as I know one single officer is responsible for the
continuance of the mischief.

9. Lastly may I suggest that the attempt to please all parties is a fruitless and
thankless task. In the course of our conversation I suggested that equal praise
bestowed on both the parties was not meant. No praise would have been the
right thing. ‘Duty will be merit when debt becomes a donation’. It is not too
late to mend. Your undoubted skill as a warrior was never more in demand
than today. Fancy a sailor without his fleet, save his mother wit !

10. I have tried to be as succinct as possible. I could not be briefer. If any of
the points raised herein demand a personal talk, you have but to appoint the
suitable time. Please do not think of calling me for the sake of courtesy.

11. I received your kind note of 10th instant2 whilst I had almost finished
this note. It does not call for a separate reply.

This was finished at 9.25 P.M. It will be typed tomorrow.

Yours sincerely,

M. K. GANDHI

2 No. 125.

140

H.M. Minister at Kabul to Secretary of State

Telegram, LIP&SI12I1811: f 128

Kabul, 11 June 1947, 10 am
Received: 11 June, 1.30 pm

No. 47. Leading article in Afghan Press of June 9th and broadcast same evening
expresses deep disappointment that Afghans living between the Durand line
and River Indus have not like other elements in India been given specific option

JUNE I947

263

to choose independence. Subsequent article in newspaper Anis suggests ref¬
erence to U.N.O. if no satisfaction is received from H.M.G.

2. Afghan Foreign Minister sent for me this morning to express same
opinion. He said that his Government after all the discussions on this problem
during the last three years1 had at least expected an answer from His Majesty’s
Government and asked whether I could give one now as Afghan feeling was
very strong.

3 . I endeavoured to explain that Pathanistan kite had recently been flown in
Peshawar but had fallen badly. He was not satisfied. I explained that tribes in
independent territory had already been assured that they were entirely free to
negotiate a new agreement with India and that presumably this freedom in¬
cluded freedom not repeat not to negotiate.

4. As regards settled districts I said that proposed referendum would only
decide which Constituent Assembly Province wished to join. I did not think
that Province could be prevented from demanding complete independence in
Constituent Assembly if they wished to do so.

5. Ali Mohamed replied that if Afghan Government could announce that
Province would not be coerced into joining either Pakistan or Hindustan against
its will their critics would be completely satisfied.

6. Grateful for instructions as to reply I should give. Perhaps I could at least
say that His Majesty’s Government will not use compulsion.

Copy by post to North West Frontier Province. Squire 47.

Repeated to Government of India, External Affairs and Commonwealth
Relations Department.2

1 See e.g. Vol. X, Nos. 82 and 213; also file L/P &S/12/1811 generally.

2 In fact the Government of India did not receive a telegraphic repeat, and a post copy reached them

only on 19 June. Tel. 4755 of 19 June 1947. Ibid: f 117.

141

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab )

Rblifao: ff 150, 154

No. 133/14 11 June 1947

Dear Jenkins,

I enclose a copy of a letter which Patel has written to me. I saw Brendon during
my visit to the Gurgaon area on 1st June and am in full sympathy with his
difficulties. I have sent a formal acknowledgement to Patel but I thought you

264

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

should see this letter, both so that you could know what is being said here, and
because the district will shortly form part of Hindustan; and for that reason you
might wish to consider Brendon’s position.

I am sorry to have to tell you that the question of Gurgaon came up in
Cabinet yesterday evening and I have never heard such unanimity as their
condemnation of the way Gurgaon was being handled. Nehru, Baldev and
others spoke with vehemence against the incompetence, rudeness and useless¬
ness of the District Commissioner and even the League members complained
the district was out of hand. It was all most embarrassing, and I really feel that
it may now be only fair to Brendon to transfer him.1

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

Enclosure to No. 141

HOME MEMBER OF CABINET, NEW DELHI, p June 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have been receiving representations from responsible men of Gurgaon against
the present Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Brendon, about whose conduct in
relation to the arrest of leading Hindus of Gurgaon I had to write to Sir Evan
Jenkins. I sent a copy of that letter2 to you. They have since been released. But
this provocative conduct of his had completely destroyed the confidence of the
majority community of the district in the Deputy Commissioner. His sub¬
sequent attitude and activities have, it appears, made the people completely
hostile to him. Stories have gained currency that he gloats over events probably
because he is entirely out of sympathy with the scheme of transfer of power
and feels that troubles such as have afflicted Gurgaon would demonstrate the
utter folly and impossibility of the policy of “quit India”. It is difficult to be
dogmatic about the accuracy or otherwise of these stories, but the fact remains
that they are widely believed in and are, therefore, undermining both the
prestige and the position of the Deputy Commissioner.

2. In these circumstances I feel that there is no alternative but to transfer him
from the district without delay. At present both communities are engaged in
making vigorous preparations for a renewed offensive on a wider scale. The
situation is full of very dangerous possibilities and everything should be done
to relieve this tension. I understand that according to the customary methods of
“warfare” in thejat areas such situations are settled by a Panchayat of both sides.
I have been advising the local representatives to settle their quarrel by this
means but they have been telling me that in the present atmosphere vitiated by
the presence of the Deputy Commissioner such a move is impossible of success.
At the same time they feel that nothing but the method of Panchayat would
settle it and restore the situation to normalcy. From this point of view also the

JUNE 1947

265

transfer of the Deputy Commissioner would seem to be inevitable and I see no
reason why prestige or any other factor should stand in the way of implementa¬
tion of this well-considered and well-meant advice. Public opinion may or
may not be reasonable, but it is sensitive and I am sure that instead of loss of
prestige there would be returning confidence in fairness and impartiality if my
suggestion regarding the immediate transfer of the District Magistrate were
accepted. It is just possible that a catastrophe may be avoided by this transfer.

3 . I would, therefore, earnestly request you to take up this matter with the
Governor of the Punjab immediately.

Yours sincerely,

VALLABHBHAI PATEL

1 Sir E. Jenkins replied on 14 June 1947 commenting on the criticisms of Mr Brendon. He noted that
the Commissioner of Ambala, Mr Eustace, had been at Gurgaon for the last ten days and had ‘sug¬
gested some days ago that Brendon needed a rest and that a transfer might be a good thing, as the
non-officials were no longer cooperating with him’. Jenkins had told Eustace to wait a few days, but
if the latter felt that Brendon’s transfer was essential he (Jenkins) would order it. R/3/1/90: f 157.
See also No. 299, para. 3 .

2 For Sardar Patel’s letter dated 30 May 1947 to Sir E. Jenkins and the latter’s reply dated 9 June see
R/3/1/90: ff 117-18, 148.

142

Sir O. Caroe ( North-West Frontier Province) to Rear-Admiral Viscount

Mountbatten of Burma

R/j/iliyo: ff 26-8

PERSONAL GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PESHAWAR, 11 June lg^y

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I received your letter No. 1450 of June 6th1 today — the letter saying you must
put in, at any rate for the time, an officiating Governor. It is strange that I had
been thinking of writing to you to say that, if the Province goes to Pakistan
and I were asked to stay on as Governor, I should have grave doubts whether it
would be right or proper for me to do so, if in any way it came to be said as a
result that I was identified with one party, and had antagonised the other for all
time. For — I say it very firmly and finally — I am not a partisan. On the other
hand I have steadily resisted authoritarianism and maliciousness in high places.
If a League regime comes here, they will be more in the tradition, but that is
another matter. They are not big men and will have a very difficult time.

It is clear that you have made up your mind that the charges of partisanship
make it wrong, on a wide view, to retain me here during this critical period,

1 No. 96.

266

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

and of course I accept that judgment. It is with deep sorrow that I accept it,
for I believe I can still help these people to straighten themselves out, and from
the limited point of view one can get here it is hard not to feel that the change
will be regarded in many quarters as a surrender to unfair attacks. But that is for
you, and not for me. I am sorry too not to be able to follow your leadership in
working through the critical months ahead.

I suggest one way of making it easier for all concerned would be for me to
say (taking the initiative) that I wished to go on leave during the next two
months (viz. the remaining months before the transfer of power) in order to
make it quite clear that I was determined it should not be said I had used my
authority to influence the course and results of the Referendum. It could be
added that, as far as could be foreseen, it was my intention to retire under “the
terms”. Whether it would be right or proper for me to come back if circum¬
stances change and if anybody wants me, you and I should have to consider
very carefully when and if the time should come. And the decision should not
be made on personal grounds.

I don’t know whether it would be best to take leave in India or go home —
on the whole I think I had better go home, for, if I remained here, it would
look as if I were hanging about on an off-chance, and it might keep propaganda
on both sides going. Another reason I could give for going home is that my
mother has just died, and I have to decide various questions relating to our
family house and so on.

I know Lockhart well — he is a great friend; and one could not wish for a
nicer person to hand over to. One thing that does worry me is the packing-up
business, for my wife is not strong enough to do it in Peshawar in the middle of
the hot weather. Another thing is that many here will feel that I’m letting them
down, but that can’t be helped.

It is very good of you to think of possible ways of making things easier, and
from what I know of Your Excellency already I can say quite truthfully that I
accept your judgment and am only sad that, together, we can’t carry through
this reorganisation of the frontier. My own conscience is clear, and that is what
matters.

I have kept no copy of this letter. If you can let me have an idea of the date on
which Lockhart expects to take over, it would be very helpful.

Yours sincerely,

o. K. CAROE

P.S. We might go to Kashmir until our staff have packed our things, and then
go home. I hope we might be able to travel by air to the U.K.

JUNE 1947

267

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

R-hlili 70: ff 31-2

IMMEDIATE FINANCIAL MEMBER OF COUNCIL, NEW DELHI,

secret 11 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Just as we were going to the Cabinet meeting this evening you informed me
that the Governor of the N.W.F.P. was being asked to proceed on leave for
two months and that General Lockhart was to be appointed to officiate in his
place. These arrangements will, of course, cover the period of the forthcoming
referendum in the N.W.F.P.

2. Since you mentioned this to me, I have given very careful thought to the
matter. I feel that by sending away the permanent Governor of the N.W.F.P.
during the next critical phase in the history of the Province you will be taking
an extraordinary and dangerous step. As you are well aware, the present
N.W.F.P. Ministers are notorious for their abuse of power, particularly in
connection with elections. To remove a Governor who knows the Province
and its people and to bring in one who has no experience of the Province or of
any Civil Administration at all means nothing except that any little check
which may otherwise be expected on abuse of power by the Ministers during
the referendum will also disappear. The new Governor, being new to the job,
will not even be able to detect, much less check, the misdeeds of his Ministers
who will thus be left completely free to play havoc with the referendum. The
election machinery will no doubt be in charge of a military official, but as
everyone knows, undue influence during elections is not exercised only through
the election machinery, but in a hundred and one other ways. And I need
hardly mention that one of the principal methods is the abuse of power and
patronage by the Government in office. If the Congress alleges that the present
Governor is anti-Congress — which as you know is absolutely without founda¬
tion — and you feel that a person with alleged anti-Congress views should not
be Governor of the Province during the referendum, I trust you will agree that
the repeated demand of the Muslim League for the removal of the N.W.F.P.
Ministry has still greater force. As you will doubtless appreciate, there is a
much greater likelihood of the Ministers abusing their powers than the Governor
doing so, as he has nothing to do with the day-to-day administration of the
Province. I am convinced that the step you propose, which will appear to the
world as nothing short of complete surrender to the Congress, will mar all
chance of a fair and free referendum unless you agree to remove the Ministry
also at the same time. I would, therefore, strongly urge upon you not to take the

268

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

dangerous step of removing the Governor alone. I suggest that it would be
better if you could discuss this matter with Mr Jinnah before taking any decis¬
ion. I shall be glad to discuss it with you myself, should you so desire, after
tomorrow morning’s meeting.

Yours sincerely,
LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

144

Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Part 11(a)

SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 11 June ig47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Abbott sent to Abell, with his letter No. GS 336, of 9th June, a copy of corres¬
pondence1 between Mamdot and myself about the official machinery which I
am setting up to deal with the partition of the Punjab.

I now enclose a copy of a further letter, dated the 10th June, from Mamdot
which I have not yet acknowledged. Mamdot’s intention is clearly to insist on
the formation of committees consisting of officials selected by the political
parties without reference to their seniority, experience and professional com¬
petence. During the past two years the services in the Punjab have been
demoralised by the political parties and are full of party supporters and party
spies.

I believe that the arrangement suggested by Mamdot would be politically
almost impossible. The Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs will all wish to include their
party nominees and I cannot conceive that the committees would work
smoothly or produce intelligible results.

Administratively the arrangement would be disastrous and I think it right to
inform Your Excellency that unless Mamdot modifies his attitude I may have
to decline further responsibility for Punjab affairs, and to recommend the
immediate release of civil servants who do not wish to remain in the Punjab
under the new regime. I could certainly not preside over or assist in arrange¬
ments which implied a lack of confidence in civil servants, whether Indian or
British, who are in my judgment competent to produce the factual studies
required and whose integrity is not open to question.

Mamdot and Swaran Singh are both in Delhi and I do not know when they
are returning. I cannot make any progress until the local leaders are present in

JUNE 1947

269

Lahore. But I shall have to take Mamdot on almost at once on this issue and I
have no intention of giving way on it.

Yours sincerely,

E. M. JENKINS

Enclosure to No. 144

The Nawah of Mamdot to Sir E. Jenkins

6 KING EDWARD ROAD, NEW DELHI, 10 June 1Q47

My dear Sir Evan,

I thank Your Excellency for your letter of yesterday.

2. I am afraid I cannot agree with the viewpoint, from which your proposals
have been formulated, that the communal complexion of the official machinery
which is to prepare the necessary data for the Partition Committee is of no
importance or consequence. The Punjab, or in fact the whole of India, is going
to be partitioned between Muslims and non-Muslims, the religion and race of
people forming the main basis of the present plan for the transfer of power. It
seems to me, therefore, of the utmost importance that the composition of the
bodies of official experts who are, not merely to present, but to prepare2
necessary facts and figures for the Partition Committee, should be representa¬
tive and satisfactory from the point of view of both parties. There need be, I
think, no difficulty in securing this, if the personnel is chosen in consultation
with the parties concerned.

3 . I fully share your anxiety for speed and feel convinced that if officials of
the choice of the parties concerned are associated with the initial task of pre¬
paring a correct picture of the relevant facts and placing details in their true
perspective, it will help the Partition Committee in coming to quick decisions.
If the Partition Committee as a whole does not feel satisfied with the personnel
of the fact-finding bodies of experts and cannot place full reliance on the results
of their work, it will only mean a repetition of the whole process all over again
by the Partition Committee to satisfy itself.

1 In a letter of 8 June 1947 the Khan of Mamdot expressed surprise at having read in the press that Mr
Sachdev had been appointed Partition Commissioner in charge of the Partition Office and that
expert committees had also been appointed to deal with partition matters in the Punjab. He thought
it ‘most astounding’ that such arrangements should already have been made ‘without the prior
consultation and approval of the Leaders of the parties’ and added that they could not be approved
by the Muslim League. He urged the early setting-up of a supervisory Partition Committee and
stressed the importance he attached to the adequate representation of Muslim interests on the
Partition Office and expert committees. In his reply, dated 9 June, 1947, Sir E. Jenkins emphasised
that ‘all decisions will naturally have to be taken by representatives of the political parties’, but went
on to argue that to take their decisions these representatives would need a large mass of factual
information which could only be provided by the officials currently responsible for the subjects in
question. He also indicated the names of those who had been appointed to the expert committees
formed on this basis. Mountbatten Papers, loc. cit.

2 Emphasis in original.

270

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

4. The correct and expeditious way of completing the task in view would be
for a notional and informal Partition Committee to be set up first and Com¬
mittees of official experts to be selected in consultation with the representatives
of the two parties on the Partition Committee. Selection for the official
Committees need not be confined to the administrative heads of Departments.
In order to ensure a satisfactory communal complexion of the machinery it
may be desirable in certain instances to select officials holding somewhat lower
positions in their Departments, provided they are in a position to bring a special
knowledge of Departmental affairs to bear on their task.

5. My party wishes me to make it clear that it will not be able to associate
itself with the process contemplated in your proposals, if the personnel of the
official committees is not selected in consultation with those whom these
committees are intended to help.

Yours sincerely,

IFTIKHAR HUSAIN KHAN

145

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Part 11(a)

NO. 4I-PSFR/47 FINANCIAL MEMBER OF COUNCIL, NEW DELHI,

11 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Khan Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot, President of the Punjab Provincial
Muslim League and Leader of the Muslim League Party in the Punjab Assem¬
bly, has brought to my notice a most unfortunate complication in the Punjab in
connection with the procedure for the partitioning of the assets, etc. of that
province.

On the invitation of the Governor of the Punjab, the Khan of Mamdot
interviewed him on June 6, 1947, in the afternoon (about 3-30 P.M.)1 when the
Governor consulted him regarding the setting up of machinery to settle the
details of division. The Khan of Mamdot promised to send him his suggestions
on the following day after consultations with his colleagues. The Governor,
however, ordered on the same day (June 6, 1947) the appointment of one Mr.
M. R. Sachdev, I.C.S., as Partition Commissioner.2 This appointment was
announced in the local newspapers on the following morning (June 7, 1947).

The Khan of Mamdot thereupon made a protest to the Governor in writing3
against the appointment which had been made without his suggestions having
been awaited. The selection of the Partition Commissioner was regarded by the

JUNE 1947

27I

Khan of Mamdot as most unsatisfactory from the point of view of his Party.

In reply the Governor wrote to him on June 8 [9], 1947, 4 explaining that the
official machinery which was being set up (including the Reforms [ ? Partition]
Commissioner and his office and a number of Committees concerned with
various subjects) were only intended to select and prepare necessary facts and
figures about common assets, etc. and would only propose alternative methods
of division. The final decisions would be taken, the Governor explained, by a
Partition Committee consisting of representatives of the political parties. In the
opinion of the Governor, the race and religion of the officials included in the
machinery did not matter at all and the parties should not start a controversy
over this point.

While explaining this, the Governor also indicated the names of the officials
who were being selected for inclusion in the various expert committees.

The proposed personnel of the expert committees seemed to make matters
much worse, as the committees were overweighted with the non-Muslim
element. The Khan of Mamdot replied on June 10, 1947, 5 from Delhi (where
the Governor’s letter had reached him) emphasising that the setting up of
official machinery in utter disregard of the interests or wishes of the Muslim
League would not make for speed. The Muslim League representatives on the
Partition Committee would not accept data prepared by these apparently
packed bodies as a correct basis for discussion and decision, but would insist on
new committees with balanced personnel being set up to prepare relevant data
all over again. The Khan of Mamdot suggested that the correct course would be
for the Governor to set up an informal Partition Committee first and to
appoint committees of officials in consultation with both parties on the Parti¬
tion Committee. In the absence of this his party, he said, would not be able to
co-operate with the procedure that was being followed by the Governor.

It appears that without waiting for the Khan of Mamdot’s reply or reactions,
the Governor of the Punjab has passed orders regarding the appointment of the
committees of experts. The personnel of these committees has been announced
in the newspapers of this morning.

It seems to me that by refusing to follow the simple and straight course
suggested by the Provincial Muslim League leader and insisting on official
committees of his own choice, the Governor of the Punjab is creating un¬
necessary complications at a critical stage in our task. It is rather high-handed to
force on the political parties concerned the help and guidance of official
committees, the composition of which is regarded by one party as wholly
unsatisfactory. A very simple way out of this impasse would be to include in the
committee an equal number of officials suggested by each political party.

In order to avoid the difficulties which I see ahead and which may mean

1 See No. 97, para. 3. 2 Ibid., para. 2.

4 Ibid. 5 Enclosure to No. 144.

3 See No. 144, note 1.

272

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

unnecessary delay, I wish to request you to intervene in this matter and use your
good offices to secure a reasonable and satisfactory procedure for the important
settlements which have to be made in connection with the division of the

I propose to raise this question at the next conference of leaders fixed for
Friday the 13 th June.

Yours sincerely,

LIAQUAT ATI KHAN

146

Sir C. Corf eld to Mr I. D. Scott
Rl3li/i37:ff 41-30

SECRET POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 11 June 1947

My dear Scott,

Please refer to your d.o. letter No. 592/89 dated the 9th June 1947.1

I have since had a talk with His Excellency and enclose a draft of the two
letters,2 which it is now proposed to issue to all Residents :

(a) giving States the choice between having representatives of a successor
Government or Governments in State territory, or sending their repre¬
sentatives to the headquarters of these Governments ; and

(b) proposing a formula for interim arrangements on a standstill basis.

I also enclose two briefs for His Excellency’s use, when he discusses these
questions and the question of disposal of the Crown Representative’s records
with the British Indian leaders. I have tried to draft these briefs3 in a form
suitable for circulation before the meeting if required.

I have since received [C.P.] Scott’s letter 592/89 dated the 10th June4 en¬
closing two further letters from Pandit Nehru.

Pandit Nehru appears to have resiled from the agreement recorded under
item 5 of the Viceroy’s 17th Miscellaneous Meeting on the 7th instant,5 but if he
is correct in his assumption that ‘States can have no objection’ to political
officers being left with their offices in States (there are very few such junior
officers) and to States corresponding only with a new Political Department, we
can amphfy the letter to Residents saying that this suggestion has been made
and asking for the States’ reactions.

There is perhaps no need for me to repeat what has so often been pointed out
to Pandit Nehru that there has been continuous contact and consultation
between the Political Department and the Departments of the Central Govern¬
ment, and that the Political Department does not operate in vacuo. It is obvious

JUNE I947

273

that our coordinating functions, on which so much stress has been laid, could
not have been performed without such contact. Perhaps the basis for Pandit
Nehru’s allegations to the contrary is the fact that the Crown Representative
has not yet shared with him control over the policy and principles, governing
the more important work of the Political Department which relates to the
exercise of paramountcy.

Pandit Nehru’s threat that after the lapse of paramountcy he might well drag
Political Officers before the Courts of Law raises the problem of their protec¬
tion after that date. He is not likely to secure their services by such means nor
to secure the cooperation of States if he declines to consider their reasonable
claims to the first refusal of property in their territory, which the Successor
Governments do not specifically need.

I see no objection to a representative of theW.M. &P. Department being
deputed to inspect the property, of which we are sending them a list (in fact
we had already decided to make this suggestion to that Department), but I fail
to see how the Home Department are concerned. I should have thought
Finance Department was more concerned.

As regards the enclosures to your office endorsement, No. 592/89 dated the
10th instant,6 which I return herewith, I can only say that eminent lawyers and
jurists can debate these problems ad nauseam, but the result will serve no useful
purpose. What is required is a practical standstill arrangement, to operate while
fresh or modified agreements are being made. In fact we have been doing all
we can to secure such an arrangement, but have hitherto been consistently
blocked (see my note forwarded to Mieville on the 29th May 1947). 7

I am somewhat surprised that Sir Alladi should close his review with a threat
that, if the States do not accept one or other of his alternative interpretations,
the question will have to be settled by inciting State subjects against constituted
authority.

Mr C. Rajagopalachari’s article,8 which I mentioned to His Excellency,
appears to be part of the general attack upon the policy embodied in the
Cabinet Mission’s Memo, of the 12th May 1946, 9 which remains unchanged.
This policy need not lead to the disruption of India if the Successor authorities

1 Enclosing an amended version approved by Lord Mountbatten of the draft summarised in No. 94,
note 5, and asking for a draft formula for arrangements on a standstill basis. R/3/1/137: f 17.

2 Drafts not printed.

3 See enclosures 1, 2 and 3. These three briefs were circulated to the Indian leaders before the meeting.
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: States, Relations with, Part 1(b), f 69.

4 Enclosing Nos. 109 and no, explaining that Lord Mountbatten now considered that ‘he should put
the whole matter before the 7 leaders whom he consulted on June 2nd’, and asking for a brief for
the meeting on the points raised in Nos. 109 and no.

5 No. 100.

6 This evidently referred No. in and its enclosures sent to Sir C. Corfield for advice.

^ Vol. X, No. 556.

8 See No. in, note 1. 9 Vol. VII, No. 262.

274

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

show consideration and statesmanship: but if they threaten and dictate, the
Balkanisation which all wish to avoid may well materialise.

Yours sincerely,

C. L. CORFIELD

Enclosure 1 to No. 146

Machinery for dealing with questions of common concern between States and

the Successor Governments in British India

The Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12th May 1946 stated that ‘the British
Government could not and will not in any circumstances transfer paramountcy
to an Indian Government’ .

As soon therefore as fully self-governing Governments are set up in British
India, paramountcy will lapse, the Crown Representative will disappear and
the machinery which he controls (Political Department, Residents and Political
Agents) will disappear with him.

Paramountcy functions, which are the main duty and preoccupation of this
machinery, can no longer be exercised. This machinery however has been used
as a convenient means of dealing with certain matters of common concern, and
for this purpose alternative machinery is required.

This alternative machinery has already begun to function by means of direct
correspondence between the appropriate Departments of the Central Govern¬
ment and States, especially the Food Department. The appropriate Department
for any State which may opt for independence would presumably be the
External Affairs Department of the Government concerned.

The Memo, of 12th May stated that the alternative machinery ‘would have
to be provided either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the
successor Government or Governments or failing this entering into particular
political arrangements with it or them’.

Direct correspondence is a normal federal relationship. It has worked per¬
fectly smoothly with the Food Department for a number of years and with
other Departments who have started it. It is the procedure which States are
likely to accept. The only problem arises out of the large number of States
which require to be addressed. This problem is being solved by the grouping of
States, e.g. the Eastern States which have established a joint agency to handle
direct correspondence with 39 States. Similar steps are being taken elsewhere.

If the Successor Governments set up Political (or States) Departments of their
own, they will raise grave suspicion in States and as no machinery will work
without the States’ cooperation, this would be an unwise step, though the ques¬
tion is of course one for the Successor Governments to decide.

If the existing machinery of the Crown Representative was handed over to
the Successor Governments for this purpose, the States would interpret this

JUNE I947

275

action as a transfer of paramountcy in practice. This interpretation would have
less justification if the appropriate Departments of the Successor Governments
took over the staff at present employed by the Crown Representative in order
to deal with direct correspondence together with the relevant records, provided
no Political Officers were taken over, though of course there is nothing to
prevent these Departments from employing Political Officers on new contracts
for this purpose after the lapse of paramountcy.

The proposal therefore is that the States should be given the option of

(a) dealing with local representatives of the Successor Governments or

(b) appointing their own representatives to the headquarters of the Successor
Governments.

Whatever the choice, these representatives should under a federal system deal
with the appropriate Department of the Successor Government with which
it is likely to have matters of common concern.

Enclosure 2 to No. 146

Formula for interim arrangements on a standstill basis

The Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12th May (para. 4) stated that ‘in
regard to the future regulation of matters of common concern, especially in the
economic and financial field’ it will, in order to avoid administrative diffi¬
culties, be necessary to arrive at an understanding between the States and those
likely to control the Successor Government or Governments, that for a period
of time the then existing arrangements as to those matters of common concern
should continue until new agreements are completed. It was added that ‘in this
matter the British Government and the Crown Representative will lend such
assistance as they can should it be so desired.’

A draft agreement (copy enclosed)10 has been produced, which may serve
as a basis for negotiation, and it is proposed to circulate this to States for their
comments. The views of the successor authorities upon it are also required. A
forum for arriving at an agreed formula by direct negotiation must then be
established if any agreement is to be reached in time.

It has to be borne in mind that these interim arrangements cannot all be on
a purely standstill basis. With the lapse of paramountcy ‘all the rights surren¬
dered by the States to the paramount power will return to the States’. This
means that all jurisdiction in State territory 11 (e.g. over Railways, Cantonments
and other administered areas) will revert to the States. Interim arrangements
can therefore only be made on this basis. This is recognised by the provisions of
proviso (c) of Article 3 of the draft standstill agreement.

10 This draft was the same as the Enclosure to No. 198 except for the addition of Item 16 to the
Schedule in the latter.

Emphasis in original.

11

27 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The Political Department have been trying for some months to secure the
cooperation of the Central Government Departments concerned for nego¬
tiating interim arrangements with the States concerned in this sphere, so that
the automatic reversion of jurisdiction to States on the lapse of paramo untcy
will not endanger all-India Defence and Communications. This cooperation
has not yet been secured though much inter-departmental work has already
been done to clarify the issues.

Where Defence and Communications are not involved the reversion of
jurisdiction offers few problems. One however is the disposal of property.
Lists of property belonging to the Crown Representative have been prepared
and are being forwarded to the Works, Mines and Power Department. But the
reversion of jurisdiction does not affect rights of property, and detailed con¬
sideration of the disposal of property can be dealt with by the Successor
Governments after the lapse of paramountcy, provided that all property
belonging to a State is handed back and direct negotiations between Successor
Governments and the States concerned are initiated forthwith regarding other
property, so that suitable arrangements are made for looking after the property
and its contents when the agents of the Crown Representative will have dis¬
appeared.

Even if States decline to entertain local representatives of the Successor
Governments, it is possible that States would agree to some clerical staff of the
Crown Representative staying on in the employ of the Successor Governments
for a period, in order to assist in the disposal of assets and settlement of lia¬
bilities. If desired, the Political Department will be glad to suggest this course
to States, since the skeleton staff thus retained for a period would be useful for
dealing with the leave and pension claims of clerical and inferior staff, the
settlement of which during the next two months presents a formidable prob¬
lem.

Enclosure 3 to No. 146

Disposal of Crown Representative’s records

An extract from the minutes of the last Residents’ Conference is attached.12

Since then an Officer on Special Duty has made a detailed examination of the
problem so far as the records at Political Department headquarters are con¬
cerned. Nawabzada Saeed Alam Khan (a senior officer with long judicial
experience) is now on special duty (assisted by a junior political officer) to
examine this report and apply its recommendations.

Nawabzada Saeed Alam has consulted the Education Department of the
Central Government and has discussed the question with the Hon’ble Member
of that Department, in order to arrange suitable liaison with the Imperial
Record Department which is controlled by the Education Department.

It is understood that the Hon’ble Member approves of the policy laid down

JUNE I947

277

and the practical steps being taken and has given his assurance of full coopera¬
tion. The Nawabzada has also established contact with the Director of Archives.

Records of the Crown Representative prior to 1880 are already stored in the
Imperial Record Department. Records of later years, when sorted, will be
transferred to that Department.

Weeding of records is a continuous process, and has to be undertaken at
regular intervals in the ordinary course of administration. During the period
1913 to 1921 all records of the Government of India were weeded. As a result
the Central Government destroyed 92% of their records of that period.

If weeding and destruction of records, belonging to a Department and its
subordinate offices which are to cease functioning after the lapse of para-
mountcy, is not pursued vigorously, there will remain a mass of useless records
for which there will be no use, no custody and no accommodation.

The records which the Crown Representative cannot hand over to a Suc¬
cessor Government are those which either (a) contain information regarding
the private lives of Rulers and the internal affairs of States or (b) have not been
weeded to see whether they contain such information.

The information at (a) came into the possession of the Crown Representative
because of the Crown’s special relations with Rulers based on treaties and
agreements and was relevant only to the functions of paramountcy in connec¬
tion with successions and intervention in the internal affairs of a State. These
functions lapse and cannot be inherited. It would therefore be a grave breach of
confidence to transfer records containing such information to Successor
Governments.

It was hoped that weeding would have been largely completed by June
1948. It cannot be completed by the 15th August 1947. An interim arrange¬
ment is therefore required to avoid a breach of confidence. The only feasible
arrangement is to entrust the records which have not been weeded by the 15th
August to the U.K. High Commissioner, lending him the necessary staff for
continuing the work. Unless preliminary destruction of valueless and ephe¬
meral records is continued at once, the mass of records still to be weeded on the
15 th August will be unmanageable.

A stage may come in history when the disclosure of these confidential records
will be justified, as in the case of similar records prior to 1880 which are already
in the Imperial Records Office. When this stage is reached and no breach of
confidence is involved, appropriate arrangements can be made between His
Majesty’s Government and the Successor Governments concerned.

12 This sentence was deleted from the brief as circulated to the seven Indian leaders to whom the ex¬
tract from the minutes of the Residents’ Conference was apparently not shown. The first sentence
of the next paragraph was amended to read: ‘Since the last Residents Conference, an officer on
Special Duty has made a detailed examination of this problem .... Mountbatten Papers, loc cit.,
ff 67, 69.

278

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Classification and disposal of records13

Note of directive given to Residents at the Residents’ Conference,

April 10, 1947.

The Political Adviser reminded Residents of the instructions sent to them in
November 194614 regarding the disposal of records of the Crown Represen¬
tative. The initial objective was the elimination, under capable supervision, of
records which could be of no possible historical interest either to India or
Britain, and which were patently valueless for purposes of future reference.
The Political Adviser understood, he said, that the process of elimination had
itself raised certain questions of classification, and he would be glad to know
what difficulties had been encountered in practice.

2. The ensuing discussion of practical difficulties showed that in many cases
the principle adopted in Sections 172 and 173 of the Government of India Act,
1935 (i.e. the principle that allocation of property follows functions) could be
taken as a guide in the disposal of records as well as in the disposal of other
forms of property. Difficulty arose mainly in the case of records relating to
functions of the Crown Representative which would not be exercised by any
known authority after the lapse ofparamountcy e.g. records relating to honours
and dignities. It was agreed that Residents should be guided in practice by the
following general rules:

(1) Records of administrative value to individual States to be handed over to
the States concerned (e.g. Settlement Reports and records relating to
administered areas).

Note . When recent records are transferred to States, office notes should
first be removed if this can be done without impairing the value of the
records.

(2) Records of administrative value to two or more States to be handed over
to an authority or agency common to those States (e.g. decisions in
boundary disputes).

(3) Records of administrative value to one or more States and to a Province
to be handed over to the Province (e.g. decisions in boundary dis-

Note. The Province should be asked to agree to authorised representa¬
tives of the States concerned being allowed access to such records on
demand. The States concerned should also be informed of any such
transfer of records.

(4) Administrative Reports, bound volumes of East India Company Pro¬
ceedings and manuscript records prior to 1880 to be offered to the
Imperial Record Department.

(5) Files relating to Memorials to be destroyed, as copies in the Political
Department are being preserved.

JUNE I947

279

(6) Law Books and Libraries to be dealt with under the principles laid down
for Disposal of property.

3. In conclusion the Political Adviser emphasised that the approach to the
question of disposal of records must continue to be positive and constructive.
Elimination of valueless records was necessary for practical reasons, but this
must not be regarded as anything but a process ancillary to the real objective
viz., the conservation of valuable records. At Political Department head¬
quarters a senior Indian Officer of the Indian Political Service would be
employed on the dual task of elimination and classification of records. Detailed
classification could not be completed during the interim period and it would
therefore be necessary to transfer a certain number of records to the custody of
the United Kingdom High Commissioner in India, who would arrange to have
them classified at leisure and preserved in such form as might be decided on by
the parties most concerned.

13 This note is not on R/3/1/137; the copy reproduced here is taken from Mountbatten Papers, loc. cit.,

f 68.

14 See Vol. IX, No. 12.

147

Mr Abell to Sir W. Croft

Rbl1l15^: f 64

personal 11 June 1947

1446/11

My dear Croft,

Many thanks for your letter of the 4th June.1 I have sent on the enclosure to
Terence Shone by hand.

The reception of the Announcement has been remarkably good, and it
really is a triumph for the Viceroy and to a considerable extent for V.P. The
fact that the more sane elements of the Congress, and especially Vallabhbhai
Patel, were at this stage prepared to do business enabled the Viceroy to use
V.P. and his influence with Patel to a remarkable effect. The second point, of
course, was that the moment the Muslim League definitely realised what was
the maximum they could get out of H.M.G. they began for the first time to be
sensible.

Yours ever,

GEORGE

1 R/3/1/156: f 21.

28o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

148

The Earl of Listowel to Mr Attlee
LIPOI8I45: ff 4 1-4

India office, u June 1947
Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 88/47

Prime Minister,

In my Minute No. 71/47 of 12th May,1 I sought your concurrence in my in¬
forming the Viceroy that I accepted his recommendation that, when a suitable
moment arrived, Lieutenant General Sir R. M. M. Lockhart should be appoin¬
ted Governor of the North West Frontier Province in succession to Sir Olaf
Caroe. Later, I mentioned the matter orally to the Viceroy2 before he returned
to India and understood from him that it had been agreed between you and
him that the matter should not be pursued for the time being and at any rate
until the referendum in the Province had been held.

A telegram3 has been received to the effect that the Viceroy now feels that
Sir Olaf Caroe should be replaced as soon as possible. The telegram, which
comes from Ismay, gives no reason for the Viceroy’s anxiety to effect a change
at once except that ‘‘the situation has become so urgent” that the Viceroy has
decided that it is necessary. But there is, in paragraph 15 of the Viceroy’s
personal report No. 8 of 9th June4 a statement that Gandhi, Nehru and Khan
Sahib have all renewed the request for Caroe’s replacement. Possibly the
Viceroy in acquiescing in this demand also has it in mind to forestall any
allegation that a referendum conducted under the local direction of Sir
O. Caroe — who is suspected by Congress of Moslem League sympathies and
certainly has difficulties with Khan Sahib — would not be conducted with
complete impartiality. At any rate it appears that the Viceroy has already
suggested to Caroe that he should take leave as soon as his relief arrives, without
prejudice to the possibility of his being asked by the Government of Pakistan,
if they win the referendum, to resume his Governorship at the conclusion of his
leave, but that Caroe has not yet replied.

Personally, I am strongly opposed to any suggestion that Caroe should
resume the Governorship if he once relinquishes it and would propose to inform
the Viceroy accordingly. But as the need to make a change is represented as so
urgent, it is extremly difficult not to comply with the request and, subject to
your concurrence, I would now propose to take steps to obtain the informal
approval of His Majesty The King in order that the Viceroy may be able to
take action immediately he considers the moment ripe. As to the manner of
achieving the change I would propose to suggest to the Viceroy that he

JUNE I947

281

should induce Caroe to ask permission of the King to lay down his office on the
medical consideration that he is overstrained and needs relief from his respon¬
sibilities.5

L.

1 Vol. X, No. 417. 2 Ibid., note 2. 3 nq. 106.

4 No. 91; the date should be 5 June.

5 Mr Attlee noted on this minute: ‘I agree. C.R.A. 11.6.47’. L/PO/8/45: f 40.

149

Sir D. Monteath to Lord Ismay
Telegram , L/P &JI10I81: ff 307-8

important India office, li June 1^47 , 4.30 pm

Received: 12 June , 9 am

No. 7521. Your telegram 1359-S of 9th June.1 Information about meaning of
Dominion Status. I am sending by next bag two copies each of notes2 prepared
by Dominions Office.

(1) on The Structure of the British Commonwealth

(2) on Dominions Governors-General.

2. very confidential. I should however warn you that the Bill now
in preparation is likely, subject to approval by Ministers, to contain provisions
which for a limited period after the date of the coming into force of the Act,
and for the exceptional purpose of removing difficulties in the course of
effecting transition to new conditions, partitioning India, dividing assets,
liabilities, etc. invest Governor-General (who is conceived as being the same
person for both States for the initial period) with powers which could, and it is
contemplated should, if necessary, be exercised otherwise than on advice. The
Bill will probably not specify one way or the other and it will be a matter for
Go vemor-Generafs judgment whether powers are so exercised. The reason for
this is that these powers are designed to enable Governor-General to deal with
matters affecting the setting up of both States, but to the extent that they are
exercised otherwise than on advice, this would infringe the Dominion Status
principle that the Governor-General being constitutional head of State should
act only on advice. On the other hand Legislature of either side will be em¬
powered to overrule orders made under these powers by its own legislation at
any time. Governor-Generafs power to issue orders is limited to six months
from the appointed day and the occasion for using them other than on advice

1 No. 1 1 7. 2 Enclosures to No. 13 1.

282

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

would be when the advice of the two sets of Ministers conflicts but acquiescence
of both can be obtained or they might have to be used to give effect to decisions
of arbitral authority.

150

Mr Herbert to Sir C. Corfield
Telegram, U/j/ 1/137: f 5*

immediate Hyderabad, ii June ig47, ii. 33 pm

confidential Received : 12 June, 7 am

No. R-59. Your telegram No. 1372-P of June 9th.1 I regret it has proved
impracticable to secure postponement of public statement by Nizam of
Hyderabad. He and Council consider it imperative to issue statement imme¬
diately in view of public demand for one and tension which continued delay is
causing. They therefore propose to issue statement on Thursday June 12th.2
Prime Minister and Monckton are proceeding to Delhi for further discussions
this weekend.

1 See No. 108, note i. 2 See No. 163.

Resolutions (2) and (3) passed by the Standing Committee of the All India States'
People's Conference at its meetings held in New Delhi on 11 and 12 June 1947 1

RI3I1I137: ff 128-30

(?)

POSITION OF INDIAN STATES IN REGARD TO THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT’S STATEMENT OF 3RD JUNE, I9472

A. The Declaration of the British Government dated 3 June 1947 states that
the position in regard to the States remains the same as it was under the Cabinet
Mission’s Statement of May 16, 1946. The All India States’ People’s Conference
has previously declared its policy and interpretation of this scheme. It has been
pointed out that the implications of the Cabinet Mission’s Scheme were that the
people of the States must have an essential voice in determining their future.
Because of this representation was given to the States as to the rest of India on
the population basis of one per million.

The A.I.S.P.C. has never accepted the recent interpretation of the theory of

JUNE 1947

283

Paramountcy. In any event if Paramo untcy lapses it cannot mean that the
Princes should function as autocratic and despotic rulers with full power to
dispose of their States as they will. The Cabinet Mission’s Statement of May 16,
1946 made it clear that the States would form parts of the Indian Union and it
was not open to any State to go out of the Union. On the lapse of Paramountcy
it does not and cannot follow that any State is free to go out of the Union. Any
such conception would meet with fantastic results and India would be reduced
to a state of anarchy. It is well known that none of the States were completely
independent at the time of the advent of the British Power. In some way or
other they recognised and submitted to suzerainty of the Moghul Empire, the
Mahratta Supremacy, the Sikh Kingdom or later the British Power. A number
of States were created by the British, many of them having no sense whatever
of an independent existence in the past. To recognise the right of these States to
independence now is to go against history and tradition, law and practice as
well as practical implications of the situation today.

In any event it must be recognised that on the lapse of Paramountcy sover¬
eignty resides in the people of the States and the Princes can only be constitu¬
tional rulers embodying the people’s sovereignty. Any Ruler declaring his
State independent will thereby express his hostility not only to the Indian
Union but to his own people. Such an act will have to be resisted.

The Standing Committee of the A.I.S.P.C. trusts therefore that all remaining
States will join the Constituent Assembly of India in terms of the agreement
arrived at between the Negotiating Committees. In the event of any State
refusing to do so, the Standing Committee requests the Constituent Assembly
to allow the people of such a State to elect their own representatives to the
Assembly so that the State may be properly represented and the people’s views
might prevail.

B. The Standing Committee is informed that as a consequence of British
withdrawal from India Political Department and its Agencies in the States are
being wound up. While welcoming the ending of a department which has
done great harm to India and the States, the Committee disapproves of the
steps being taken which are likely to lead to administrative chaos all over India.
The Political Department and the Residencies and Agencies were not only the
agents for carrying out the functions of Paramountcy but also represented the
central authority of the Government of India in numerous matters of common
concern. It is necessary and inevitable that some central agency should exist for
carrying out these common functions. So long as some new arrangement is not

1 The resolutions passed at these meetings, together with those passed at the Annual Session of the
A.I.S.P.C. at Gwalior from 18 to 20 April 1947, were forwarded to Lord Mountbatten by the
General Secretary on 18 June 1947. R/3/1/137: ff 127-60. For references to Pandit Nehru’s speech at
the Gwalior Session see Vol. X, Nos. 181, note 2; 187-9; 193; 196; 225.

2 No. 45.

284

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

made for this purpose the existing structure and channels of communication
should be maintained with suitable modifications and without exercising
Paramo untcy functions. This will be to the advantage of both the Government
of India and the States.

The Standing Committee, therefore, demands that the Political Department
and its Agencies be handed over to the Government of India for this purpose,
or in the alternative a new Central Department should be created immediately
which can take charge of the staff, property and buildings, equipment and
records of the Political Department, Residencies and Agencies in the States.

(3)

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS OF PARAMOUNTCY

It is the considered opinion of the Standing Committee of the A.I.S.P.C. that
on the termination of Paramountcy, sovereignty should as a matter of course
vest in the people of the States. In view of this, the attempt of the Rulers of
States in certain Agencies, at the instance of local Residents, to form Councils
of Rulers of the States to annex themselves certain administrative functions of
Paramountcy is indefensible and constitutes a serious encroachment on the
sovereign rights of the people. So long as the States are not sufficiently democ¬
ratised to enable the people of the States to exercise their sovereignty, the
administrative functions of Paramountcy should continue to be exercised by the
Interim Government of India which commands the confidence of the people of
the States as well.

The Committee further calls upon the States that during the intervening
period popular interim Governments should be established in the States or
groups of States and that steps should be taken for setting up a suitable machin¬
ery in each State or group of States for framing the constitution on the basis of
full responsible government through a Constituent Assembly composed of the
duly elected people’s representatives.

152

Meeting of the Special Committee 1 of the Indian Cabinet
Mountbatten Papers. Partition Committee Minutes

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held on 12 June lgqy at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Patel, Dr Rajendra
Prasad, Mr Abdur Rab Nishtar; Lord Ismay, Sir E. Mieville, Mr H. M. Patel
(Secretariat)

JUNE I947

285

MINUTES

1. Procedure regarding partition in the Provinces

It was noted that both in the Punjab and in Bengal various committees had been
set up by the provincial governments. It was agreed that the machinery for
partition in the Provinces should be generally on the lines of the machinery for
partition at the Centre. There too the various Committees etc. should have
been set up in consultation with the leaders of the principal parties concerned.
His Excellency said that he would inform the Governors of the Punjab and
Bengal to review the machinery already set up in consultation with the leaders
and make such alterations or modifications as may be necessary. His Excellency
further directed that Provinces should be kept informed of action taken in
regard to partition at the Centre.

2. Machinery for implementing the Partition

The Committee considered the paper2 on the machinery for implementing the
partition.

The Hon’ble Mr Liaquat Ah said that the paper gave an incorrect impression
regarding the position of this Committee. It was in his view set up only to
prepare the mechanics of partition and was not to take any decision. It could do
such preliminary work as was essential, and whatever it did was to be regarded
as being subject to ratification by the Partition Council. It was contended that
time was of the essence and if this Committee was to be compelled to refrain
from taking any decisions, it could do whatever was possible short of deciding.
The Hon’ble Mr Liaquat Ah suggested accordingly that the Committee should
be called upon (1) to make preparatory arrangements for the provision of
accommodation, clerical staff etc., and (2) to send out a questionnaire to officers
of various services enquiring which part of the country they wished to serve —
Pakistan or rest of India.

The Committee agreed —

(1) that for the present the Steering Committee should consist of two
officials,

(2) that Messrs. H. M. Patel and Mohamad Ali should be nominated as
members of the Committee,

(3) that its terms of reference should be to ensure,

(a) that concrete proposals are evolved in time by the Expert Com¬
mittees,

(b) that these proposals adequately dove-tail with each other and form a
comprehensive whole,

(c) that the recommendations of the various Expert Committees are
presented to the Partition Council in a suitable form, and

(d) that the decisions reached are implemented in time.

1 i.e. the Partition Committee. 2 Not traced.

286

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The Committee directed further that

(i) subject to the terms of reference that it might lay down for each of the
Expert Committees, the Steering Committee may provide day to day
guidance, advice and direction to them, and

(ii) the members of the Steering Committee should keep in close touch with
the members of the Cabinet Committee (and later the Partition Council
when it is set up).

The Committee directed that the Steering Committee should in consultation
with the various Departments concerned make recommendations in regard to

(a) the various Expert Committees which should be set up,

(b) the terms of reference of each Expert Committee, and

(c) the personnel of each Expert Committee.

The Committee approved of the following provisional basis for the division
of officers and staffs, namely, every Government servant would be given the
opportunity to select the Government he wished to serve. If in any case during
a transition period a different arrangement is necessary, specific orders of the
Cabinet Committee (later Partition Council) would be obtained on the basis of
the recommendations of the relevant Expert Committee.

The Committee also agreed that every reasonable assistance should be given
for the training of Muslim officers in the work of departments of which no
Muslim officer had any knowledge.

3 . Armed Forces Committee

The Committee considered the question of the Armed Forces Committee. It
was agreed that the relationship of the Armed Forces Committee to the
Partition Council and the Steering Committee should be exactly similar to that
of any of the other Expert Committees, that is, the terms of reference and the
composition of the Armed Forces Committee would be approved by the
Cabinet Committee (and later the Partition Council) and its report would be
submitted to the Partition Council through the Steering Committee. While the
Commander-in-Chief would doubtless keep the Hon’ble the Defence Member
acquainted with whatever step he took, it would be correct for him to be in
direct touch with the Steering Committee and with the Cabinet Committee
(and later the Partition Council). It was understood that the Commander-in-
Chief would be putting up before the Cabinet Committee a panel of names of
senior Hindu and Muslim officers to enable the Cabinet Committee to select
officers whom they would like to serve on the various Expert Sub-Commit¬
tees. His Excellency said that at the next meeting a paper would be circulated
which had been prepared by the Commander-in-Chief explaining clearly the
problems involved in the partition of the Army and how it was proposed to
tackle them. His Excellency further suggested that it might assist discussion if
between now and Monday, one member at least on each side were to dis-

JUNE 1947

287

cuss the whole problem separately with the Commander-in-Chief. This was
agreed to.

DECISION

(1) The Armed Forces Committee would stand to the Partition Council and
the Steering Committee in the same relation as any of the other Expert Com¬
mittees.

(2) The terms of reference and the composition of the Armed Forces Com¬
mittee should be submitted to the Committee of the Cabinet for its approval.

(3) The paper prepared by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief
explaining the problems involved in the division of the Army and how it was
proposed to tackle them should be circulated among members of the Cabinet
Committee with a view to discussion at its meeting on Monday, the 16th
instant.

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma and

Sardar Patel and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy's Interview No. 147

12 June 1947, 11 am

I kept back the above Ministers after the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on
partition today,1 and told them that the resolution2 of the Muslim League
Council on the announcement of 3rd June had aroused misgivings in the
Congress camp.3

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan expressed surprise. He said that the Muslim League
Council had accepted the plan without reservation, though naturally they were
dissatisfied about the partition of Bengal and the Punjab.

Mr. Patel said that, on the contrary, all that the Muslim League Council
had done was to authorise Mr. Jinnah to accept the plan on their behalf, and so
far Mr. Jinnah had given no indication that he was prepared to do so. In the
absence of any such explicit declaration by Mr. Jinnah, the Congress resolution
was bound to be hedged round with reservations.

At this point I recalled my own part in the negotiations. I had taken the great
risk of accepting Mr. JinnalTs word that he would do his utmost to get the plan
accepted, and it would be remembered that he (Mr. Jinnah) had stated at the
meeting of the Indian leaders on 3rd June4 that he personally would accept the
plan and would do his best to persuade his followers to do likewise.

1 No. 152. 2 Enclosure to No. 127.

3 See e.g. Nos. 129 and 130. 4 No. 39.

288

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Sardar Patel said that this was true, but that this statement of Mr. Jinnah’s
was known only to the Congress leaders and not to the main body of the Con¬
gress party.

Thereupon, I suggested that I should try to persuade Mr. Jinnah to write to
me in the following sense: —

“I have been authorised by the Muslim League Council to accept the plan on

their behalf, and I hereby state that I do so accept it as a compromise solu-

• >>

tion.

I would then send a copy of this letter to the President of Congress, so as to get
it into his hands before the Congress recorded their final resolution.

Sardar Patel said that this would meet his point, and Mr. Liaquat AH Khan
undertook to tell Mr. Jinnah of our conversation and of my proposal. I said that
I would see Mr. Jinnah myself later in the day.5

I then turned to the question of the argument as to whether Pakistan was
“seceding”, and as to whether Hindustan, or ‘India’ as Congress preferred to
call it, would inherit the membership of UNO, and would also inherit the
Indian representatives at present in foreign countries.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that the Muslim League did not want to argue
about words. All that concerned them was that they should be assured of a
share in the assets, and likewise the obligations, of the Government of India. To
his mind this was imphcit in H.M.G.’s statements of February 20th6 and June
3rd,7 in which they referred to transferring power to a successor authority or
successor authorities .8

I pointed out that it was not for HMG to attempt to settle the exact
proportion which would accrue to each of the successor Governments, and
that this was a matter for the Arbitral Tribunal which was to be set up.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan agreed, but he wanted an assurance from HMG that
they, “the present owners of the estate”, intended that a proportion should go
to Pakistan.

I undertook to refer this matter to HMG and I sent a telegram (No. )9

to the Secretary of State the same day.

Finally, Sardar Patel said that Congress were apprehensive about the safety
of the Congress members of the Bengal Legislative Assembly, who would be
proceeding from their homes to the meeting summoned by the Governor of
Bengal on 20th June. There was a risk that they would be kidnapped or
harmed.

Mr. Liaquat Ah Khan said that there was no risk of this ; but I undertook to
bring the matter to the notice of the Governor and a telegram10 to that effect
was immediately despatched.

JUNE I947

289

Lord Ismay was present throughout the meeting and has dictated this note
on my behalf.

5 No record of this interview has been traced, but see No. 162, para. n.

6 Vol. IX, No. 438. 7 No. 45. 8 Emphasis in original.

9 Number left blank in original. No telegram from Lord Mountbatten to Lord Listowel dated 12 June
on this subject has been traced, but a telegram was sent two days later: see No. 202.

10 Lord Mountbatten did this in tel. 1405-S of 12 June to Sir F. Burrows adding that the Congress
leaders ‘ask that your Ministry should take any special precautions that are practicable’. Mountbatten
Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Bengal, Situation in, Part 1(b).

154

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir O. Caroe (North-West Frontier

Province)

Rh/i I1 7°'- f 34

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL 12 June I947

Dear Sir Olaf,

Many thanks for your manuscript letter of the nth June.1 I am sorry mine to
you was delayed and hope this will get to you more quickly by hand of pilot.

I appreciate the way you have taken this and I should like to repeat that I
regard the allegations of partiality against you as entirely unfounded. These are,
however, exceptional times, and we have to get through them as best we may
and work in cooperation with the Parties.

I think the best way of proceeding might be by your writing to me a letter
on the lines of the first draft enclosed and my replying as in the second draft.2
Both these letters would then be published, rather like letters between Ministers
and the Prime Minister at home when a change is made in the Cabinet. The
publication would be followed by an Announcement that The King had
appointed Lockhart to act.

Would you please telegraph and let me know whether you are prepared to
write a letter on the lines suggested?3 If so, please follow it up with the letter,
which should be sent by safe hand of pilot.

I want Lockhart to reach Peshawar by the 24th if possible.

I am sure we can fix up air passages for you as soon as you decide when you
would like to go home. My wife and I very much hope that you and your wife
may be able to visit us before going home.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 No. 142.

2 For the letters as issued see Enclosure to No. 181 and No. 227, where differences between the final
version and the draft are noted.

3 Sir O. Caroe replied in the affirmative in tel. CAF-112 of 13 June. R/3/1/170: f 45.

290

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

155

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Gandhi

R/3l 1/151: f 147

12 June 1947

Dear Mr Gandhi,

Thank you for your letter of 10/nth June.1 I am grateful to you for your
comments on current affairs, and I will certainly bear them in mind.

I doubt whether it would be practicable to make my special staff work out
all the details of the splitting up of the Departments of the Government of
India and a complete allotment of India's assets and liabilities, but they will do
everything in their power to help. It is a tremendous task and only a fraction of
it can be done before the transfer of power. It is essentially a matter in which
there must be negotiation between the parties concerned.

I am so grateful for your unfailing advice and support and kindness, which
have done so much to sustain me in this difficult task.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 No. 139.

156

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Gandhi

Rj3li/i5i:f 154

1446/3 12 June 1947

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I spoke to Mr. Jinnah1 along the lines that you asked me2 and he has authorised
me to reply to you as follows.

2. Mr. Jinnah will gladly accept your suggestion that he should visit the
Frontier and put the case of Pakistan to the leaders and people up there,
provided you can obtain an undertaking from the Congress that they will not
interfere.

3. He agrees with your view that by this means a referendum can be avoided
and with it the risk of bloodshed removed.

JUNE I947

291

4. I suggest that you should now communicate directly with him in this
matter, as I am leaving for Simla to-morrow.

5. I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Jinnah.

Yours sincerely,
[mountbatten of burma]

P.S. I note that you did not obtain the support of the Congress leaders to your
proposal,3 but I did promise you that whatever happened I would convey your
personal views to Mr. Jinnah, and he will quite understand if you are unable to
get the Congress leaders to support you.

1 Not traced. 2 See Annex to No. 99. 3 See No. 139, para. 1.

157

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Arbitral Tribunal

SECRET 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 12 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

In some of the papers1 sent to me by Sir Eric Mieville there is a proposal about
the Arbitral Tribunal which is meant to decide on matters referred to it by the
Partition Council. It is suggested in this note that the Tribunal should consist
of three men of great judicial experience2 and that the Chairman of this body
should be a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.3

2. My colleagues and I think that the simplest and most effective procedure
would be to request the three judges of the Federal Court to function as the
Arbitral Tribunal for this purpose. They are all here and are easily accessible
and are men of great judicial experience. They would, of course, not function
as the Federal Court in this matter. We do not see any particular advantage in
asking for a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to come
to India for this purpose.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1 Evidently the papers to be considered by the meeting of the Viceroy and the seven Indian leaders on
13 June (see No. 175).

2 See No. 100, Item 1, conclusion (v). 3 See No. 101, para. 1.

292

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

158

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten ofB urma

Rl3liji57:ff 13-15

SECRET AND PERSONAL 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 12 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I enclose the Terms of Reference we suggest for the Boundary Commissions
in the Punjab and Bengal. You will notice that they are very simple and brief.
Indeed they reproduce the language used in paragraph 9 of HMG’s Statement
of June 3, 1947, 1 without any addition thereto.

2. We gave a good deal of thought to this matter and tried to draft fuller
terms of reference. We found that in doing so, the result achieved was not very
satisfactory. There are all manner of factors which may have to be considered.
If we try to make a list of them, it is either too short or too long. It is better,
therefore, to leave the matter to the Boundary Commission itself. They will,
no doubt, take into consideration all factors they consider relevant.

3. The work of these Boundary Commissions is meant to be done fairly
rapidly. If we complicate the issues at this stage, their work will be prolonged
and final decisions will be delayed. I imagine that if and when two States have
been formed, those States will mutually consider modifications and variations
of their frontiers so that a satisfactory arrangement might be arrived at. That is
likely to be a fairly lengthy process involving the ascertainment of the wishes of
the people concerned in any particular area affected. If all this work is entrusted
to the Boundary Commissions, their work will be heavy and prolonged.
Hence our desire to leave the issues as clear and simple as possible.

4. Two particular areas have been mentioned in the course of our conversa¬
tions — The Thar Parkar District in Sind and some parts of Purnea District in
Bihar. I do not know how Purnea District comes into the picture as it is pre¬
dominantly non-Muslim and is part of a Province which is not affected by any
secession or partition. Probably it was mentioned because one sub-division of
the District has a Muslim majority population. It would be laying down a
novel principle if we proceeded in regard to other Provinces on a basis of small
areas less than a District. It would also produce confusion if a new Province
like Bihar was affected by any such division of a small area. In any event no
such division could take place without some kind of a referendum. All this
would involve fresh complications and delay.2

5. So far as Thar Parkar is concerned, it is a District of Sind and can be dealt
with as a unit. There also, presumably, it would be necessary to have a referen-

JUNE 1947

293

dum such as in Sylhet. On further consideration, however, of this subject, we
think that this question should also not be raised at this stage and in this manner.
I have, therefore, not mentioned Thar Parkar or Purnea in the terms of ref¬
erence of the Boundary Commissions.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Enclosure to No. 138

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS

For the Punjab:

The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the
two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority
areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so it will also take into account
other factors.

For Bengal:

The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the
two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas
of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so it will also take into account other
factors.

2. In the event of the referendum in Sylhet District of Assam resulting in
favour of amalgamation with eastern Bengal, the Boundary Commission for
Bengal will also demarcate the Muslim majority areas of Sylhet District and
contiguous Muslim majority areas of adjoining districts.

1 No. 45.

2 For a letter of 12 June 1947 from the Governor of Bihar on the possible transfer of parts of Purnea
district to Eastern Bengal, and other papers on this question: see R/3/1/167. For Lord Mountbatten’s
reply, see No. 400.

159

Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rl3\i\8i: S 139-42

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA,

d.o. no. 80/V-1/47/8 new Delhi, 12 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

In his letter of the 6th June1 Lordlsmay asked me to let you have my views on
the withdrawal of British forces from India.

I accordingly instructed my Chiefs of Staff Committee to examine the diffi-

1 See No. 126, note 4.

294

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

cult and delicate problems connected with the retention of British Army and
Royal Air Force units in India after the granting of Dominion Status to the two
new States to be set up.

The results of their examination are set out in the attached paper C.O.S.(47)
29B, and I agree with their conclusions and recommendations.

Yours sincerely,

C. J. AUCHINLECK

Enclosure to No. 159

C. in C/s Secretariat
Chiefs of Staff Committee

SECRET

cos (47) 29B — British forces in India (Submitted by CGS)

NOTE: — In this Paper, wherever the term ‘‘British Forces” is used, it is
understood to include the Six Infantry Bde Gps, and essential units of the RAF.
Introduction

1. In the past, the governing factor has been that as long as HMG is res¬
ponsible for the internal security of India, this responsibility in the last resort
rests with the Commander-in-Chief. For this purpose, therefore, it had been
agreed that British Forces must be retained in India particularly in view of the
security of British lives and interests.

2. It had been assumed that by 1 June 48, the expected date of transfer of
power, all European civilians, who wished to leave India, would have been
given the opportunity to do so. Those who stayed after that date would do so
at their own risk; and the necessity for retaining British Forces for their pro¬
tection would therefore not2 arise. Consequently, it had been planned that
British Forces should leave India by about 1 June 48.

3. The basis of this plan has been altered by the decision to grant Dominion
Status to Hindustan and Pakistan at an early date. The grant of this status implies
that responsibility for internal security will rest with the Governments of
Hindustan and Pakistan from the day of their inception. Their vehicle of
enforcement will ultimately rest with the Indian Armed Forces, which, with
their agreement, will be commanded, during the early process of reconstitution
by the C-in-C.

Object

4. The object therefore of this Paper is to recommend whether British
Forces should be retained in India after Dominion Status has been given to
Hindustan and Pakistan; and if so, what should be the period of their retention.

Factors

5. It may be argued that the general situation in India after the granting of
Dominion Status to Hindustan and Pakistan, might be such that

JUNE I947

295

(a) British Forces should be retained to back up the Indian Armed Forces,
and as an insurance to cover the initial stages of their reconstitution.

(b) British Forces should be retained to ensure the safety of European lives.

6. As regards para 5 (a) above: —

(a) Political opinion in the U.K. might be expected to be very averse to this
course.

(b) The Hindustan and Pakistan Governments should be prepared to rely
solely on the Indian Armed Forces, the reconstitution of which must be
carried out with special care to the demands of internal security.

on the other hand,

(c) The Governor-General has been charged with the duty of ensuring, as
far as possible, an orderly transfer of power. It might therefore be
inadvisable to deprive him of such valuable support in carrying out his
duty.

The first stages of the Reconstitution of the Indian Armed Forces may be
very difficult, and the morale of the troops may not stand the strain. It
might therefore be advisable to retain British Forces in India, as a stabili¬
sing influence, until the first stages of Reconstitution have been success¬
fully accomplished.

(d) Trouble on the N.W. Frontier, during the reconstitution of the Indian
Armed Forces, might lead to a demand for the help of British Forces, the
demand being based on the argument that, as fellow members of the
British Commonwealth, it is to be expected that one Dominion should
come to the help of another.

In the event of trouble on the N.W. Frontier, it is considered that pri¬
marily Indian troops should be employed. Should British Forces be in
India and should it appear to the C-in-C that their help is essential,
special representation must be made by the Government concerned to
H.M.G.

(e) It is considered however that retention of British Forces can not be
justified on these grounds, except at the specific request of the Hindustan
and Pakistan governments.

7. As regards para 5 (b) above

(a) Although in theory the Hindustan and Pakistan Governments would be
responsible for the safety of European civilians, the shortened time before
the hand over of power will prevent many of the latter, who do not wish
to remain in the country, from leaving before the date when Dominion
Status is given. It may be felt, therefore, that H.M.G. has a moral res¬
ponsibility for their safety until such time as they have had the oppor¬
tunity to leave. Consequently, until this time, which should be calculated
on the numbers wishing to leave and the resources of shipping, British

2 Emphasis in original.

296

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Forces might remain in India. 1 Jan 48 is considered a suitable date.

(b) British Forces may be considered necessary, after the departure of the
European civilians, for the protection of the Governor-General, the
British High Commissioner, the Commander-in-Chief and their staffs,
and other British Military and Civilian officials. It is considered however
that the protection of British officials, whether civil or military, does
not justify the retention of British Forces. A risk, if such exists, must be
accepted by them, as in the course of their normal duties.

8. Recommendations

(a) It is therefore recommended that British Forces be retained in India, after
the granting of Dominion Status to Hindustan and Pakistan, as an
insurance to cover the early stages of the reconstitution of the Indian
Armed Forces; and for a period that must depend upon the progress of
the reconstitution.

This recommendation, however, is imphcit on a formal request being
received from the Governments of Hindustan and Pakistan, that
British forces should be retained.

Facts are insufficient to justify an accurate forecast of this period; but it is
recommended that the provisional date for the withdrawal of the British
Forces should be fixed now at 1 Apr 48 and reviewed on 1 Jan 48.

(b) If no such request for British Forces to remain to back up the Indian
Armed Forces is received from the Hindustan and Pakistan Governments,
it is recommended that British Forces remain in India until 1 Jan 48 to
fulfil H.M.G/s moral obhgation to safeguard British lives. It would be
best if the Hindustan and Pakistan Governments asked for British Forces
to remain for the purpose. Should such a request not be forthcoming,
H.M.G. must be firm and insist.

9. Further Recommendations

On the assumption that British Forces be retained in India after the granting of
Dominion Status to Hindustan and Pakistan, the following subsidiary recom¬
mendations on their exact role and employment are made : —

(a) That British Forces be directly under the C-in-C who would be respon¬
sible through the Governor-General to H.M.G. They would not take
orders from either the Hindustan or the Pakistan Governments.

(b) That an “all-British” chain of command is essential. So long as circum¬
stances permit, the C-in-C would exercise command of the British
Forces through Army and Air Commanders and existing normal
channels.

If a situation arose, which made this impracticable, the C-in-C will
exercise command of British Army troops through the Major General
British Troops in India who would become GOC British Troops in

JUNE I947

297

India and of the RAF units through the AOC-in-C. In this event, the
area, or sub area commander would be responsible for local administra¬
tion and all maintenance. “All British” signal communication would be
necessary.

(c) The incidence of duties should determine the incidence of cost. If British
Forces are retained in India solely as an insurance to cover the initial
stages of reconstitution of the Indian Armed Forces ; and at the specific
request of the Flindustan and Pakistan Governments, the charges involved
should be debitable to India. If only to safeguard British lives, the cost
should be shared between H.M.G. and India.

(d) If retained for the sole purpose of safeguarding British lives, British
Forces would not be employed to quell any communal or other dis¬
turbances, except where British lives are endangered.

(e) If British Forces remain at the request of the new Governments as an
insurance to cover the initial stages of the reconstitution; it will be
necessary to obtain the concurrence of H.M.G. — and probably of Parlia¬
ment — to their employment in this role. The extent to which they are to
be subject to the authority of the new Governments must also be clearly
defined.

(f) The legal status of the British Forces remaining, whether at the request of
the new Governments or not, should be changed in that they would
n o t be subject to the laws of the new Dominions and the courts of those
Dominions should have no jurisdiction over members of the British
Forces.

(g) That steps be taken to ensure that British Forces remaining in India are
provided with arms and equipment the property of H.M.G.

160

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Kripalani

Rfr/i/itf: f 70

no. 1446/11 12 June 1947

I am writing to inform you that Mr Jinnah came to see me this evening1 to
inform me officially as President of the All India Muslim League that the
Council of the All India Muslim League had empowered him to accept the
plan contained in His Majesty’s Government’s announcement of the 3rd June
as a compromise.

1 No record, of this interview has been traced, but see No. 162, para. 11.

298

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

2. Subject to the All India Congress Committee accepting this plan, he has
given me his word that he will sign a joint document on behalf of the All India
Muslim League with such representative as the All India Congress Committee
may appoint, accepting this plan as a settlement.2

3 . I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr Jinnah.

2 On 1 July Lord Ismay submitted a minute to Lord Mountbatten regretting that in the recent pressure
of events he had forgotten to remind him about pursuing the question of an agreed joint statement;
he suggested, however, that ‘in view of the fact that partition is in progress and the obvious implica¬
tion that the plan has been accepted’ Lord Mountbatten might not wish to pursue the question any
further. The latter minuted in reply: ‘No further action unless Congress raises this’. Mountbatten
Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Transfer of Power, Part IV (b).

161

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL 12 June 1947

Dear Listowel,

Thank you so much for your letter of the 5th June1 and for the good wishes
and congratulations which you were kind enough to send me. I must say that
everything has gone very well so far and, although we are not out of the wood
yet, I have every hope that the good start we have made will be continued.

2. The All India Muslim League Council held their meeting on Monday the
9th June and I have referred to this in more detail in my weekly report attached.2
The All India Congress Committee meeting takes place next Tuesday the 17th
June and, although both Nehru and Patel have written3 to me about the Muslim
League resolution,4 I feel I will be able to solve this difficulty by further
personal negotiation.

3. We might have had a little trouble with Gandhi but, as I have described in
my report, I think we can now count at least on some form of cooperation
from him. Nehru and Patel of course also worked on him hard.

4. Gandhi also told me5 that there was a lot of loose talk going about that
His Majesty’s Government might have different agreements with Hindustan
and Pakistan which would possibly tend to favour one over the other. He felt,
therefore, it was important that an announcement should be made to the effect
that it was His Majesty’s Government’s wish either to enter into tri-par tite
arrangements with both the Dominions, or to have similar bi-lateral agreements
with each of them; and that, in any event, there would be no question of

JUNE I947

299

differentiation. One solution might be for this to be referred to by the Prime
Minister in the House.

5. I have read Hansard for both Houses of Parliament.6 I am so glad that the
plan had such a favourable reception, and am most appreciative of all the kind
dungs that were said. I was particularly pleased at Winston’s very nice reference
to the Prime Minister. The publicity arrangements at this end were also most
satisfactory and I have written7 specially to Vallabhbhai Patel to thank him for
the assistance which was given by All India Radio and the Information and
Broadcasting Department, particularly in regard to my press conference.

6. There has been no relaxation of the pace here and we have pressed on hard
all the week in ensuring that the leaders and the Cabinet face up squarely to the
administrative consequences of partition. The pace is so hot that we are still
three or four lengths ahead, but certainly June in Delhi is not a month in which
anyone — British or Indian — can be expected to give of his best.

[Para. 7, on re-employment prospects for members of the Indian Forest
Service; and para. 8, on arrangements for the Indian Art Exhibition, omitted.]

9. I notice in your letter of the 5th June8 you refer to the possibility of a
special honours list in advance of the New Year list 1948. I am very keen to
have a special allowance of honours particularly for those who helped to put the
agreement through and should have liked to have had the names included in the
New Year’s Honours List 1948. But before I reach any decision on this point I
should be glad if I could be informed whether it is the intention that the Star of
India and the Indian Empire Orders should lapse on the 15 th August this year.
Naturally it would be preferable for all concerned to receive honours in these
two Orders rather than in other British Orders which are available, but this
may prove difficult if the Indian Orders have lapsed on the 15 th August, unless
arrangements can be made for a special allocation for the New Year List 1948.
I should be very grateful if I could receive an early decision on this point.
Personally I feel strongly they should not be allowed to lapse for the present.

10. In letters9 to your predecessor I have referred more than once to the
position of Caroe in the Frontier Province. As you know, I have been pressed
continuously and most strongly by the Congress party for his removal. These
representations have recently been renewed10 to the effect that there is no hope

1 No. 78. 2 No. 162. 3 Nos. 129 and 130. 4 Enclosure to No. 127.

5 See No. 69; also Nos. 99 and 125.

6 Pari. Debs., 5th ser., 3 June 1947, H. of C., vol. 438, cols. 40-46 and H. of L., vol. 148, cols. 26-8.

7 Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Transfer of Power, Publicity Arrangements for
announcement of.

8 No. 78, para. 12. 9 Vol. IX, Nos. 108, para. 7, and 165, para. 34.

10 See Nos. 24, 61 and 81.

300

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

of peace, nor of a fair and orderly referendum in the Frontier Province, so long
as Caroe is Governor, and I therefore decided that the time had come when I
must, for the moment at any rate, replace him.

11. I attach a copy of my letter11 to Caroe and I have just heard from him12
to say that he accepts my suggestion and that he would like to go on leave to
England to settle affairs consequent on the recent death of his mother. This
seems the best solution for a difficult problem.

12. In one of my past letters to your predecessor I referred to the American
Ambassador Elect to India and to the impression he had created at his first press
conference.13 I do not know whether it has been reported in England, but Mr
Grady has managed to say the wrong thing again, this time on his arrival at
Singapore, where he told reporters that “We hope to be of assistance to India
in her fight for independence”. If this statement had been made before the 3rd
June it would, to say the least of it, have been tactless, but at the present time it
is, of course, merely pointless. One of the high ranking members of the Con¬
gress hierarchy, referring to this statement, said to me “Some people take time
to grow up”.

[Paras. 13-14, on re-employment prospects in the Colonial Service for
Irrigation Engineers, omitted.]

15. I may not be sending you a Personal Report next week as I am going to
Simla from Friday evening the 13 th to Monday morning the 16th inclusive,
and to Kashmir from Wednesday the 18th to Monday the 23 rd inclusive,
returning in [to] Delhi in time for the visit of the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff. I have promised Nehru to try and smooth over some of his recent
difficulties with the Maharajah, as the latter is a very old friend of mine.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

P.S. Ismay has had a better brain wave than paragraph 11 re Caroe, and I
attach a copy of the letter14 I have just written to him.

M. OF B.

11 No. 96. 12 No. 142. 13 Vol. X, No. 164, para. 5. 14 No. 154.

JUNE I947

301

162

Viceroy's Personal Report No. g
LjPO!6ji23:ff 123-33

top secret and personal 12 June ig47

I have spent most of the past week in consultation with the Indian leaders about
the administrative consequences of partition. Meanwhile press reactions in this
country to His Majesty’s Government’s announcement of the 3rd June con¬
tinue to be favourable and the absence of any serious outbreaks in the country
is most satisfactory.

2. I received information1 towards the end of last week that Gandhi was in a
very unhappy and emotional mood and some of the Congress leaders feared he
might denounce the plan and its acceptance at his next prayer meeting. I
therefore asked him to come and see me before this prayer meeting; he was
indeed in a very upset mood and began by affirming how unhappy he was at
my spoiling his life’s work.

[Paras. 3-5, reporting Lord Mountbatten’s interview with Mr Gandhi in
virtually the same words as the Addendum to No. 69, fourth para, to con¬
cluding note, omitted.]

6. Generally speaking His Majesty’s Government’s statement has eased the
tension throughout the country and the real fear of communal war on a large
scale has disappeared. The situation in the Gurgaon area is however still
unsatisfactory; nor did any of us expect the announcement of the 3rd June to
have any appreciable effect on this particular situation. It is clear that there are
still not enough troops in the area to control the situation and the District
Commissioner has asked for more.2 The Commander in Chief has agreed to a
further increase bringing the force up to one brigade. Lahore and Amritsar also
remain rather unsettled, although the disturbances are on a much smaller scale
than before the announcement. Calcutta is, I am glad to say, remarkably quiet.
I refer to Burrows’ report on Bengal later on.

7. Auchinleck obtained special reports on the way the armed forces had
reacted to the Statement. He has summarised their views by saying that in
general the solution is thought to be the best possible, though nearly all regret
partition. Many of the troops have not yet realised the full implication of the
plan, though they are obviously concerned at the inevitable splitting of the
Services. Only in one case was any anxiety betrayed about the reliability of the

1 No. 58.

2 Lord Mountbatten evidently meant the Divisional Commissioner: see Nos. 137 and 179.

302

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

army in the immediate future, while several reports were definitely most
optimistic in this respect.

8. The All India Muslim League Council held a meeting in camera on
Monday the 9th June. I thought it very wise of them to hold it in camera, but
this did not prevent Vallabhbhai Patel from sending me the transcript of short¬
hand notes on the proceedings,3 presumably taken by a Congress spy ! I attach
a copy of the resolution, which was passed.4 I had asked5 Jinnah to show me the
draft resolution before it was put to the meeting, but he said that the resolution
would be formulated as a result of the meeting and he did not know what it
would be.

9. Although I did not expect the resolution to be very differently worded, it
caused a howl of indignation among the Congress Press, and violent letters6 of
protest from Nehru and Patel, who expressed fears that they would not be able
to manage the All India Congress Committee in view of the failure of the
League to make a definite announcement that they accepted the plan as a
settlement.

10. After a meeting this morning of the Committee of the Cabinet which I
have set up to make the necessary administrative preparations for the Partition
Council, I kept back Liaquat Ali Khan and Patel to thrash this matter out.7
Patel said quite categorically that unless Mr. Jinnah would give a firm accep¬
tance in writing before the All India Congress Committee met, he could not
guarantee what would occur at that meeting, since their draft resolution was an
acceptance of the plan “in view of the acceptance of the plan by the Muslim
League Council”. Liaquat countered by pointing out that when the League
accepted the Cabinet Mission plan, Congress had defeated them by putting
such reservations on their acceptance that the League had had to pull out, and
they did not intend to be outmanoeuvred again in this way.

11. I finally suggested as a compromise that Jinnah should write me a letter
saying that he was authorised by the All India Muslim League Council to
accept the plan as a compromise settlement subject to the All India Congress
Committee accepting it in a similar spirit. Liaquat Ali Khan went off to try and
persuade Jinnah to sign such a letter, but was not very hopeful since he said Mr.
Jinnah did not like signing letters of this sort. I told him that if Mr. Jinnah
refused to sign he was to send him to see me. Jinnah came at 6 o’clock tonight
and categorically refused to sign until after Congress. Once more I had to take
the onus upon myself and so I wrote a letter8 to the President of the Congress
(a copy of which I attach) which I hope will do the trick.

12. I had a very difficult Cabinet meeting last week in fact I have never
attended a worse meeting at any time anywhere. The trouble arose over my
proposal that there should be a sort of moratorium on high grade appointments

JUNE I947

303

and policy decisions until the two future Governments had been sorted out. I
suggested that any urgent appointments or action should be submitted to the
Cabinet as a whole. (The Muslim League have been making some bad appoint¬
ments in their departments the major part of which will be inherited soon by
Congress, and the latter are naturally sore about this). Both sides accepted my
suggestion with every sign of pleasure, with the proviso from the Muslim
Leaguers that matters thus placed before the Cabinet would not be decided by a
majority vote since that would put Congress in control over the appointments
and high level policy of every department. I suggested that the way out of this
difficulty would be for both parties to authorise me to decide whether an
appointment or a policy decision was likely to be prejudicial to one or other of
the two new Governments and, if so, to rule that the matter should not be
decided by majority vote. This was accepted by both sides.

13. Nehru then announced that he had a number of diplomatic appoint¬
ments which were awaiting confirmation and that whereas he did not mind
placing them before the Cabinet, he trusted I would rule that they did not
concern Pakistan. Liaquat objected and hinted that Pakistan would not wish to
have an Ambassador appointed to Russia. As Nehru’s own sister, Mrs. Pandit,
has been proposed for this appointment, this remark was particularly tactless,
though Liaquat afterwards assured me that he had no idea that Mrs. Pandit had
been nominated. Anyway, there was a tremendous scene when Nehru an¬
nounced that he would not tolerate interference by the League in the affairs of
the Government, and that he would insist on matters like this being put to the
majority vote and would see that the League was outvoted every time. When
Liaquat replied equally violently, Nehru then said that if the Government were
to be turned over to the League he himself would forthwith resign from the
Government. Pandemonium then broke loose and everyone talked at once.

14. I had to call the principal offenders to order by name, and I then said
“Gentlemen, what hopes have we of getting a peaceable partition if the very
first discussion leads to such a disgraceful scene as this? This matter will be
deferred for the present, and when it is brought up I will give a ruling. In the
meanwhile I want to know that you back me in this matter.” I then looked
round at each of them. I was still faced with two or three sulky faces, and I then
said “I am not going on with the next item until I see a row of smiling faces in
front of me.” This had the desired effect: everybody laughed and the tension
was broken. I have only reported this incident at such length to show the electric
atmosphere in which we are still working and the appalling difficulty with
which all of us are going to be faced during the 64 days that remain until

3 Presumably Enclosure to No. 130. 4 Enclosure to No. 127.

5 See Nos. 101 and 102. 6 Nos. 129 and 130. 7 No. 153.

8 No. 160.

304

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

partition is achieved on the 15 th August. The very speed at which we will all
have to work will, however, be our best safeguard against such trouble.

15. I might add that the Cabinet started this meeting under obviously
strained feelings, since those Members who had not been in on my discussions
with the leaders over the administrative consequences of partition had appa¬
rently resented being left out of it. I took the responsibility on myself for doing
this, and explained that though they might be the legal Government of India
to-day, they had to face the fact that within the next two or three weeks we
should probably find on the vote of the Provinces that partition was certain. I
therefore had to deal over questions affecting partition so far as possible with
the leaders who were likely to be responsible for selecting the two new separate
Governments. This explanation, I am glad to say, was well received ; but they
did insist that the committees and machinery for doing the partition should be
set up by a Committee of the present Cabinet until partition was legally certain,
and this was agreed to.9

16. I had an equally difficult meeting with the leaders the next day.10
Jinnah said that he could not agree that this matter had been handled correctly
in the Executive Council (as he insisted on referring to the Cabinet). His point
was that the authority really responsible for making all the arrangements was
His Majesty’s Government or the Governor-General in his discretion, and not
the Interim Government. This, of course, led to an acrimonious discussion
between Jinnah and Nehru. I eventually got Jinnah to agree to the proposal
I had put to the Cabinet that a Committee should be set up consisting of two
representatives of Congress and two representatives of the Muslim League, all
of whom should be members of the Interim Government, but that it should not
be referred to as a Cabinet Committee. I also offered to act as Chairman, and
with this course of action there was general agreement.

17. The representatives of this Committee have been selected by the leaders
as Sardar Patel and Rajendra Prasad for the Congress, Liaquat Ali Khan and
Abdur Rab Nishtar for the League. The duty of this Committee will be to make
an examination of the steps to be taken to set up the machinery, including the
formation of sub-committees, for carrying out partition, and that this should be
a fact-finding body, whose duty it would be to make proposals and not to
reach final decisions.

18. The first meeting of this Committee took place this morning,11 when it
was agreed that a Steering Committee should be set up consisting of the Cabinet
Secretary (H. M. Patel) and the Financial Adviser in the Military Finance
Department (Mohamed Ali), probably the two most experienced and able
Indian officials in the country. This Steering Committee and the expert sub¬
committees will consist of officials only, and both Patel and Mohamed Ah are

JUNE 1947

305

optimistic that the principles of partition and a great deal of the actual separation
can be effected before the 15th August.

19. It was also decided12 that as soon as a decision on partition is known (i.e.
immediately any one Province has declared in favour of joining a new and
separate Constituent Assembly), a Partition Council should be set up to take
over from this Committee; that it shall consist of two of the top ranking
leaders of Congress and two of the Muslim League, whether they are in the
Interim Government or not; and that I shall be Chairman with no arbitral
functions.

20. I was again asked by both sides to act as Arbitrator, but I pointed out
how soon their confidence in me would be shaken in the present atmosphere.
They therefore agreed13 that an Arbitral Tribunal should be set up at the same
time as the Partition Council. It will consist of three members, all men of great
judicial experience and the composition of it will be settled by the Partition
Committee. It was agreed that Sardar Baldev Singh will consult the other Sikh
leaders about the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal and will inform the
Partition Committee of their views. The services of the Arbitral Tribunal will
be offered to the Provinces which are to be partitioned.

21. A decision has not yet been reached about the composition of the
Boundary Commission, for which two suggestions have been put forward.14
These are: —

(a) That each Commission should consist of three persons obtained through
U.N.O., plus three expert assessors from each side of each partition
Province.

(b) That each Commission should consist of an independent Chairman and
four other persons, of whom two should be nominated by Congress and
two by the Muslim League.

22. Nehru pointed out that suggestion (a) above would involve considerable
delay. The U.N.O. Headquarters would probably have to communicate with
each Member Government, and a long time would elapse before a choice
could be made. Furthermore, it is possible that the ultimate choice might not
be a very suitable one.

23. With regard to the second proposal, it has been suggested that the four
persons nominated, two each by the Congress and the Muslim League, should
be of high judicial standing. Possibly these four might elect their own Chair¬
man for each Commission. If there was any difficulty about this, the two parties
could perhaps themselves suggest names for the appointments of Chairmen. I

9 No. 95. 10 No. 100.

13 Ibid., conclusion (v).

11 No. 152. 12 No. 100, Item 1, conclusion (iv).

See Nos. 101, 124 and 128.

14

306

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

hope to take a decision on this matter at my meeting with the leaders on
Friday the 13 th June.

24. I have already described the feeling in last week’s Cabinet meeting. I
must now add that the Cabinet held yesterday evening had promised to be an
equally stormy one ; for Liaquat had kindly warned me that he was going to
oppose the proposal to set up a corporation in which private companies and the
Government would co-operate to exploit the forests of the Andaman Islands.
His grounds for opposing this were that the Andamans were part of the over-all
assets of India, still to be divided between Pakistan and the rest of India. I knew
that this would bring matters to a head again, besides broaching an issue about
the future of these islands as far as His Majesty’s Government are concerned. I
was therefore most gratified when Mr. Bhabha, the Parsee business man,
criticised the proposal as a most unbusinesslike proposition. I thereupon
referred the paper back to the Agricultural Department to work out a more
business-like proposal in consultation with Mr. Bhabha. This saved a crisis and
we got through a big agenda in the record time of 45 minutes.

25. It is, however, becoming increasingly clear to me that any attempt by
His Majesty’s Government to claim the Andaman Islands as colonies, to be
treated in the same way as Aden, will cause an absolute flare-up throughout the
length and breadth of India, and will probably call forth violent opposition
from Pakistan as well as from the rest of India. My own position would be
permanently undermined if I were to act on behalf of His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment in this matter; it will therefore have to be left to the High Commissioner
or some other authority. But I believe that the only reasonable solution would
be to suggest some form of joint control or a leasing of the naval and air bases
under a treaty. Yet another alternative might be to refer the case of these
islands to U.N.O. or some form of arbitration. The one thing I am quite certain
about is that any high-handed action by His Majesty’s Government about these
islands at this moment will destroy all the good feeling which now exists
between the two countries, and that we must be careful to avoid dealing with
any items appropriate for a treaty in a piecemeal way.

26. In the last week I have sent Abell to Lahore and Calcutta to discuss with
the Governors the action to be taken about the partition of the Provinces.

27. Jenkins in the Punjab is very anxious to get a Coalition Government, but
has not been able to take the matter far because the Muslim League leaders are
in Delhi. What he would like is a “divisible” Coalition Government con¬
sisting of members who could, when the time comes, fall into two Groups and
form, perhaps with certain additions, the Ministries of the two new Provinces.
For the partition work he will adopt the general outline of procedure suggested
by me for the Centre and he has already got some expert committees working.1 5

JUNE 1947

307

What he lacks at present is the Partition Committee comprising representative
leaders who can commit the two new Governments, but he will try to secure
this very soon. Meanwhile, the officials are getting ahead with preparing
material and there is of course a great deal of work to do at the official level
before much can be settled between the parties.

28. The Muslim League have objected that the officials are predominantly
non-Muslim and Jenkins, who appointed them on what he took to be their
merits and chose the men most qualified for the work, will have now to modify
his arrangements in consultation with the parties.16 Unfortunately he could not
consult Mamdot, the Punjab leader of the League, as he was away from
Lahore. But as he was in Delhi I have spoken to him myself and he will go back
to Lahore and start discussions with the Governor. Jenkins took rather a stiff
line about this and wanted to refuse to alter his arrangements, but clearly this
is impossible and we shall have to secure the co-operation of both parties.

29. Burrows is much fitter than he was and is very gratified by the reception
of the announcement. He says the week before the announcement was appal¬
ling, with everyone in a great state of nerves expecting large scale riots. The
indications, however, that the parties had accepted the plan, and especially the
broadcast by Jinnah,17 did a world of good and now he thinks that he should be
able to get through without a major disaster in Calcutta. Bengal, owing to
having a Ministry with the leaders absent in Delhi, has been less quick than the
Punjab in getting started on the partition work, but they will now go ahead.
Burrows, like Jenkins, will try to get a Coalition Ministry, and though he is
not sure of success in this he realises that it is essential that there must be at least
a Partition Committee representing the prospective Governments and he hopes
to persuade the leaders that one must be set up.

30. Both Governors expect a certain amount ol difficulty over the Boundary
Commission. Unless the terms of reference are drawn widely they will not
satisfy the Sikhs in the Punjab. The Muslim League, who would like wide terms
of reference in Bengal in order to be able to stake a claim to Calcutta, want
narrow terms of reference for the Punjab in order to resist those claims of the
Sikhs which are based on property and historical associations rather than on
populations.

31. Jenkins is doubtful whether many British officials will stay on in the
Punjab, even temporarily. They have been disgusted by recent events and most
of them doubt whether they have much to contribute. Burrows is slightly more
optimistic about Bengal and if the Muslim League appeal to British officials to
stay on temporarily (in addition to those who want to stay on permanently) I
shall of course do my best to get the men. The present indications, however,
are that the Congress do not really want men on a temporary basis and are

15 cf. Nos. 97 and 98. 16 See Nos. 144 and 145. 17 No. 47.

308

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

certainly not prepared to appeal to them to stay. The matter of the Services is
urgent and I hope to get firm decisions by the parties very soon.

32. Jenkins is not prepared to stay on in the Punjab because he considers that
he must make it clear during the difficult weeks ahead that he has no personal
axe to grind at all and is not interested in any offer of a Governorship from
either party. Similarly, Burrows is sure that it would be unsuitable and un¬
dignified for him to stay on as Governor of half the Province. I respect both
men for their attitude and I think they are right. I have written to Jinnah and
Nehru18 reminding them of the importance of preparing at once a hst of men
suitable for such high appointments. A Governor cannot be got into position in
five minutes.

33. It is with great regret that I have arranged for the Governor of the
NorthWest Frontier Province, Olaf Caroe, to go on leave during the period of
the referendum, and asked for authority to appoint Lieutenant General Sir
Rob Lockhart temporarily in his place. The situation in the Frontier is such that
I do not feel it would be fair to Caroe to leave him there during the referen¬
dum. For although I am convinced of his essential integrity and highminded¬
ness, his Government have accused him so openly of intriguing to get the
Muslim League into power that his position would be intolerable during the
referendum. Neither Ismay nor I feel his nerves are in a fit state to stay under
such conditions.

M. OF B.

18 See No. 113 for letter to Mr Jinnah; that to Pandit Nehru was presumably on similar lines.

163

Firman-e-Muharak issued by the Nizam of Hyderabad 1

L/P&S/ijIi 843: f 143

His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar has graciously issued the
following Fir man-e- Mubarak to the People of Hyderabad: —

At the time when the Cabinet Mission issued the Statement of May 16, 1946,
the States were invited to join one representative Constituent Assembly for the
whole of India. I thought it wise then to wait before making my decision till I
saw how the political situation would develop. His Excellency the Viceroy’s
recent announcement of 3rd June, 1947 makes it clear that in all probability
British India will now be divided into two parts and there will accordingly be
not one Constituent Assembly but two. I have now, therefore, to consider

JUNE I947

309

whether my State should send representatives to one or other of these Assem¬
blies.

“indivisible asset for all”

2. The basis of the division of British India is communal. In my State,
however, the two major communities live side by side and I have sought, since
I became Ruler, to promote by every means good and friendly relations
between them. My ancestors and I have always regarded the Muslims and the
Hindus as two eyes of the State and the State itself to be “the indivisible asset of
all” the communities inhabiting it. I am happy to say that there has not been
in my State the same acute cleavage as has led to the recent events in British
India. The subjects of my State have affinities and common interest with both
the contemplated new Unions. By sending representatives to either of the
Constituent Assemblies, Hyderabad would seem to be taking one side or the
other.

I am sure I am consulting the best interests of my subjects by declining to take
such a course. I have, therefore, decided not to send representatives to either of
the Constituent Assemblies.

NEGOTIATION WITH BOTH UNITS

3. The result in law of the departure of the Paramount Power in the near
future will be that I shall become entitled to resume the status of an indepen¬
dent Sovereign. But the question of the nature and extent of the association or
relationship between my State and the Units in British India remains for
decision at a later stage, when their constitution and powers have been deter¬
mined. Whatever form of constitution they ultimately adopt, it will be the
desire of Hyderabad to live in the closest friendship and amity with both.
Meantime, I and my Government will lose no opportunity of reaching by
active negotiation working agreements on matters of common interest for the
mutual benefit of all. When the time comes to decide on the nature of the
State’s association or relationship with the new Units, after they have settled
their constitutions, I shall continue to be guided by a consideration of the best
interests both of Hyderabad and of India as a whole.

INTEGRITY OF HYDERABAD

4. The political and constitutional picture in India has in the past few years
been changing rapidly and who can say whether the two Units now con¬
templated for British India represent the final solution or whether there will be
still further divisions or whether after all unity may eventually be achieved by
mutual agreement? In these rapid changes, I am satisfied that the course of
political wisdom lies in not taking sides, in concentrating on the maintenance of

1 The text of the Firman reproduced here is taken from New Hyderabad, June 1947, p. 5, a copy of
which was enclosed in the Resident’s Appreciation of the situation in Hyderabad, D.O. No. 84-R of
28 July. L/P &S/13/1843 : ff 144-6. The Firman was issued on 12 June ( Times of India, 13 June 1947).

3io

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

the integrity of my Dominions and fostering the welfare of my people. The
achievement of that object depends upon the continuance of mutual good-will
between the two communities in my State and, in the unsettled conditions all
around, upon ensuring for all my subjects the benefits of peace and security.

5. Before making this declaration I have taken into consideration the diver¬
gent views of local political opinion and I feel confident that the best solution is
to follow the policy which I have adopted in this Firman.

Signature of

HIS EXALTED HIGHNESS

164

Mr Attlee to Major Adeane
LIP&JI10I133: ff 97-9

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, 12 June ip^7

My dear Adeane,

1 . As The King knows, the Viceroy when in London reported that already at
that date certain prominent Congress leaders, speaking as individuals and not
on behalf of their party, had indicated in private conversation their belief that
India would accept Dominion status within the Commonwealth as an ad
interim measure if there could be a very early transfer of power; and that if this
were effected at an early date there was good prospect that the portion of
British India under Congress control would ultimately abstain from secession
from the Commonwealth. The first part of this forecast seems now to be in a
fair way to realisation. The Indian leaders, however, made plain their view that
it would be a necessary condition of any such arrangement that the Royal Title
should be varied by omission of the words “Indiae Imperator” and “Emperor
of India”.

Apart from these representations the decision of His Majesty’s Government
that, as from the date of transfer of power in British India, the Paramountcy of
the Crown over the Indian Princes should cease, would make a change in this
sense in the Royal Title appropriate.

2. But the preamble to the Statute of Westminster implies that a change in
the Royal Title should receive the assent not only of the United Kingdom
Parliament but also of each of the Dominion Parliaments.

3. So far as concerns the United Kingdom Parliament I consider that the
best course would be to include in the India Dominions Bill, which will be
introduced in July, a Clause declaring that the United Kingdom Parliament has

JUNE I947

311

given assent to the omission of “Indiae Imperator” and “Emperor of India”
and to the issue of a Royal Proclamation for this purpose.

4. As regards the Dominion Parliaments, I suggest that before the India
Dominions Bill is introduced, I should inform the Prime Minister of each of the
Dominions of what is proposed in the United Kingdom and should enquire
whether Dominion Governments agree and are prepared to take such steps as
they deem necessary to obtain the assent of the respective Dominion Parlia¬
ments.

5. There is a related point, namely the disposal of the Indian crown, on which
The King may wish for information. The position is that this crown, fashioned
for the special occasion of the Coronation Durbar at Delhi in 1911, was pur¬
chased out of Indian revenues at a cost of jC 60,000 in 1912 by the Secretary of
State for India in Council on behalf of the Government of India. It is vested in
His Majesty for the purposes of the Governor General of India in Council, that
is to say, in the particular context, for the purposes of His Majesty’s office as
“. . . of the British Dominions beyond the seas King, Defender of the Faith,
Emperor of India”. So long as India remains within the Commonwealth it
would seem appropriate that this crown should be retained among the Crown
Jewels; but if at a later date one or other or both of the prospective India
Dominions were to secede from the Commonwealth the contention might
well be put forward that the property in the crown should be vested in some
Indian authority in view of the fact that it was purchased out of Indian revenues.
In the meantime, however, a suitable means of dealing with the situation might
be that the crown should be retained here on the understanding that it would be
available for use in India on the occasion of any future Royal visit to India while
India remains in the Commonwealth.

6. I should be glad if you would lay these matters before The King.

Yours sincerely,

C. R. ATTLEE

312

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

165

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee . Paper 1.8.(47)97
L/P &J/10I140: ff 28-30
Andaman and Nicobar Islands

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA
TOP SECRET INDIA OFFICE, 12 June 1947

With reference to 1. 13.(47) 28th Meeting,1 Minute 5, I have given further
consideration to the problem of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

2. 1 recommend to the Committee that a telegram be sent to the Viceroy on
the lines of the attached draft raising with him the question of possible reper¬
cussions if the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are taken away from India before
the transfer of power. I think we ought to have the Viceroy’s considered views
on this before we finally decide what to put in the Bill. It is clear that the ques¬
tion of the islands cannot be left indeterminate in the legislation.

3 . If the islands are to be taken away from India, immediate provision must
be made for their administration. The Ministry of Defence and the Colonial
Office have been consulted. The Ministry of Defence consider that it is for the
Colonial Office to take charge of the administrative side of the matter. I think
there is no doubt that the Colonial Office is the only Department which can
undertake this task but I am taking up the matter with the Secretary of State for
the Colonies.2

L.

Annex to No. 1 65

DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

TO VICEROY

TOP SECRET

Future of Andamans and Nicobars. You will remember that at meeting of I.B.
Committee on 28th May it was decided that Andaman and Nicobar Islands
should be retained as British territory at any rate pending negotiation and that
nothing should be done in the legislation or said to the Indian leaders to suggest
that we accepted the view that islands were organic part of British India.

2. It has become clear in drafting the Bill that either Andamans and Nicobars
must be legislated into one or other of the Indian Dominions or provision be
made whereby islands are separated from India by Order-in-Council between
date of passing of Act and appointed day for giving effect to the Act, so that

JUNE 1947

313

islands cease to be part of Indian territory prior to constitution of new Indian
Dominions.

3 . It is clear therefore that we have to make definite choice now between (a)
separating Andamans and Nicobars from India by British legislation (b)
including islands in territory transferred to one of new Indian Dominions
(presumably India as distinct from Pakistan) and relying solely on subsequent
negotiation to secure our defence requirements.

4. Draft Bill which is in transit to you by air deals with matter on lines at (a)
in accordance with Committee's instructions. We desire, however, to have your
advice urgently on how this matter can best be handled. Defence interests are of
extreme importance and we do not wish to be placed in position in which
islands have been left by Parliament as part of India and we subsequently have
to negotiate as to defence requirements. At same time we realise that simply to
legislate islands out of India before appointed day without consultation with
Indians may give rise to strong reactions from Congress. We, therefore, wish to
have your view before deciding finally which of above courses to adopt in the
Bill. We do not wish you to discuss this matter with Indian leaders at any rate
until we have considered your views.

5. If decision is to legislate islands out of India provision must be made for
their future administration before that is done. There is very little time in which
to do this even if period between passing of Bill and giving effect to it is the full
period of 2 months provided for under the Bill. It would help if you could
supply any information available to you of what would be immediate and
annual essential requirements of the islands in the way of supplies etc. and what
is annual cost to India of their administration. Very little information is
available here.

1 Vol. X, No. 553.

2 For correspondence on this subject between Lord Listowel and Mr Creech Jones, and Sir D. Monteath
and Sir T. Lloyd, see L/P &J/i 0/140.

166

Mr Attlee to Mr Mackenzie King , Mr Chifley , Mr Fraser and Field Marshal Smuts

Telegram, P.R.O. PREM 8/460

important 12 June 1947, 6.56 pm

PERSONAL

D. No. 520. Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister.

Begins. We have for some time felt that the present titles of the Secretary of
State for Dominion Affairs and the Dominions Office are not now entirely

314

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

appropriate and tend to convey a misleading impression of the relations
between the United Kingdom and the other members of the Commonwealth.
We have accordingly under consideration1 a proposal that they should be
changed to “Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations” (or possibly for
Commonwealth Affairs) and “Commonwealth Relations (or Affairs) Office”,
respectively.

Apart from indicating more clearly the existing functions of the appointment
and of the department, the new titles would have the advantage of making it
easier to include within the scope of the Department the conduct of our rela¬
tions with other countries such as India, Burma and Ceylon if and when these
should attain a position of autonomy within the Commonwealth.

It would help me in coming to a decision if you would let me know how
this idea strikes you. Ends.

1 See Nos. 31 and 118, para. (i).

167

Lord Ismay to Sir D. Monteath
Telegram , ff 31-2

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 12 June I947 , 10. 45 pm

secret Received: 13 June , 2.10 pm

No. 1416-S. Your 7521-S.1 Many thanks for notes on Dominion Status.

2. very confidential. Although para. 2 of your telegram under reply
was marked “Very Confidential”, I naturally showed it to the Viceroy. His
Excellency is absolutely horrified that it should be contemplated —

(a) that any (repeat any) powers should be reserved to him after the establish¬
ment of Dominion Status; and

(b) that he should have any arbitral authority whatsoever.

3. As regards (a), he has made it clear to the Indian leaders over and over
again, and he emphasized in his Press Conference,2 that, after August 15th, both
Dominions would be free as air, and that the Governor General or Governors
General, whoever he or they might be, would be a constitutional Governor
General in every sense of the word, and would have no executive authority
whatsoever.

4. As regards (b), the Viceroy made it clear to the India/Burma Committee
that he would be placed in an entirely false position if he happened to be
appointed Governor General of both Dominions, and were then invited to
undertake arbitral functions. The Cabinet entirely agreed with him.

JUNE 1947

315

5. If the Viceroy should be appointed Governor General of both Domin¬
ions, he would confine himself to guidance and advice, it is quite possible that,
in many cases, he might get both parties to reach agreement by his own
influence. But it has already been officially agreed with the Indian leaders that
an Arbitral Tribunal should be set up to deal with all cases where the Partition
Council, or successor Governments, fail to reach agreement. The composition
of this Tribunal is now under active consideration.

6. We may have misunderstood your meaning, but it is quite clear to us that
any reservations of the kind that we interpret into your telegram would blow
the whole scheme sky high.

1 No. 149. 2 See No. 59, p. 113 and 60, p. 120 et seq.

168

Mr Abell to Sir D. Monteath

Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Partition, Adminis¬
trative Consequences of

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 12 June 1947, 8.20 pm

SECRET

No. 1418-S. Your 7541 of June nth. If Rowlands is asked to help with
administrative organisation of Pakistan the Viceroy thinks no embarrassment
would be caused by HMG making him available.1 If, however, the intention
is that Rowlands’ knowledge obtained as Finance Member should be used to
assist Pakistan in arguing their case with Hindustan before the transfer of powder
about the proportion of the assets of India which they would receive, he thinks
that it would cause some embarrassment vis-a-vis Congress if HMG were to
make Rowlands available. In any case Viceroy feels that as a general rule it
would be wise to refrain from making available to either party services of high-
powered British officials from the UK until after the transfer of power.

2. Monckton is expected here tomorrow, and I will telegraph further if he
has more information.

1 Sir D. Monteath had informed Mr Abell that Sir A. Rowlands had received an enquiry through
Sir W. Monckton regarding the possibility of his advising Pakistan on finance and administrative
problems. Mountbatten Papers, loc. cit.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

169

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins [Punjab)
Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Part II[a)

BY AIR MAIL NEW DELHI, 12 June 1Q47

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1419-S. I saw Khan of Mamdot this evening.1 I explained to him that you
had made no arrangements whatsoever about the machinery for making
political decisions and that this was a matter which you would fix up with the
Indian leaders in the Punjab at the first opportunity. All that you had done was
to set up fact-finding machinery, which would merely be required to assemble
all the facts and present the various problems for decision on a political level. I
emphasized that these fact-finding bodies would not themselves be in a position
to influence decisions.

2. Khan of Mamdot countered by saying that I had consulted leaders here
about the official machinery and that the same thing should have been done in
the Punjab.

3 . I replied that I myself had impressed upon you the need for speed in
setting up the administrative machinery, but had omitted to tell you that I
myself was consulting Indian leaders about the machinery to be set up at the
Centre. To this extent I myself was to blame.

4. Khan of Mamdot said that in view of the Hindu preponderance on the
Committees you had set up, and especially of the fact that four out of five
Chairmen were Hindus, there was a danger that the facts would be twisted
in such a way as to prejudice the political decisions. I asked him point blank
whether he intended to cast this aspersion on the integrity of the Civil Service
and he replied ‘Yes’.

5. I therefore suggested that his point would be met if Muslim members of
the Civil Service were added (repeat added) to the Committees which you had
already set up, pointing out that they would be in a position to examine all the
files and papers and to report to him if any monkey tricks were suspected. Khan
was inclined to press for changes of chairmanship, but, in the end, said that he
was prepared to accept my suggestion of additional Muslim members, to avoid
creating a difficult situation.

6. Khan returns to Lahore on 14th and will come to see you at once. I very
much hope that you can see your way to settling this quarrel on the lines I have

JUNE 1947

317

suggested. In view of the procedure adopted at Headquarters, Muslims have
certain grounds for grievance and I am extremely anxious that you should meet
them.

1 See No. 145.

170

Mr Abell to Mr Lowis (North-West Frontier Province )

Telegram, R/3/1 / 131 : f 133

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 12 June 1947, 11 pm

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL

No. 1420— S. Your CA/108 of June 10th.1 Viceroy agrees to announcing dates
of Referendum, but this announcement should explain that dates cannot be
later because of Ramzan . It can also be said that preparation, including dates,
have to be fixed against the possibility of the Punjab choosing partition. The
arrangements will only be confirmed if such a decision is taken.

2. Viceroy agrees that you should resist all moves designed to cause delay.

3. No letter has been received from Premier.

1 No. 136.

171

Rear Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, LIEI8I3387: f 183

CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, 12 June 1Q47, 11. 3O1 pm

Received: 13 June, 6.43 am

No. 1414-S. The food position in India has become serious enough once again
to be brought to the attention of H.M.G. and their assistance invited. The
Food Member has now asked me, both privately and in yesterday’s Cabinet
meeting to approach you.

2. Late damage occurred to autumn harvest last year in Central India, the
Central Provinces and Hyderabad and millet crop was a failure throughout the
country. The year therefore started with a very low carry-over. The spring

1 Time of despatch taken from Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files : Food.

3 1 8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

wheat harvest of the same areas in Central Provinces, Hyderabad, Central
India, Gwalior and Bombay was almost totally destroyed by rust disease. In the
Punjab the crop has only been average and disturbances have farther reduced
exportable surplus available from that Province. The relevant figures are
available with you.

3 . Last year full publicity was given to shortages in India but this year as a
matter of deliberate policy it was decided to state the facts of the situation and
not to plug the risk of famine. Had this not been done, it was felt that famine
propaganda, added to political tension and general jumpiness, would have
induced hoarding, and produced the very famine result which we wished to
avoid.

4. At the same time, every possible effort has been made by Food Depart¬
ment to improve procurement within India, and to secure further imports ; and
at the moment, representatives of Government of India are doing their best in
the Argentine, Australia and America. At Cabinet meeting yesterday it was
decided that we should attempt to get from Burma a further quota which
would not be offset against allocations by I.E.F.C.

5. The period of July to September will be crucial and any extra ship-loads
of grain which India can obtain at that time would certainly prevent semi¬
starvation in some areas, and may well avert famine deaths. It is possible that
H.M.G. may have succeeded in arranging for a satisfactory stock-pile for
Great Britain, and I therefore appeal, at request of Food Member, backed by
whole of Interim Government, for diversion to India during these vital months,
of any cargoes which can possibly be made available, on the understanding that
they would be repaid later from India’s allotment. I need not stress the fact
that cuts in 12 oz. ration, which have already been imposed in Madras and are
inevitable in other deficit areas, will cause much dissatisfaction, with attendant
political risks. On the other hand a gesture by H.M.G. would have very
valuable results at this particular juncture.

172

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Indian Independence

Bill — Draft Bill, Part 1(a)

immediate new Delhi, 12 June 1947, 11. 45 pm

secret Received: 13 June, 1.10 am

No. 1421-S. Your 7496 of 10th June.1 I consider it absolutely essential that the
Indian leaders should be shown the draft Bill. In fact I have already undertaken

JUNE I947

319

to support their strongly expressed desire to be allowed to do so. Unless the
draft is very different from what we all expect, there is no reason at all why
there should be any long disputes.

1 No. 138.

173

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Attlee ( via India Office)

Telegram , 12/5/1/147: / 75

immediate new Delhi, 12 June 1947, ii. 45 pm

secret Received: 13 June , 1 am

No. 1422-S. Please pass following to Prime Minister.

1 . It has occurred to me that the visit of the CIGS would be a very favourable
opportunity for settling once and for all the question of the Gurkhas, a matter
which has been hanging fire. I therefore suggest that he should come out
prepared to clinch the issue at a meeting with the U.K. High Commissioner,
Pandit Nehru and Sardar Baldev Singh.1

1 Mr Attlee agreed in tel. 7877 of 18 June 1947. L/WS/1/1024: f 63.

174

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Andaman and

Nicobar Islands

important new Delhi, 12 June 1947 , 11.45 pm

secret Received: 13 June , 2.10 am

No. 1423-S. Ismay’s Top Secret and Personal letter of April 12th1 to Monteath.

A statement appeared in the Times of India on June 9th saying that it is
rehably understood that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are to be ceded to
British Government under the new arrangements.

1 Enclosing a note on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands which briefly mentioned their status as ‘part
of India’ and discussed their value, actual or potential, to India. Lord Mountbatten had asked for a
note to be prepared in view of the expression of opinion by the Chiefs of Staff that British ‘strategic
requirements can only be assured if British sovereignty over the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is
maintained, whatever the future of India and Burma’ (Vol. IX, No. 544, para. 9). Mountbatten
Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

320

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

2. This has brought a sharp rejoinder in the Hindustan Times on June nth,
probably inspired, to the effect that the British Government have not raised the
question of the future of these islands with the Interim Government, and that if
any suggestion of the type mentioned is made hereafter, it will be summarily
rejected. In my opinion there can be no question of raising this controversial
subject at the present delicate stage of our political negotiations. It is a matter on
which Indians feel deeply and if we were to raise the question now of being
allowed to use the Islands as a naval or air base, which is about all we can hope
for, we should ruin our chances of success.

3. The line that I propose to take, if this question is raised by either side, is
that it is one of the very many problems which will have to be settled by nego¬
tiation when we are framing the treaties or agreements with the two new
Dominions which will be the natural result of their assumption of Dominion
Status, and that it would be wrong to take up any of these points in isolation.

i75

Minutes of Viceroy’s Eighteenth Miscellaneous Meeting

Mountbatten Papers

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s House, New Delhi, on 13 June
1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Pandit Nehru,
Sardar Patel, Mr Kripalani, Mr Jinnah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Mr Nishtar , Sardar
Baldev Singh, Lord Ismay, Sir E. Mieville, Sir C. Corf eld; Lieutenant-Colonel
Erskine Crum ( Secretariat )

Item 1

THE STATES

The Political Department and the lapse oj paramountcy

pandit nehru said that, before considering the various papers which had
been circulated,1 he wished to point out that this was the first time that members
of the Interim Government had had the privilege of being invited to discussions
concerning the States.

At pandit nehru’s request, his excellency the viceroy explained
that the Political Department had, until the Government of India Act 1935
came into operation, worked under the Governor-General-in-Council. Under
that Act, however, the functions formerly exercised by the Governor-General-
in-Council in relation to States were separated and allotted to the Crown
Representative, his excellency stated that his instructions were that

JUNE 1947

321

paramountcy should lapse not later than the date on which the transfer of
power took place.2 The lapse of paramountcy would automatically involve the
closing down of the Political Department.

pandit nehru said that, as he understood it, all other functions of the
Political Department except paramountcy had continued, despite the 1935 Act,
to be exercised under the Governor-General-in-Council. sir conrad
c orfield said that all functions connected with the States were exercised by
the Crown Representative, pandit nehru said that, whereas he accepted the
position with regard to the lapse of paramountcy at present, surely all the other
matters with which the Crown Representative and the Political Department
had to deal were Government of India matters and would continue, sir
conrad corfield stated that no such clear division could be made. From
the point of view of the Central Government the object of the liaison functions
of the Crown Representative was that States should not prejudice all-India
interests. The procedure was for the Crown Representative to consult the
various Departments of the Government of India and to use the paramountcy
power to ensure that States did not take any detrimental action. For instance,
the Crown Representative might get a representation from the States that the
policy of the Central Government in a certain matter was contrary to their own
interests. If, after consultation with the Central Government, the Crown
Representative was satisfied that this policy was necessary, he would use his
influence under paramountcy to ensure that the States complied. If, however,
he was not satisfied, he would use his influence to ensure that States’ legitimate
interests were not prejudiced by the Central Government.

pandit nehru said that he had consulted many eminent lawyers about
this matter, and his point was that at the least it was a highly controversial one.
Fie asked what right the Political Department had to go ahead in taking action
that was highly injurious to the Government of India. He had been writing
letters on this subject for four months.3 He and his colleagues had not (until
now) been shown the common courtesy of being brought into consultation.
Completely unilateral action had been taken continuously, pandit nehru
said that he charged the Political Department and Sir Conrad Corfield with
misfeasance. He considered that an immediate enquiry on the highest judicial
level into their actions was necessary.

sir conrad corfield said that he wished to point out that in every¬
thing he had acted under the instructions of the Crown Representative with the
approval of the Secretary of State, his excellency the viceroy said
that, from his experience, what Sir Conrad had said was absolutely correct.
He went on to say that he had invariably carefully considered the points put

1 Enclosures 1, 2 and 3 to No. 146. 2 See Vol. IX, Enclosure to No. 543.

3 See Vol. IX, Nos. 496 and 542; Vol. X, Nos. 102, 266 and 541; in this Vol., Nos. 68, 109, no and

322

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

forward by Pandit Nehru in his various letters, and taken action on them. For
example, Pandit Nehru had complained that the Political Department never
consulted the Government of India. As a result of that, he (His Excellency) had
arranged for Sir Conrad Corfield to go and see Pandit Nehru.4

pandit nehru said that he alone was not the Government of India.
He was talking not only of himself, but of his colleagues too. A stage was now
being reached at which very serious consequences were threatened. He pointed
out that His Majesty’s Government’s Statement of 3rd June5 referred back to
the Memorandum of the Cabinet Mission dated 12th May, 1946. 6 He said that
he accepted these documents as they were, but in his opinion the policy of the
Political Department had been contrary to them.

his excellency said that, on his arrival, Lord Wavell had informed
him that the Political Department had been acting strictly in accordancewith the
Memorandum of 12th May. sir conrad corfield confirmed that this had
been done. Every item of the programme of the Political Department had
been based on this Memorandum. There was continual consultation with the
Departments of the Government of India. Full details had been afforded to the
Government at inter-Departmental conferences. There had continually been
full liaison.

pandit nehru said that it was one thing to deal with a Department on a
specific matter. The wider policy was quite another question. There were
many rights and obligations apart from paramountcy. To deal with each
Department separately concerning these would produce administrative chaos.

Independence of States

pandit nehru said that he fully admitted the principle that any States
could, if they so wished, join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. But there was
no trace in the Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum of any State being allowed to
claim independence.

sir conrad corfield read out an extract of this Memorandum which
stated “The void will have to be filled, either by the States entering into a
federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments in British
India, or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or
them.”

pandit nehru said that in his opinion this did not signify the possibility
of States becoming independent, sir conrad corfield said that in his
opinion the term “particular political arrangements” implied relations with
autonomous units.

mr jinn ah said that in his view the States were fully entitled to say that
they would join neither Constituent Assembly. Every Indian State was a
sovereign State, pandit nehru said that he differed altogether. He spoke
as a lawyer, mr jinnah said that he spoke as a lawyer also, pandit nehru

JUNE I947

323

suggested that the opinion of the Federal Court on this point should be ob¬
tained.

mr jinnah reiterated that in his opinion Indian States were sovereign
States for every purpose except in so far as they had entered into treaties with
the Crown. British India could do nothing to them. The Crown was under
certain obligations to them and they to it, according to the terms of treaties and
agreements which had been made. To say that the Governor-General or the
British Parliament could lay down that every Indian State was bound to enter
one Constituent Assembly or the other, was not according to the law or to the
Constitution. If the States liked to come in, they could do so by agreement, but
there was no way of forcing them in.

pandit nehru asked what were the tests of sovereignty? One was the
capacity for international relations. The States had no such capacity. Another
was the capacity for declaring war. The States had no such capacity. There
were 562 States. Of this number there might perhaps be a few which could
claim semi-sovereignty, but no more. The significance of every treaty would
have to be examined. It was impossible, in his opinion, to plan any general
order. The Political Department had been run by money provided by the
Government of India. Tributes obtained from States had not been sufficient
to pay for this.

pandit nehru then read out several extracts from the Cabinet Mission’s
Memorandum. Fie said that, in his opinion, the whole background of this
statement was that the States should enter the structure of one or other Govern¬
ment.

mr jinnah reiterated his view that the Cabinet Mission had never laid
down that every State was bound to come into one or other Constituent
Assembly. They were free to decide themselves ; but there were many matters
which would require adjustments. These could only be made through the
Crown Representative so long as he continued. It was in the interests of both
the Muslim League and Congress that these adjustments should be made.

pandit nehru said that he entirely agreed with this. He said that he
was not intending to lay down that every State must join one or other Con¬
stituent Assembly; but if they did not come in, they would have to come to
some other arrangement. Such other arrangements could not and should not
be preceded by declarations of independence, his excellency the vice¬
roy said that he did not consider that the proposals put forward in the papers
before the meeting violated Pandit Nehru’s point. In fact, they were intended
to secure his object.

4 See Vol. X, Nos. 102, 205, 218 and 236.

5 No. 45, para. 18.

6 Vol. VII, No. 262.

324

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The Machinery for dealing with questions of common concern between the States and
the successor Governments in British India

It was with this in mind that he had arranged for a paper on the machinery for
dealing with questions of common concern between the States and the successor
Governments in British India to be written.7 This paper proposed two alterna¬
tives — that the States should be given the option of:

(a) Dealing with local representatives of the successor Governments, or

(b) Appointing their own representatives to the Headquarters of the successor
Governments.

A draft letter to all Residents, putting forward the two alternative sugges¬
tions, was also circulated.8

his excellency the viceroy said that he felt that the two alterna¬
tive choices should be put before the States. He had discussed in London the
question of the Government of India taking over the offices in the various
States. His instructions had been that this was only to be done if the States
agreed. Moreover, it was going to be very difficult to convince the States that
Agents of the Government of India located in State territory would not
continue to represent a paramount power. In his opinion, the alternative that
each State or group of States should appoint a representative or representatives
to be located at the Headquarters of the appropriate Government would be the
best arrangement. He had discussed this with the States Negotiating Com¬
mittee,9 the members of which had agreed with him. He emphasised that he
was not entitled to force a State to continue to accept an agent of the Central
Government in their territory.

sir conrad c orfield stated that he had discussed this question with
a number of Dewans. It seemed to him that it would be a mistake to set up an
organisation with which the States were not likely to cooperate.

pandit nehru said that he considered that these suggestions proceeded
from a wrong basis. Neither was a good idea. Present arrangements should
continue.

To have representatives of the States at capitals would lead to very con¬
siderable delays. He did not understand how H.M.G. could give a ruling in
which the Government of India had not even been consulted. This ruling did
not flow from the Statement of 12th May.

The Agents of the Government of India should continue in operation until
they were withdrawn. The lapse of paramountcy should not lead to indepen¬
dence. Only certain functions would cease to be exercised. Others would
remain. It was essential to have a Department to continue to deal with the
States. He suggested that the Political Department and the Residents should
continue to function. The political and administrative aspects should continue
in operation. The choice of what machinery should be set up lay with the
Government of India. If any State took up a line of opposition to the policy of

JUNE I947

325

the Central Government, this would be considered as an unfriendly act, and
all the privileges which those States enjoyed would cease.

HIS excellency the viceroy said that he recognised the rights of
the two new Governments each to set up a new Department to deal with
States’ matters, but he suggested that this should not be called a Political
Department. A more acceptable name would be “States Department”. It
should be set up forthwith, divided into two sections, ready for the partition
of the country. The existing Political Department would give all possible
assistance and advice in the formation of this new Department.

HIS excellency the viceroy stated that, on the other hand, he was
convinced that it was for the States to decide whether to send representatives to
either capital or to receive representatives from the successor Governments.
On his excellency’s instructions, the letter to Residents on this subject
was amended in certain details.

Formula for standstill arrangements

A second letter to Residents, covering a draft formula for standstill arrange¬
ments when paramountcy lapsed, was then handed round.10 It was agreed that
the schedule attached to the draft formula should be amended to cover matters
of common concern not specifically mentioned.11 pandit nehru said that
he had not yet had time to analyse this draft formula. He had discussed it in the
early hours of that morning with lawyers, who had raised many points of
difficulty. He doubted whether the description that it covered only “adminis¬
trative” arrangements was correct, mr jinnah gave his view that this was
correct.

his excellency the viceroy suggested that both parties would wish
a longer time to look into this draft in detail. He considered that the States
should send representatives to negotiate and sign the agreement proposed.
Negotiation could be initiated through the States Negotiating Committee,
but all States would have to send fully accredited representatives for the pur¬
pose of signature.

The disposal of the Crown Representative's records

The next paper considered concerned the disposal of the Crown Representa¬
tive’s records.12 This explained the steps which were being taken to weed and
sort these documents, and to destroy those no longer of interest.

pandit nehru said that he thought that, without doubt, the majority
of the records were of concern to the Government of India. He considered that

7 Enclosure 1 to No. 146. 8 Not printed.

9 Possibly a reference to the meeting reported in No. 94.

10 Draft letter not printed. For the brief on this subject, see Enclosure 2 to No. 146; for the draft
Standstill Formula, see Enclosure to No. 198.

11 The amendment consisted of the addition of Item 16 to the Schedule attached to the Enclosure to
No. 198.

12 Enclosure 3 to No. 146.

326

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

there should be a committee of historians and others to look into the whole
question. He could see no reason for rushing the destruction.

mr jinn ah said that he agreed with this. He was opposed to the idea
that the present Political Department should be judge of what should be
destroyed.

sir conrad c orfield pointed out that the present processes were being
carried out in consultation with the Imperial Record Department, which was a
very skilled body. He was ready to guarantee that nothing of value would be
destroyed. Amongst the documents being sorted, there might be some which
should not be handed over to the Government of India. He explained that
nearly all important documents were in the Political Department, although the
Residencies might have some.

The States' Forces

sardar baldev singh said that he understood that previously the Com-
mander-in-Chief used to exercise control over the States’ forces, sir conrad
c orfield explained that this had not really been control, but more in the
nature of a bargain and applied exclusively to units included by agreement in
the Indian States’ Forces Scheme. A State could have forces outside that
scheme but would have to pay for their arms and equipment, whereas arms
and equipment for units included in the Scheme were supplied free.

sardar baldev singh asked whether, when paramountcy lapsed, the
States would be free to obtain their arms from anywhere they wanted, sir
conrad corfield said that his suggestion was that the Central Govern¬
ment should provide arms, on payment, for legitimate purposes. If a bargain
was made in advance, there would be factual control.

The States People

pandit nehru said that he was speaking as a representative of the people
of the States, mr jinnah said that he challenged Pandit Nehru’s right to
do so. pandit nehru reiterated that he spoke for the people. He dealt
with the Rulers but would not forget the people.

IT WAS AGREED :

(i) that the draft letter to Residents (circulated at the Meeting) under the
heading “Direct correspondence between States and the Central Govern¬
ment”, should be amended by the Political Adviser as indicated by the Viceroy
during the meeting, and despatched;

(ii) that it would be advantageous if the Government of India were to set up
a new Department, possibly called the “States Department”, to deal with
matters of common concern with the States; that, if this were done, the new
Department should be divided into two sections, ready for the partition of the
country; and that the existing Political Department and the Political Adviser
should give all possible assistance and advice in the formation of this new
Department;

JUNE I947

327

(iii) that the draft letter to Residents, (circulated at the meeting), under the
heading “Formula for Standstill Arrangements on the lapse of Paramountcy”,
should be amended by the Political Adviser as indicated by the Viceroy during
the meeting, and despatched ;

(iv) that the “Draft Standstill Formula’’, (circulated before the meeting),
should be amended by the inclusion, in the Schedule, of a provision to include
matters of common concern not specifically mentioned ;

(v) that the Indian leaders should give further consideration to this “Draft
Standstill Formula”, and inform the Viceroy of any suggestions they might
have in regard to it;

(vi) that there should be a meeting between the Indian leaders and represen¬
tatives of the States (possibly the States Negotiating Committee) to consider
this “Draft Standstill Formula” and any other matters of common concern, on
a date to be decided, probably in July;

(vii) that it would be necessary for all States to send fully accredited repre¬
sentatives to sign this Standstill Formula, when it was finally agreed ;

(viii) that the Political Adviser should empower Residents to continue with
the destruction of ephemeral records and of documents, copies of which are
held in the Political Department;

(ix) that the Political Adviser should apply to the Honourable Member for
Education for the services of experts to assist in the weeding and sorting of the
Crown Representative’s Records; but that there should be no more destruction
of these records until after the transfer of power ;

(x) that records which

(i) contained information regarding the private lives of Rulers and
the internal affairs of States or

(ii) had not been weeded to see whether they contained such information
should be handed over, on the transfer of power, to the United Kingdom High
Commissioner ;

(xi) that the Political Adviser should circulate to Pandit Nehru and Mr
Jinnah copies of the report of the Indian States Enquiry Committee (Financial),
1932, commonly known as the Davidson Committee Report.13

Item 2

THE BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS

Composition

Two alternative suggestions14 were put forward for the Composition of the
Boundary Commissions.

These were:

‘A’ That each Commission should consist of three persons obtained

13 Cmd. 4103.

14 See Nos. 101 and 128.

328

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

through U.N.O., plus three expert assessors from each side of each Par¬
titioned Province; and

‘B’ That each Commission should consist of an independent Chairman
and four other persons, of whom two should be nominated by Congress
and two by the Muslim League.

pandit nehru gave his opinion that suggestion ‘A’ above would involve
considerable delay. The U.N.O. Headquarters would probably have to com¬
municate with each member Government, and a long time would elapse
before a choice could be made. Furthermore, it was possible that the ultimate
choice might not be a very suitable one. With regard to suggestion ‘B’, he
proposed that each of the four persons nominated should be of high judicial
standing.

mr jinnah said that he would frankly have preferred suggestion ‘A’,
but was willing to accept suggestion ‘B\ He had wanted, if possible, to avoid
lawyers. There was always trouble when two or more lawyers got together.

his excellency put forward the suggestion that a person with previous
knowledge of drawing boundaries might possibly be obtained through U.N.O.
and attached to each Commission in an advisory capacity.

IT WAS AGREED *.

(i) that each Boundary Commission should consist of an independent
chairman and four other persons, of whom two should be nominated by
Congress and two by the Muslim League ;

(ii) that all these persons should, if possible, be of high judicial standing;

(iii) that Congress would include a Sikh in the two persons nominated by
them for the Punjab Boundary Commission;

(iv) that Pandit Nehru and Mr Jinnah should send to the Viceroy their
nominees for both Boundary Commissions, as soon as possible;

(v) that the members of each Boundary Commission, when nominated,
should meet together to choose an independent chairman; and that, if they did
not succeed in coming to a decision on this, the choice of chairmen would be
made at a meeting of the Indian Leaders ;

(vi) that the following draft Terms of Reference for the Boundary Com¬
missions should be considered further by the Indian Leaders, and that they
should send in their comments thereon to the Viceroy :

[There follows the text of the Enclosure to No. 158]

Item 3

THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL

pandit nehru stated his opposition to the suggestion, which had been made
by Mr Jinnah,15 that the Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal should be a member
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. He suggested instead that the
three judges of the Federal Court should constitute the Arbitral Tribunal.

JUNE I947

329

MR jinn ah stated his opposition to the use of the Federal Court for this
purpose. He said that he had had enough experience of High Court Judges;
the present lot were particularly poor, in his opinion. There was not a single
judge in India who was “a patch” on the members of the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council. Pandit Nehru’s father had always been a strong champion
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council !

HIS excellency the viceroy suggested that, in view of the opposing
opinions which had been expressed, it would be best for this question to be
further discussed outside the meeting. He pointed out that it would be necessary
for both new Governments to promise to be bound by the decisions of the
Arbitral Tribunal.

IT WAS AGREED :

that Sardar Patel and Mr Liaquat Ah Khan should further consider together
the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal, and send in their agreed recommenda¬
tions to the Viceroy.

Item 4

THE CALCUTTA ENQUIRY

IT WAS AGREED :

that the Viceroy should obtain from Sir Patrick Spens his full views concerning
the suggestion that the Calcutta Enquiry16 should now be wound up, and a
report obtained concerning the work it had so far completed.

Item 5

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE
IT WAS AGREED :

that Sir Eric Mieville should further consult the leaders of Congress and the
Muslim League concerning the preparation of election posters for the N.W.F.P.
referendum.

15 See Nos. 101 and 157. 16 See Vol. VIII, Nos. 206, para. 2, 217 and 223.

Mr Gandhi to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

ff 161-2

NEW DELHI, 13 June 1947

Dear Friend,

Your two letters of 12th instant1 were received last night for which I thank you.
I have sent a letter to Qaide Azam Jinnah of which a copy is enclosed herewith.

Nos. 155 and 156.

1

330

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The condition, precedent to the Qaide Azam accepting my suggestion is
dangerous in its implication. My suggestion is simply what I conveyed to you
in my letter of nth instant.2 “Before proceeding with the referendum you
should invite Qaide Azam Jinnah to proceed to the Frontier Province to woo
the Ministers including Badshah Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgars . . .” I have
added, “Before he goes, no doubt he should be assured a courteous hearing
from them.” The visit, therefore, if it takes place will take place for convincing
and converting the Ministers and Badshah Khan and his Khudai Khidmatgars.
It should in no sense be a propaganda tour. I hope both you and Her Excellency
would have a quiet and cool week end in Simla.

Yours sincerely,

M. K. GANDHI

Enclosure to No. 176
Mr Gandhi to Mr Jinnah

NEW DELHI, 13 June 1947

Dear Qaide Azam,

His Excellency the Viceroy writes saying that 4 you will gladly accept my
suggestion and put the case of Pakistan to the leaders and the people there,
provided I can obtain an undertaking from the Congress that they will not
interfere’.

I do not know what you mean by the undertaking from the Congress that
they will not interfere.

2 See No. 139, para. 2.

177

Mr Jinnah to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

163-4

10 AURANGZEB ROAD, NEW DELHI, 13 June 1947
Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am enclosing herewith Mr. Gandhi’s letter received by me to-day and the
reply I have sent to him immediately.

Yours sincerely,

M. A. JINNAH

JUNE 1947

331

Enclosure to No. 1 77

[There follows a copy of the Enclosure to No. 176]

Mr Jinnah to Mr Gandhi

new delhi, 13 June ig47

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I am in receipt of your letter of 13 th June and I thought it was quite clear what
I meant that the Congress should undertake that they will not interfere with
the people of the Frontier in any way whatsoever.

Yours sincerely,

M. A. JINNAH

178

Giani Kartar Singh to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Sikh Problem, Part 11(a)

NEW DELHI, 13 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I had the honour of an interview with your Excellency early in June.1 During
that interview your Excellency was pleased to suggest that it would be better
if I send to you in writing my suggestions concerning safeguards for the pro¬
tection of Sikh interests in the two parts of the Punjab Province and in other
spheres. It would be premature to say anything at this stage regarding safe¬
guards for the Sikhs in Western Punjab. Due to terrible happenings since
March, 1947, in Rawalpindi and Multan Divisions over a lakh of people have
come over from those areas to the Eastern Punjab. Before the demarcation of
the boundary line nobody can say as to how much of the Sikh population will
remain in the West Punjab. Furthermore, as mentioned by your Excellency in
your Broadcast speech on 3rd June,2 the exact degree of the split of the Sikh
community is yet to be determined by the Boundary Commission and we trust
that under your Excellency’s directive the Boundary Commission will devise
ways and means to maintain the integrity and solidarity of the Sikh com¬
munity in the Eastern Punjab.

In this set up I venture to make a few suggestions as regards safeguards for the
Sikhs in the Eastern Punjab : —

1. In the present constitution the Sikhs have separate representation and
weightage in the Legislature and there is the special responsibility of the

1 See No. 91, para. 26.

2 No. 44.

332

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Governor General and the Governor about the protection of the Minorities.
We wish your Excellency to use your good offices with the Congress to give
adequate weightage to the Sikhs in the new constitution in the Eastern

2. Your Excellency remembers that in the Cabinet Mission Scheme there
was a provision that in the future legislatures at the Centre any question
raising a major communal issue shall require for its decision separate majority
of votes of the members present and voting of the two major communities.
We want a similar safeguard for the protection of Sikh interest in Central
and Provincial Legislatures on any major communal issue affecting the
Sikhs.

3. The third point is the representation of Sikh community in the Legis¬
latures of Provinces other than Eastern Punjab. To take one illustration, in
U.P. the Sikhs are over twice as numerous as the Indian Christians. The
Indian Christians enjoy representation in the Legislatures of U.P., but the
Sikhs go unrepresented.

4. Similarly questions of weighted representation for the Sikhs in the
Central Legislatures will come up before the Constituent Assembly. The
Sikhs trust that in all the matters referred to above, they have the sympathy
of your Excellency.3

Yours sincerely,

KARTAR SINGH

3 On 24 June Commander Nicholls wrote to Giani Kartar Singh informing him that Lord Mount-
batten would be pleased to discuss the points raised in his letter and asking whether he would like
Baldev Singh to be present at the interview. For a note of the interview: see No. 417.

179

Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck to Sir E. Jenkins
Telegram , R/j/i/gi: f 2

IMMEDIATE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT, 1J June I947 , 11.20 am

SECRET

Personal for Governor from C.-in-C. Your 1126-G 10 Jun1 reed 12 Jun.
Quite realize troops have been thin on ground in relation to area and scope of
disturbance but this has been unavoidable owing numerous other commit¬
ments largely in Punjab and difficulties of rail movement. 80 Inf Bde now in
process of taking over responsibility for Gurgaon operations and hope this will
improve matters especially as reinforcements should be available from Delhi

JUNE I947

333

District. Situation seems to be under control at present from military point of
view though we quite realize trouble may increase and spread.

1 No. 137.

180

Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma ( Extract )

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Part 11(a)

SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 13 June 1Q47

NO. 68l

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Many thanks for Your Excellency’s message No. 1419-S of 12th June1 which I
received this morning by the I [ndian] N [ational] A [irlines] Service.

I will deal with Mamdot tomorrow as Your Excellency desires. But I am
sure you will agree that the grievance — if there is one — is not solely a Muslim
grievance and that if the personnel of the expert committees is to be changed
to suit the politicians this must be done in consultation with the leaders of all
parties. The Sikhs, for example, have only one representative among the
official experts — the Legal Remembrancer, who happens at the moment to be a
Sikh.

It would be possible to add to the membership of the committees provided
that the additional members selected for their political views do not supersede
officials senior to them and that I am not expected to upset the whole adminis¬
tration — particularly the law and order side of it — to please the politicians. If
Mamdot accepts, in his conversation with me, the appointment of additional
members, I will endeavour to form the Partition Committee as soon as I can
and will then put the point to all the leaders.

1 No. 169.

334

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

181

Sir O. Caroe (. North-West Frontier Province) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten

of Burma

Rl3jiji7o:ff 46-7

SECRET AND PERSONAL GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PESHAWAR

(No copy kept of this or the enclosure)1 13 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Many thanks for your kind letter of the 12th June.2 I enclose a letter almost
exactly in the terms of Your Excellency's draft. I have written “I have been
considering” at the opening — the other suggested the initiative was not mine —
and have included a slightly smug bit about personal considerations not count¬
ing. I hope these small amendments are suitable: if not, please cut them out in
the published correspondence.3

Possibly things may in the end turn out as you suggested in your first letter :4
in many ways I do not wish to exclude the hope, if it means I can work with
and under you again in rather a happier atmosphere.

Your draft letter5 is in kind and thoughtful terms. I hope it may be dated a
little later than mine to avoid an appearance of too obvious planning, if this is
permissible.

I rather think my wife and I will go for a short time to Kashmir, as there is a
lot of packing to do, and she can’t do it in this weather — and then home about
mid-July. If we can see you and Lady Mountbatten before we leave, we most
certainly shall.

I don’t want you to feel that I am in any way sore about this affair.

Yours sincerely,

o. K. CAROE

P.S. I will expect Lockhart on 24th June, but will say nothing until I know the
letters are published.

Enclosure to No. 181

Sir O. Caroe (. North-West Frontier Province) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten

of Burma

SECRET AND PERSONAL GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PESHAWAR

13 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have been considering my position6 in regard to the vital Referendum which
is shortly to be held in this Province. As you know, allegations have been made
to the effect that I am not impartial, and that I would favour one party at the

JUNE I947

335

expense of the other. I think you realise how unfounded these allegations are,
but I believe there may be wider political considerations which would make it
desirable that, just as the immediate conduct of the Referendum is to be by
entirely independent British military officers of the Indian Army, so the
Governorship of the Province during this time should be in new hands.

It is with the greatest regret that I make this suggestion, for I am devoted to
the NorthWest Frontier Province and its people, and I believe that I could help
them. But in the larger scale personal considerations count as nothing, and, if
my presence7 here causes the slightest suspicion about the conduct of the Ref¬
erendum, I would like to take leave and let someone else hold this post until the
transfer of power.

I, therefore, request that I may be allowed to go on leave for this period of
about two months, and, if this is approved, I suggest that an officiating Gover¬
nor should be appointed as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,
o. K. CAROE

1 Both were in manuscript. 2 No. 154.

3 Sir O. Caroe’s amendments were retained in the correspondence as published. R/3/1/170: f 70.

4 No. 96. 5 i.e. the draft of No. 227.

6 In the draft enclosed in No. 154 this phrase read: ‘I have considered my position . . .’.

7 In the draft the opening passage of the second para, read : ‘It is with greatest regret that I make this
suggestion, because I am devoted to the Province and its people, and I believe that I could help them,
but if my presence here . . .’.

182

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary oj State

PRIVATE AND TOP SECRET INDIA OFFICE, 13 June 1947

Dear Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of 5th June1 enclosing Personal Report No. 8, 2
which I, and I am sure all my colleagues, have read with the keenest interest. I
have also been most interested to read the full records of your crucial meetings
with the Party leaders and with the members of the States’ Negotiating Com¬
mittee.3 It is clear that you achieved a tactical success by at once bringing the
leaders up against the administrative consequences of partition.

2. On receiving your telegram No. 1348-S of 7th June4 about the proposed
Arbitral Tribunal, I at once approached the Lord Chancellor about a possible

3 Nos. 23, 39 and 43. 4 See No. 135, note 1.

1 No. 90.

2 No. 91.

336

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Chairman.5 It seems that, apart from any other consideration, the members of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council are all ruled out on account of age
since 60 ought, I think, to be regarded as an absolute maximum and 55 would
probably be the optimum age. As you doubtless realise, the pressure upon
High Court Judges at the moment is very heavy and the Lord Chancellor can
hold out no hope of one being made available for your purpose. An approach
is, however, being made to Sir Cyril Radclilfe who would, I think, fill the bill
admirably. Apart from his great legal abilities, he has just the right personality
and acquired during the war administrative experience which would be likely
to be of great assistance to him. Of course, he may well feel unable to leave the
Bar, even temporarily, so soon after returning to it, however worthwhile your
job can be made to appear, but there is just a possibility that he might be
attracted by it.

3. I am also having the question of the manning of the Boundary Com¬
missions, raised in your telegram No. 1364-S,6 looked into and the suggestion
about U.N.O. taken up with the Foreign Office. Clearly, the handling of this
Boundary Commission business is going to be of crucial importance. It seems as
if the Sikhs may try to get back at the Boundary Commission stage some of the
ground which they surrendered over the announcement of policy. It is to be
hoped that the staking out of claims, as, for example, for the River Chenab line,
in advance of the findings of the Boundary Commissions will not get out of
hand since, once claims of this kind have been staked out, withdrawal is apt to
prove difficult without loss of face.

4. I was interested in what you say in paragraph 30 of Personal Report No. 8
about Suhrawardy’s plans for the economic development of Eastern Bengal.
It looks as if Eastern Bengal will be a pretty poor show economically and will
require a good deal of development economically if it is to live. I am not
surprised that American businessmen should already be making offers to
Suhrawardy, because it is their tendency in fluid conditions, such as obtain at
present in India, to make such offers, in order to get their foot in on the ground
floor, but without necessarily having any intention of carrying the matter
through. Doubtless the interest which American businessmen are now taking in
India generally will be reflected in a certain number of orders, availability of
dollars permitting. But British exporters have great advantages, flowing from
their long connection with India, the organizations which they maintain there,
and the fact that the Indians are accustomed to their products. They are tending
to mark time at present but I think that we shall find that when they talk
business they will do so seriously. We shall have to consider in due course what
encouragement we should give them to help build up Pakistan economically
to enable it to stand on its feet. I agree that the matter is one for Shone to
handle.

JUNE I947

337

5. I was a little surprised to see Ismay’s telegram to Monteath No. 1354-S
about Caroe.7 When I mentioned the matter to you at Northolt,8 I understood
that the Prime Minister did not wish any action taken in the matter for the time
being. I can quite understand, however, that, if the public agitation for Caroe’s
removal had subsided, you consider it politic in all the circumstances to meet
Congress criticisms on this score and, in particular, to forestall any allegation
that a referendum conducted under the local direction of Caroe would not be
carried out with complete impartiality. I have already obtained the Prime
Minister's consent9 to my approaching the Palace with a view to obtaining the
King’s informal approval and I shall hope to be in a position to telegraph to you
within a day or so. At the same time I feel very strongly, and the Prime Minister
agrees with me in this, that it would be most unwise that Caroe should be
allowed to resume the Governorship of the North West Frontier Province if
he once relinquishes it. Surely such action would be taken as implying that we
ourselves believe that Caroe is prejudiced in favour of the Moslem League and
therefore ought not to be in office during the holding of the referendum.

6. The Prime Minister recently held a meeting10 of the Ministers concerned
to discuss the future of the India and Burma Offices. As a result of the meeting
Sir Edward Bridges was instructed to arrange for the preparation of a detailed
scheme for the establishment of a Commonwealth Relations Office to which
would be assigned, not only the duties at present entrusted to the Dominions
Office, but also the affairs of India, Burma and Ceylon, if those countries, on
attaining their independence, desire to retain a link with the Commonwealth. It
was recognised that it would be possible, and probably necessary, to provide,
within the new Department, for what would in effect be separate sub-depart¬
ments to carry out our special responsibilities to India and possibly Burma,
which for some considerable time would be likely to differ in many ways from
any which we have to exercise in respect of other countries, whether within or
without the Commonwealth.

7. All concerned here have been pressing ahead as fast as possible with the
preparation of the draft Indian Dominions Bill. According to present plans, the
draft Bill will be considered by the India and Burma Committee on Tuesday
morning next, a copy being sent to you before the week-end11 so that you
may have it available by the time that the views of the Committee reach you by
telegram. The time-table in regard to the Bill is of course going to be very tight
indeed and great care will be required at every stage to ensure that nothing is
allowed to upset it.

8. You will remember that at the meeting of the I. Sc B. Committee on

5 No. 135. 6 No. 120. 7 No. 106. 8 Vol. X, No. 417, note 2.

9 No. 148 and its note 5. 10 No. 31. 11 See No. 189.

338

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

22nd May,12 at which you were present, it was agreed that, on the grant of
Dominion status to one or more successor States in India, the offer of facilities
for Indian Officers to attend the Imperial Defence College and the Joint
Services Staff College should be renewed. This matter has been taken up with
the Ministry of Defence13 who have been consulted at the same time about the
possible renewal of the invitation to India to attend the Commonwealth
Advisory Committee on Defence Science and on the subject of the disclosure of
classified information to India. I have asked that these matters should be
approached with the desire to do everything possible to convince Indians of the
advantages to be derived from membership of the Commonwealth.

9. You may care to know that of late we have rather gone out of our way
to keep in close touch with the “Joint Committee on India’ ’ which is a
co-ordinating body for British commercial and industrial organisations with
interests in India. It seemed very desirable to let the Committee feel that they
were being given the opportunity to express their views while the draft Bill was
still in a fairly fluid state and I am glad to say that Stafford Cripps has agreed to
be with me tomorrow when a deputation from the Committee is calling on
me.14

10. I am very glad that it has been possible to obtain the agreement of the
Foreign Office and the Prime Minister to the Government of India’s scheme for
a temporary Indian diplomatic establishment in London to handle India’s
relations with a number of smaller countries in Europe. Krishna Menon was
able to see both McNeil and Bevin on this question when he was over here and
I have just sent a telegram to Nehru conveying H.M.G.’s agreement.15

11. In paragraphs 9 to 12 of your letter of April 24th16 you referred to the
Nagas and to Clow’s pamphlet on “The excluded and partially excluded areas
of Assam”.17 The problem of these areas is very similar to that of the frontier
areas of Burma; and there is some resemblance between the suggestions in
Clow’s pamphlet and the observations in Part III of Chapter III of the report of
the Burma Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry.18 I enclose three copies of
this report, and suggest that you may like to send one to Hydari. The report
would probably also be very useful to the Sub-Committee of the Advisory
Committee of the Constituent Assembly which is dealing with the future
administration of the tribal and excluded areas.

12. Talking of Burma, it now looks very much as if the Burmese are going
to shun the Indian example and decide for complete independence outside the
Commonwealth. Whilst this decision is of course greatly to be regretted, it has
to be recognised that it is probably due to the fact that the Burmese rank and
file are completely ignorant of the meaning of Dominion Status which they
regard as an inferior brand of independence and that the leaders of A.F.P.F.L.,

JUNE I947

339

who probably themselves would prefer that Burma should remain inside the
Commonwealth, do not feel certain enough of their position to give a firm
lead in that direction. Certainly, if the result of their endeavouring to do so was
their own overthrow and the coming into power of the Communists, we
should have still greater cause for regret.

13. I was very glad to hear that Mr. Jagjivan Ram would be visiting this coun¬
try on his way to Geneva and you can rest assured that we will do all we can
to make his visit a success. I shall greatly look forward to meeting him myself.
This week I have seen General Savory, the Nawab of Bahawalpur and Mr.
B. C. Roy.

Yours sincerely,

LISTOWEL

12 Vol. X, No. 517, Minute 5. 13 See L/WS/1/1070.

14 See L/E/8/4123 for a record of this meeting which in fact took place on 13 June.

15 Papers on this subject are on L/P &S/12/4633.

16 Vol. X, No. 210. 17 L/P &J/7/10635.

18 Ibid. Dated 24 April 1947 and published in June 1947 as Cmd. 7138.

183

The Earl of Listowel to Mr Attlee

LIP&JI10I141: ff 173-6

India office, 13 June 1947
Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 89/47

Prime Minister,

Please see the letter1 from the Viceroy of which a copy is attached.

2. In the draft Bill2 which I am circulating for consideration by the India
and Burma Committee on Monday it is provided in Section 5 that there shall
be two appointments of Governor-General, that these may be held by the same
person, and that until another appointment is made the existing Governor-
General shall hold both appointments. Thus, Mountbatten would remain in
office until Hindustan or Pakistan asked for someone else to be appointed.

3 . 1 do not think it would be appropriate for Mountbatten and the Governors
to tender their resignations to The King on the day of the transfer of power. It
is not necessary to elaborate the possibihties ; but unless The King refused to
accept the resignations or there and then re-appointed them there would be
no Governor-General, and no one who could act in that capacity, and every
Executive in India would be headless simultaneously. I appreciate, however,
Mountbatten’s desire that the Indians should feel that whoever is Governor-
General or Governor is publicly known to be so by their own wish. I think

1 No. 79.

2 See No. 191.

340

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

therefore that we should be at pains in the debates on the Bill to make it plain
that all these appointments will be filled in future on the advice of Indians. On
or before the appointed day the Governors might impress upon their Ministries
that if they wish when the appointed day is reached to advise the Crown to
make a new appointment of Governor they are entirely free to do so and that
the present Governors will be only too ready to give way to their new nominee.
The Governor-General might similarly make it plain to those who are most
likely to control the affairs of Hindustan and Pakistan that he is also willing to
withdraw at any time on their request. Suitable publicity could be given to the
fact that this had been done.

4. The Viceroy gave us to understand when he was here that the Congress
had already expressed their willingness that he should continue as Governor-
General.3 If the Muslim League were also willing there would seem to be much
the best prospect of a rapid and peaceful division of functions if Mountbatten
remains as an impartial counciliator who can bring people together and force
common sense upon them. I do not suggest that he should act as arbitrator in
disputes, but there may be occasions on which the Indians, while unable to
agree, will accept something virtually imposed by him, as they have done in
effect over partition and other matters. In short, I think we want the Governor-
General to stay on for a time, but I think if he actually resigned and the Indians
were forced to make a new nomination themselves they might find it difficult
to ask that he should be re-appointed.

5. You will no doubt wish to discuss this subject on the relevant clause of the
Bill at the meeting on Tuesday. I have referred to it in the Memorandum
(I.B.(47)ioo,4 paragraph 4(i)).

LISTOWEL

3 See Vol. X, No. 471, p. 886. 4 No. 190.

184

Major Adeane to Mr Attlee
LjP &JI10I133: f 100

Buckingham palace, 13 June 1^47

Dear Prime Minister,

The King has considered the points raised in your letter of the 12th June,1 which
I laid before His Majesty this morning.

His Majesty entirely agrees with the course which you suggest in paragraph 3
of your letter, in which you propose including a clause in the India Dominions

JUNE I947

341

Bill declaring that the United Kingdom Parliament has given assent to the
omission of “Indiae Imperator” and “Emperor of India” and to the issue of a
Royal Proclamation for this purpose.

The King also approves your suggestion of informing the Prime Minister of
each Dominion of what is proposed, before the India Dominions Bill is
introduced, but His Majesty wishes me to point out that this may well be the
occasion for some of the Dominions to raise the question of further changes in
the Royal Title to conform with their several views on the divisibility of the
Crown. The King hopes that any such discussion may be avoided at the present
time.2

Finally The King agrees with your proposals contained in paragraph 5 for
dealing with the Indian Crown. That is to say that the Crown should be re¬
tained here for the time being on the understanding that it would be available
for use in India on the occasion of a future Royal Visit while India remains in
the Commonwealth.

I am,

Yours sincerely,

M. E. ADEANE

1 No. 164.

2 Mr Attlee acknowledged this letter on 16 June, remarking that in his telegrams to Dominion P.M.s
(see No. 203) he had suggested that discussion of any recommendations for further modifications in
His Majesty’s title could not well be undertaken before the India Bill had been passed. L/P &J/10/133 :
f 101.

185

Viscount Jowitt to the Earl of Listoivel

LlP&Jl7li2500:jf 93-4

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

HOUSE OF LORDS, S.W.I,

13 June 1947

Dear Listowel,

I think I told you that on Wednesday I saw Cyril Radcliffe to sound him about
his willingness to go out to India to fulfil the role which the Viceroy suggested.
I read to him the telegram1 from the Viceroy: I did not read to him your letter
to me :2 but I did warn him that he might have to stay very much longer than
the six months indicated in the telegram.

1 No. 135, note 1.

2 No. 135.

342

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

He came to see me to-day, having thought the matter over in the mean¬
time, to tell me that he was so impressed with the importance of the task that he
was prepared to undertake it, subject to certain considerations which I will
mention.

I want you to understand the position which he occupies at the Bar. I do not
know what his precise income is, but I should think he is making at least
-£60,000 a year and could, without very much difficulty, make much more if it
were worth his while. Further I want you to realise that in my considered
judgment he has in a pre-eminent degree all the qualities that are needed for
this great task which no one else has. And further, if he were to retire from the
Bar definitely he has a strong inducement from the income tax point of view,
for fees paid in respect of earnings at the Bar after retirement are exempt from
both income tax and surtax. For instance, if he were to retire he could collect
all his outstanding fees — probably about -£50,000 — and not incur any obliga¬
tion to pay tax thereon. Yet the circumstances of this offer and the possibility
that he would not be wanted for more than six months make it impossible for
him to retire from the Bar, so that this income tax inducement does not apply
in his case. You will therefore see, if he does go out, that so far as the money
side of the matter is concerned he places us under an immense obligation to him.
I do not think the amount of the salary which he is to receive matters very
much: I should suggest -£5,000 a year as this is the mark of the status he is to
have. But what he does want may be summed up under the three heads —
travel, accommodation and living allowances.

"With regard to travel, arrangements must be made so that his wife and her
boys can from time to time whenever possible come to visit him and the ex¬
pense of this travel must be without cost to him.

Secondly, he must be provided with suitable accommodation in India so
that he and his wife and boys when they join him must be able to live in
comfortable style without expense to him.

Thirdly, living allowances must be paid to him.

These terms may seem considerable, but if you are asking a man in his
position to undertake a job of this nature you must be prepared to do these
things handsomely.

There is one other matter and that concerns the Privy Counsellorship. I
think I told you that I had a word with the Prime Minister about this who
thought it was a good idea and eminently suitable; moreover, it gives him the
requisite status for the important job he is to do. I think we should be able to
tell him that this will be done.

Perhaps you would like to get him to come and see you and talk over these
points, but, if I may say so, for God’s sake — if you want him — don’t hesitate to
make your people agree to the arrangements I have suggested about travel,
accommodation and living expenses. If you want a bargain, bargain about

JUNE I947

343

salary and it may be that he would go out for no salary at all. Anyhow, he says
he does not regard that as important.

Yours,

JOWITT

P.S. I suppose you 11 be discussing everything with Mountbatten.

J

186

Group Captain Stapleton to Sir D. Monteath
L\P&J\io\i2o:f 3

TOP SECRET MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, GREAT GEORGE STREET,

s. w.i, 13 June 1947

Dear Sir David Monteath,

I am writing with reference to my letter (COS. 1462/6) dated 22nd November,
1946,1 concerning the military considerations of a future Treaty with India.

2. At their meeting this morning,2 the Chiefs of Staff referred briefly to a
draft of a Bill3 to make provision for the setting up in India of two independent
Dominions and for other matters consequential or connected with the setting
up thereof.

3 . At first sight, this draft Bill did not appear to conflict with any of our
military requirements. The Chiefs of Staff note that it is not concerned with
details of our military requirements, nor does it provide a “card of re-entry’ ’
enabling us to retain contacts for negotiating our future military requirements.

4. The Chiefs of Staff are anxious that provision should be made for our
military requirements, and they will be grateful to be advised by the India
Office on how negotiations concerning these requirements are to be conducted.

5. The Chiefs of Staff’s views on our military requirements referred to in my
above quoted letter, were set out, you will remember, in General Hollis’ letter
to you (COS. 1213/6) dated 4th October, 1946.4 In addition they wish me to
inform you that they will shortly be reporting to the India/Burma Committee
about the withdrawal of British troops from India.

Yours sincerely,

STAPLETON

1 See Vol. VIII, No. 537, note 3 (the letter was in fact signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon).

2 Not printed. 3 No. 191. 4 Vol. VIII, No. 408.

344

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

187

Chiefs of Staff Committee
Joint Planning Staff. Paper J.P.(4f8y [Final)

LIWSI1I980: ff 74-5
Laccadive Islands

REPORT BY THE JOINT PLANNING STAFF

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.I, 1J June 1947
As instructed1 we have examined the question of the retention of the Laccadive
Islands by H.M.G. in the United Kingdom.

2. These islands which are sparsely inhabited coral strips assume strategic
importance from the air point of view if we find we cannot retain all the
facilities we require in India. In such circumstances they would be essential for
our air reinforcement and transport route to Australia, New Zealand and the
Far East.

3. The Navy have had no requirements in the Laccadive Islands in the past
and do not foresee any in the future. In all the islands there are only open
anchorages which cannot be used during the South-West monsoon.

The Army have no requirements in the islands.

Air Transport Route

4. On the assumption that we cannot use India, the only practicable route to
the Far East is through Ceylon. From Ceylon eastwards we have the facilities
we need assuming that we can continue to rely on the use of the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands which are excluded from the transfer of power to the successor
Indian Governments by the provisions of the draft India Bill.

5. Between Masirah Island and Ceylon, a distance of 1680 miles, present
facilities are inadequate. Firstly, there is an existing gap of 800 miles in the
network of navigational aids. These can be partly closed by putting more
powerful beacons at Masirah and Ceylon, but even then the route could only
be used by our most experienced crews and the margin of safety, even in their
case, would be very small.

Secondly, there is no provision for emergency landings which must be plan¬
ned for on so long a leg.

The same considerations apply to the route between Aden and Ceylon which
may be developed.

6. We can only provide adequate navigational aids and an emergency land¬
ing strip by making use of the Laccadive Islands. Without them regular air

JUNE I947

345

communication to the Far East would be entirely dependent on the continued
and full-co-operation of the Indian authorities.

Conclusion

7. Since we cannot assume that the successor States in India, even if they
remain Dominions, will give us continued and full co-operation in the pro¬
vision of the necessary facilities for the air transport route to the Far East, we
must re-ensure by means of an alternati ve.

The only alternative is the retention of the Laccadive Islands.

We therefore conclude that legislative provision should be made for the
transfer of the Laccadive Islands from the Government of Madras to the
Administration of H.M.G. in the United Kingdom.

Recommendation

8. We recommend that the Chiefs of Staff should submit this paper to the
Minister of Defence as a brief for his use at the Ministerial Meeting on Tuesday,
17th June.

J. F. STEVENS
G. H. MILLS
R. H. BARRY

1 C.O.S. (47)75th Meeting, Item 4, 13 June 1947. L/WS/1/980: ff 76-7.

188

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper 1.8.(47)99

LlP&Jliol8i:ff252-4

International Status of the Indian Dominions

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 13 June 1947
I have already circulated to my colleagues copies of the Viceroy’s telegrams of
9th June, Nos. 13 58— S and 1368-S1 in which the question is raised of the future
international status of the two new Indian Dominions but copies are attached
for convenience of reference. The claim by Pandit Nehru that Hindustan will
automatically succeed to the position of India as an international entity is, of
course, part of a general claim by the Congress Party that the majority of India
which will adhere to the existing Constituent Assembly is the legitimate heir of
the present Government of India in all spheres and that Pakistan is merely a
seceding minority. This claim is, naturally enough, contested by Mr. Jinnah

1 Nos. 115 and 116.

346

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

who seeks to establish, I gather, that what is now being done is the creation of
two new States, neither of which can claim to be the successor of India in the
international sphere and each of which will therefore have to secure recognition
separately as a member of the family of nations.

2. The decision in a matter of this kind does not depend entirely on action
taken by the United Kingdom Government and Parliament, since the position
of the two new Dominions in regard to U.N.O. and other international bodies
must be determined by the recognition accorded to them by the member
States. On the other hand, the form in which our legislation is drafted, though
not necessarily conclusive, would clearly have an important bearing on any
decision reached. It is, therefore, important that the Bill should be framed in
such a way as to lead to the inference that it is desired that the United Nations
should draw.

3. I am advised that Clauses 1 and 2 of the draft Bill2 certainly lead to the
inference that Hindustan (which is to be known as “India”) continues the
international personality of India, and that Pakistan is an off-shoot. If it were
desired to do so, it would be possible to make this even more clear by altering
the language. On the other hand, if it were desired to support the Muslim
League view that two new States are created, then the Bill would have to be
altered and would have to be drawn in a form which clearly leads to that
inference.

4. I think that there is considerable force in the Viceroy’s opinion that far
greater difficulties will be encountered from the Congress Party if their con¬
tention is not accepted than from the Muslim League if we adopt the Congress
Party’s view. Apart from the majority argument and the fact that all the existing
representatives of India in foreign countries and on international bodies have
been nominated by Nehru as External Affairs Member of the Interim Govern¬
ment, there is the further consideration that Hindustan will, at least at the out¬
set, take over the machinery of the Central Government that is concerned with
external relations and will be able to function de facto as the successor Govern¬
ment.

5. Moreover, there can be no doubt that, whichever way the decision goes
between the two points of view, Pakistan will have to establish its claim to
international status and to seek election as a member of U.N.O. and other
international bodies. If it desires representation in foreign countries it will have
to take separate steps to secure the agreement of the Governments concerned
for the exchange of diplomatic and consular representatives. It would seem
therefore that the only result which the establishment of two States would
bring about would be to deprive Hindustan of the right to claim a title to
membership of U.N.O. and other bodies as India’s successor, without thereby

JUNE 1947

347

making it any more certain that Pakistan would secure international recogni¬
tion.

6. If, for example, Hindustan were to establish its title to continue the exis¬
tence of India as an international person by securing the acceptance of a
Hindustan Delegation at the U.N.O. Assembly in September as the represen¬
tative of the former member India, this would not prejudice Pakistan’s right to
apply separately for membership. There might, of course, be difficulties with
the U.S.S.R. on the Security Council and, if it appeared that Pakistan was
intending to remain within the British Commonwealth, this opposition might
be more formidable; but even so I think this is a risk which must be accepted
and I do not think that Pakistan would very greatly improve her chances of
election merely by the fact that she would be applying concurrently with
Hindustan.

7. The Treaty position to which the Viceroy refers in paragraph 6 of his
telegram is rather less simple than he represents it. I understand that the position
is that if Hindustan continues India’s international personality, she will prima
facie inherit all India’s Treaty obligations (save those which can only be carried
out in territory not belonging to Hindustan or under her control) ; whereas, if
two new States are created, the obligations of the former India, in general,
lapse and need to be re-negotiated and only those would automatically remain
which — such as boundary treaties — are essentially and in any event associated
with the territory of one or other of the two new Dominions. While this
would be the legal position, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom
(who will have brought about the change in the situation) would not be relieved
in either case of their political duties towards foreign States to ensure that the
Treaty position is made politically and practically satisfactory. It will still, I am
advised, be incumbent on us, particularly as the new States will continue at
least for a time within the Commonwealth, to see that the Treaty position is
regularised. I feel that we cannot disregard the precedents set when the senior
Dominions established themselves as separate international entities. The steps
to be taken in this regard by or on behalf of the new Governments when they
are established would, however, be less if one of them continues the existence of
India than if two new States were to be created.

8. On balance, the advantage would seem to lie, so far as concerns the inter¬
national position, in adopting the Congress doctrine and accepting Hindustan
as the successor of the former India. (It would be consistent with this and
internationally, no doubt, would somewhat simplify the matter, were Hin¬
dustan to be known, as Congress desire, as “India”; but this, as is evident
enough even in the Bill, entails much opportunity for confusion as to the

2 No. 191.

348

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

meaning of the word “India” in different contexts — and outside the Bill the
opportunities would be multiplied). But I must point out that though the
advantage lies as indicated for purposes of international position, the adoption
of Hindustan as the entity taking the personality of India involves, in relation to
property, a result unfair to Pakistan; in fact, on that basis, Hindustan succeeds
automatically to all property outside India now owned by the Governor-
General of India in Council such as India House in London and the Legation
buildings in Kabul and Katmandu, even though such property has been
acquired or created out of monies contributed pro rata by the Pakistan portions
of the former India. It may be that this result might be mitigated by Orders
passed by the Governor-General under clause 8 of the Bill ; but it might be the
more difficult for him to do so if it were held that, as the continuing personality,
Hindustan had a legal right to the property.

L

189

Mr Turnbull to Mr Abell

70-3

secret India office, 13 June ig47

My dear George,

I am sending you in two consignments by today’s air mail and the next one 20
copies of the draft Bill.1 This has been evolved by the India Office and Parlia¬
mentary Counsel in consultation with some other Departments, where
concerned, and has not been approved in any way by Ministers at present. It
will be taken by the India and Burma Committee on Tuesday, 1 6th June,2 and
we shall telegraph their views to His Excellency as soon as possible thereafter.
We hope that you will receive the Bill more or less simultaneously with the
Committee’s views. The Committee will of course not take any final decision
pending the receipt of H.E.’s views.

I would draw your attention particularly to the extreme secrecy of the clause
about the Andamans. The Committee will consider on Tuesday the question
whether Indian politicians should be consulted on the terms of the Bill as His
Excellency suggested in a recent telegram.3

I enclose a note which explains some of the points on which you may other¬
wise be mystified. It does not purport to be an exhaustive commentary,
because I have been too pushed with the Bill itself and a memorandum4 for
Ministers on the subject.

Yours ever,

FRANK TURNBULL

P.S. i. Since dictating the above Mr. Henderson and the Secretary of State

JUNE 1947

349

have had a discussion with us on the Bill. They thought it should be made clear
to His Excellency that the use of the words “Secretary of State” in certain
passages in the Bill, notably in Section 13, does not mean the Secretary of State
for India will continue in being. “Secretary of State” in Acts of Parliament
means any Secretary of State and will in this case be whatever Secretary of
State is in charge of the relations of H.M.G. with India.

2. Timetable. To get this Bill through this Session we must introduce it on
the 7th July without delay. Time must be allowed at this end for final con¬
sideration by the India and Burma Committee in the light of H.E.’s comments,
redrafting in the light of their consideration, consideration of the final draft,
Cabinet approval, and printing. Assuming that you receive this not later than
Wednesday the 18th, I think we must ask to have His Excellency’s comments
not later than Wednesday the 25th. Comments on detailed points of drafting
might perhaps be received up to Saturday the 28th, but comments on principles
which will have to be considered by Ministers must, I calculate, be circulated to
Ministers on Friday the 27th at latest, for consideration on the 30th June, and
this will only leave us a week for finalising. There may be points on which we
shall have to refer to you again. If you could arrange to let us have His Excel¬
lency’s comments earlier, of course, that will be a great help, especially if they
are major points of principle.

Enclosure to No. 189

NOTE ON THE DRAFT BILL

This note is confined to a brief commentary on points which may not be
readily intelligible at a first reading of the Bill.

1. Section 2(1). This includes in Hindustan all territories under the sover¬
eignty of His Majesty immediately5 before the appointed day except those
included in Pakistan. It should be noted that the Andamans will under Section
16(1) cease to be part of India by Order-in-Council from a date before the
appointed day and are therefore not swept up in Section 2(1).

2. Section 3(2). Assurance is particularly desired from India as to whether
this Section correctly expresses the intention, i.e. are all the representatives
concerned returned by constituencies within the Sylhet District.

3. Sections 2 and 3. It will be noted that, while, in deference to Congress,
Hindustan is entitled India, the same principle has been applied to Bengal and
the Punjab where the Muslim part of the Province continues to be called
Bengal and the Punjab and a new area is called Western Bengal and Western
[? Eastern] Punjab.

1 No. 191. 2 See No. 244; the date should be 17 June. 3 No. 115; see also No. 172.

4 No. 190. 5 Words in italics underlined in original.

350

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

4. Sections 3(3) and 4(2). Is it agreed that decisions on the Boundary Com¬
mission’s report shall be taken by Order of the Governor-General prior to the
appointed day and by agreement between the two Indian Dominions thereafter ?

5. Sections 5(1) and (2). The Dominions Office have represented6 that it is a
sine qua non of Dominion status that there should be a Governor-General
appointed by His Majesty. These two sub-sections enshrine this principle.
Section 5(2) and (3). The intention is that the existing Governor-General should
continue in office until Pakistan or Hindustan ask for a new one. It is not stated
in the Bill because this would not be in accordance with constitutional practice,
but it follows from the description of the two new States as Dominions that
their Governors-General are appointed by the Crown on advice.

6. Section 6(1). See sub-sections 6(6) and 21(3). It is the main conception
underlying this Bill that complete legislative authority is given to the legislatures
of the Dominion as affects their own territory, whereby they can do anything
including amending the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935 which
remain in force and amending the present Act. The present Act, however,
remains valid in its operation as part of the United Kingdom law irrespective of
what the Indian Dominions do. It is this fact which constitutes the essence of the
transfer of power and is the reply to any suggestion that other provisions in the
Bill convey something less than full Dominion status. Section 6(3) removes the
existing provisions about the reservation of legislation for P. [HJM.’s pleasure.

Section 6(4) follows the Statute of Westminster position that the United
Kingdom Parliament legislates only at the request of the Dominion. Section
6(7) is inserted to show that the Constituent Assembly for each Dominion can
constitute a Federation by voluntarily limiting its own power as Legislature
and giving autonomy to the Provincial Legislatures. Meantime the existing
Provincial set-up carries on under the existing Act modified as in Section 9(2).

7. Section 7. These are declaratory provisions. 7(i)(c) was inserted to meet
the position of the Tribal areas on the North-W est Frontier. The Statement of
June 3rd7 says that new agreements will have to be negotiated. Since, however,
the Tribal areas are not within the definition of Pakistan in Section 2(2) and are
yet part of India as defined by the Government of India Act, 193 5, 8 there might
without this sub-section be a claim by the Hindustan Government to exercise
jurisdiction and to be regarded as the successor to the existing agreement with
the Frontier Tribes. It was not thought necessary to say anything about the
North-Eastern tribes because they have not got agreements.

8. Section 8. This is the provision designed to enable the Governor-General
to take steps for the dividing up process both in Provinces and at the Centre.
8 (2) (a) and (c) in particular were intended to provide for the proposed Joint

JUNE I947

351

Delegations.9 Since, however, it is impossible for anything to be forced on
Indians under this Bill unless they are prepared to agree or acquiesce in it, it
was felt to be useless to impose any duties on the Governor-General in this
regard. You will observe that nothing is said as to how powers under this
Section are to be exercised, whether on advice or otherwise. Situations may arise
in which the Governor-General may find it possible and expedient to proceed
without advice, having first ascertained that his decision will be acquiesced in.
It is not in any case constitutional practice to say that the Governor-General acts
on advice for this is an assumption implicit in Dominion status. So long, how¬
ever, as the Governor-General is the same person holding the two appoint¬
ments, he cannot act on conflicting advice and his task presumably will be to
try by conciliation to reconcile the two sides or to thrust upon them a via
media. But in any case it is clear that Orders about matters affecting both States
can only be made either by two Governors-General giving effect to an agree¬
ment of the two Governments, or by a common Governor-General receiving
the same advice from the Executives of both States. I think you will agree that
this Section is the best way of giving effect to the ideas which were discussed in
the Cabinet Committee for Joint Delegations and the joint exercise of authority
over the undivided field of administration. You will observe that this power of
making Orders is conferred only for a period of six months after the appointed
day, that it can be taken away any time after the appointed day by legislation of
either Dominion, and that any particular Order can also be set aside by the law
of either Dominion.

9. Section 9. Particular attention is invited to 9 (2) (a), (b) and (c). Con¬
sideration was given to the possibility of having a schedule showing the
provisions of the Act of 1935 which remain in force. This, however, un¬
fortunately proved an impossible task in the time. It was therefore felt that a
generalised provision of this kind is unavoidable and probably also preferable
provided that it is made clear that there is no common Central Government
over both Indian Dominions and that the discretionary and individual functions
lapse. 9(2)(b) was inserted to meet the point which has constantly been made
that the Secretary of State’s Services cannot be wound up without Parlia¬
mentary authority.

10. Sections 10-12 and 3rd Schedule. These have been worked out by the
sub-Committee appointed under a Committee appointed by the Minister of
Defence to consider the question of the conditions of service of future British
officers in the Indian forces. They are technical and you can take it that the
Service Department experts are behind them.

11. Section 13. This is probably the most contentious. It was felt on the

6 See No. 134. 7 No. 45, para. 17. 8 Government of India Act 1935, Section 311(1).

352

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

official plane that it was essential to include something of this kind if the Bill is
to get through unopposed. We are taking away from the Category I per¬
sonnel,10 referred to in the note on the Treaty which H.E. has, the statutory
protection which they have always enjoyed and we have no assurance to give
them whatever. Moreover, H.M.G. have promised to pay compensation and to
settle the matter of incidence with the Government of India. There is no
statutory authority to get the money without such a clause as this. I daresay,
however, that Ministers will have views about this Section which we shall
telegraph to you.

12. Sections 14-18 require, I think, no particular comment. Section 16 is, of
course, based on the decision taken in the India Committee. The effect of
Section 18 is that the Divorce arrangements under the Indian and Colonial
Divorce Jurisdiction Act will come to an end because under a Dominion set-up
the Lord Chancellor cannot nominate Judges and also because European
Judges will no doubt die out. Pending cases, however, will continue until they
are completed. This is understood to represent the views of the Lord Chan¬
cellor.

13. Section 19. This abolishes the Secretary of State’s Advisers. Sub-section 2
has the effect of transferring the India Office and its contents to the sole control
of the United Kingdom Government.11

14. Section 21 contains important definitions. Please note particularly 21(2)
which governs all references to the “Governor-General” in the Act, 21(3)
which defines the Constituent Assemblies and the definition of the remunera¬
tion and pension in 21(4). 21(6) may appear futile but it is essential for some
special point of Parliamentary procedure.

Could you have carefully checked the first two Schedules.

9 See Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 2, No. 545, No. 546 and No. 553, Minute 7.

10 Paper 1.6.(47)42 of 1 April 1947 on the proposed Treaty with India (L/P &J/10/90: ff 12-42) divided
H.M.G.’s responsibility for outstanding Indian obligations into four categories. Category I, which
was the highest category of responsibility, was defined as covering ‘persons whose contracts are
with the Secretary of State or Secretary of State in Council and were concluded in circumstances which
laid a special moral obligation on H.M.G. , beyond that arising from their general control of Indian
affairs, and who, also, will remain British subjects’. It was suggested that, among others, members
of the Secretary of State’s Services and European Officers of the Indian Army fell into this category.
See No. 190, para. 4(xiii) and its note 8.

11

JUNE I947

353

190

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper LB. (4 7) 100
LlP&Jlioli23:ff 249-5 7

Legislation to Set Up the Indian Dominions and to

Transfer Power

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 1 3 June 1947
I attach for consideration by my colleagues a draft of the proposed India Bill.1
The aim is to introduce the Bill not later than 7th July. Copies have already
been despatched by air to the Viceroy and circulated for comments of all
Departments in Whitehall. The Committee’s views will be communicated to
the Viceroy by telegram. The draft will then be revised in the light of the
Viceroy’s reply and the views of Departments here and submitted for final
approval of the Committee and the Cabinet.

2. The main principle adopted in drafting the Bill has been to confine it to
minimum essentials and to avoid dealing with detail. This was necessary: —

(a) To make it possible to complete the drafting of the Bill in time, and

(b) Because, since there is no means of enforcing the provisions of this
legislation upon Indians, it would be useless and deceptive to include any
detailed provisions except on matters which can be given effect by His
Majesty’s Government themselves or on those on which there is Indian
agreement.

3. The following is a brief summary of the main provisions of the Bill: —

(a) The setting up in India, as from an appointed day, (viz. 1st October, or
such earlier day as may be fixed by the Governor-General) of two Dominions
(Section 1), and the definition of their territories (Section 2) subject to sub¬
sequent adjustment as the result of Boundary Commissions (Section 3(3), 4(2)).

(b) The creation before the appointed day of new Provinces by division of
Bengal and Assam (Section 3) and the Punjab (Section 4).

(c) Provision vesting the executive authority in each of the two Dominions
in His Majesty, and providing for the appointment of Govemors-General by
His Majesty. The possibility that at the outset the same person may hold both
appointments is envisaged.

(d) The conferment upon the legislatures of each of the two Indian Domin¬
ions thus set up of full powers to make laws for that Dominion and the taking

1 Mo. 191.

354

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

from Parliament of power to legislate for them except by request of the
Dominion concerned (Section 6). This legislative power rests in the Constituent
Assembly of each Dominion until other provision is made by the law of that
Dominion. The Constituent Assemblies are defined in Section 15 (4). 2

(e) A declaratory provision (Section 7) that as from “the appointed day”
His Majesty’s Government cease to have responsibility for peace and good
government in any part of India and that the functions of His Majesty in rela¬
tion to Indian States shall cease to be exercisable from that day. The assent of the
United Kingdom Parliament to the change in the Royal Title to delete “Em¬
peror of India” is also recorded.

(f) Power to the Governor-General to make Orders providing as appears to
him to be necessary for dividing powers, rights, property, duties, and liabilities
between the Indian Dominions and between the new Provinces (Section 8).
Similar powers are conferred on the Governors acting in their individual
judgment under sub-section (3) of Section 8. This power is given to the Gover¬
nor-General up to the appointed day and six months thereafter. Orders made
within that period have effect until altered by the law of the Dominion con¬
cerned and either Dominion can at any time after the appointed day legislate
to deprive the Governor-General of this Order-making power.

(g) Certain matters in regard to which, in particular, such orders may make
provision are referred to in Section 8(2) and Sections 10 and 13. Of them the
most important is the division of the Indian Army.

(h) Provision whereby the Government of India Act and all Orders and
rules under it continue in force in each Dominion until altered by a Dominion
law, and all law now applicable to British India and its parts similarly continues
in operation (Section 9). This is subject, however, to the discontinuance, from
the appointed day, of any form of control over either Dominion by His
Majesty’s Government or by any common central Government.

(i) Temporary provisions as to Pensions and Debt (Section 13). Important
questions of policy arise on this on which I comment below.

(j) Provision for the separation of the Andamans from India (Section 16).

(k) Consequential provisions in regard to the military discipline of British
forces remaining in India after the appointed day (Sections 10, 11 and 12 and
3rd Schedule).

(l) Provision withdrawing jurisdiction in Divorce cases under British Law
from Indian Courts (Section 12) and for adaptation of United Kingdom Law.

4. I now refer to the points to which I think my colleagues should give
particular consideration : —

(i) The Position of the Governor-General

Provision has been made (Section 5) for two appointments of Governor-
General, one for each Dominion, to which the same person may 3 be appointed.

JUNE 1947

355

It is also provided that the present Governor-General shall hold both appoint¬
ments until other provision is made. As both Pakistan and India are defined as
independent Dominions, new appointments to the posts of Governor-General
will be made on advice of the respective Dominion authorities, though, in
accordance with our constitutional practice, this is not stated in the Bill. As
regards salary and emoluments of the Governor-General the existing provisions
of the 1935 Act and instruments under it continue in force for both appoint¬
ments until they are altered by the Dominion legislature concerned, subject, of
course, to only one salary being drawn if the same individual holds both
appointments.

The Viceroy has proposed4 that he should tender his resignation to His
Majesty on the appointed day and request Governors of all Provinces to do
likewise, and has asked whether this is in agreement with the wishes of the
King and His Majesty’s Government. It appears to me that the only prospect of
any reasonable or orderly partition of India and transfer of power depends on
the continued presence for a time at least of Lord Mountbatten and of some
at any rate of the British Governors, particularly those in Bengal and the
Punjab. I would have thought, therefore, that neither the Viceroy nor the
Governors should resign on the appointed day but that they should make it
clear to their ministries in Provinces and to the Union leaders at the Centre that
it is open to them at any time to recommend to His Majesty to make a new
appointment, and add that they personally are entirely willing to withdraw at
any time when the Indian leaders desire. In short, I think the onus of securing
resignations should be placed on the Indians.

I should like to know whether my colleagues agree with this view.

(ii) Legislative Authority

Each Dominion will have complete legislative authority in respect of its own
territory and can repeal or amend the present Bill, the Government of India
Act, 1935, Orders-in-Council etc. under it and any existing Indian law. Until
they do so, however, this Bill, and the Government of India Act, so far as not
inconsistent with it, will continue in force, but explicitly shorn of the safe¬
guarding powers that represent British control (Section 9(2)).

(iii) Executive Authority

The Bill makes no provision for setting up Ministries. This is deliberate. It will
be a matter of the de facto position in each Dominion how far the executive
power is exercised by the Governor-General solely on advice. It is considered
undesirable to make any provision to the effect that the Governor-General shall
act on advice because clearly, so long as there is one Governor-General for the
two Dominions, he may receive conflicting advice and our conception of his

2 Section 15 is on legal proceedings and has no sub-section (4). Presumably Section 21(3) was intended.

3 Words in italics underlined in original.

4 No. 79; see also No. 183.

356

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

position is that he will be a conciliator. To prescribe that there shall be Minis¬
tries and that the Governor-General shall act on their advice would greatly
weaken his position. Thus, until the partition of the Central subjects is complete
or until this power is limited by one or other Dominion legislature, the
Governor-General will in practice have a position different from that of a
Dominion Governor-General. For this reason it seems most undesirable to
define his position precisely, and there is good precedent for not doing so since
the constitutions of the Dominions do not prescribe that the Governor-General
must act on advice.

(iv) Order-making power of Governor-General and Governors
These powers are contained in Section 8. They are conferred to enable Pro¬
vinces and the Central administration to be divided speedily in the absence of
any other common authority. It is under this Section (particularly sub-section
8(2)(b) and (c)) that it is contemplated that the Joint Delegations5 will be
brought into existence. It is considered undesirable to make any more specific
provision for them in the Bill because they can only exist and function with the
cooperation of Indians and will be primarily of an administrative nature. It will
be for the Governor-General in exercise of his power under this Section to set
them up and to endeavour to get them to work. We cannot, however, lay a
statutory obligation on him to do something which can only be done with the
cooperation of two other parties. The power to make Orders has been deli¬
berately drawn widely and important matters in regard to which they may be
made have been specified. For the general reasons given above nothing is stated
as to the extent to which it is exercisable on advice.

It will be observed that the power to make Orders is limited to the period
before the appointed day and six months thereafter. After the appointed day the
Orders have effect as part of the law of the Dominion or Dominions concerned
but only until other provision is made by laws of the legislature of that Domin¬
ion. By sub-section (6) of Section 8 either Dominion can by its own law decide
that the power of the Governor-General to make Orders in respect of it shall
cease forthwith.

This Order-making power is a special apparatus for assisting the organisation
of the partition. Each Dominion can prevent it from being used after the
appointed day either in a particular instance or generally. Thus, although this
power is — for so long as it is operative — an infringement of the principle that
the Governor-General has only the powers of a constitutional monarch, it
seems essential to include it in the Bill. The Viceroy has told the Indian leaders
that he is not prepared to act as arbitrator, but none the less some executive
authority, recognised as impartial, must take the initial decisions and action
necessary for dividing Provinces and the Central subjects. Orders by an
authority other than the Dominion Governments will also be needed to give

JUNE I947

357

effect to the decisions of any arbitral board and to decisions of the Joint Dele¬
gations.

(v) Continuance of existing laws

Section 9 provides for this and in particular provides that the Government of
India Act, 1935, the Orders-in-Council and rules and instruments under it
continue in force provided that this shall not be construed as continuing in force
the control of His Majesty’s Government or any common Central Government
over the affairs of either of the Dominions or of any Province or other part
thereof. The possibility was considered of repealing the Government of India
Act and scheduling to the Bill the provisions which remain in force. But this
presents great technical difficulties and could not be done with accuracy in the
time available. It is felt that a general provision such as is provided for in
Section 9 is preferable. At a later date it may be feasible to have a Bill repealing
all provisions of the Government of India Act not required for the purposes of
His Majesty’s Government.

There has been included in this Clause a phrase to cover the winding up of
the Secretary of State’s Services which may be a matter in which Parliament will
display interest and which does require direct Parliamentary authority. It has
also been made clear that the Governor-General and Governors will cease on
the appointed day to have the discretionary and individual judgment functions
which they possess under the 1935 Act.

(vi) Temporary provisions as to pay , compensation , pensions and debt ( Section if)

As the Committee is aware we have been intending to secure by Treaty or in
connection with the settlement of the sterling balances firm assurances from the
new Indian authorities as to the payment of certain classes of outstanding
obligations for which His Majesty’s Government have special responsibility.
We have not been able to do this both for lack of time and also for the con¬
vincing reason that the successor authorities will not come into being until after
this legislation has been passed. At the same time the effect of the Bill is to
withdraw from the Secretary of State the power to meet these obligations from
Indian funds as he has been able to do hitherto and there may well be enquiry in
Parliament as to how that situation is being dealt with and strong criticism
unless there is provision which will ensure that in no circumstances will
individual pensioners and others find themselves without the means of liveli¬
hood on which they rely.

Clause 13 has been drafted primarily as a provision to bridge over a period
during which negotiations on these matters can take place with Indians. It is
operative for six months or such further period as the Secretary of State may
subsequently specify and provides : —

(a) That the existing machinery for paying pensions and for the service of

5 See No. 189, note 9.

358

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

debt in London through the High Commissioner and the Secretary of
State will continue (Section 13(1)).

(b) That the Governor-General may make Orders ensuring that sufficient
monies are available to defray the sums falling to be paid by them.

(c) That payments may be made by the Treasury out of the Consolidated
Fund on the application of the Secretary of State for the purpose of paying
remuneration or pensions to persons who have served the Crown in
India or any principal or interest on any sterling debt which would have
been payable but for this Act out of the revenues of the Governor-
General in Council.

(d) That reimbursements by India of sums so spent may be paid into the
Exchequer.

I commend a Clause on these line to my colleagues for the following reas¬
ons: —

(1) . There is certain to be a strong demand from the Opposition that
assurances should be given to pensioners who are both United Kingdom sub¬
jects and have had contracts with the Secretary of State or His Majesty’s
Government in connection with Indian affairs, and from whom the existing
statutory protection will be withdrawn by the Bill.

(2) . In the matter of compensation and leave pay we have given an assurance
to the personnel concerned that they will get their money, and that His
Majesty’s Government will deal with the matter of incidence of cost in nego¬
tiations with the Indian Government. Compensation will fall due to be paid
during the next six months in most cases, and we must be in a position to pay it.
We must, I consider, give a similar assurance in regard to pensions of the per¬
sons in Category I ( vide I.B.(47)426 pages 7, 10 and 11 and Annex I), though of
course the Government of India have not shown any intention of failing to meet
them.

(3) . There is, I consider, a definite risk that in the process of dividing India
there may be a failure, not through intent, but through maladministration, to
provide the money to the High Commissioner which is required for meeting
these dues. There might for example be a dispute between Pakistan and India
as to the amounts payable by each with the result that something less than the
full amount is actually received. I think we should have power to protect
individuals against hard treatment as a result of such a development.

In general I believe that a clause of this kind is necessary to ensure the passage
of the Bill this session, that it is cast in the most harmless form possible as a
temporary bridging provision to cover a period of negotiations, that it does not
commit us finally as to the categories whose claims we should have to meet in
the event of default by India. We shall of course be pressed in Parliament for a
more precise commitment and I shall submit separately to my colleagues
proposals as to the line to be taken. In the meantime I ask my colleagues to

JUNE 1947

359

agree in principle to the inclusion of this clause, particularly as a provision is in
any case necessary to enable the assurance given by His Majesty’s Government
that compensation will be paid to be implemented. Payment will, of course,
be subject to further discussions with Indians on the question of incidence.

(vii) The Andamans

The Committee took a decision7 to exclude the Andamans from the territories
to be transferred to India. Clause 16 provides for this. It must, however, be
expected that this provision will excite great hostility in India. It is unlikely that
we should secure Indian agreement to a provision of this kind, but in the Bill
we must either include or exclude the Islands in the territories transferred to
India. Without Clause 16 they would pass under Clause 2(1) to the new India.

Urgent consideration is being given by the Ministry of Defence and Colonial
Office to the question of the future administration of the Andamans, which
have in the past not been self-supporting.

(viii) Titles of the new Dominions and Provinces

The names “India” and “Pakistan” have been adopted. The same principle has,
however, been applied in the reverse direction in the Punjab and Bengal. The
Muslim majority areas have been named Punjab and Bengal and the separated
areas Eastern Punjab and Western Bengal. The use of the term ‘India’ for
Hindustan is, however, likely to cause a good deal of confusion.

(ix) Berar

The Committee are aware of this problem. It has been dealt with in Sections
2(1) and 2(3). Sub-section 2(1) excludes Berar which is not under the sovereignty
of His Majesty. Section 2(3) makes it possible for Berar to be incorporated in
India. The matter will have to be negotiated between India and Hyderabad.

(x) Privy Council Appeals from Indian Courts

These will continue, under the Bill, until the Indian Dominions stop them.

(xi) Divorce Jurisdiction

This is a technical matter. At present European Judges of Indian High Courts
nominated by the Lord Chancellor exercise divorce jurisdiction under English
law on behalf of the High Court in this country in respect of United Kingdom
residents in India. Clearly the Act of 1926 which provides these facilities cannot
continue in a Dominion.The Bill proposes (Clause 18) that pending cases should
be concluded and that thereafter these facilities should cease. The matter is
under consideration by the Lord Chancellor and the Clause is subject to revision
in the light of his final views.

(xii) The Armed Forces

Clauses 10-12 and Schedule III of the Bill provide firstly that the Indian Forces
should be divided and, secondly, that any British Forces remaining in India
after the appointed day should be under United Kingdom jurisdiction and
authority for the purposes of their governance and discipline.

6 See No. 189, note 10. 7 See Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 5(a).

360

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(xiii) India Office and Secretary of State's Advisers

Clause 19(1) provides for the abolition of the Secretary of State’s Advisers who
will no longer be required. The effect of Clause 19 (2) (a) is that the India Office
building and its contents will pass to the United Kingdom Government. This
property, which was originally paid for from Indian revenues, at present vests
in His Majesty for the purposes of His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom but cannot be diverted for purposes not connected with the discharge
of the functions of the Crown in relation to India and Burma without the
consent of the Governor-General.8
(xiv) The Appointed Day

This has been fixed as 1st October, or such earlier day as the Governor-General
may appoint. The Committee earlier suggested that the day should be fixed by
Order-in-Council. This would, however, be rather inconsistent with the con¬
ception that this Bill ends control from Whitehall. It seems preferable to give
the power to fix the date to the Governor-General, who may wish to vary it at
the last moment. This is particularly so as it will fall to be exercised in August
or September when The King may be absent from London.

It seems quite clear that the Bill must come into operation in two stages.
In the first place effect must be given to the division of the Punjab and Bengal
prior to the coming into being of the two Dominions each of which will cover
part of these two Provinces. Reasonable time must be allowed for this process.
Secondly, if we decide to separate the Andamans, time is required for the pass¬
ing of an Order-in-Council and for the administrative processes involved. The
Viceroy has said at his Press Conference that power will be transferred by the
15th August.9 I cannot but feel that this is rather unfortunate. I should have
thought a period of six weeks at least would be needed for dividing the Punjab
and Bengal and for preparing the Orders which will be required at the Centre.

8 See Government of India Act 1935, Sections i72(i)(c), (2), (3) and (4).

9 See No. 59, note 12; also No. 53, para. 9.

JUNE 1947

361

191

Draft Indian Dominions Bill1
LIP&JI10I123: f 258-67

SECRET

Indian Dominions Bill

Clause* ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES

1. The Indian Dominions.

2. Territories of the Indian Dominions.

3. Bengal and Assam.

4. The Punjab.

5. Executive government of the Indian Dominions.

6. Legislation for the Indian Dominions.

7. Consequences of the setting up of the Indian Dominions.

8. Orders for bringing this Act into force.

9. Continuance of existing laws of British India.

10. Indian armed forces.

11. British forces in India.

12. Naval forces.

13. Temporary provisions as to pay, compensation, pensions, government
debt, etc.

14. Audit in the United Kingdom.

15. Legal proceedings by and against the Secretary of State.

16. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

17. Aden.

1 8 . Divorce j urisdiction.

19. Consequential provisions.

20. Adaptation of United Kingdom law, etc.

21. Interpretation, etc.

22. Short title.

Schedules :2

First Schedule — Bengal Districts provisionally included in the new
Province of Bengal.

Second Schedule — Districts provisionally included in the new Province
of the Punjab.

Third Schedule — Modifications of Army Act in relation to British
Army in India.

1 Earlier drafts of the Bill will be found on L/P &J/10/123. This, however, was the first submitted to
Ministers.

2 Not printed.

362

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

A.D. 1947.

The Indian
Dominions.

Territories
of the Indian
Dominions.

10 & ii Geo. 6. Indian Dominions.

DRAFT

OF A

BILL

TO

Make provision for the setting up in India of two independent
Dominions and for other matters consequential on or
connected with the setting up thereof.

J^E it enacted by the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, by and
with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled,
and by the authority of the same, as follows : —

1. — (1) As from the appointed day, two independent Domin¬
ions shall be set up in India, to be known respectively as India and
Pakistan.

(2) In this Act, the expression “the appointed day” means
the first day of October, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, or
such earlier date as may be fixed by order of the Governor-
General.

(3) The said Dominions are hereafter in this Act referred to as
“the Indian Dominions”.

2. — (1) The territories of India shall be the territories under
the sovereignty of His Majesty which, immediately before the
appointed day, were included in India, except the territories
which, under subsection (2) of this section, are to be the territories
of Pakistan.

(2) The territories of Pakistan shall be —

(a) the territories which, on the appointed day, are included
in the Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, as constituted
under the two following sections;

(b) the territories which, at the date of the passing of this
Act, are included in the Province of Sind and the Chief
Commissioner’s Province of British Baluchistan; and

(c) if, before the appointed day, the Governor-General
declares that the majority of the valid votes cast in the

JUNE I947

363

referendum which, at the date of the passing of this Act,
is being held in that behalf under his authority in the
North West Frontier Province are in favour of repre¬
sentatives of that Province taking part in the Constituent
Assembly of Pakistan, the territories which, at the date
of the passing of this Act, are included in that Province.

(3) Nothing in this section shall prevent any area being at any
time included in or excluded from either of the Indian Domin¬
ions, so, however, that —

(a) no area not forming part of the territories specified in
subsection (1) or, as the case may be, subsection (2), of
this section shall be included in either Dominion with¬
out the consent of that Dominion; and

(b) no area which forms part of the territories specified in
the said subsection (1) or, as the case may be, the said
subsection (2), or which has after the appointed day
been included in either Dominion, shall be excluded
from that Dominion without the consent of that
Dominion.

3. — (1) As soon as may be and in no event later than the Bengal and
appointed day — Assam.

(a) the Province of Bengal, as constituted under the
Government of India Act, 1935, shall cease to exist; and

( b ) there shall be constituted in lieu thereof two new
Provinces, to be known respectively as Bengal and
Western Bengal.

(2) If, whether before or after the passing of this Act, but
before the date of the constitution of the said new Provinces, the
Governor-General declares that, at a meeting held in that behalf
under his authority of the members of the Assam Provincial
Legislative Assembly whose constituencies are within the
District of Sylhet, the majority of the said members present and
voting at the meeting were in favour of representatives of that
District taking part in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan,
then, at that date —

(a) the Province of Assam, as constituted under the Govern¬
ment of India Act, 1935, shall cease to exist; and

( b ) there shall be constituted in lieu thereof a new Province
to be known as Assam; and

(c) a part of the territories of the Province of Assam which
ceases to exist shall, in accordance with the provisions

364

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The Punjab.

of subsection (3) of this section, form part of the new
Province of Bengal.

(3) The boundaries of the new Provinces aforesaid shall be
such as may be determined, before the appointed day, by order
of the Governor-General, in the light of the relevant reports of
any boundary commissions appointed or to be appointed by him
in that behalf, or as may be determined, on or after the appointed
day, by agreement between the two Indian Dominions in the
light of any such reports, but until the boundaries are so deter¬
mined —

(i a ) the Bengal Districts specified in the First Schedule to
this Act,3 together with, in the event mentioned in
subsection (2) of this section, the Assam District of
Sylhet, shall be treated as the territories which are to be
comprised in the new Province of Bengal ;

(b) the remainder of the territories comprised at the date of
the passing of this Act in the Province of Bengal shall
be treated as the territories which are to be comprised
in the new Province of Western Bengal; and

(c) in the event specified in subsection (2) of this section, the
territories, other than the District of Sylhet, comprised
at the date of the passing of this Act in the Province of
Assam shall be treated as the territories which are to be
comprised in the new Province of Assam.

4. — (1) As soon as may be and in no event later than the
appointed day —

(a) the Province of the Punjab, as constituted under the
Government of India Act, 1935, shall cease to exist; and

(b) there shall be constituted two new Provinces, to be
known respectively as the Punjab and the Eastern

(2) The boundaries of the said new Provinces shall be such as
may be determined, before the appointed day, by order of the
Governor-General, in the light of the relevant reports of any
boundary commissions appointed or to be appointed by him in
that behalf, or as may be determined, on or after the appointed
day, by agreement between the two Indian Dominions in the
light of any such reports, but until the boundaries are so deter¬
mined —

(a) the Districts specified in the Second Schedule to this

JUNE I947

365

Act4 shall be treated as the territories to be comprised in
the new Province of the Punjab; and
(b) the remainder of the territories comprised at the date of
the passing of this Act in the Province of the Punjab
shall be treated as the territories which are to be com¬
prised in the new Province of the Eastern Punjab.

5. — (1) The executive government of each of the Indian
Dominions is vested in His Majesty and shall be administered
by a Governor-General as His representative.

(2) The Governor-General of each of the Indian Dominions Executive

shall be appointed by His Majesty: °

Provided that, unless and until another appointment is made, Dommions-
the person who, immediately before the appointed day, is
Governor-General of India within the meaning of the Govern¬
ment of India Act, 1935, shall, as from the appointed day,
become the Governor-General of each of the Indian Dominions.

(3) Until other provision is made by the law of the Legislature
of the Dominion the Governor-General of each of the Indian
Dominions shall receive the same emoluments and, as nearly as
may be, shall have the same provision made for him for enabling
him to discharge conveniently and with dignity the duties of
his office, as was enjoyed by the Governor-General of India
within the meaning of the Government of India Act, 1935,
immediately before the appointed day :

Provided that, where the same person is Governor-General of
both of the Indian Dominions, he shall not, by virtue of this
subsection, be entitled to receive greater emoluments or to have
greater provision made for him for enabling him to discharge the
duties of his office than he would have been entitled to receive
or have made for him if he had been Governor-General of one
Dominion only.

6. — (1) The Legislature of each of the Indian Dominions Legislation
shall have full power to make laws for that Dominion, including Dominions,
laws having extra-territorial operation.

(2) No law and no provision of any law made by the Legisla¬
ture of either of the Indian Dominions shall be void or inoperative
on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to
the provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament of

3 The First Schedule listed the Muslim majority districts of Bengal (see Appendix to No. 45).

4 The Second Schedule listed the Muslim majority districts of the Punjab (see ibid).

366

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made
under any such Act, and the powers of the Legislature of each
Dominion include the power to repeal or amend any such Act,
order, rule or regulation in so far as it is part of the law of the
Dominion.

(3) The Governor-General of each of the Indian Dominions
shall have full power to assent in His Majesty's name to any law
of the Legislature of that Dominion and so much of any Act as
relates to the disallowance of laws by His Majesty or the reserva¬
tion of laws for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure thereon
or the suspension of the operation of laws until the signification
of His Majesty’s pleasure thereon shall not apply to laws of the
Legislature of either of the Indian Dominions.

(4) No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed on or
after the appointed day shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to
either of the Indian Dominions as part of the law of that Domin¬
ion unless it is expressly declared in that Act that the Dominion
has requested and consented to the passing thereof.

(5) No Order in Council made on or after the appointed day
under any Act passed before the appointed day, and no order,
rule or other instrument made on or after the appointed day
under any such Act by any United Kingdom Minister or other
authority, shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to either of the
Indian Dominions as part of the law of that Dominion.

(6) The power referred to in subsection (1) of this section
shall, until other provision is made by the law of the Dominion,
be exercised by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion,
and references in this Act to the Legislature of an Indian
Dominion shall be construed accordingly.

(7) The power referred to in subsection (1) of this section
extends to the making of laws limiting for the future the powers
of the Legislature of the Dominion.

Consequences
of the setting
up of the
Indian
Dominions.

7. — (1) As from the appointed day —

(< a ) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall
have no responsibility as respects the peace and good
government of any of the territories which, imme¬
diately before that day, were included in India ;

(h) the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States shall
cease, and the functions theretofore exercisable by Him
with respect to the Indian States, and any powers,
authority or jurisdiction theretofore exercisable by

JUNE I947

367

Him in the Indian States, being functions, powers,
authority or jurisdiction incident to or flowing from
that suzerainty, shall cease to be exercisable; and

(c) any powers, authority or jurisdiction which, at the date
of the passing of this Act, have become exercisable by
His Majesty in the tribal areas by grant, usage, sufferance
or otherwise shall lapse.

(2) The assent of the Parliament of the United Kingdom is
hereby given to the omission from the Royal Style and Titles
of the words “Indiae Imperator” and the words “Emperor of
India” and to the issue by His Majesty for that purpose of His
Royal Proclamation under the Great Seal of the Realm.

8. — (1) The Governor-General shall by order make such
provision as appears to him to be necessary or expedient for
bringing this Act into effective operation, for dividing between
the Indian Dominions, and the new Provinces to be constituted
under this Act, the powers, rights, properties, duties and liabilities
of the Governor-General in Council or, as the case may be, of the
relevant Provinces which under this Act are to cease to exist,
and for removing difficulties arising in connection with the
transition from the provisions of the Government of India Act,
1935, to the provisions of this Act.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of
subsection (1) of this section, the provision to be made by any
such orders may include —

(a) provision for enabling functions to be performed,
property held, powers and rights exercised, duties
performed and liabilities discharged, jointly on behalf
of the two Indian Dominions after the appointed day;

(b) provision for enabling functions to be performed,
property held, powers and rights exercised, duties
performed and liabilities discharged, jointly on behalf
of any two of the new Provinces constituted under this
Act after the constitution thereof;

(c) provision for enabling the government of either of the
Indian Dominions to be carried on during any period
elapsing between the appointed day and the coming
into force of provision in that behalf made by the laws
of the Legislature of the Dominion in question;

(d) provision for enabling the Constituent Assemblies, or
either of them, to make laws before the appointed day,

Orders
for bringing
this Act
into force.

368

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

either subject to limitations or without limitations, and
for enabling agreements to be entered into, and other
acts done, on behalf of either of the Indian Dominions
before the appointed day;

(e) provision as to the Reserve Bank of India, and, in
particular, as to the reserves thereof;

(/) provision for modifying any Act or law for the time
being in force and, in particular, and without prejudice
to the generality of the preceding words, provision for
modifying the application of the Government of India
Act, 1935, in relation to the new Provinces constituted
under this Act; and

(<?) provision for varying the constitution, powers or juris¬
diction of any Legislature, court or other authority and
for creating new Legislatures, courts or other authori¬
ties.

(3) The powers conferred by this section on the Governor-
General shall, in relation to their respective Provinces, be
exercisable also by the Governors of the Provinces which, under
this Act, are to cease to exist; and those powers shall, for the
purposes of the Government of India Act, 1935, be deemed to
be matters as respects which the Governors are, under that Act,
to exercise their individual judgment.

(4) This section shall be deemed to have had effect as from the
third day of June, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and any
Order of the Governor-General or any Governor made on or
after that date as to any matter shall have effect accordingly, and
any Order made under this section may be made so as to be
retrospective to any date not earlier than the said third day of
June:

Provided that no person shall be deemed to be guilty of an
offence by reason of so much of any such order as makes any
provision thereof retrospective to any date before the making
thereof.

(5) Any orders made under this section, whether before or
after the appointed day, shall have effect —

(a) up to the appointed day, in British India;

(b) on and after the appointed day, in the Dominion or
Dominions concerned; and

(c) outside British India, or as the case may be, outside the
Indian Dominion or Indian Dominions concerned, to
such extent, whether before, on or after the appointed

JUNE 1947

369

day, as a law of the Legislature of the Dominion or
Dominions concerned would have on or after the
appointed day,

but shall, as respects each of the Dominions, have effect only
until other provision is made by law of the Legislature of that
Dominion.

(6) No order shall be made under this section, by the Governor
of any Province, after his Province has ceased to exist, or, by the
Governor-General, after six months from the appointed day or
such earlier date as may be determined, in the case of either
Dominion, by any law of the Legislature of that Dominion.

9. — (1) The law of British India and of the several parts thereof Continuance
existing immediately before the appointed day shall, so far as °a^sxlQfins
applicable and with the necessary adaptations, continue as the British India,
law of each of the Indian Dominions and the several parts thereof
until other provision is made by laws of the Legislature of that
Dominion or by any other legislature or other authority having
power in that behalf.

(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section extend to
the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the
Orders in Council, rules and other instruments made thereunder,
so, however, that —

(a) nothing in this section shall be construed as continuing
in force on or after the appointed day any form of
control by His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom, or by any common central government, over
the affairs of either of the Indian Dominions or of any
Province or part thereof, or any discretionary control
of the Governor-General over the affairs of any
Pro vince ;

(b) without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of
paragraph (a) of this subsection, nothing in this section
shall be construed as continuing in force on or after the
appointed day the provisions of the Government of
India Act, 1935, relating to appointments to the civil
services of, and civil posts under, the Crown in India
by the Secretary of State or the provisions of that Act
relating to the reservation of posts ;

(c) so much of that Act as requires the Governor to act in
his discretion or exercise his individual judgment as

370

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Indian

armed forces.

Temporary

provisions

as to pay,

compensation,

pensions,

government

debt, etc.

respects any matter shall cease to have effect as from the
appointed day; and

(d) as from the appointed day, no Provincial Bill shall be
reserved under that Act and no Provincial Act shall be
disallowed by His Majesty thereunder.

(3) The provisions of this section shall have effect subject to
any other express provision of this Act and subject also to any
orders made under the last preceding section.

10. — (1) The orders to be made by the Governor-General
under the preceding provisions of this Act shall make provision
for the division of the Indian armed forces of His Majesty between
the Indian Dominions, and for the governance of those forces
until the division is completed.

[Clauses 10(2), 11 and 12, regarding the governance as from the
appointed day of members of the British Armed Forces serving
with the Indian Armed Forces, of British Forces in India, and of
Naval Forces, not printed.]

13. — (1) The Secretary of State and the High Commissioner
are hereby authorised, during the period specified in subsection
(3) of this section, to perform, between them, on behalf of
whatever government or governments may ultimately be found
to be concerned, the functions —

(a) as respects the paying of remuneration, compensation
and pensions to and in respect of persons who have
served the Crown in or in connection with the affairs
of India before the appointed day; and
( h ) as respects the management of, and the making of pay¬
ments in respect of, government debt; and
(c) as respects the meeting of claims on the Governor-
General in Council or any Provincial Government,
which they were, between them, performing up to the appointed
day, and the matters for which provision under this Act may be
made by orders of the Governor-General shall include the secur¬
ing that there are at all times in the hands of the Secretary of State
and the High Commissioner sufficient monies to enable them to
defray the sums falling to be paid by them in the exercise of those
functions and the expenses respectively incurred by them in the
exercise thereof, including, in the case of the High Commissioner,
his remuneration and that of his staff.

JUNE 1947

371

(2) During the period specified in subsection (3) of this section,
there shall be issued out of the Consolidated Fund of the United
Kingdom or the growing produce thereof such sums, if any, as
the Treasury may direct on the application of the Secretary of
State for the purpose of paying —

(a) any remuneration, compensation or pension to or in
respect of any person who, before the appointed day,
has served the Crown in India, or in connection with the
affairs of India;

(b) any principal of or interest on any debt the interest
whereon is payable in sterling, being interest which,
but for the provisions of this Act, would have fallen to
have been paid by the Secretary of State out of the
revenues of the Governor-General in Council.

(3) The period referred to in subsections (1) and (2) of this
section is the period of six months beginning with the appointed
day:

Provided that if the Secretary of State is satisfied that insuffi¬
cient time has elapsed for the making and carrying into effect
of other arrangements with the Governments of the Indian
Dominions as to the matters dealt with in those subsections, he
may from time to time by order extend the said period as respects
the said subsections or any provisions thereof, for such further
period as may be specified in his order.

(4) Any sums issued from the Consolidated Fund under
subsection (2) of this section shall be repaid to the Exchequer
out of moneys provided by Parliament.

(5) Any sums received from the Indian Dominions in respect
of any money issued from the Consolidated Fund under sub¬
section (2) of this section or in respect of the expenses of the
Secretary of State in performing functions on behalf of the Indian
Dominions or either of them shall be paid into the Exchequer.

[Clauses 14 and 15, regarding the functions of the Auditor of
Indian Home Accounts and Legal proceedings by and against the
Secretary of State on and after the appointed day, not printed.]

16. — (1) On such date as His Majesty may by Order in Council The Andaman
fix, being a date before the appointed day, the Andaman and islands.
Nicobar Islands (in this section referred to as ‘‘the Islands”)
shall cease to be part of India, and references in this Act to
India and British India shall be construed accordingly.

372

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Consequential

provisions.

Interpretation,

etc.

(2) His Majesty may by Order in Council make such provision
as appear to Him to be necessary or expedient in view of the
change effected by this section, being provision —

(1 a ) for determining the laws which, on and after the date
fixed under this section, are (subject to amendment or
repeal by any competent legislature or authority) to
remain valid as laws of the Islands, notwithstanding
the said change;

(b) for adapting or modifying any such laws as aforesaid,
and any other laws in force at the date of the passing
of this Act relating or referring to the Islands ;

(r) for dealing with incidental, supplementary or conse¬
quential matters.

(3) The British Settlements Acts, 1887 and 1945 (which
authorise His Majesty to make laws and establish institutions
for British Settlements as defined in those Acts) shall apply in
relation to the Islands as if they were a British Settlement as so
defined.

[Clauses 17 and 18, regarding Aden and Divorce jurisdiction,
not printed.]

19. — (1) As from the appointed day, the Secretary of State
shall not have any such advisers as are provided for by section
two hundred and seventy-eight of the Government of India
Act, 1935, and that section, and any provision of that Act which
requires the Secretary of State to obtain the concurrence of his
advisers, is hereby repealed as from that day.

(2) As from the appointed day —

(a) so much of any enactment as requires the consent of the
Governor-General in Council or any other authority in
India to the doing of any act done for the purposes of
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom
shall cease to have effect ; and

(b) so much of any enactment as requires the approval of
His Majesty in Council to any rules of court shall not
apply to any court in either of the Indian Dominions.

[Clause 20, regarding Adaptation of United Kingdom law, not
printed.]

21. — (1) References in this Act to the Governor-General shall,
in relation to any order to be made or other act done on or after
the appointed day, be construed —

JUNE 1947

373

(a) where the order or other act concerns one only of the
Indian Dominions, as references to the Governor-
General of that Dominion;

(b) where the order or other act concerns both of the Indian
Dominions and the same person is the Governor-
General of both those Dominions, as references to that
person; and

(c) in any other case, as references to the Governors-
General of the Indian Dominions, acting jointly.

(2) References in this Act to the Governor-General shall, in
relation to any order to be made or other act done before the
appointed day, be construed as references to the Governor-
General of India within the meaning of the Government of India
Act, 1935, and so much of that or any other Act as requires
references to the Governor-General to be construed as references
to the Governor-General in Council shall not apply to references
to the Governor-General in this Act.

(3) References in this Act to the Constituent Assembly of a
Dominion shall be construed as references —

(a) in relation to India, to the Constituent Assembly, the
first sitting whereof was held on the day of
December, nineteen hundred and forty-six, modified —

(i) by the exclusion of the members representing
Bengal, the Punjab, Sind and British Baluchistan;
and

(ii) if and so soon as it appears that the North West
Frontier Province will form part of Pakistan, by the
exclusion of the members representing that
Province; and

(iii) if and so soon as it appears that the Province of
Assam constituted under the Government of India
Act, 1935 is to cease to exist under this Act, by the
exclusion of the members representing that
Province; and

(iv) by the inclusion of members representing Western
Bengal, the Eastern Punjab and, if there is to be
such a Province, the new Province of Assam.

(b) in relation to Pakistan, to the Assembly set up or in
process of being set up at the date of the passing of
this Act by the authority of the Governor-General as
the Constituent Assembly for Pakistan:

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as

374

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

affecting the extent to which representatives of the Indian States
take part in either of the said Assemblies.

(4) In this Act —

“remuneration” includes leave pay, allowances and the cost
of any privileges or facilities provided in kind ;

“pension” means, in reference to any person, a pension,
whether contributory or not, of any kind whatsoever
payable to or in respect of that person, and includes
retired pay so payable, a gratuity so payable and any
sum or sums so payable by way of the return, with or
without interest thereon or other additions thereto, of
subscriptions to a provident fund ;

“Indian Forces” includes all His Majesty’s Indian Forces
existing before the appointed day and also any forces
of either of the Indian Dominions.

(5) Any power conferred by this Act to make any Order in
Council or order includes power to revoke or vary any Order in
Council or order previously made in the exercise of that power.

(6) Any sums falling to be paid by reason of the passing of
this Act out of any revenues of India shall be paid out of those
revenues.

Short title.

22. This Act may be cited as the Indian Dominions Act, 1947.

JUNE I947

375

192

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper I.B .{47)101
L/P &J 1 10 1 Si : ff 25 7-8

Assumption of International Obligations by
the Successor Authorities
memorandum by the secretary OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 13 June 1947
In his memorandum I.B.(47)42I on the content of the Treaty with India
relating to matters arising out of the transfer of power, my predecessor pro¬
posed, after full consultation with Foreign Office experts, that we should seek a
specific undertaking from the new Indian authorities by Treaty that they will
accept and observe all Treaties with foreign States concluded in the name of
the Crown or of the Government of the United Kingdom which can only be
fulfilled in India or only wholly fulfilled if India observes them. The Com¬
mittee2 felt that it would be inadvisable to include any general provision on
this matter in the Treaty and decided that when it was publicly announced how
the transfer of responsibilities in India would take place His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment should notify the foreign States with which they had Treaties which
could only be fulfilled by virtue of their authority in India that in the new
circumstances they could no longer be responsible for the performance of such
obligations under the Treaties as could only be fulfilled by the authorities in
India. The Committee felt that this notification should in itself be adequate
protection against claims by foreign governments on His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment.

2. I annex a letter3 I have received from the Foreign Secretary. In this he
represents that the view advanced by my predecessor was based on the advice
of the Legal Adviser at the Foreign Office and that the conclusion reached by
the Committee, which conflicts with that advice, was taken in the absence of
any Foreign Office representative. He urges, therefore, that this decision should
be reconsidered since the Foreign Office consider that, without such a Treaty
undertaking, diplomatic claims and political difficulties of a grave character
are likely to arise for His Majesty’s Government.

3. The meeting of the Committee at which the decision in question was
taken took place before the Viceroy’s visit. Much has happened since to change

1 Dated 1 April 1947. L/P&J/10/90: fF 12-42.

2 Vol. X, No. 288, Minute 2(b), 2 May 1947.

3 No. 52.

376

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

the situation. We cannot now hope to conclude any Treaty with the new
Indian authorities before the introduction of legislation. The options will not
have been exercised until the end of June and the Pakistan Constituent Assem¬
bly can hardly begin to function until the result of the referendum in N.W.F.P.
is known early in August. Until that time, therefore, there will be no one to
negotiate with in respect of at any rate one of the two States. We might
perhaps endeavour to hold negotiations with representatives of the two Con¬
stituent Assemblies during August in the hope of getting an agreement before
the proposed Bill comes into operation. But this may be difficult if the sterling
balance conversations are postponed for a considerable period as now seems
likely, since some of the most important matters to be discussed in Treaty
negotiations tie up with the sterling balances.

4. Therefore it seems unlikely that we could in any case secure a Treaty
provision of the kind the Foreign Secretary wants before the transfer of power.
The only alternative is to try and secure some assurance from the existing
Interim Government on behalf of both the future States in the sense desired.
There are already some Treaty matters in regard to which we requested the
Viceroy to seek such an assurance, e.g. the service conditions of British person¬
nel in subordinate Services. We could ask the Viceroy to seek a formal assurance
from the Interim Government on this question of the Treaties as well.

5. The main reason why the Committee rejected the Foreign Office advice
on this matter was, I think, that they felt that if the Indians were asked to accept
liabilities incurred by us under Treaty, vis-a-vis foreign powers, they would ask
why we should contend that it is not possible to transfer to them our rights and
obligations under the Treaties with Indian States — which we have always
declined to do. There is, of course, a clear distinction to be drawn between these
two classes of Treaty. The international Treaties were concluded, after negotia¬
tions, by voluntary agreement between sovereign States; they are subject to
interpretation, in the last resort by an international law; and they are legally
terminable — save where the instruments themselves provide for denunciation
by one party — only by agreement between the parties. On the other hand none
of the Indian States have ever held international status. Nearly all of them were
subordinate or tributary in pre-British times and some were created by us. All
of them passed under British suzerainty and the rights and obligations existing
between us and them are not of a like nature to the provisions of treaties
between sovereign states. I feel, therefore, that possibly we gave too much
weight to this consideration and I should be glad myself if the matter could be
reconsidered on the lines that the Foreign Secretary desires.

L

JUNE 1947

377

193

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper I. B. (47) 102
L/P &Jli°li35: ff 31-2

Question Whether the Draft Bill Should Be Shown to

the Indian Leaders

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 13 June 1947
The Viceroy has urged in telegram 13 58— S of 9th June1 that the party leaders
should be shown the draft Bill in accordance with Pandit Nehru’s request in his
letter of the 7th (telegram 1368-S).2 1 pointed out to the Viceroy in my telegram
74963 that opinion in the Committee had been against any consultation with
Indian leaders on the terms of the Bill and said that I feared that to show it to
them might give rise to controversy which would prevent the Bill passing this
Session. The Viceroy in telegram 142 i-S of the 13 th June4 says that he considers
it absolutely essential that the leaders should be shown the draft Bill and that
he has undertaken to support their strongly expressed desire to be allowed to
do so. He thinks that unless the draft is very different “from what we all
expect”, there is no reason at all why there should be any long disputes.

2. We are working on the basis that the Bill should be introduced not later
than the 7th July. This would allow three (possibly four) weeks for its passage in
both Houses. I do not think that this is more than a bare allowance for a Bill
of this importance even though we have an assurance from the Opposition that
they will, if it gives effect to an agreement among Indians, assist in securing its
passage. The draft now before the Committee was despatched to the Viceroy
by air mail on the 13 th and should reach him more or less simultaneously with
the Committee’s views upon it on June 18 th. If we give the Viceroy a week in
which to make his comments we shall then have 10 days in which to settle the
final form of it, (which may involve further correspondence with the Viceroy)
to redraft in the light of these decisions, and to submit the Bill to the Cabinet. I
do not think this is any too much time. I very much fear that if we introduce
into this programme the submission of the draft to Indian leaders we may, in
spite of what the Viceroy says, get involved in a controversy which would
delay the introduction of the Bill seriously. It is quite likely that Congress
and the Muslim League would raise conflicting points.

3. A further important consideration is that the text contains the clause5
about the transfer of the Andamans to our control, before “the appointed day”;

1 No. 115. 2 No. 116. 3 No. 138. 4 No. 172. 5 No. 191, clause 16.

378

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

whereas in his telegram No. 1423-S of 13 th June6 the Viceroy expresses himself
as strongly averse from raising this matter at all at this stage, still more in such a
definite way as this clause does; and proposes to leave it over as a matter to be
negotiated with the relevant Dominion when created.

4. I have considered the possibility of having a memorandum prepared which
could be shown to the Indian leaders giving a summary of the Bill. I think,
however, that this would be dangerous as the Bill is intricate and a wrong
impression might easily be conveyed by a summary. We might then be faced
with charges of bad faith when the Bill is published which might be very
embarrassing to us during the proceedings in Parliament.

5. At the same time I feel that if we adopt an entirely non-possumus attitude
towards the Indian leaders in this matter we run the risk of getting into diffi¬
culties at a later and therefore more embarrassing stage, namely, after the Bill
has been introduced and published. On this account, and having regard to the
undertaking which the Viceroy has already given to the Indian leaders, I feel
that, as soon as the Bill has been finally approved by the India and Burma
Committee (in the light of any comments the Viceroy may have to make upon
it), the Viceroy should be authorised to tell the Indian leaders orally what the
main provisions of the Bill will be.

L

6 No. 174.

194

Sir D. Monteath to Lord Ismay
Telegram , L/P &Jlio/8i : ff 28g-gi

immediate India office, 13 June ig4y , g pm

secret Received: 14 June , 8.30 am

No. 7668. Your telegram 13th June 1416-S.1 It was intended that you should
show very confidential second paragraph in my 752 12 to His Excellency, but I
think that when the draft Bill is examined it will be recognised that too much
has been read into my attempt to explain the features in this Bill, which though
not inconsistent with Dominion constitution forms, are special owing to the
special nature of the transitional problem to be faced. There is no repeat no
reservation of power to G.G. personally or in discretion or in individual
judgment and no arbitral functions are assigned to him.

2. As is normal in Dominion constitution, executive power of each new
Indian Dominion is vested in His Majesty to be administered by a Governor-

JUNE I947

379

General.3 In the Dominions this executive authority is exercised on the advice of
Ministers, but the Constitution Act does not actually say so. That is a matter of
constitutional practice. In the Bill equally, it is not said whether the Governor
will exercise executive authority on advice or otherwise.

3 . A special feature of this Bill is provision enabling Governor-General by
order to make such provision as appears to him to be necessary or expedient
for a variety of purposes necessary in order to bring the Act into force.4 These
orders would be made by the Governor-General in the exercise of the executive
authority of the Dominion, but following the normal forms it is not stated
whether they will be made on advice or otherwise. Many of these matters
concerned with the division of assets, liabilities and functions between the two
new Dominions are matters on which the Governor-General of one Dominion
may receive different advice from the Governor-General of the other. The Bill
provides that for a time it shall be permissible, if acceptable by the authorities
of the two new Dominions, that one person shall function as Governor-General
for both,5 in which case that person would be liable to receive from one
Dominion authority advice different from that of the other. Executive orders
will however have to be made in order that difficulties may be overcome and
the Governor-General will have to issue the orders whether they are or not
wholly consistent with the advice tendered by one or other Dominion autho¬
rity.

4. In ordinary Dominion circumstances the Governor-General does not act or
take the initiative to action unless and until advised by Ministers. In the peculiar
Indian conditions confronting us it will be necessary, in order to overcome
difficulties in the way of bringing the Act into operation, for the Governor-
General to take the initiative in many instances, and he will, in fact, do what is
stated in the first sentence of your paragraph 5 — guide and advise and use his
influence to reach agreement, (or if not agreement by both, agreement by one
and acquiescence by the other) which if reached will amount to advice on which
he will act.

5. The last two words of my 7521 were intended to refer to the arbitral
tribunal to whose award effect would need to be given by orders made by the
Governor-General. But evidently inasmuch as the matters on which an arbitral
award was required were matters on which the Governor-General had not
earlier been able to proceed in accordance with advice tendered to him by
Ministers, these orders of the Governor-General giving effect to the award of
the arbitral tribunal will be orders made otherwise than “on advice .

6. It is in the practical application of the provisions of the Bill that the per-

1 No. 167. 2 No. 149. 3 No. 191, clause 5.

4 Ibid., clause 8. 5 Ibid., clause 5(2).

380

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

sonal activities of the Governor-General will differ from those of Governor-
General at the head of a fully established and normally working Dominion, and
it was to this fact that my warning was directed rather than to any difference
appearing on the face of the Bill between its provisions6 and those of an ordinary
Dominion Constitution Act.

6 ‘provisions’ deciphered as ‘centre’.

195

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P EJ/io/ny: ff ig8-g

immediate India office, 13 June 1947, 10 pm

secret Received: 14 June , 6 am

No. 7673. Your telegram No. 1364- S of June 9th.1 Boundary Commissions.

Following are my views after consulting Foreign Office with special ref-
ference to your paragraph 3 .

2. Difficulties regarding reference to U.N.O. Security Council were pointed
out in Paragraph 1 (i) of my telegram No. 7251 of June 4th.2 Reference to
U.N.O. General Assembly in matter of this kind is not recommended by
Foreign Office; and in any case I understand that Boundary Commissions could
only be constituted formally by U.N.O. by resolution of annual Assembly or
by special meeting called for this purpose. I am advised also that Secretary
General could not appoint Boundary Commissions on his own initiative. He
might be asked to suggest names from international field, but in this event his
choice might well be governed by considerations other than that of obtaining
best men. Latter difficulty would indeed apply in event of matter being referred
to any organ of U.N.O.; and possibility cannot be ruled out that Russians and
other Slav States would create other political difficulties. Moreover, appeal to
U.N.O. would suggest that we ourselves had proved incapable of transferring
power without recourse to that body.

3 . Foreign Office suggest that something in the nature of the present Franco-
Siamese Conciliation Commission might offer satisfactory alternative. This
Commission was set up by joint agreement between French and Siamese to
consider border between Siam and French Indo-China. French and Siamese of
their own volition invited a British, an American and a Peruvian member
to sit on the Commission in addition to French and Chinese [? Siamese]
representatives. As an alternative to reference to U.N.O., ITindus and Muslims
might similarly adopt course of inviting French, American and British members

JUNE 1947

381

(or a possible variant, which might work more quickly, whereby H.M.G.
would be invited to nominate one, French Govermnent a second and U.S.A.
Government a third). But, if Hindus and Muslims were unable to agree on
membership of commission, then President of International Court of Justice
might be invited to select the neutral members (compare paragraph 1 (ii) of my
telegram No. 7251). If speed is essential and agreement improbable this course
might be adopted from the outset.

1 No. 120.

2 No. 71.

196

Sir C. Corfield to Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

RfclilW- f 73

SECRET POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 14 June 1947

My dear Erskine Crum,

Many thanks for the draft minutes,1 which you have so promptly and accurately
produced and which I return with a few amendments.

Conclusions (i) and ( iii ).

I am assuming that His Excellency does not wish to see the amended drafts
before issue. Copies will be forwarded to P.S.V. after issue.

Conclusions ( vii ) and {xii).2

I discussed the date with M.S.V. and understood that July 23rd3 would be the
best date for beginnning these discussions. I shall presumably be informed soon
whether they are to be held in Delhi or Simla.4
Conclusion (xi) .

Copies of the report have already been sent to Mr Jinnah and Pandit Nehru.

2. I understand that His Excellency informs the Cabinet of the conclusions
reached at these talks with leaders. I hope these conclusions will be com¬
municated at the next meeting of the Cabinet and that His Excellency will make
it clear that, as jurisdiction over administered areas in States reverts automati¬
cally to States on the lapse of paramo untcy ( vide para. 5 of the Cabinet Mission’s

1 i.e. a draft of No. 175, Item 1.

2 Presumably the reference is intended to be to conclusions (vi) and (vii).

3 It may be noted that on 9 June 1947 Lord Mountbatten had written to Lord Listowel stating that Sir
C. Corfield wished to leave India on 23 July 1947 as his daughter was being married in London on
5 August. It was therefore proposed that Corfield should take leave preparatory to retirement as from
23 July. L/P &S/13/1801.

4 In the event the Conference opened on 25 July 1947 in New Delhi.

382

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Memo, of the 12th May 19465) and as this reversion will not be affected by the
proposed standstill agreement6 (which only covers administrative7 arrangements)
consideration of the standstill formula must not be allowed to delay the
negotiation of practical arrangements in administered areas on the basis of
changed jurisdiction. The full cooperation of the Interim Government in pro¬
ceeding with such negotiations is essential.

It would help me greatly if a copy of the resulting Cabinet decision can be
sent to me, so that I can refer to it when pursuing the urgent questions of
jurisdiction over railways and cantonments in States which have been held up
by the Interim Government for the last two months.

His Excellency will doubtless also make it clear to the Cabinet that if coopera¬
tion is lacking, he will, as Crown Representative, have to make independent
decisions and that in cases where reversion of jurisdiction does not affect
all-India Defence and Communications, he must in any case retain full discre¬
tion to retrocede jurisdiction in advance of its automatic reversion on the lapse
of paramountcy, so that the rights of States and the interests of his officers are
not prejudiced.

3 . I shall be glad to receive 40 copies of the conclusions in the form in which
they are issued to the Leaders, so that the officers at headquarters and the
Residents and Political Agents can be kept in the picture.

Yours sincerely,

C. L. C ORFIELD

5 Vol. VII, No. 262. 6 See No. 198 and its Enclosure.

7 Words in italics underlined in original.

197

The Secretary to the Crown Representative to Residents
Express Letter, Rj^ji/i^y: ff 84-5

no. f. 45-r(s)/47 political department, 14 June 1947

Reference Political Department Memorandum No. f.24~r(s)/47 dated the 17th
April, 19471 on the subject of direct correspondence between States and the
Central Government.

2. At a meeting2 with the Congress and Muslim League Leaders the Crown
Representative raised the question of liaison between the States and the two
Dominion Governments which will be set up on 15th August, 1947. Doubt
was expressed whether the direct correspondence, which was initiated by this
memorandum and which is further developing as States set up joint organisa-

JUNE I947

383

tions for this purpose, will ensure adequate liaison between the Successor
Governments of the rest of India and the large number of States concerned.

3 . The party leaders have therefore agreed that, so far as the Central Govern¬
ment is concerned, steps should be taken to set up a new Department, to be
called the “States Department”, to deal with matters of common concern with
the States, and that this new Department should be divided into two sections,
in anticipation of the partition of the country. All possible assistance and advice
will be given by the existing Political Department in the formation of this new
Department.

4. So far as the States are concerned, the following arrangements have been
suggested : —

(a) that the States should agree to the location by the Successor Governments
of their own agents in State territory, and/or

(b) that each State or group of States should appoint a fully authorised
representative or representatives to be located at the Headquarters of the
appropriate Government to provide information, to elicit replies and to
secure co-operation.

5. Please enquire from the States and Groups of States in political relations
with you which of the arrangements suggested in paragraph 4 they prefer.

6. The Crown Representative feels strongly that arrangements, in one of the
forms suggested, should be put into effect before paramountcy lapses to avoid
the disorganisation which all the leaders and he feel may well result if one of
these courses is not adopted.

7. Arrangements now decided on will, of course, be provisional and
subject to review in the light of experience and subsequent developments.

8. A reply is requested before the end of this month, if necessary by telegram.

The issue of the above
has been authorised.

E. B. WAKEFIELD

for Secretary to His Excellency the
Crown Representative.

1 R/3/1/136: f 56.

2 No. 175, Item 1.

384

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

198

The Secretary to the Crown Representative to Residents
Exp ress Letter , R^/ 1/137: ff 86-8

no. f. 46-r(s)/47 political department, 14 June 1947

Subject: — Formula for Standstill Arrangements on the lapse of Paramountcy
Please refer to paragraph 4 of the Memorandum on States’ Treaties and
Paramountcy presented by the Cabinet Mission to His Highness the Chancellor
of the Chamber of Princes on 12th May 1946.1

2. The interim period referred to in this Memorandum is expected to come
to an end on August 15, 1947, but no progress has been made in negotiations
between the States and British India in regard to the future regulation of
matters of common concern. The States cannot remain entirely isolated from
the economic life of the rest of India and fresh or modified Agreements will
have to be negotiated with the Successor Governments in due course. In the
meantime, however, to avoid an administrative breakdown on the lapse of
Paramountcy, it is essential in the interests of all concerned that agreements
should be reached in regard to administrative arrangements during the interval
between the lapse of paramountcy and the conclusion of such fresh or modified
Agreements. In the Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum it was suggested that such
arrangements should be on a standstill basis, and there seems to be no practical
alternative to this suggestion.

3 . A preliminary draft of a standstill Agreement between individual States
and the two Successor Governments is enclosed herewith. Please communicate
it urgently to all States and report their reactions before the end of this month.

4. In communicating the draft to States, please explain that it is nothing more
than a ‘cockshy’ — an attempt by the Crown Representative to provide a basis
for direct discussion and negotiation between representatives of the States and
of the prospective Dominion Governments. It is hoped to arrange for these
discussions to be held towards the end of July. British Indian party leaders are
also examining the draft from the point of view of the two Dominion Govern¬
ments but have so far expressed no views on it.

The issue of the above has been authorised.

E. B. WAKEFIELD

for Secretary to His Excellency the
Crown Representative.

JUNE I947

385

Enclosure to No. 198

DRAFT STANDSTILL FORMULA

whereas it is expedient that, without prejudice to the rights of any State or
of the Successor Governments in British India, existing administrative arrange¬
ments of mutual benefit to the people of the States and to the people of the
rest of India should continue in force while negotiations for new or modified
arrangements are in progress between the authorities respectively concerned :
Now, therefore, the parties jointly and severally agree that: —

(1) No State shall be liable to pay any cash contribution falling due for
payment after -/-/ 19472 otherwise than on terms to be mutually agreed
upon between the parties to this Agreement.

Note: In this Article the term ‘cash contribution’ has the meaning assigned
to it in subsection (5) of Section 147 of the Government of India Act,
1935-

(2) For a period of two years, but subject to denouncement by any party
concerned on giving six months’ notice and subject always to earlier
modification by mutual agreement of the parties concerned, a State shall
be entitled to continuance of any privilege or immunity which it enjoyed
immediately prior to -/-/ 19472 provided that it continues duly to fulfil
all conditions or reciprocal obligations attached to each such privilege or
immunity.

Note: In this Article the term “privilege or immunity” has the meaning
assigned to it in sub-section (6) of Section 147 of the Government of
India Act, 1935.

(3) In respect of all matters of common concern relating to the subjects
specified in the attached Schedule existing administrative arrangements
shall continue in force for a period of two years from -/-/ 19472 and shall
not be modified otherwise than by mutual agreement of the parties
concerned; provided that

(a) No tiling contained in this Agreement, and nothing done in pursuance
thereof, shall be deemed to create in favour of any party any right
continuing after the date of termination of the Agreement.

(b) Nothing contained in this Agreement, and nothing done in pursuance
thereof, shall be deemed to derogate from any right which, but for
this Agreement, would have been exercisable by any party to it, and

(c) Nothing contained in this Agreement shall affect the liberty of any
party to it to exercise within its own territory all rights of jurisdiction
which it may be entitled to exercise whether by reversion on the
lapse of paramo untcy or by transfer from His Majesty’s Government
or otherwise.

1 Vol. VII, No. 262. 2 [Sidenote in original:] Insert date of lapse of paramountcy.

386

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

SCHEDULE

1 . Air Conimunications

2. Arms and equipment

3 . Control of Commodities

4. Currency and coinage

5. Customs

6. Import and Export Control

7. Irrigation and Electric Power

8. Motor Vehicles

9. National Highways

10. Opium

11. Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones

12. Railways

13. Salt

14. Taxation

15. Wireless

16. Any other subject involving matters of common concern

199

Sir W. Monckton to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten o/B urma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Hyderabad , Part 1(a)

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL H.E.H. THE NIZAM’s PALACE,

new Delhi, 14 June 1947

My dear Dickie,

In the hope that you will have time to see me on Tuesday, I am writing this
letter to tell you how very troubled I am about the way in which my Hydera¬
bad clients are being treated. I have made it plain to them that you told me that
H.M.G. would not consider their entering the British Commonwealth of
Nations as a Dominion. This came as a disappointment to the Nizam but your
statement at the Press Conference went much further and certainly gave the
impression that no relations with H.M.G. , even on economic questions, would
be possible, save through one of the two new Dominions. You will remember
the passage: — “There can be no negotiation between H.M.G. and the States.
We hand back Paramountcy and in the process we offer our services for
enabling them to make the necessary contact with the Government of India
and with the respective Constituent Assemblies to come together and make
their agreement. But we (meaning H.M.G.) are not actually going to enter into
fresh negotiations. We will come out of all commitments”.1 I cannot believe

JUNE I947

387

that you really intended to bar Hyderabad from all access to H.M.G.2 If I am
right in this, I wonder if you would consider making a dementi at the first con¬
venient opportunity. Meantime, you can imagine that this statement, seized on,
as it has been, by all the Hindu press, and never contradicted, has caused great
indignation in Hyderabad. They point out to me that there was no prior con¬
sultation with them nor any opportunity for discussion before these decisions
were announced publicly. They contrast this with what you said about British
India, namely that you had made and announced no decision without full
discussion with them beforehand. Moreover, your observations about geo¬
graphical considerations3 appeared to the Nizam to mean that in your judgment
he had no real choice: he must join the Hindustan Union. He feels that he will
be kept in a very unsatisfactory state of suspense till the 15th August, or
whatever date paramountcy ceases, and will then be abandoned to his own
resources.

He asks me what reason he has to trust the Congress. At one moment, their
leaders say that they will not exercise pressure on the States to join the Con¬
stituent Assembly : at the next, they let it be known that they will do what they
can to create disorder in States which elect not to join. At one moment, they
profess readiness to permit the Princes to remain: at another and in private
conversations, they say that the days of the Nizam are numbered.

He points out that even a casual survey of the Hindu papers shows the
eagerness with which they wish to make sure that they can get out of the British
Commonwealth as soon as they want to, and their anger when they learn that
they cannot drag Pakistan out with them.

The policy of the Nizam has always been, and still is, to retain and increase
the ties which bind him to the British. (I need not remind you how strictly the
treaties, solemnly repeated by Cripps and Wavell,4 oblige the British to protect
the State and the dynasty against external aggression and internal disorder, nor
how the State has been prevented right up till now from raising forces or
procuring equipment adequate even for the maintenance of internal order,
because they have been taught and compelled to rely on British arms and the
British word). Can you be surprised if the Nizam cannot bring himself to trust
in Hindustan for his future ? He asks : Am I really to be kicked out of the British
family without discussion? Will you really just denounce the treaties, refuse me
any political and economic arrangements with H.M.G. and then leave me to my

1 This particular answer is not included in the report of the Press Conference at No. 60, but was
reported in the Times of India , 5 June 1947, p. 5, col. 2.

2 cf. No. 1 12, para. 2.

3 Lord Mountbatten was reported to have said that the States were at liberty to send their represen¬
tatives to either Constituent Assembly and continued: They were absolutely free to choose, but he
supposed that geography would play a large part in their decisions’. Times of India, 5 June 1947, p- 5,
col. 3.

4 See No. 112, note 5.

388

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

fate? Have I any assurance, if I do join them, that if they walk out of the British
Commonwealth they will not be able to drag me with them?

I have written all this to you, because H.E.H. is pressing me to return at once
to England, since action is urgent and he understands you to have said that there
is no more you can do to maintain for him a tie or even any direct access to
H.M.G. I shall feel bound to go. That means that the one prospect I wanted to
avoid cannot be avoided. I cannot give proper service to my clients (and I have
never yet refused to give a hundred per cent service) without making my own
protest to members of the Cabinet and seeing to it, by my own speeches and
writings, and through my old colleagues, that, before it is too late, the British
public at least understand that, however justifiable may be the ultimate end,
they have treated, and are treating, their old friends and allies shamefully. I
shall hate doing this, because I came out here with a wholehearted wish to help
you and I know this will have the opposite effect. Moreover, I shall hate it
because I think, if I had been able to stay, I could have helped to some extent by
my friendship with Jinnah and, above all, because H.E.H. will be making
decisions almost day by day in my absence and I firmly believe that if I could
stay with him I might still have been able to guide him into a course of friendly
co-operation with the Hindustan Union as well as with Pakistan. But I cannot
stand by silently and see him automatically cut off from H.M.G. or allow him
to drift until August when we practically walk out and leave him to his fate.
My present plan is to return to England between 23 rd and 30th June and I
suppose that, if once I go away, it is very improbable I shall come back again.
For I only just manage to hold the Nizam when I see him daily. The extreme
Muslims, the Ittihad-ul-Muslemin are attacking me in the Press and in private
and will undermine me if I am away three weeks.

Sorry to be a nuisance, but I don’t want to go behind your back.

Yours ever,

WALTER MONCKTON

200

Viceroy's Conference Paper V.C.P . 76

Rblil^o:ff 3~5

SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 14june I947

THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

The attached paper, prepared by the Reforms Commissioner in the form of a

JUNE I947

389

minute to His Excellency, will be considered at the next Viceroy’s meeting with
members of his Staff.

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM
Conference Secretary

Y.E.

As desired by Your Excellency, I discussed with Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel and
Mr. Krishna Menon the question of reconstituting the present Council after the
issue of partition has been decided.

2. After decisions on partition are taken, there are two important con¬
siderations affecting the administration which have to be taken into account. It
is impossible to expect at that stage either the Congress or the Muslim League
Members to view matters from an all-India angle; neither party is likely to be
content to leave the interests of their parts of the country to be dealt with solely
by the Members belonging to the other party. Secondly, both parties, and the
Muslim League in particular, would be likely to require the intervening period
till the Dominion Status Constitution comes into effect to complete the parti¬
tion plans and to bring the successor Governments into being. The best way to
meet this situation would be to arrange that the Government at the Centre
should operate in two separate compartments.

3. If this is accepted, it seems necessary to alter the basis of the existing
Government almost immediately the partition issued is settled. The results of
the Provincial option will be known by the end of June except in regard to
Sylhet and N.W.F.P. I suggest that we need not wait for these results before
Your Excellency reconstitutes the Executive Council.

4. It is accordingly suggested that at the Executive Council meeting to be
held on the 2nd July Your Excellency should ask for the resignation of all
Members of the Council to be sent to you by the evening of Thursday the 3rd.
When these have been received, Your Excellency will ask the Congress and
League leaders who are likely to be the Prime Ministers in their respective
Dominions after the 15th August to nominate a Cabinet in respect of their
respective territories. After taking the pleasure of the Crown, these persons will
then be appointed Members of the Executive Council. As Members of Council
they will have equal status and all will be equally entitled to participate in the
meetings of the Council. But while the normal administration of all the
Departments will be distributed among the Congress Members of the Cabinet
in the usual manner, the Muslim League Members will be concerned only with
the Pakistan areas ; and for these areas each of them would be associated with one
or more portfolios. The effect of this arrangement will be that for each Depart¬
ment there will be two Members of Council of whom the Congress Member
will be in charge of the normal administration for the whole of India while the

390

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Muslim League Member will be concerned only with the interests of the Pakis¬
tan areas. Corresponding to this, there will also be a parallel organisation for
Pakistan areas within the Secretariat. In each Department the ‘Pakistan Cabinet’
will be represented by a Secretary whose functions will be confined to —

(1) collecting the personnel, records, and other material necessary to set up a
separate Secretariat for Pakistan by the middle of August, and

(2) watching over the interests of Pakistan in the meanwhile.

If in any particular the Pakistan Secretary cannot obtain satisfaction from his
opposite number, he will bring it to the notice of his Member who will take
up the matter with the corresponding Member of the Congress Cabinet. If the
Pakistan Member fails to get the matter suitably adjusted, he will bring it up to
the Governor-General who may have it placed before the whole Cabinet.

5. These arrangements should come into operation as early as possible after
the 3rd July having regard to the time taken for the acceptance of the resigna¬
tions and the appointment of new Members by His Majesty.

201

Mr Krishna Menon to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Mountbatten Papers . Demi-Official Correspondence Files : Krishna Menon

PERSONAL iy YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 14 June 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I enclose a note on Parliamentary legislation, specially dealing with the point of
two1 bills and of their character and consequences. This may be read with the
note previously sent2 on the point that India was a Continuous State under
H.M.G.’s pi an.

The plan3 encountered heavy weather at the A.[I.]C.C. meeting today and
may fare worse tomorrow. It will no doubt secure a way out, but only because
of the stand taken by the leaders.

I had intended to talk to you about one or two matters that have been much
on my mind, but the interview did not lend itself to it. I will mention them, and
I take the hberty of doing this as my approach to you has always been frank
and personal. You will forgive me if what I say appears uncalled for. I cannot
in any event go into details in a letter.

You may remember that when I first submitted to you ideas on what may be
done, and we had talks in London last March,4 the one thing we both thought
fundamental was that, in any partition, which I put forward as necessary to a
solution, the outer line of India must remain intact. All secession must be subject
to it.

JUNE 1947

391

That picture has changed, the N.W.F.P. referendum appeared to cut right
across it. Given the results of that referendum, being a victory for Pakistan,
owing to various causes, the Baluchistan referendum is meaningless. However
the shape of things appear to leave the defences of India in Pakistan. Mr Bevin
said at Margate,1 2 3 4 5 that the withdrawal from India meant consolidation of Britain
in the middle east. Is our frontier still the hinterland of this imperial strategy ?
Does Britain still think in terms of being able to use this territory and all that
follows from it? There is a considerable amount of talking in this way and if
Kashmir for one reason or another chooses to be in Pakistan, there is a further
development in [?] that direction — I do not know what British policy is in this
matter. I do not know that you would know it either. But if this be British
intent it is tragic. It will be a grave miscalculation. As it becomes more evident,
the attitude of India would be resentful, and British hold on Pakistan would not
improve it. I think I have said enough, perhaps a little too much. Events in
Kashmir are watched with concern. If Kashmir and N.W.F.P. go to Pakistan,
all hopes of the plan being a settlement will prove fanciful. India might be
absorbed in her internal and economic difficulties and for the moment be too
weary. But in [ ?] those areas, [ ?] any fight will spread on a huge scale and we
may be menaced by years of conflict. I have just thought aloud. I hope you will
forgive me for doing so. It may be that as the events cast their shadow on this
unhappy country one begins to see every vision more distorted. Perhaps I am
wrong and Britain does not think in terms of Empire. But it would not have
been right if I did not mention to you these thoughts that pass through my
mind as I have in my, very happy, relations with you maintained the utmost
frankness and I hope reasonable objectivity. I won’t write more about this.

I hope the weekend in Simla has done you some good. I shall leave here
tomorrow and return by the end of the month and see you before I go back to
London.

Yours sincerely,

KRISHNA

Please don’t keep this letter.

1 Underlined in original.

2 Not traced.

3 i.e. No. 45.

4 See e.g. Vol. IX, No. 531.

5 The Labour Party Annual Conference met at Margate from 26 to 30 May 1947.

392

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Enclosure to No. 201
Note by Mr Krishna Menon
Rhl1l153: ff 181-3

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE ON PARLIAMENTARY LEGISLATION

I. The proposed Parliamentary legislation has two purposes : —

(a) conferring Dominion Status on India

(b) creating a new State (Pakistan) as a Dominion.

II. Dominion Status for India should be effected by a Bill to amend the
Government of India Act. This would be the first measure (in time). The
amending bill would seek to : —

(a) delimit the territory of India so as to exclude from it, presumably by
omission from the relevant schedules to the Act, all those areas that have
seceded or are in the process of doing so

(b) alter the relation of the Crown to the Executive and the Legislature so
that the Governor-General representing the Crown would be a con¬
stitutional head as in the Dominions

(c) make the legislature sovereign and alter the character and composition of
the legislature so that in effect the Constituent Assembly becomes the
legislature

(d) make such changes as are consequential to the extinction of paramountcy
(but make no other changes in the clauses concerning the States)

(e) make such other amendments as are necessary to give the new Dominion,
the Status as under the Statute of Westminster.

III. When the Government of India Act is thus amended certain parts of
present India would remain outside the Dominion of India and the Jurisdiction
of the new Government of India.

These areas would be constituted into a Dominion and presumably provided
with the necessary organs of Government.

This (above) is the function of the Second Act, the Dominion of Pakistan
Act which parliament would enact. This is a second and independent measure.

IV. The Pakistan Act is, in law, consequential to the Amendment Act which is
Act No. 1. It is evident that the two enactments cannot be simultaneous, or be
different parts of the same measure.

V. If it is proposed to create two new Dominions by first, a Repeal of the
Government of India Act, and the enactment thereafter of a measure creating
two new States (Dominions) a large number of complications arise.

(a) The most important of these complications is that India will resist this
method whereby the present State of India is extinguished. India holds
that she continues as a state under the H.M.G. plan and the changes

JUNE 1947

393

consequential to the acceptance of the plan are only those of the structure
and status of the government and in the delimitation of territory.

(b) The other objections have been set out in my previous note. Briefly, they
are all those consequences that arise from terminating all existing inter¬
state and international relations, political, economic, fiscal, commercial,
Labour Sec.

(c) Now relations cannot be established by the two successor states until they
have been accorded recognition by the parties concerned. This takes time
and in the meanwhile there is either an interregnum or handling of all
these matters by H.M.G. Either would be disastrous.

VI. There are other objections, mainly of an Indian character.

(a) The Act creating the Dominions, is until the Constituent Assembly has
made constitutions and implemented them, the Constitutions of the
respective Dominions.

(b) It would be incongruous and disagreeable for the two independent states,
born out of an agreement to differ and live apart, to have the same Con¬
stitution Act ! even though they be in two parts of the same Act.

VII. There are a large number of residuary matters which are not and cannot
be now considered in the various negotiations that are in progress. There are
probably a number that will not even come to light for some time.

These residual matters will remain vested in India if India is continuous as a
State. International and interstate relations would continue and there would be
no interregnum.

The two new States, if they are created as new States, would each have
vested in them, only what the constitution vests in them and what they as free
and independent states undertake thereafter. They have no residual rights or
obligations.

VIII. To sum up, the proposed Parliamentary legislation must be : —

(a) by way of two independent, separate measures

(b) in the nature of things (and by law), the Pakistan Act would be con¬
sequential on the Indian Dominion Act

(c) The Indian Dominion Act should be by way of an amendment of the
Government of India Act 1935

(d) The enactment of one (or two) Acts, consequential to a Repeal of the
Government of India Act is neither appropriate nor likely to be accepted
by India.

(e) Any enactment of parliamentary legislation in such a way as to extinguish
the State, India, and to create two new States, would result in all kinds of
complications, an interregnum and also cause all the obligations owed by
India, all claims by and against her to lapse.

(f) Finally H.M.G.’s statement of June 3, 6 as I have pointed out in my pre-

6 No. 45.

394

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

vious note does not contemplate the creation of two totally new states,
but only the secession of certain territories from the present Indian State
and the provision thereafter to constitute the seceding parts into a
dominion while giving India herself the Status of a Dominion.7

7 Lord Mountbatten referred this note to Mr Abell and Mr V. P. Menon on 21 June indicating that he
had inadvertently overlooked it. Mr Abell noted: ‘Out of date now?’ Mr Sundaram replied on
behalf of Mr V. P. Menon, in a note dated 23 June, that Mr Krishna Menon’s note was ‘out of date but
interesting. The draft Bill received by us proceeds on lines different from those set out in Para. VIII
of the Note, except that points (e) and (f) in that para, have been carefully kept in mind’. In a further
note of 24 June Mr Abell recommended no further action on Mr Krishna Menon’s proposals, adding :
‘His main point that India should be a continuing entity has been secured’. R/3/1/153: ff 177, 180.
184.

202

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listoivel

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Indian Independence

Bill , Part 1(a)

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 14 June 1()47

SECRET

No. 143 9-S. I have given most anxious consideration to question of inter¬
national status of new India after separation of Pakistan. Our Legislative Depart¬
ment and V. P. Menon have given me a memorandum on the subject copy of
which is being sent to you by air.1 Their view is that there can be no doubt that
after partition the identity of the remainder of India as an internationally
recognised state will not be affected and that remainder of India after the
northern and eastern portions are separated will remain identifiable with the
pre-partition India. According to them this position is implicit in H.M.G.’s
statement of 3rd June 1947.

2. I do not wish to involve myself in legal or constitutional arguments over
this issue but to approach it from a practical standpoint.

3. I had a talk with Liaquat Ali Khan on the subject.2 He was emphatic that
he did not wish to waste time arguing whether Hindustan should take title of
India or inherit membership of U.N.O. or regard as their own, representatives
who have now been sent out by Governor General in Council to countries
abroad. He told me he was a realist and all he really wanted was a fair pro¬
portionate division of assets and liabilities.

4. The Congress position is that Hindustan succeeds to present international
personality of India. According to V. P. Menon who had talks with Patel and
Nehru Congress have no desire to do down the Muslim League in the division

JUNE I947

395

of assets and liabilities and are prepared to agree to any principle of equitable
distribution. In other words to Congress question of the international status of
Hindustan is one of prestige and the League’s approach to the problem is one
of practical politics. In any case League can derive no benefit to themselves by
contesting the Congress view.

5. We have therefore a fair chance of a compromise between the two
parties.

6. My advice therefore is (a) that so far as H.M.G. is concerned India minus
Pakistan should inherit the entity of India internationally; (b) that Hindustan
will take over all the international obligations3 of the present Government of
India; and (c) that agreement should be reached between the Government [s] of
Hindustan and Pakistan as regards division of assets and liabilities on equitable
basis.

7. I recognise that so far as representation to U.N.O. is concerned question if
raised before that body is one for them to decide and that question of represen¬
tatives abroad is again a matter for Hindustan to settle with the countries
concerned. It will however be very useful if H.M.G. could make their own
position clear and accept my view as regards the international status of India
as set out above ; and also state their intention that successor authorities whoever
they may be shall share proportionately assets and liabilities of the Government
of India.

8. I am absolutely certain that a wrong approach to this issue will cause a
complete breakdown in the present settlement.4 I have gone into the matter
very carefully and I and my staff hold unanimous view. I must go so far as to
say that I prophesy untold trouble if the course I have suggested is not adopted.

9. I shall be grateful if H.M.G. ’s views on this are included in the reply to my
135 8— S5 in a form in which it can be communicated to both parties.

1 L/P&S/12/4638: ff 97-100. 2 See No. 153.

3 ‘obligations’ deciphered as ‘(? omission)s’. 4 ‘settlement’ deciphered as ‘Assembly’.

5 No. 115.

396

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

203

Mr Attlee to Mr Chifley, Mr Fraser and Field Marshal Smuts1

Telegram , L/PO/^/122:/ 375

IMMEDIATE DOMINIONS OFFICE, 14 June 1947, 4.43 pm

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister. Begins.

The Viceroy has informed us that in connection with the arrangements now
being made for the immediate transfer of power in India on the basis of Dom¬
inion status, the Congress leaders have stipulated that in any such arrangement,
steps should be taken to alter the King’s Title by the omission of the term
“Emperor of India”.2

As you will be aware, the Canadian Government have already suggested that
there should be a general review of the King’s present title and that the Indian
position might be considered in this connection.3 I fear, however, that in view
of what I have said above, it would not be possible for us to defer action here
as regards the title “Emperor of India” until such a general review had taken
place. While we for our part are very willing to agree to such a review, we feel
bound to make provision regarding India in the India Bill which we are now
drafting in order to give effect to the new proposals for Dominion status for
India and Pakistan. We contemplate therefore that in the India Bill we should
include a clause declaring that the United Kingdom Parliament has given assent
to the omission of “Emperor of India” and to the issue of a Royal Proclamation
for this purpose. This will leave the new position of India covered in the
general wording of the title. We should hope that a clear declaration of the
intention of the United Kingdom and Parliament in this sense would suffice
so far as Indian opinion is concerned and that the actual issue of the proclama¬
tion could then be deferred for the time being.

It is clear that under the preamble to the Statute of Westminster, any altera¬
tion in the King’s Title is a matter requiring the assent of other Commonwealth
countries as well as the United Kingdom. I do not expect that it would be
possible for you to take such action as you may regard necessary in relation to
your Parliament before the time when we must complete our new India Bill.
I should, however, be glad to learn whether you would agree that the title
“Emperor of India” should be dropped and would be prepared to take such
steps as you may deem necessary to obtain the assent of your Parliament. If you
feel able to give me an assurance in this sense, it would meet the case if you could
authorise me to make a statement to this effect in Parliament here at the time of

JUNE 1947

397

the discussion of the India Bill. I should be grateful to hear from you on this
point as a matter of urgency.

I am sending a similar message to the other Prime Ministers.4 Ends.

1 Tel. 120 to Australia; 100 to New Zealand; 49 to South Africa.

2 See Nos. 164 and 184. 3 See No. 8, para. 3.

4 The telegram to Mr Mackenzie King (No. 149 of i4june) had minor variations in its wording, dealing
at slightly greater length with the point alluded to in para. 2 above. L/PO/6/122: f 376.

204

Mr Abbott to Mr Abell

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Situation in. Part 11(a)

immediate ij June 1947, 9 am

confidential Received : 15 June , 2.15 pm

No. 13 i-G. Your telegram 143 7-S.1 Best available figures from 18th November
to 15th May are 3280 killed and 1359 injured. Figures certainly below actuals
as Rawalpindi district figures still uncertain and in Gurgaon many casualties
removed by rioters themselves.

1 Dated 14 June 1947 requesting figures for casualties in communal disturbances.

205

Resolution of the All-India Congress Committee 1

Mountbatten Papers

15 June 1947

The A.I.C.C. has given careful consideration to the course of events since its
last meeting in January last and, in particular to the statements made on behalf
of the British Government on February 20, 1947, 2 and June 3, 1947.3 The
Committee approves and endorses the resolutions passed by the Working
Committee during this period.

The Committee welcomes the decision of the British Government to transfer
power completely to the Indian people by next August.

The Congress accepted the British Cabinet Mission’s statement of May 16,

1946. 4 as well as the subsequent interpretation thereof dated December 6,

194 6. 5 and has been acting in accordance with it in the Constituent Assembly

1 The text of the resolution reproduced here is that circulated to the Viceroy’s Staff under reference
V.C.P. 77. 2Vol. IX, No. 438. 3 No. 45- 4 Vol. VII, No. 303.

5 Vol. IX, Appendix to No. 166.

398

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

which was constituted in terms of the Cabinet Mission’s plan. That Assembly
has been functioning for over six months and has not only declared its objectives
to be the establishment of an independent sovereign republic of India and a just
social and economic order, but has also made considerable progress in framing
the constitution for the free Indian Union on the basis of fundamental rights
guaranteeing freedom and equality of opportunity to all Indians.

In view, however, of the refusal of the Muslim League to accept the plan of
May 1 6, and to participate in the Constituent Assembly, and further, in view of
the policy of the Congress that ‘it cannot think in terms of compelling the
people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared
and established will,’6 the A.I.C.C. accepts the proposals embodied in the
announcement of June 3, which have laid down a procedure for ascertaining the
will of the people concerned.

The Congress has consistently upheld that the unity of India must be main¬
tained. Ever since its inception, more than 60 years ago, the National Congress
has laboured for the realization of a free and united India, and millions of our
people have suffered in this great cause. Not only the labours and sacrifices of
the past two generations, but the long course of India’s history and tradition
bear witness to this essential unity. Geography and the mountains and the seas
fashioned India as she is, and no human agency can change that shape or come
in the way of her final destiny.

Economic circumstances and the insistent demands of international affairs
make the unity of India still more necessary. The picture of India we have
learnt to cherish will remain in our minds and hearts. The A.I.C.C. earnestly
trusts that, when the present passions have subsided, India’s problems will be
viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations in
India will be discredited and discarded by all.

Secession

The proposals of June 3, 1947, are likely to lead to the secession of some
parts of the country from India. However much this may be regretted, the
A.I.C.C. accepts this possibility, in the circumstances now prevailing.

Though freedom is at hand, the times are difficult and the situation in India
demands vigilance and a united front by all those who care for the independence
of India. At this time of crisis and change when unpatriotic and anti-social forces
are trying to injure the cause of India and her people, the A.I.C.C. appeals to
and demands of every Congressman and the people generally, to forget their
petty differences and disputes and to stand by, vigilant, disciplined and pre¬
pared, to serve the cause of India’s freedom and defend it with all their strength
from all who may seek to do it injury.

6 Resolution of the Congress Working Committee, n April 1942. Vol. I, No. 605.

JUNE I947

399

206

Resolution of the All-India Congress Committee on the States 1

Mountbatten Papers

15 June 1947

The A.I.C.C. welcomes the association of many Indian States in the work of the
Constituent Assembly. The Committee hopes that the remaining States will also
cooperate in this building up of the constitutional structure of a free India in
which the State units will be equal and autonomous sharers with the other units
of the Federation.

The position of the States in the constitutional changes that are taking place
was defined in the memorandum presented by the Cabinet Mission on May 12,
1946, 2 and the statement of May 16, 1946.3 The recent statement of June 3,
1 947, 4 has not added to these in any way. The position, according to these
papers, was that the Indian Union would consist of the provinces and the States,
that paramountcy would lapse on the transfer of power, and that in the event
of any State not entering into a federal relationship with the Union, it will
enter into other political arrangement with it.

In the memorandum it was further stated that the British Government had
been informed by the Indian States that they desired in their own interests and
in the interests of India as a whole both to make their contribution to the fram¬
ing of the structure and to take their due place in it when it is completed. Hope
was also expressed that the various State Governments which had not already
done so would take active steps to place themselves in close and constant touch
with public opinion in their States by means of representative institutions. It
was suggested that existing arrangements as between the States and the Govern¬
ment of India should continue in regard to matters of common concern until
new agreements were completed.

While recognizing that some progress has been made in some States towards
representative institutions, the A.I.C.C. regrets that during this past critical
year, since the memorandum of the Cabinet Mission, this progress has been
very limited both in its extent and quality. In view of the basic changes that are
going to take place in India within the next two months, resulting from the
complete transfer of power to Indian hands, it is of vital importance that
progress leading to responsible government should take place rapidly in the
States. The A.I.C.C. trusts that all the States will initiate these changes so as to
keep in line with the fast-changing situation in India and at the same time
produce contentment and self-reliance in their people.

1 The text of the resolution reproduced here is that circulated to the Viceroy’s Staff under reference
V.C.P. 78.

2 Vol. VII, No. 262. 3 Vol. VII, No. 303.

^ No. 45.

400

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The Committee does not agree with the theory ofparamountcy as enunciated
and interpreted by the British Government; but even if that is accepted, the
consequences that flow from the lapse of that paramountcy are limited in
extent. The privileges and obligations as well as the subsisting rights as between
the States and the Government of India cannot be adversely affected by the
lapse of paramountcy. These rights and obligations have to be considered
separately and renewed or changed by mutual agreement. The relationship
between the Government of India and the States would not be exhausted by
lapse of paramountcy. The lapse does not lead to the independence of the
States.5

Both from the point of view of the spirit underlying the memorandum of
May 12, 1946, and the statement of May 16, 1946, as well as the acknowledged
rights of the people all over the world today, it is clear that the people of the
States must have a dominating voice in any decisions regarding them. Sover¬
eignty, it is admitted, resides in the people, and if paramountcy lapses, resulting
in the ending of the relationship of the States to the Crown, the inherent rights
of the people are not affected thereby for the worse.

The arrangement made under paramountcy in the past dealt, inter alia, with
the security of India as a whole. In the interest of that security various arrange¬
ments were agreed to limiting the power of the States authorities and at the
same time granting them protection. The question of the security of India as
well as other matters are as important today as at any time previously and
cannot be ignored in deciding the future of the States.

The A.I.C.C. cannot admit the right of any State in India to declare its
independence and to live in isolation from the rest of India. That would be a
denial of the course of Indian history and of the objectives of the Indian people

5 Sir P. Patrick noted on 18 June that this and the penultimate paragraphs: ‘directly challenge the con¬
clusion to be drawn from the memorandum of 12th May 1946 and para. 18 of the Statement of 3rd
June that the States on the recognition of the two Dominions regain independence and are free either
to join the Dominions or to regulate their relations with them by special agreements. Mr Nehru’s
recent speech dots the i’s and crosses the t’s. But his view is challenged by Mr Jinnah. While we must
avoid as long as possible taking a hand in the controversy it will presumably be necessary to say
before long that with the lapse of paramountcy the treaties and engagements made under para¬
mountcy lapse and the States become free agents.’ L/P &J/10/100: f 25. The speech by Nehru to
which Patrick refers was presumably the one he made on the resolution on the States at the meeting
of the A.I.C.C. The Times, 18 June 1947, p- 4, col. 4, reported him as saying: ‘If a State does not
join the Union, its relationship with the Union — and there will have to be some relationship — will
not be one of equality, but slightly lower. We require suzerainty or paramountcy.’ He stated that the
States could not be allowed contacts with any foreign State or any independent authority in defence ;
and he added that ‘we will not recognize any independence of any State in India’, and that ‘any
recognition of any such independence by any foreign Power . . . will be considered an unfriendly
act’. For Mr Jinnah’s views see No. 225.

JUNE 1947

401

The A.I.C.C. trusts that the rulers of the States will appreciate fully the
situation as it exists today and will in full cooperation with their people enter as
democratic units in the Indian Union, thereby serving the cause of their own
people as well as of India as a whole.

207

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rl3l*l*57:f 28

17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 15 June I947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

The following names are suggested for the Boundary Commissions :

For the Punjab Commission:

Mr. Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan.

Mr. Justice Teja Singh.

Both of the Lahore High Court.

For the Bengal Commission:

Mr. Justice C. C. Biswas.

Mr. Justice Bijan Kumar Mukherji.

Both of the Calcutta High Court.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

208

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , jR/j/i/ijz : f 27

important new Delhi, 13 June 1947> 2.20 pm

secret Received: 15 June , 2.43 pm

No. 145 i-S. Your 7673 of 13th June.1 Boundary Commissions.

1. At my meeting with the seven Indian Leaders on the 13 th2 it was decided,
in view of the time factor, to drop the suggestion that the Boundary Com¬
missions should be composed of persons obtained through U.N.O.

1 No. 195.

2 No. 175, Item 2.

402

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

2. Instead each Boundary Commission will consist of an independent
chairman and four other persons, of whom two will be nominated by Congress
and two by the Mushm League. The nominated members (all of whom will be
of high judicial standing) will choose their own chairmen, or, if they cannot
reach agreement, the leaders themselves will make the choice at a future meet¬
ing.

3 . If, by any chance, neither of these processes results in agreement, I might
then, as a last resort, put forward the suggestion that the President of the
International Court should be invited to select the chairmen.

4. Please therefore take no further action on the suggestion that U.N.O.
should be approached. Nor, I suggest, should any but purely exploratory action
be taken with the President of the International Court.3

3 Lord Listowel replied in tel. 7804 of 18 June that he was glad to hear that the Boundary Commission
question might be settled without recourse even to the International Court, adding that he would
ask the Foreign Office to take exploratory action only, as suggested in para. 4 above. L/P &J/10/117:
f 194.

209

Sir E. Jenkins [Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rfe/i/i 78: ff 63-6

SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 13 June I947

NO. 683

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

The main event of the fortnight was the announcement of 3rd June.1 It is now
possible to give a fairly accurate appreciation of the reactions to it.

2. There is a complete absence of enthusiasm for the partition plan — nobody
seems pleased, and nobody seems to want to get on with the job. The plan has
had no discernible effect on communal relations, which remain as they were.
Nor is there any sign of special anxiety for, or hostility to, Dominion Status.

On the other hand, the political parties here acquiesce in the plan, but (as is
usual in matters of this kind in India) for widely differing reasons. Mushm
Leaguers think it a master-stroke by Jinnah, who has secured the recognition of
Pakistan and will in the end get them all they want. Congressmen think it a
master-stroke by Patel, who, having pushed the Muslims into a corner (or into
two corners) will be able to destroy them before very long. Patel’s private
conversation is reported to be menacing — Barq who was a Minister in the

JUNE I947

403

Coalition Government told me he had heard him say that Hindustan could
quickly make an end of its Muslim inhabitants if Pakistan did not behave. This
may be quite untrue, but the story represents the attitude the Hindus hope and
the Muslims fear Patel will take up. The Sikhs pin their faith on the Boundary
Commission; they are now said to be fairly well organised in the Districts they
think critical, and it is quite likely that they will refuse to go very far with
partition until they know where the boundary will run. Their latest announce¬
ment demands exchanges of property and transfers of population.

Intelligent people not deeply committed to the political parties are far from
happy. They do not believe that partition will settle anything, and the dis¬
turbance it will cause will make them at best uncomfortable and at worst
insecure. Land values are said to be falling in the colony districts, and there are
many stories about the “flight of capital” from Lahore.

Generally, the atmosphere of fatalism continues. It was ordained from the
first that the communities should massacre and loot one another; nothing can
alter this ; unity means ruin of one kind, and partition ruin of another ; if there
is to be ruin anyway partition seems the simpler and perhaps the less bloody
form of it.

3. The effect of the announcement on the Services is still not quite certain.
We have asked all members — British and Indian — of the Secretary of State’s
Services whether they are willing to serve on and, if so, whether their willing¬
ness extends to service in a United Punjab, in a Western Punjab, in an Eastern
Punjab, or in all or any two of them. Replies are due by 25th June.

It seems doubtful if many of the British officials will wish to stay. By all
accounts they are not impressed by the Dominion Status idea, and they have no
confidence at all in the Central or the Provincial politicians. The average British
official does not in fact believe that the new Governments will be fit to serve
under — in his opinion they are hkely to be communal and unfair, their adminis¬
trative standards will be low, and their financial stability will at best be ques¬
tionable. This goes apparently not only for British members of the I.C.S. and
I.P., but for the majority of the Doctors and Engineers. The General Manager
of the North Western Railway tells me that feeling is much the same among his
British personnel. I hope that the replies to our questionnaire may be less
uncompromising than I now expect, but I fear that the political parties will have
to launch the new Governments without much British assistance, even if they
want it. The Irrigation Department may suffer almost more than any other.

Indian members of the all-India Services are worried. The Muslims are, I
understand, already parcelling out the more lucrative Pakistan appointments
among themselves. The non-Muslims do not think they will be safe in the
Western Punjab, and hope to be accommodated in Hindustan.

The Provincial Services (composed almost entirely of Punjabis with a

1 No. 45.

404

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

sprinkling of Anglo-Indians) are in much the same case. It is assumed that there
will be a communal split — Aduslims to the West, others to the East — and I have
no doubt that the scramble for appointments will soon begin.

The great mass of the Subordinate Services — including anything from an
Inspector of Police recruited provincially to a Constable or office messenger
recruited on a district basis — can in my opinion be dealt with only by gradual
adjustments, but they will not escape the general ferment.

So far as the services are concerned, we are going through a very difficult
time, with some men yearning to leave India, others trying to please new
masters, and others again upset and apprehensive. The old administrative
machine is rapidly falling to pieces.

4. I have kept Your Excellency informed of what I have done to get the
Partition Proceedings started. The politicians do not yet realise what they are in
for, and my difficulty will be to get them to take the business seriously and to
undertake the really arduous work which it involves. Mamdot’s sole contri¬
bution to date has been his objection to the official Committees — I am told that
he and his colleagues are still too busy dividing the prospective spoils to do
anything else. He returned from Delhi on 14th June, and I had understood from
Your Excellency that he was to come and see me on his arrival. One of his
retainers telephoned to my Secretary on 14th afternoon to say that he had
arrived, but when my Secretary asked if he wished to see me, the reply was
l‘No”. I have left it at that over the week-end, but shall have to shake up all the
leaders, including Mamdot, during the next few days.2

The troubles I foresee are of three kinds. In the first place, we have no
outstanding political leader here and the members of the Partition Committee
will almost certainly lose themselves in recriminations and hair-splitting. We
are very short of magnanimity in the Punjab. Secondly, we have not really got
the staff to present the material properly in the time available. There is no
easy remedy, but I am getting back Askwith a senior member of the I.C.S. who
was on leave preparatory to retirement and volunteered to return in any
capacity. Askwith knows the Punjab background well, and as he has not served
here since 1940 can hardly be suspected, even in these days, of favouring one
side or the other. He was a first-class District Officer, and is also very good at
Secretariat work. I am told that the Home Alember did not like Askwith’s
return, but the offer was too good to miss. Thirdly, until the boundary is
settled, final decisions can hardly be taken e.g. as to the exact financial adjust¬
ments to be made, and the Committee may decline to proceed by settling
principles and applying them later.

I believe that the job could be put through quite quickly if the parties would
concentrate on the minimum essentials for the establishment of two Provinces
with two separate Governments. But if the parties insist upon dividing e.g. the

JUNE 1947

405

Irrigation and Electricity Departments, with all their assets and stores, and all
financial adjustments complete to the last anna, before the two separate Govern¬
ments are established, the process may take months or even years.

I am not sure what line Your Excellency intends to take if on 15 th August the
Partition Committees in the Punjab and/or Bengal are still hard at it with no
results in sight. Here in the Punjab the boundary is vital, and until that is
settled it is difficult to see how the two new Provinces or for that matter the
two new Dominions can be created — unless of course the Punjab is kept as a
kind of no-man’s land under Central control.

5. I have mentioned that the announcement of 3rd June had no appreciable
effect on communal relations. Lahore and Amritsar have both been seriously
disturbed throughout the fortnight — the main incidents being stabbings, cases
of incendiarism, and bomb explosions. Lahore has been slightly better during
the last day or two; but Amritsar is a constant trouble and the periodical
improvements there are seldom maintained.

Gurgaon — about which I have had some separate correspondence2 3 with Your
Excellency — has been largely out of hand. Our resources there have been
inadequate, and we have so many commitments that it is quite impossible to
make police and troops available in the numbers required to suppress quickly
what amounts to a primitive war. The situation has, however, improved in the
last few days, and I hope that this time the improvement will be maintained. I
would fly over to Gurgaon again if I were not so busy here with the preparations
for partition. Eustace, the Commissioner of Ambala, is at Gurgaon and is in
close touch with the Army.

Elsewhere, largely I think because of the presence of troops in all districts
likely to give trouble, the fortnight has been fairly quiet. Gujranwala had some
communal stabbings; and bomb explosions, suspicious fires, and minor
incidents are so common that one hardly notices them in the District reports.

Our liaison with Northern Command is excellent. Messervy established a
Tactical Headquarters at Government House, Lahore, for about a week from
4th June — a very useful experiment which can be repeated if necessary.

[Para. 6, on the food position, omitted.]

Yours sincerely,

E. M. JENKINS

2 [Note in original:] I am seeing Mamdot, Sachar and Swaran Singh tomorrow 16th at io.o A.M.
Mamdot has launched a local Press campaign against me which the others will not like ! They will
think it an attack on them.

3 See No. 141 and its note 1.

40 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

210

Note by Mr H. M. Patel
Mountbatten Papers. Partition Committee Papers

IMMEDIATE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, CABINET SECRETARIAT,

secret new delhi, 1 5 June 1947

NO. 135/C. F./47

The Cabinet Secretary presents his compliments to the Honourable Member
for and is directed

by His Excellency the Viceroy to request that he will attend a meeting of the
Special Committee to be held at The Viceroy’s House at 6 P.M. on Monday,
the i6thjune, 1947.

AGENDA

1. Recommendations of the Steering Committee in regard to the Expert
Committees, their terms of reference and personnel, (attached)

2. A paper prepared by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on the
Re-constitution of the Armed Forces in India, (attached)

H. M. PATEL

Cabinet Secretary

To Hon’ble Members for Finance, Home, Food Sc Agriculture, and Com¬
munications.

Enclosure to No. 210

NOTE BY THE STEERING COMMITTEE

In the attached statements are set out

(1) the Expert Committees and sub-Committees that it will be necessary to
set up, and

(2) recommendations as to their respective terms of reference and their
membership.

As directed by the Cabinet Committee, departments were consulted regarding
the suitability of the terms of reference as also the composition and every effort
has been made to meet the various points urged and recommendations made by
them. In regard to two Expert Committees it has not been possible for the
Steering Committee to agree on their respective terms of reference. Each of us
have [ ? has] set out the terms of reference which he considers to be reasonable
and appropriate.

2. In so far as the Expert Committee No. 1 is concerned, alternative drafts
are submitted for para (a).

JUNE I947

407

3. In so far as the Expert Committee No. 2 is concerned, alternative drafts
are submitted for clause (2). The difference between the two drafts raises a
fundamental issue. Mr Patel’s view is that normally material assets must be left
where they are. In ordinary times, it is not only a simple arrangement but
positively advantageous in certain ways. It proceeds from the truth that division
and physical transfer of a material asset generally impairs its total value. This in
fact is a well-established principle. It was adopted first when Burma was
separated from India and was followed subsequently in the separations of Sind
from Bombay and Orissa from Bihar. In the present state of scarcity of capital
goods, however, a certain measure of physical transfer may be necessary in
order that the Government lacking in a particular resource may not be unduly
hampered in that service for a prolonged period. For that reason, in Mr Patel’s
draft, it has been stated that in such cases subject to the needs of the jurisdiction
in which they He negotiated arrangements may be reached.

On the other hand, Mr Mohamad Ah’s view is that the accident of geo¬
graphical location should not have priority over the just and equitable dis¬
tribution of assets like workshops and industrial installations between the two
successor Governments. The separation of Burma does not provide a parallel
since, owing to the geographical isolation of Burma, services in Burma were
very largely self-contained. It is only fair that both the successor Governments
should in the matter of efficiency of services start on as equal a footing as
possible. Inevitably Pakistan will be comparatively worse off in industrial
equipment which is at present in short supply throughout the world. This
disadvantage should not be further accentuated.

4. The terms of reference for Expert Committee No. 5 (Finance and Cur¬
rency Committee) together with its composition will be submitted later.

5. A separate paper entitled “Reconstitution of the Armed Forces in India”
is being circulated today containing the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief
for the setting up of an Armed Forces Committee together with its sub¬
committees. Owing to shortness of time, it has not been possible for us to
discuss this paper with the Commander-in-Chief. The paper, however, appears
to us to be satisfactory and we would recommend its acceptance.

6. It is proposed that all Expert Committees including the Armed Forces
Committee should be called upon to complete their work not later than the
22nd of July. It will not be feasible for the Assets and Liabilities Committee,
however, to submit its recommendations by the 22nd of July since a certain
portion at least of its work can only commence after a number of sub-Com-
mittees have completed their work ; that Committee can, therefore, be asked to
report by the 31st July. The Steering Committee will for its part submit
proposals to the Partition Council as the various Expert Committees’ reports
are received and examined.

408

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

TERMS

(As proposed by
Mr. H. M. Patel
(a) To obtain and submit
proposals —

(1) for the administrative
machinery required for
Pakistan, including

(i) the various kinds and
grades of staff,

(ii) the necessary office
equipment, furniture,
stores, etc.,

(iii) the necessary records,
documents, interna¬
tional agreements, etc.
(which should be
separated or duplicated).

(2) for the consequential
adjustments required in the
administrative machinery of
the rest of India.

EXPERT COMMITTEE NO. I
Organisation, Records and Personnel
OF REFERENCE

(As proposed by
Mr. Mohammad Ah)

(a) To submit plans for the

organisation of Departments,
Offices and services so that
the two successor Govern¬
ments have the necessary
administrative machinery
including —

(i) the various kinds and
grades of staff,

(ii) the necessary office
equipment, furniture,
stores, etc.,

(iii) the necessary records,
documents, international
agreements, etc. (which
should be separated or
duplicated).

COMPOSITION

1. Mr. S. A. Venkataraman

2. Mr. Yakub Shah

3. Mr. Ikramullah

4. Mr. Bhattacharyya

Secretaries

1. Mr. P. V. R. Rao

2. Mr. M. Ayub

(b) To make recommendations regarding the division, in accordance with the general directive given
below as far as possible, and where this may not be possible, to suggest the basis of division, of the
following —

(1) officers of the Superior Services,

(2) the staff of the Departments of the Government of India and of the Attached and Subor¬
dinate offices,

(3) the staff of the regional organisations, for example, the various Railways, P. & T. Circles,
and Income Tax Circles.

(c) Where it is not possible to effect a complete separation of functions by the partition date to recom¬
mend interim arrangements for carrying out the functions concerned in the two areas.

(d) To recommend measures for giving effect to the decisions taken on the recommendations in (a)
(b) and (c) by the Partition Council.

DIRECTIVE

Every government servant should be given the opportunity to select the
Government he wishes to serve. If in any case during the transition period a
different arrangement is necessary, specific orders of the Cabinet Committee
(later Partition Council) would be obtained on the basis of the recommenda¬
tions of the relevant Expert Committee by the Steering Committee.

[There follows a list of the Departmental Suh-Committees of Expert Committee
No. i, the terms of reference for which were to he 'as for the Expert Committee No. 1
suitably modified to meet the requirements of the departments concerned' .]

JUNE 1947

409

EXPERT COMMITTEE NO. II

Assets and Liabilities

TERMS OF REFERENCE

(As proposed by (As proposed by

Mr. H. M. Patel) Mr. Mohammad Ali)

(1) To compile lists of assets by broad categories showing value and
present location.

(2) To make recommendations as (2)

to the division of assets between
the two successor Govts,
keeping in view the following
broad principles —

(i) Fixed assets like railway
lines, buildings and public
works, telegraph and
telephone lines, etc. should
be regarded as the property
of the Govt, in whose
jurisdiction they lie.

(ii) Moveable assets like

To make recommendations
for the physical division of
assets between the two
successor Govts, bearing in
mind the objective that as
far as practicable

(a) the service in the two
Governments run with the
same degree of efficiency,

(b) the two Governments are
self-sufficient to the
maximum degree.

Explanatory Note

COMPOSITION

1. Mr. V. Narahari Rao

2. Sir Ghulam Mohd

(Non-official)

3. Mr. S. Ratnam

4. Mr. Mumtaz Hasan

5. Mr. Rangachari

6. Mr. M. Shoaib

Secretaries

1. Mr. Negi

2. Mr. Anwar Ali

rolling stock, reserves and There are certain categories of
maintenance stores, assets such as irrigation canals,

equipment relative to the railway lines, Telegraph lines,
fixed assets in (i) where buildings which will be taken over
applicable should be by the Government in whose

divided in such manner as territory they are located. On the
would enable the respective other hand, there are other
Govts, to be currently categories of assets such as stores,
self-sufficient and main- equipment, rolling stock, work-
tain the utilities efficiently, shops and industrial installations
(iii) Assets like plant and which can and should be divided

machinery in workshops, between the two Governments
factories and other irrespective of their present

installations and equipment locations so that both Govem-
in institutions of an all- ments have their due share of
India character may, such assets. This division should

subject to needs of the not be such as to destroy their
jurisdiction in which they utility to either Government
lie, be shared by the other except of course the temporary
Govt, to assist the latter loss of production during the
to be self-sufficient as far period of transportation and in
as practicable some cases of dismantling and

re-erection.

(3) When division is impracticable, to make recommendation either for mutual assistance or for joint
administration or for any other arrangement for such period as may be necessary.

(4) To make recommendations in regard to the financial settlement between the two Governments
arising from the above as well as from an allocation of the public debt, pensions and other liabilities.

(5) To recommend measures for giving effect to any transfer of assets after the recommendations have
been accepted by the Partition Council.

Note: Departmental sub-Committees and the Armed Forces Committee will submit reports to the
Expert Committee in regard to assets falling within their purview.

4io

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

[There follows: (i) a note on the Departmental Sub-Committees of Expert Com¬
mittee No. II. [Apart from Railways and All India Radio the departmental sub¬
committees of Expert Committee No. I were also to function as the departmental
sub-committees of Expert Committee No. II.)

(ii) a list oj the other Expert Committees with their Terms of Reference .]

Enclosure 2 to No. 210

SECRET

C-IN-C

Reconstitution of the Armed Forces of India
Commander-in-Chief’s Paper No. 1 of 1 1 June, 1947

1. Object

To set up a Committee for the reconstitution of the Indian Armed Forces
with the necessary sub-committees.

2. Responsibility of Committee

The Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee (AFRC) is to report to the
main Partition Council through the Steering Committee which will co-ordin¬
ate the work of this and other expert Committees. It is understood that the
Partition Council have decided1 that while the C-in-C will keep the Hon
Member for Defence acquainted with the proposals and intentions of AFRC,
the latter will not be subject to the existing Defence Dept, of the Government of
India.

3. Composition of the Committee

I propose that the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee should be
composed as follows: —

(a) Main Committee to define policy.

President — the C-in-C
Members — the C-in-C RIN

— the C.G.S.
the A.O. C-in-C
Mr. Muhammad Ali (FA D &S)

Mr. G. S. Bhalja (Additional Secy. Defence Department)
Secretary — Colonel Muller (C-in-C’s Sectt.)

(b) Sub-Committees to make recommendations regarding implementation of
policy.

(i) Navy Sub-Committee

Chairman — Commodore Jefford, RIN.

Members — 2 British officers of the RIN (one of whom will be an
Engineer Officer) ; 4 Indian officers of the RIN (The twro
senior Indian officers should be executive officers).
Secretary — An officer of the RIN.

Total 8 officers.

JUNE 1947

411

(ii) Army Sub-Committee

Chairman — Major-General Irwin, DCGS, GHQ
Members — 1 Colonel (British) GS Branch.

1 Colonel (British) AG’s Branch.

1 Colonel (British) QMG’s Branch.

6 Indian Officers of the Indian Army.

Secretary — An officer of the Indian Army.

Total 11 officers.

(iii) Air Force Sub-Committee

Chairman — Air Vice Marshal Perry-Keene, RAF, AOA, AHQ
India.

Members — 2 British officers of the RAF (one of whom will be a
technical officer) ; 4 Indian officers of the RIAF.
Secretary — An officer of the RIAF.

Total 8 officers.

A panel of names of Indian officers of each Service who are considered by me
competent to act as members of the Sub-Committee is attached,1 2 so that the
requisite number of Indian officers to serve on each sub-committee, namely 4
for the Navy, 6 for the Army and 4 for the Air Force, may be selected by the
members of the Partition Council.

I shall be grateful if H.E. the Governor General will procure for me the part
time services of Mr. Muhammed Ali and Mr. Bhalja to serve on the main
Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee. I think it is essential to have a
representative of each major community on this committee and I consider that
the two gentlemen I have suggested are admirably suited for this work.

The number of members suggested for the Army Sub-Committee may seem
to be on the large side, but the operation of reconstituting the Army is bound to
be most complex and difficult; and it is essential in my opinion to ensure that
there is the fullest possible measure of expert experience and knowledge
available in its members.

4. Terms of Reference

I suggest that the terms of reference for the A.F.R.C. should be as follows: —
“In close consultation with the Steering Committee, acting under the
orders of the Partition Council, to prepare a plan for the creation from the
existing Armed Forces in India, namely the Royal Indian Navy, the Indian
Army and the Royal Indian Air Force, (including the various installations,
establishments and stores owned by the present Defence Department of
the Government of India) of two separate, self-contained and self-suffi-

1 See No. 152, Item 3.

2 Panels of names, indicating the community to which each officer belonged, are attached for each of
the three service sub-committees, but are not reproduced here.

412

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

dent parts, one for eadi of the two Dominions into which British India is
to be divided. Due regard will be paid to the strategic and internal needs of
these new States and the necessity for ensuring the highest possible standard
of efficiency in their Armed Forces. In preparing its plan the Committee
will be guided throughout by the over-riding importance of maintaining
the highest possible standard of discipline, reliability and solidarity in the
present Armed Forces during the process of division.

The Committee will also ensure to the best of its ability that the plan
recommended by it safeguards to the utmost extent possible the welfare,
prospects and interests of the officers and other ranks now serving in the
Armed Forces of India. Implementation of the plan, when approved by the
Partition Council, shall be the responsibility of the C-in-C in India.”

5. Assumptions

In planning to give effect to its Terms of Reference the Committee will work
on the following assumptions : —

(i) That it is essential for their continued existence as organised Forces,
that the Navy, Army and Air Force should, during the process of their
reconstitution, continue to be administered and maintained by the
existing machinery, namely N.H.Q., G.FLQ. and A.FI.Q. under the
general direction of the C-in-C. Delegation of control to the new
authorities to be set up can be gradual and progressive, as these become
able to carry out their functions.

(ii) That service in the Armed Forces of the two new States will be on a
territorial and not on a communal basis; that is, a Muslim domiciled
outside Pakistan may serve in the Armed Forces of Hindustan, if he so
wishes and is considered suitable and vice versa.

(iii) That service in the Armed Forces of both States will be voluntary, at
any rate in the first instance.

(iv) That no Indian officer or man now serving in the Indian Armed
Forces, whatever his domicile, can be compelled against his will to
continue to serve in the new Armed Forces to be set up in the two
States, and that proportionate benefits be allowed to any Indian officer
or man who does not3 wish to do so.

(v) That Indian officers and other ranks who agree to take service in the
Forces of the new States will do so under a fresh agreement to be
formulated by the Governments of the States. Those who volunteer
to serve on in the Forces of either State will be permitted to do so under
their existing terms and conditions of service, until new terms are
promulgated, and that, then, if they do not desire to serve on under the
new terms, they will be allowed to terminate their service, and that
proportionate benefits be admissible to them also.

(vi) That any Indian officers or other ranks it may be necessary to engage

JUNE I947

413

for service in the Armed Forces, between now and the time when the
new Forces of the two States are fully established, should be engaged
under existing terms and conditions of service, with the option of
resigning from the service, should they not wish to serve on under any
new terms or conditions which may be imposed by the new Dominion
Governments.

(vii) That the hability for non-effective charges in respect of pensions,
gratuities, annuities, etc. earned by Indian officers and other ranks of the
three Services prior to the transfer of authority to the new Dominion
Governments will be undertaken by these Governments and publicly
so announced.

(viii) That no increases or decreases in the number of major units or estab¬
lishments of the three Services existing today will be made while the
reconstitution of the Armed Forces is in process, any such changes as
either Dominion may desire to make being deferred until it has assumed
full responsibility for the administration and maintenance of its own
new Forces.

(ix) Similarly, there shall be no changes in the basic organization of
formations, units, establishments and installations of the three Services,
or in the class composition of units except as may be demanded by the
process of reconstitution, while the creation of the Armed Forces of
the two Dominions is in progress. Any such changes which may already
be in contemplation or proposed will be suspended.

(x) Likewise, no changes will be made in the nomenclature of existing
formations, units or establishments while division is proceeding, other¬
wise administrative confusion is bound to ensue.

(xi) For the successful reconstitution of the Armed Forces, the services of
the greater number of the British officers now serving in them will be
required.

Therefore, while the normal process of nationalization will continue,
the plan for complete nationalization by June 48 will not4 be imple¬
mented.

6. Conclusion

I request the early approval of the Partition Council to these proposals and
that I may be informed of the names of the Indian officers selected to sit on the
three Service Sub-Committees, so that the preliminaries for the reconstitution
of the Armed Forces may be put in hand without delay. Owing to the great
complexity and delicacy of this problem, it is essential that its solution should
begin at the earliest possible date.

C. J. E. AUCHINLECIC

3 4 Emphasis in original.

4 H

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

21 1

Sir D. Monteath to Lord Ismay
Telegram , L/PO/8/45: JJ 25-8

most immediate India office, 15 June 1Q47, li pm

secret Received: 16 June , 6 am

7702. Your telegrams 14th June 143 6-S and 143 8-S.1 King has now given
informal approval to appointment of Lockhart to act in place of Caroe and to
suggestion that change should be explained by publication of letters sum¬
marised in your 143 6-S.

2. I suggest that simultaneously with despatch of his reply to Caroe on lines
indicated H.E. should telegraph to S. of S. his formal recommendation of
Lockhart and that full text of letters exchanged should be telegraphed to Harris
or me for use as shown in following paragraph.

3 . On receipt of King’s formal approval which will be obtained without
delay announcement will be made here repeat here. Precise time of publication
will be telegraphed so that as nearly as possible simultaneous publication may
be made in India. Proposed terms of announcement as follows. Begins. H.M. has
been pleased to approve appointment of Lockhart to act as Governor of the
N.W.F.P. in the place of Caroe who has been granted leave of absence by the
S. of S. for I. on the recommendation of H.E. the G.G. Ends. This would be
accompanied by Press notice containing text of letters exchanged.

4. This will conform to position now reached by fact that Caroe’s letter
offering to take leave has already been despatched.

5. It is understood that letters to be exchanged will make no more definite
reference to possibility of Caroe resuming Governorship after referendum than
is implied by phrases in your summary of C’s letter ‘a new Governor should be
in charge during referendum’ and in Viceroy’s reply ‘a new Governor during
this period’. But in regard to this possibility S. of S. with whom P.M. concurs
(as was about to be conveyed to you when your 143 6-S was received) is
opposed to resumption of Governorship by Caroe once he has relinquished it 2
and considers that it would have been better to make his resignation and L’s
appointment substantive forthwith. For whereas if referendum were to go in
favour of Congress Caroe clearly could not resume, if it goes in favour of
Moslem League his immediate resumption would be likely to be taken as clear
evidence that he has been League’s man all along. It is too late now to pursue
this course and no doubt it will be possible if necessary after further considera¬
tion to induce Caroe to tender resignation while on leave and to confirm
Lockhart’s acting appointment. Of course if Pakistan Government when

JUNE 1947

415

created and in exercise of rights of Dominion Government were to make its
own recommendation to King and advise that Caroe resume or be re-appointed
a new situation would arise.3

1 The first of these telegrams explained the proposal to announce the change of Governors by publica¬
tion of an exchange of letters between Sir O. Caroe and Lord Mountbatten (see Nos. 154, 181 and
227) and emphasised the urgency of the matter; the second notified Sir O. Caroe’s agreement to the
procedure proposed. R/3/1/170: ff 52-3.

2 See No. 148, last para.

3 Lord Mountbatten replied to this telegram in tel. 1463-S of 16 June pointing out that ‘there is no
question of Caroe taking over again as Governor unless a recommendation in his favour were made
by the Pakistan Government’. R/3/1/170: f 59.

212

Secretary of State to H.M. Minister at Kabul
Telegram, L\P &Sli2/i8n: f 127

immediate India office, 16 June 1947, 9. jo am

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 51. Your telegram No. 47 ofjune nth:1 Afghan interest in future of North
Western India.

2. The Afghan Minister called at the Foreign Office on June nth to express
his Government’s views on that part of the declaration ofjune 3rd which
concerned the North West Frontier Province.

3 . The Minister said that the Afghan Government were concerned at possible
fate of the population of this Province if, in accordance with the present plan, a
referendum took place and the choice were offered to them of associating
themselves either with Pakistan or liindustan. The Afghan Government
considered that the population of the former Afghan territories annexed by
Great Britain to India during the last century should have the opportunity of
deciding whether they wished to rejoin Afghanistan or to form a separate State
enjoying complete independence. The Afghan Government had hitherto
acknowledged the necessity of treating the question of the NorthWest Frontier
Province in connexion with the question of partition in India. In view of recent
developments however they considered that the moment was opportune for
them to make official representations regarding the Province and to put forward
proposals for its future in accordance with ethnological considerations.

4. The Afghan Minister was told thaf if he would submit a note setting out in
detail his Government’s proposals, they would be given due consideration by
H.M.G.

Repeated to Government of India, External Affairs and Commonwealth
Relations Dept.

1 No. 140.

4i 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

213

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Withdrawal of British Forces ,

Part ( 1 )

16 June 1947

H.E.

On 31st March1 Your Excellency wrote to the Secretary of State asking that
HMG should give formal approval to the policy that there should be no sub¬
stantial withdrawal of British forces from India until power had been actually
transferred, i.e. until June 1948.

2. The Secretary of State for India confirmed this policy in his letter of 30th
April, 1947.2

3 . The situation having been completely changed by the decision to transfer
power on or about 15th August, 1947, you instructed me to ask the C-in-C for
his advice as to the line which should now be taken in regard to the withdrawal
of British forces.

4. The C.G.S. has now submitted the paper at Flag ‘A’,3 which, it is under¬
stood, has been approved by the C-in-C. The recommendations (see para. 8)
are:

(a) Provided that a formal request is received from the Governments of
Hindustan and Pakistan, the provisional date for the withdrawal of
British forces should now be fixed at 1st April, 1948, and reviewed on 1st
January, 1948: and

(b) If no such request is received from the Governments in question, HMG
should insist that British forces should remain until 1st January, 1948, to
fulfil HMG’s moral obligation to safeguard British lives.

5. If these recommendations were approved, it would be necessary to safe¬
guard the position by an arrangement whereby the British forces in India would
be directly under the C-in-C, who would be responsible to HMG through the
Governor General or Governors General. This safeguard would be demanded
by public opinion at Home, but would, it is thought, be most unpalatable
to the Governments of both India and Pakistan. It would defeat the object
which is uppermost in your mind, namely that, from the date of the transfer of
power, both the new Governments should be autonomous in every sense of the
word, without a vestige of the old restrictions or safeguards.

6. As for the argument that HMG have a moral obligation to safeguard
British lives until such time as those who have to leave India have been able to

JUNE I947

417

make arrangements to do so; it looks as though the numbers are likely to be
relatively small, and that these could be got away in the next two months. In
any case, the responsibility for the protection of all foreign nationals, including
of course British nationals, in the whole sub-continent of India will, from 15th
August, rest with the Governments of India and Pakistan : and unless both of
them specifically ask for British forces to remain to help them to carry out this
duty, insistence on our part on retaining them would be tantamount to an
admission that we did not trust them to carry out their obligations with their
own forces. Finally, if things really blew up, the handful of British troops that
would remain in this country could do very little to safeguard British lives as a
whole.

7. I ought to remind you —

(a) That at the meeting of the India/Burma Committee (I.B. (47) 28th
Meeting, Item 9) held on 28th May,4 you said that there would be every
advantage in withdrawing the British forces from India as soon as possible
after the enactment of the legislation providing for the transfer of power.
The Committee decided to resume consideration of this question after the
views of the Chiefs of Staff had been obtained: and

(b) That at your Press Conference you gave the impression, without saying
so in terms, that the British troops would be withdrawn when Dominion
status had been granted to the two new Dominions.

8. In all these circumstances, your Staff submit that political considerations
are overriding and that the proper policy is to commence the withdrawal of
British forces on the 15 th August, and to carry it out as rapidly as possible. They
further submit that a very early announcement of HMG’s decision to do this
would have a most excellent political effect.

9. If you approve these proposals, I submit that you should discuss them with
the C-in-C, and then, subject to anything that the Field Marshal may have to
say, authorise me to draft a telegram to the Secretary of State for India, request¬
ing the formal approval of H.M.G.

ISMAY

1 Vol. X, No. 38. 2 Ibid., No. 255. 3 Enclosure to No. 159. 4 Vol. X, No. 553.

4i 8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

214

Mr Abell to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten o/B urma

Rhl 1/153: f 82

16 June 1947

The copies of the Indian Dominions Bill1 arrived on Sunday afternoon. The
Bill is being immediately examined by the Reforms Commissioner and Sir
George Spence.

2. I have also sent copies for comments to the Governors of the Punjab and
Bengal, to the Political Adviser2 and to the C.G.S. (in the absence of the Chief,
who does not get back till the 18th).

3 . At first sight the Bill looks fairly satisfactory to me but there will be points
on which we shall have to send comments to London.

4. The India Office want our comments by 25th June but it is not clear
whether, if the Cabinet Committee, which meets tomorrow, agrees to our
showing the text to the Indian leaders, we have got to get it cleared with them
also by 25th. I have sent a telegram to the India Office enquiring about this.

5. Attached below the copy of the Bill is a letter from Mr. Turnbull of the
India Office and a memorandum explaining certain points in the Bill.3 I do not
think Y.E. need study this in detail at the moment but C.V.S. has suggested a
meeting on Tuesday afternoon or evening to examine the Bill with the Reforms
Commissioner in the light of the comments received.

G. E. B. ABELL

1 No. 191.

2 Sir C. Corfield replied on 17 June stating that he had ‘no comments on the parts [of the Bill] affecting
the States’. R/3/1/153: £94.

3 No. 189 and its Enclosure.

215

Mr Abell to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rbl1 li%9: f 13$

16 June 1947

Y.E. said in your broadcast of the 3rd June1 that you appealed to members of
the Services to continue in India if they were wanted.

2. The situation is likely to be different in the Congress Provinces, as com¬
pared with the Pakistan Provinces. The Home Member does not2 intend to

JUNE 1947

419

appeal to British officials to serve on in India. He will only say that they can put
down their names for consideration by the Indian Governments if they wish to
do so.

3. Secondly, Pandit Nehru’s speech to the A.I.C.C.,3 of which I attach a
marked newspaper report, is likely to reduce to negligible proportions the
number of British officials who will stay on in the Congress Provinces.

4. Pakistan’s attitude has not yet been ascertained, but I have asked the
steering committee to try and get instructions on the point, as it is most urgent.
Probably Pakistan will welcome British officials and in Sind, at any rate, they
are likely to stay.

5. The attitude of the Congress makes it, in my opinion, impossible to make
any further appeal to officers of the Secretary of State’s services in Hindustan.

6. The question remains whether a strong appeal should be made to officials
in Pakistan, if the Pakistan authorities themselves are prepared to make an
appeal on their own behalf. I think this question should be left over for the
moment.

7. I shall be grateful for orders on the point about an appeal to officials in
Hindustan, because a circular to officials asking them their intentions is likely to
be issued in the next day or two from the Home Department, and I must be
able to give them an indication of Y.E.’s intentions.

G. E. B. ABELL

1 Sec No. 44, penultimate para. 2 Emphasis in original. 3 See Enclosure to No. 218.

216

Minutes of Viceroy's Forty Third Staff Meeting , Items 1-3

Mountbatten Papers

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's House , New Delhi, on 16 June
at 4 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Lord Ismay, SirE.
Mieville, Mr Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Item 1

THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES

his excellency the viceroy said that he had seen Field Marshal Auchin-
leck several times at Simla during the previous week-end. Field Marshal
Auchinleck was now satisfied that the division of the Indian Armed Forces
could be carried out without vitally impairing their efficiency, provided that

420

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

there was goodwill and trust, and provided that political pressure was not
applied to hurry the processes unduly.

rao bahadur menon suggested that Sir Chandulal Trivedi should
be asked to come to Delhi in connection with the discussions on the division of
the Indian Armed Forces.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed P.S.V. to pursue the suggestion that Sir Chandulal Trivedi should

come to Delhi for this purpose.

Item 2

THE DRAFT BILL

rao bahadur menon stated that copies of the draft Bill to be introduced
into Parliament conferring Dominion status on the two parts of India had been
received the previous day. His first impressions were that it was a good draft.
He was at present examining it in detail and would have prepared, by the
following morning, a draft telegram to the Secretary of State.

his excellency the viceroy said that he considered that, since Rao
Bahadur Menon as a citizen of the future India had had an opportunity to see
the draft Bill at this early stage, it would be only fair correspondingly to allow a
future citizen of Pakistan to see it. Probably the most suitable person would be
Mr Mohammed Ali.
his excellency the viceroy:

(i) decided to have a further meeting the following afternoon to consider
the Reforms Commissioner’s draft telegram to the Secretary of State
about the draft Bill;

(ii) directed the Reforms Commissioner to show a copy of the draft Bill to
Mr Mohammed Ah.

Item 5

THE STATES

his excellency the viceroy said that it had transpired that there was
some doubt as to whether he had given the right answers at his Press Con¬
ference to questions concerning the position of States which declared themselves
independent.1 He had intended to say that H.M.G. would not confer Dominion
status on any State which declared itself independent. To the question whether
H.M.G. would have relations of any sort with such States, he had intended to
reply that this was a hypothetical question which would have to be referred to
H.M.G.2 It now appeared possibly that the answers to these two questions had
been confused.

lord ism ay suggested that His Excellency might wish to make the posi¬
tion absolutely clear in a personal statement — possibly during his forthcoming
visit to Kashmir.

JUNE 1947

421

rao Bahadur menon made the alternative suggestion that this matter
might be cleared up by means of a question and answer in the House of
Commons.

his excellency the viceroy said that he was inclined to favour the
latter of these two suggestions.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

decided to speak to Sir Walter Monckton about this matter that evening.3

1 Presumably Lord Mountbatten had in mind Sir W. Monckton’s letter at No. 199.

2 cf. No. 60, p. 1 1 5.

3 No record of this interview has been traced.

217

Meeting of the Special Committee of the Indian Cabinet
Mountbatten Papers. Partition Committee Minutes

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held on 16 June 1947 at 6 pm were: Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma , Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , Sardar Patel , Dr Rajendra
Prasad , Mr Abdur Rab Nishtar ; Lord Ismay , Sir E. Mieville , Mr Mohammed Ali ,
Mr H. M. Patel , Mr Osman Ali ( Secretariat )

[First two items , on a press note which was to be issued explaining the partition
machinery which had been set up , and on the draft letter to Provincial Governments and
members of the Secretary of State's Services regarding the guarantees to be given to
members of the Services, omitted.]

[iii]. Recommendations of the Steering Committee in regard to the Expert
Committees, their terms of reference and personnel.1

MINUTES

Expert Committee No. 1.

His Excellency said that he would suggest the inclusion of a 'standstill’ proviso
in the draft directive in accordance with which it was proposed that Expert
Committee No. 1 should make recommendations for the division of officers
and staff. This was that after every Government servant had elected which
Government he wished to serve, the cadres would be separated accordingly but
actual transfers would have to be arranged over a period of time and in the
meanwhile a 'standstill’ agreement should be made so that the efficiency of the
organisations might be preserved.

In the course of subsequent discussion the following points were made : —
(1) In view of the existing abnormal conditions and the consequent difficulty

x Enclosure 1 to No. 210.

422

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

which an officer might find in making a final choice in the matter, a reasonably
long period, say, one or two years, should be allowed to officers within which to
exercise their option.

(2) Unless the final choice was made within a short time it would not be
possible for either Government to go ahead with recruitment to its services.
Moreover, it would be detrimental to retain for any length of time in the
Administration officers whose loyalty might He with another State.

(3) These difficulties could be overcome by one of two methods (a) by
arranging mutual transfers later on or (b) by stipulating that officers who chose
to serve a State other than the one in which they were at present, should be
retained until such time as it was possible to recruit others to take their place.

(4) It was only to provide for those officers who felt that they could not make
a final choice, because of the prevailing abnormal conditions, that a chance
should be given to them to reconsider their decision. This should, of course, be
done before either State commenced fresh recruitment to its services on any
considerable scale.

His Excellency said that H.M.G. were examining the question as to which
party should be recognised as inheritor of the present Government for the
purpose of preserving continuity of diplomatic representation abroad and other
such matters. He thought that when H.M.G.’s decision on this point had been
communicated it might be easier to agree on the terms of reference of this
Committee.

Expert Committee No . 2

His Excellency said that in certain cases where physical assets were uprooted
their value might be lowered and he felt that the interests of Pakistan might
best be served if Pakistan obtained financial compensation for purchasing new
machinery and if India agreed to give Pakistan equal facilities for servicing in
such cases until such time as Pakistan acquired its own machinery.

The following points were made in the course of discussion :

(1) It was important that the administration and services in both States
should run efficiently. This could not be done unless there was a division of
physical assets. The Armed Forces, for example, could not do without Ord¬
nance Factories.

(2) The division of all physical assets might result in neither State having
efficient plants.

(3) The Steering Committee might not experience much difficulty once they
got down to the job. It might, therefore, work on the general principle that the
greatest good of both the new states should be secured; but if there were dis¬
puted claims by Pakistan for fixed assets Hke plant and machinery, the removal

JUNE I947

423

of which might be detrimental to the interests of the other Government, the
facts of each case should be reported to the Partition Council for consideration.

The Hon ble Mr. Liaquat Ah Khan said that it might be necessary to make
some changes in the membership of the expert committees if, for example,
certain officers who had been proposed to serve on them were not available.
The Steering Committee should be authorized to make such changes subject
to the approval of the Partition Council. He wished to include in Expert
Committee No. 2 a retired official for the reason that there were no Muslim
officers of sufficient seniority and experience to serve effectively on that
Committee.

DECISION

The Committee agreed :

(1) to the setting up of the expert committees with the personnel recom¬
mended in the note prepared by the Steering Committee.

(2) that as a special case Sir Ghulam Mohammad though non-official should
be allowed to serve on Expert Committee No. 2 (Assets & Liabilities).

(3) that the terms of reference of the Committees should be as recommended
by the Steering Committee, except in regard to Expert Committees Nos. 1 and
2.

(4) that the terms of reference of expert committee No. 1 should be settled
after H.M.G. had announced their decision regarding the authority to be
treated as successor to the present Government for purposes of continuity of
foreign representation etc. It was desirable, however, that the work of the
committee should not be held up and that the Steering Committee should
endeavour to give suitable instructions to enable the committee and its sub¬
committees to get on with their work.

(5) that the directive in accordance with which the Expert Committee No.
1 would make recommendations regarding the division of officers and staff
should be as follows : —

“Every Government servant should be given the opportunity to elect which
Government he wished to serve. This option should be exercised within a
period of, say, 10 days. If, however, any Government servant desired the right
to reconsider his decision he should make a specific request to that effect at the
time he makes his choice and be allowed six months in which to make his final
choice. When the option has been exercised, the cadres will be separated
accordingly. But actual transfers will have to be arranged over a period of time
and in the meanwhile a ‘standstill’ agreement should be arranged so that the
efficiency of the organisations may be preserved.”

(6) that the Steering Committee should endeavour to evolve agreed terms of

424

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

reference for Expert Committee No. 2, failing which it should proceed with its
work subject to the adoption of the broad principle of securing the greatest
good of the two states, and that in the event of disputed claims for fixed assets
like plant and machinery, the removal of which might be detrimental to the
interests of the other Government, the facts of each case should be reported for
consideration by the Partition Council.

(7) that changes in the personnel of the expert committees could be made by
the Steering Committee subject to the approval of the Congress and the League
members of the Special Committee (later Partition Council).

[iv]. Paper prepared by the Commander-in-Chief on the reconstitution of the
Armed Forces in India.2

MINUTES

His Excellency said that the Commander-in-Chief had at first been gloomy
about the probable effects of the division of the Army on the discipline and
morale of the troops. However, as a result of the lead given by the leaders that
the country should accept the partition in the proper spirit, he was now opti¬
mistic and confident that he could produce at the earliest reasonable moment
two Armies each of which would be as efficient as the existing one, provided
the advice of the experts on the question of division was given due con¬
sideration.

Para. 2. Responsibility of the Committee.

It was explained that the name of the Committee had been deliberately
chosen by the Commander-in-Chief for psychological reasons. It implied
division, which would be followed by reconstitution. The Committee agreed
that the name suggested by the Commander-in-Chief should stand and the
responsibilities of the Committee should be as set out in para. 2 of the paper
prepared by the Commander-in-Chief.

Para. 3. Composition of the Committee.

His Excellency said he had looked at the panel of names of Indian officers
who were considered by the Commander-in-Chief competent to act as mem¬
bers of the Sub-Committees and he had noticed that, for circumstances beyond
control, none of them was of great seniority or had any high level experience.
There was a world of difference between command experience and high level
experience. He suggested, therefore, that Sir Chandulal Trivedi, who had been
Secretary of the War Department for three years during World War II and who
had a good inner knowledge of the working of the Armed Forces, might be
co-opted or called in for consultation by the Armed Forces Reconstitution
Committee. The Committee agreed that a wire should be sent to Sir Chandulal
Trivedi inviting him to serve on the main Committee.

JUNE 1947

425

Para. 3(b). Sub-Committees.

The Hon’ble Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan suggested that each Sub-Committee
should have two Secretaries, one from each community. Continuing, he said
that most of the officers were unknown to the two parties and he suggested that
they should be given some time to make recommendations regarding the
composition of the Sub-Committees. They should also be enabled to interview
any officer about whose suitability they were in doubt.

His Excellency suggested that the Chief of the General Staff might be asked
to depute a senior officer from each service, who would be in a position to
express impartial views on all the officers under consideration for appointment
to the Sub-Committees and who would advise the Congress and the League
members. If they wished to interview any of the Indian officers, facilities should
be provided.

Para. 4. Terms of reference

His Excellency said that the main point of difference between the terms of
reference suggested by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on the one
hand and the Hon’ble Members for Home and Food & Agriculture on che
other2 3 was that the latter desired that the plan for division should be completed
not later than the 22nd of July, 47.

In the course of subsequent discussion the following points were made : —

(1) It would be possible to have an outline plan together with a certain
amount of detail ready by the 22nd of July, but the task was so big that even
with the utmost good-will it would not be possible to settle all the details by
that date. It was understood, for example, that ordnance items alone, not
including Engineer stores, etc. numbered as many as 4,50,000. The work
would, however, be done with the greatest speed possible. It was essential,
however, to maintain the morale and discipline on the one hand, and to keep in
view the needs of internal security on the other. That and the fact that the work
had to be done through the Sub-Committees necessarily imposed certain
limitations.

(2) It was important to know what the position of the Army would be
on the 15 th of August. Unless the division were completed by then, there would
be no Army under the control of either Government. It was pointed out that
this difficulty could be overcome by placing the troops located in each successor
State under the operational control of the respective Governments, who would
give their own orders to the Commander-in-Chief regarding movements,

2 Enclosure 2 to No. 210. General Sir A. Smith, Chief of the General Staff, was present for the remain¬
der of the meeting.

3 No copy of the terms of reference suggested by Sardar Patel and Dr Rajendra Prasad has been

traced.

426

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

disposition of troops etc. within their own borders. The Commander-in-Chief
would, of course, for a time have to retain administrative control.

(3) It was not clear what the position of the Commander-in- Chief would be
in the event of conflicting orders being given to him by both States. The point
required consideration and it may be that some sort of Defence Council would
have to be evolved to deal with such cases.

(4) If the number of troops now in the Northern Command, which more or
less covered the N.W. Pakistan area, could be ascertained, as well as their
community- wise composition, it would be possible for those units which were
wholly or mostly composed of Muslims to be kept in Pakistan (both Western
and Eastern) and units which were wholly or mostly composed of other com¬
munities to be moved to the rest of India before the 15th of August. The
Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee should, therefore, immediately work
out proposals to ensure that the disposition of the Army on the 15 th of August
or as soon thereafter as might be possible, should be such that the maximum
number of troops would be located in the State to which they belonged, that
is, in either of the two Pakistan States or in the rest of India.

(5) It would not be possible to work out the numbers of troops to be in
position in each State on the 15th of August without knowing the basis on
which the present Army was to be divided. It was explained that it would be
necessary for alternative schemes to be prepared by the experts each based on
different premises.

(6) It was necessary to give the Sub-Committees a lead on the question
whether, in making recommendations on the division of the Armed Forces,
they should consider the needs of defence against external aggression or of
internal security. The Committee agreed that they should primarily take into
account the needs of internal security, the possibility of trouble from the tribes
and as an alternative plan also from Afghanistan.

(7) It was important to know by what date British troops were to be with¬
drawn. After H.M.G.’s views were known, the two successor Governments
could be consulted on this question.

DECISION

The Committee of the Cabinet agreed —

(1) that Sir Chandulal Trivedi should be invited to serve on the Armed
Forces Reconstitution Committee.

(2) that each Sub-Committee of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Com¬
mittee should have two secretaries, one from each community.

(3) that the Chief of the General Staff should direct a senior officer from each
service who would be in a position to advise the Congress and the League
members of this Committee on the suitability of the officers for appointment
to the Sub-Committees. The two parties would be enabled to interview any
officer about whose suitability they were in doubt.

JUNE I947

427

(4) that the Chief of the General Staff should consult Sardar Patel and Dr.
Rajendra Prasad and Mr. Liaquat Ah Khan and Sardar Abdur Rab Nish tar and
endeavour to draw up agreed terms of reference for the Armed Forces Recon¬
stitution Committee.

(5) that H.M.G. should be consulted as to their intention regarding the date
of withdrawal of British troops.

(6) that the Armed Forces Committee should immediately work out
proposals to ensure that disposition of troops on the 15 th of August, or as soon
thereafter as possible, shall be such as to contain the maximum number of units
of the State to which they are eventually going to belong, i.e., by endeavouring
as far as possible to have the majority of Muslims in Pakistan and the majority
of non-Muslims in the rest of India.

(7) that the aim should be to give operational control over the units in each
State to the Government of that State, the administrative control remaining
with the common Commander-in-Chief.

MINUTES

M-

His Excellency said he hoped he was correctly interpreting the views of both
parties in saying that it was their common desire that the partition should be
carried out in a spirit of friendship and goodwill and with a sincere desire to
part as friends. If so, he suggested that the Committee should agree to this being
placed on record as a broad statement of the spirit in which the work would be
done. By making known their views on this matter they would exercise a
valuable psychological effect on the Expert Committees.

DECISION

The Special Committee directed that the work of partition should be under¬
taken in a spirit of friendship and goodwill, and with the desire to give a fair
deal to both sides.

218

Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Situation in, Part 11(a)
SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, l6 June lg 47

NO. 684

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have read with considerable surprise Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru’s speech of
15th June to the All India Congress Committee as reported in this morning’s

428

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

“Tribune”. I enclose cuttings which show the general tone and purport of the
speech.

2. Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru’s main points are —

(i) that it is inexplicable that British officers who dealt efficiently with the
earlier civil disobedience movements should be incapable of controlling
the present disturbances;

(ii) that where Congress ministries are in office disturbances were brought
under control, but where the British exercise authority there is chaos ;

(iii) that in the Punjab trouble is most acute in, if not confined to areas
controlled entirely by, British officers ; and

(iv) that British officers are now callous and when asked to help during
disturbances advise the victims to apply to Pandit Nehru or Sardar
Patel.

3. Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru is wrong both in his facts and in his reasoning.
The answer to point (i) is that the disturbances now occurring differ not only in
degree but in kind from any trouble we have had in the past. In the Punjab we
are going through what amounts to a revolution. The Congress leaders com¬
monly compare our performance in 1942 with our performance in 1946-47;
but in 1942 the authorities were faced not with widespread fighting between the
communities but with concentrated attacks on Government servants and
Government buildings and institutions. Point (ii). There have been very serious
disturbances in Bombay, Bihar and the N.W.F.P. all of which are under
Congress Governments. In Bombay and in Bihar there was, so far as I can see,
little justification for the disturbances and in Bihar there was by all accounts
the worst massacre that has occurred anywhere. The fact is that disturbances
are almost inevitable now in any province in which the conflict between the
Muslim League and the Congress is a live issue. The danger spots are manifestly
Bengal, the Punjab and the N.W.F.P. and it would be difficult to relate the
state of law and order in those areas to the complexion of the Government
holding office. It is incorrect on point (iii) that trouble in the Punjab has been
confined to places where the staff is entirely British. Multan and Lahore both
have Indian Commissioners ; and in Multan the D.I.G. Police is also an Indian.
By tradition we have always posted British Deputy Commissioners and Super¬
intendents of Police to Lahore, Rawalpindi, Multan and Amritsar because they
were places where communal trouble was likely to occur. There has only been
one Indian Deputy Commissioner in Lahore and during his time things were
certainly no better than they were before and after under British Deputy
Commissioners. Point (iv) is malicious and is, to the best oi my belief, without
foundation. An allegation of this kind was made to me on one of my visits to
Rawalpindi, the officer concerned being the Deputy Commissioner. I was able

JUNE 1947

429

to confront the complainant with the Deputy Commissioner and the com¬
plainant was at once covered with confusion. It was clear from his manner
and from the laughter of those with him that he was not telling the truth.

4. If Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru was simply the leader of a political party, his
views would not be of great importance; but he is the Vice-President of Your
Excellency’s Executive Council and I should be glad to know how far his views
are endorsed by His Majesty’s Government and Your Excellency. I do not
think His Majesty’s Government can expect their British servants in India to
remain in office until the transfer of power unless they are able to protect them
from official onslaughts of this description.

Yours sincerely,

EVAN JENKINS

Enclosure to No. 218

EXTRACT

“tribune”

(Lahore, Monday, June 16th, 1947.)

Pandit Nehru expressed his horror and disgust at the riots in the Punjab,
Bengal and elsewhere and said that these were no isolated riots. They were
planned attacks. It seemed the administration had broken down and that there
was no authority left in the country to enforce order. How was it, he asked, that
British officers who coped with the civil disobedience movements in the past
were unable to cope with the present disturbances? Where there were Congress
ministries disturbances were brought under control but where the British
exercised authority there was chaos.

In the Punjab where there was cent per cent British rule, Pandit Nehru said,
despite the efforts of certain senior officers, murder and arson continued. The
trouble was prevalent the most where there were the British officers in charge
and divisions under the control of either Hindu or Muslim officers were com¬
paratively quiet. The Interim Government was able to do nothing to protect the
people.

WHAT BRITISH OFFICERS TOLD VICTIMS

Deploring the disturbances in the country, Pandit Nehru reiterated that govern¬
mental authority had almost collapsed. The British were no longer interested
because they were leaving. This probably explained why some officers asked the
victims who came to them for help to go to him (Nehru) or Sardar Patel for
help. They were not desirous of shouldering any further responsibility and
many had become callous.

430

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

219

Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

(Extract)

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Part 11(a)

CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, l6 June I947

NO. 685

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I enclose for Your Excellency’s information a copy of the note on a meeting I
held this morning with Mamdot, Sachar and Swaran Singh. The meeting was
quite amicable and I think we shall be able to get things going.1 Mamdot said
almost nothing and made no reference to his complaint about the expert
committees on which he launched a press campaign yesterday. I think, though
one can never be sure, that the three Party Leaders will now arrive at some
sensible agreement among themselves. They all seem to accept my point that
the main responsibility for the presentation of facts must rest with the officials
responsible for the subjects concerned.

Enclosure to No. 219

Note on a meeting on partition preliminaries held at Government House, Lahore , at

10 a.m. on Monday , 16 June 1947 (Extract)
present The Governor

Khan Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot
Lala Bhim Sen Sachar
Sardar Swaran Singh

12. In the course of the proceedings the Party Leaders undertook to discuss
among themselves and to advise the Governor on the following points : —

(1) The composition of the Partition Committee (including the question
whether the appointment of members from outside the Punjab is
admissible).

(2) On the assumption that the Partition Committee will not be set up until
after 23 rd June, the formation of an Interim Committee of the kind
suggested by Sardar Swaran Singh.2

(3) The necessity for a 44 Steering Committee” and the selection of its per¬
sonnel (Messrs. Askwith, Zahid Husain, and Sachdev were the persons
mentioned at the meeting).

(4) The functions of the Steering Committee (The Governor’s suggestion
was that this Committee might form the nucleus of the Partition Com¬
mittee Secretariat in addition to 4 ‘steering” the Expert Committees).

JUNE I947

431

(5) The composition of the Expert Committees.

(6) The need for advisors on the lines suggested by Sardar Swaran Singh3
and whether such advisors, if appointed, should be attached to the
Steering Committee and be available to all or any of the members of the
Partition Committee.

(7) The selection of the advisors mentioned in (6).

The Governor undertook:

(a) to issue a press note;

(b) to refer to the Governor-General the views of the Party Leaders about the
preparation of information for the Boundary Commission;4

(c) to initiate arrangements for office accommodation and the clerical staff
for the Partition Committee; and

(d) to examine the possibilities of remitting fees for the inspection of docu¬
ments at the instance of Party Leaders.

1 See No. 180.

2 Sardar Swaran Singh’s suggestion was that the formation of the full committee should be postponed
until after the decision on partition (to be taken by the Punjab Legislative Assembly on 23 June) and
that in the meantime a committee consisting perhaps of the three Party Leaders might be set up to
supervise the initial arrangements.

3 Sardar Swaran Singh and Lala Bhim Sen Sachar had suggested that members of the Partition Com¬
mittee would require, in addition to the general partition machinery, advice of a more personal kind,
and had proposed the allocation of personal advisers to the Partition Committee.

4 The Party Leaders had proposed that the Punjab Government should provide a regular information
service capable of answering any question that any party might choose to put in the course of pre¬
paring its case for the Boundary Commission. Sir E. Jenkins thought the provision of so wide-
ranging a service would be difficult and that it would be better to wait and see what information the
Boundary Commission called for.

220

Sir J. Colville (. Bombay ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

( Extract )

Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Governor of Bombay

government house, Bombay, 16 June igqy

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT NO. 84
My dear Dickie,

Thank you very much for your letter of 9th June,1 also for your reply to my
telegram of congratulations. I was so stirred when I heard all the broadcasts on
3rd June that I could not refrain from sending you a joyful message. Whatever

1 Not printed.

432

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

may be ahead it was a wonderful achievement and you have now got final
Muslim and Congress acceptance.

2. On the whole the plan has gone well here though a section of the Press is
still attacking it. Official Congress circles take their cue from the Centre and
accept with some reluctance but in a realistic spirit; Socialists and the Mahasabha
oppose and Communists violently attack it. Mahomedans on the whole are
pleased, and with the idea of Pakistan conceded do not appear inclined to
quarrel over the arrangements for division. The Prime Minister when he read
the statement shortly before your broadcast was obviously pleased at the
prospect of immediate Dominion Status. So I think are my other Ministers
although they are less outspoken. Kher observed to me that he had fought all his
life for freedom and he believed that Dominion Status in fact gave full freedom.
The prospect of splitting the Army is causing real concern to the more thought¬
ful and the hope is expressed that out of that headache will come a common
defence policy which could retain co-ordinated services.

221

Chiefs of Staff Committee. C.O.S. (47) 76th Meeting , Minute 4

L/WS 1 1/1032: ff 127-9

Those present at this Meeting held on 16 June ig4j at 4 pm were: Vice-Admiral
Sir R. McGrigor (in the Chair), Major-General A. D. Ward, Air Vice-Marshal
Foster

4. INDIAN DOMINIONS BILL

J-P- (47) 8 7 (Final)1

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(47)75th Meeting, Mins. 2 & J)2
the committee had before them —

(a) A report3 by the Joint Planning Staff examining the question of the
retention of the Sovereignty of the Laccadive Islands by His Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom.

(b) A minute by the Secretary covering a copy of a telegram4 from the
Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India expressing the view that there
should be no question of raising the controversial subject of the future of
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands at the present delicate stage of political
negotiations.

major-general ward ageed that it was of the utmost importance to us
to retain possession of the Andaman, Nicobar and Laccadive Islands. It would
not be sufficient to ensure, as suggested in the telegram from the Viceroy, that
we should merely be allowed to use the Islands as naval or air bases, but essential

JUNE 1947

433

to retain our sovereignty over them. He suggested that the timing and method
of approach to the Indian authorities on the question was a matter for political
decision.

In discussion there was general agreement with this view and with the report
by the Joint Planning Staff.
the committee: —

(a) Approved the Report by the Joint Planning Staff.

(b) Instructed the Secretary to inform the Minister of Defence of their
views1 * 3 4 5 in the light of the above discussion and of (a) above.

Annex to No. 221

Copy of a minute dated 16th June, 1947, to the Minister of Defence from

Lt.-General Sir Leslie C. Hollis

MINISTER

The India and Burma Committee tomorrow will consider a draft of the Indian
Dominions Bill.6

2. The main defence items are as follows: —

(i) The maintenance of internal security. This is covered to the satisfaction
of the Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 7(i).

(ii) The position of British Service personnel continuing to serve in the
Indian Armed Forces. Satisfactory provision is made under paragraph

10.

(iii) The withdrawal of British units from India. This is covered in paragraph

11, but the Chiefs of Staff will shortly be reporting in detail to the India
and Burma Committee on how they intend to withdraw their forces.

(iv) The Andamans and Nicobars are referred to in paragraph 16.

3 . On items (ii) and (iii) above, a separate brief is being prepared and sub¬
mitted to you by the Permanent Secretary.

4. On item (iv), the Chiefs of Staff were completely in accord with the
proposal to hold the Andamans and Nicobars under the direct control of His
Majesty's Government. The continued possession of the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands is of the utmost importance to us since they form an essential
link in our air communications with the Far East. Whilst, however, the Chiefs
of Staff can state what their military requirements are in these islands and

1 No. 187.

1 Meeting of 13 June 1947; the conclusion of the relevant Minute instructed the Joint Planning Staff
to prepare a report on the subject of the Laccadive Islands for consideration on 16 June. L/WS/1/980:
ff 76-7.

3 i.e. No. 187.

4 No. 174.

5 See Annex immediately following.

6 No. 191.

434

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

recommend that it is essential that the islands be ceded to us, they acknowledge
that the method and timing for raising the question with the Indian authorities
is for political decision. In the same category as these islands is the acquisition
of the Laccadive Islands, which form part of the Presidency of Madras. At
Annex I, I submit a note on the military reasons for retaining the Laccadive
Islands,7 which the Chiefs of Staff agreed today and instructed me to submit to
you as a brief for your use tomorrow.

5. There remains one most important point omitted from the Indian
Dominions Bill, namely, how we are to acquire the military facilities which the
Chiefs of Staff have stated it essential to retain in the event of India either
remaining in the Commonwealth or becoming an independent Republic. The
Indian Dominions Bill makes no provision for even preliminary negotiations
to be held with Pakistan and Hindustan for these military requirements. The
Chiefs of Staff are, therefore, somewhat apprehensive that unless some formal
insertion is made in the Bill providing for such negotiations to take place, or
that informal soundings are taken at once as to how these requirements are to
be negotiated, they may find themselves in a position where the Indian Govern¬
ments could say that as no engagements had been entered into, British defence
requirements can be left for future negotiations. This would be most un¬
satisfactory and the Chiefs of Staff have written8 to the India Office for their
advice on the method of approach for acquiring these facilities. The Chiefs of
Staff action was reinforced by correspondence they had previously with the
India Office, when they stated that if India remained a Dominion there would
be no need for a treaty but that affairs could be settled by liaison methods as with
other Dominions. The India Office, however, in reply stated that a treaty might
be more advantageous owing to the Indian reverence for an official document.

6. A summary of the British military requirements in India is attached at
Annex II.9

7 No. 187.

8 No. 186.

9 Not printed.

L. C. HOLLIS

JUNE 1947

435

222

Mr Attlee to the Earl of Listoivel
Public Record Office. PREM 8 [575

private 16 June 1947

Prime Minister’s Personal Minute: Serial No. M.246/47
Secretary of State for India

I enclose an exchange of letters between myself and Halifax. I should be glad
if you would deal with the matter personally as it is one of some delicacy. Before
I consult the Viceroy I should be glad to have your views on the suggestion
which Halifax makes, but I ask you to consult as few people as possible in your
Department about it.

C . R . A .

Enclosure 1 to No. 222
The Earl of Halifax to Mr Attlee

garrowby, york, 12 June 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

May I presume to make a suggestion about India that if it has any merit you
have already probably thought of, and if it has no merit, can be quickly thrown
aside in the waste paper basket.

I think, as you know, your colleagues and you have played a very courageous
part in the way you have handled this business, and though no doubt you keep
your fingers severely crossed, you have got across enough awkward fences to
give good ground for hope.

The real seal of achievement will be of course if you can hold them in the
Commonwealth on terms as nearly analogous to those of Dominions as
circumstances permit.

The Indians are, I think, much more moved by sentiment than by reason
and my suggestion is that subject to the Viceroy’s concurrence you should get
the King and Queen to go to Delhi in the autumn for the purpose of formally
saying goodbye, and wishing them good luck. I, would not let them do anything
else but the formal farewell ceremony, at which the King would make a moving
oration full of all the right emotions, emphasising the complete freedom of
choice that the Indian Governments would by that time possess, and saying
that whatever happened, they would enter upon their new career with the
warm good will and prayers of all His peoples.

Yours ever,

HALIFAX

436

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Enclosure 2 to No. 222
Mr Attlee to the Earl of Halifax

13 June 1947

My dear Halifax,

Thank you very much for your letter and for your suggestion. While we are
not yet out of the wood, I think there is really a good chance of getting a
settlement in India. I realise how much sentiment plays in the Indian makeup
and I will certainly put your suggestion to the Viceroy, but I do not know at all
whether it will be possible for the King and Queen.

Yours sincerely,

C . R . A .

223

The Earl of Lis towel to Mr Attlee
L/PO 18/45: ff 18-20

India office, 16 June 1947
Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 90/47

Prime Minister,

In my minute No. 88/47 of nth June1 (with which you concurred), I reported
that I was proposing to take steps to obtain the informal approval of The King
to the substantive replacement of Sir Olaf Caroe (who would resign on grounds
of ill health) as Governor of the N.W.F.P. by Lt. General Sir R. Lockhart. This
I did: but, before His Majesty’s informal approval had been signified and
communicated to the Viceroy, a further telegram2 was received from Lord
Ismay reporting that the Viceroy had already proceeded on the basis that Sir
O. Caroe should go on leave and not resign now at any rate and that General
Lockhart’s appointment should therefore be an acting one. Sir O. Caroe has
agreed to this procedure and the Viceroy proposes that simultaneously with the
announcement of the appointment of General Lockhart as Acting Governor,
an exchange of letters between Sir O. Caroe and himself should be published.
Sir O. Caroe’s letter would say that, in view of allegations made against him,
he considers that a change of governorship during the period till the transfer of
power is desirable and that, just as the referendum is to be run by British
Officers of the Indian Army so a new Governor should be in charge during the
referendum. He will assert his own complete impartiality but recognise that
there may be wider political considerations which may make the Viceroy
consider it desirable to recommend the change proposed. The Viceroy in his
reply will say that he is convinced of the complete impartiality of Caroe but

JUNE 1947

437

agrees with him that for the reasons mentioned there should be a new Governor
during the period in question.

Although I would have preferred that the matter should have been handled
from the start on the basis of Caroe resigning, there seemed, since Caroe’s letter
in the above sense, offering to take leave, had already been written and des¬
patched to Delhi,3 to be no alternative to acquiescing in the Viceroy’s method
of handling it and, as Ismay pressed the extreme urgency of the matter, and
matters had already proceeded so far, The King’s informal approval of the
proposed change on the revised basis was obtained last night and communi¬
cated to the Viceroy.4 No doubt it will be possible, if necessary, after further
consideration to induce Caroe to tender his resignation while he is on leave and
to confirm Lockhart’s acting appointment.5

LISTOWEL

1 No. 148.

2 See No. 21 1, note 1.

3 Enclosure to No. 181.

4 No. 211.

5 Mr Attlee minuted on 16 June: ‘I agree’. L/PO/8/45: f 16.

224

The Earl of Listowel to Viscount Joivitt
LjP&Jlyji 2500: f 92

India office, 16 June 1947
I am extremely grateful to you for the trouble you have taken to find out from
Radcliffe whether he would be willing to serve as Chairman of the Viceroy’s
Arbitral Tribunal.1 The success of your efforts was greater than I had dared to
hope, and I am informing the Viceroy immediately by telegram2 of Radcliffe’s
willingness to act subject to the conditions you mention. I do not know, of
course, what the Viceroy’s reaction will be, but as a peaceful partition of India
will largely depend on the effectiveness of the arbitral machinery which the
parties will use when they are unable to agree, I do not myself think that the
conditions suggested are out of relation to the importance of the work.

With my warmest thanks for your promptness and helpfulness in dealing
with this matter.

LISTOWEL

1 See No. 185.

2 In tel. 72 of 18 June Lord Listowel informed Lord Mountbatten that Sir C. Radcliffe would probably
be prepared to undertake the chairmanship of the Arbitral Tribunal on the conditions outlined in
No. 185. He added that: ‘If in fact you do require a Chairman for the Arbitral Tribunal from this
country I am convinced that you could not do better than secure Radcliffe’. L/P &J/7/12500: ff 90-1.

438

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

225

Report from Reuter Indian Service
L/P &SI13I1827: jf 8-9

MR JINNAh’s STATEMENT

NEW DELHI, 17 June 1947
Mr Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Moslem League President, in a statement today on
the position of the Indian States after the lapse of paramountcy, said: “Con¬
stitutionally and legally the Indian States will be independent sovereign States
on the termination of paramountcy and they will be free to decide for them¬
selves any course they like to adopt.”

“It is open to the States to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly or the
Pakistan Constituent Assembly or decide to remain independent. In the last
case they can either enter into such arrangement or relationship with Hindu¬
stan or Pakistan as they may choose,” Mr Jinnah said.

Mr Jinnah said if the States wished to remain independent and wished to
negotiate or adjust any political or any other relationship such as commercial or
economic relations with Pakistan “we shall be glad to discuss with them and
come to a settlement which will be in the interests of both”.

He added that he was not of the opinion that the States were limited only
to the option of joining one or other Constituent Assembly.

“In my opinion they are free to remain independent if they so desire. Neither
the British Government nor the British Parliament nor any other power or
body can compel them to do anything contrary to their free will and accord,
nor have they any power of sanction of any kind to do so”, he said.

226

Report of the Madras States Residency for the fortnight ending 15th June 1947

( Extract )

LIP&SI13I1299: f 4

Trivandrum, 17 June 1947

TRAVANCORE

3. The question of independence of States after the lapse of British para¬
mountcy, with particular reference to Travancore, has been the subject of
sharp controversy between Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar on the one side and
leaders of the Congress and All-India States’ People’s Congress parties on the
other. Through Press Conferences and Press statements, the Dewan has

JUNE I947

439

explained that the decision of His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore to
declare the independence of the State after the lapse of British paramountcy
was taken when the Congress accepted the partition of India but that the
independence so declared will not be for the purpose of remaining in isolation
from the rest of India but for the purpose of entering into mutually beneficial
treaties and agreements on questions of common concern with any future
Government or Governments of India. The Dewan has repeatedly emphasised
that the Maharaja’s decision is supported by a vast majority of his subjects and
has pointed out, in answer to the plea for a referendum made by the Travancore
State Congress President, that the forthcoming elections on the already-
announced basis of universal adult franchise may well be utilised by the State
Congress for seeking a verdict on their contention that the people are not in
favour of a declaration of independence.

The State Congress, which is unyielding in its attitude of opposition to the
constitutional reforms announced by His Highness the Maharaja, wanted to
hold meetings and demonstrations to celebrate the Constituent Assembly Day
on June 13 th all over the State. The Travancore Government authorised the
District Magistrates to ban such meetings wherever any breach of peace was
feared. A few State Congress men who defied the ban in some places were
arrested.

C. G. N. EDWARDS

Resident for the Madras States

227

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to Sir O. Caroe ( North-West Frontier

Province)

RI3UI170: f 65

SECRET AND PERSONAL THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

no. 1450 17 June 1947

Dear Caroe,

I have received your letter dated the 13 th June.1 I should like to say first that I
am convinced that there is no truth in the allegations which have been made
against you. I know you have always worked wholeheartedly in the interests
of the Province as a whole, and you have done very fine work at a most
difficult time.

The gesture you now make is a characteristic one, and I appreciate your
motives. I believe you are right that there is much to be said for your taking
leave as you propose, so that a new man may hold the post of Governor during

1 Enclosure to No. 1 81.

440

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

the Referendum. Your offer will be widely recognised as prompted by your
public spirit and your devotion to the people of the Frontier.

I will recommend to H.M.G. that Lt. General Sir Rob Lockhart2 should be
Acting Governor.

My warmest thanks for all you have done. My wife and I very much hope
we may see you and your wife if you come to Delhi.3

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA4

2 In the draft the words ‘whom you know weli’ followed ‘Sir Rob Lockhart’.

3 The draft had the words ‘in Delhi on your way through if you decide to go to England for your
leave’ instead of ‘if you come to Delhi’.

4 This letter and the Enclosure to No. 181 were published on 19 June. R/3/1/170: f 70.

228

Mr Kripalani to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

RI3I1I151: ff 172-5

IMMEDIATE AND SECRET 6 JANTAR MANTAR ROAD, NEW DELHI,

17 June ig47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

As you know a position of peculiar difficulty has existed in the Frontier Province
for a long time. We have drawn your attention to various aspects of the situa¬
tion on several occasions. The provincial government has been unable to work
with the Governor with the result that there is now a complete impasse in
regard to many matters and the relations between the Ministers and the Gover¬
nor are strained to an extreme degree.

It is in this context that we have to consider other developments. Whenever
the question of the Frontier arose, we told you that it would be necessary to
consult the Frontier Ministers and leaders before a final answer could be given
on our behalf. The matter concerned them intimately and they were the best
judges of the situation. They were very much averse to any issue being raised in
the province which could be exploited as purely communal or Hindu-Muslim
issue. This would give a chance to the communally-minded persons to rouse
popular passions. The best way to avoid this was to put forward the real issue.
This was the creation of a free Pathan State which would later decide on its
relations with the Indian Union or Pakistan.

In accordance with this strong sentiment I wrote to you in my letter dated
June 2nd,1 paragraph 12, that “the proposed referendum should provide for the

JUNE 1947

441

people voting for independence and subsequent decision as to their relation with
the rest of India”. I understand that you have been unable to agree to this unless
the Muslim League also agreed. This has added to our difficulties and we have
been giving anxious thought to the matter.

We have accepted the Plan contained in the Statement of June 2 [3] and we
propose to abide by it fully. We do not wish to do anything which can be said
to go against that Plan. At the same time we cannot impose any course of action
on the N.W.F. Province to which the leaders and people there are opposed. It is
this difficulty which has faced us.

We have again conferred with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Mr Yahya Jan,
Minister for Education for the N.W.F.P. The former has recently consulted his
colleagues, and he has been given authority on their behalf to deal with the
situation. He tells us that there is a strong and insistent demand that the Frontier
people should be allowed to pronounce on the issue of independence. They
are totally averse to taking part in a referendum which must turn purely on the
communal issue.

The referendum must take its course, assuming that there is perfect peace
restored in that unhappy province. But Badshah Khan contends that if the issue
cannot be between Pathanistan and Pakistan, he would advise his followers to
abstain from participating in the referendum. This, he holds, will ease the
situation somewhat though the Province may be lost to the Congress, at least
for the time being.

Various proposals had been put forward by you in regard to this referendum.
This includes the avoidance of electioneering speeches and a clear statement of
the issue by either side. Irrespective of agreement I can say that the Congress
has no intention of sending any one from outside the province to influence
voters there for this referendum. And we have advised Badshah Khan to avoid
electioneering speeches in the province immediately after the date of referen¬
dum is published.

We are very anxious that whatever might be done in the Frontier Province,
it should in no way be in opposition to the working out of the Plan we have
agreed to. We have impressed this upon our colleagues of the Frontier. On
behalf of the Congress I hope to make a public statement explaining the
Congress position in regard to the Province.

Yours sincerely,

J. B. KRIPALANI

1 No. 35.

442

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

229

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rhl1 1137- ff 9°~9^

17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 1J June I947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

You asked me to send you a note on Kashmir and I promised to do so. I now
enclose this note.

I hope you will have a pleasant holiday in Kashmir and come back refreshed.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Enclosure to No. 229

A NOTE ON KASHMIR

The State consists of roughly three parts: Kashmir proper; Jammu; Ladakh,
Baltistan, Skardu and Kargil. The last named are very sparsely populated and
have a considerable number of Buddhists. Jammu is largely a continuation of
the Punjab.

2. Kashmir proper is a very definite cultural and linguistic unit with a very
long history behind it. In the past it has been a very great centre of Buddhist
and Sanskrit learning. The people of Kashmir, Hindu or Muslim, have pro¬
bably more in common than Hindus and Muslims elsewhere in India. Their
language is Kashmiri; their dress, food and social customs are more or less
alike. There is extreme poverty all over Kashmir except for some land-lords
and State officials and merchants.

3 . In Kashmir proper Muslims form 92% of the population. In the whole
State Muslims are 77% and Hindus 21%, the others being chiefly Sikhs and

Buddhists. The following are the population

figures :

Jammu

Muslims

1,208,675

61%

Hindus

772,760

39%

Kashmir

Muslims

1,589,488

92%

Hindus

139,217

7-8%

Total Muslims in the State

3,101,247

77-11°/

Total Hindus in the State

809,165

21%

Total Sikhs in the State

65,903

Total Buddhists in the State

40,696

Others

4,605

Total population

4,021,616

JUNE I947

443

4. About fifteen years ago a popular movement arose in Kashmir State under
the leadership of Sheikh Mohamad Abdullah, himself a Kashmiri educated at
Aligarh University. This movement was very largely Muslim as the population
itself was largely Muslim. It took shape in the Muslim Conference. It was not,
however, definitely communal. Sheikh Abdullah was arrested and imprisoned
and later communal riots broke out in Kashmir. This was in the early thirties.
This was followed by committees to inquire into political reforms that might
be granted to the people. Certain reforms were granted and a legislature was
started.

5. Sheikh Abdullah, on coming out of prison, tried to give a definitely
nationalist turn to the movement and changed the name of the Muslim
Conference to the Kashmir National Conference. He had some trouble with
communalists in his ranks and a few left him and the organization. But the
movement continued to grow and spread especially to the masses who were
principally Muslim. Many Hindu and Sikh young men were also attracted to
the National Conference. Even those Hindus who did not join it were usually
more or less friendly to it.

6. Of all the people’s movements in the various States in India, the Kashmir
National Conference was far the most widespread and popular. Sheikh
Abdullah was amazingly popular among the masses and numerous songs and
legends grew up about him. Certain reactionary Hindu and Muslim groups
opposed him and his movement. These Muslim groups later allied themselves
to the Muslim League, but they had little influence in the State. The Hindu
groups represented a certain vested and middle-class element chiefly interested
in the State service of which they had a dominant share.

7. The Maharaja is a Dogra Rajput and his army consists almost entirely of
Dogra Rajputs. Kashmiris, whether Hindu or Muslim, are excluded from it.
This was a common grievance among all Kashmiris.

8. The real background of the popular movement was economic. The
terrible poverty of the people was contrasted not only with the enormous
riches of the few but also with the potential resources of Kashmir State. The
land system was out of date and oppressive, as well as partial to certain dom¬
inant classes. It was with this background that the popular movement grew up
under Sheikh Abdullah. It demanded political reforms and responsible govern¬
ment.

9. This movement allied itself to the All-India States people’s movement as
represented by the All-India States Peoples Conference. This Conference,
though an independent body, has been working in line with the National
Congress. Sheikh Abdullah became a Vice-President of the All-India body and

444

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

last year, while he was in prison, he was elected President. He is still the Presi¬
dent not only of the Kashmir National Conference but also of the All-India
States Peoples Conference.

10. After the introduction of various reforms in Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah
and the Kashmir National Conference, though far from satisfied with the extent
of the reforms, decided to cooperate with them. They contested the elections
for the State Assembly and won a large number of seats. One of their number
became a Minister. Members of their party delivered highly eulogistic speeches
praising the Maharaja for what he had done and was doing, but at the same
time demanding responsible government. Their objective was responsible
government under the aegis of the Maharaja who would function as a kind of
constitutional head. That also was the objective of the All-India States Peoples
Conference in regard to all the States in India.

1 1 . The policy of the Kashmir National Conference was thus one of coopera¬
tion with the State authorities and more specially with the Maharaja who was
considered above conflict of parties. This attitude was, no doubt, pardy
governed by an expectation of favours to come. But there was certainly a fund
of goodwill for the Maharaja and all criticism was directed to various Ministers.
There was plenty of room for criticism, for the Kashmir administration for
long years past has been amazingly static and unchanging. Nothing gets done
there and any intelligent officer soon gets the feeling that he is wasting his
talents and his energy because he can get nothing done.

12. This period of semi-cooperation with the Kashmir State authorities even
survived the upheaval in India of August 1942. The Kashmir National Con¬
ference sympathised with this upheaval and demonstrated accordingly. But the
then Prime Minister, Sir N. Gopalaswami Iyengar, refused to take any pre¬
cipitate action, and the situation calmed down.

13. There was a rapid change in Prime Ministers. Within a few years there
were four Prime Ministers. Meanwhile the Minister who represented the Kashmir
National Conference complained more and more that he had no responsible
work to do and indeed that he could hardly approach the Maharaja himself. Mr.
Kak was throughout the Minister in attendance on the Maharaja and ultimately
in 1945 he became Prime Minister. The National Conference supported him in
this on the ground that he was a Kashmiri. Almost immediately after Mr. Kak
became Prime Minister, there was a change in the attitude adopted towards the
National Conference. This Conference represented the most powerful organi¬
zation in the State with a very big mass following. It had drawn into its ranks
most of the idealistic youth in the State, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh, and it was
especially popular among the peasantry. Evidently Mr. Kak thought that this
was too strong to be encouraged or tolerated and he began to encourage
communal organisations both of the Muslims and the Hindus.

JUNE 1947

445

14. Matters came to a crisis early in 1946 and the National Conference
Minister resigned. Thus the period of cooperation between the National
Conference and the State authorities ended and the situation became pro¬
gressively more tense.

15. When the Cabinet Mission came in 1946, great expectations were roused
all over India including the States. There was considerable irritation at the fact
that no representatives of the States people were interviewed by the Cabinet
Mission. When it was known that the Cabinet Mission would go to Kashmir
for a few days, a telegram was sent on behalf of the Conference to them in
which the slogan of “Quit Kashmir” was used and the Amritsar Treaty,
according to which Kashmir was sold to the great grand-father of the present
Ruler, was bitterly criticised. Subsequently the Quit Kashmir cry was explained
to mean nothing more than responsible Government under the aegis of the
Maharaja.

16. A big agitation began to grow up in Kashmir in support of the message
sent to the Cabinet Mission. Within a few days, however, Sheikh Abdullah was
invited by Nehru to Delhi to discuss the situation. Sheikh Abdullah thereupon
stopped the agitation completely and said that nothing should be done till his
return from Delhi. Four days later he started for Delhi and was arrested en
route. At the same time large numbers of other arrests were made and the mili¬
tary practically took possession of the valley. It was clear, and indeed it was
admitted by Mr. Kak, that he had long been making preparations to crush the
National Conference. These preparations had nothing to do with the new phase
of the agitation and had preceded it. The Quit Kashmir cry gave Mr. Kak a
pretext for quick and widespread action.

17. This happened about 15 months ago and ever since then there has been a
continuing conflict between the State authorities and the National Conference.
Sheikh Abdullah and many of his colleagues have been in prison, most of them
sentenced, others in detention. There has been repression of an extreme type
and the people generally have suffered very greatly, especially during the
winter months when food and fuel were deliberately not distributed with
fairness. The police and the military have fired at crowds and individuals
repeatedly, killing many.

18. These events in Kashmir produced a powerful effect in other States in
India and the All-India States Peoples Conference made Kashmir a test case.
Probably to some extent some of the other Rulers also treated it in a like way
from their point of view. It is widely believed with a great deal of justification
that the Political Department gave its backing to this repressive policy of the
State and encouraged it.

19. Over a year has elapsed since this began and the result is that Sheikh

446

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Abdullah is probably more popular than ever with the masses of Kashmir. The
Muslim League there has no particular following. Latterly even the communal
Sikh and Hindu organisations have demanded Sheikh Abdullah's release. It is
said that the Dogra army also strongly disapproves of Mr. Kak's policy which
has resulted in making the Maharaja completely ineffective and almost a
prisoner in his palace. Corruption is rampant in the State and the whole
administration is centred in a small clique controlled by the Prime Minister.
Almost everybody else complains bitterly of this clique and says that nothing
can be done in Kashmir till Mr. Kak ceases to be Prime Minister. Even the
Maharaja has begun to realise this and wants to do something about it. But Mr.
Kak has so frightened him and so isolated him that it is difficult for the Maharaja
to take any step of his own volition.

20. Kashmir has become during this past year an All-India question of great
importance. It was only because of other developments in India and a desire to
avoid adding to the existing troubles that an effort was made to prevent this
spreading.

21. Sheikh Abdullah's organization, the Kashmir National Conference, has
demonstrated its hold on the masses and there is no doubt that Sheikh Abdullah
himself is by far the most outstanding leader in Kashmir. Mr. Kak's efforts to
build up a rival leadership have not produced much effect. It is true, however,
that Sheikh Abdullah’s long absence in prison has produced a certain confusion
in people's minds as to what they should do. The National Conference has stood
for and still stands for Kashmir joining the Constituent Assembly of India.
From the Maharaja's point of view this is obviously desirable and preferable to
joining the other Assembly. Mr. Kak, however, comes in the way and it has
been reported that he has told the Maharaja that the Viceroy favours Kashmir
joining the Pakistan Assembly because of the geographical situation of the State.
Mr. Kak has also tried to convince the Maharaja that as soon as he joins the
Indian Union, there will be communal riots in the State and that possibly
hostile people from the surrounding territory of Pakistan might enter Kashmir
and give trouble. The Maharaja is timid and is in a fix. There is no doubt that if
Mr. Kak remains in control, he will himself see to it that there are communal
riots.

22. The situation in Kashmir cannot be effectively met without major
changes leading to responsible government in the State with the Maharaja as
the constitutional head. Indeed there is no other way out and if this course is not
adopted, the Maharaja's position will become progressively more insecure. If,
however, the Maharaja gives a lead in this direction by joining the Constituent
Assembly of India and taking steps for reforms in the State, he would im¬
mediately put himself right with the people and gain the support of Sheikh

JUNE 1947

447

Abdullah and the most powerful party in the State, which, though pre¬
dominantly Muslim, includes many Hindus and Sikhs.

23. Before this can be done, the immediate steps that appear to be essential
are the removal of Mr. Kak from the Prime Ministership, and the discharge of
Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues from prison. It has been said that there are
other prisoners also who belong to the Muslim League. There is no reason why
all such prisoners should not also be released. If any person misbehaves in future,
action can be taken against him.

24. Mr. Kak’s policy during the past year has caused tremendous injury to
Kashmir and to the Maharaja. Unless this is completely reversed very soon, the
Maharaja’s difficulties will become insurmountable and the only solution then
will be by way of violent upheaval. In this upheaval the sympathy of nationalist
India will not be with the Maharaja. Mr. Kak has succeeded in antagonising
every decent element in Kashmir and in India as a whole. He has hardly any
friend anywhere.

25. It is interesting and important to note that Kashmir has kept out of
communal troubles during a period when the rest of India has been full of them.
This is a remarkable tribute to the policy of the National Conference and Sheikh
Abdullah. During this period there is little doubt that Mr. Kak encouraged
communal friction in order to weaken the political movement. Yet he did not
succeed although the leaders of the popular movement were in prison. When
Sheikh Abdullah comes out of prison, he will undoubtedly be able to control
his people effectively and he will gladly cooperate with any real steps for the
progress of Kashmir.

26. Sheikh Abdullah’s wife, Begum Abdullah, has played a notable part
during this past year in heartening the people of Kashmir and in giving relief
to the vast numbers of sufferers there. Previously living mostly in purdah, she
has come out and gone to her people.

27. What happens to Kashmir is, of course, of the first importance to India
as a whole not only because of the past year’s occurrences there, which have
drawn attention to it, but also because of the great strategic importance of that
frontier State. There is every element present there for rapid and peaceful
progress in cooperation with India. Communalism has not vitiated the atmos¬
phere as in other parts of India. The resources of the State are very great; but
unhappily a wrong policy, carried through ruthlessly by a man without any
scruple or long vision and with a great deal of personal ambition, has brought
the State to the verge of ruin. There is almost complete unanimity today in
Kashmir amongst all classes and sections of the people that Mr. Kak should go.
Where he can go to, it is difficult to say because he has made himself un-

44 8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

acceptable everywhere in India and more especially in Kashmir. But in any
event he must be removed from his position of authority. The second im¬
mediate step that has to be taken is the release of Sheikh Abdullah as well as of
other political prisoners. Obviously no conditions can be attached to this release.
When Sheikh Abdullah is released, he will, no doubt, take counsel with his
colleagues in Kashmir and outside before any fresh step is taken. The National
Congress is deeply interested in this matter and but for the urgency of other
work, Nehru would have been in Kashmir long ago. He still thinks of going
there soon. Gandhiji also intends going there before long.

28. If any attempt is made to push Kashmir into the Pakistan Constituent
Assembly, there is likely to be much trouble because the National Conference
is not in favour of it and the Maharaja’s position would also become very
difficult. The normal and obvious course appears to be for Kashmir to join the
Constituent Assembly of India. This will satisfy both the popular demand and
the Maharaja’s wishes. It is absurd to think that Pakistan would create trouble if
this happens.

New Delhi
17 June 1947

230

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , Mr

Gandhi and Mr Jinnah

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy s Interview No. 148

17 June 1947, 10 am- 12 noon

I saw Mr Gandhi from 10 to 11 a.m. The main topic of the discussion was the
referendum. He still wanted Mr Jinnah to go and see the NWFP Govern¬
ment leaders, to woo them as suggested in the statement he had prepared with
Lord Ismay.1

He was most dissatisfied at Mr Jinnah’s stipulation about no Congress
interference;2 and he still wanted me to urge Mr Jinnah to go, as their corres¬
pondence had come to a full stop.

I asked him whether he would agree to see Mr Jinnah right away, and on
obtaining his agreement, sent a telephone message to Mr Jinnah asking if he
would come earher than his original time, to see Mr Gandhi. Mr Jinnah came at
11.0 a.m. and joined the meeting until 12 noon.

Both these great men spoke in such low voices that they could not hear each
other, so I had to move their chairs close together. After a good deal of mutual
recrimination about their correspondence, I finally solved the problem by
suggesting that since Abdul Ghaffar Khan had been invested with plenary

JUNE 1947

449

authority by the Frontier Ministry,3 Mr Jinnah should take advantage of his
presence in Delhi to meet him here.

Both leaders seemed to think this a good idea, but Mr Gandhi said that Abdul
Ghaffar Khan was most mistrustful of Mr Jinnah and would not come unless he
received a written invitation. Mr Jinnah said he had frequently extended verbal
invitations, and that if Abdul Ghaffar Khan was not prepared to accept these,
he certainly had no intention of sending him a written invitation.

After this wrangle had gone on for some time, I solved the difficulty by
offering to invite all concerned to meet me at 7.45 the same evening. Both
accepted and honour was satisfied.

(Unfortunately, Abdul Ghaffar Khan had had an engagement 100 miles
outside Delhi, and although he was due back between 6.0 p.m. and 7.0 p.m., he
did not get back in time for the meeting. I personally telephoned Mr Jinnah and
Raj Kumari Amrit Kaur, Mr Gandhi’s Secretary, and got them to agree to a
meeting with Abdul Ghaffar Khan at the Viceroy’s House the following day,
under the chairmanship of Lord Ismay.)

Before Mr Jinnah’s arrival, I mentioned to Mr Gandhi that I believed a
question was likely to be asked in the House4 concerning the position of those
Indian States who declared their independence. I informed him that on being
asked this question in my Press Conference,5 I had replied to the effect that
States would not be allowed Dominion Status and that the question of separate
negotiations with States was a hypothetical question which had not yet arisen.
If I received such a request, I would refer it to HMG. I pointed out that Hydera¬
bad had a Trade Commissioner in London, and I was sure that HMG could
not be expected to cut off trade relations with Hyderabad.

Mr Gandhi begged me on no account to make any statement in Delhi, and,
if possible, to make no statement about this question until he returned. Since he
wished to continue the discussion with me and I was unable to do so, I invited
him to see Lord Ismay and arrange for an immediate meeting.

M. OF B.

1 Annex to No. 99. 2 See Nos. 156, 176 and 177. 3 See No. 228.

4 cf. No. 216, Item 3. 5 cf. No. 60, p. 115.

231

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: Interviews (2)

17 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

As I informed you yesterday, the Muslim League has decided to locate the
headquarters of the Pakistan Government temporarily at Karachi. Accommo-

450

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

dation, office and residential, will, therefore, be required at Karachi by the 15 th
of August, 1947, for the Ministers, officers and staff of the Government and the
Members of the Constituent Assembly. In view of the urgency of the require¬
ment, and as a considerable amount of readjustment in regard to the accom¬
modation occupied by Military units and formations in Karachi, will be
involved, it would, I think, be best if the Military authorities, who have con¬
siderable experience in these matters, could be requested to undertake the pro¬
vision of the accommodation, together with the necessary furniture, telephones,
etc. required by the Pakistan Government. The transportation of personnel and
stores to Karachi will also present a major problem which could best be handled
by the Military authorities. I should be grateful if the Commander-in-Chief
could be asked to issue necessary instructions to the appropriate Military
authorities regarding the provision of accommodation and transportation
facilities. It would be desirable to appoint a senior Military officer to be in
charge of the whole operation.

2. It is not unlikely that, in addition to whatever accommodation can be
found by readjustments, requisitioning, etc., fresh construction will also have to
be undertaken. This will normally be undertaken by the C.P.W.D. The
C.P.W.D. will therefore have to be closely associated with the Military authori¬
ties from the very start and it will be necessary for the Works, Mines and Power
Department to issue instructions detailing the necessary staff to Karachi for this
purpose.

3. The Sind Government will be glad to assist the C.P.W.D. and the
Military authorities in whatever way they can do so.

4. We shall furnish the necessary information regarding our requirements of
office and residential accommodation at Karachi to the officers who are en¬
trusted with the work.

5. The expenditure incurred on the provision of accommodation for the
Pakistan Government at Karachi will have to be duly authorised by the issue of
formal orders by the Defence and Works, Mines and Power Departments
respectively. The expenditure can be adjusted in due course in accordance with
the principles that may be agreed to in this behalf.

Yours sincerely,

LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

JUNE I947

451

232

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Rblil9o:ff 167-8

FINANCIAL MEMBER OF COUNCIL, NEW DELHI, 1J June 1$47
Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I enclose for your information a copy of a letter which I have received from
Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Daulatana, Member of the Punjab Legislative
Assembly and a Member of the Council of Action of the All-India Muslim
League and until only recently the General Secretary of the Punjab Provincial
Muslim League, giving a first-hand account of the present situation in the
Gurgaon area. The letter which, as you will see, represents the observations,
among others, of three Ministers and one ex-Minister of Sind and the Mayor of
Lahore, speaks for itself. It is hardly necessary for me to add that the stream of
deputations and representations that I have been receiving, and continue to
receive, in regard to the Gurgaon situation have all gone to confirm the exis¬
tence of the appalling state of affairs disclosed in Mr Daula tana’s letter. You
will also doubtless have seen the recent intelligence reports issued by Armed
Forces Headquarters containing accounts of large-scale burning and looting of
Muslim villages not only by the Hindu population of the British area but also
by State Forces of the neighbouring Indian States.

2. The Muslims of Gurgaon area feel helpless and unprotected against the
full-scale war of extermination which is being waged against them by the
armed hosts of Hindus with the active help of the neighbouring States and, I am
sorry to say, without hindrance from the Indian troops detailed to the area by
the Commander-in-Chief.

3. I have repeatedly requested you to post Muslim troops also to the area but
without any success.1 The situation is getting desperate and I must appeal to you
once again in the name of justice and fair play that the handling of this grave
situation should not be left entirely to the mercies of non-Muslim troops whose
anti-Muslim activities have now broken all reasonable bounds. It would be a
pity indeed if at this juncture when His Majesty’s Government is anxious to
ensure a smooth transfer of power and responsibility to the peoples of this
country, they were to close their eyes to the large-scale attempt that is being
made and has been going on for weeks within 20 miles of the capital of India
to exterminate a whole population of Muslims. May I hope that you will take
more personal interest in this matter and see that something really effective is
done to protect the lives and property of the Muslim population of the Gurgaon
area?

Yours sincerely,

LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

1 See e.g. No. 11; also No. 254.

452

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Enclosure to No. 232

Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Daulatana to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan ( Extract )

Rfalifao: ff 169-70, 172-3 , 174-5

6 KING EDWARD ROAD, NEW DELHI, 12 June ig47

My dear Liaquat Ali Khan Sahib,

A party consisting of Pir Ilahi Buksh, Mir Bundeh Ali, Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur,
Ministers of Sind, Mr M. H. Gazdar, Mian Amiruddin, Mayor of Lahore,
3 members of the Ad Hoc Delhi Muslim League Committee and myself toured
the riot-affected area of Gurgaon District on the nth of June 1947. We visited
Gurgaon, Sohna, Taru, Nuh and Palwal and the surrounding villages which
have been devastated in the recent disturbances. We went in no official capacity
and it was not our intention to present a detailed report of our observations, but
we were so completely taken aback by what we saw, and by the nature and
extent of the devastation already caused and likely to be caused in the im¬
mediate future that we feel it our duty to impress you with the gravity of the
situation and to urge you to take immediate steps to bring under control, what,
is in effect, full scale civil war raging within 20 miles of the capital of India.
If the least delay is permitted in this, it is our opinion that thousands of helpless
men, women and children will be massacred within the next few days and an
irretrievable disaster will befall more than half a million of human beings,
which will tarnish the birth of Indian freedom and shame the last days of the
British rule in India.

We are surprised that it is not sufficiently realised in Delhi, or for the matter
of that in any part of India, that a cruel and merciless war is being waged at this
very moment in the closest proximity to the Indian capital, with all the horrors
and atrocities attendant on a campaign for extermination conducted with the
most modern weapons of destruction but unchecked by any of the conventions
of civilised war-fare. It is ridiculous to apply the phrase communal rioting to the
situation in Gurgaon. What is actually taking place is a large scale invasion of
the Muslim villages by thousands of armed and disciplined men from the
adjoining districts of the United Provinces, as well as by the official armed forces
of Bharatpur and Alwar State. It is to be borne in mind that the Meo tract in
Gurgaon and the adjoining Indian States is the only compact and populous
concentration of Muslim majority population between the Sutlej and the
border of Bengal, numbering near 10 lakhs of people, and it appears to be the
firm intention of the surrounding Hindu provinces as well as the Hindu states
to liquidate this powerful and gallant pocket by all the tactics made familiar
by Herr Hitler in Poland. From reliable information that we were able to
collect on the spot we are convinced that many thousands of men, women and
children have been massacred in the last few days and that scores of villages have

JUNE 1947

453

been burnt to the ground, and that people in all the surrounding villages are
living day and night in imminent peril of attack and extermination.

The most alarming feature of the whole situation is the conduct of the
military that has ostensibly been called out to restore order. The composition of
the military in Gurgaon is exclusively non-Muslim. From time to time a purely
Hindu Rajput regiment is replaced by a Sikh Regiment which is later relieved
by the former Rajput regiment. This is being done at a time when the non-
Muslim army is misbehaving in a shameless and atrocious manner. In fact it is
our belief that more Muslims have been indiscriminately massacred by the
Indian non-Muslim military than by the combined attacks of thejats, the Ahirs,
the Rajputs, the Hindus of U.P. and the armies of Bharatpur and Alwar. In
particular it is the common belief in Gurgaon that the Sikh military has taken it
upon themselves to wage war on behalf of the non-Muslims. Sikh army per¬
sonnel have indiscriminately shot the Meos, and it is rumoured that some of
their men have actually taken off their uniforms to re-inforce the mobs with
their official weapons. It is the common practice for the soldiers to carry out
searches for arms in the day in Hindu villages and to redistribute the con¬
fiscated arms at strategic places under cover of night, thus securing that the
maximum force is deployed at the decisive place against the doomed Meos.
Similarly in one place some 600 Hindu rioters were arrested by the military at
the spot, but 450 were released immediately the remaining 150 having already
passed to the custody of the police. There are at the moment lying in Palwal
Civil Hospital 4 men who were forced to lie on their backs by the military and
then crushed twice over under military trucks. It would be fruitless to pile
illustrations because it is our belief that the savagery, brutality and partisanship
of the military is well-known to the authorities. We understand that the D.C.
of Gurgaon has represented again and again to the Central Government for
mixed troops but he has been snubbed with the answer that the military does
not recognise communalism. This is amusing when it is noticed that wherever
disturbances take place, whether it is in Rawalpindi, in Attock, in Multan, in
Amritsar or in Gurgaon, lack of communal considerations in the Army means
the exclusive presence of non-Muslims troops.

It is our firm conviction that the worst offenders in the present Gurgaon
disturbances have been the non-Muslim army, and that unless immediate steps
are taken to introduce a mixed military personnel there is no hope for Muslims
in Gurgaon. If it is not found possible to secure this, then we suggest that the
military should be completely withdrawn, because the brave Meos would be
able to fight their Hindu enemies with better chances of avoiding complete
annihilation if they are not re-inforced by their military allies. It is also to be
hoped that when mixed military is introduced in Gurgaon it will be done in
sufficient numbers to cope with the enormity of the problem. It is ridiculous
that whilst it is impossible to see the road for army trucks in West Punjab, it is

454

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

possible to travel almost right through the disturbed area in Gurgaon without
coming across a uniform.

Finally we would like to impress upon you with all the force at our disposal,
the wicked role that is being played by the Indian States of Bharatpur and
Alwar. As you know the Mewat is a compact tract that covers adjoining areas
of Gurgaon, U.P., Bharatpur and Alwar, and whilst there are some 2,50,000
Meos in Gurgaon, more than twice this number live in Alwar and Bharatpur. At
present these two States have declared a war of extermination on the Muslims
of Mewat. As recently as the night of the 10th, whole regiments of the Bharat¬
pur military took part in an organised attack on Meo villages in Bharatpur
State on the Gurgaon boundary, killing hundreds of people and sacking and
burning 7 villages completely, whilst the Indian troops on the border looked on,
only concerned to see that no Muslim escaped from Bharatpur to Gurgaon, or
that no Gurgaon Meo should enter into Bharatpur to succour and defend his
kith and kin.

We Muslims of India believe that we are one people. We cannot watch
unmoved the pitiless massacre of our brothers merely because an artificial
boundary divides Gurgaon from Bharatpur and Alwar. In the name of human¬
ity we call upon you to appeal to the Viceroy of India in this matter and to
see that the concepts of medieval barbarism are not allowed to reign un¬
checked in a tract almost within sight of the Viceregal Palace, and at a time
when we stand at the very threshold of our freedom.

233

The Nawab of Marndot , Sardar Swaran Singh and Lala Bhim Sen Sachar to Sir E.

Jenkins (Punjab)

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Part 11(a)

Lahore, 17 June 1947

Dear Sir Evan,

You will kindly refer to your D.O. letter of the 16th of June, 1947,1 enclosing
a copy of the minutes of the meeting of party leaders with you held yesterday
at Government House, Lahore.

As decided in the meeting the three of us met last evening and discussed the
various points mentioned in paragraph 12 of the minutes.2 Our agreed decisions
are as follows : —

1. We have agreed that the Partition Committee should beside the Governor
consist of four members of which two shall be the nominees of the Muslim
League, one of the Congress and one of the Panthic Party. The parties will have

JUNE I947

455

full liberty with regard to the choice of their nominees whether from within or
from outside the Punjab. We are also agreed that H.E. the Governor may
preside over the meetings of the Partition Committee. The issues shall not be
decided by votes; and in case of disagreement parties will set up an agreed
machinery for the settlement of disputes.

2. We are agreed that there is no need of an interim Committee of the party
leaders pending the formation of the Partition Committee, but the party
leaders should have free access to any official information that they might desire
to have.

3. We are agreed that a Steering Committee consisting of Mr. M. R.
Sachdev and Syed Yakub Shah, Finance Department, Government of India,
shall be appointed. We are also agreed that there is no need to add a third
member to this committee.

4. We are agreed that as soon as the Steering Committee assembles it shall
form the nucleus of the Partition Committee Secretariat in addition to steering
the Expert Committees. We are also agreed that when members of the Steering
Committees assume office the office of the Partition Commissioner shall become
superfluous.

5. Comments on para. 5 will follow later.3

6. & 7. We are agreed that part time official advisers may be made available
for advice to the members of the Partition Committee. Such advisers will be
chosen by the members of the Committee and shall be attached to the Steering
Committee.

Yours sincerely,

IFTIKHAR HUSAIN KHAN
SWARAN SINGH
BHIM SEN SACHAR

1 Not printed.

2 See Enclosure to No. 219.

3 Not on file; but an agreement on the composition of the Expert Committees was subsequently
reached: see No. 339, para. 7.

456

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

234

Lord Ismay to Mr Ghazanfar Ali Khan

Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Situation in , Part 11(a)

17 June 1947

Dear Mr Ghazanfar Ali Khan,

In accordance with your request, I asked the Chief of General Staff to let me
have a statement showing the class composition of the units now employed in
the Gurgaon civil disturbances, and I send you herewith a copy of his reply.1

It came as a shock to me to see that the Muslim Company of the 3/15 Punjab
had had to be left behind at Chaman, and that it was not due in Gurgaon until
after 1st July, since I was under the impression that the whole of this unit was
already in the disturbed area.

The C.G.S. has undertaken to ask the Commander-in-Chief whether it
would be in any way possible to get any other Muslim troops to this area in the
near future, but emphasises the difficulty of dealing with disturbances on a
communal basis.

Yours sincerely,

ISMAY

1 See Enclosure

Ser. Units CLASS COMPOSITION

JUNE I947

457

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458

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

235

Mr Ghazanfar Ali Khan to Lord Ismay

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Situation in , Part 11(a)

MEMBER OF COUNCIL, HEALTH, 6 KING EDWARD ROAD,

new Delhi, 17 June 1947

Dear Lord Ismay,

I thank you for the inquiries you have made from the C.G.S.1 The statement
supplied by him shows the class composition of the troops operating in Gurgaon
district. It lends point to the serious complaints which we have been receiving
from there.

raj rif is a regiment of mixed composition. It, however, so happened
that only non-Muslim Companies of it were sent to Gurgaon. Now it trans¬
pires that the Muslim Company of the 3/15 Punjab has been left behind in
Chaman so that only non-Muslim Companies of this mixed regiment will be
operating in Gurgaon district. I do not wish to cast aspersions but somehow
Muslim companies always happen to be left behind in such cases. One Muslim
Company of 3/15 Punjab will, it is said, join soon after July 1. I doubt if there
will be any Muslims left to need protection in the disturbed area by that time.

You say that the C.G.S. has emphasised the difficulty of dealing with dis¬
turbances on a communal basis. The whole point of our complaint is that these
disturbances are actually being dealt with on a communal basis, only non-
Muslim troops being used and Muslim units of even mixed regiments being left
out by a strange series of accidents. If Muslim troops cannot be made available
in the near future, is it not possible to use some British troops ?

From the reports reaching me at present it appears that the Muslim villagers
have become quite desperate and almost hysterical, owing to attacks by the
numerical [ly] superior and better armed mobs on the one hand and the treat¬
ment which is being meted out to them by the authorities on the other. I fear
clashes between these villagers and the troops out of sheer desperation, unless
steps are taken immediately which may have a re-assuring effect on them.

I thank you once again for the interests you have taken in the affair.

Yours sincerely,

GHAZANFAR ALI2

1 See No. 234.

2 A note by Lord Ismay states: ‘Shown to C.G.S. on 18/vi.’

JUNE 1947

459

236

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Mr Kripalani

Rlj/i/iSi: f 176

secret new delhi, 17 June 1947

NO. I446/3

Dear Mr Kripalani,

Thank you for your letter of yesterday1 about the Referendum in the Frontier.
I think you and your colleagues fully understand my point of view, and the
point of view of H.M.G. I realise the great difficulties of the Frontier situation,
but it is not feasible to alter the terms of the Referendum as laid down, in the
statement of the 3r dj une.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

PS. I had already drafted a letter to Pandit Nehru dealing with one aspect of
your letter, and have now redrafted it;2 so perhaps you would be good enough
to talk this over with him.

M. OF B.

1 No. 228; in fact dated 17 June.

2 See No. 237.

237

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru

RI3I1I151: f 177-8

PERSONAL AND PRIVATE NEW DELHI, June I947

NO. I44b/3

Dear Mr Nehru,

I have received a letter from Mr Kripalani dated the 17th June1 about the
Referendum for the North-West Frontier Province. One of his main points is
contained in the first paragraph, which reads as follows :

“The provincial government has been unable to work with the Governor
with the result that there is now a complete impasse in regard to many
matters and the relations between the Ministers and the Governor are strained
to an extreme degree. It is in this context that we have to consider other
developments.”

In this connection I am sending you a copy of a letter2 1 have received from
Sir Olaf Caroe, together with a copy of my reply.3 I should like you to know

460

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

that I only had to mention to him the difficulty you felt about the Referendum
for him to have come forward with this generous suggestion on his part, thus
making everything much easier. I hope you will agree that I could not do less
than send him the reply of which a copy is enclosed.

Mr Kripalani’s letter puts forward once more the suggestion of allowing the
Frontier to vote for independence, and I am sending you a copy of the reply1 * 3 4 I
have sent to him. I have not of course made the point in this reply that it was at
your written request that the option for Provinces to vote for independence
was taken out;5 and that Mr Jinnah (who was in favour of Bengal being allowed
to vote for independence)6 is aware of the fact that I conceded this point to
Congress. But in the circumstances you will see that both your position and my
position would be completely untenable if either of us were to go back on this
arrangement now. I hope, however, that the action of the Governor in offering
to go on leave may help you in influencing Abdul Ghaffar Khan to accept the
Referendum in the right spirit.

I know I do not need to ask you to use your influence to avoid the Press
saying that Caroe had been sacked, for it was on the basis of your promise of no
further Press attacks7 that I wrote to him.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

PS. Since dictating the above Mr Gandhi has been to see me to discuss this
question of the Referendum.8 He told me that he felt that a satisfactory solution
might be found if Mr Jinnah and Abdul Ghaffar Khan could talk the matter
over together.

With Mr Gandhi’s consent I invited Mr Jinnah, who was due to come for an
interview later, to come earlier and have a discussion with Mr Gandhi. After an
hour’s talk we three agreed between us that we would meet again at 7.45
tonight with Abdul Ghaffar Khan to try and find an amicable solution.

I told Mr Gandhi of the exchange of letters with Caroe, and he has urged me
to send them to the newspapers for publication, a course which I shall of course
follow.

M. OF B.

1 No. 228.

3 Enclosure to No. 181.

3 No. 227.

4 No. 236.

5 See Vol. X, Nos. 402, 406 and 429, para. 4(c).

6 See Vol. X, Nos. 229; 249, first para.; 264; 276, paras. 30-31; 280, last para, and 287, last para.

7 cf. Vol. X, Nos. 328 and 343.

8 See No. 230.

JUNE 1947

Viceroy s Conference Paper V.C.P. 81
Mountbatten Papers

SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 17 June I947

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A * STATES DEPARTMENT* *

Attached is a copy of a letter and proposals from Pandit Nehru, which will be
considered at The Viceroy’s meeting with his Staff at 15.00 hours on Tuesday,
1 7th June 1947.

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary
new delhi, 16 June ig47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

At the meeting which you had with the political leaders last Friday,1 it was
agreed that it would be advantageous if the Government of India were to set
up a new Department, possibly called the States Department, to deal with
matters of common concern with the States. I attach, for your consideration,
certain proposals regarding the constitution and functions of this Department.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1. The Political Department which, under the control of H.E. the Crown
Representative, now deals with the Indian States is in process of being wound
up and will cease to exist from the date on which India and Pakistan become
Dominions. But a whole complex of administrative and economic arrange¬
ments, at present in existence between what is now British India and the Indian
States, must continue if certain essential Services of common interest to the two
Indian Dominions and the States are not to come to an abrupt and probably
disastrous end. Indeed, even in the political field, specifically as regards External
relations and Defence, the States must, until other arrangements are negotiated,
continue, in relation to the successor Governments in British India, to enjoy
the rights and to discharge the obligations which, in exercise of its Paramountcy,
the British Crown had conferred or imposed upon them. This content of
Paramountcy directly concerned the security of British India and must logically
be preserved in the interests of those who will inherit, from the British Power,
the responsibility to protect what is now known as British India against external
aggression and internal commotion.

2. To deal with the matters referred to in the preceding paragraph, the
immediate creation of some Central machinery which would take the place of

1 No. 175, Item 1, conclusion (ii).

462

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

the Political Department a few weeks hence is essential. Steps to this end
cannot be delayed because the process of succession must take a little time. The
new machinery, which must be a new Department of the present Government
of India until the two Dominion Governments come into being, will gradually
take over from the Pohtical Department the appropriate records and some of its
personnel. It will also, during the period of its co-existence with the Pohtical
Department, endeavour to learn as much of the Political Department’s pro¬
cedure and mode of operation as may be useful for its own operation after the
Pohtical Department ceases to function.

3. The functions proposed for the new Department are:

(1) To correspond, on behalf of the Government of India, with Indian States
on all matters of common concern. Matters of special interest to indi¬
vidual Departments of the Government of India will be disposed of in
consultation with them by the new Department. The alternative of
allowing each Department of the Government of India to deal with the
States will result in lack of coordination with all its attendant disadvan¬
tages.

(2) To supervise the Agents whom the Government of India may decide to
maintain in certain States and to deal with any representatives whom the
States may appoint to the headquarters of the Government of India.

(3) To follow up the negotiations initiated by the Political Department
between the Government of India and the States for the adjustment of
matters of common interest and, where necessary, to initiate new negotia¬
tions for a similar purpose.

(4) Generally to safeguard the interests of the Government of India in the
States.

4. During the pre-Dominion stage the Department should consist of one
Secretary and one or possibly two Deputy Secretaries. The junior and subor¬
dinate staff should, so far as possible, be drawn from the Political Department.
Since both the future Dominions will be interested in the activities of the new
Department its officers should be selected with due regard to this fact.

5. The structure and composition of these Departments under the Dominion
Governments of India and Pakistan should be left to be determined by the two
Governments.

JUNE 1947

463

239

Minutes of Viceroy s Forty Fifth Staff Meeting
Mountbatten Papers

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's House, New Delhi, on 17 June
1947 at 3 Pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Lord Ismay,
Sir E. Mieville, Mr Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine
Crum

Also present for Items 1-4 were Sir C. Corf eld, and for Items 1-2 Sir G. Spence
and Mr Sundaram

Item 1

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

his excellency the viceroy said that, during his interview with Mr
Gandhi that morning,1 the latter had expressed himself as very keen to create
an opportunity for the two sides to come together in connection with the
referendum in the N.W.F.P. his excellency said that Mr Jinnah had
come early for his interview and had spent an hour together with Mr Gandhi.
Mr Gandhi had proposed that the discussions should be continued with Abdul
Ghaffar Khan that evening; and they were all expected at 7.45 p.m. the
viceroy said that he was not very optimistic about the outcome of these
discussions, but felt that it was up to him to provide every opportunity for
their success.

Item 2

THE DRAFT BILL

The meeting considered two draft telegrams2 to the Secretary of State, prepared
by the Reforms Commissioner, containing comments on the Draft Bill3 which
was to be cited as the “Indian Dominions Act, 1947”.

his excellency the viceroy said that he considered it absolutely
essential that copies of this Draft should be shown, before it was introduced
into Parliament, to the Indian Leaders. He asked Lord Ismay to make this view
perfectly clear to the Secretary of State if the latter telegraphed the opposite
view during his absence in Kashmir. He also authorised Lord Ismay to conduct
any negotiations which he deemed fit with Pandit Nehru and Mr Jinnah.
Berar

Clause 2 of the Draft Bill stated that “the territories of India shall be the
territories under the sovereignty of His Majesty . . .” It was pointed out that
these did not include Berar.

1 No. 230.

2 Drafts not printed (R/3/1/153 : fF 97-105); for the telegrams as issued see Nos. 248 and 249.

3 No. 191.

464

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

his excellency said that the talks which he had had with Sir Walter
Monckton had indicated to him clearly that it would be essential to have a
standstill agreement for Berar. He pointed out that, although legally Berar
belonged to the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Government of India were in
possession of it.

sir conrad cor fi eld confirmed that the right to administer Berar
would revert automatically to the Nizam on the transfer of power. He con¬
sidered that His Excellency, as Crown Representative, would not be able to
force the two parties to come to agreement but only to help to bring them
together. The Nizam might well demand concessions. Moreover, the Nizam’s
consent would have to be obtained before any of his representatives entered
even preliminary negotiations on this subject.

his excellency said that he agreed that it was his task, as Crown Repre¬
sentative, to do his best to bring the two parties together and to use his best
endeavours to produce a standstill agreement. He added that it would be
necessary to explain the legal position to Congress before the negotiations
opened.

Bengal and the Punjab

his excellency gave his opinion that the intention to name the new Pro¬
vinces “Bengal”, “Western Bengal”, “The Punjab” and “The Eastern Punjab”
was likely to create some confusion. However, he did not intend to take this
point up with the Secretary of State at this stage.

The Governors-General

A proviso in the Draft Bill, in the clause concerning the appointment of
Governors-General,4 read: “Provided that, unless and until another appoint¬
ment is made, the person who, immediately before the appointed day, is
Governor-General of India within the meaning of the Government of India
Act, 1935, shall, as from the appointed day, become the Governor-General of
each of the Indian Dominions”.

his excellency said that he felt that both he and the leaders of the two
prospective Dominions would be put in a most invidious position by this
proviso. He intended to ask the two leaders whether they accepted it and
whether they would ask for him to be Governor-General of each Dominion.
He would then, before the Bill was finalised, ask for an alternative draft to be
inserted on the lines that it would be lawful for each Dominion to have the same
Governor-General if they both asked for it.

rao Bahadur menon stated that the nominations made by the two
Dominions Prime Ministers, for the posts of Governor-General, would come
through His Excellency.

The Lapse of Paramountcy

Paragraph 7 (1) (b) of the Draft Bill concerned the lapse of paramountcy.
Rao Bahadur menon said that he was opposed to the inclusion of this para-

JUNE 1947

465

graph. No question of paramountcy should surely come into the legislation.
His Majesty’s Government had already published their word sufficiently that
paramountcy would lapse on 15 th August.

sir conrad corfield said that he would have been ready to agree with
this view if there had been general accord that paramountcy would then lapse ;
but many eminent jurists had expressed their disagreement with this, and he
therefore considered that the paragraph would best be left in. He suggested,
however, that it should be made to apply instead of “as from the appointed
day” rather “as from not later than the appointed day”.

his excellency pointed out that it was doubtful whether the Bill would be
passed until the beginning of August; and then there would only be a fortnight
until the transfer of power. He did not therefore consider that the amendment
suggested by Sir Conrad Corfield was necessary.

his excellency added that the reports that the Nizam of Hyderabad had
declared the independence of his State were incorrect. He had in fact declared
that he considered himself entitled to declare his State independent if he so
wished.5

The Royal Style and Titles

In connection with paragraph 7 (2) of the Draft Bill, his excellency
the viceroy said that he intended to ask Pandit Nehru and Mr Jinnah whether
they would agree that the King should continue to use the letters “R.I.” in his
signature.

The Andaman and Nicohar Islands

his excellency said that he had been amazed to find in the Draft Bill
provision that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands should cease to be part of
India after 15th August. But it was not for him to attempt to disguise the
intentions and desires of His Majesty’s Government in this respect. He con¬
sidered that it would be better to allow this paragraph to be circulated to the
leaders ; to come out into the open and then to try to negotiate an agreement
with them. Whoever took the document round to the Indian Leaders should
draw their particular attention to this paragraph. They should point out that
Aden had ceased to be part of India under the Act of 1935 ; and that it was a
similar procedure which His Majesty’s Government now envisaged with the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands; but that, if the leaders wished to contest this,
some alternative means of satisfying His Majesty’s Government would have to
be found, his excellency said that, so far as he knew, all His Majesty’s
Government really wanted were harbours and airfields on the Islands. It would
have to be a matter of negotiation. In the meanwhile an alternative draft
should be prepared. Was there, incidentally, any chance of splitting the

4 Clause 5(2).

5 See No. 163.

466

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

difference, leaving the Andaman Islands in India, and taking over Nancowry
and the Nicobar s ?

A number of amendments to the draft telegrams to the Secretary of State
consequent upon the discussion recorded above were made.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

(i) directed Con. Sec. to amend the two draft telegrams to the Secretary
of State in accordance with the discussion and to despatch them;

(ii) authorised C.V.S. to despatch, during his absence in Kashmir, a
telegram to the Secretary of State, saying that he considered it
absolutely essential to show the Draft Bill to the Indian Leaders if,
during that absence, the Secretary of State expressed, by telegram,
an opposite view;

(iii) authorised C.V.S. to conduct or arrange any negotiations which he
thought fit with Pandit Nehru and Mr Jinnah, concerning the Draft
Bill; and in this connection drew particular attention to the way
(recorded above) in which to deal with the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands ;

(iv) directed C.V.S. to discuss with Sir Walter Monckton, Sir Conrad
Corfield and the Nawab of Chhattari the future of Berar;

(v) directed C.V.S. to write to Pandit Nehru after the discussions in (iv)
above, saying that he (The Viceroy) considered that it was time that
the question of Berar was brought forward; asking Pandit Nehru
whether he would initiate or attend discussions with the Nizam’s
representatives on this subject; and making clear to Pandit Nehru the
legal position of Berar;6

(vi) directed the Reforms Commissioner to prepare an alternative draft
to the proviso in Clause 5 (2) of the Draft Bill;

(vii) decided to speak to Pandit Nehru and Mr Jinnah at the next oppor¬
tunity concerning the retention in His Majesty’s signature of the
letters “R.I.”.

(viii) directed the Reforms Commissioner to prepare an alternative draft
of Clause 167 of the Draft Bill.

Item 3

GOVERNORS

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed P.S.V. to expedite an answer from the Secretary of State to his
proposals8 concerning the resignation of all Governors on the date of the
transfer of power.

Item 4

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STATES DEPARTMENT (V.C.P. 8l.)9
The Meeting considered a letter from Pandit Nehru covering proposals which

JUNE I947

467

lie had drafted concerning the establishment and functions of the new States
Department of the Government of India which it had been decided to set up.

sir conrad corfield made a number of comments on these proposals,
especially with regard to Pandit Nehru’s statement that the States must con¬
tinue in the political field to enjoy certain rights and discharge certain obliga¬
tions. his excellency accepted, in principle, the various comments put
forward by Sir Conrad Corfield.

his excellency said that he wished to take the opportunity to tell Sir
Conrad Corfield what he felt about the attack which had been made on him, at
the last meeting with the Indian Leaders, by Pandit Nehru.10 He explained that
it had always been his policy to refuse to enter into discussions with the Indian
Leaders concerning the behaviour of British officials. Nevertheless, he felt that
on the occasion referred to, he should perhaps have made it absolutely clear to
Pandit Nehru that he of course completely disassociated himself with the latter’s
remarks and was unable to consider accepting the various strictures which he
had made, his excellency added that he could not believe that Pandit Nehru
would even have followed up his accusations if he had been asked to sub¬
stantiate them and had been told that they would be carefully gone into.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

(i) directed the Political Adviser, in conjunction with the Reforms
Commissioner, to draft a reply to Pandit Nehru’s letter; this reply
should make clear that the Viceroy had approved the general lines on
which it was drafted and should emphasise that the Political Depart¬
ment would assist in the formation of the States Department;

(ii) directed the Political Adviser, in conjunction with the Reforms
Commissioner, to prepare a memorandum to be enclosed in his reply
to Pandit Nehru’s letter, and eventually to be put up before the
Cabinet, making definite proposals for the establishment and func¬
tions of the new States Department;

(iii) authorised C.V.S. to sign, on his behalf, the documents in (i) and (ii)
above.

Item 5

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (v.C.P. 76. )n

The Meeting considered a paper, prepared by the Reforms Commissioner,
which proposed that, after the first week in July, the Central Government

6 On 18 June Lord Ismay noted that he thought that Lord Mountbatten’s remarks were in fact less
categorical than this conclusion implied, and that, after discussion with Sir E. Mieville, he was clear
‘that this very big question must await the return of the Viceroy himself’. In the meantime it was
possible that Mr Menon might broach the subject in general terms with Sardar Patel. Mountbatten
Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Indian Independence Bill, Part 1(b), f 21.

7 i.e. the Clause concerning the Andamans and Nicobars.

8 No. 79. 6 7 8 9 No. 238.

See No. 175, Item 1.

10

11 No. 200.

468

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

should operate in two separate compartments. It was suggested that the Con¬
gress and Muslim League Leaders, who were likely to be Prime Ministers in
their respective Dominions after 15th August, should be asked to nominate a
Cabinet in respect of their respective parties; that all the members of each
prospective Cabinet should have equal status and be equally entitled to par¬
ticipate in Meetings of the Council; but that the Muslim League Members
should be concerned so far as normal administration was concerned only with
the Pakistan areas.

lord ismay said that he did not believe that the Muslim League Ministers
would welcome these proposals. He personally did not see the necessity for
altering the present set-up so far before 15 th August.

mr abell said that he also did not believe that the Muslim League would
welcome the proposals. He considered that the administrative aspects of
Partition should be left to the Steering Committee and the other bodies which
had been particularly set up for this purpose. Then the political aspect of these
proposals alone remained. Did Congress really attach sufficient importance to
them to justify the dislocation and the dissatisfaction among the Muslim League
members that they were bound to cause?

his excellency the viceroy said that he had no doubt whatsoever that
Congress attached the very greatest importance to these proposals. On this
subject there was no holding Pandit Nehru, who continually threatened
resignation unless the Executive Council was reorganised.12 his excellency
said that he believed that he personally would be able to convince Mr Liaquat
Ali Khan of the desirability of these proposals, because the chief concern of the
latter, who had, on his own confession, lost interest in the Finance Department
and the Cabinet, was to find and train sufficient Muslim administrators. Mr
Liaquat Ali Khan might well be induced to accept these proposals if he was
given absolute authority to safeguard the position of Pakistan. There would not
be much legislative action during the last six weeks before the transfer of power.
The efforts of all the Ministers would be directed almost exclusively towards the
problems of Partition. He asked whether it would be possible to modify these
proposals to the extent that the Muslim League Ministers would continue
nominally to hold, until the transfer of power, the portfolios which they now
held, rao bahadur menon said that this suggestion had been turned
down by Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel.

his excellency said that he believed that the proposals contained in Rao
Bahadur Menon’s paper could be redrafted in a form more acceptable to the
Muslim League. When this had been done, he would talk to Mr Liaquat Ah
Khan on the subject.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY :

(i) directed the Reforms Commissioner to redraft V.C.P. 76 in a form
more acceptable to the Muslim League ;

JUNE 1947

469

(ii) decided that he would then personally speak to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan
about the proposals contained in V.C.P. 76, as redrafted;

(iii) decided provisionally to mention this matter at his next Cabinet
Meeting; to have a paper put up for the one after that; and to ask for
resignations of Honourable Members to be effective approximately a
week after that.

Item 6

THE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES
There was before the meeting a Minute13 by Lord Ismay to His Excellency on
this subject. This referred to a paper14 prepared by Lieut. General Sir Arthur
Smith, the recommendation of which was that British Forces should be
retained in India at least until January 1948. Lord Ismay’ s Minute stated that the
Viceroy’s Staff submitted that, in this matter, political considerations were
overriding, and that the proper policy was to commence withdrawal of British
Forces on 15th August.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

(i) approved C.V.S.’s Minute;

(ii) directed C.V.S. to discuss the proposals contained in his Minute with
the C.G.S. and subsequently with the C. in C.15

Item 7

BAHA WALPUR

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY!

directed P.S.V. to ensure that, in due course, the papers16 concerning the
special position of Bahawalpur were put before the Punjab Boundary
Commission.

Item 8

SIR CHANDULAL TRIVEDI

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY!

directed P.S.V. to invite Sir Chandulal Trivedi to come to stay at the
Viceroy’s House for a few days in connection with the discussions on the
partition of the Army.

12 cf. No. 80, para. i. 13 No. 213. 14 Enclosure to No. 159.

15 On 18 June Lord Ismay wrote to Field Marshal Auchinleck on the lines of paras. 5-8 of No. 213 and
stated that therefore, subject to his (Auchinleck’s) concurrence, Lord Mountbatten proposed:

‘(a) To submit the above conclusions [i.e. the conclusions in No. 213, para. 8] to the Secretary of
State for India and ask for their endorsement by H.M.G.

(b) To get authority from H.M.G. to inform the Indian leaders of this policy before it is an¬
nounced, but to tell them that if both parties were to submit a formal request that British forces
should remain in this country for, say, six months, to tide over the initial period of transition, he
would be prepared to forward their request to H.M.G. He would, of course, explain that they
could only be kept here with proper safeguards.’

R/3/1/81: ff 147-9*

16 Not traced; but see No. 101, penultimate para., and No. 246, para. 5.

470

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Item g

DOMINION STATUS

There were before the meeting two papers17 which had been prepared by the
Dominions Office.

These were entitled :

“THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH* *

and

“dominion governors-general”

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY!

directed C.V.S. to send copies of these papers to the Indian leaders for their
information.

17 Enclosures to No. 13 1.

240

Sir F. Burrows [Bengal) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma

Telegram , Rfe/i/i^iff 4-5

most immediate 17 June , ip47, 5.55 pm

confidential Received: 17 June , 11.30 pm

No. 159-C. In pursuance of my desire to have a Coalition Ministry, if at all
possible, for interim period between decision to partition Bengal and advent of
Dominion Status, I saw Suhrawardy on Friday and again today and Karan
Sankar Roy on latter’s return from Delhi on Sunday. Former was most un¬
helpful in regard to a Coalition and without in any way meeting my arguments
he made it clear that he would not make room for members of the Opposition
in his Ministry which he seemed to think could quite well carry on as a Care¬
taker government till partition actually takes effect. He agreed to the idea of
having a partition committee at Party leader’s level with an official Steering
Committee to submit proposals for that Committee’s decision and expert
official Committees working under Steering Committee.

2. K. S. Roy also made it clear that he did not think participation in a
Coalition Ministry to run a care-taker Government for two months was
necessary or likely to be useful. He does not like the idea of Section 93 (in
which I fully agree with him) but considers that we should have two Regional
Ministries to run the Province in two parts but through one Secretariat until
partition actually takes effect. He agreed that there would have to be joint
consultation on matters of joint interest. After a half-hearted attempt to suggest
that the partition committee should be composed entirely of High Court
Judges, he saw my point that it must be a committee of Party leaders who can

JUNE I947

471

pledge tlieir Parties in advance in such matters of great urgency as settling terms
for and making offers to the Services.

3. I can see that I am not going to get a Coalition Ministry. I therefore
discussed at length with Suhrawardy today question of forming Regional
Ministries when partition has been decided upon. He pointed out — what I
already of course appreciated — great administrative difficulties of running such
a system. He however did not turn the idea down but promised to give it full
consideration in consultation with his colleagues and the High Command and
finished with the words “I will do my best”. I am therefore very hopeful that
he will play.

4. He leaves for Delhi this afternoon by plane for consultation with Jinnah
on this and other matters. I informed him that I was acquainting you with the
position and that I should request you to interest Jinnah favourably in the idea
of Regional Ministries for the period between decision on partition and hand¬
ing of power. He welcomed this.

241

The Earl of Listowel to Mr Attlee
Public Record Office. PREM 8/575

private India office, 17 June 1947

Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 92/47

Prime Minister

I have carefully considered the exchange of letters with Halifax enclosed in
your personal minute of 16th June, M.246/47.1

2. My first comment is that — adopting for the moment Halifax’s assumption
of a visit this year — it would be inadvisable to make any reference to the
Viceroy till it has been ascertained from Their Majesties that the suggestion is
not from their point of view wholly impracticable. Any reference to the Vice¬
roy might result in the excitation of hopes, in one quarter or another, with
corresponding disappointment if there were no prospect of their realisation.

3. My second comment is that Halifax writes of a visit “to Delhi in the
autumn for the purpose of saying goodbye, and wishing them (that is the
Indians) good luck”. Halifax evidently means the coming autumn which, even
if interpreted as “during the cold weather” and January and February rather
than November and December, seems to me impracticably early in any circum-

1 No. 222.

472

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

stances for all the elaborate arrangements that have to be made for a Royal Tour
and emphatically so when the administrative machine in India is as run down
and as over-strained as it now is by its immediate and necessary duties.

4. This leads to my third comment; that the purpose of any such visit should
not be, as Halifax says, that of formally saying goodbye to Indians — as though
they were going out of the Commonwealth — but of inaugurating the two new
Dominions. I do not think that I am being pessimistic in forecasting that neither
Dominion will by the end of the coming cold weather have so fully con¬
stituted itself and so completely adjusted its relations with the other that formal
inauguration, with all the ceremony involved, would be appropriate or
possible — least of all, in all probability, in the case of Pakistan which, of the
two is more likely to welcome whole-heartedly a visit by the King, the symbol
of Commonwealth unity.

5. To sum up ; my view is that, given an assurance of the appropriate atmos¬
phere of cordial welcome, a visit by Their Majesties at the appropriate time to
inaugurate the two new Dominions might well be most valuable in the way of
fomenting a genuine desire to continue as Dominions within the Common¬
wealth; that it will be too early, at any time during the cold weather 1947-48,
to be sure either of such welcome (and anything like a boycott on any con¬
siderable scale in either part of India, such as might well be organised by the
Socialists or Communists, both advocates of Republicanism, would be disas¬
trous) or that the administrations will be able to cope with the additional
burden thrown on them; and that it would be better to postpone pursuit of the
idea till conditions are much more settled in India than they can be for several
months, with a view to considering its feasibility as a project for execution in the
cold weather 1948-49.

6. By that time, too, the Indian Princes may have defined their relations with
the Indian Dominions: till they have done so a visit by their Suzerain — to
whom despite the severance of the link of paramountcy many will wish to
remain bound in some way — might provoke many causes of political embar¬
rassment to the new Indian Dominions, to H.M.G. and to Their Majesties
themselves.

7. For all these reasons I would deprecate taking the matter any further for
the time being.2

L.

2 A note dated 3 July 1947 by the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary indicates that Mr Attlee had
discussed this matter with Sir A. Lascelles ‘and agreed with the view expressed, that the idea was not
practicable even if it was desirable’. Mr Attlee had not therefore mentioned it to the King. He
shortly intended to explain the matter to Lord Halifax. P.R.O. PREM 8/575.

JUNE I947

473

242

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru

R^f/iSi: f 179

no. 1446/3 1 7 June ig47

Dear Mr Nehru,

Thank you so much for your note1 about Kashmir, which I shall look forward
to reading in the aeroplane.

I have been having a very long and busy day, with interviews with the
Nawab of Chhatari about Hyderabad2 and the Nawab of Bhopal about
Bhopal.3 1 have been giving them advice to the best of my ability and will talk
it over with you when next I see you.

I was very hopeful that we should make some progress at the meeting with
Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah tonight, but have just heard that Badshah Khan
cannot be found, so that the main object of the meeting cannot be achieved.
But I have not given up hope.

There are so many problems pressing on me from all directions that I would
complain of being over-worked to anybody but you; but I know that you are
over- working a great deal more than me and I wish you wouldn’t!

Yours very sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

P.S. Since dictating the above Rajkumari has telephoned that Badshah Khan
cannot be found. I considered it so important that the meeting should take
place that I rang up Mr. jinnah and obtained his concurrence to its taking place
with Lord Ismay in the chair tomorrow. Rajkumari promised to get Mr.
Gandhi to bring Badshah Khan to the meeting. I attach the greatest importance
to this meeting and sincerely hope that all parties will attend it and arrive at a
satisfactory settlement.

1 No. 229.

2 Not traced.

3 For an account of this interview see No. 369, paras. 32-5.

474

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

243

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: States , Relations with ,

Part 11(a)

important new Delhi, 17 June 1947, 10.20 pm

SECRET

No. 1482-P. Title of His Highness for Rulers.

2. I wish to request that the orders passed in Birkenhead’s Secret Despatch
No. 3 dated the 23rd July 1925 should be modified.

3 . The refusal of the style of His Highness to Rulers with a salute of nine
guns is seldom observed in practice, and the restriction is little known to the
public. The Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes has consistently used the
style of His Highness in addressing nine gun Rulers, and their subjects have done
the same. In practice, it is only officials who are forced to refuse to these Rulers a
courtesy which general social practice allows.

4. Many of those States are more important than certain eleven gun States ;
and the extension of the courtesy of the style of His Highness to all Rulers of
salute States would be widely welcomed by them, and would be of much
advantage in the future.

5. Arrangements will be made to avoid all publicity about this, as far as
possible.1

1 The Earl of Listowel replied on 21 July in tel. 9401 conveying the King’s approval of the extension of
the style 'His Highness’ to all Rulers with salutes of 9 Guns and their lawful wives and widows.
Mounthatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: States, Relations with, Part 11(b).

244

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. LB. (47)3 1st Meeting
L/P&Jliol8i:ff 241-50

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.i, on 17 June 1947
at 9.30 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir S. Cripps, Mr A. V. Alexander, the
Earl of Listowel, Mr C. P. Mayhew, Mr A. G. Bottomley, Mr Arthur Henderson,
Lord Chorley

Also present were: Viscount Jowitt (for item 1), Mr A. Creech Jones for (Item 4),
Mr W. Whiteley (for Item 1), Sir E. Bridges, Sir D. Monteath, Sir W. Croft,
Mr J. Rowlatt, Mr K. Anderson, Mr J. A. Simpson; Mr S. E. V. Luke, Mr D . F.
Huhback, Mr F. F. Turnbull (Secretariat)

JUNE 1947

475

Minute 1

Legislation to set up the Indian Dominions and to Transfer Power
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for
India (1.13.(47) I00)»I covering a draft of the proposed India Bill,2 and a further
memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (I.B.(47) 102), 3 on the question
whether the draft Bill should be shown to the Indian leaders.

the chief whip said that the aim was to introduce the Bill not later
than Monday, 7th July. If that proved possible, the Second Reading might be
taken on 17th July. The Committee and remaining stages might be taken either
on the following day or on a day in the week following the Second Reading.
He understood, however, that the Opposition leaders had suggested that the
Bill might pass through all its stages on the same day. It might be best in the
circumstances to defer a decision regarding the time required for the various
stages of the Bill and the dates on which they should be taken until after the
discussions with the Opposition on the draft of the Bill.4

The Committee thought that no attempt should be made to complete all the
stages of the Bill on the same day. This would not provide the House of
Commons with adequate time for consideration of it, and amendments of
value might be lost. It was agreed that the Bill should be introduced by 7th
July or earlier if practicable. It would, however, not be possible to decide on a
time-table for the passage of the Bill until the proposed discussion with the
Opposition had taken place.

The Committee then considered whether the Bill should be shown in draft
to the Indian political leaders.

the secretary of state for India pointed out that the Viceroy,
in his telegrams nos. 13 58— S of 9th June and 142 i-S of 13th June, 5 had strongly
pressed Pandit Nehru’s request that the Indian political leaders should be shown
the draft Bill; he had also informed them that he would support it. But there
was a serious risk that, if this request was met, we should be involved in con¬
troversy over the details of the Bill which would seriously delay its intro¬
duction. It would nevertheless be impolitic to adopt a wholly non-possumus
attitude towards the request, and he suggested that the Viceroy might be
authorised to tell the Indian leaders orally what the main provisions of the Bill
would be.

the president of the board of trade thought that there were two
over-riding arguments for acceding to Pandit Nehru’s request. First, the
Viceroy had gone very far towards giving a personal assurance that the Indian

1 No. 190. 2 No. 191. 3 No. 193.

4 It may be noted that a tentative estimate, prepared in the India Office on about 16 June 1947, of the
time which would be required to pass the Bill, envisaged its introduction on 7 July leading to a Third
Reading on 3 1 July ‘leaving one week for consideration of Lords, amendments in House of Com¬
mons and for mishaps’. L/P &J/10/130: ff 261-2.

5 Nos. 1 15 and 172.

476

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

leaders would have an opportunity of seeing the draft Bill, and an oral account
of the Bill might lead subsequently to complaints that its terms had not been
made clear. Secondly, it could be assumed that the process of establishing the
Indian Dominions and transferring power would develop more smoothly if the
political leaders had been consulted about the terms of the United Kingdom
legislation. This should not, however, mean that copies of the Bill should be
handed to them; their request would have been sufficiently met if they were
given an opportunity of studying the draft at the Viceroy’s House.

the prime minister said that, as soon as agreement had been reached with
the Viceroy on the terms of the draft Bill, he would discuss it with the Opposi¬
tion: he would inform them at the same time of Pandit Nehru’s request. Until
these consultations had taken place it would be premature to show the Bill to
the Indian leaders.

The Committee —

(i) Agreed to resume consideration of Pandit Nehru’s request after the
consultations with the Opposition leaders on the draft Bill had taken
place.

The Committee then considered the text of the draft Bill annexed to I.B.(47)
ioo.

In discussion, it was agreed that the draft should be amended as follows —

(a) Clause 3(2) : It was pointed out that this Clause was incorrect and would
have to be redrafted to provide for a referendum to be held in the district of
Sylhet in accordance with the provisions of the Government’s recen t announce¬
ment6 on the transfer of power in India.

(b) Clause 5 : The Committee were informed that this Clause was based on a
similar provision in the British South Africa Act. This form had been adopted
to meet the views of the Dominions Office who held that a Governor-General
appointed by the Crown was an indispensable element of Dominion Status.
The Committee felt, however, that the Clause, as drafted, would be incom¬
prehensible in India and would be a cause of suspicion and misunderstanding.
They considered that the possibility of an alternative formula should be
examined : the requirements of the Bill might perhaps be met by reference to
the comparable status of one of the other Dominions.

(c) Clause It was agreed that the word “British” should be inserted

before “India”. It was also agreed that it would be desirable to include in the
Bill a definition of the word “India”.

(d) Clause 8: The Committee considered that it was essential that an order
making power of this kind should be conferred on the Governor-General. They
felt, however, that it might be preferable to substitute, for the detailed pro-

JUNE 1947

477

visions of Clause 8(2), a general provision enabling the Governor-General to
provide by order for the “interim administration of the joint services”. It was
agreed that the Viceroy should be asked to ascertain the views of the Indian
political leaders on the question whether they would prefer that the Governor-
General’s powers in this respect should be specified in detail on the lines of
Clause 8(2), or by a general and comprehensive formula.

(e) Clause 9(2): It was agreed that the words “or legislature” should be
inserted after the words “common central government” in Clause 9 (2) (a).

(f) Clause 13: It was agreed that a definition of the term “High Commis¬
sioner” should be inserted in the Bill.

the secretary of state for India said that the intention had been to
secure by treaty or in connection with the settlement of the sterling balances
firm assurance from the new Indian authorities for the payment of certain
classes of outstanding obligations for which His Majesty’s Government had a
special responsibility. This had not so far been possible, and Clause 13 had been
inserted primarily with the object of bridging a period during which negotia¬
tions could take place. There was a definite risk that in the process of dividing
India there might be a failure, not through intent, but through mal-administra-
tion, to provide the necessary money for meeting these dues.

sir edward bridges said that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would
prefer that sub-Clauses (2), (4) and (5) of Clause 13 should be omitted from the
Bill. Their inclusion implied too specifically the possibility that India might
default on its obligations. If in fact there should be a breakdown in the arrange¬
ments for payment, it would be possible to meet the immediate needs of the
situation from the Civil Contingencies Fund. If any public assurance was to be
given that His Majesty’s Go vernment would meet these obligations as an
emergency measure, it would be preferable that it should be given in the House
of Commons in discussion of the Bill.

The Committee agreed that sub-Clauses (2), (4) and (5) of Clause 13 should
be omitted from the draft Bill, but that an assurance should be given in Parlia¬
ment that His Majesty’s Government would ensure that these obligations were
fully honoured.

(g) Clause 14: It was agreed that sub-Clause (2) should be omitted on the
understanding that an attempt would be made to secure Indian agreement to
the continuance by the Auditor of Indian Home Accounts of his existing
functions in relation to Burma.

(h) Clause 13: It was agreed that the words “authorising the Secretary of
State to continue to exercise his functions on and after the appointed day”

6 No. 45, para. 13.

478

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

would be misunderstood in India, and that this part of the sub-Clause should be
re-drafted in less general terms.7

(i) Clause 16: In accordance with the conclusion reached on the discussion
under item 4 of the agenda, it was agreed that this Clause should be omitted.
The question whether any reference should be made to the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands in the draft Bill was also discussed under that item.

(k) Clause 17: mr. rowlatt informed the Committee that it was pro¬
posed to re-draft this Clause. Reference to the Government of India Act, 1935,
would be omitted and the colony would be brought within the scope of the
British Settlements Act.

(l) Clause 19 : The Committee thought that it would be advisable to make
clear in the Bill the fact that the words “the Secretary of State” did not mean
“the Secretary of State for India”. In the absence of a definition of the term “the
Secretary of State” they thought that Indian opinion might not appreciate this
point. In view of the assurance that had been given that Indian affairs would no
longer be handled by the India Office, it seemed important that there should be
no misunderstanding. It was agreed that the possibility of amending the draft
Bill to meet this criticism should be considered.

(m) Clause 21 ( j){ii ) : It was agreed that this sub-Clause should be re-drafted to
avoid the implication that the North West Frontier Province would inevitably
join Pakistan.

(n) Clause 21(3): It was agreed that provision should be made under this
sub-clause for the tribal areas.

(o) Clause 21(5) : It was agreed that this sub-Clause should either form part of
Clause 17 or should be omitted altogether.

(p) Clause 2i{6)\ It was pointed out that this sub-Clause had been inserted
to meet the requirements of the procedure of the House of Commons. It was
agreed, however, that it would be misunderstood in India and should be
omitted.

(q) Clause 22 : It was agreed, on the Prime Minister’s suggestion, that the Bill
should be called the “Indian Independence Bill”.

In addition to the above amendments, the following points were made in
discussion : —

(i) The question was raised whether provision ought to be made in the Bill
for the assumption by the successor States in India of the international obliga¬
tions assumed under treaties concluded in the name of the Crown or the
Government of the United Kingdom. It was pointed out, however, that the
United Kingdom Government and Parliament were not competent to deter¬
mine the international position of the two new Dominions. That must depend
on the recognition accorded to them by foreign countries. It would, therefore,
be inappropriate to impose on the new Dominions by United Kingdom

JUNE 1947

479

legislation responsibility for the assumption of the obligations which had been
assumed in respect of India by the British Government in the past.

(ii) THE PRIME minister drew attention to Clause 7(i)(b) of the draft Bill,
which read as follows : —

“As from the appointed day . . .

(b) the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States shall cease, and the
functions theretofore exercisable by Him with regard to the Indian States,
and any powers, authority or jurisdiction theretofore exercisable by Him in
the Indian States, being functions, powers, authority or jurisdiction incidental
to or flowing from that suzerainty, shall cease to be exercisable”.

No reference was made in the draft Bill to the termination of the treaties and
agreements with the Indian States. Would it not be advisable to denounce these
treaties in the Act itself? If no reference was made to this point in the Bill, the
matter might be raised in Parliament. It was desirable to take formal steps to
make clear to the Princes and to others that these treaties would not remain valid
on behalf of the new Dominions.

the lord chancellor said that it was not essential to include in the Bill
any reference to the treaties with the Indian States: denunciation was an act of
state for which no legislation was necessary. On the other hand there was no
reason why denunciation should not be included in the Bill.

It was agreed that the question whether any reference to the treaties with the
Indian States should be made in the draft Bill should be further examined.

(iii) In connection with Clause 5 of the draft Bill, the secretary of
state for India said that the Viceroy had proposed8 that he should tender
his resignation to His Majesty on the appointed day and should request Gover¬
nors of all Provinces to do likewise. It appeared, however, that the only prospect
of any reasonable or orderly partition of India and transfer of power depended
on the continued presence, for a time at least, of Lord Mountbatten and of some
at any rate of the British Governors, particularly those in Bengal and the
Punjab. He thought, therefore, that neither the Viceroy nor the Governors
should resign on the appointed day but that they should make it clear to their
Ministries in the Provinces and to the Union leaders at the centre that it was
open to them at any time to recommend to His Majesty that a new appointment
should be made and add that they personally were entirely willing to withdraw
at any time when the Indian leaders desired.9

7 Clause 15(1) provided that statutory provisions authorising legal proceedings by or against the
Secretary of State should cease to have effect on the appointed day ‘notwithstanding anything in this
Act, and, in particular, notwithstanding the provisions thereof authorising the Secretary of State to
continue to exercise his functions on and after the appointed day’. L/P &J/10/123 : f 264. The Com¬
mittee evidently felt that this reference to the ‘Secretary of State’ might be misundertood for the
same reason as that in Clause 19 (see para. (1) below).

8 No. 79.

9 cf. No. 183.

480

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The Committee felt that there were marked advantages in the Viceroy’s
proposal that he should continue in office only on the request of the Indian
leaders. The adoption of the procedure which he had suggested would, how¬
ever, involve a serious risk that India might be left without a Governor-
General at a most critical and difficult time, and it was clearly essential to avoid
this possibility. It was agreed that the Viceroy should be asked to consult at
once with the Indian leaders with a view to reaching agreement on a satis¬
factory solution of this problem.

The Committee: —

(2) Invited the Secretary of State for India to inform the Viceroy of the
amendments of the draft Bill on which they had decided, and to take
up with him at the same time the other points raised in their dis¬
cussion.

Minute 2

International Status of the Indian Dominions
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for
India (I.B.(47) 99)10 on the question of the international status of the Indian
Dominions.

the secretary of state for India said that the claim made by Pandit
Nehru that Hindustan should automatically succeed to the position of India as
an international entity was naturally contested by Mr. Jinnah, who held that
two new states were being created, neither of which could claim to succeed
India in the international sphere. Each state, in Mr. Jinnah’s opinion, would
have to secure recognition separately. As the position of the two new Domin¬
ions in regard to the United Nations and other international bodies depended
on recognition accorded to them by member states, it was most important that
the Bill should be so drafted as to influence the United Nations towards taking
the same view as the United Kingdom Government. Clauses 1 and 2 as at
present drafted largely embodied the Congress Party’s view; in the Viceroy’s
opinion this would involve far less difficulties than would the acceptance of the
Muslim League contentions. Hindustan would embrace the greater part of
India; it would also take over the machinery of the Central Government
concerned with external relations. Moreover, all existing representatives of
India in foreign countries and on international bodies had been nominated by
Pandit Nehru as External Affairs Member of the Interim Government. What¬
ever decision might be taken by His Majesty’s Government, Pakistan would
have to establish its claim to international status. The only result of setting up
two new states would be to deprive Hindustan of its right to claim membership
of the United Nations without in any way assisting Pakistan to secure inter¬
national recognition. Pakistan would have a claim to a share of the property
now owned by the Government of India for the purposes of foreign affairs,

JUNE 1947

481

but these assets could be included in a financial settlement of assets and liabilities.
On balance the advantage lay in accepting Hindustan as the successor of the
former India. The Viceroy had very strongly supported this view in his
telegram No. 1439-S of 14th June.11

The Committee: —

Invited the Secretary of State for India to inform the Viceroy that His
Majesty’s Government for their part accept Pandit Nehru’s view that
Hindustan will succeed to the position of India as an international entity ;
but assume that there will be a financial adjustment of the assets involved.

Minute 3

Assumption of International Obligations by the Successor Authorities
(Previous Reference: I.B.(47)20th Meeting, Minute 2(b))12
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for
India (LB. (47) 101)13 covering a letter from the Foreign Secretary regarding the
Committee’s decision of 2nd May (I.B.(47) 20th Meeting, Minute 2(b)) on the
procedure for securing the assumption of international obligations by the suc¬
cessor authorities.

The Committee were informed that the Foreign Secretary still held the view
that we should seek a specific undertaking from the new Indian authorities by
Treaty that they would accept and observe all Treaties with foreign States
concluded in the name of the Crown or of the Government of the United
Kingdom which could only be fulfilled in India or only wholly fulfilled if
India observed them.

the secretary of state for India pointed out that the situation had
changed since the Committee had reached their decision. The transfer of power
would take place sooner than was then contemplated, with the result that there
was no hope of concluding a Treaty with the new Indian authorities before the
introduction of legislation. On the other hand, he thought that an attempt
should be made to secure an assurance from the existing Interim Government
on behalf of both the future Dominions in the sense desired by the Foreign
Secretary. The Treaties in question were, of course, international treaties and
not those concluded in the past with Indian States, none of which had ever
held international status.

The Committee: —

Endorsed the views expressed by the Secretary of State for India in

I.B.(47) ioi.

10 No. 188.

11 No. 202.

12 Vol. X, No. 288.

13 No. 192.

482

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Minute 4

Andaman and Nicobar Islands

(Previous Reference: I.B.(47)28th Meeting, Minute 5)14

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for
India (1. 13.(47) 97), 15 together with a telegram No. 1423 of 13 th June1 6 from the
Viceroy on the question of the future of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

the secretary of state for India said that, in the opinion of the Vice¬
roy, there could be no question of raising this controversial subject at the present
delicate stage of our political negotiations. It was a matter on which Indians felt
deeply. Any attempt by His Majesty’s Government to separate the Islands from
India would probably provoke violent opposition from all parts of India. In a
personal letter the Viceroy had made it clear that such a proposal would
seriously undermine his own position.

the minister of defence said that, in the conversations which the Chiefs
of Staff had had with the Viceroy before his departure for India,17 they had
emphasised the great importance which they attached to these Islands as an
essential link in the chain of Commonwealth air and sea communications. It
was vitally important that we should not be deprived of the use of these Islands
for strategic purposes. This was the more important in view of the uncertainty
about the arrangements for securing our future defence requirements in India
itself. The future of the Laccadive Islands ought to be considered at the same
time : they were also very important as a link in our line of air communications
to the Far East, and we should not be denied their use.

The Committee thought that, in view of the advice given by the Viceroy, it
would not be possible to pursue the suggestion of separating the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands from India. We should have to try to secure our defence
requirements by negotiation, and on this point the views of the Viceroy should
be sought. There were various possible courses of action; we might seek to
lease bases; we might try to negotiate a condominium; or it was possible that
Burmese interest in the strategic area of the Indian Ocean might be recognised
by a tripartite agreement for the strategic use of the Islands. It would, therefore,
be necessary to amend the draft Bill; Clause 16 in its existing form would have
to be omitted. If no mention of these Islands were made in the Bill, however,
they would automatically become part of Hindustan on the “appointed day”.
The Committee thought that this should, if possible, be avoided and the
Viceroy’s advice should be sought on the question whether a clause might be
inserted in the draft Bill in the sense that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands
should continue to be governed by a Commissioner under the Governor-
General of India until agreement had been reached about their future disposal.

JUNE I947

483

As regards the Laccadive Islands the Committee were informed that they
formed part of the Madras Presidency: in these circumstances, they agreed that
it would be necessary to seek by negotiation any facilities that we might require
for their use for strategic and defence purposes.18

14 Vol. X, No. 553.

15 No. 165.

16 No. 174.

17 See Vol. IX, No. 487 and No. 544, para. 9, last sub-para.; also No. 221 in this Vol.

18 On 1 July the Air Ministry wrote to the India Office, noting the above decision in regard to the
Laccadive Islands, and requesting that the approval of the Govt of India be sought for a recon¬
naissance of the Islands with a view to the installation of navigational equipment and if possible the
construction of a landing strip there. In due course, Lord Mountbatten sounded Pandit Nehru
informally on the subject, reporting on 19 July that he had spoken to Nehru who was ‘quite friendly
and said there was no objection to official approach being made though he could not commit
himself until all implications had been considered’. Following this an official request for permission
to make the proposed reconnaissance was sent to the Govt of India who agreed to it ‘without
prejudice’. Mountbatten to Listowel, tel. 203 8-S of 19 July; S. of S. to G. of I., Defence Dept, tel.
9327 of 19 July; G. of I., Defence Dept, to S. of S., tel. 2773 of 9 August 1947. L/WS/1/980:
ff 73, 70, 68, 65.

245

Government of India, External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Department, to

Secretary of State

Telegram, LjP &SI12I4197: f 47

17 June 1947, 10.50 pm
Received: 18 June, 2 am

No. 4694. Reference Foreign express letter No. F. io(i4)-nef/46[?47] 25th
April re future of British Mission Lhasa.1

2. Political Officer in Sikkim is anxious to explain informally to Govern¬
ments of Tibet and Bhutan the effect that present constitutional developments in
India will have on existing relationships between H.M.G. and those countries.
He recognizes that no formal declaration such as that in regard to Indian States
could be made. But urges that as a matter of courtesy an early informal explana¬
tion is desirable.

3 . Representatives from Tibet and Bhutan visited Delhi for Asian Relations
Conference and were left in no doubt of India’s friendliness towards their
countries. Nevertheless we agree that H.M.G. might consider it desirable to
send Governments in question informal messages explaining effect of develop-

1 Vol. X, No. 219.

484

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

meats in India on existing treaty relations and attitude which H.M.G. will adopt
for the future towards Tibet and Bhutan.

4. Grateful for early indication of H.M.G. ’s wishes.

5. Meanwhile we are sending informal message of goodwill to Bhutan,
containing assurance that India does not wish to make any change in present
arrangements without mutual agreement.

246

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/3/1/157: f 103

express new Delhi, 17 June 1947, 11.30 pm

secret Received: 17 June, 11.33 pm

No. 1483-S. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this telegram state the issue about existing
agreements between the Crown and the Indian States as it is seen by my
Reforms Office. Political Department do not agree with the Reforms Office
presentation of the issue either in method of approach or in detail. Political
Department’s views follow in my immediately succeeding telegram. I should
be grateful for your opinion.

2. Question has been raised how far existing agreements of a commercial,
economic or financial character between States on the one hand and British
Government, Secretary of State in Council, Governor General in Council, See.,
on the other will be binding on the States and on the successor authorities,
shortly to be established.

3 . One view taken is that since all agreements between States and paramount
power, or agent of paramount power, all to a great or lesser degree relate to
paramountcy the agreements must cease to be legally effective when para-
mountcy lapses. This seems an extreme view.

4. There are several important agreements entered into for common benefit
of States and British India into which paramountcy did not enter, e.g. agree¬
ment of 1920 with Bahawalpur and Bikaner regarding Sutlej Valley Canals
Project and Salt Agreements with Jaipur and Jodphur. Mutual rights and
obligations of parties under such agreements cannot be regarded as lapsing on
withdrawal of paramountcy. On commencement of 1935 Act Crown’s rights
and obligations became for all practical constitutional purposes rights and
obligations of Central Government and were secured as such by provisions of
the Act. Financial commitments of Central Government under agreements of

JUNE 1947

485

this type are considerable. Better view would therefore seem to be that these
agreements will continue to be1 binding on the States and on the successor
Governments of British India jointly.

5 . I discussed the Bahawalpur agreement with the Dewan2 who said he was
particularly anxious that this agreement should be recognized as binding since
the position of Bahawalpur who draw their water from the Sutlej which passes
through both Pakistan and Hindustan would be most insecure if either Domin¬
ion Government repudiated the agreement. I realise however that this may be a
special case.

1 The words ‘that these agreements will continue to be’ omitted from decipher.

2 cf. No. 101, penultimate para.

247

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/j/i/iJZ-*# 104-5

EXPRESS NEW Delhi, 17 June 1947 , 11.55 pm

secret Received: 18 June , 2.5 am

No. 1484-S. Reference paragraph 1 of my telegram 1483-S dated June 17th.1
Political Department’s views are as follows.

2. The question of the extent to which agreements of a commercial, eco¬
nomic or financial character entered into by the Indian States and Crown would
continue to be binding on the successor governments in India after the transfer
of power and the States after the lapse of paramountcy was considered by the
Cabinet Mission. They recognized that the issue was not a legal issue and even if
it was there was no authority competent to determine it. They therefore sug¬
gested negotiation of new agreements between the States and British India. See
paragraph 4 of Memorandum on States Treaties and Paramountcy dated May
12th 1946. 2 Question was also discussed at meeting on 9th May 1947, 3 at which
the Secretary of State and the Political Adviser were present. It was then agreed
that abolition of the Crown Representative would automatically void para¬
mountcy and any agreements between the Crown and the States.

3 . Political Department do not endorse the view expressed in paragraph 4 of
my telegram No. 1483-S that the Sutlej Valley Canals Agreement of 1920 and
the Jaipur and Jodhpur Salt Agreements are Agreements into which para¬
mountcy did not enter. The first of these was entered into on behalf of Bahawal¬
pur by a Council of Regency controlled by the paramount power when the

1 No. 246.

2 Vol. VII, No. 262.

3 Vol. X, No. 376.

486

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Ruler was a minor. The Bahawalpur Government regard their obligations
under the Agreement as having been undertaken under pressure of para-
mountcy. The Jaipur and Jodhpur Salt Agreements are typical of agreements
which States were required to conclude with the paramount power during the
latter half of the 19th century in the interests of the Central Revenues. See
paragraph 96 of the Butler Committee Report,4 and paragraphs 209-218 of the
Davidson Committee Report.5

4. The opinions expressed at the end of paragraph 3 and at the end of
paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 1483-S may commend themselves to the
Governor General6 but in Political Department’s view could hardly be enter¬
tained by the Crown Representative. Political Department consider that there
are other points in Reforms Office statement of case which could be criticised
but say that you are fully aware of the position and that further detailed
criticism is unnecessary.

4 Report of the Indian States Committee 1928-9. Cmd. 3302.

5 Report of the Indian States Enquiry Committee (Financial) 1932. Cmd. 4103.

6 ‘to the Governor General’ deciphered as ‘to your views’.

248

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, RI3I1J33: f 106

immediate new Delhi, 17 June 1947, 9 pm

secret Received: 17 June, 9.30 pm

No. 1480-S. In my succeeding telegram I am sending you my preliminary
comments on the Draft Bill.1 We should be able to reach agreement on terms of
Bill by 20th.

2. I propose then to have Bill reprinted here and to consult the Indian
leaders. I will not give them copies for retention. My final comments, after
consultation with them, should reach you before June 25th.

1 No. 191.

JUNE 1947

487

249

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , fi/j/ 1/153: jf 107-11

immediate new Delhi, 18 June 1947, 1.30 am

secret Received: 18 June , 1 am

No. 148 i-S. Indian Dominions Bill. I am most grateful to you for producing
what seems a very good Bill1 within such a short time. My advisers have
examined it with reference to the note sent with Turnbull’s letter.2 Our
preliminary comments are as follows : —

Clause 1 : In view of assurance given by me to leaders and at Press Con¬
ference3 I consider it vital that appointed day should be August 15th.4 I therefore
urge redrafting of sub-clause (2) to read : —

Begins. (2) In this Act, the expression “The appointed day” means the
fifteenth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-seven. Ends.

Clause 2 Sub-clause (1): I am glad to note the formula adopted in this clause
since it supports viewpoint strongly urged by me as to continuance of inter¬
national status at present enjoyed by India. But Berar is likely to raise a storm. I
am informally consulting Monckton and the Nawab of Chhattari and will
endeavour to bring about a standstill agreement regarding Berar between the
Congress and the Nizam.

Clause (2) Sub-clause (2) paragraph (c): Possibility of referendum being
completed before passing of Act should not be ignored in drafting.

Clause 3 Sub-clause (1): Since August 15th is to be the appointed day it seems
unnecessary to have a different date for reconstitution of new provinces in
Bengal, Assam and Punjab. Suggest that words “as soon as may be and in no
event later than the appointed day” be replaced by “as from appointed day”.

Sub-clause (2) : Intention is to assume from result of referendum in Sylliet
district that that district will join Pakistan Constituent Assembly, and not repeat
not to put the question expressly to Sylhet representatives in the Assam
Legislative Assembly. Suggest therefore that opening paragraph of sub-clause
should be drafted on same lines as Clause 2(2)(c) e.g. as follows: —

“If before appointed day Governor General declares that majority of valid
votes cast in the referendum which on the date of passing of this Act is being
held in that behalf under his authority in the district of Sylhet are in favour of
that district forming part of the new province of Bengal then as from the
appointed day ...”

1 No. 191.

2 No. 189.

3 See Nos. 53, para. 9, and 59, note 12.

4 cf. No. 190, para. 4(xiv).

488

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Sub-clause (j): It is unlikely that Boundary Commissions will be able to
report before 15 th August, but probably this sub-clause does no harm as it
stands.

Clause 4: Comments against sub-clauses (1) and (3) of Clause 3 apply equally
to this clause.

Clause 5 Sub-Clause (3): Should not the words “as was enjoyed” read “as
were received or was enjoyed”?

Clause 6 Sub-clauses ( 1 ) and (7): These have been drafted on the basis that the
Dominion legislatures will have not merely the powers of existing Indian
Legislature but full power to legislate over whole field, Central, Provincial and
concurrent. This has not been our intention. It is essential to preserve existing
distribution of legislative and executive authority between the new Dominions
and their Provinces at any rate to start with although the Dominion Legislature
will have power to amend the constitution as it thinks fit. Since this is important
it should be expressly provided for in this clause if necessary by redrafting or
modifying sub-clauses (1) and (7).

Clause 6 Sub-clause ( 6 ) : Express provision for extinction of existing Indian
Legislature should be included in this clause, since such power does not seem to
accrue from sub-clause (2) of Clause 8 or from sub-clause (1) of clause 9:
Sub-Clause on following lines is suggested : —

“on the passing of this Act the Indian Legislature constituted under the Ninth
Schedule to the Government of India Act 1935 shall cease to exist”.

Secondly sub-clause (6) gives the Constituent Assemblies a purely Legislative
power whereas it will be necessary for them to possess all the powers of the
existing Indian Legislature in respect of interpellations, moving of resolutions,
regulation of procedure by standing orders, etc.

Thirdly express provision is also required for filling casual vacancies in the
Constituent Assemblies in accordance with original intendment.

Clause 7 Sub-Clause (1):

In paragraph (a) I suggest that the words “The government” should be
substituted for “peace and good government” which are lacking in tact and
hkely to cause annoyance.

The provision with regard to the tribal areas will be subject to adverse
comment because it will be taken as discouraging tribal areas to enter into any
sort of relationship with either of the two Dominions. I feel strongly that
paragraph (c) should be omitted.

Clause 8 Sub-clause (2) paragraph (b) : Joint arrangements may be necessary
for the three new provinces of Assam, Bengal and Western Bengal, e.g. in
respect of Calcutta High Court. Reference in line 15 [2] may perhaps be to
“two or more” of the new provinces.

Paragraph (J): It is our intention to adapt the Government of India Act 1935
so as to enable the States to join the Dominion.5 Power given in this paragraph

JUNE 1947

489

to modify any Act for the time being in force may be held to exclude power to
bring part II of the Government of India Act5 6 into force with modifications.
Paragraph should therefore be suitably modified to give this power.

Sub-clause ( 6 ): On further consideration I think that your arguments are
forcible7 and I agree to retention of power for six months after appointed day
with Governor-General as proposed in sub-clause ; but we must be prepared to
limit the retention up to the appointed day if party leaders take serious objec¬
tion. I will however press the leaders to see the advantage of such provision.

Clause 9 Sub-clause (2) paragraph (a): We presume that this paragraph will not
stand in the way of our adapting section 126 of Government of India Act, 1935,
so that the control which is now vested in the Governor-General will in future
vest in the Dominion Government. Congress attaches very great importance
to such a provision.

Para, (d) : Existing provisions regarding reservation of Provincial Bills for
consideration of Governor-General under Section 107 (2) may continue.

Clause 13: The imposition by Parliament of duties on the High Com¬
missioner (meaning presumably the High Commissioner for either Dominion
in U.K.) and the requirement in latter half of sub-clause (1) are likely to be most
contentious. It will be strongly urged that any provision of this type should be
left for negotiation and mutual agreement between H.M.G. and the Dominion
Governments. I feel there would be considerable force in such an argument.
After all H.M.G. are holding the sterling balances and they are in a good
bargaining position with the two Dominions. Therefore I suggest that the
Clause should be redrafted so as to omit references to the High Commissioner
and the latter half of Sub-clause (1).

Clause 1 6: I have no doubt that both parties, particularly Congress, will take
very serious exception to this Clause. I am leaving it in but I feel strongly that
we may have to think of some alternative solution or compromise. Would it
meet H.M.G.’s requirement if, as a condition of omitting this Clause, Congress
gave a firm undertaking that the Dominion Government of India would enter
into an agreement with H.M.G., giving them all facilities, perhaps on a joint
user’ basis, for naval and air bases in the islands.

Clause ig Sub-clause (2) Paragraph (a): I invite your attention to para. 14 of
Government of India telegram No. in dated the 14th January 1935 and para.
19 of the Secretary of State’s telegram No. 4774 of the 25th January 193 58 on
Section 172, sub-sections (1) and (2) of the present Act. I feel that if we now go
back upon the undertakings we gave to India in 1935, for sentimental and other
reasons it will create a very bad effect in India. It is likely to be regarded as

5 ‘Dominion’ deciphered as ‘Commonwealth’.

6 i.e. the Federal Part of the Government of India Act 1935.

7 See Nos. 149, 167 and 194.

8 See Annex to No. 252.

490

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

undisguised confiscation and its repercussions will be difficult to predict. I
cannot help feeling that this is a very unwise move, especially when India is
about to attain Dominion status. The subject has already been a matter of
comment in India. I suggest that the matter should be left as it was in the 1935
Act so that it could be adjusted by subsequent negotiations after India becomes
a Dominion.

Clause 21 Sub-clause (3) paragraph (a):

The date is 9th December.

Sub-clause (6):

Reference Turnbull’s telegram 7718 of i6thjune9 to Abell, I gratefully accept
offer to omit this sub-clause.

Finally, my Cabinet have asked10 me to convey to H.M.G. their desire that
provision should be made in the Bill for India to give effect to the guarantees
which the Government of India had agreed11 to give to those officers of the
Secretary of State’s Services who would continue in service after the transfer of
power.12

9 This telegram replied to tel. 1456-S of 16 June from Mr Abell asking whether Clause 21(6) was really
necessary as it was likely to give rise to questions in India. Mr Turnbull explained that ‘its inclusion
would simplify Parliamentary procedure but if H.E. advises that it would cause trouble it can be
omitted’. R/3/1/153 : f 81 ; L/P &J/10/123 : f 298.

10 Indian Cabinet Meeting, 11 June 1947, Case No. 148/31/47. R/3/1/189: f 121. In the Home Depart¬
ment Summary of this Case which was before the Indian Cabinet it was stated that the Home
Member (i.e. Sardar Patel) was ‘of the opinion that provision should be made in the parliamentary
Dominion Legislation for India to give statutory effect to these guarantees and that His Majesty’s
Government should be addressed accordingly’. Ibid., f 120.

11 In the announcements made on 30 April 1947 by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for
India and the Viceroy regarding Compensation for the Services, it was stated that the Government of
India undertook to give to those members of the Secretary of State’s Services who continued in
service after the transfer of power the same terms and conditions of service as before, and that
Provincial Governments would be asked to give similar assurances in respect of officers continuing
to serve in the Provinces. Cmd. 7116.

12 On 18 June Mr Abell sent a message to Mr V. P. Menon asking him to consider whether the last
para, of this telegram should not have been made more specific. R/3/1/153: fii5.

250

The Secretary to the Crown Representative to Residents
Express Letter, L/P &SI13I1807A: f 148

no. F.63-r(s)/46 political department, 18 June 1947

Disposal of records of Crown Representative

Reference Political Department express letter No. F.63~R(S)/46 dated 20tli
May 1947. 1

JUNE 1947

491

2. The Crown Representative’s instructions2 that no further records should
be destroyed are now modified.3 Destruction may be resumed of (1) Ephemeral
records i.e. records which possess no historical interest and are patently valueless
for purposes of future reference, and (2) Documents of which copies are held in
the Political Department.

3. From August 15th 1947 the Crown Representative’s control over his
records will cease. All confidential records relating to the private lives of Rulers
and the internal affairs of their States — particularly recent records — must
therefore be dealt with well in advance of August 15th. Those which are not
destroyed under paragraph 2 above should be sent direct to the United King¬
dom High Commissioner for India, 6, Albuquerque Road, New Delhi. You
will, of course, give priority to dealing with such confidential records. Other
records may, if there is not time to classify and distribute all of them to their
intended recipients, be left in situ. In particular, all records intended for the
Imperial Record Department may be left in situ for removal in due course by
the Dominion Government concerned.

The issue of the above has been
authorised.

E. B. WAKEFIELD

for Secretary to His Excellency
The Crown Representative

1 Not printed in Vol. X.

2 See Vol. X, No. 304.

3 No. 175, Item 1, conclusion (viii) in this Volume.

251

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper I.B.(4y)n 5
LlEl8l3387:ff 162-3
Indian Food Situation

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 18 June 1947

In my memorandum I.B. (47)72 of 19th May1 I drew the attention of my col¬
leagues to the recurrence of a potentially dangerous food situation in India and
its possible bearing on the political field. I have been in constant touch with the

1 Not printed in Vol. X. L/E/8/3387: ff 206-7.

492

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Minister of Food to see whether there is any way in which we might be able to
help but he has told me that much to his regret he sees no way in which this
country can materially assist India at the present time. He points out that in
regard to wheat, which India specially needs in consequence of the damage to
her own wheat harvest this Spring, such help could only be effected by diver¬
sions at the expense of the United Kingdom or areas for whose food supply the
United Kingdom has a more direct responsibility. From June until our own
harvest the United Kingdom will be almost entirely dependent on imported
supplies and according to present estimates we shall be in no better position
even at the end of July than we were last year when it was found necessary to
introduce bread rationing.

2. I have now received an earnest appeal for help from the Viceroy, support¬
ed by his whole Government, contained in his telegram No. 1414-S of 13th
June,2 of which a copy is attached and to which I invite my colleagues’ attention.

3 . I also append as an Annex3 a brief appreciation of the present Indian food
position. The figures do not in themselves suggest that a breakdown is more
imminent than on occasions in the recent past. But the situation is most insecure
and seems likely to deteriorate. The prospects as regards imports during the
next few months are depressing. The overall stock position conceals a dangerous
situation in particular areas and the current political tension, the declining
administrative standards and the loosening of the hold of the Central Govern¬
ment over the Provinces and States makes fair distribution of supplies more
difficult to achieve.

4. India needs increased food imports as much as any other country. But we
must consider the matter mainly from the political angle. It is important to our
interests that the orderly transfer of power should not be jeopardised by a food
breakdown and it would be unfortunate if the closing days of our responsibility
for the good government of India coincided with another famine, particularly
if we had done nothing to help prevent it.

5. In view of what the Minister of Food has told me I cannot suggest that
we may be able to assist India on a major scale. But I wish to endorse whole¬
heartedly the Viceroy’s view as to the value of a gesture by us at the present
time. The political value of the diversion of even a relatively small quantity of
food would be great and would indeed be enhanced by the public knowledge of
our difficulty in making it.

6. It is our hope, and that of other Commonwealth Governments, that the
new Dominions in India will remain within the Commonwealth. It would be
appropriate for us, I suggest, to draw the attention of Australia and also Canada
to our political interest in India’s current food problem and to the possible value
to the Commonwealth as a whole of a demonstration to India now of the

JUNE I947

493

advantages of membership of the Commonwealth. The next few months may
be crucial in that respect.

7. I therefore invite my colleagues : —

(1) to ask the Minister of Food, as a matter of political urgency, to arrange
for the diversion to India of some quantity of wheat or flour even at the
cost of slowing down the rebuilding of our own stocks ;

(2) to ask the Secretary of State for the Dominions to instruct the United
Kingdom High Commissioners in Australia, particularly, and also in
Canada to present the problem in the light suggested above to the
Australian and Canadian Governments and to urge those Governments
as a matter of Commonwealth interest to do everything they can to assist
India at this moment without immediately looking for too much in
return.

L.

2 No. 171.

3 Not printed.

252

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper I.B.{4y)n6
L\P &Jlio/i2j: ff 203 , 209
Indian Independence Bill

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 18 June 1947

I circulate herewith copies of two telegrams1 from the Viceroy received today.
Telegram No. 148 i-S contains his preliminary comments on the draft Bill2
circulated under cover of I.B.(47)ioo.3 These comments are under urgent
examination by my officials, in consultation with Parliamentary Counsel, and I
hope to be in a position to hand round a draft reply to the Viceroy’s telegrams
at tomorrow morning’s meeting of the Committee. A copy of the interim
reply4 sent to the Viceroy’s telegrams is attached.

L.

1 Nos. 248 and 249.

2 No. 191.

3 No. 190.

4 India Office tel. 7814 of 18 June referred to No. 248, reported that the India and Burma Committee
had amended the draft Bill, and suggested that further action on it be deferred pending receipt of the
Secretary of State’s telegrams containing the Committee’s amendments. L/P &J/10/123 : f 210.

494

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

NOTE Copies of the paragraphs of telegrams exchanged between the
Government of India and the Secretary of State in 1935 referred to on page 3
of the Viceroy’s telegram No. 148 i-S are also attached for convenience of
reference.

Annex to No. 252

EXTRACTS FROM TELEGRAMS REFERRED TO IN THE VICEROY’S
TELEGRAM 1481-S OF l8TH JUNE IN THE COMMENTS ON

CLAUSE 19 OF THE BILL

Paragraph 14 of Government of India telegram 111 dated fanuary 14th 193 s
Lastly we could not pass over without comment provision in Clause 250 on
subject of India Office building and valuable treasures it contains. Apparently
it is intended that, except to the small extent mentioned in sub-Clause (3),
Federal Government should have no rights in these. Corrections in sub-Clauses
(2) and (3) communicated in Dawson’s subsequent telegram of January 13 th,
13 1, do not improve position. Provisions in this Clause, if we read them cor¬
rectly, will provoke the greatest resentment in India, to which the India Office
is bound by the closest sentimental and other associations. We trust that no
provision will be included in Bill excluding India from her rights in the India
Office building and in valuable and historical possessions housed therein,
including pictures, furniture, objects of art and library.

Paragraph 19 of Secretary of State's telegram 4774 of January 25th 1935
(Paragraph 14). Clause 168. The Secretary of State is unable to appreciate the
ground for the strictures which the Government of India have passed upon
clause 168(2) and (3) in relation to the India Office building and its contents. The
effect of the clause is to ensure that no sale or conversion to other use of the
building or of the more valuable of its contents can take place without the
consent of the Government of India. It is proposed to seek Treasury agreement
to the proposition that if at any time it was decided between the two govern¬
ments to send any of the contents of the India Office to India H.M.G. could not,
on account of the legal vesting of the property, raise any claim to be reimbursed
for the value of any articles so transferred.

253

Sir E. Mieville to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

RI3I1I159: f 6

the viceroy’s house, new Delhi, 18 June 1947

H.E.

Pug and I saw Gandhi, Jinnah and Badshah Khan in your room at 4.30 p.m.
today. Jinnah started off by saying that he would be very pleased to see Badshah
Khan at his house at any time that would be convenient. Gandhi then said that

JUNE 1947

495

surely it would be a good plan to have a discussion here and now, to which
Jinnah replied that that was not his understanding of the object of the meeting.
He recalled that when you were talking to Gandhi and him1 it was suggested
that he, Jinnah, should write a note to Badshah Khan inviting him to his house
but he had not seen fit to adopt this course. You had then suggested that all four
should meet in your room and that he should then extend the invitation ver¬
bally. Gandhi replied that this was not his understanding of the case but Jinnah
was insistent and after about a quarter of an hour’s discussion during which
Gandhi had suggested that he, Pug and myself should withdraw to another
room so that Jinnah and Badshah Khan could talk alone — a proposal that
jinnah flatly turned down — it was agreed that Badshah Khan should call on
Jinnah at 7.30 this evening.2 They all went away in the best of tempers !

After the meeting broke up, Pug saw Jinnah privately for a moment and
asked him whether he would be prepared to authorise Suhrawardy to form a
regional Ministry in Bengal as desired by the Governor.3 I am afraid that
Jinnah’s reply was an absolute negative, and I do not think that the subject is
worth pursuing.4

E. M.

1 See No. 230.

2 For the outcome of this meeting see Nos. 321, penultimate para, and 369, para. 25.

3 See No. 240, para. 4.

4 Lord Ismay reported Mr Jinnah’s refusal to Sir F. Burrows in tel. 1489-S of 19 June (repeated to
Viceroy’s Camp). R/3/1/159: f 7.

254

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to Lord Ismay

Telegram, Rfe/i/go: f 179

immediate kashmir, 18 June 1947, 5 pm

secret Received: 19 June, 9 am

i-S.K. I gave my word to Liaquat that some Muslim troops would be sent at
once to Gurgaon following your discussion with C.G.S. I am immeasurably
shocked that my promise has not been honoured.1 Please express my regret to
Liaquat, whose letter of June 17th2 1 have only just read, and ask Chief to do all
in his power to send as many Muslim units to Gurgaon as soon as possible.3

1 See No. 234. 2 No. 232.

3 Lord Ismay replied in tel. 1504-S of 19 June that he had just heard from the C.G.S. ‘that C-in-C has
ordered another battalion to Gurgaon area and that Army Commander has been instructed privately
(repeat privately) to select battalion containing as large a proportion of Muslims as possible . In the
meantime he (Ismay) had conveyed Lord Mountbatten’s regrets to Liaquat. In his letter of 19 June to
Lord Ismay giving him the information, Sir A. Smith explained that because of the ‘policy never to
deal in the Army with these matters on a communal basis, the Muslim aspect in choosing the bat¬
talion will not be officially mentioned in our orders’. R/ 3 / 1 /9° : & 181-2; Mountbatten Papers,
Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Situation in, Part 11(a).

496

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

255

Mr V. P. Menon to Mr Turnbull
Telegram , Rfe/i/itf: ff 123-4

immediate new Delhi, 18 June 1947, 8 pm

secret Received: 18 June, 11.33 pm

No. 1487-S. Following comments and suggestions are supplementary to
Viceroy’s telegram No. 148 i-S of June 17th1 on Indian Dominions Bill.2

2. Clause 6 Sub-clause ( 1 ) and (7): It is suggested that effect desired by us
could be produced by adding to sub-clause (7) a provision on following lines :
“and until other provision is made by any such law as aforesaid, the provisions
of the Government of India Act, 1935, relating to the distribution of legislative
powers between the Federal and Provincial Legislatures shall be deemed to be
such a law and to have effect as if the references therein to the Federal Legislature
were references to the Legislature of the Dominion”. Without some such
express provision we cannot regard it as “necessary adaptation” within the
meaning of Clause 9 sub-clause (1). It will not (repeat not) be feasible for either
Constituent Assembly to make requisite law before appointed day even if
authorised under Clause 8 (2)(d) of Bill and we cannot contemplate assumption
by Constituent Assembly even for a day of the totality of powers of Provincial
Legislature.

3. Clause 6 sub-clause ( 6 ): Second comment on this sub-clause is elaborated in
following draft provision suggested by Spence as an additional sub-clause (8) : —
“In addition to the power referred to in sub-section (1) of this section the
Constituent Assembly of each Dominion shall also exercise the powers formerly
exercisable by the Indian Legislature constituted under the Ninth Schedule to
the Government of India Act, 1935, in respect of the asking of questions on,
and the discussion of, subjects of public concern in the Dominion. Each of the
two Constituent Assemblies shall regulate by Standing Order its own procedure
for the exercise of the powers referred to in sub-section (1) of this section and in
this sub-section and Standing Orders made for the regulation of procedure in
exercise of the powers referred to in sub-section (1) may include provision
enabling a Bill which was pending in either Chamber of the Indian Legislature
constituted under the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935,
immediately before that Legislature ceased to exist to be proceeded with in the
Constituent Assembly as if all proceedings in a Chamber of that Legislature in
respect of the Bill had taken place in the Constituent Assembly”.

As regards third comment on sub-clause (6) object is to preserve existing
method of filling up casual vacancies in accordance with principles and pro¬
cedure which are laid down in Cabinet Mission’s Plan of May 16th as applicable

JUNE 1947

497

to the initial formation of Assembly. At present this is secured by a rule of
procedure of the Constituent Assembly but express provision in the Bill seems
necessary.

4. We assume that under the Bill there will be a Federal Court for each
Dominion with powers and jurisdiction mutatis mutandis the same as those of
existing Federal Court and that the appellate jurisdiction of Privy Council both
as respects Federal Courts and High Courts is not (repeat not) affected. Please
confirm.

5. Although clause 9 (2)(c) does not refer to Governor Generafs discretion
and individual judgment, we assume they will not exist after appointed day. It is
suggested however that they may be expressly eliminated.

1 No. 249.

2 No. 191.

MOST IMMEDIATE
SECRET

256

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P&Jlio/i2j: jf 221-7

INDIA OFFICE, lS June 1947, 6.40 pm
Received in New Delhi: 19 June , j am1

7840. Draft Bill2 text of which marked 1 10-4 was sent by Turnbull to Abell on
13th3 was considered by Cabinet Committee yesterday evening.4 General view
of Committee was that draft Bill met excellently requirements of situation and
was on the right lines from political point of view. Committee considered draft
clause by clause and approved it subject to further consideration in the light of
your comments and to following points on Clauses : —

2. Clause 1. Titles “India” and “Pakistan” were agreed. Separate telegram5
follows about Nehru’s claim that new Dominion of India is successor in inter¬
national sphere of present India.

3. Clause 2. This was agreed. It was explained to Committee that, in view of
express provision in Clause 47 of 1935 Act, Berar would not fall within Clause
2(1) of the Bill but could be included in India by agreement under sub-clause

(3)-

1 Repeated to Kashmir. R/3/1/153: fn8.

2 No. 191.

3 No. 189.

4 No. 244, Minute 1.

5 No. 270.

498

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

4. Clause 3(2). This is a mistake and will be revised to refer to referendum.

5. Clause 3(1). It was felt that this form of words might be misunderstood in
India. Possibility of revision is being considered.6

6. Clause 5(2). On this Committee considered proposal in your letter of 5th
June 1446(1 6) 7 to the Secretary of State that you and Governors should tender
resignations as from appointed day. It was pointed out that on the appointed day
the office of Governor-General of all India ceases to exist and two new offices
of Governor-General come into existence. There is therefore no question of
resignation of the former post. The difficulty about making no provision in this
Bill on lines of Clause 5(2) is that there would then be no executive head of
either Dominion upon the appointed day and this would occur at a most
difficult time. It was realised, however, that there would be much advantage in
having an overt request for yourself to remain. We suggest therefore that
appropriate representatives of India and Pakistan might be consulted informally
before the appointed day and asked whether they wish to request for new
appointments to be made or for you to carry on.

The position in Provinces which are not split differs from that at the Centre
in that the existing office remains in being, but Provincial Governments could
be asked informally in advance by Governors whether they wished for new
appointments to be made as from the appointed day. If so, appointments in
accordance with their wishes could be made in time to come into effect on that
date. We think, however, that suitable publicity could be given to the fact that
this had been done in the Provinces and that leaders at the Centre had been asked
whether they wished to nominate new Governor-General for Hindustan or
Pakistan. Proviso to Clause 5(2) would then clearly apply only for the short
period necessary to make a change on advice of new Governments. View of
Committee was, however, that this was a point on which we should consult
Indian leaders and get their view. I am telegraphing separately8 on general
question of consulting leaders.

7. Clause y(i)(a). At end it was decided to substitute “British India” for
“India”. It was also agreed to include a definition of the word “India” at an
appropriate point in the Bill.

8. Clause 8 . Committee were of view that a general power of this nature was
essential. Though they felt that from Parliamentary point of view there would
be advantages in including sub-clause 8(2), particularization might make powers
more unacceptable to Indians. They would be prepared to omit sub-clause (2)
and substitute for it an additional general phrase in sub-clause (1) to provide for
interim administration of joint Services and for Reserve Bank. Committee
thought, however, that Indian leaders might be consulted on question whether
they would prefer that Governor-General’s powers in this respect should be

JUNE I947

499

specified in Bill on lines of 8(2) or by general formula. Committee felt that
inclusion of power to make Orders should be acceptable to Indians if it were
emphasised to them that under sub-clause (6) respective Legislatures have power
to terminate any Order after appointed day or to end power of Governor-
General to make Orders for their Dominion.

9. Clause 9(2). Words “or Legislature” are to be added after “Central
Government” in line 44.6 7 8 9

10. Clause 13(2). Treasury representative stated that Chancellor was satisfied
that if there were a breakdown of arrangements under 13(1) monies required
could be provided by Treasury temporarily without special Parliamentary
authority. Funds could also be provided temporarily for payment of compensa¬
tion in this way. Consequently it was agreed that Clause 13(2), (4) and (5)
should be omitted on the understanding that statement would be made giving
assurance in respect of pensions and sterling debt, similar to that already given
in respect of compensation, i.e. that H.M.G. will see that they get their money.
We are considering form of such a statement.

11. Clause 14. It was agreed that specific reference to Burma in sub-clause
(2) should be omitted and also reference to Burma Act in Clause 20(2).

12. Clause 13. It was felt that reference to authorisation by Parliament of
continuance of Secretary of State’s functions in lines 36 to 38 might be mis¬
understood in India and this is to be modified.

13. Clause 16. Separate telegram10 contains our conclusions on this subject.

14. Clause 17. This is to be revised to omit reference to Government of
India Act and to bring colony within scope of British Settlements Act.

15. Clause 19. Committee thought it would be advisable to make it clear
here and elsewhere in the Bill that words “Secretary of State” did not mean
“Secretary of State for India” and that Bill definitely marks final end of any
control of Indian affairs from Whitehall. Possibility of an amendment in this
sense is being considered. You will of course appreciate that “Secretary of State”
in Bill means any Secretary of State who may be in charge of future relations
with India and not Secretary of State for India as such.

6 In tel. 7898 of 19 June Lord Listowel telegraphed the following revised opening of Clause 5 replacing
sub-Clause 1 and first sentence of sub-Clause 2 in No. 191 : ‘For each of the Indian Dominions there
shall be a Governor-General who shall be appointed by His Majesty and shall represent His Majesty
for the purposes of the Government of the Dominion’. L/P &J/10/123 : f 176. Lord Mountbatten
agreed in tel. 14-S.K. of 21 June. R/3/1/153 : f 166.

7 No. 79.

8 No. 257.

9 i.e. line 4 of Clause 9(2)(a).

10 No. 258.

500

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

1 6. Clause 2i(j)(a){ii) is to be modified to avoid any implication that North-
West Frontier Province will inevitably join Pakistan.

Clause 2i(j)(b). It is proposed to include words “or about to be set up” to
cover possibility that Pakistan Constituent Assembly may not be in being by the
15 th August.

17. Clause 21(3). It was felt that the Proviso should cover the Tribal Areas as
North-West Frontier tribes may wish to join Pakistan Assembly.

18. Clause 21(6). It was agreed to omit this.

19. Clause 22. Title. It was felt that “Indian Dominions Bill” was not
appropriate and might be felt by Indians to over-emphasise acceptance of
Dominion Status. We propose instead “Indian Independence Bill”.

Additional points.

20. It was agreed to consider further whether there should be included in the
Bill a specific denunciation of the Treaties with Indian States. Normally
speaking, Treaties are terminated by Act of State but there is no reason why on
an occasion of this importance and in the peculiar circumstances this should not
be done by Act of Parliament. It would emphasise and legalise position whereby
Paramountcy does not pass to new Indian Dominions. We should be glad of
your views urgently on this suggestion. Appropriate place would be in Clause

7(z)(b)-

21. Your telegram 148 1-S11 was received this morning after Committee’s
meeting on which above telegram is based. Points you raise are being con¬
sidered.

11 No. 249.

257

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &J/ 10/123 : ff 216-17

most immediate India office, 18 June 1947, 3 pm

secret Received in New Delhi: 18 June, 11.43 pm1

7841. Your telegram 1358 of 9th June.2 Paragraph 3. Cabinet Committee
considered3 programme for passage of Bill. They are convinced that it must be
introduced by 7th July or if possible earlier. In order to secure its easy passage it
will be necessary to show text to Opposition leaders prior to introduction. Text
should be almost finalised before this is done.

2. It is contrary to usual Parliamentary practice to show the text of a Bill to
other parties concerned before publication and it certainly must not be given to
them. There is clearly a strong probability that even if text is shown to Indian

JUNE I947

501

leaders sense at any rate will at once be published. While we appreciate your
reasons for desiring to show Bill to Indian leaders and are disposed to agree that
it should if possible be done, we feel that it should only be done after we have
consulted Opposition here and if possible got their agreement to doing so. At
most it could only be done by letting them peruse copies in your presence and
withdrawing them before they leave the meeting. We shah telegraph to you
further on this subject later on. In the meantime we do not wish you to commit
yourself to show the Bill to the Indian leaders. We shah use every endeavour to
secure that Bill can be shown to them before publication. We should however
like you to obtain their views as soon as possible on the point referred to in
paragraph 6 of my telegram 7840.4

1 Repeated to Kashmir. R/3/1/1 53 : f 117.

2 No. 115.

3 No. 244, Minute 1.

4 No. 256.

258

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &J/ 10/123 : Jf 213~14

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, lS June 1947, 3.20 pm

secret Received in New Delhi: 18 June, 11.43 pm1

7842. Future of Andaman and Nicobar islands. Cabinet Committee considered
yesterday evening2 your 1423 of 13 th June3 and views expressed in paragraphs
24 and 25 of your Personal Report No. 9 of 12th June.4

2. Minister of Defence represented to Committee strong view fully sup¬
ported by Chiefs of Staff as to strategic importance of islands and their great
value to Commonwealth defence on which great emphasis was laid in your
discussions with them. The sea and air landing facilities there are essential to our
Imperial defence communications and it is vital that we should not be deprived
of them. Committee however appreciated the danger that the arbitrary reten¬
tion of the islands as British territory would severely damage our future
relations with India.

3. Committee felt that Clause 16 of the Bill in its existing form would have
to be omitted but if no other provision is inserted the islands automatically

1 Repeated to Kashmir. Mounthatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Andaman and Nicobar
Islands.

2 No. 244, Minute 4.

3 No. 174.

4 No. 162.

502

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

become part of the new Dominion of India by virtue of Clause 2(1) of the Bill.
We note that Muslim League claim that they are entitled to a share in Andamans
as an all-India asset. Committee thought that we should avoid if possible
including the Andamans in either Indian Dominion pending discussions about
them. They would be glad to have your view urgently as to whether a clause
could be inserted in the draft Bill in the sense that the islands should continue
to be governed by the Chief Commissioner under the Governor General until
agreement has been come to about their future. Committee felt that in any
such negotiations some account might have to be taken of the Burmese interest.

259

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Lord Ismay

Telegram , R^/ 1/147: j 77

important 19 June 1947, 1.35 am

secret Received: 20 June , 12 noon

No. 5-S.K. If no answer received from London about Gurkha negotiations1
suggest most immediate follow up telegram be sent as follows subject to
Shone’ s concurrence —

[Begins.] Nehru has now put back consideration of Gurkha question a
month by which time he will have discovered proposal to exclude Andamans
from India. This latter proposal may well enrage him to point of exercising
option given him by Maharaja of Nepal to refuse India’s agreement to use of
Gurkha troops by British.

Only way to force quick issue on Gurkha question before he discovers about
Andamans is to adopt suggestion I telegraphed and telegraph immediately
asking him to conclude agreement with Shone and CIGS during latter’s visit
on 23 rd and 24th. Since Gurkhas destined for British Army will come under
CIGS I feel certain Nehru would accept invitation and there would then be
every chance of this matter being satisfactorily disposed of before the inevitable
storm bursts about the Andamans.

Shone has been consulted and entirely agrees that this is our best and perhaps
last chance of agreement. [Ends.]2

1 See No. 173.

2 The draft telegram was not sent because, in the meantime, Mr Attlee’s approval for the C.I.G.S. to
conduct negotiations had been received: No. 173, note 1.

JUNE 1947

503

260

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rbf I142: ff 115-16

ig June ig47

H.E.

Sir Eric Mievilie and I had a meeting yesterday morning with the Nawab of
Chhattari and Sir Walter Monckton on the subject of Berar: and we had a
further meeting on the same subject with Sir Walter Monckton and Sir Conrad
Corfield in the afternoon. Our recommendations are as follows.1

1. As soon as possible after your return to Delhi, you should see Pandit
Nehru and make the following points:

(a) The position of Berar must be cleared up at the earliest possible date,
otherwise there is bound to be chaos and trouble after 15th August;

(b) The legal position is clear (see Annex) ;2

(c) Congress are not only the natural successor authorities to H.M.G. in this
matter, but they are also in de facto possession of the Province;

(d) It is up to Congress to initiate negotiations. Pandit Nehru should therefore
ask Your Excellency as Crown Representative to approach the Nizam to
send representatives to Delhi to discuss Berar in particular, and any other
points that call for immediate negotiation;

(e) So far as Berar is concerned, the best plan would be to negotiate interim
arrangements on a stand-still basis, which will continue after 15th August,
until fresh agreements have been made.

(f) You yourself, being an interested party in your capacity as Crown
Representative, would be prepared to preside at the opening of the
negotiations and then to drop out gradually.

2. If Pandit Nehru should agree to (d) above, the Nawab of Chhattari and
Sir Walter Monckton feel that they would be able to persuade the Nizam to
send representatives immediately to Delhi with the Nawab himself as head of
the delegation.

1 See also No. 239, Item 2, conclusion (v).

2 Not printed. Its conclusions were that ‘Berar has never been ceded to the British Government’, that it
had been ‘specifically recognised’ as being included in the Dominions of the Nizam of Hyderabad,
that the British Government had no authority to dispose of it, and that the right of the British
Government to administer it was ‘specifically related to the obligation to afford protection to
Hyderabad State’. With the establishment of two fully self-governing Dominions in British India,
H.M.G. would ‘be disabled from carrying out their obligations to afford protection to Hyderabad’,
and ‘the right of administering Berar will revert to H.E.H. the Nizam’. R/3/1/142: ff 117-18. See
also Vol. VIII, Enclosures to No. 522, and No. 532.

504

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

3 . If, on the other hand, Pandit Nehru does not agree, you have a very strong
card to play. The legal and constitutional position is crystal clear; if he chal¬
lenges it, you are prepared to refer it to any judicial tribunal that he may choose;
and if he insists on adopting a high-handed attitude, HMG will have no option
but to issue a public announcement which would show that the very first act
of the leaders of the new Government of India was to flout constitutional law
and the rights of minorities. This would be a very bad start for the new India.

4. Sir Walter Monckton and the Nawab of Chhattari return to Hyderabad
on Saturday, 21st June. They would like at least a week to talk things over with
the Nizam, but could return to Delhi earlier if events so demanded.

ISMAY

261

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

RI3I1I137: ff 109-12

PRIVATE THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, ip June I947

My dear Viceroy,

I had a long discussion with Walter Monckton yesterday about the question and
answer in the House1 on the subject of future relations between HMG and those
Indian States which do not join either Constituent Assembly. There was no
difficulty in posing the question, but considerable difficulty in framing the
answer: the point being that the latter had to be sufficiently acceptable to the
Nizam to prevent his sending Walter home2 to mobilise opinion, and particu¬
larly Opposition opinion, against our treatment of the States in question.

Walter thinks that the answer that we have drafted will do the trick, pro¬
vided that in reply to any awkward supplementaries, the Under Secretary of
State for India refuses to be drawn, and takes the line that nothing more definite
can be stated until the whole future set-up is known.

In view of the time factor, I thought that I should send the attached letter and
enclosure to Monteath at once, without waiting for your approval. It is, I
think, in line with your instructions, and you yourself are not committed to the
answer in its present form, since it will be referred back for your comments by
the India Office.

Simultaneously, Walter is writing to Rab Butler explaining the position, and
asking him or one of his friends to get the question put. He is also warning him
about supplementaries.

Yours ever,

ISMAY

JUNE 1947

505

P.S. Since dictating the above, I have seen Walter’s letter to Rab Butler which
is in line with mine to Monteath. In addition, he is sending Harry Gordon home
at the end of this week with letters to Bobbity Salisbury and other friends on
the Opposition front bench, telling them that the proposed answer ought to
suffice to satisfy the States for the time being, and advising them to hold their
horses.

1.

Annex to No. 261
Lord Ismay to Sir D. Monteath

top secret and personal ig June ig47

My dear David,

There has, as you know, been a lot of wild talk in the Congress Press out here
on the lines that the future Government of India will not tolerate any Indian
States having independent relations with HMG.1 2 3 4 Naturally, the States them¬
selves, particularly Hyderabad, are extremely upset by this, and the Viceroy
thinks that something should be done at the earliest possible moment 4 to steady the
position. Otherwise there is a real danger of the Nizam, and others, making a
concerted effort to mobilise Opposition opinion against the way in which the
States are being treated. I need not dilate upon the consequences that might
flow if this agitation were successful.

It seems to the Viceroy that the best procedure is by way of Question and
Answer in. the House. It also seems to him that this question should come from
the Opposition, since otherwise Congress, who are very familiar with our
Parliamentary procedure, would suspect that we had deliberately framed it.
Accordingly, Walter Monckton is arranging to have the annexed question put
by one of his friends. The answer that we suggest, after consultation with
Walter Monckton, is on the same sheet.

The Viceroy would be glad if, when the question is put, you would telegraph
it out to us, together with your proposed reply, and ask for his comments. This
telegram should not indicate in any way that we had had any previous discus¬
sion on the subject.

I ought to add that Walter Monckton thinks that the answer that we propose
would probably satisfy H.E.H. of Hyderabad in its present form, and it is
therefore most important that it should not be whittled down in any way. It is
also important that whoever answers for HMG should refuse to be drawn by
supplementaries. He could, we imagine, base himself on the argument that
until the future set-up is known, it is impossible to go any further into the

1 See No. 216, Item 3.

2 See No. 199.

3 cf. No. 206, note 5.

4 Words in italics underlined in original.

506

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

matter, and that each case will have to be judged on its merits in the light of the
then existing circumstances.

Yours ever,

ISMAY

DRAFT QUESTION AND ANSWER
QUESTION :

Will the Under Secretary of State for India explain the position in regard to
relations between HMG and the Indian States after the transfer of power.
Is it the intention of HMG to refuse to have any sort of relations with the
States, except through one of the two contemplated Dominion Governments?

SUGGESTED ANSWER!

When the transfer of power takes place, paramountcy will lapse. The States
will then be completely free either to join one of the two contemplated
Dominions or to become separate autonomous units.

HMG hope that all States will associate themselves with one or other of the
two Dominions, and thus become partners in the British Commonwealth.
Should, however, any State or States decide otherwise, HMG would review
the situation in the light of the then existing circumstances. All that can be said
at this stage is that, while they are not prepared to recognise any such States as
separate Dominions, they would certainly not refuse to have direct relations
with them.

The Hon. Member will, however, bear in mind that it is impossible to
undertake to apply any such general principle to all cases, since the Indian States
range from vast territories like Hyderabad with its population of seventeen
millions, down to very small areas with a few thousand inhabitants.

262

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Jinnah

Rl3lili57:ff 33-4

SRINAGAR, 19 June 1947

Dear Mr Jinnah,

With reference to our discussion, at the meeting on Friday 13 th June,1 on the
composition of the Boundary Commissions, you may be interested to know
that I have now received a reply2 from the Secretary of State for India to a
telegram3 which I sent him asking for preliminary consideration to be given to
the suggestion that U.N.O. should provide the members of these Commis¬
sions.

JUNE I947

507

2. The Secretary of State has now confirmed the view, expressed at our
meeting on the 13 th, that the time factor would render this suggestion imprac¬
ticable. He points out that U.N.O. could only constitute the Commissions at
the annual meeting of the Assembly, or at a special meeting called specifically
for the purpose. It would be unconstitutional for the Secretary General to
appoint Boundary Commissions on his own initiative.

3. The Secretary of State has, however, suggested the possibility of the Presi¬
dent of the International Court of Justice being invited to select members of the
Commissions.

4. You will recall that on the 13 th we decided that the chairman of each
Commission should be selected by the nominated members ; and, if they could
not agree on a choice, that the choice of chairmen should be made at a meeting
of the Indian leaders.

5. I hope that agreement will be reached in one or other of these processes.
But, in case by any chance there is, eventually, no agreement on the choice of
chairmen, perhaps we should fall back on the Secretary of State’s suggestion
and ask the President of the International Court of Justice to select chairmen.

6. The following are the names suggested by Pandit Nehru for the Boundary
Commissions : —

For the Punjab Commission: —

Mr Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan
Mr Justice Teja Singh
For the Bengal Commission: —

Mr Justice C. C. Biswas
Mr Justice Bijan Kumar Mukherji

7. I should be grateful to have your suggestions when you have had time to
consider the matter.1 2 3 4

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 No. 175, Item 2.

2 No. 195.

3 No. 120.

4 Lord Mountbatten wrote in similar terms to Pandit Nehru except that, instead of paras. 6 and 7, he
concluded: ‘Many thanks for your letter of the 15th June [No. 207], giving your nominees for the
Boundary Commission. I am asking Mr Jinnah for his’. R/3/1/157: ff 35-6.

5°8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

263

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab)
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Situation in, Part 11(a)

SECRET AND PERSONAL VICEROY’S CAMP, INDIA, ip June 1Q47

NO. I224/5

Dear Jenkins,

I am not surprised to get the protest in your letter of the 16th June1 about
Nehru’s speech of the 15 th June. I naturally realised as soon as I saw it that it
would be bitterly resented by the Services, and make it very difficult to get any
of them to stay on, at any rate in Congress Provinces.

2. I think you realise my difficulties with Nehru. They are partly political
and partly psychological. Nehru’s goodwill is essential to me in this critical
transition period. He is appallingly overworked, is liable to lose his temper and
generally shows many signs of extreme strain. I shall mention this speech to
him at the right moment, but I am sure you appreciate that I cannot hope to
achieve very much.

3. Unless I hear from you that you have any objections I shall probably
forward your letter to him at an appropriate moment with a covering one
pointing out that in the face of such an uncalled for onslaught it is clear that he
can neither expect (nor evidently want) any British officers to stay on.

4. As for his allegations, they are, like others that he has made, completely
absurd, and you can take it from me that neither I nor HMG believe a word of
such charges. I hope you will do your utmost to keep up the morale of the
British members of the Service, in spite of this new difficulty which has been
put in your way.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 No. 218.

JUNE I947

509

264

Pandit Nehru to Lord Ismay1

Mounthatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: States , Relations with , Part 11(a)
SECRET EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, ip June 1^47
Dear Lord Ismay,

Thank you for your letter of the 16th June2 sending me a note by the
Dominion [s] Office on the structure of the British Commonwealth.

2. Thank you also for sending me a note on the decisions taken at the so-
called Leaders’ Conference3 with the Viceroy when the States question was
discussed.

3 . I am having the summary4 sent to the Cabinet Office about the formation
of the States Department of the Government of India, as decided upon at that
Conference. I hope this will take shape soon.

4. We have been examining the draft “standstill” agreement5 between the
Government of India and the States. I have consulted in this matter the lawyers
of the Government of India as well as some of our constitutional officers and
we are preparing another, and probably briefer, draft which I hope to send
soon. This draft of ours will also, I hope, be circulated among the rulers. The
previous draft contained many lacunae.

5. The position in regard to the States has become a very confused one,
largely owing to various statements made on behalf of HMG during last year
without any reference whatever to us. The Leaders’ Conference the other day
was the first occasion when we discussed the States question as between the
Government of India and the Political Department. It seems to me essential
that there should be clarity about this matter and that our views should be fully
known, so that there might be no reason for misapprehension in the future.
This is particularly important from the point of view of the parliamentary
legislation that is being undertaken. I do not know if there is going to be any
reference to the States in this parliamentary legislation. If there is such a ref¬
erence I hope it is of the right kind and does not introduce unnecessary com¬
plications.

1 This letter and its enclosure were circulated to the Viceroy’s staff under reference V.C.P. 85 of
21 June 1947.

2 Not traced, but cf. No. 239, Item 9.

3 No. 175.

4 Presumably Enclosure to No. 238.

5 Enclosure to No. 198.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

510

6. Also, that in the event of any answers being given in Parliament regarding
the States in India, our point of view will be kept in mind.

7. You will appreciate that it is of the highest importance to us that the
States should fit in properly into the picture of India. It is bad enough that India
has to be partitioned. It would be disastrous if this process went further and
resulted in the “balkanisation” of the country. That would certainly lead to
conflict till some suitable equilibrium was arrived at. We might well have to go
back a hundred years when the East India Company was consolidating its power
in India and emerging as the dominant authority.

8. I do not wish to challenge statements made on behalf of HMG regarding
the States, though I do wish to make it clear that some of these statements were
unfortunate and not in line with the facts of the situation. Even accepting these
statements, certain facts emerge. One is that it has been the firm intention of
HMG that the States should join the Union of India or one of the two Domin¬
ions. In case they do not become federal units of these Dominions, nevertheless,
they are associated with them in a number of ways. It is quite inconceivable
that a State can become independent in the legal sense of the term, which
means having external relations and the power to declare war or peace and
controlhng its defence and communications. That would be a challenge to the
security of India which the Indian Union could never agree to. If any foreign
power encouraged such independence of a State this can only be considered as
an unfriendly act by the Indian Union.

9. All this has little to do with paramo untcy in the limited sense of the word.
That paramountcy is not being transferred by the British Government to an
Indian Government, but the facts of geography cannot be ignored and the
dominant power in India will necessarily exercise certain control over any State
which does not choose to come into the Union. If a State comes into the
Union, then it becomes an equal sharer in that dominant power’s position. If
not, it has to function within certain limitations.

10. I am enclosing a note on this subject which might help in clarifying the
position. I would add that any trade pact between a State and a foreign Govern¬
ment would definitely affect our external relations. Foreign trade is essentially a
part of foreign relations. Therefore, foreign trade must be conducted through,
or with the concurrence of, the principal authority in India. I mention this
specially, as it might be thought that trade is something apart from other
relations. It is, in fact, intimately connected with the foreign relations of the
country and it might well result in creating vested interests which affect the
security and vital interests of that country.

11. I trust that the States Department of the Government of India will soon
be constituted, so that it can deal with all these matters satisfactorily and

JUNE 1947

511

uniformly. There has been enough delay already and further delay might lead
to greater confusion.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Enclosure to No. 264

In the Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy presented by the
Cabinet Mission to His Highness the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes on
the 12th May, 1946, 6 it was stated:

(a) “During the interim period which must elapse before the coming into
operation of a new constitutional structure under which British India
will be independent or fully self-governing, Paramountcy will remain in
operation. But the British Government could not and will not in any
circumstances transfer Paramountcy to an Indian Government.” (Para. 2.)

(b) “During the interim period it will be necessary for the States to conduct
negotiations with British India in regard to the future regulation of
matters of common concern, especially in the economic and financial
fields. Such negotiations, which will be necessary whether the States
desire to participate in the new constitutional structure or not, will occupy
a considerable period of time, and since some of these negotiations may
well be incomplete when the new structure comes into being, it will, in
order to avoid administrative difficulties, be necessary to arrive at an
understanding between the States and those likely to control the succes¬
sion government or governments that for a period of time the then exis¬
ting arrangements as to these matters of common concern should continue
until the new agreements are completed.” (Para. 4.)

(c) “When a new fully self-governing or independent government or
governments come into being in British India, His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment’s influence with these governments will not be such as to enable
them to carry out the obligations of Paramountcy. Moreover, they
cannot contemplate that British troops would be retained in India for
thispurpose. Thus, as a logical sequence and in view of the desires expressed
to them on behalf of the Indian States, His Majesty’s Government will
cease to exercise the powers of Paramountcy. This means that the rights
of the States which flow from their relationship with the Crown will no longer
exist and that all the rights surrendered by the States to the Paramount Power
will return to the States.7 Political arrangements between the States on the
one side and the British Crown and British India on the other will thus
be brought to an end. The void will have to be filled either by the States
entering into a federal relationship with the successor government or govern-

6 Vol. VII, No. 262.

7 Words in italics underlined in original.

512

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

merits in British India , or failing this , entering into particular political arrange -
merits with it or them .” (Para. 5.)

2. The plan announced by H.E. the Viceroy on June 3rd shortens the interim
period referred to in extracts (a) and (b) to a few weeks. Continuance, for a
period of time, of the arrangements now existing as to the matters of common
concern mentioned in extract (b) thus becomes a matter of urgent necessity.
These matters, it may be noted, relate mainly to the economic and fiscal fields.
A draft standstill agreement for this purpose has been prepared and circulated
by the Political Department to the Indian States. But, as regards “political
arrangements between the States on the one side and the British Crown and
British India on the other” which will be brought to an end when His Majesty's
Government will cease to exercise the power of Paramountcy, no action has
been taken by the Political Department, although the extract in para. i(c)
recognises that this “void will have to be filled either by the States entering into
a federal relationship with the successor government or governments in
British India, or, failing this, entering into particular political arrangements
with it or them.”

3. Both with States which have joined the Constituent Assembly and those
which have declared their intention not to join it, the Government of India
are most anxious to arrive at a “regulation of matters of common concern,
especially in the economic and financial fields”, and at particular political
arrangements to take the place of Paramountcy. But this desirable consumma¬
tion cannot be achieved by the single will or effort of the Government of
India. Unless the States show an equal desire for a mutually beneficial and
honourable settlement, there may be a void both in respect of administrative
arrangements and of political relations.

The facts of geography, which are as paramount as Paramountcy itself, make
it necessary, however, that if the security and well-being of India are to be
assured, there shall be no Void’, and both kinds of arrangements must be made.
Otherwise, in the absence of what might comprehensively be described as
administrative arrangements, such matters of common interest as railway,
telegraphic and postal communications and other services of common benefit to
India as well as the States may come to an end. And, without political arrange¬
ments, States may establish relations with foreign countries, even with countries
unfriendly to India, raise large armies, and take other measures which may be a
menace to the security of the new Dominion of India. The territories of the
Dominion will be so interlaced with the territories of the States in geographical
contiguity to it as to render a complete isolation of the administrative and
economic life of the Dominion from that of the States or the conduct of its
foreign relations and defence independently of the foreign relations and defence
of the States impossible.

JUNE 1947

513

4. India does not desire the continuance of any relationship between herself
and the Indian States now exercised by the Paramount Power from motives of
prestige. Nor is it India’s desire to offend the dignity of Indian States by the use
of any such term as “subordinate cooperation” to describe her relationship with
the States. But, “to safeguard the interests of the community as a whole” — the
phrase is quoted from paragraph 29 of the Report of the Butler Committee8 —
the new Dominion of India must broadly retain the right to continue, in the
administrative and economic as well as in the political field, the same relation¬
ships as have always prevailed between the States and the Paramount Power.
The only matters which, prima facie, do not appear to affect “the interests of the
community as a whole” are dynastic ones; these may be excepted from the
scope of the proposed relationship if the States so desire.

5. In paragraph 39 of the Butler Report, the following passage occurs: “It is
not in accordance with historical fact that when the Indian States came into
contact with British Power they were independent, each possessed of full
sovereignty which no [a] modern international lawyer would hold to be
governed by the rules of international law. In fact, none of the States ever held
international status”. It would be a strange commentary on the facts of modern
government if the creation of two States, successors to British Power in India,
were to result in the conferment on Indian States of an international status which
they never enjoyed before, to the almost certain detriment of one or both
successor States and without any apparent commensurate benefit to the people
of the States. Such a sequel to the withdrawal of British Power from India, no
successor government, conscious of its responsibilities to its own people, could
accept.

8 The Indian States Committee, 1928-1929. Cmd. 3302.

265

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. I.B. ( 47)32 nd Meeting
L/P &JI 10/81: jf 225-30

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.i, on ig June ig47
at g.30 am were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Hugh Dalton, Sir S. Cripps, Mr A. V.
Alexander, the Earl of Listowel, Mr C. P. Mayhew, Mr A. G. Bottomley , Mr
Arthur Henderson, Lord Chorley

Also present were: Viscount Jowitt (for Item 3), Mr A. Barnes (for Item 2), Mr J.
Strachey (for Item 2), Mr W. Whiteley (for Item 3), SirH. Wilson Smith (for Item 1),
Sir D. Monteath, Sir W. Croft, Mr J. Rowlatt (for Item 3), General Sir G. Scoones

514

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

( for Item i), Lieutenant-General Savory ( for Item l), Mr J. A. Simpson , MrH. A. F.
Rumhold; Mr S. E. V. Luke , Mr D. F. Huhhack , Mr F. F. Turnbull ( Secretariat )

Minute 1

Continued Service of British Officers in the Armed Forces in India
(Previous Reference: I.B.(47)28th Meeting, Item 8)1
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Minister of Defence
(I.B. (47) 98)2 covering a Report by an Official Committee on the question of
the continued service of British Officers in the Armed Forces in India after the
transfer of power. This Report had been prepared in accordance with the
Committee’s decision at their meeting on 28th May (I.B. (47) 28th Meeting,
Item 8).

the minister of defence invited special attention to the Committee’s
proposals regarding the compensation and pension rights of British Officers of
the Indian Army and Royal Indian Navy who continued to serve in India, and
to the proposal regarding the rights of any British Officers attached to the Indian
Forces to earn a special Indian element of pension. As regards the former, it was
proposed that payment of compensation should be made immediately to British
Officers who continued to serve, and that they should receive a special increase
of pension in proportion to their length of continued service; both these con¬
cessions would involve a departure from the terms of the White Paper (Cmd.
71 16).3 There were certain matters such as the assurance of tolerable conditions
of life and provision of reasonable promotion prospects on which precise
recommendations could not be made; they would be the subject of negotiation
with the Indian authorities.

sir henry wilson smith said that the Official Committee had pre¬
pared their Report on the assumption that, subject to Ministerial approval, it
would be communicated to the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief for use
as a basis for negotiation with the Indian authorities. The Committee had
reached the conclusion that the terms set out represented the minimum con¬
ditions which would have to be offered to British Officers as an inducement to
continue to serve in the Armed Forces in India. The British Officers concerned
would be employed by the Indian Dominion Governments ; it was, therefore,
open to them to offer less favourable terms, though, in the Committee’s view,
such terms would fail in attracting British Officers for continued service. The
Indian Dominion Governments would have to take financial responsibility for
the employment of British Officers on the terms proposed. It was proposed that
His Majesty’s Government should underwrite the terms agreed with the
Indian Dominion Governments; in the event of default, however, the British
Government would have a clear claim against the defaulting Government.

the chancellor of the exchequer said that he was in agreement
with the Official Committee’s recommendations on the understanding that no
additional charge on the British Exchequer was involved. He assumed that, if

JUNE 1947

515

the proposal to go beyond the compensation terms of the White Paper should
give rise to a similar claim on behalf of civilian officers, it would be resisted.

the secretary of state for India said that it would be assumed that
His Majesty’s Government would underwrite the terms contained in any agree¬
ment with the Indian Governments to the extent necessary to ensure the posi¬
tion of the individual officer. Although the decision to transfer power at an
earlier date than originally contemplated meant that the position of civilian
officers was now not dissimilar from that of the officers of the Armed Forces, he
agreed that a claim for the extension to civilian officers of the terms now pro¬
posed should not be entertained unless the Indian authorities were themselves
to offer to make such payments.

The Committee —

Agreed that the recommendations in the Official Committee’s Report
annexed to 1.13.(47) 9$ should be communicated to the Viceroy as a basis
for negotiation with the Indian Government.4

Minute 2

Indian Food Situation

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for
India (LB. (47) 115)5 on the food situation in India.

the secretary of state for India said that India was entering on the
most difficult months of the year. The situation was already insecure and there
was a serious risk of famine in some areas in the early future. Cuts in the twelve
ounce cereal ration had already taken place in Madras and Bengal. India would
be short of at least 4 million tons of grain this year; additional imports of
670,000 tons were needed to maintain the present low ration. This situation
might further deteriorate as the result of the administrative difficulties which
would result from partition. The Viceroy has asked for a diversion to India of
any shiploads which Great Britain could spare, on the understanding that they
would be repaid by India after the present crisis was over. In the Viceroy’s view
a gesture by His Majesty’s Government would have very valuable results at the
present time.

The Secretary of State said that the main reasons for helping India now were
political rather than humanitarian. We should do everything possible to
demonstrate the advantages of membership of the Commonwealth.

the minister of food said he fully recognised the dangers of the situa¬
tion in India, and was naturally anxious to give any help possible. On the other

1 Vol. X, No. 553.

2 Not printed; L/WS/1/1115.

3 i.e. the White Paper setting out the terms of compensation for British Civil and Military Officers in
India.

4 Lord Listowel did this in a letter, dated 20 June 1947, to Lord Mountbatten. Mountbatten Papers,
Official Correspondence Files: Armed Forces, Indian, Volume I, Part II.

5 No. 251.

Si6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

hand, he had to keep the overall supply situation in mind. At the Foreign
Secretary’s request he had agreed to the diversion of 42,000 tons of wheat to
Germany. The probability of the United States Government being able to
replace this wheat in a reasonable time had been seriously prejudiced by the
American shipping strike. The diversion of wheat to Germany had prompted
the French to make a request for 20,000 tons, which he had not felt able to meet.
Moreover, the United States Government had expressed serious doubt whether
they would be able to provide the 350,000 tons of cereals which they had
previously agreed to export to this country in the third quarter of the year. This
fresh request from India came at a time when our own stocks were low. The
best we could hope for would be that our stocks by the end of June would rise
to 600,000 tons, which was precisely the level at which it was considered
necessary to impose bread rationing in July last year. He was being asked to
procure wheat for India at the same time that Indian representatives were in
keen competition with us in the wheat supplying countries. Nevertheless, he
recognised the political importance of making at least a token contribution
towards Indian needs, and would be prepared to withdraw the United King¬
dom’s claim to a shipment of 10,000 tons of Australian wheat, the proper
destination of which was at present in dispute between us and India.

There was general agreement that the Minister of Food’s proposal constituted
the most that could be done for India at the present time.

The Committee —

Invited the Minister of Food to consider whether 10,000 tons of
Australian wheat could be diverted to India for delivery in July.

Minute 3

Indian Independence Bill

Previous Reference: I.B.(47)3ist Meeting, Item i)6
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for
India (I.B.(47) 116)7 covering copies of telegrams8 from the Viceroy comment¬
ing on the draft Bill9 annexed to I.B.(47) 100.10

Copies of a draft reply to the Viceroy (subsequently circulated as I.B.(47)
117)11 were handed to the Committee. The draft was agreed to, subject to
certain amendments. In particular, the Committee decided to accept the
Viceroy’s proposal that the “appointed day” should be 15th August.12 They also
decided that Clause 19 (2) (a) of the draft Bill should be omitted, and that the
disposal of the India Office and its contents should be a matter for negotiation
with the Indian Government.13

The Committee wished further consideration to be given to the proposal in
the last paragraph of the Viceroy’s telegram No. 148 i-S that provision should
be made in the Bill for the Government of India to give effect to guarantees
which they had agreed to in the case of those officers of the Secretary of State’s
Services who would continue in service after the transfer of power. The

JUNE 1947

517

Committee thought that it would be inadvisable to fail to take advantage of
this proposal, which had been put forward by the Indian Ministers themselves.
The Committee —

Invited the Secretary of State for India to arrange for the draft telegram, as
amended, to be sent to the Viceroy.

6 No. 244.

7 No. 252.

8 Nos. 248 and 249.

9 No. 191.

10 No. 190.

11 Not printed. For telegram as issued see No. 271.

12 In the draft it was proposed that the appointed day should be ‘September 1st or such earlier date as
may be fixed by Order of the Governor General’ on the ground that ‘if we had trouble in Parliament
it might not be feasible to fix appointed day as 15th August and there might be criticism of such a
provision in Parliament as being unreasonable’. L/P &J/10/123 : f 182.

13 In the draft the comment on Clause I9(2)(a) was as follows : ‘India Office and contents at present vest
in His Majesty’s Government but cannot be used for purposes not connected with India or Burma
without assent of Governor General. It will not be feasible for them to be used entirely for such
purposes after appointed day and must therefore be made available for other purposes of His
Majesty’s Government. But we shall be prepared to discuss with the two Dominion Governments
disposal of contents as we recognise that art treasures etc. are of particular interest to India.’ Ibid.:
f 183.

266

Mr Turnbull to Mr Harris
L/P&JlioIgg: f 12

ig June ig4y

Private Secretary (through Under-Secretary of State)1

Mr. Harris’s note2 below refers to paragraph 4 of the Viceroy’s private letter
of the 12th June, copy attached.

2. I think we should be very wary about this. Obviously one of the objections
to partition which the Congress have always felt strongly is the possibility that
Pakistan will fortify itself against Hindustan with the assistance of foreign
powers, including in that term this country, the Americans and the Muslim
States of the Middle East. Having been forced to agree to partition the Congress
are now trying to re-insure themselves against such a possibility by giving it
out that anyone who tries to give military or other assistance to Pakistan on a
larger scale than to Hindustan will incur the displeasure of Hindustan. But they

1 Sir W. Croft minuted that he agreed with Mr Turnbull and Sir D. Monteath noted: ‘So do 1. 1 hope
that this will be a case of “in vain is the net spread in the sight of the bird”. D.T.M. I9.vi.’

2 Asking for comments on the Viceroy’s letter of 12 June (No. 161), para. 4.

5 1 8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

would not make so much noise about it if they were not frightened of the
consequences.

3. We want good defence arrangements with Hindustan and Pakistan and
good economic arrangements too. Just as this business of Congress suddenly
coming round to Dominion status is partly due to the fear of Pakistan remain¬
ing in the Commonwealth and so getting the kind of advantages now in
question, so it may turn out to be the case that we shall get much better arrange¬
ments with Hindustan by keeping open the possibility that if Hindustan does
not give us good arrangements we shall come to more favourable ones with
Pakistan. In short, to give the kind of assurance Mr. Gandhi wants might smite
out of our hands the best negotiating weapon that we have or are ever likely to
have, and moreover one which may be singularly effective for a long time to
come.

4. Therefore, I think we should consider very carefully before making any
statement of the kind the Viceroy proposes. It may be desirable to make some
such statement but I think it should be a little less pro-Gandhi than the Viceroy’s
formula. I suggest it should begin by saying that we want friendly and close and
effective arrangements with India in all fields, and particularly in the defence
and economic field, on a basis of free negotiation, and that what we should like
best is to have equally good arrangements with both parts. I certainly would not
say that there can be no question of any differentiation. That would simply
mean that, however uncooperative the Congress were, Pakistan could get
nothing better however willing it might be. Also I would not say anything
about a tripartite arrangement. The agreement itself is not by any means the
whole of the matter. Y ou can have an agreement which is worth very little if
the other party does not cooperate in the proper spirit, and worth a lot if they
do. If the agreement were tripartite everything that was done under it would
require the assent of the new Dominion of India as well as of Pakistan. If it
were not tripartite, we might be able, if it suited us, to do all sorts of things
with the cooperation of Pakistan within the agreement which we could not do
in Hindustan.

5. Surely the time has come when we can begin to consider British interests
on their merits. Every opportunity should be given to Hindustan to cooperate
on a friendly basis in the Commonwealth, but not on a basis which precludes
somebody else from cooperating better. It will be remembered that the Chiefs-
of-Staff3 recently took a strong view that if Pakistan or even Travancore or
Hyderabad wanted Dominion status within the Commonwealth and Hindustan
went out, it would be to the advantage of Imperial defence to allow them to
have it.

F. F. T.

3 See Vol. X, No. 416.

JUNE I947

519

267

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram , R/j/ 1 / 153: f 136

most immediate new Delhi, ig June ig47, 4.20 pm

secret Received: ig June, g.43 pm

No. 1497-S. 1. Reference India Office telegram 7840. 1 Staff have had first

reading of Cabinet comments and are meeting again this afternoon with Spence
and Griffin. We will telegraph our views on paras. 6 and 20 tonight, since India
Office want immediate replies on these specific points. Our comments on
remainder of telegram will follow tomorrow.

2. Reference India Office telegram 7841. 2 I am not using authority you gave
me to telegraph direct in your name, since matter is still open. But we suggest
that you send following telegram to Secretary of State at once3 :

Begins: Your 7841. I must point out that I could never have got Announce-
mentofjune 3rd accepted if I had not consulted leaders at every stage. Similarly
I am positive that I cannot get Bill accepted in the spirit necessary for its
successful implementation unless I take leaders into my confidence in advance.
In fact both leaders have made a definite request to see draft Bill as soon as
possible.

You suggest that I should consult them on certain clauses of the Bill. I should
much prefer to await your authority to show them the whole thing before I
take up these points in isolation. I will guarantee to devise procedure whereby
risk of leakage is reduced to minimum.

If it is decided to consult Opposition leaders, I hope you will emphasise that
any success I may have hitherto enjoyed is largely due to the fact that I have
been completely open and frank with Indian leaders, and that refusal to let
them see Draft Bill would make my position impossible. Ends.

1 No. 256.

2 No. 257.

3 This telegram was not, in fact, sent to H.M.G., Mr Abell telegraphing to Lord Ismay that it was no
longer necessary in light of tel. 7899 (No. 279, note 2). Tel. 7-S.K. of 20 June; R/3/1/153: f 162.

520

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

268

Sir F. Burrows [Bengal) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , R/5/1/159: ff 8-10

immediate ip June 1947, 6 pm

confidential Received in New Delhi: 20 June, 11 am

No. 163-C. I am grateful to you for sending Ismay to see Jinnah about region
ministries though naturally disappointed at attitude taken up by Jinnah.1
Suhrawardy is not yet back from Delhi and I cannot make definite proposals
till I have seen him; but there are now only two courses left — to continue pres¬
ent ministry with whatever safeguards of impartiality I can devise and enforce,
or to go into Section 93.

2. As you know, telegram No. 389 of February 14th2 that a coahtion
Government was a necessity in Bengal as offering the only hope of obviating
partition in the first place and then, since June 3rd, of effecting partition peace¬
fully. Whatever the origin of partition movement in Bengal may have been,
the argument that seems to have influenced the Hindus most is that only by
partition can they escape from permanent Moslem domination. The present
ministry is generally regarded by Hindus as being no better than a Moslem
ministry though it has three non-Moslem ministers. Its title to be in sole office
for whole province and particularly to control the administration of West
Bengal after a vote in favour of partition will be bitterly denied. The arguments
in favour of a coahtion Government in such circumstances seem to me to be —
W M give Hindu members on separation committee equal standing and
equal access to papers and officers ; (2) to let province at large see they have this
standing; (3) to avoid possibility of accusations, otherwise inevitable, that a
government virtually drawn from one community only will take unfair
advantage, e.g. postings, appointments and disposition of supplies; (4) to form
nucleus of two future Governments; and (5) to give sufficient standing to
Hindus to enter into engagements with members of the Services. Failing
Coahtion, which both sides have turned down, these arguments hold good for
the plan of regional ministries also. Now that Jinnah has apparently ruled out
regional ministries, the only way in which I can place the two parties on a level
for the conduct of partition negotiations seems to be by going into Section 93 .

3. Though Kiran Sankar Roy did not favour this, as against regional
ministries, when I saw him on June 15 th,3 there is good reason to believe that
Hindus would welcome it rather than have existing government continue in
office without any Congress elements. Probable reactions of Moslem League
are not so clear and they would of course have technical argument that in a

JUNE 1947

521

meeting of whole house they would still command a clear majority of Legis¬
lative Assemblies and in the absence of 25 European members. If province were
going to continue in its integrity this argument would be decisive, but in the
circumstances that will exist if vote is /or4 partition tomorrow or next day I am
convinced that in logic and equity it loses much of its force. My chief doubts
arise from risk that if I force Suhrawardy out of office I may not obtain the
cooperation of the League in separation committee : on the other hand I am
doubtful if I shall obtain Congress cooperation if I retain the present ministry
in sole charge. In spite of administrative difficulties which I have all along been
anxious to avoid, I feel that Section 93 by agreement , if I can get agreement, now
offers best chance of securing useful cooperation of both parties in partition. I
do not expect open agreement from Suhrawardy but acquiescence coupled with
promise of League’s cooperation in separation committee would, I consider,
justify my asking you to let me go into Section 93.

4. This telegram is to keep you informed of developments. I shall be grateful
for any advice you can give me. I feel it is to interest of both high commands
that Separation Committee in Bengal should be formed at level and in condi¬
tions that will offer best chance of it working effectively. Argument that there
is no question of dismissing Governments in Congress Provinces or making
them accept coalitions will probably be advanced by League but is inapplicable
to conditions in a province which is going to be partitioned.

5. I feel I should add that if I have to go into Section 93 I may require help
from Centre (a) in dealing with difficult food situation in East Bengal and (b)
as regards potential danger of widespread disturbances in East Bengal and
Calcutta.5

Addressed Viceroy repeated Viceroy New Delhi

1 See No. 253, note 4; also No. 240.

2 This reference has not been traced; the wording here may have been corrupted in transmission.

3 See No. 240.

4 Words in italics underlined in original.

5 In a telegram of 21 June from Kashmir Lord Mountbatten referred to this telegram and directed
Lord Ismay to ask Mr Jinnah ‘whether he really prefers section 93 to Coalition or regional ministry*.
R/3/1/159: f 11.

522

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

269

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma

Telegram, Rfe/i/itf: j 137

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, ig June 1947, 8 pm

secret Received: 20 June, 6 am

No. 1503-S. Reference para. 6 of Secretary of State’s telegram No. 7840.1 This
is exactly what Your Excellency had in mind. Position is that Congress views
are known and that informal contacts have been made with the Muslim League.
We suggest it would be bad tactics to press them again for two or three days
but I am seeing Liaquat tomorrow about buildings in Karachi and could, if you
so wished, tell him that the India Office had raised this specific point in connec¬
tion with the drafting of the Bill and therefore that the matter was really
immediate. Please let me have your instructions.

2. As regards the question of the appointment of Governors, the Secretary of
State’s telegram assumes that Governors will be appointed by Provincial
Governments. V. P. Menon says that Congress intention is that Governors
should be appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Dominion
Government concerned. The Muslim League views are not known but I could
ask Liaquat about this also when I see him tomorrow.2

3. Reference para. 20 of Secretary of State’s telegram 7840. Political Depart¬
ment and Reforms Office both agree, although for different reasons, in depre¬
cating specific denunciation of treaties. We suggest you should inform Secretary
of State to this effect at once.

4. It has, however, been suggested that the position may be secured by the
omission from para. 7(i)(b) of the draft Bill of the words “being functions,
powers, authority or jurisdiction incident to or flowing from that suzerainty”.
We will consider this further tomorrow but do not think that it need be
mentioned in any telegram which you will be despatching at once.

1 No. 256.

2 In tel. 7-S.K. of 20 June Mr Abell informed Lord Ismay that Lord Mountbatten agreed about
consulting Liaquat on procedure for appointing Provincial Governors. As regards the Governor-
General he felt that ‘getting a spontaneous invitation from Jinnah’ was more important than securing
immediate decision and that Liaquat could therefore ‘be given discretion to postpone approach to
Jinnah if desirable’. R/3/1/153: f 162.

JUNE I947

523

270

The Earl oj Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten oj Burma

Telegram , L/P &JI10I81: ff 232-3

immediate India office, 19 June 1947, 4 pm

secret Received in New Delhi: 20 June, 4 am1

7893. Your telegram 1358— S,2 paragraphs 4-6, was considered by Cabinet
Committee on night of 17th June.3 Question of international status of new
Dominion of India and of Pakistan is not, of course, one which can be finally
determined by U.K. legislation. It is a matter for members of U.N.O. and other
foreign States as much as for ourselves. At same time, we recognise that form of
legislation and our own attitude will not be without effect upon others.

2. Foreign Office advise that Bill as drafted will lead to the inference that new
Dominion of India continues the international personality of existing India and
that Pakistan is an offshoot. Committee’s view was that Nehru’s attitude on this
subject should be accepted by FI.M.G. so far as India’s external relations are
concerned but that, as contended by Liaquat, (your telegram 143 9-S)4 it would
be reasonable that assets of Government of India outside India should be
included in general equitable division of Central assets. Legally assets would
pass to Hindustan but I should be glad to know that you are satisfied that this
will not prejudice equitable division.

3 . Disadvantage to India (Hindustan) if Jinnah’s view were accepted and two
new States were created would be that India would have to apply de novo for
membership of U.N.O. and would have to secure fresh agreement of each
foreign State to receive diplomatic and consular representatives and new
credentials would have to be presented. Pakistan will have to do these things in
any case and only advantage to Pakistan of India (Hindustan) having to do so
also would be appearance of absolute equality in international circles. In view of
Liaquat’s attitude as reported by you we are satisfied that Nehru’s view should
be allowed to prevail but subject to your views we do not think that we need
do more than we have already done in the draft Bill to give recognition to it.
When, however, suitable opportunity arises e.g. by appearance of Hindustan
delegation at U.N.O. Assembly in September we should support claim of India
(Hindustan) to be regarded as continuing international personality of existing
India and therefore entitled to continued and unbroken membership of U.N.O.,
and also of course any application by Pakistan for separate membership.

1 Repeated to Kashmir. R/3/1/153: f 127.

2 No. 115.

3 No. 244, Minute 2.

4 No. 202.

524

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

271

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &Jlio/i2j: Jf 177-80

immediate India office, 19 June 1947, 7 pm

secret Received in Srinagar: 20 June, 8.30 am1

7897. Your telegram 148 1-S.2 Indian Independence Bill. Cabinet Committee3
have considered your preliminary comments and reached following con¬
clusions : —

Clause 1. We agree.

Clause 2 sub-Clause 2. Account will be taken of this in next draft.

Clause 3(1). This will read “Not later than the appointed day — etc.”.

Clause 3(2) will be amended.

Clause 4(1) and (3) will be dealt with in same way as Clause 3.

Clause 5(3). We doubt necessity of this.

Clause 6(1) and (7). Since initially Dominion Legislatures are the two
Constituent Assemblies they must have power to vary existing constitution.
We do not consider it practicable to distinguish in Bill between constitution
making function and function as legislature. It should be clear from Clause 9(2)
that provincial constitutions under 1935 Act remain in force unless altered by
Dominion Legislatures but words for addition to that clause to bring out the
point are being considered. We do not wish to make addition to Clause 6 on
this point. It is essential from Parliamentary point of view to leave the position
as general as possible. Dominion Legislatures can limit their own powers under
sub-Clause 7 of Clause 6.

Clause 6(6). First point. This is being dealt with in amendment to Section
9(2). Second point. In our view all these matters should be dealt with by
Governor General’s Order or by the Dominion Legislature. We are reluctant
to cater in legislation here for details of this kind. If however it is a point to
which the Indian leaders are known to attach importance or one which they
raise we will consider further what we can do to meet it. Third point. It will be
made clear in Bill that this can be dealt with by Governor General’s Order.

Clause 7(i)(a). We agree.

Clause 7(i)(c).4 We think this is essential. In course of assurances given on 15 th
November to Afridi Jirga and similarly to Ahmadzai Wazirs5 Wavell said that
new agreement would be required to replace present Treaty with British
Government “for which ultimate responsibility still rests in England”. In view
of this and of paragraph 17 of statement of June 3rd (which was inserted to meet
the insistence of the tribes that their position should be made clear) we regard

JUNE I947

525

it as necessary that bill should say plainly that authority of the Crown in relation
to tribal areas will lapse.

Clause 8(2)(b). Your point will be met if 8 (2)1 2 3 4 5 6 is retained. See para. 8 of my
7840.7

Clause 8(2)(f). Modification will be made.

Clause 9 (2) (a). It is very doubtful whether what you propose could legally be
done by means of Governor General’s Order under Clause 8, but there is no
doubt that it is within power of Dominion Legislature to legislate making
such provision if they so desire. In our view Governor General’s Order should
not be used for this purpose as it would be an act of constitution making and
not a matter required as a result of partition. It is proposed to amend Section
6(2) line 32 by insertion of words “this or” before “any existing”. It will thus
be made clear that Dominion Legislatures can amend present Act in its applica¬
tion to their own territory.

Clause 9(2)(d). Appropriate amendment will be made.

Clause 13. Cabinet Committee have already decided to omit sub-Clause 2.
Object of sub-Clause 1 was to authorise High Commissioner to continue to
make payments on behalf of both Dominions in anomalous situation which
must continue until provision is made by Dominion Legislatures and also to
assure those who are accustomed to draw payments that existing machinery
will go on. The clause was designed simply to authorise and not to require but in
view of your comments we are prepared to omit reference to High Com¬
missioner and confine clause to Secretary of State, provided repeat provided
that you can obtain assurance from the leaders of the predominant party in each
Dominion that they agree that High Commissioner and Secretary of State
should continue to discharge these functions and undertake to continue to
provide necessary funds. We shall require such an assurance which can be
quoted in Parliament if we are to dispense with provision in Bill.

Clause 16. We have already telegraphed8 for your views on a possible
alternative.

Clause 1 9 (2) (a). We agree to omit this clause and leave position as it is under
1935 Act. It will then fall to be dealt with by negotiation.

1 Repeated to New Delhi. R/3/1/153 : f 130.

2 No. 249.

3 No. 265, Minute 3.

4 The comment on Clause 7(i)(c) is a revised version transmitted in tel. 7921 of 19 June. L/P &J/10/123 :
f 165. Originally this comment read simply: ‘We think this is essential. Assurances have been given
to tribes by Wavell and in statement of June 3rd that as in case of States, powers of Crown resting on
agreements will lapse and that new agreements will have to be negotiated.

5 R/3/I/92- ff 176-9.

6 ‘met if 8(2)’ deciphered as ‘added if 8(1) \

7 No. 256.

8 No. 258.

526

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

2. We are considering possibility of provision to cover last paragraph of
your telegram I48i-Sq but it is not at all clear to us precisely what kind of
provision Interim Government desire should be made in the Bill. We suggest
that you let us have for consideration a draft clause of the kind you think they
want.

3. Governor of Bengal’s telegram 161-S of 18th June10 as to titles of two
parts of Bengal in the Bill. We are prepared to accept his view.11 If you support
it would it then be necessary to use the titles East and West Punjab?

9 No. 249.

10 Sir F. Burrows had telegraphed that he apprehended ‘serious criticism from all classes of Bengali
Hindus of proposed names for new provinces’, [i.e. Bengal and Western Bengal: see No. 191, Clause
3(i)(b)]. He pressed ‘most strongly on historical and sentimental grounds (and Bengali Hindus are
extremely sentimental) that the two provinces should be called by the uncontroversial names of
‘East Bengal’ and ‘West Bengal’. These names have been in common parlance for many years and
the former has associations which will commend it to Muslims.’ He preferred ‘the shorter and sim¬
pler words East and West to Eastern and Western, compare with Indies, Yorkshire Riding, South
East Asia Command, etc.’ Tel. 161-S of 18 June, para, (a) to Viceroy repeated to Secretary of State.
R/3/1/153: f 113.

11 This sentence omitted from decipher.

272

Secretary of State to H.M. Minister at Kabul
Telegram, L/P &SI12I1811: J 124

important India office, 20 June ig47, l am

CONFIDENTIAL

52. My telegram No. 51 of June 16 :l Afghan representation concerning the
future of the North-W est Frontier Province.

Following is gist of Afghan note dated June 13 th.2 Copies follow by bag.

2. Note refers to your discussions with Afghan Foreign Minister over the
period 1944 to 1946 concerning frontier questions (please see correspondence
ending with your demi-official letter to Weigh tman No. F 706/44 of March
15th 1946). 3 Afghan Minister also refers to a subsequent exchange of notes
with the Foreign Office, in which H.M.G. were invited to study questions
which had been raised in Kabul. Fie expresses his Government’s regret at the
reply received from the Foreign Office, which was to the effect that these
questions would have to be studied in full consultation with the Government of
India and that it was not opportune at that time to embark on such consultation.

3. The Afghan Minister has been instructed to draw the particular attention
of H.M.G. to the question of the North-West Frontier Province. This is

JUNE I947

527

described as lying between Afghanistan and India proper; it is said to be a land
which has for centuries been principally inhabited by Afghans and to have been
annexed by Great Britain to India during the Anglo-Afghan wars of last
century. The annexation of this Afghan territory is described as an arbitrary
dismemberment of Afghanistan, and the connexion between the Afghans and
the North-West Frontier Province and the people of India can never be
considered anything but an artificial one. The Afghan Government has con¬
sistently made it clear over the last ten years that in the event of any change in
India the future of the millions of Afghans and their lands must not be neglected.
In view moreover of the change in the status of India the obligations created
by the Anglo-Afghan treaties in respect of these territories will in future no
longer be regarded as binding.

4. The Afghan Government consider that as the future of India is now being
settled it is opportune to consider the problem of the future of the North-West
Frontier Province, and its population. They do not think that this matter
should depend on the future Government or Governments of India. Note goes
on to say that the Afghan Government consider that the referendum which is
being arranged for the North-West Frontier Province is not compatible with
justice, as it debars the Province from choosing either to form a separate free
State or to rejoin its motherland Afghanistan.

5. In conclusion the Afghan Minister asks for an early reply and states that
the Afghan Government cannot be indifferent to any decision which is con¬
trary to justice and to the freedom of the Afghans of the North-West Frontier
Province and that they will be obliged to consider the interests of this large
Afghan community.

6. The terms of the note will require further study here before a reply can be
returned. H.M.G. would in the meantime be grateful for any comments which
you or the Government of India may have, in particular as to an assurance
being given on the lines of Ah Mohammed’s suggestion in para. 5 of Katodon

47*4

Repeated to Government of India, External Affairs and Commonwealth
Relations Dept.

1 No. 212.

2 L/P &S/12/1811 : fF 121-2.

3 Ibid.] fF 288-95.

4 No. 140.

528

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

273

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

LIP&SI13I1845: jf 12-14

1446/18 srinagar, 20 June 1947

Dear Listowel,

I enclose a copy of a letter I have received from H.H. the Nawab of Bhopal,
until recently the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes. He has asked me in the
last paragraph of his letter if I will transmit a copy of the enclosed note1 to the
Prime Minister. I am therefore sending two copies of the note and the letter,
one for you and one for you to pass to the Prime Minister. I obtained his
agreement to sending also a copy of his covering letter.

I told the Nawab and his new Dewan, Sir Zafrullah Khan, at a recent inter¬
view2 that Congress would never have agreed to the Plan if there had been
more than two dominions to be set up and had even refused to agree that
Bengal should be allowed to have independence and dominion status.3 I
pointed out that quite apart from any other consideration the Plan would not
have been accepted by Congress on any other basis. I told him also that H.M.G.
had given careful consideration to the position of the States and that in fact the
memorandum of May 12th 19464 had been expressly referred to again in the
Statement of June 3 rd,5 so that its acceptance by all parties would be publicly
acknowledged.

There is no doubt, however, that some of the States feel very unhappy,
particularly of course Hyderabad and Bhopal, who have Muslim rulers with
Hindu-majority populations.

Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

Enclosure to No. 273

The Nawab of Bhopal to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
PERSONAL AND SECRET QASR-I-SULTANI, BHOPAL, 14 June I947

Your Excellency,

I enclose for your consideration a Note which contains some of my reflections
on what I have described as the Mountbatten Plan. I can pretend to no know¬
ledge of the motives or considerations which may have impelled His Majesty’s
Government to leave the States in the unhappy position in which they fmd
themselves under this Plan. I can only guess that they may have been actuated
by the hope that they might thereby conciliate the present leaders of the Indian
National Congress. If that was so, all that I wish to observe is that a very short
passage of time will demonstrate only too clearly the futility of that hope. The
Congress has so far in spite of occasional internal crises been able to maintain a

JUNE I947

529

united front vis-a-vis Britain inasmuch as all sections and groups inside it were
actuated by an uncompromising hostility towards Britain. Of this you have
had ample proof and experience as Supreme Commander of the S.E.A.C. How
many times the burdens and anxieties of that very delicate and responsible
position were multiplied by the open and secret activities of the Congress can
be adequately known to you alone. You are also aware of the part that the
States played in that life and death struggle. They at least did far more to protect
their country against foreign aggression and domination than the Congress can
ever lay claim to.

Now that the Congress is about to climb into the seat of supreme power in
Hindustan, it will find it impossible to maintain a united front. The right wing
and the left wing will not continue to hold together even during a space of
months after the complete transfer of supreme power into the hands of the
Congress. All indications point to the early predominance of the left wing and
though that wing prefers to describe itself at present as the socialist wing of
Congress, its socialism is only a thin veneer covering a mass of rank com¬
munism, a reality which H.M.G. may not at present be prepared for obvious
reasons to recognise, but which has not escaped the penetrating vision of Mr
Sumner Welles. By what degree of affection, devotion, and love for Britain a
communist Hindustan will be inspired, I am not competent to assess. That task I
leave to statesmen possessed of the far sighted vision and experience of the
British Prime Minister and his colleagues and advisers.

In the accompanying note I have preferred to confine myself to the broad
question of H.M.G.’s policy towards the States. I have not touched upon the
concrete difficulties that have been created by the Congress in the way of the
States taking part in the shaping of the future constitution of Hindustan. I have
no doubt that you have studied with care the decisions already made by the
Constituent Assembly on matters comprised within the Objectives Resolution,1 2 3 4 5 6
the list of Fundamental Rights and the list of Union Subjects.7 It seems to me
that decisions and resolutions of that type leave very little incentive for the
States to cast in their lot with Hindustan.

I have been privileged to enjoy your friendship for over 25 years now, and
for this reason I have frankly given my views in the note, and written to you

1 Not printed. See L/P &S/13/1845 : fF 15-22.

2 See No. 369, paras. 32-5.

3 In the course of his note, the Nawab of Bhopal had argued that as, under the Mountbatten Plan, each
section of British India was to be accorded ‘the choice to remain within the British Commonwealth
... or to get out of it’ the same choice should have been accorded to the States. L/P &S/13/1845:
f 18.

4 Vol. VII, No. 262.

5 No. 45, para. 18.

^ Vol. IX, No. 190.

7 cf. No. 7.

530

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

without reserve, in the confident hope that what I have said will not be mis¬
understood by you and will be read in the spirit in which it has been written. I
shall be much obliged if Your Excellency will kindly arrange to transmit a copy
of the enclosed note to the Prime Minister for his information.

Yours very sincerely,

HAMIDULLAH

274

Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck to Lord Ismay
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Withdrawal of British Forces ( 1 )

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA,

new delhi, 20 June ig47

My dear Ismay,

Thank you for your letter of the 18th June1 about the withdrawal of the
British Forces from India.

2. My paper COS (47) 29B2 was submitted to the Viceroy in response to a
request from him for my view on this subject. The paper represents my opinion
as the Viceroy’s adviser on all military matters and was naturally written from
the general military point of view. As Commander-in-Chief in India, one of
my responsibilities is the maintenance of law and order when so required by the
civil authorities.

3. I adhere to the advice I gave in the paper under reference but realise of
course that the Viceroy has every right to disregard it for over-riding political
considerations. That is solely his responsibility and it is not my business to
comment on his decision. It is my duty to accept it and I do accept it.

4. I have no data at my disposal to confirm your statement in the third
paragraph of your letter that the number of British nationals desiring to leave
India is likely to be relatively small and that they can be got away in the next
two months. If this is so, then so much the better, as my responsibility in this
matter would be considerably lightened.

5. I am afraid I can not agree with your opinion that the “handful of British
troops ’ that might remain in this country could do very little to safeguard
British lives as a whole. My considered opinion, in which my advisers support
me, is that even small forces of British troops at say Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi
and Karachi might make all the difference should the tide of feeling in the
country take an anti-British or anti-European turn. I agree that they could do
little to protect individual Europeans in country districts, but the bulk of
Europeans are concentrated in the larger seaports and towns.

JUNE I947

531

I request that this opinion may be recorded and conveyed to HMG in the
representations that the Viceroy is going to make on the subject, as I feel that it
would give HMG a wrong impression if we were to say that they could do very
little. It all depends on circumstances prevailing at the time of course, but the
above is my opinion given as military adviser to the Viceroy.

6. I must injustice to myself and in pursuance of my duty as military adviser
to the Viceroy, point out that on the withdrawal of British troops, the instru¬
ment on which the civil authorities will be able to rely for the protection of
British and European lives against mob violence will be the Indian Army. That
Army will soon be involved in the process of reconstitution during which the
majority of its units will not be capable of rendering armed assistance to the
civil power even if the Indian officers and men composing them were willing to
carry out these duties for the protection of Europeans, which I cannot in any way
guarantee.

In order to carry out the reconstitution of the Army in an orderly and
logical way, the very large number of units now distributed in small detach¬
ments all over Northern India on internal security duties will have to be recalled
to undergo reconstitution. Also for the next six months and more, there will be
a continuous movement and cross transfer of units between Pakistan and
“India” which will virtually immobilise the units involved for the time being.

7. Moreover, I can not state with any certainty that during this process of
reconstitution, the Army will retain its cohesion or remain a reliable instrument
for use to aid the civil power in the event of widespread disturbances.

I have dwelt on this aspect of the situation at some length as I wish to make it
clear to the Viceroy and through him to HMG, that if I am to remain, as I
understand is proposed, in central control of the Armed Forces during the
process of their reconstitution, I can no longer be responsible in grave emer¬
gency for the protection of British lives and property should these be threat¬
ened, once the British forces have been withdrawn.

I hope that no such need will arise but it may and, should this happen, it is
essential that the position, in respect of the Indian Armed Forces and as it
affects myself and my subordinate commanders, should be clearly understood
by HMG.

8. I should very much like to discuss the whole question with you before the
Viceroy returns to Delhi.

Yours sincerely,

C. J. AUCHINLECK

P.S. We talked of this last night but should you wish to discuss the matter
further I am at your disposal — as always !

1 See No. 239, note 15; also No. 213.

2 Enclosure to No. 159.

532

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

275

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Interviews (2)

20 June ig47

H. E.

I had a long talk with Mr Liaquat Ali Khan. The following is a summary of the
principal topics :

I. Gurgaon

I reiterated the Viceroy’s regrets about the hitch over the despatch of Muslim
troops to Gurgaon.1 I added that the Commander-in-Chief had ordered an
additional battalion to that area, and that the CGS had instructed the Army
Commander concerned privately that this battalion should contain as large a
proportion as possible of Muslims.

2. Karachi

I said that I had consulted the Commander-in-Chief who had stated that there
would be great difficulty in making Muslim engineers available in the im¬
mediate future for helping with arrangements for accommodating the Pakistan
Government in Karachi. Mr Liaquat Ali Khan said that he was not, at this stage,
thinking in terms of engineers. What he wanted was the services of a senior
military officer with ‘Qfuartermaster]’ experience to make plans for the
accommodation of the Pakistan Government in Karachi and for the move of
the Government to that place. I promised to write again to the Commander-
in-Chief explaining that my first approach had been under a misapprehension.
A copy of my letter is at Annex ‘A’.2

3. Controller of Currency

I referred to a letter that I had just received from Mr Liaquat Ah Khan in which
he asked me to help him to find a Controller of Currency for the Pakistan
Government (Annex ‘B’) : and I undertook to write to Lord Catto at once, with
a copy to Mr Holland Martin (see Annex ‘C’).3

4. Arbitral Tribunal

I reminded Mr Liaquat Ah Khan that there had been a difference of opinion
between the two parties on this matter, and that it had been agreed4 that he and
Sardar Patel should consult together and let us have an agreed recommendation.
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan said that he would get in touch with Sardar Patel at the
first opportunity.

I took the opportunity of dropping a hint — without of course mentioning
names — that if they were to decide to ask for an independent British Chairman,

JUNE I947

533

we had got a possible candidate in mind who would be quite first class. This
was with reference to the Secretary of State’s telegram5 about Sir Cyril
Radcliffe.

5. Boundary Commissions

I said that we had received the nominations of Congress for both Boundary
Commissions two or three days ago,6 and asked him to expedite the Muslim
nominations. Mr Liaquat Ah Khan said that he would do his best. He added that
the Chairman (who was to be nominated by the Boundary Commissioners
themselves)7 should not be an arbitrator, but, so to speak, a business manager. He
anticipated that agreement would not be reached by the Boundary Com¬
missions, and therefore that two sets of recommendations would be submitted
to the Governor General who would pass them to the Partition Council. It was
not beyond the bounds of possibility that the Partition Council would be able to
come to an adjustment among themselves; but if they failed to do so, reference
would have to be made to the Arbitral Tribunal.

6. Governor General and Governors

I told Mr Liaquat Ah Khan that we had already received certain proposals for
the draft Bill, and that the Bill itself might reach us on Monday or Tuesday
next. Meanwhile HMG had asked8 us to consult the Indian leaders on the
following points:

(a) Was there to be a common Governor General to start with; and

(b) What was to be the procedure for appointing Governors.

As regards (a), I reminded him of the conversation that Sir Eric Mieville and
I had had with him some days ago,9 but he said that he had not yet had an
opportunity of talking it over with Mr Jinnah. I impressed upon him the

1 See No. 254.

2 Lord Ismay’s letter, dated 20 June 1947, to F. M. Auchinleck enclosed a copy of No. 231 and ex¬
plained what Mr Liaquat Ali Khan wanted along the lines of para. 2 above, adding that ‘the Viceroy
has asked me to say that he would be most grateful if you would do all in your power to help, since
it is essential in the public interest that the Pakistan Government should be in a position to function
efficiently from 15th August onwards’.

3 Mr Liaquat Ali Khan’s letter, dated 19 June 1947, explained that Pakistan was urgently in need of an
expert to advise on ‘currency, exchange, etc. in connection with partition’, adding that, after parti¬
tion, he would function as the ‘Controller of the Currency for the Pakistan Government’ and would
organise the Reserve Bank of Pakistan. He asked Lord Ismay to approach the Bank of England for a
suitable officer. Lord Ismay passed on this request to Lord Catto in a letter dated 20 June, and in his
letter of the same date to Mr Holland-Martin, to whom he thought Lord Catto would refer the
matter, he emphasised that ‘we are desperately anxious to help these people in the terrific task which
confronts them’.

4 No. 175, Item 3.

5 No. 224, note 2.

6 No. 207; see also No. 262.

7 No. 175, Item 2, conclusion (v).

8 No. 256, para. 6.

9 No record of this conversation has been traced.

534

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

urgency of this matter, and emphasised how impossible it would be to get any
sort of continuity or any sort of orderly partition if each Dominion had a
separate Governor General. He said that he would consult Mr Jinnah at the
first opportunity.

As regards (b), I said that the alternatives were broadly as follows:

(a) Governors could be appointed by the Provinces themselves, presumably
after reference to The King; or

(b) The Governors could be appointed by the Governor General on the
recommendation of the Dominion Governments concerned.

I said that (b) seemed far the better procedure, but did not think it right, or
perhaps tactful, to let him know that Congress favoured this course.10 Mr
Liaquat Ali Khan said that he would discuss this point with Mr Jinnah at the
first opportunity.

7. Governor General's Bodyguard

I said that the composition of the Governor General’s Bodyguard was such that
it could be divided between India and Pakistan without much difficulty. Did
Pakistan want a Governor General’s Bodyguard ? Mr Liaquat Ali Khan replied
‘Certainly’. I told him that since the Bodyguard was a unit of the Army, he
ought to take this up with the Army Reconstruction Committee.

8. Partition of the Army

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan expressed grave doubts about the speed at which the
Army was to be partitioned. I emphasised over and over again that unless there
was to be chaos, the whole Army must be under a single central administration.
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan said that he had no objection to this, provided that by 15th
August Pakistan had its own Army (which would, of course, be subject to
adjustment later, and which might, in the first instance, consist of, say, 70%
Muslims and 30% Hindus), under its own Commander-in-Chief, who should
be nominated at an early date. The movement of Muslim majority units to
Pakistan and the movement of units which were either exclusively Hindu or
had a majority of Hindus to Hindustan should be started at once and conducted
as a war measure with the greatest possible dispatch. He concluded by stating
most emphatically that he and Mr Jinnah were resolved that they would not
take over the reins of Government in Pakistan unless they had an Army on the
spot, and under their control, of the kind that he had mentioned.

Note: I feel that Y.E. should have a talk with the Commander-in-Chief at the
first opportunity and impress upon him that whatever the military position,
political considerations demand that these movements should be put through as
a matter of the greatest urgency.

9. British Troops in India

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan said that it would help to steady matters if British troops

JUNE T 947

535

were to remain in India while the Indian Army was under process of transition.
I said that it had already been agreed that HMG should be asked their intentions
about the withdrawal of British troops: and I added that it would be very
difficult for them to allow them to remain unless both Dominions specifically
asked for this.

ISMAY

10 Sec No. 269, para. 2.

27 6

Mr V. P. Menon to Mr Abell
Telegram, Rfe/ilitf: /jp

most immediate new Delhi, 20 June ig47 , d pm

secret Received: 20 June , g.15 pm

No. 1504-S. Baluchistan referendum. Crichton and I today discussed with
Nehru question of supporting referendum with special reference to Prior’s
proposals.1 Nehru has now come round to view that time factor and other
considerations preclude any attempt to increase representative character of body
to decide the issue. He has now agreed that decision may be taken at a meeting
of members of Shahi Jirga (excluding Sardars nominated by Kalat State) and
non-official members of Quetta Municipality and that meeting should be
called for a date not later than June 30th. This is satisfactory.

2. Ismay is writing2 to Jinnah that alternatives mentioned by him3 have been
carefully considered, but all of them involve a considerably long period, that
His Excellency is convinced that if a decision is to be arrived at within short
time left the reference will have to be made to same body as before and asking
him to let Ismay know urgently if he agrees.

3. If Jinnah agrees, it is proposed to issue at once the requisite announcement
under para. 21 of Statement.4

Please telegraph whether His Excellency agrees.5

1 R/3/1/155: fF 34-5-

2 Ibid.: f 38.

3 Mr Jinnah had suggested that the electorate in Baluchistan should consist of one of the following
three alternatives: (1) Holders of ration cards (about 2,000); (2) All Maliks and Mutibars (about 500);
(3) All members of district Jirgas (about 400). Ibid.: f 32.

4 No. 45.

5 On 21 June Mr Abell noted on this telegram: ‘Pt. Nehru having made all this fuss about Baluchistan
now recommends the same procedure as before. Had he not agitated, the announcement of the 3rd
June would have been clear on the point. I fear Jinnah will not agree now — he was definitely against
the Shahi Jirga last time the matter was discussed in my presence. He is likely to fear that the Congress
have now nobbled the Shahi Jirga.’ Ibid.: fF 39-4°-

536

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Sir F. Burrows ( [Bengal ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , LlP&Jlioj8i: f 224

immediate Calcutta, 20 June, 1947, 3.1s pm

en clair Received in India Office: 20 June , 1.30 pm

No. 978-S. Joint meeting of Members Bengal Legislative Assembly this after¬
noon decided under paragraph seven of H.M.G.’s statement1 by 126 votes to 90
votes to join a new Constituent Assembly. Divisions of separate meetings
expected later this afternoon.

Addressed to Viceroy, New Delhi; repeated to Viceroy, Kashmir and
Secretary of State.

1 No. 45.

278

Sir F. Burrows [Bengal) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram, LjP &JI10I81: f 223

immediate Calcutta, 20 June ig47, 4.40 pm

en clair Received in India Office : 20 June, 3 pm

No. 979-S. Continuation my telegram No. 978-S.1 Separate meetings of
members West repeat West Bengal Legislative Assembly this afternoon
decided under paragraph six of H.M.G.’s statement2 by 58 votes to 21 votes
that Province should be partitioned; and under paragraph eight of statement by
58 votes to 21 votes again that West Bengal should join existing Constituent
Assembly. Separate meeting of members East repeat East Bengal Legislative
Assembly this afternoon decided under paragraph six of statement by 106 votes
to 3 5 votes that Province should not repeat not be partitioned ; under paragraph
eight of statement by 107 votes to 34 that East Bengal should join new Con¬
stituent Assembly; and under paragraph thirteen of statement by 105 votes to 34
votes that East Bengal would agree to amalgamation of Sylhet.

Addressed to Viceroy, New Delhi; repeated to Viceroy, Kashmir and
Secretary of State.

1 No. 277.

2 No. 45.

JUNE 1947

537

279

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/3/1/15J: f 163

immediate viceroy’s camp, kashmir, 20 June ig47, 6. IS pm

secret Received: 20 June , 3.20 pm

No. 8-S.K. Your 7840, 1 para. 6. I should prefer to consult the leaders on the
whole text as agreed in your 7899, para. 3 2 but am having separate enquiries
made about attitude towards appointment of Governor-General and
Governors.

Para. 20. Both Reforms Office and Political Department deprecate formal
denunciation of treaties3 and I agree.

1 No. 256.

2 Lord Listowel’s tel. 7899 of 19 June concerned arrangements for further consideration of the draft
Bill. It asked Lord Mountbatten to telegraph whether he now agreed with the text of the Bill (as
amended by Nos. 256 and 271) ‘subject to further comments in the light of Indian leaders’ views at
later stage. If so we will then proceed to consult Opposition on basis of revised text. Your consulta¬
tion with Indian leaders can then take place on receipt of revised text and after Opposition have been
consulted’. L/P &J/10/123 : f 175.

3 See No. 269, para. 3.

280

Mr Turnbull to Mr V. P. Menon
Telegram , LfP &J) 10)123: jf 162-3

immediate India office, 20 June 1947, 12. 30 pm

secret Received: 20 June , 10 pm

7944. Your telegram 1487-S1 arrived too late for consideration, by Cabinet
Committee2 with Viceroy’s 1481-S,3 reply to which has issued today.4 As
regards Clause 6 sub-Clauses 1 and 7 and Clause 6(6) view here is that it is
definitely not desirable or indeed necessary to enlarge the Bill as you propose
except that insertion will be made to make clear that existing arrangements for
filling vacancies can continue.

Your paragraph 4. It is for Dominions respectively to decide whether they
want a Federal Court and provision will have to be made by Governor Gen-

1 No. 255.

2 No. 265, Minute 3.

3 No. 249.

4 No. 271.

538

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

eral’s Order accordingly. Clause 8(2)(g) is intended to cover this but if only 8(1)
is retained it will cover such matters as division of Federal Court if desired and
of High Courts in split provinces. Appellate jurisdiction of Privy Council will
continue until altered by law of Dominion though of course if Court is
abolished appellate jurisdiction over it is abolished also.

Your paragraph 5. Governor General has no individual judgment at present.
Discretionary control over provinces is eliminated by 9 (2) (a). If what you have
in mind is discretionary and individual functions under Part II of 1935 Act
which is not now in operation any legislation of the Dominions or Orders of
Governor General bringing this into operation will have to contain necessary
modifications dealing with discretion and individual judgment.

281

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary of State

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, 20 June I947

Dear Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of 12th June and your Personal Report No. 9.1

2. Since I last wrote the All-India Congress Committee has ratified2 the
Congress leaders’ acceptance of the announcement of 3rd June so that another
potential obstacle to progress has been surmounted. It is clear from your
Personal Report that it was by no means plain sailing and that once again the
successful outcome was in large measure due to your own initiative. It was
perhaps hardly surprising that, with the example before them of what had
happened in regard to the Cabinet Mission’s plan, the Muslim League were
chary about committing themselves to a definite acceptance of the announce¬
ment until they knew where the A.I.C.C. stood.

3. It is also clear from your letter and report that Gandhi will continue to
require very careful watching and handling, though it is to be hoped that the
stage has now passed when it was within his power to sabotage the whole plan.
It has to be recognised, however, that injured vanity might still impel him to
try to do so.

4. I have given some preliminary consideration to his point about agree¬
ments between H.M.G. and the two Indian dominions which you mentioned
in paragraph 4 of your letter3 but am not yet entirely clear as to how we should
proceed in regard to it.4 It may very well prove the right course that the Prime
Minister should say something on the point in the House but the terms of any

JUNE I947

539

statement will require to be very carefully thought out and I am not at all sure
that it won’t have to be on lines rather different from what Gandhi would like.

[Para. 5, on honours questions, omitted.]

6. I am sorry that it took a little time5 to fix up at this end the change in
Governorship in the N.W.F.P. but in the result a premature leakage seems to
have been avoided. I had myself thought, as you know,6 that it would have
been better that Caroe should resign outright from the start but I can see the
advantages of handling the matter on the lines finally adopted and I am glad to
know that you yourself do not contemplate Caroe resuming office as Governor
unless a recommendation in his favour were made by the Pakistan govern-
ment.7

[Paras. 7 and 8, on re-employment prospects in the Colonial Service for
Irrigation Engineers, omitted.]

9. In addition to your letter and Personal Report I have received during the
past week the reports of your various meetings with the Indian leaders about the
administrative implications of partition, for which I am most grateful. It seems
that you have been able to achieve considerable progress in spite of unseemly
wrangles. I note that it was agreed at your meeting on 13 th June8 that Patel and
Liaquat Ali Khan should consider together the composition of the Arbitral
Tribunal; possibly, however, the services of a distinguished outsider as Chair¬
man may still be required. You will have received my telegram No. 71 [72]°
about Radcliffe who, as I said in my previous letter,10 ought to fill the bill
admirably if he is acceptable. I am glad that the idea of consulting U.N.O.
about the composition of the Boundary Commissions has been abandoned11
and it will probably be best if a reference even to the President of the Inter¬
national Court of Justice is also avoided as it would inevitably involve delay.

10. We feel every sympathy with you and your staff having to work at such
intensity at the height of the hot weather. All concerned here, particularly those
engaged on the Bill, have also been set a very fast pace and it may interest you
to know that the Cabinet Secretariat staff worked until 5 a.m. on Wednesday

1 Nos. 161 and 162.

2 No. 205.

3 No. 161.

4 See No. 266.

5 See No. 211, note 1.

6 Ibid., para. 5.

7 Ibid., note 3.

8 No. 175, Item 3.

9 No. 224, note 2.

10 No. 182, para. 2.

11 See No. 208.

540

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

morning producing the minutes12 of a meeting of the Cabinet Committee as a
basis for communicating to you the Committee’s comments on the draft Bill.

ii. It is clear from the A.I.C.C. Resolution13 on the subject and from various
other pointers that the Congress are working up opposition to our policy
towards the States and, in particular, to our declared intention not to hand over
any degree of paramountcy to the successor authorities in India. Some com¬
ment on this issue is beginning to appear in the Press here and diverse opinions
are expressed. You ought to know that Stafford Cripps recently received a
letter14 on the subject from Rajagopalachariar in which he challenged alike the
legal, historical, political and moral bases for the doctrine of the lapse of
paramountcy. The only possible line to take in reply to such representations is,
of course, that, from an historical and constitutional point of view, the Cabinet
Mission’s statement of 12th May, 1946, 15 was and remains right. Thus, there can
be no doubt that the relations of the States have always been with the Crown;
the point is argued at some length in the Joint Opinion of 24th July, 1928, by
Leshe Scott and other eminent Counsel given to the States (cf. in particular
paragraph 7(i) of Appendix 3 to the Report of the Butler Committee) 4 6 Before
1935 the Government of India was, of course, used as the agent of the Crown
for conducting these relations; but this function was not to be confused with
that government’s executive functions as the Government of British India. At
the same time it is imperative that our policy should take full account, as it has,
in fact, done, of the practical consequences of the principle by which it has had
to be determined. Thus, we have scrupulously avoided, and must continue to
avoid, doing anything which might be taken by individual States as an en¬
couragement to them to stand out of the new Indian set-up — this, I am sure
you will agree, applies particularly to Hyderabad, Travancore and any other
States which are reported to have declared their intention to assert indepen¬
dence — and we must clearly give any assistance in our power towards the
working out of satisfactory new arrangements between the States and the
successor authorities. The letters to Residents which it was agreed should be
despatched at your meeting with the Indian leaders on 13th June17 may be
expected to help in bringing about the desired result.

[Para. 12, on a forthcoming Parliamentary announcement about the future of
Ceylon, omitted.]

13. I was not at all surprised to receive your telegram No. 141-S18 about the
food situation. Both Pethick-Lawrence and I have lost no opportunity in
recent months of impressing upon the Minister of Food the desirability of
doing all we possibly can to help India over food and about a month ago I
circulated a memorandum19 to the Cabinet Committee warning them of the
facts. I was, therefore, able, on receipt of your telegram, to follow up my

JUNE 1947

541

previous representations with a further memorandum20 inviting my colleagues
to ask the Minister of Food, as a matter of political urgency, to arrange for the
diversion to India of some quantity of wheat or flour, even at the risk of
slowing down the rebuilding of our own stocks, and to ask the Secretary of
State for the Dominions to instruct the U.K. High Commissioners in Australia
and Canada to urge those Governments as a matter of Commonwealth interest
to do everything they can to assist India at this moment. I shall hope to let you
know the outcome of my efforts very shortly.

14. On the subject of food I was interested to see what Ramamurty said in
his fortnightly letter to you of 30th May (No. 8 3). 21 Although you have hinted
to me22 that Ramamurty acted rather lavishly during his short spell as Governor
of Bombay, it appears from the letter referred to that he approached his
responsibilities in an energetic and constructive manner.

[Para. 15, on the Fifth Commonwealth Forestry Conference; and paras. 16 to
18, on the claim of civilian ex-service clerks serving in G.H.Q. (India) to
compensation, their future employment prospects, pensions, and the possibility
of persuading the Government of India to concede to them the right to retire on
proportionate pension, omitted.]

19. I am glad to know that you have been able to get up to Kashmir for a
few days which will, I hope, prove most refreshing to you and Lady Mount-
batten.

Yours sincerely,

LISTOWEL

12 No. 244.

13 No. 206.

14 No. 107.

13 Vol. VII, No. 262.

16 Cmd. 3302.

17 See No. 175, Item 1, conclusions (i) and (iii); also Nos. 197 and 198.

18 This should read ‘1414-8’; i.e. No. 171.

19 See No. 251, note 1.

20 No. 251.

21 L/P &J/5/168 : fF 51—6.

22 No. 90, para. 5.

542

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

282

India Office Minutes
L/P &Jlio/i2j: f 12s
Minute by Mr Baxter

Mr Turnbull

20 June i$4y

Draft Bill — edition 51

Now that old 19 (2) (a) has gone,2 is there any risk that ‘contents’ of the I.O. may
be held so to cover the actual India Office records (i.e. those of the S/S in
C[ouncil]’s and S/S’s administration) that these could not be dealt with except
by negotiation with the new Govts ? Perhaps this will be a case where possession
is 9 points.

G. H. B.

Minute by Mr Turnbull

21 June 1947

Sir W. Croft
Sir A. Carter

I think there is risk of this. But nothing can be done about it except to repudiate
the idea in the negotiations.

F. F. T.

Minute by Sir W. Croft

I agree with Mr Turnbull.

21 June ig4y
w. d. c.

Minute by Sir A. Carter

2i June ig4y

And I. The legal position, as now left by the Cabinet Committee, has in it the
seeds of complete deadlock; but nevertheless leaving us in a pretty strong
position since all this property is vested in H.M.G. in U.K.

R. h. A. c.

1 i.e. as amended up to and including No. 271.

2 See No. 265, Minute 3, second sub. para.

JUNE 1947

543

283

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , R/3/1/153:# 153~4

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 20 June 1947, 11 pm

SECRET

No. 1511-S. This and my succeeding four telegrams contain draft replies to
telegrams received from Secretary of State. Following is draft reply to Secretary
of State’s 7840 of June 18th.1 Begins: Your 7840 of June 18th.

1. Clause 1, sub-clause (3). Suggestion has been made that it may not be
acceptable to Muslim League to refer to the Dominions of India and Pakistan
as “the Indian Dominions” even though it is only for the purposes of the Act. A
simple solution would be to substitute for the words “Indian Dominions”
wherever they occur in the Bill the words “new Dominions”.

2. Reference your paragraph 6. (Your Excellency please insert paragraph
here in the light of my 1503-S of 19th June.2 Reference para. 2 thereof, Liaquat
today said that he would consult Jinnah).

3. Reference your paragraph 8, I do not think that sub-clause (2) of Clause 8
will be unacceptable to Indian leaders. But I cannot of course consult them
about this point separately until I show them the Bill as a whole.

4. Your paragraph 10. I agree and await your draft statement.

5. Your paragraph 15. I would welcome an amendment in the sense you
suggest as it would remove any possibility of misunderstanding.

6. Your paragraph 17. I would prefer that no reference should be made to
tribal areas in Clause 21 (3), but if you insist I feel that reference should not be
linked up to States and would suggest addition to proviso on lines “or pre¬
cluding the participation of representatives of tribal areas in either of the said
Assemblies in accordance with such arrangements as may be made in this
behalf”.

7. Your paragraph 19. I agree most heartily with title “Indian Independence
Bill”.

8. (Your Excellency please insert paragraph here in answer to Secretary of
State’s paragraph 20 and in the light of my 1503-S.3 With reference to 1503-S,
however, we are now all agreed that suggested omission from paragraph 7 (1)
(b) would be undesirable and that that paragraph should be left as it is). Ends.*

1 No. 256. 2 No. 269. 3 Ibid.

4 A message in these terms was sent in Lord Mountbatten’s name to Lord Listowel in tel. 1527-S of
21 June, 4.5 pm, from New Delhi, with the following modifications:

(i) Para. 2 read: ‘Reference your paragraph 6 see my 8-S.K. of June 20th.’ [No. 279]

(ii) In para. 7 the word ‘Indian’ was omitted before ‘Independence Bill’.

(iii) Para. 8 read: ‘Your paragraph 20. See my 8-S.K. of June 20th.’ [No. 279]

R/3/1/153: f 173.

544

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

284

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram , R/j/ 1/133: f 133

immediate new Delhi, 20 June 1947, 9.40 pm

SECRET

No. 1512-S. Following is draft reply to Secretary of State’s 7842 of June 18th.1
Begins: On further consideration I have come to the firm conclusion that to
confront leaders with the draft Bill including paragraph 16 either in its original
form or amended as you suggest would severely damage our future relations
with India.

2. I have no other course but to press strongly for the complete exclusion
from the draft Bill of any reference to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. I
must ask that I should be left to pursue this matter by negotiation. [Ends]2

1 No. 258.

2 Lord Mountbatten telegraphed in these terms to Lord Listowel in tel. 11-S.K. of 21 June, 12.45 Pm>
from Kashmir, but he deleted the last sentence and substituted the following: ‘I am sure HMG will
have to pursue the matter by negotiation and this is not a matter on which I personally can even
negotiate. This clearly will have to be undertaken by the U.K. High Commissioner.’
R/3/1/153: f 165.

285

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , Rfr/ 1/133: f 136

immediate new Delhi, 20 June 1947, 9.30 pm

SECRET

No. 1513-S. Following is draft reply to Secretary of State’s 7893 3 Begins. I
entirely agree with views expressed in your 7893 of 19th June. I am satisfied
that equitable division of foreign assets will not be prejudiced. Ends.2

1 No. 270.

2 Lord Mountbatten telegraphed in these terms to Lord Listowel in tel. 10-S.K. of 21 June, 4 pm, from
Kashmir. R/3/1/153 ; f 164.

JUNE 1947

545

286

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , RIj/i/ijj: ff ijy-8

immediate new Delhi, 20 June 1Q47, 11. jo pm

SECRET

No. 1514-S. Following is draft reply to Secretary of State’s 7897.1 Begins: Your
7897 of 19th June.

1. Clauses 3 and 4. I support Governor of Bengal’s view expressed in his
161-S of June 1 8th2 and consider that titles of ‘East Punjab’ and ‘West Punjab’
should also be used.

2. Clauses 3 (1) and 4 (1). I adhere to my original suggestion that these
should read “as from the appointed date”. I think it convenient that same date
should apply to all processes. A definite date would also obviate necessity for a
separate ad hoc Order.

3. Clause 6 (1) and (7). My Advisers strongly adhere to view expressed in
my telegram No. 148 1-S3 and still hope you will be prepared to consider
amendment on lines of Menon’s telegram to Turnbull No. 1487.4 They are not
clear of precise significance of Clause 9 (2) in this connection. I see immense
advantage in starting the new Dominions with as complete a Constitution as
possible. This would avoid the necessity of going to the Constituent Assemblies
immediately after August 15 th with essential amendments of 1935 Act, which
would immediately set them off on other and perhaps more radical amend¬
ments.5 I consider therefore that we should be in a position to adapt 1935 Act
to suit foreseeable requirements of near future of both Dominions. The
risk you run in leaving gaps6 to be filled will land us in many serious difficulties
and the whole question of the continuance of Dominion status for India might
well then be raised.

4. Clause 6 (6). Second point. Provided you are satisfied that object in view
can be secured by Governor General’s Order, I do not press my original sug¬
gestion.

1 No. 271.

2 See No. 271, note 10.

3 No. 249.

4 No. 255.

s In the telegram sent to London (see note 8 below) this passage was deciphered as : ‘immediately set
(?Standing Committee) off on other and perhaps undisciplined radical amendments’. L/P &J/10/123 •
f 127.

6 Deciphered as ‘apportionments’ in telegram sent to London. Ibid.

546

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

5. After further consideration I agree to leave in Clause 7 (i)(c).

6. Clause 9 (2) (a). My Advisers are much disturbed by the narrow view you
take of the scope of the power to adapt the Constitution Act in Clause 8. They
suggest that last 13 words of Clause 9 (2) (a) be omitted and words “Governor-
General or” be inserted in Clause 9 (2)(c) after the words “requires the”. And
see also my comment in para. 3 above.

7. Clause 13. I accept your offer to omit reference to High Commissioner
and confine clause to Secretary of State. I will use my best endeavours to obtain
agreement of leaders when I discuss the Bill with them.

8. Reference paragraph 2 of your 78977 My Advisers suggest following
clause for consideration. “Every person who, having been appointed by the
Secretary of State or the Secretary of State in Council to a civil service of, or
civil post under, the Crown in India, continues on and after the appointed day to
serve under the Government of either Dominion or of any province or part
thereof, shall be entitled to the same conditions of service as respects remunera¬
tion, leave and pensions, and to the same rights as respects disciplinary matters
(or rights as similar thereto as the changed circumstances will permit) as that
person was entitled to immediately before the appointed day.” Ends.8

7 No. 271.

8 Lord Mountbatten telegraphed in these terms to Lord Listowel in tel. 18-S.K. of 21 June, 11 pm,
from Kashmir. R/3/1/153: if 167-8.

287

The Secretary to the Crown Representative to Residents
Express Letter, R^f 1/137: jj 164-3

no. f.46-r(s)/47 political department, 21 June lg 47

Formula for Standstill Arrangements on the lapse of Paramountcy.

In paragraph 4 of Political Department Express Letter No. F.46-R(S)/47 dated
14th June 19471 reference was made to discussions which it was hoped to arrange
towards the end of July between representatives of the States and of the pros¬
pective Dominion Governments in regard to "standstill” arrangements on the
lapse of paramountcy.

2. It is the desire of His Excellency the Crown Representative that when these
discussions take place accredited representatives of all States should be present
i.e. representatives empowered to sign any agreement which may be reached
as a result of discussion and negotiation.

JUNE I947

547

3. This question of States’ representation presents considerable difficulty.
Ideally, negotiations would be conducted by a small body of States’ represen¬
tatives, not exceeding 8 or 10 in number, authorised to act on behalf of all
States, so that any agreement reached with this body would be automatically
ratified by individual States. It is difficult, however, to achieve this ideal in
existing circumstances.

4. The most practicable procedure appears to be (i) that as many States as
possible should combine to send a joint, accredited representative to the
meeting, and (ii) that these accredited representatives should meet before the
negotiations begin and appoint from their number a small Committee to
conduct the actual negotiations. The main body of representatives could, of
course, remain in the background to advise their Committee as the negotiations
proceeded.

5. You are requested to explain the position to all States, and to make every
endeavour to ensure

(a) that every State is represented at the meeting,

(b) that representatives are authorised to sign any agreement that may be
reached, and

(c) that as many States as possible combine to send a joint representative.

6. There is no suggestion that States should be asked to enter into any
permanent commitment. It is vitally necessary, however, that the lapse of
Paramountcy should not result in widespread administrative dislocation (which
would be equally damaging to the States and to British India) and it is thought
that a standstill agreement covering administrative arrangements in matters of
common concern is the only practical means of avoiding this disaster.

The issue of the above has
been authorised.

E. B. WAKEFIELD

for Secretary to His Excellency the
Crown Representative.

1 No. 198.

548

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

288

Lord Ismay to Pandit Nehru1

Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: States, Relations with, Part II (a)

21 June 1947

Dear Mr Nehru,

His Excellency has asked me to thank you for your letter of the 1 6th June 19472
forwarding certain proposals regarding the constitution and functions of the
proposed States Department of the Central Government.

I now enclose a Memorandum on the subject, which H.E. proposes to include
in the Agenda of the Cabinet meeting next week. This Memorandum, you will
see, follows very closely the general line of your proposals. It has not been seen
in its final form by the Viceroy, but is, I think in strict accord with his general
instructions.

The matters with which the States Department will be primarily concerned
are those to be included in the Standstill Agreement, of which you have received
a draft3 and which H.E. proposes to discuss with political leaders and represen¬
tatives of States at the end of July. Meanwhile, there are many coordinating
functions which the States Department can take over from the Political
Department. In all these matters the States Department will work in very close
cooperation with the Political Department who will give every possible assis¬
tance to the new Department. The whole object of the proposal is of course that
when the Political Department is wound up, the successor Governments will
each have an organisation which can take over the conduct of relations with
Indian States, and that this process of taking over should be effected smoothly
and without any dislocation .

Yours sincerely,

ISMAY

Enclosure to No. 288

DRAFT MEMORANDUM4

The Political Department which, under the control of the Crown Representa¬
tive, now deals with the Indian States is in process of liquidation and will cease
to exist from the date on which the two Dominions are established. There is at
present in existence, however, a whole complex of administrative and economic
arrangements which extend throughout the Indian States and British India.
Various essential services function as part of this nexus of administrative and
economic arrangements; and it is imperative in the interests alike of the States
and British India that continuity of these services should not be jeopardised
when the new Dominions are set up and the paramountcy of the Crown over
the States ceases to exist.

JUNE 1947

549

2. To achieve continuity of existing administrative arrangements, the first
requirement is some kind of “ standstill” agreement between the States and the
two Dominions. If such an agreement can be reached, existing arrangements in
the economic, financial and administrative spheres can continue without
dislocation while fresh or modified arrangements are built up. A tentative draft
standstill agreement has been prepared as a basis for discussion and is now being
examined by the authorities concerned. It is my intention to discuss this matter
with political leaders and with representatives of the Indian States about the
end of July.

3 . It will also be necessary, in order to achieve continuity of existing adminis¬
trative arrangements, to set up a machinery at the Centre, to take the place of
the Political Department. At my meeting with the Political leaders on 13 th
June1 2 3 4 5 it was agreed to set up a new Department called the “States Department”.
This Department should be set up at once and should be in charge of the Hon.
the Home Member.

4. The functions of the new Department will be to deal with all matters
arising between the Government of India and the Indian States.

5. The Department will supervise any local agents appointed by the Central
Government to conduct relations with Indian States, and deal with any repre¬
sentatives whom the States may appoint to the headquarters of the Central
Government. The Department will also be in charge of the negotiations,
initiated by the Political Department, between the Central Government and the
States for the acceptance of the “standstill” agreement referred to in para. 2
above, and will, where necessary, initiate new negotiations for the adjustment
of matters of common concern.

6. When the newr successor Governments come into being, each of them, will
have its own separate organisation for dealing with matters arising between it
and the States. The States Department will however have to be set up at once
so that when the transfer of power takes place and the Political Department is
wound up, the organisations of the successor Governments could be constituted
forthwith and be ready to discharge their functions. It is therefore essential that
the States Department should from its very inception be so organised and its
work so distributed that at the appropriate time it can be divided up between the

1 Lord Ismay also sent Pandit Nehru another letter of the same date to acknowledge No. 264 and its
enclosure which he stated he would bring to Lord Mountbatten’s notice immediately upon the
latter’s return from Kashmir. R/3/1/137: f 124.

2 No. 238; see also No. 239, Item 4, conclusions (i)-(iii).

3 Enclosure to No. 198.

4 The memorandum was circulated by the Cabinet Secretary on 23 June 1947 without further amend¬
ment to members of the Indian Cabinet. Mountbatten Papers, loc. cit,

5 No. 175, Item 1, conclusion (ii).

550

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

two successor Governments without any dislocation. The Department should
therefore consist of two high level officers, a Secretary and a Joint Secretary
with two Under or Assistant Secretaries.

As regards the subordinate staff, it should be left to the Secretary in consulta¬
tion with the Joint Secretary to determine the strength and to select the
personnel. The personnel for this Department should as far as possible be
obtained by transfer from the Political Department.

7. The States Department will work in close cooperation with the Political
Department.

8. The future of the Crown Finance Department requires consideration
since its functions with its present status under the Crown Representative will
cease to exist when the office of the Crown Representative terminates. It
performs many useful functions and should be continued as part of the new
States Department.

289

Sir F. Burrows ( Bengal ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , jR/j/j I159: jf 14-16

IMMEDIATE 21 Julie 1Q47, 3.45 pm

confidential Received in New Delhi: 22 June , 2 am

No. 166-C. Please refer to my telegram 163-C of June 19th.1 In the light of
“partition” decision taken yesterday2 I had long discussion with Suhrawardy
this morning. I began by reminding him of my efforts to promote first a regular
coalition in Bengal and then, failing that, regional ministries. I pointed out
that both parties had rejected the former and the League had turned down the
latter though the Congress had expressed a desire for it. I made it clear to him
that I did not consider it feasible for a Ministry drawn from one side only to
continue in sole charge of the whole Province now that decision had been taken
for partition and principal business would be dividing up assets and liabilities;
any attempt to maintain present Ministry in sole charge would invite attempt
to set up parallel government in West Bengal suppression of which at this stage
would face him as Chief Minister with a problem he would not wish or be in a
position to handle. I finished by saying that my alternative solutions having
been turned down, I should like to know what he would suggest. As I expected
he did not answer this directly but replied “Why put the onus on me? Why
should I commit political suicide?”

2. Though I did not in so many words threaten him with Section 93 he
knew that this was what I had in mind and our discussion proceeded on that

JUNE 1947

551

basis. The upshot of a long and friendly talk was that he is not going to help me
to go into Section 93 : he is going to put the whole onus on me. At the same
time he will not attack me for doing so and will offer no opposition. More
important still is that he had promised me even under Section 93 full coopera¬
tion in the process of partition and has in fact named himself and Nazimuddin
as the two League members of Separation Committee and suggested a Muslim
officer for official Steering Committee. I got the impression today as before
that, in spite of a certain amount of bluff, he came in fully prepared to hear that
I was going into Section 93 and, except that he will not help me by making an
offer from his side to the contrary, I think I could almost say that he acquiesces in
my going into Section 93 . This impression is strengthened by extreme friendly
nature of interview and by his repeated request that when he ceases to be my
Chief Minister he may still have access to me. Because of its bearing on my
belief that he will cooperate in partition even if I go into Section 93 feel I must
stress the particularly cordial nature of our talk today.

3. Suhrawardy’s promise that he will not attack me for going into Section
93 and that he will cooperate in partition bears out what I had gathered from
other sources, particularly from Kwaja Nazimuddin with whom I had a very
helpful talk yesterday. (The latter would not wish subject matter of his talk with
me disclosed.)

4. As I am assured of cooperation of two main groups of League and as
Congress also, while they do not on principle like Section 93, would much
prefer it to continuing as we are, I feel that I must now definitely ask for your
formal concurrence under Section 93 (s)1 2 3 to my issuing proclamation. If this is
agreed, the sooner I do so the better. I should like if possible to issue proclama¬
tion not later than Monday evening June 23 rd both to end present uncertainty
and to avoid suggestion of yielding to pressure which will undoubtedly increase
as each day passes.

5. It is obvious in view of Suhrawardy’s tactics that I shall have to call for
resignation of himself and his colleagues: I shall not myself use the word
“dismissal”.

6. I am seeing Kir an Shankar Roy this evening with a view to getting
[ ?from] him two names for my separation Committee. 1 shall confirm to him
that League have not agreed to Regional Ministries and that I am considering
other expedients. If anything useful affecting the proposal for Section 93 comes

1 No. 268; see also No. 240.

2 See Nos. 277 and 278.

3 Section 93(5) of the Government of India Act 1935 provided that no Proclamation should be made
by a Governor under Section 93 ‘without the concurrence ol the Governor-General in his dis¬
cretion’.

552

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

out in my talk I shall telegraph you4 but meanwhile I am getting necessary press
announcement ready. I shall try to have text of this awaiting you in New Delhi
on your return there on Monday.

4 In tel. 167-C of 21 June Sir F. Burrows reported that he had informed Mr Roy that evening that the
proposal for Regional Ministries had fallen through. Mr Roy had said that ‘he thought only course
left now was to go into Section 93’. R/3/1/159: f 17.

290

Mr V. P. Menon to Mr Turnbull
Telegram, Rfe/i 1 153: ff 174- 5

most immediate new Delhi, 21 June 1947, 5 pm

secret Received: 21 June, 4.15 pm

No. 1528-S. Your telegram 7944 of June 20th.1

2. Your first paragraph. I regret having to return to charge but must explain
fully the practical difficulties I anticipate in not expressly continuing existing
distribution of powers.2 In Secretary of State’s telegram 78972 the remark
against Clause 9 (2) (a) shows that his advisers take restricted view of Governor
General’s order making power and will regard any modification of 1935 Act
not covered by terms of Clause 8 (1) and (2) and Clause 9 (2) as “constitution
making”. In this view and with clauses saying no more than what they say now
I have no doubt that resulting position on August 15th will be completely
untenable. If Dominion constitution is to have fair trial in India or even in
Pakistan I think it essential that each Dominion should have to start with as
complete a constitution act as we can devise for them. Otherwise if the tidying
up is left to the Constituent Assembly acting in its plenary legislative capacity
there is very grave risk of that body embarking on a flood of amendments and
there will be no holding it back. Further Pakistan Assembly may not have got
going by August 15th and the result will be great confusion in Pakistan as to
powers of Dominion Government vis-a-vis Provincial Governments. I am
therefore very strongly of view that Bill must provide for continuance of
existing distribution of powers as between Dominions and Provinces and for
freer hand in regard to adapting provisions of 1935 Act and orders in Council,
rules, &c., made thereunder. I have no doubt that both parties will welcome
such provision. Spence and Sundaram who have both come to Reforms for
doing adaptation work are in full agreement with above view.

3. Your second para, meets my point. As regards your third para. I would
strongly press for omission of last 13 words of Clause 9 (2) (a)4 and substitution

JUNE 1947

553

of “the Governor General or a Governor” for “the Governor” in Clause 9
(2) (c) • Although Governor General has no individual judgment at present, by
virtue of Section 313 (4) provisions of 1935 Act in force which do refer to
Governor General’s individual judgment would technically require to be
eliminated. I feel that both the Congress and League would welcome a con¬
tinuance of Governor General’s control (transformed to Dominion control
from August 15th) over affairs of provinces.

1 No. 280.

2 cf. No. 286, para. 3.

3 No. 271.

4 cf. No. 286, para. 6.

291

Lord Ismay to Sir F. Burrows (Bengal)

Telegram, R/3I 1 / 139: f 18

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 21 June 1947, 9.3O pill

SECRET

No. 1533-S. Jinnah has just told me that he has had telephone message from
Suhrawardy saying that you had threatened him with Section 93 if he refused
coalition ministry or regional ministry.1 He said that this was entirely ultra
vires, that we had considered Section 93 in NWFP and decided that it was
impossible.2 There was no reason why Suhrawardy should not carry on with
caretaker government. He begged me to inform Viceroy of position at once
and ask him to instruct you to take no final decision till matter had been dis¬
cussed between Viceroy and Jinnah.

Have just telegraphed Kashmir accordingly.3 Viceroy returns Monday and
should be able to let you know his views Monday evening or Tuesday morning
at latest.

1 cf. No. 289.

2 See e.g. Vol. X, No. 310.

3 No. 292.

554

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

292

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , R/5/1/159: f 19

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 21 June 1947, 9. 30 pm

SECRET

No. 1534-S. One minute before receiving your telegram No: nil dated June
2 1 st 19471 Jinnah had rung me up in a great state of excitement and protest. He
said that he had just had a telephone message from Suhrawardy that Burrows
had threatened him with Section 93 if he did not accept Regional Ministries.
Jinnah said that this was entirely ultra vires and begged that I should telephone
Viceroy asking him to take no (repeat no) decision until he had discussed matter
with Jinnah.

I was just going to telephone to you the submission that we ought to accede
to Jinnah’s request and that you should telegraph Burrows to hold his horses
until he received further instructions probably on Tuesday morning.

In view of urgency and vital importance of this matter I have telegraphed2
Burrows most immediate not to do anything definite until he hears from Vice¬
roy.

1 See No. 268, note 5.

2 No. 291.

293

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl oj Listowel

T elegram , R/5/i /i 33 : f 169

IMMEDIATE SRINAGAR, 21 June I947 , 11. j0 pm

secret Received: 22 June , 7.5 am

No. 19-S.K. My telegram of today1 answering your 7897 of 19th June2 about
draft of Bill.

2. Background to my insistence on points mentioned in paragraphs 3, 4 and
6 of my telegram is as follows : V. P. Menon3 says that Congress are determined
that there should be minimum discussion on constitutional points immediately
after passing of Bill. They want to leave distribution of powers between Centre
and Provinces as they stand, but to be quite certain that they can secure control
in case of emergency over Provincial Governments to replace control now
exercised through Governor-General and Governors. Apart from drafting

JUNE 1947

555

difficulties I am sure that their point is of practical importance and that we
should meet it. Pakistan also will want to save their energies for administrative
matters at first and at the same time to secure necessary control over their
Provinces.

3. The less that the new Dominion Governments are obliged to deal with
constitutional matters of this sort the easier for their realists to keep them off
constitutional matters and get them down to vital administrative questions.
Incidentally the better the 1935 Act works from the beginning the longer
dominion status is likely to last.

1 See No. 286.

2 No. 271.

3 cf. No. 290.

294

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and

Pandit Kak

R/jl 1 1137: f 114. Viceroy s Interview No. 150 1

22 June ig4y

H.E. said that he believed there might have been some misunderstanding about
the advice he had given to H.H. the Maharaja in discussion with him.2

2. He had told H.H. that, in his opinion, Kashmir would find it very diffi¬
cult to protect themselves against the pressure of the Congress unless at the
right moment they joined one or other of the two Constituent Assemblies.

3. It was not for him to suggest which Constituent Assembly they should
join, but clearly Kashmir should work this out for themselves on the basis of the
best advantage to the ruler and his people, and in consideration of the factors of
geography and the probable attitude of the Congress and the Muslim League
respectively to Kashmir.

4. If Kashmir joined the Pakistan Constituent Assembly presumably Mr.
Jinnah would protect them against pressure from the Congress.

5. If they joined the Hindustan Assembly it would be inevitable that they
should be treated with consideration by Hindustan.

1 Interview number taken from copy of this interview in Mountbatten Papers.

2 For an account of Lord Mountbatten’s talks with the Maharaja see Nos. 319, para. 5 and 369, para.
30.

556

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

6. But if they joined neither Assembly they would be in a very difficult
position.3

7. Pandit Kak replied that he was grateful for what H.E. had said. H.H.’s
decision was that at present he could not commit himself. Clearly he must see
what the set-up was to be in Pakistan, and until that was clear he would have to
maintain his present non-committal position. H.H. realised the various factors
involved, but in any case was not now in any way alarmed by Pandit Nehru or
disturbed by his threats.

8. H.E. pointed out that Pandit Nehru felt very strongly about Kashmir, and
it would be extremely difficult for him (H.E.) to do anything to help to protect
Kashmir after the 15th August, when Pandit Nehru would become Prune
Minister of Hindu India, and H.E., even if he remained, would become only a
constitutional Governor-General. The only protection for Kashmir after the
15th August was to join one or other of the Constituent Assemblies.

3 In the Report on the Last Viceroyalty, submitted in September 1948, Part D, para. 116, Lord Mount-
batten further recalled that: ‘I told them that the States Department were prepared to give an
assurance that, if Kashmir went to Pakistan, this would not be regarded as unfriendly by the Govern¬
ment of India’. L/P &J/5/396/3. See also V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States
(Orient Longmans, 1961), p. 376/

295

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Rl3M*44:ff3-4

17 york road, new Delhi, 22 June ig4y

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Your attention must have been drawn to the various statements made by
Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar or on his behalf regarding Travancore.1 He has
declared that Travancore will be independent on the lapse of paramountcy on
the 15 th August. This raises vital issues and any perseverence on his part in this
attitude and declaration will inevitably bring Travancore into conflict with the
Government of India.

2. He has nominated a representative of Travancore for Delhi. Normally we
would welcome any representative from any State and deal with him directly
in order to facilitate business of common concern. But after the declarations
made by Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, any recognition of his Envoy here
becomes undesirable and objectionable.

3. In today’s paper it is stated on behalf of the Travancore Government that

JUNE I947

557

“as a result of personal discussions and correspondence between Mr. Jinnah and
the Dewan of Travancore, the Dominion of Pakistan, on its establishment, has
agreed to receive a representative of Travancore and to establish relationship
with the State which will be of mutual advantage”; further that in pursuance
of this decision the Travancore Government have nominated a certain person
“as representative of Travancore State in the Dominion of Pakistan and he will
take charge of his duties from the date on. which paramountcy lapses and
Travancore becomes independent”.

4. This statement is extraordinary in many respects. There is no Dominion of
Pakistan in existence and I am not aware of Envoys being sent to a non¬
existent State. Normally two existing States confer together and come to an
agreement about exchange of representatives. Apart from this, I take it that till
paramountcy lapses, it is still functioning and any statements affecting para¬
mountcy are to be made only with the consent of the Political Department. I
do not know if the various statements that Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar has
issued have been referred to the Political Department and if that Department’s
sanction or concurrence has been obtained. If they have not been so referred,
then I think it is not only a breach of decorum but also of the rules at present
governing the relationship of the States with the Paramount Power.

5. The Dominion Government of India will, no doubt, deal with this matter.
But meanwhile such statements are mischievous and harmful and I think that
Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar should be informed accordingly.2

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1 cf. No. 226.

2 Mr. Abell sent this letter to Sir C. Corfield for advice and Lord Mountbatten also asked for Mr V. P.
Menon’s advice. On 1 July Lord Mountbatten replied to Pandit Nehru that he had taken note of the
views expressed in this letter about Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar’s statements and would like to
discuss the matter when he and Pandit Nehru next met. R/3/1/144: fF 7, 15.

296

Sir W. Monckton to Lord Ismay

Mountbatten Papers . Official Correspondence Files: Hyderabad , Part 1(a)
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL LAKE VIEW HOUSE, 22 June

My dear Pug,

1. I am by no means at the end of troubles here. The State has been pressing the
Political Department for the removal of Indian Army troops from our canton¬
ments. There are 7 or 8000 Indian Army fighting troops in the State including
armoured formations. The Nizam thinks it quite intolerable that they should

558

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

remain here after the 15th August. They would in effect be an Army of
Occupation. But such pressure as the Political Department has been able to
exert has been quite ineffective. Whether the Defence Member is stalling or not,
I don’t know; but it does look as if those who will form the Government of
the Indian Union would not be unwilling to find themselves with an Army of
Occupation here. I spoke to the C-in-C about it and he said (privately) we
should have nothing to worry about while he was directing the Army. This is
cold comfort.

The Crown Representative is still the Crown Representative and he could
direct the Government to take steps to move the troops out of State territory
by the 15 August.

The State is writing a further letter asking for information about the dates
and stages of the programme by which the troops will be removed, in view of
the acceleration of the departure of the British. The letter will ask for a reply
within a specified time. If no reply is forthcoming, a question will be asked in
the House giving the steps taken by the State and the result and asking whether
this Army of Occupation will be permitted to remain.1

I wish the States had not been so persistently overlooked, for then it would
not be necessary to risk throwing a spanner into the works in order to get a
monstrous injustice avoided.

2. For your very private ear, I am under some pressure from Kashmir to go
there at once for a few days and should be grateful for any information you can
give me as to the form there.2 Are you free to guide me as to the line taken in
the recent talks and the reaction? I don’t want to waste my time and effort,
unless there is something to be done. There is more than enough to do for
Hyderabad.

Yours ever,

WALTER

P.S. I am in bed with fever. I hope to be well enough to come up to Delhi on
Wednesday the 25th. If it wasn’t for the uncertainty, this could wait for my
seeing you. But you will understand and in any event see Harry.3

WALTER

1 The first three paragraphs of this letter were circulated under reference V.C.P. 91 of 24 June 1947 and
considered as Item 2 of the Viceroy’s 47th Staff Meeting. At Sir C. Corfield’s suggestion, Lord
Mountbatten directed that as soon as the further letter from Hyderabad arrived, the Nizam should
be asked to send a delegation to Delhi to discuss the withdrawal of these troops, the question of
Berar, and other matters of common concern with the Political Department and the States Depart¬
ment. The least possible publicity was to be given to the visit of this delegation. On 26 June Lord
Ismay noted that he had spoken to Sir W. Monckton explaining that the States Department would
take up the matter directly the Hyderabad letter arrived. Ismay added: ‘He [Monckton] didn’t seem
very impressed, but agreed to wait and see’.

2 No record of Lord Ismay’s response on this point has been traced.

3 Presumably Harry Gordon, Sir W. Monckton’s private secretary at this time.

JUNE 1947

559

297

Pandit Nehru to Lord Ismay

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files : States, Relations with, Part 11(a)

17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 22 June 1$47

Dear Lord Ismay,

I received your letter of the 21st June1 last night on my return from Hardwar.
Thank you for sending me the draft memorandum on the constitutional
functions of the proposed States Department of the Central Government.

2. There is only one thing I would like to suggest. The memorandum deals
with the whole complex of administrative and economic arrangements. I do
not know if this includes certain political arrangementa also and relations. You
will remember that in the Cabinet Mission’s memorandum of 12th May 19462
it was stated that “the void will have to be filled either by the States entering
into a federal relationship with the Successor Government or Governments in
British India or, failing this, entering into particular political arrangements
with it or them”.

3. Perhaps this matter can be brought out in the “Stand-Still” agreement.

4. I am sorry for the slight delay in sending you our suggestions for the
“Stand-Still” agreement. I wanted to consult some lawyers and constitutional
experts in regard to this. I hope to send it to you before long.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU3

1 No. 288.

2 Vol. VII, No. 262, para. 5.

3 Lord Ismay replied on 23 June saying that he had already, in anticipation of the Viceroy’s wishes,
sent the draft memorandum to the Cabinet Secretariat for circulation and consideration at the next
meeting of the Cabinet, and agreeing that the points raised in para. 2 of Pandit Nehru’s letter could
well be considered when the Standstill Agreement was under discussion.

298

Mr Jinnah to Lord Ismay

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: States, Relations with, PartII(a)

10 AURANGZEB ROAD, NEW DELHI, 22 June 1947

Dear Lord Ismay,

I am in receipt of your letter of 20th of June, 19471 and I have nothing more to
add to the various suggestions I made to His Excellency over a week ago ;2 and

2 See Ibid., note 3.

1 See No. 276, para. 2.

S6o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Mr Abell was then instructed to examine those suggestions and get in touch
with me, but I have heard nothing from him so far.

And now you write to inform me that His Excellency desires that a reference
should be made to the same body as before viz. the members of the Shahi Jirga
(excluding the Sirdars nominated by the Kalat State) and the non-official
members of the Quetta Municipality.

I regret I am unable to approve of this course, as paragraph 12 of the State¬
ment of 3rd June contemplates a reference to a more representative body than
on the last occasion.

Yours sincerely,

M. A. JINNAH

299

Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rhlil9i:f7

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 22 June I947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I visited Gurgaon today and have to thank Your Excellency once more for a
car and a luncheon basket.

The forces on the spot or arriving now seem adequate, and with 80 Bde Hq
at Palwal and a good wireless net should be able to maintain control.

But the district is in a very bad way. Brendon has been sent off on leave — the
Commissioner confirmed his original report,1 and he had something like a
nervous breakdown at the end. I am sending in Brendon’s place a Sikh member
of the I.C.S. who has done well in a difficult district.

The Soldiers say that Bharatpur State is still very seriously disturbed. The
C.O. 6th Kumaon came over from Kosi to see me at Palwal, and said that
many Bharatpur villages could be seen burning from our side of the border.
When he entered the State to contact the Bharatpur Forces he was not favour¬
ably impressed. The Brigadier and all C.O.’s apprehend an incursion of Bharat¬
pur refugees to add to our troubles.

I hear Her Excellency is visiting some of the Gurgaon hospitals on 26th. A
surgical unit has been sent to Gurgaon. I did not see it, but am told it is doing
well.2

Yours sincerely,

E. M. JENKINS

1 See No. 141, note 1.

2 Lady Mountbatten minuted on 27 June: ‘The surgical unit mentioned in Sir Evan Jenkins’ letter
forms part of the Gurgaon Civil Hospital which I visited yesterday and which is I think doing very
good work indeed’. She added that in the report she had sent to Lord Mountbatten on her tour ‘I
have referred to the trouble being caused from Bharatpur and Alwar’. R/3/1/91: f 39.

JUNE 1947

300

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Rl3lil9i:ff 8-12

PERSONAL 17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 22 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

You have not returned from Kashmir yet and are due back tomorrow. I am,
however, writing this to you rather late at night because I am distressed and the
sending of this letter will perhaps give some relief to my mind.

2. I am writing about what is happening in Lahore and to some extent in
Amritsar. Yesterday 1 went with Gandhiji to Hardwar and visited the numer¬
ous refugee camps there. There were, till yesterday, about 32,000 refugees
there from the Frontier Province and the Punjab. Most of them were from the
Frontier Province. Daily some 200 or so fresh arrivals came there. Apart from
these refugee camps in Hardwar, there are similar large camps at half a dozen
other places, some in the U.P. and some in the Indian States like Patiala, Alwar
etc. The condition of many of these people is pitiable although many relief
societies and local governments are trying to help them.

3 . But this letter is mainly about the city of Lahore where fires are raging
and consuming hundreds of houses. It is reported that 100 houses were burnt
down last night and this morning. During the previous two days about 250
houses were set fire to and burnt. At this rate the city of Lahore will be just a
heap of ashes in a few days’ time. The human aspect of this is appalling to
contemplate.

4. Amritsar is already a city of ruins, and Lahore is likely to be in a much
worse state very soon. Lahore is, of course, a much larger city than Amritsar.

5. If you will forgive a personal touch, I should like to tell you that my
mother came from Lahore and part of my childhood was spent there. The fate
of Lahore, therefore, affects me perhaps more intimately than it might many
other people who are not connected with that city.

6. Human beings have an amazing capacity to endure misfortune. They can
bear calamity after calamity; but it is very difficult to have to bear something
which can apparently be avoided. I do not know if it can be said that what is
happening in Lahore is beyond human control. It is certainly beyond the con¬
trol of those who ought to control it. I do not know who is to blame and I do
not want to blame anybody for it. But the fact remains that horror succeeds
horror and we cannot put a stop to it. Meanwhile vast numbers of human
beings, men, women and children, live in the midst of this horror, often in
streets and pavements, or run away in search of some peace and shelter else¬
where. It is curious that when tragedy affects an individual we feel the full force

562

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

of it, but when that individual is multiplied a thousand-fold, our senses are
dulled and we become insensitive.

7. Apart from newspaper reports, people have come from Lahore to see me
today and they have given descriptions of what is happening there. Whether
their accounts are correct or not, I cannot say. They tell me that repeatedly,
when houses were set fire to, the residents of those houses rushed out into the
streets and lanes and these people were fired at by the police for breach of the
curfew order. Most of these fires occurred at the time of the curfew. I am told
that the District Magistrate has ordered that people should keep open the doors
of their houses and lanes so as to allow refugees from burning houses to enter
other houses, because if they remain in the streets during curfew hours, they will
be fired at by the police.

8. This is a very strange state of affairs and few persons would like to be
residents of Lahore at present. Surely something effective has to be done to stop
this tragedy, if existing methods have failed and the police are incapable of
controlling the situation. As I told you once, the insistent demand is either for
the military to take charge, or for the withdrawal of the police and the military
so that the people can look after themselves. You were surprised at this last
demand and it is surprising enough. But it is passionately repeated. All manner
of charges are made against the police of committing arson and of preventing
people from putting out fires and firing at them when they try to do so. It is
not possible for me to know the truth of these charges; but the fact remains
that there is this strongly-felt feeling about the police and further that the
situation continues to deteriorate. Are we to be passive spectators while a great
city ceases to exist and hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants are reduced to
becoming homeless wanderers, or else to die in their narrow lanes?

9. You gave an assurance even before June 3rd and subsequently that any
kind of disorder will be put down with vigour.1 I am afraid we are not honour¬
ing that assurance in some places at least, notably in Lahore and Amritsar.
Gurgaon also is still more or less a battle-field, although similar and adjoining
areas on the U.P. side are fully under control.

10. From all accounts that I have received, the Statement of June 3rd has had
a sobering and calming effect in most places. Whether people like the decisions
or not, they accept them and have a general feeling that a settlement has been
arrived at. The old tension is gone or is much less. There is no more talk, as
there used to be, of civil war and the like.

11. But this does not apply to Lahore, Amritsar and Gurgaon. Gurgaon is a
wide area and already several hundred villages have been burnt down. The
damage has been done and, I suppose, sooner or later the trouble there will end,

Meeting with the Indian leaders. Viceroy’s House, 2 June 1947. Document 23.

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JUNE 1947

563

though it is still continuing to some extent. Lahore is an even more serious
matter, not only because it affects a very large number of persons and valuable
property, but also because it is the nerve-centre of the Punjab. There appears to
be a deliberate policy being pursued there of smoking out people. It is an aston¬
ishingly foolish policy from any point of view and can do no good to anybody.
Nevertheless it has succeeded in a large measure, and if it is continued on this
scale for another ten days or so, there will be little left in the city of Lahore to
save. If anything has got to be done, it must be done immediately.

12. There is one other matter I should like to refer to. This relates to numer¬
ous refugees in various places. I think there should be an organised and scientific
approach to their problem. So far nothing of this kind has been done and they
have been left largely to their own resources or to the charity of various insti¬
tutions. It may be said that the Central Government is not directly concerned
because most of these refugees are in the U.P. or in some State. I think, how¬
ever, that it is only the Central Government that can view the problem as a
whole and help in laying down uniform policies. It is not so much a question of
money but of proper direction. The Central Government may have to find
some money too. What I would like to suggest, however, is for us to appoint a
competent Relief Officer with a few able assistants to collect full particulars
about these refugees and to report how their problems can be tackled. He would
naturally consult local authorities who are dealing with the problem now. Some
kind of effort should be made to engage the refugees in productive work as far
as possible. Their trades and professions should be noted down. This will at
least give us the data for the formulation of any policy. Personally I feel that
most of them should go back to their own homes. But where the homes have
ceased to exist, something will have to be done for them even there. Many may
not be able to go back because of changed political conditions. Perhaps the
final decision in this matter will have to await some time. Meanwhile all this
data can be collected and relief organised on a proper basis. Discarded military
camps might be used for their residence.

12. Please forgive me for this long letter which you will get on your return
from Kashmir. I tried to stop myself writing it, but the thought of Lahore
burning away obsessed me and I could not restrain myself.2

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1 See No. 60, p. 115 and its note 10.

2 On 23 June Mr. Abell noted on the file: ‘This is a long rigmarole about the Punjab’, and suggested a
draft reply, but on 27 June Captain Brockman noted: ‘H.E. says this is now out of date in view of the
discussion in Cabinet on 25/6.’ R/3/1/91: f 15.

564

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

301

Note by Mr C. P . Scott
RI3/1I159: f 26

23 June 1947

I received the following message from Mr Tyson, Governor’s Secretary,
Bengal, over the telephone at 11.30 this morning.

“On Saturday evening1 the Governor received a very peculiar letter from
Mr Suhrawardy. He said he had been meeting the members of the League
Parliamentary Party in Bengal and he wished to place before H.E. their reac¬
tions to the present position. They considered that to go into Section 93 would
be wholly unconstitutional so long as the province continued united. As
between a Coalition Ministry and Section 93 they preferred a Coalition
Ministry and they stated that a Coalition Ministry or a joint Ministry (Regional
Ministry) must be given a test before Section 93 can be imposed. They thought
the correct position would be for the present Ministry to function as a caretaker
government until separate legislatures can be set up.

To this the Governor replied 1 notice you do not mention your own views,
and I assume that you do not resile from the position you took up at our
conversation this morning.2 Or am I to understand that you are now prepared
to agree to the immediate formation of Regional Ministries?’

To that we have had no reply and it is quite clear that Mr Suhrawardy, who
has been in touch with Mr Jinnah by telephone, is now sitting on the fence.”

After Mr Tyson had dictated the above message he said that they were
finding great difficulty in drafting a proclamation under Section 93. The reason
was that the ostensible reason for going into Section 93 , namely, the risk that if
the present Government remained in office, the Hindus of West Bengal might
take it into their heads [to] set up a parallel government in Calcutta which
would inevitably cause widespread trouble, was one which the Governor felt
should not be stressed in present circumstances. The real reason for going into
Section 93 — that it was unfair that, during the two months before the transfer of
power, all the assets of the whole of Bengal should be in the power of one
Party, while the other Party would have no means of getting access to informa¬
tion nor have a legal position from which to hold a watching brief for the
Hindus while the division of the assets and liabilities of the Government was
decided — is one which under the terms of the Section would not justify a
Governor in making a proclamation under Section 93. Mr Tyson said that they
had received two telegrams3 from Lord Ismay and that they were not taking
any action of any kind until they received further instructions from H.E.

c. P. SCOTT

1 21 June 1947. 2 See No. 289.

3 No. 291 and presumably a repetition to Bengal of No. 292.

JUNE 1947

565

302

Note by Mr I. D. Scott

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Bengal, Situation in, Part 1(b)

23 June 1947

Governor s Secretary Bengal has telephoned the following passage from a
letter just received by the Governor from Suhrawardy. This letter is in reply to
the Governor’s1 asking Suhrawardy what his view was about the Muslim
League party’s opposition to a Section 93 Government in Bengal.

“My position is as follows : I entirely agree with the party that in view of the
fact that there is no constitutional breakdown, Section 93 is inapplicable. The
1935 Act has not been abrogated: as regards regional ministries, I personally
have no objection to such a course, if Section 93 is the alternative. That is to
say, I consider the regional ministry to be a lesser of two evils.

The final decision however appears to rest in other spheres”.

I. D. SCOTT

1 See No. 301, second paragraph.

303

Sir S. Cripps to Mr Rajagopalachariar
Rhl1l137- f 193

AIR MAIL BOARD OF TRADE, MILLBANK, S.W.I, 23 June I947

My dear Rajagi,

I have carefully studied your letter of 8th June1 about the States. I am afraid I
cannot go with you on the historical and constitutional argument: I feel no
doubt that our Cabinet Mission Statement of May 19462 was, and remains,
right, and that the relations of the Crown with the States, though before 1935
conducted through the agency 3 of the Governor-General in Council, have always
been constitutionally quite distinct from the executive government of British
India. When the Crown ceases to be the paramount power in India as a whole,
the executive government of British India will pass to British Indian hands, but
the Crown’s existing relations with the States must necessarily lapse.

But, the constitutional issue apart, I quite recognise and appreciate the
practical issues which so disturb you. You rightly say that these relations com-

1 No. 107.

2 Vol. VII, No. 262.

3 Words in italics underlined in original.

566

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

prise a large number of important matters which directly concern British
India. The Cabinet Mission recognised this and suggested the “standstill”
arrangements in the Memorandum. Of course, at that time we envisaged a
longer period in which such an arrangement could be made. Now things are
moving much faster and both we and the Viceroy are alive to the need for some
speedy settlement between the States and British India on the lines of a “stand¬
still” agreement. This is a matter which must be settled at your end and I
understand the Viceroy has been discussing it with the Committee of Leaders.
You may be sure that we shall do anything we can here to help and support
him. It is a case for co-operation and goodwill on the administrative level in the
first instance — like so much of the business now before you all in India — and
cannot be settled on a legalistic basis; I feel sure that in practice means will be
found to avoid undue administrative confusion.

R. STAFFORD CRIPPS

304

Report from Reuter Indian Service
L\P&J\8\663:ff $1-2

PUNJAB ASSEMBLY VOTES AMID BURNT-OUT RUINS

Lahore, 23 June 1947

With large sections of Lahore and scores of villages throughout the Province
fire-blacked ruins, the 168 members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly laughed
and joked as they shook hands in the lobbies of the Assembly building on their
way to record their votes to decide whether the Punjab should be partitioned.

Meeting in joint session in the Assembly Chamber, 91 members voted to
join a new, separate Constituent Assembly if the Province remained united.

Twenty minutes later, 72 members from East Punjab, meeting in separate
session, rejected by 50 votes to 22, a motion by the Moslem League leader
Khan of Mamdot that the Province should remain united.

Under the British plan, this decided the partition issue, although West
Punjab members rejected a partition motion by 69 votes to IXI7.1

Later East Punjab members decided to join the existing Constituent Assem¬
bly.

The Assembly members’ decision is to be formally communicated to the
Governor by the Assembly speaker.

Members, by agreement, barred discussion or speeches at the meetings
which were without incident and, since the result was virtually decided in

JUNE 1947

567

advance in the Party Councils, there was little dramatic about the formal moves
to decide the partition of the Province.

Approaches to the Assembly building were blocked by barred [?barbed]
wire barriers and the vicinity was under heavy police guard.

The pubhc was not admitted, but foreign and local pressmen filled the press

The 91 members who voted in favour of joining the new Constituent
Assembly consisted of 88 Moslems, two Indian Christians and one Anglo-
Indian.

Hindus, Sikhs and representatives of the Scheduled castes, numbering in all
77, voted for the present Constituent Assembly.

The 88 Moslems included eight Moslem unionists (who have in the past
been opposed to the partition of the Punjab) led by Sir Khizr Hyat Khan
Tiwana, former Premier of the Punjab.

For the first time in the history of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, the
speaker, Dewan Bahadur S. P. Singha (Indian Christian) went to the lobby and
recorded his vote for the new Constituent Assembly.

A back-bencher occupied the Premier’s seat because instead of the Parties
sitting in separate groups as in the past the seats were allotted in alphabetical
order of members’ names.

As a result of the partition decision the present Punjab members of the
existing Constituent Assembly cease to be members from today.

Fresh elections are now expected to be held in the first week of July to return
representatives of the Western Punjab (Moslem) to the new Constituent Assem¬
bly and of the Eastern Punjab (Congress) to the existing Constituent Assembly.

1 The correct figure here should apparently be 27. Report in Times of India , 24 June 1947, p. 5, col. 1.

305

Note by Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab )

Rfa/i \i 76: ff 203-5

23 June 1947

I asked Mamdot, Sachar and Swaran Singh to see me at 3.30 p.m. to-day to
discuss the law and order problem.

2. I began by explaining the situation in Gurgaon and the measures taken to
deal with the refugee problem and with rehabilitation. I said that Gurgaon
seemed to me on rather a different footing from the rest of the Punjab. The
district would probably settle down within a reasonable time, but I doubted if

568

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

outside leaders could help very much. In fact, the local people had given me the
impression that they would do better without outside interference.

My gravest anxiety was about Lahore and Amritsar. In these two cities we
were faced with a campaign of assassination and arson by individuals. A cam¬
paign of this kind was notoriously difficult to deal with. I mentioned the Irish
troubles and the present troubles in Palestine. The police and the troops could
only get results very slowly and the real remedy was a determined change in
public opinion. I believed that the parties could make this change. I did not
recommend the issue of press statements by the leaders, but contacts which
could certainly be established between the parties and the disorderly element
among their supporters. If the parties failed to restore order, the two Premiers
of the new provinces, who would already have an extremely difficult task,
would fmd themselves in an almost impossible position.

3. The three Party Leaders said that they agreed with what I had suggested.
They intended to hold a further meeting of their own this evening and to
decide on what action to take. They thought that the British officers now in
charge of disturbed areas should be relieved and replaced by selected Indian
officers.

I said that this change would have to be made very shortly in accordance
with the partition plan. The Party Leaders agreed, but said that it would be
unnecessary to wait for any final plan as they seemed to imagine that the dis¬
placed British officers would be available for general duty. I pointed out that it
would be unfair to keep those who wanted to go hanging about in the Punjab
in relatively unimportant appointments. Once a British officer had been
relieved, he should be allowed to go for good. I think this was generally
accepted, though Sardar Swaran Singh did not seem to approve entirely.

I did not think the Leaders very determined about the law and order situation
and they seemed to pin their faith rather on a change of personnel, which may
or may not work.

4. I took the opportunity of settling the programme for the Constituent
Assembly elections. Mamdot wanted much earlier dates while Sachar and
Swaran Singh wanted to stick to the dates provisionally settled for the election
on 1 2th July. In the end they compromised and the elections will be on 4th

July-

5. I asked when the Partition Committee would be set up. Mamdot was
extremely vague. Jinnah apparently still hopes to bring in Zaliid Husain who is
at the moment in Quetta. Bhim Sen Sachar is going to Delhi tomorrow for at
least two days. Swaran Singh was also vague. I said that we must get going as
soon as possible and I hoped that the Leaders would let me have their names
without delay.

JUNE 1947

569

[Para. 6, on the terms of a ‘standstill order’ and on action already taken in the
case of State scholars; and para. 7, on the Physical Assets Committee’s Report,
omitted.]

8. Our discussion was quite amicable, but there is not yet very cordial
cooperation between the parties.

e. M. j.

After my meeting with the Party Leaders this afternoon Lala Bhim Sen
Sachar and Sardar Swaran Singh stayed with me for some little time. They said
that they deplored the Muslim League resolution demanding my recall1 and
that they were considering what they could do to counter it. I replied that
from my point of view it would be best if they did nothing. Any press propa¬
ganda would naturally be embarrassing and could do no good. Things of this
kind had to be left to work themselves out.

2. Lala Bhim Sen Sachar and Sardar Swaran Singh then spoke at some length
about the alleged misconduct of Mr A. G. Cheema, and the law and order
situation in the city. I said that the political parties had debauched the Services
for their own ends. In the past people wanted officials to be fair and the task of
the District Officer, particularly of the British officer, was comparatively easy.
Now no one wanted fairness and district officers who tried to be impartial
were heavily criticised. Sardar Swaran Singh, who is a very fairminded person,
thought that there was a good deal of truth in this. As regards Mr Cheema I
said I had had certain reports and was making enquiries.

E. m. j.

1 On 21 June 1947 the Punjab Muslim League Assembly Party passed a resolution expressing lack of
confidence in Sir E. Jenkins in view of his ‘partisan attitude’ and requesting the Governor-General
to withdraw him ‘during these decisive days which will affect the destiny of our people for many
generations to come’. The meeting appointed a sub-committee consisting of Malik Firoz Khan
Noon, Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Maulana Daud Ghaznavi to wait in deputation on Mr Jinnah to
acquaint him with the feelings of Punjab Muslims against the Governor. The Statesman , 22 June
1947, p. 9, col. 3.

570

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

306

Viceroy s Conference Paper V.C.P. 88
Mountbatten Papers

SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 23 June 1947

GOVERNMENT IN BENGAL

i. The attached paper, prepared by the Reforms Commissioner, will be con¬
sidered at The Viceroy’s Meeting at 4 p.m. on 23rd June, 1947.

2. It should be read in conjunction with the Governor of Bengal’s telegram
No. 166-C of2istJune.1

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

GOVERNMENT IN BENGAL

The position now reached in Bengal is summarised as follows:

(1) Neither the Congress nor the Muslim League agrees on the basis of a
Coalition Ministry for the Province.

(2) Congress is in favour of the formation of Regional Ministries, but the
Muslim League is opposed to such an arrangement.

(3) The League is also opposed to the Governor taking over under Section
93 , but the Congress is prepared to acquiesce in a 93 administration as a
Caretaker arrangement.

In other words, the League position is that the present Ministry must continue
in office and that no suggestions for any alternative arrangement should be
considered ; while the Congress is most anxious that the present Ministry should
not remain in office.

2. The decision having been taken that the Province of Bengal should be
partitioned, it is obviously most anomalous that the League Ministry, which
definitely does not enjoy the confidence of the Hindus, should continue in sole
charge of the whole Province during a period when issues of vital importance
to both parts of Bengal will have to be settled. This point has been well brought
out in the Governor’s report of his interview with Mr Suhrawardy.

3 . The issue raised takes on an added importance in view of the fact that
any decision taken will have implications in other Provinces and possibly in the
Centre as well.

4. In the Punjab the Governor has continued in Section 93 and has refused to
allow the Khan of Mamdot to form a purely Muslim League Ministry because a
communal Ministry would find it difficult to maintain itself in present condi¬
tions in that Province; he has informed the Muslim League leader that con-

JUNE 1947

571

stitutional Government by a Ministry must be conducted in accordance with
certain principles, and when any large section of the population denies the
validity of those principles, the position of a Ministry becomes impossible. One
of the first acts of the Governor, after the issue of H.M.G.’s Statement of June 3 ,
was to put to the party leaders a suggestion for a “divisible” Coalition Ministry
during the short period remaining before partition.2 If we allow Mr Suhra-
wardy to continue in Bengal with the present Ministerial set-up, the position of
the Punjab Governor is bound to be weakened, and he may not be able to
withstand further pressure from the League for the formation of a communal
Ministry in that Province.

5. In the N.W.F.P. it is clear that if as a result of the Referendum the Pro¬
vince opts to join Pakistan, the position of Dr Khan Sahib and his Ministry will
at once directly be in issue. But this Ministry has a comfortable majority in the
Legislature. If therefore it insists on remaining in office on the strength of its
Parliamentary majority, our decision in Bengal will more or less also decide
our attitude in the N.W.F.P.

6. It is also possible that our decision in regard to Bengal may affect the set¬
up at the Centre. A Coalition Government at the Centre consisting of both the
major parties is a most valuable safeguard of the interests of the two Dominions
after Partition. But, if the League continues in power in Bengal, we may not
be in a strong position to deal with a Congress demand that the Centre should
be run by the majority party on a Caretaker basis.

7. My conclusion therefore is that, both on merits and on a consideration of
the wider implications involved, there remain in Bengal only two alternatives —
either that the Chief Minister must reconstitute his Ministry in a manner
acceptable to the minorities, or that the Governor should go into Section 93 as
an assurance that during the crucial weeks that lie ahead there will be an im¬
partial Caretaker in charge.

1 No. 289.

2 See No. 97, para. 3.

572

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

TOP SECRET

307

Viceroy's Conference Paper V.C.P. go
Mounthatten Papers

the viceroy’s house, new Delhi, 25 June ig47

THE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES

The attached draft telegram to the Secretary of State will be considered in
conjunction with V.C.P. 841 at the Viceroy’s Meeting at 4 p.m. on 23rd June,
1947-

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

Draft telegram from Viceroy to Secretary oj State (Extract)2

6. I agree with Auchinleck’s recommendation in 3(a) above,3 subject to the
absolute proviso that the request is received from both new Governments. I
consider that a unilateral application from one Government should be refused.
It is only by dealing with the two new Dominions as far as possible on the basis
of identical bi-lateral agreements that we shall retain the goodwill of both.

7. Liaquat has already informally asked4 Ismay for British troops to remain
in Pakistan after the transfer of power. Ismay replied that it would be very
difficult to allow them to remain unless both Dominions specifically asked for
this. Information at present leads to the belief that Congress will not make such
a request.

8. I therefore recommend:

(a) that I should now be empowered formally to ask the representatives of
both future Dominions whether they want British forces to stay after 15th
August.

(b) That unless both reply in the affirmative, the process of withdrawal
should start on 15th August and be completed as quickly as possible.

(c) That if both reply in the affirmative the provisional date for the with¬
drawal should be fixed for 1st April 1948 and be reviewed on 1st January
1948.

9. I request the early approval of H.M.G. to these recommendations.

1 V.C.P. 84 circulated Lord Ismay’s letter of 18 June 1947 to Field Marshal Auchinleck (No. 239, note
15) and the latter’s reply of 20 June (No. 274).

2 Paras. 1-5 not printed. This portion of the draft differed in only minor respects from paras. 1-4 of the
telegram as issued, for which see No. 335.

3 Para. 3(a) read: ‘Provided that a formal request is received from the Governments of India and
Pakistan, the provisional date for the withdrawal of British Forces should now be fixed at 1st April,
1948, and reviewed on 1st January, 1948.’ cf. Enclosure to No. 159, para. 8.

4 No. 275, para. 9.

JUNE 1947

573

Minutes of Viceroy s Forty Sixth Staff Meeting, Items 1 and 3-11

Mountbatten Papers

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy s House, New Delhi, on 23 June
1947 at 4 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma, Lord Ismay,
Sir E. Mieville, Mr Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon, Captain Brockman, Mr I. D.
Scott, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Item 1

BRITISH BALUCHISTAN

The meeting considered a letter1 from Mr Jinnah in which he said that he was
unable to “approve” of the decision in British Baluchistan being taken by the
members of the Shahi Jirga (excluding the Sirdars nominated by the Kalat
State) and the non-official members of the Quetta Municipality.

rao bahadur menon stated that the Chief Commissioner had been
consulted in this matter and had said that it would be out of the question to
secure a representative opinion from the people of Baluchistan before the end of
June by any other method.2 Any of the plans which Mr Jinnah himself had
proposed3 would put back the decision in regard to British Baluchistan till
about 17th July, rao bahadur menon stated that it would be possible
to amend the Draft Bill in its references to British Baluchistan to cover the
contingency of no decision being reached before that date. The provisions in the
Draft Bill concerning British Baluchistan could be made similar to those which
dealt with the N.W.F.P. He pointed out that Pandit Nehru had agreed that the
decision should be taken by the Shahi Jirga.

lord ismay gave his opinion that Mr Jinnah ’s letter was only a further
example of his well-known delaying tactics. It was, in his view, quite possible
that Mr Jinnah would say that he would not be prepared to take over power on
15th August.

his excellency said that in such a contingency he would make it abso¬
lutely clear to Mr Jinnah that power would be transferred on 15th August in
any case. He would discuss the procedure in British Baluchistan with Mr
Jinnah when he saw him that evening and would, if necessary, point out that,
according to H.M.G.’s statement of June 3rd,4 the decision on this point lay in
his own hands and that he was under no compulsion to obtain the Party
Leaders’ agreement to it.

1 No. 298.

2 R/3/1/155: f 34-

3 No. 276, note 3.

4 No. 45, para. 12.

574

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Item 5

GOVERNMENT IN BENGAL

The Meeting considered a paper5 prepared by Rao Bahadur Menon, the con¬
clusion of which was that there remained in Bengal only two alternatives —
either that the Chief Minister must reconstitute his Ministry in a manner
acceptable to the minorities or that the Governor should go into Section 93.
rao bahadur menon emphasised that the Governor was legally entitled to
form a Section 93 Government.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY!

(i) approved V.C.P. 88;

(ii) decided to make clear to Mr Jinnah at his meeting that evening that
only these two possibilities existed for the future Government of
Bengal;

(iii) decided to consult Pandit Nehru on the subject when next he saw
him.

Item 4

RECONSTITUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL6

his excellency the viceroy said that he considered that his discussions
with Mr Jinnah that evening on the reconstitution of the Bengal Government
might afford a good opportunity for opening with him the subject of the
reconstitution of the Executive Council.

rao bahadur menon stated that Mr Mahommed Ah had informed
him that Mr Jinnah would never accept the reconstitution of the Executive
Council on the lines which had been proposed.7 He added that he felt, on the
other hand, that it might well be possible to persuade Pandit Nehru to continue
the present Interim Government.

Item 5

GOVERNORS-GENERAL

rao bahadur menon pointed out that it was apparent from the Draft
Bill that the India Office were assuming that His Excellency would be asked by
both parties to become Governor-General of each of the two new Dominions
which were going to be set up. It appeared that the India Office were expecting
both Mr Jinnah and Pandit Nehru to write letters to His Excellency asking him
to accept this post; and that it would be possible to quote these letters in
Parliament.8 He gave his opinion that it would be essential to obtain such a
letter from Mr Jinnah before 5th July if the Legislation was to remain in its
present form.

his excellency pointed out that, in the present wording of the proviso
in the Draft Bill,9 one of the three parties (consisting of himself, Pandit Nehru
and Mr Jinnah) would have to take active steps. It was possible that Mr Jinnah
would do nothing active. One course, in such circumstances, would be for him

JUNE I947

575

(His Excellency) publicly to state that he would be prepared to resign whenever
either Mr Jinnah or Pandit Nehru asked him to.

his excellency said that he had not as yet finally decided how to handle
Mr Jinnah on this issue. He might, if favourable opportunity offered, broach
the subject that evening. He might ask Mr Jinnah to give a definite answer in,
say, three days’ time. He might offer to make a member of his staff available
to Mr Jinnah clearly to point out the advantages and disadvantages of himself
remaining as Governor-General of both Dominions for the initial period.

Item 6

THE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES
The Meeting considered copies of letters10 which had been exchanged between
Field Marshal Auchinleck and Lord Ismay on this subject: and a draft tele¬
gram11 to the Secretary of State.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

(i) approved in principle the draft telegram contained in V.C.P. 90;

(ii) directed C.V.S. to discuss the draft telegram contained in V.C.P. 90
with the C.I.G.S. and the C-in-C; and, if they agreed with it, to
despatch it without further reference to him.

Item 7

THE DRAFT BILL

The paper12 before the Meeting recommended that His Excellency should, at
the appropriate time, invite the Indian Leaders to come to Viceroy’s House;
allow them to bring such legal advisers as they wished ; let each party consider
the Draft Bill in separate rooms for one or two hours; and then hold a Meeting
with both parties and go through the Bill clause by clause, withdrawing copies
after the Meeting.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

(i) approved V.C.P. 89 subject to the exclusion of the recommendation
that the Indian Leaders should be allowed to bring legal advisers with
them when they came to Viceroy’s House to read through the Draft
Bill;

(ii) decided that he would invite only Pandit Nehru, Mr Jinnah, Sardar
Patel and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan;

(iii) directed Con. Sec. to prepare invitations to these four leaders.

5 V.C.P. 88 (i.e. No. 306). 6 See No. 239, Item 5.

7 See No. 200.

8 cf. No. 256, para. 6.

9 For the proviso see No. 191, Clause 5(2).

10 No. 239, note 15 and No. 274.

11 No. 307.

12 V.C.P. 89: not printed. This paper summarised the references to showing the draft Bill to the
Indian leaders in Nos. 248, 257, para. 2, and 279, note 2, and concluded with a recommendation in
the same terms as para. 1 of Item 7 above.

576

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Item 8

CEREMONIES ON THE DAY OF TRANSFER OF POWER

The Meeting considered a draft telegram13 to the Secretary of State on this
subject.

his excellency the viceroy said that he had intended, at an early
opportunity, to consult Pandit Nehru and Mr Jinnah concerning flags for the
two new Dominions. He had already had a specimen design made out.

mr abell stated that Sir John Colville had told him that he would not be
prepared to remain as Governor of Bombay unless he was permitted to fly the
Union Jack or a flag embodying the Union Jack.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

(i) approved the telegram contained in V.C.P. 87 subject to a slight
amendment agreed in discussion; and instructed Con. Sec. to despatch
it;

(ii) directed Pers. Sec. to ensure that he discussed with Pandit Nehru and
Mr Jinnah, at the earliest opportunity, the design for the flags of the
Dominions of India and Pakistan.

Item g

THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

his excellency the viceroy said that he had asked Sir Eric Mieville and
Lieutenant General Sir Rob Lockhart to prepare an explicit poster in connection
with the Referendum in the N.W.F.P. As he envisaged it, there would be two
ballot boxes, one marked for Pakistan, and one for India. The actual vote would
be on the issue of whether the N.W.F.P. should send representatives to the
existing Constituent Assembly or to the new Constituent Assembly. Whichever
Constituent Assembly was chosen, the N.W.F.P. would join the Dominion
which it represented. There would be no opportunity for the N.W.F.P. to
remain independent.

Item 10

BERAR

his excellency the viceroy said that he considered that it was up to him
as Crown Representative to initiate discussions on the position of Berar. He
proposed, as soon as the new States Department was set up, to write to Sardar
Patel and the Nizam of Hyderabad suggesting that meetings should be held on
this subject.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed P.S.V. to draft invitations to Sardar Patel and the Nizam of
Hyderabad to participate or to send representatives to participate in dis¬
cussions on the future of Berar ; and to ensure that these invitations were
not despatched until after the States Department had been set up.

JUNE 1947

577

Item 11

HYDERABAD

Reference was made to a letter14 from Sir David Monteath to Lord Ismay
which said that the emissary of the Nizam of Hyderabad in London had
approached Air Chief Marshal Courtney to go to Hyderabad and advise on the
organisation of the Hyderabad Air Force. The India Office had advised Air
Chief Marshal Courtney, and he had accepted this advice, that the matter should
be left over for three or four months at least.
his excellency the viceroy said that he agreed with this advice.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY!

directed C.V.S. to inform Sir Walter Monckton, when the latter returned
to Delhi, of the offer which had been made by the Nizam of Hyderabad to
Air Chief Marshal Courtney.

13 Not printed. For papers on this subject see L/P &J/10/136.

14 Dated 17 June 1947. L/P &S/13/1851.

309

H.M. Minister at Kabul to Government of India , External Affairs and Commonwealth

Relations Department

Telegram, L/P &Sli2ji8ii: f 93

immediate Kabul, 23 June 1947, 5 pm

Received in India Office: 23 June , 8.23 pm

No. 51. Forminka 52.1 I have just had further interview with Afghan Foreign
Minister who assures me that Afghan interest in North West Frontier is purely
ideological. They do not consider Pathans to be Indians and are anxious that
they should have the utmost freedom to decide their own future. Afghan
Government have given no thought to political, economic or security implica¬
tions of independent Pathanistan or other alternatives.

2. They do further earnestly wish to make their position clear and have
therefore allowed their press and radio considerable hearing. But they have not
discussed the matter with the Russian Embassy as they are fully aware of the
dangers of such a course, nor have they even consulted the American Legation
as the matter is purely one for friendly (? settlement) with H.M.G. and Govern¬
ment of India.

3. In order to explain their attitude and to inform themselves of the real
feeling in the North-West Frontier and Delhi, they now wish to send very
urgently mission consisting probably of Abdul Majid Khan, Najibullah Khan

1 No. 272.

578

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

and Abdus Samad Khan of Afghan Foreign Office, to India to have informal
talks with political leaders such as Dr Khan Sahib, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and
Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar in Peshawar and Pandit Nehru and Mr Jinnah in
Delhi. They also hope that His Excellency the Viceroy would give them an
interview. Ah Mohammad asked me to ascertain urgently whether the Govern¬
ment of India would agree and whether they would prefer visit to be official,
semi-official or purely private (as guests of the Afghan Consul-General in
Delhi). They are anxious to send mission this week if possible.

4. If Government of India with all their present preoccupations could find
time to receive mission I consider it would be wholly beneficial in removing
misunderstandings. Grateful for urgent telegraphic reply.

Repeated to Secretary of State, and Northwest Frontier Province.

310

Sir O. Caroe ( North-West Frontier Province) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten

of Burma [Extract)

LIP&JI5I224: ff 29-30

CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NATHIAGALI, June 1947

NO. GH-93

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

In two days’ time I expect to have handed over, but we have been too closely
in touch for it to be necessary for me to attempt to tie up many loose ends in
this letter. There is, however, one matter on which I think it important I should
lay emphasis at this moment, and that is the position of the North-West
Frontier tribes. Circumstances have been such that Your Excellency has been
compelled to devote the greater part of your attention to political and minis¬
terial matters within the Province as they affect the parties in India, but you
found time to speak to the tribes. What I wish to say now is that the most
important part of the Governor’s work up here is keeping the tribes steady.
The tribal situation and the situation within the Province of course react to one
another continually, but by proper management a great deal can be done to
maintain tribal steadiness. The fact that on the whole we have been successful
in doing this during the last few years, including the last momentous year, is
not the result of chance. It is in the first place a tribute to our system of tribal
management over many years, while recent success owes a tremendous lot to
the influence of Cunningham and the way in which he left the tribes for me to
take over. During the last 16 months I have given a great deal of my mind and
energy to this matter, have seen innumerable Jirgas , and talked to tribesmen
and to the ruling Chiefs in the north continually. I have made a great point of

JUNE 1947

579

keeping the right men, as far as I could judge them, in the right places, and this
includes not only the Resident and the Political Agents, but the Assistant Politi¬
cal Officers who belong to the Provincial Service. My Ministry have contin¬
ually tried to interfere with postings and to bring unfair charges against officers
in the tribal areas, mainly Indian, based on prejudice or false report. I shall tell
Lockhart that it will be necessary for him during the next two months to keep
an eye on this.

I have already written separately1 to you about the all-important question of
fitting the tribes into the new Constitution and finding the money to run them
during the interim period, and I have particularly emphasised the value of
employment as the real method by which we maintain a steady frontier. This
employment must be kept going. Mudie, to whom we lent a number of
Frontier Constabulary platoons to deal with the Hurs, will tell you what
splendid men they are, and the same applies to the Militias and Scouts in
Waziristan, the Khyber and elsewhere. The Khassadari system, too, must be kept
alive and improved, and it is worth remembering that we spend about eight
times as much on Khassadars as we do on Maliki allowances.

Lastly in my view the new Constitution should not aim at placing the tribes
under the Provincial Government, which can never pay for them and too often
must clash with them. The Agent who deals locally with the tribes must derive
his own authority from a Centre, whether that Centre be of Hindustan or
Pakistan. And in the long run I believe H.M.G. will not be able to divorce
themselves entirely from interest in the maintenance of this most delicate and
difficult land frontier.

2. It was inevitable that the Afghans would bring their weight to bear in this
matter and raise the cry of Afghanistan irredenta, but it is interesting that they
should have timed it and brought it into line with the Congress theme of
Pathanistan. I do not myself think that this Afghan interference is going to be
very dangerous, if (and this is the important point) the successor authority
makes it quite clear that the tribesmen are going to get the benefits that they
enjoy at present from this side. Tribal Jirgas are already asking the Political
Agents if there is any objection to their going off to see the Afghans in Kabul,
and the answer the Political Agents should be able to give is that the tribes
receive benefits from this side and we are going to do our best to see that any
successor authority continues to grant those benefits. If the successor authority,
whoever it is, can be got to endorse this, so much the better. The pity is that it is
impossible to get any line on matters of this kind out of the External Affairs
Department at this moment.

3 . This brings me to one reflection which I think I ought to make, namely
that most of our troubles were started when Nehru took tribal affairs under his

1 Not printed.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

wing and followed this up with his ill-starred visit. Before that time the
Province was going along very nicely all things considered, but it was an
impossible thing to do to bring these tribes under a Pandit. Practically all our
frictions and tensions date from that time.

[Remainder oi para. 3, on Sheikh Mahbub AH’s case, omitted.]

311

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and Mr

Jinnah

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy's Interview No. 133

secret 23 June 1947, 7 pm

Sir Eric Mieville was also present.

the viceroy started the conversation by saying that, whereas he was not
raising the matter on personal grounds, he must ask Mr Jinnah to give his
earnest and early consideration as to whom he would wish as the first Governor-
General of Pakistan1 and also the names of those who he would want as
Governors of the Pakistan Provinces. The Viceroy, while stressing the advan¬
tages to be derived from having during the partition period a common Gover¬
nor-General for both Dominions, made it abundantly clear that he was not
asking for the appointment himself and that it was an entirely free choice of the
two Dominions concerned. The Viceroy further explained that an early
decision was required because it affected a clause in the Bill that was shortly to
be laid before Parliament, mr jinnah replied by saying that he trusted he
would be allowed to see the Bill and to comment on it. the viceroy said
that he had had a great tussle with H.M.G. who had taken the line that it was
entirely contrary to Parliamentary procedure for a Bill to be shown to anyone
outside the Government before presentation. However, he had fought hard and
won and was glad to say that Mr Jinnah would be given an opportunity of
seeing the Bill, although the Viceroy could not allow him to take a copy away.
Referring back to the question of the Governor-General, mr jinnah then
said that whatever decision he reached would not be taken on the grounds of
not wanting the Viceroy, in whom he had implicit trust and confidence, but
the rule of his life was that he must always consider the interests of his people.
At various times of his career he had had to pass over those nearest and dearest
to him. He finished by saying that in two or three days time he would be ready
to convey his decision to the Viceroy.

2. boundary commissions.2 mr jinnah said that he accepted the
terms of reference that had been put up by the Congress Party3 and that he

JUNE I947

581

would have names of his nominees for both Boundary Commissions ready for
submission to the Viceroy within the next day or two. He then said that he felt
it would be impossible for both parties to agree upon the two Chairmen and
he therefore suggested that a distinguished member of the Bar from England
might come out as an independent Chairman for both Commissions and that
his decision should be final. He should, in fact, act as an Umpire. It was sug¬
gested that in view of the fact that the Arbitral Tribunal in Mr Jinnah’s opinion
would not be functioning seriously for some time to come, whoever was
appointed Chairman of that Tribunal (and the composition of the Tribunal
has not yet been agreed to by Congress)1 2 3 4 might come out from England in the
near future and act as Chairman of the two Boundary Commissions before
taking over his duties with the Tribunal. He did not anticipate that the work of
the Boundary Commission would last very long, the viceroy told Mr
Jinnah, in confidence, that the man who had been suggested as Chairman of the
Arbitral Tribunal was Sir Cyril Radcliffe. mr jinnah, while saying that he
would like a day or two to consider whether he thought Sir Cyril to be a
suitable Chairman, knew of him and of the high reputation which he held at the
Bar.

3. Bengal.5 mr jinnah started by hotly contesting the right of the Gover¬
nor to go into Section 93. the viceroy said that he had two alternative
suggestions to offer, namely (a) Coalition Government and (b) Regional
Ministries. To neither of these did mr jinnah agree, the viceroy then
proposed that the existing Government in Bengal should remain in power but
that a shadow Cabinet should be formed in West Bengal which should be
invested with a right of veto over all decisions taken by the Government
affecting West Bengal. To this mr jinnah agreed.6 the viceroy added
that he had a similar plan in mind for the interim period at the Centre, mr
jinnah did not demur.

4. British Baluchistan.7 the viceroy explained that we had gone
carefully into the three suggestions put up by Mr Jinnah for obtaining a more
representative vote in British Baluchistan than that which had hitherto pre¬
vailed, but all these suggestions involved considerable delay and he therefore
asked Mr Jinnah whether he would not reconsider his decision, mr jinnah

1 See No. 308, Item 5; also No. 275, para. 6.

2 See Nos. 262 and 275, para. 5.

3 See Nos. 158 and 175, Item 2, conclusion (vi).

4 See Nos. 175, Item 3, and 275, para. 4.

5 See No. 308, Item 3.

6 Lord Mountbatten communicated the gist of this para, to Sir F. Burrows in tel. 1552-S of 24 June
remarking that ‘I hope this will solve your difficulty satisfactorily, as I know you share my view that
we should avoid sec. 93 if possible’. R/3/1/159: f 25.

7 See No. 308, Item 1.

582

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

said diat he really did not feel strongly in the matter and would leave it in the
Viceroy’s hands.

5. sir evan jenkins. MR jinnah said that he thought Sir Evan was
adopting a weak attitude and that he must show a firm hand. He should, for
example, make a statement that he was determined to put down the present
troubles and that there would be no more latitude shown, the viceroy
agreed that it might be useful if Sir Evan were to make some such statement on
those grounds.

6. division of the army.8 MR jinnah returned to the charge that he
must have a Pakistan army ready by August 15th and that there must be an
operational Commander-in-Chief in Pakistan by that date who would take his
orders from the Pakistan Government, the viceroy agreed with this, but
added that for administrative matters both armies should continue to be under
Field Marshal Auchinleck. mr jinnah saw the point but said that the Muslims
no longer had faith in Field Marshal Auchinleck and they would much prefer
to see someone else in his place, the viceroy disagreed with this view
entirely and said there was no more reliable or respected officer in India than
Field Marshal Auchinleck.

7. constituent assembly, mr jinnah asked the Viceroy whether
he thought that the first meeting of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly should
be held in Karachi or in Delhi, the viceroy expressed the view that in
his opinion Delhi would be the more convenient place, mr jinnah then
said that the first meeting would be held somewhere about the middle of July
and he wondered whether the Congress would be agreeable to the meeting
taking place in the Legislative Assembly Chamber.

CONCLUSIONS OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE VICEROY AND
MR JINNAH HELD AT 7 P.M. ON MONDAY, JUNE 23rd9

1. mr jinnah promised to give early consideration to the question of who he
wished to have as Governor-General of Pakistan and Governors of the Pakistan
Provinces when the transfer of power took place. He promised to let the
Viceroy have his views in the next two or three days.

2. boundary commissions, mr jinnah accepted the terms of ref¬
erence which had been put up by the Congress leaders based on H.M.G.’s
statement of June 3rd. Mr Jinnah promised to let the Viceroy have the names of
his nominees for the two Boundary Commissions within the next two or three
days. Mr Jinnah felt that the Chairman of both Commissions should be a
senior member of the Bar from England. He thought that one Chairman
could act for both Commissions, and subsequently perhaps as Chairman of the
Arbitral Tribunal.

JUNE I947

583

3. Bengal, mr jinnah agreed with the Viceroy’s suggestion that the
Government in Bengal should remain in being and that a shadow Cabinet
should be formed in West Bengal with a right of veto over decisions on
matters affecting West Bengal.

4. British Baluchistan, mr jinnah agreed that he would not press the
Viceroy to alter the existing proposal whereby the views of the people in
British Baluchistan should be obtained through the non-official members of
the Quetta Municipality and the members of the Shahi Jirga (except the
Sirdars of Kalat State).

5. mr jinnah proposed and the Viceroy agreed that a suggestion should
be made to Sir Evan Jenkins that he should issue a statement in the near future
to say that he would not tolerate any longer the violence and bloodshed that
was going on in the Province and that he intended to stop it. Mr Jinnah pressed
the point that this applied equally to members of all communities.

6. mr jinnah said that he must have a Commander-in-Chief in Pakistan
for operational purposes before August 15 th and that whoever was selected for
the post should be under the orders of the Pakistan Government. The Viceroy
agreed, although he added that for administrative purposes both the Dominion
armies would still be under the present Commander-in-Chief until the partition
of the armies had become an established fact.

7. mr jinnah said that he would like to hold the first meeting of the
Pakistan Constituent Assembly in Delhi and that he hoped that the Legislative
Assembly Chamber might be available for the purpose.

8 See No. 275, para. 8.

9 On 24 June 1947 Sir E. Mieville sent this table of conclusions to Mr Jinnah asking him if he would let
him (Mieville) know if he thought it was an accurate record of what took place. Mountbatten
Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Interviews (2). No reply from Mr Jinnah has been traced.

312

Note by Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck

Mountbatten Papers. Partition Committee Papers

TOP SECRET 23 June 1947

RETENTION OF BRITISH OFFICERS

Commander-in-Chief’s paper No. 4/47 of 23 June 1947

1. It will be remembered that at a meeting of the Defence Committee (India)
on Friday 25 April last,1 it was agreed that the total nationalization of the
Armed Forces, originally planned to be completed by June 1948 would be
held up until a political decision had been taken on the main issue of separation.

1 Vol. X, No. 221, Conclusion (3).

5§4

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

2. I have always stated my firm conviction that it is not practicable to
reconstitute the Armed Forces as required by the Partition decision and to give
effect to the complete nationalization of their officer cadres at the same time.

Therefore, the services of a number of British officers and also of certain
British other ranks and ratings must be retained with all three Services during
the process of reconstitution.

To regularise the situation and to enable me to ascertain to what extent British
officers and other ranks would be willing to continue to serve with the Indian
armed forces during their reconstitution, I request that a public announcement
be made by the Partition Committee on behalf of the two new Dominion
Governments to be set up, that those Governments will desire to retain the
services of a number of British officers and other ranks during the process of the
reconstitution of the Armed Forces.

3. The numbers of British officers now serving in the Indian Armed Forces
are approximately: —

R.I.N.

RIN (Regular)

150

RIN (Reserve)

70

RN (on loan)

20

ARMY

Indian Army — Regulars

2500

ECOs

2000

British Service attd.

3700

AIR FORCE

General Duties ^

Technical >

Other Branches J

630

240

8200

630

4. To ensure the wholehearted cooperation of such British officers and other
ranks as it may be necessary to retain, it is essential that they should serve as
volunteers and not be subjected to any form of compulsion. I consider that the
number of British officers required, initially at any rate, will approximate to the
totals given in paragraph 3. Whether this number of volunteers will be forth¬
coming it is not yet possible to say.

5. There is every reason to believe that, in the present circumstances, many
serving British officers are not really desirous of continuing their service in
India. This attitude is the result of the frequent and emphatically expressed
desire of Indians of various shades of opinion to be rid of the British Officer
element in the Armed Forces; and the markedly unfriendly and mistrustful
attitude frequently adopted towards them by some Indians; and their dis¬
appointment that, for political reasons, the forces — of which they are so justly
proud — are to be remoulded into separate entities.

JUNE 1947

585

6. It must be appreciated, therefore, that it is asking a great deal of the
British Officer, after hearing the cry “Quit India” reiterated so loudly and so
often in the past, to acquiesce readily to a request to stay. For this reason, I
think Indian leaders must say publicly that they need the help of British officers.
Such a statement should encourage the officer to hope that he will be respected
and trusted and treated as a friend which is what he desires.

7. This paper refers to Officers. There will be problems of a similar nature
affecting some of the British ratings and other ranks serving with the Indian
Armed Forces whose retention will be required, but I assume that their treat¬
ment will follow the same lines as that accorded to the officers.

C. J. E. AUCHINLECK

313

Mr Mackenzie King to Mr Attlee ( via Dominions Office )

Telegram , P.R.O. PREM 8/460

important 23 June 1947, 4.09 pm

personal Received: 24 June, 6 am

No. 122. Your telegram D. No. 520 of June 12th.1
Following from Prime Minister for Prune Minister.

Begins. I entirely sympathize with your de: ire that everything possible should
be done to avoid giving misleading impressions of the relations between mem¬
bers of the Commonwealth. It has been our own experience that the term
“Dominions” as applied to some of the members of the Commonwealth tends
to be misinterpreted both here and abroad. While the designation of Cabinet
Ministers of the United Kingdom is a matter for decision by the United King¬
dom Government, other members of the Commonwealth have a particular
interest in the title given to the Minister with whom they are in direct com¬
munication. I appreciate your courtesy in letting me know that a change in the
title of the Secretary of State is under consideration. If a change in the designa¬
tion appears to meet with general acceptance, I should prefer the adoption of
“Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations” to “Secretary of State
for Commonwealth Affairs”. The former appears to indicate more adequately
the nature of the Office than the alternative. Ends.2

1 No. 166.

2 The other Dominion Prime Ministers had already replied to No. 1 66. Mr Fraser thought the change
‘inevitable’ and Field Marshal Smuts considered it Very timely’; both preferred ‘Commonwealth
Relations’ to ‘Commonwealth Affairs’ (tel. 118 of 14 June and tel. (copy unnumbered) of 17 June).
Mr Chifley saw merit in the change but did not indicate which alternative he preferred; he stated
that such change might require changes in other titles and suggested that the matter be discussed at a
British Commonwealth Meeting to take place at the end of August (tel. 144 of 16 Tune). P.R.O.
PREM 8/460.

586

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

314

Sir A. Hydari {Assam) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , R/3/1/157: / 44

immediate 23 June 1947, 7.50 pm

confidential Received: 23 June, 11 pm

No. 145-MSG. Reference para. 1 of your telegram 1472-S June 17th.1 Boun¬
dary Commissions. There is strong and unanimous feeling among my Ministers
that there should be separate Boundary Commission as between Eastern Bengal
and Assam in case Sylhet elects to join Eastern Bengal. The same Boundary
Commission as may be appointed for partitioning Bengal would not be accep¬
table. I recommend compliance of this request.

1 This telegram to the Governors of Punjab, Bengal and Assam described the progress so far made in
setting up the Boundary Commissions. R/3/1/157: f 29.

315

Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery to General Simpson {via Viceroy and India

Office)

Telegram, Rfe/i \82: ff 3-6

immediate new Delhi, 23 June 1947, 11.40 pm

top secret Received: 24 June, 12.40 am

No. 1547-S. PEPPER 73. Please pass following to War Office personal for
VCIGS from CIGS.

1. I arrived in Delhi at 1230 hours today and had my first interview with
Nehru at 1700 hours. I discussed two main points.1

2. Withdrawal of British troops from India. I said that the War Office had
been planning to complete the withdrawal by June 48 but that a new situation
had now arisen in that transfer of power was to take place on 1 5 August. Did
he want the withdrawal to begin on 15 August and to be finished as soon after
that date as was reasonably possible. To this question he answered yes. I then
said that if we began the withdrawal on 15 August we would hope to complete
it by about the end of Feb. 1948 and would this be quite satisfactory to him.
He said that it would suit him very well. I pressed him again on this latter
point so as to make quite certain and he again agreed and added that a few weeks
either way could make no possible difference. I finally said that I wanted to be

JUNE I947

587

quite certain that he would not at some later date ask to keep some British
troops in Hindustan. He replied that I could be quite certain on this point and
that he wanted them all to go and none to remain.

3. We can now regard this matter as settled. You should plan to begin the
withdrawal on 15 August and to finish it by 28 Feb 1948. It is important that
the first British troops to leave should actually sail from Karachi on 15 August
and the Viceroy is most anxious that this should be done. Inform all concerned.

4. Gurkhas. We had a long discussion on this subject. Nehru was on the
defensive to start with and was obviously worried about possible political
repercussions. But he thawed very considerably by the time we had finished
talking. He said he must consult some of his colleagues before he could agree to
it. I am to meet him again at lunch tomorrow at the house of the British High
Commissioner and he will give me his answer then.

5. salt seventy received.2

6. ACK.3

1 For more detailed accounts of Lord Montgomery’s talks with Pandit Nehru see Nos. 337 and 388.

2 Not traced.

3 General Simpson acknowledged this telegram in tel. 8100 (Salt 72) of 24 June 1947 stating that the
necessary instructions for planning for withdrawal of British troops were being issued to all con¬
cerned; he also enquired whether it was possible that Mr Jinnah might ask for perhaps two brigades
to be left in Pakistan ‘for some time longer’ than February 1948. R/3/1/82: f 7.

316

Viceroy's Conference Paper V.C.P. 92
Mounthatten Papers

SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 24 June 1947

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEUTRAL ZONE IN THE PUNJAB

The attached note will be considered at a Staff Meeting.

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEUTRAL ZONE IN THE PUNJAB

I. The following is an extract from a telegram1 from the Governor of the
Punjab containing his comments on the Draft Bill:

“The boundaries may be determined before or after the appointed day;
but, until they are determined, the present notional boundaries hold good.
Unless the boundaries are determined before the appointed day, the Sikhs

1 Tel. 134-G of 17 June 1947- R/3/i/i53* f95-

588

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

certainly and the Hindus probably will demand a neutral zone under a
special Commission to be excluded temporarily from both Dominions. Such
a neutral zone would cause many complications ; but the demand may be
very strong and, unless H.M.G. are determined to resist them firmly, appro¬
priate provision should be included in the Bill. This point has doubtless been
considered already.”

2. P.S.V. has minuted against the above extract:

“I do not think a neutral zone is feasible. The Muslims will not accept it,
and there will be no neutral authority to control it.”

3 . Mr Sundaram has minuted :

“Rao Bahadur Menon agrees that the suggestion of a neutral zone is not
practicable but feels that, before we turn down the proposal, it should be dis¬
cussed at a Staff Meeting.”2

2 V.C.P. 92 was considered as Item 6 of the Viceroy’s 47th Staff Meeting on 25 June 1947 at which
Lord Mountbatten decided to discuss the question at the Partition Committee the next day. No clear
record of such a discussion has been traced, but cf. Nos. 354, Item vi, para. 3, 456 and 473.

3D

Mr Jinnah to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rl3li/i57:f 58

10 AURANGZEB ROAD, NEW DELHI, 24 June K)4J
Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am in receipt of your letter dated (Srinagar) 19th June 19471 and I thank you
for it. With regard to your suggestion that in the event of there being no agree¬
ment on the choice of the chairmen of each Commission, the President of the
International Court of Justice should select the chairmen, we discussed this
matter last night2 and, for the reasons that I have already given to you, that
course will not be at all satisfactory.

I have already made my suggestions3 to you with regard to the chairmen of
the two Boundary Commissions and with regard to the Arbitral Board, which
will finally decide the partition of assets and liabilities including Defence,
Finances and Communications and I hope that you will be able to persuade the
Congress to accept my suggestions which are fair and which will lead to
finality in the shortest possible period.

With regard to the names for the Punjab Boundary Commission I submit the
following two names :

1. Mr. Justice Din Mohammad, ex-judge, Punjab High Court, and

2. Mr. Justice Mohammad Munir, sitting judge of the Punjab High Court.

With regard to Bengal the two names are:

JUNE 1947

589

1. Mr. Mustice Abu Saleh Mohammad Akram, Judge Calcutta High Court;
and

2. Mr. Justice S. A. Rehman, judge Punjab High Court.

Yours sincerely,

M. A. JINNAH

1 No. 262.

2 See No. 311, Item 2.

3 See ibid.

318

Sir T. Shone to Mr Tyson
Rfcl 1/280: ff 77-8

confidential 24 June 1947

Dear Tyson,

I am sorry for the delay in replying to your letter of 20th March1 which is due
to the necessity for consultation with the authorities in London. In your letter
you raised on behalf of the Central Constitutional Committee two major
questions, namely:

(a) the maintenance of law and order and the protection of British lives and
property during the period before the final transfer of power in India,
and

(b) the protection of British business interests in India both before and after
the 30th June 1948.

2. The position in India, has, of course, been considerably changed by the
Viceroy’s announcement of June 3rd which has greatly shortened the period
before the transfer of power.

3 . In connection with the maintenance of law and order and the protection
of British lives and property during the interim period your Committee made
three requests :2

(1) that British troops should be maintained in India in numbers adequate
to secure the protection of British residents as long as possible,

1 Vol. IX, No. 552.

2 The portion of Mr Tyson’s letter detailing these requests is not printed in Vol. IX. Their gist is
adequately summarised here. However, in regard to (1), on the maintenance of British troops in
India, Mr Tyson had stated that: ‘It is realised that after the complete transfer of power we shall have
to look for protection to an Indian Government or Governments and the forces at their disposal.
The C.C.C. strongly urge, however, that until the transfer of power there should be no general
withdrawal of British troops’. R/3/1/280: f 39.

590

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(2) that security schemes independent of the Government of India should be
perfected and that His Majesty’s Government should satisfy themselves
that these schemes are in fact workable, and

(3) that an assurance should be given that His Majesty’s Government would
advise without delay if in their opinion a situation is reached when it is no
longer possible to ensure the safety of British women and children in
India.

4. As regards the first of these requests your Committee no doubt recall the
statement made in Parliament by the Minister of Defence on the 20th March
19473 that until the transfer of authority His Majesty’s Government recognise
that they have responsibilities in India which require the continuous presence of
British Forces and that His Majesty’s Government are not therefore prepared to
contemplate complete withdrawal of those Forces from India in the intervening
period before power is transferred.

5. Careful consideration has been given to the second and third requests
referred to in paragraph 3 above. I understand that your Committee are already
aware that certain security precautions have been planned by the Viceroy in
conjunction with Governors and the military authorities. At the present stage
it therefore appears more appropriate that any further enquiries which you may
wish to make should be pursued in those quarters. Although your Committee
will doubtless agree that it would be most undesirable to do anything which
would be likely to cause undue alarm, the fact remains that there are certain
areas in this country where disturbances are more likely to occur than others
and where Europeans in isolated situations are more likely to be menaced.
There would therefore be no objection to your Committee advising Europeans
living in isolation in such areas who still have their families with them to
remove them for the time being, if not out of India, to some place of compara¬
tive safety. It seems to me, however, that it would be preferable for such
advice to be given unofficially through the various agencies represented in the
Central Constitutional Committee rather than through official channels which
it is anticipated would be more likely to cause alarm.

6. A separate reply will be sent as soon as possible regarding paragraphs 11,
12 and 13 of your letter in which you discussed the question of the protection of
British commercial interests in India.4

TERENCE SHONE

3 Pari. Dehs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 435, col. 607.

4 See L/E/8/4123 for the discussions which took place between the High Commissioner and

the business community as to what approach, if any, should be made to the Government of India
regarding the protection of British commercial interests. No firm conclusions appear to have been
reached prior to the transfer of power.

JUNE 1947

591

319

Record oj Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and

Pandit Nehru

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy’s Interview No. 151

top secret 24 June 1947, 11 am-12.30 pm

I showed him the article in the Indian News Chronicle of the 23 rd June, in
which he was reported to have made the following statements at Hardwar:

1. The Frontier Congress will, in all probability, decide to boycott the
proposed referendum.

2. In the event of a one-sided referendum, the present Ministry will resign
and fight elections afresh on the issue of Pakistan versus Free Pathanistan.

3. Whatever may be the immediate future of the Province, the freedom-
loving Pathans will continue their struggle for an independent Pathan
State.

I told him that Mr Jinnah had last night protested to me about this, on the
ground that statement No. 2 was a highly improper remark to make coming
from a leader of Congress who had accepted that there should be no alternative
for the N.W.F.P. except to join Hindustan or Pakistan.

Pandit Nehru defended himself by saying that he had made no statement to
the Press, nor had he seen any pressmen. This statement appeared to have been
extracted by a reporter from refugees with whom he had been in conversation,
and did not represent either what he said or his views. I told him I would inform
Mr Jinnah accordingly.

2. I told him that Mr Mandal had asked permission to address the Scheduled
Castes in Sylhet on the subject of the referendum, and asked him if he had any
objection. He shrugged his shoulders and said he did not mind particularly, but
asked, while we were on the subject of Sylhet, why the Reforms Commissioner
had exluded the labourers from taking part in. the referendum. I sent for Mr
V. P. Menon, who explained the reasons to Pandit Nehru, and they arranged to
meet subsequently to go into the matter further.

3. I gave him my painting of a proposed flag for the Dominion of India
which I had designed. This consisted of a Congress flag with a small Union
Jack in the upper canton. Since the Congress flag consists of three horizon tal
stripes, the Union Jack had been fitted into the exact width of the space between
the stripes, which made the Jack one sixth1 of the total area of the flag instead of
one quarter as in the case of Australia, etc.

In the original ‘?ninth’ has been typed above the word ‘sixth’.

1

592

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

He took the flag away with him and said he would follow the matter up and
let me know.

4. I told him that Mr Jinnah had asked me2 for advice as to where he should
assemble the Pakistan Assembly. I said that I had strongly recommended that it
should be in Delhi in the first instance so that they could obtain the benefit of
close contact with the Indian Constituent Assembly.

Pandit Nehru said that he thought that there were a lot of advantages in this
if accommodation difficulties could be overcome. I suggested that the Pakistan
Constituent Assembly might use the Legislative Assembly Chamber since this
was not being used by the Indian Legislature. He promised to follow the matter
up and let me know.

5. Finally, we talked about Kashmir. I told him I had arranged with the
Maharajah to have a long talk with him on the last day (Sunday) — first an hour
or so alone with him after luncheon, and then an hour or so with him and his
Prime Minister after dinner. Unfortunately His Highness had been indisposed
and had had to take to his bed, and so the conversation could not take place.

Pandit Nehru said that that was an old trick, which the Maharajah had played
on him when he was going to meet him in Kashmir — he had on that occasion
also had “a tummy ache”.

I remarked that I did not think the colic was feigned, and that in any case I
had managed to have a certain amount of conversation both with the
Maharajah and Mr Kak, the Prime Minister,3 though not together. The advice
I had given to both of them independently was :

(a) That Kashmir should not decide about joining any constituent assembly
until the Pakistan Constituent Assembly had been set up and the situation before
them was a bit clearer.

(b) That meanwhile they should make no statement about independence or
about their intentions.

(c) That they should go ahead and enter into “standstill” and other agree¬
ments with both new States.

(d) That eventually they should send representatives to one Constituent
Assembly and join one of the two States, at least for defence, communications
and external affairs.

(e) That so far as possible they should consult the will of the people and do
what the majority thought was best for their State.

I said that I got the impression that the Maharajah and the Prime Minister
had separately agreed that this was sound advice; but both had stated that on
account of the balance of population and the geographical position in which
they found themselves, any premature decision might have a very serious effect
on their internal stability.

Pandit Nehru agreed that my advice was sound and unexceptionable.

JUNE 1947

593

6. He then asked me what luck I had had about Sheikh Abdullah. I told him
that my wife had had an invitation from Begum Sheikh Abdullah to have tea
with her at her house, and that she had enclosed a letter from Pandit Nehru
urging acceptance. I told him that this letter only arrived on Friday evening and
that Sunday was being devoted to an expedition away from Srinagar; and the
only spare time on Saturday had been taken up for visits to two hospitals which
had not been included in the programme. The only way therefore that the
Begum could have been seen, would have been to invite her up to the Palace.
This the Maharajah asked me not to do since he said she was indulging in
political propaganda against him and it would be too awkward if she came. Her
Excellency had therefore written to the Begum and explained her inability to
accept her invitation.

Pandit Nehru said he was sorry that I had been unable to solve the problem of
Kashmir, for the problem would not be solved until Sheikh Abdullah was
released from prison and the rights of the people were restored. He, Nehru, felt
himself called upon to devote himself to this end, and he thought he would
soon have to go to Kashmir to take up the cudgels on behalf of his friend and
for the freedom of the people.

I replied that both H.H. and the Prime Minister had particularly asked that
no Congress or League leaders should come and visit Kashmir until their
decision had been announced, since it would gravely add to their troubles if
they were to be subjected to political propaganda before a decision had been
reached. As this did not appear to deter Pandit Nehru, I then pointed out that
he really must look to his duty to the Indian people as a whole. There were
four hundred millions in India and only four millions in Kashmir. He would
soon be the Prime Minister of an Indian Government, ruling at least two
hundred and fifty millions; and I would consider it highly reprehensible of him
to desert his most important duties at the Centre to interest himself on behalf of
four millions who might very well be going to join Pakistan and have nothing
more to do with him. In fact I called upon him as a matter of duty not to go
running off to Kashmir until his new Government was firmly in the saddle and
could spare his services.

He reluctantly agreed that I was right, and took my advice in very good part.

M. OF B.

2 No. 3 11, Item 7.

3 See No. 294.

594

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

320

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab )

Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Situation in.

Part 11(a)

by secraphone 24 June 1947 , 1.10 pm1

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1569-S. I talked with Jinnah last night2 and he begged me to be utterly
ruthless in suppressing trouble in Lahore and Amritsar. He said: “I don’t care
whether you shoot Moslems or not, it has got to be stopped”.

2. Today Nehru came to see me and talked in the same strain. He has
suggested that what is required is a fresh approach to the problem, which
although somewhat unorthodox and without precedent, might have excellent
psychological effect. He suggests —

(i) That martial law should be declared forthwith in Lahore, Amritsar and
any other area you think fit ;

(ii) That the whole operation should be handed over to the military, all
police being withdrawn ostensibly for rest and recuperation;

(iii) That the troops should be empowered to be utterly ruthless and to shoot
at sight.

3. I entirely agree with Indian leaders that something must be done, and,
subject to your comments, I propose to raise it at Cabinet tomorrow morning
and to issue announcement of what has been decided with their full backing.

4. Request your comments, in consultation with Military Commander.

1 The time of despatch given here is taken from the recipient’s copy on the Punjab Governor’s Secre¬
tary’s file (R/3/1/176: f 206). The time given on the copy in the Mountbatten Papers (7.30 pm) is
evidently a mistake since the time of despatch of Sir E. Jenkins’s reply (No. 327) is given as 345 pm
on both his copy and that in the Mountbatten Papers.

2 No. 3 1 1, Item 5.

321

Statement by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan1
LlP&Jlioj8i: f 203

24 June 1947

KHAN ABDUL GHAFFAR KHAN OPPOSES FRONTIER REFERENDUM

An appeal to all Khudai Khidmatgars and others who believe in a free Pathan
State not to participate in the referendum in the frontier, and to keep away

JUNE I947

595

peacefully from it, is made by Kban Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who has just returned
to Peshawar after attending a joint meeting of the Frontier Provincial Congress
Committee, the Frontier Congress Parliamentary Party, the Khudai Khidmat-
gars and the Zalme Pakhtoon.

In a statement on June 24th, he says: “Recent developments have placed
great difficulties in our way. In the announcement of June 3rd it has been stated
that a referendum will be held in the N.W.F.P. where the only alternative
which will be put before the electors of the present Legislative Assembly will be
whether to join the India Union Constituent Assembly. This limits our choice
to two alternatives, neither of which we are prepared to accept. We cannot vote
as we want to vote for a free Pathan state. The way this question will be put
makes it a communal question, and people will be confused because of this
communal approach. We do not want to encourage communalism in our
province.”

Alleging that even now, leading members of the Muslim League are carrying
on a “raging and tearing campaign” to frighten people from voting against
them in the Frontier, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan says that holding a referendum
in the circumstances and on the issues mentioned in paragraph four of the
announcement of June 3rd, which are essentially communal in their nature,
appear to be “the result of a deep-rooted conspiracy.”

Fie says: “In view of this situation, it was pointed out to the Viceroy that it
would be necessary to provide an opportunity for us to vote in the referendum
for a free Pathan State.2 The Viceroy said he was unable to change the pro¬
cedure laid down except with the consent of the parties.3 1 consulted the leaders
of Congress4 and they assured me they were perfectly willing for this oppor¬
tunity to be given to us. Mr. Jinnah, however, on behalf of the Muslim League,
entirely opposed the idea of a free Pathan State, and would not agree to the
opportunity being given us to vote for this.5 It is therefore clear that the Muslim
League wants to take full advantage of the communal issues involved.”

Maintaining that the great majority of Pakhtoons are for the establishment
of a free Pathan State, he says: “In these circumstances, I am convinced that we
cannot associate ourselves with this referendum . . . but this does not mean that
we should sit still. A new struggle has been forced upon us . . . However, I wish
that, even at the eleventh hour, Mr. Jinnah had recognised the justice of our
position and refrained from dividing Pathans from Pathans.”

1 The text reproduced here is taken from tel. B 461 of 25 July 1947 received by the India Office
Information Dept from the Press Information Bureau, New Delhi.

Sir O. Caroe had telegraphed on 23 June 1947 that: ‘Abdul Ghaffar Khan announced at largely
attended public meeting [at] Bannu 22nd evening Congress decision to boycott referendum/ He
added: ‘League wish referendum to proceed and their campaign continues actively. Still no marked
tribal reaction to coming constitutional changes/ Tel. 227-CB of 23 June to Viceroy, repeated to
Secretary of State and Governors of Sind and the Punjab. R/3/1/151: f 211.

2 No. 35, para. 12. 3 No. 91, para. 23(a). 4 See No. 228. 5 See No. 369, para. 25.

596

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

322

Cabinet C.M.[^j)$6th Conclusions , Minute 4
LIP&JI10I133 : f 91

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.W.i , on 24 June 1947
at 11.30 am were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Ernest Benin,
Mr Arthur Greenwood, Mr Hugh Dalton, Sir S. Cripps, Mr A. V. Alexander,
Viscount Jowitt, Mr J. Chuter Ede, Viscount Addison, Mr J. Westwood, Mr A.
Creech Jones, the Earl of Listowel, Mr E. Shinwell, Mr Aneurin Bevan, Mr T.
Williams, Mr George Tomlinson
Also present were: Mr John Strachey, Sir E. Bridges

INDIA

Constitutional Changes

(Previous Reference: C.M.(47)50th Conclusions)1
the prime minister reminded the Cabinet that, when the proposed con¬
stitutional changes took place in India, it would be necessary for The King to
divest himself of the title “Emperor of India”. The assent of the United
Kingdom Parliament would be given by a Clause in the Indian Independence
Bill, and the four Dominion Governments who had been consulted2 had agreed
to introduce similar legislation as soon as practicable.3

the secretary of state for dominion affairs said that the Govern¬
ment of Eire had not yet been consulted but that this would be done as soon
as practicable.

The Cabinet —

Took note of the Prime Minister's statement.

* Vol. X, No. 521.

2 No. 203.

3 In their replies to No. 203, all four Dominion P.M.s had indicated the willingness of their Govern¬
ments to take the necessary action in their Parliaments in due course. Mr Mackenzie King, Mr
Chifley and Field Marshal Smuts also authorised Mr Attlee to state in the U.K. Parliament that they
had agreed to take such action, but Mr Fraser did not refer to this point. Tel. 121 of 20 June (Canada) ;
tel. 150 of 21 June (Australia); tel. (copy unnumbered) of 19 June (South Africa); tel. 125 of 20 June
(New Zealand); L/PO/6/122: ff 287-8 and L/P&J/10/133 : ff 94-5.

JUNE 1947

597

323

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper I.B.[4y)i2i
L/P &Jlio[i 23 : ff g$-8

Viceroy’s Comments on the Draft Bill

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 24 June 1947

A number of telegrams have been received from the Viceroy replying to our
comments on the Bill, and to our views on his own suggestions. For con¬
venience I circulate a summary of the points on which full agreement has not
yet been reached.

The most important points on which there is still a difference of view are
Clause 6(1) and (7), Clause 16 (the Andamans). I am circulating separately a
memorandum1 on these points.

L.

Annex to No. 323

SUMMARY OF VICEROY’S REPLIES2 TO THE POINTS OUTSTANDING

ON THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

(References are to the 4th Edition3 of the Bill circulated with I.B.(47)ioo.)4

1. Clause ( 1 ) sub-Clause (3)

The Muslim League may object to the words: “the Indian Dominions”.
Suggests that this be changed to “the new Dominions”. There seems no great
harm in this.

2. Clause 3 and 4

(a) Agrees with the proposal of the Governor of Bengal that the titles East
and West Bengal be used. The Punjab must then follow suit. (Amend¬
ments are being made to meet this.)

(b) Clauses 3(1) and (4)(i). Considers that these should open “As from the
appointed day . . .” i.e. The partition of Provinces and inauguration of the new
Dominions should be simultaneous. (See Memorandum 13.(47)122, paragraph
2*)5

3. Clause 3(1) and (2)

Agrees with the revised text proposed by the India and Burma Committee.
(Telegram 7898 from Secretary of State to Viceroy.)6

1 No. 324.

2 Unless otherwise noted the points listed occur in Nos. 283 and 286.

3 No. 191.

4 No. 190.

5 No. 324.

6 No. 256, note 6.

598

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

4. Clause 6(1) and (7)

Presses strongly for inclusion of a limitation on the powers of the Dominion
Legislature to Constitution making and the powers of the existing Central
Legislature (Telegrams 18-S.K. para. 3, 19-S.K. and 1528-S).7 (See Memoran¬
dum 1.13.(47)122, paragraphs 3-6 and Annex.)

5. Clause 7(1) (c)

Agrees to retain this.

6. Clause 8

Does not consider Indians will reject sub-Clause (2) but can only ascertain this
when the whole Bill is shown to them.

7. Clause 9 (2) (a)

His advisers are disturbed by the view expressed in my telegram 7897s that
Governor General’s Orders should not be used to alter the constitution beyond
what is required for effecting partition. Requests omission of the words “or
any discretionary control of the Governor General over the affairs of any
Province” and suggests the addition of “Governor General or” before “Gover¬
nor” in sub-Clause 9(2)(c). (I deal with the merits of this in the separate paper
I.B.(47)i22, paragraphs 3-6.)

8. Clause 13

Agrees to the proposed limitation to the Secretary of State and omission of
sub-Clause 2, and will do his best to obtain agreement of the Indian leaders
when the Bill is discussed with them. Awaits text of draft statement in Parlia¬
ment.

9. Clause 16 (Andamans)

Has come to the firm conclusion that to confront the Indian leaders with a draft
Bill including this clause, even modified as the Committee suggested, would
severely damage our future relations with India. Has no other course but to
press strongly for complete exclusion of any reference to the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands. Is sure that the matter will have to be pursued by negotiation
and is not one on which he personally can negotiate. It will clearly have to be
undertaken by the High Commissioner (Telegram 11-S.K.).9 (See Memoran¬
dum I.B.(47)i22, paragraph 6.)

10. Clause 19

Agrees that it should be made clear that the ‘Secretary of State’ in the Bill is
not the ‘Secretary of State for India’ and that the Bill ends control from London.
This has been dealt with in the 5th Revise of the Bill (03.(47)123, Clause 13). 10

11. Clause 21 (3)

Would prefer no reference here to the Tribal areas but if one is to be made
feels that it should be an addition to the proviso as follows: “or precluding the

JUNE 1947

599

participation of representatives of the Tribal areas in either of the said Assem¬
blies in accordance with such arrangements as may be made in this behalf”.
Words to this effect could be added in the Proviso to Clause 19(3) of the
revised draft Bill (1.5.(47)123). 11

12. Additional

Proposes the following clause to cover the desire of the Interim Government
that the Bill should contain provision implementing the assurances given by
them in respect of members of the Secretary of State’s Services who continue
to serve:

[There follows the draft contained in No. 286 , para. 8]

A separate Memorandum12 is being circulated on this point.

7 Nos. 286, 293 and 290.

8 No. 271.

9 No. 284.

10 The 5th Revise (1.13.(47)123) has not been reprinted. Clause 13 was the same as No. 428, Clause 14.

11 Clause 21(3) had become Clause 19(3) in the revised draft of the Bill.

12 No. 325.

3M

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper LB. (4 7) 122
LIP&JI10I123: Jf gg-102

Outstanding Points for Decision on the Indian

Independence Bill

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 24 June ig47

I am circulating separately (I.B. (47)121)* a paper summarising the points which
remain for decision as a result of the Viceroy’s replies1 2 to the telegram3 sent to
him after the Committee’s last meeting on this subject.4 There are, however,
among these points some which raise considerable issues. These I discuss in the
present paper.

1 No. 323.

2 Nos. 286 and 293; see also No. 283.

3 No. 271.

4 No. 265, Minute 3.

6oo

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

2. Clause 3(1) and 4(1). 5 The Committee’s proposal was that the Bill should
require that the division of Provinces should take place “not later than the
appointed day”. The Viceroy wishes it to take place “as from the appointed
day”. I should have thought that administratively it would be much preferable
for the division of Provinces to have proceeded some distance before the two
new Dominions are set up. But if the Viceroy and his Advisers are of a con¬
sidered opinion to the contrary, I do not press this consideration. There is,
however, one difficulty which seems to me to be of some importance. Gover¬
nors will have to be appointed by the King for the two newly created Provinces.
If the appointments are made on or after the appointed day, this wrill raise the
question on whose advice the King should make these appointments. Provincial
Ministers will not be entitled to advise the Crown direct but from the appointed
day the Ministers in each Dominion will become entitled to do so. It is ques¬
tionable, however, whether the Dominion Governments should advise the
Crown on the appointment of Provincial Governors. In Canada Provincial
Governors are, by the constitution, appointed by the Governor General on the
advice of his Ministry. In Australia on the other hand, which is, constitutionally,
a closer analogy with India, State Governors are appointed by the Crown on the
advice of the Secretary of State for the Dominions. I understand that the
Secretary of State has informal correspondence, generally through the retiring
Governor, with the leaders of the political parties as to who would be accep¬
table, but that there is no right of formally tendering advice to the Crown. It
seems very desirable that this issue should not come up in India until a later
stage and it will be particularly difficult in the case of split Provinces because on
the appointed day there will be no Ministry already constituted to advise the
Crown and presumably no Ministry can be constituted until after a Governor
has been appointed. For this reason I should prefer to see the splitting of
Provinces take place at any rate a few days before the appointed day.

3. Clause 6(1) and (7) and Clause 9(2). 6 The Committee are familiar with the
point raised on Clause 6 which briefly is the contention that the Constituent
Assemblies of the two Dominions should, in their legislative as distinct from
their constitution making function, be limited to exercising the powders over
Provinces exercised by the present Central Legislature and should not be entitled
to invade the provincial field of legislation. The effect of the point made on
Clause 9(2) is to request that the Bill should not, as it does now, wash out the
Governor General’s discretionary control over Provinces but should leave it to
be exercised on the advice of the Dominion Ministers. At the same time it is
suggested that the Governor General’s individual judgment functions should be
specifically knocked out, even though they are not at present in operation. The
object is to clear the way for bringing into operation parts, at any rate, of the
federal provisions of the Government of India Act and to provide a ready made

JUNE 1947

60I

constitution for the two new Dominions. The arguments put forward for the
first point are —

(a) That unless it is made clear that the existing distribution of functions
continues between the Provinces and the two new Centres there will be
great uncertainty as to the constitutional position.

(b) That we should provide as complete a constitution as possible for each
of the new Dominions since otherwise the Constituent Assemblies will
begin to make modifications and will be led on to wholesale but piece¬
meal constitution making and this will lead to widespread confusion.
The Pakistan Constituent Assembly may not have got going by the
appointed day and an uncertain situation might continue there for some
little time.

4. The arguments advanced for the continuance of the Governor General’s
discretionary control over the affairs of Provinces but exercisable on advice of
Ministers is that both Congress and the League would welcome the contin¬
uance of such control. The technical objection to the continuance of it is that the
discretionary control of the Governor General was exercised through the
Governor acting in his individual judgment. For the Bill to retain the dis¬
cretionary functions of the Governor General when the discretionary and
individual judgment functions of the Governors have been made exercisable on
advice creates an impossible position because the Governor who receives the
directions from the Centre is required to act on the advice of his Ministers.

5. I draw the attention of my colleagues to the general drift of the observa¬
tions made in support of these two points by the Viceroy and his Advisers.
Particularly I draw attention to telegram 19 S.K., copy annexed.5 6 7 This appears
to indicate that the Congress at any rate intend to side-track constitution making
entirely and to establish their authority under the existing constitution. While
they wish to leave the distribution of powers as at present, they wish to be
certain that they can secure other [? secure control over] Provincial Govern¬
ments in case of emergency in view of the control now exercised through the
Governor General and Governor. The Viceroy urges that the more we enable
the two new Dominions to keep off constitution making and devote themselves
to administrative matters the longer Dominion status is likely to last. I think that
there is much force in this assertion and that our interest probably lies in securing
that the existing Congress leaders can fortify their position in India without the
Left Wing elements having a chance to make radical constitutional changes at
once. If that view is accepted then we have to consider, I suggest, not merely

5 [Note in original:] References are to the 4th Edution [No. 191] of the Bill circulated with I.B.(47)ioo

[No. 190].

6 See Nos. 255, 280, 286, paras. 3 and 6, 290 and 293.

7 No. 293.

602

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

whether we give way on the points in Clauses 6 and 9 to which the Viceroy
refers but whether we do not also widen the powers in Clause 8 to enable the
1935 Constitution to be adapted into a temporary constitution which might
last a considerable time by Orders of the Governor General.

6. Clause 16 (15 in the new edition). The Viceroy is quite clear8 that no
provision should be included about the Andamans and that the matter must be
dealt with by negotiation by the High Commissioner presumably after the
appointed day. The Committee are fully aware of the arguments both ways on
this matter. The essential point is that if no provision is inserted about the
Andamans they will go into the Dominion of India by virtue of Clause 2(1)
of the Bill. The Committee may wish to consider the revised Clause 15 in the
new text of the Bill circulated as 1.6.(47)123. 9 It seems possible that tills would
not be as offensive to Indians as the Viceroy suggests.

7. On the question of the resignation of the Governor General and Governors
as from the appointed day, the Viceroy proposes to consult with the Indian
leaders when he shows them the Bill as a whole.10

8. I suggest that the Committee should finalize the text of the Bill in the
light of the Viceroy’s comments and that the Opposition should be consulted
on it this week so that the Viceroy can show it to Indian leaders if possible this
week end.

L.

8

9

No. 284.

Not printed. The revised Clause 15 read as follows:

‘References in this Act to the Indian Dominions include references to the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands, but, until other provision is made as respects those Islands with the agreement of both the
Dominions —

(a) those Islands shall be treated as belonging to the Indian Dominions jointly;

(b) the government thereof shall be carried on by a Chief Commissioner appointed by, and
holding office at the pleasure of, and acting in all respects subject to the direction and control
of, the Governor-General; and

(c) the Governor-General and, to such extent as the Governor-General thinks fit to authorise
him to do so, the Chief Commissioner, may make regulations for the peace and good
government of those Islands.’

L/P &J/10/123 : f 71 v.

10 cf. No. 279.

JUNE 1947

603

325

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper 1.3.(47)127
LjP &Jlio/i2j: ff ng-20

Inclusion in Indian Independence Bill of Guarantee
of Conditions of Service to Officers Serving the

Future Governments in India

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 24 June 1947

At their meeting on the 19th June1 the Committee asked that further con¬
sideration should be given to the proposal in the last paragraph of the Viceroy’s
telegram No. 148 i-S dated 17th June2 that provision should be made in. the Bill
to give effect to guarantees which the Government of India had agreed to give
to those officers of the Secretary of State’s Services who continue in service after
the transfer of power, namely that they will be given the same terms as to
scales of pay, leave, pension rights and safeguards in matters of discipline as
hitherto. The Committee thought that it would be advisable to take advantage
of this proposal which had been put forward at the express request of the Indian
Interim Government. The terms of the clause proposed by the Viceroy will be
found on p. 3 of I.B.(47) 121.3 The wording will, however, require to be
revised by Parliamentary Counsel.

2. The arguments for and against the inclusion of such a provision appear to
be:

For (a) in order to implement the assurance given to us in this matter by
the Congress and League Leaders at the Centre it is necessary for
them to have the co-operation of the Provincial Governments
and it will be of assistance to them in securing this if there is a
constitutional provision alterable only by the Dominion Legisla¬
ture and binding on Provincial Governments until such alteration
is made.

(b) it may give confidence to officers who might otherwise be
unwilling to serve the new Governments.

Against (a) if a guarantee is given to Secretary of State’s officers only, officers
of the Central and Provincial Governments own Services may
feel that, as they have not been given similar protection, they have
no security and become apprehensive as to their position.

1 No. 265, Minute 3.

2 No. 249.

3 No. 323, para. 12; see also No. 286, para. 8.

604

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(b) it is, in fact, impossible to guarantee the same conditions of service
since the Secretary of State’s control and protection will have
disappeared.

(c) officers of the Secretary of State’s Services will regard the pro¬
vision as a guarantee by H.M.G. that their existing conditions of
service will continue and in the event of any Government default¬
ing will undboutedly look to H.M.G. to see that the obligation is
met or that compensation is granted for the failure to discharge it.

(d) The provision is in fact unenforceable by H.M.G. and can be
removed the day after the Bill becomes law by either Dominion
Legislature. Yet it would remain binding on H.M.G. as part of the
law of the United Kingdom. Our position vis a vis Parliament
in the matter would therefore be somewhat equivocal.

3 . In view of what has already been said in connection with the grant of
compensation about the obligation of the Secretary of State and H.M.G. to
protect Secretary of State’s officers, it seems difficult in spite of the obvious
objections to refuse to meet a specific request by the Indian Interim Government
that provision for the protection of such officers should be included in the
present Bill.

4. On the whole I consider that it would be to our advantage to include the
provision proposed by the Viceroy subject to the condition that when he
shows the draft Bill to the Indian Leaders he secures their specific concurrence
to the terms of this Clause and makes it clear that we have included this pro¬
vision as a result of their request and propose to say in Parliament that this is the
reason why it has been included.

L.

326

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper LB. (4 7) 128
L/P&Jliol8i: ff 208-9

Proposed Parliamentary Question About Policy

Towards the States

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 24 June 1947

We have just had by bag from Lord Ismay1 the enclosed draft Question and
Answer which the Viceroy thinks should be used in Parliament at the earliest

1 Annex to No. 261.

JUNE 1947

605

possible moment. He says that the States, particularly Hyderabad, are extremely
upset by wild talk in the Congress press about the future Indian Government
not tolerating States having independent relations with H.M.G. If something
is not said, the Nizam and others may make an effort to mobilise Opposition
opinion against the way the States are being treated.

2. It appears that this suggestion is the result of a talk between Ismay and
Walter Monckton, who is in India as the Nizam’s constitutional adviser.
Monckton is arranging to have the Question put down by one of his friends,
and Ismay says the draft Answer is based on consultation with him, would
probably satisfy the Nizam, and should not be whittled down.

3. This looks like a ‘"plant” by Monckton. The draft Answer goes further
than the Committee’s decision on 1.13.(47) $42 on 28th May,3 which was that if
we admit at this stage that we will be prepared to maintain separate relationships
with States we shall be charged with disintegrating India. It is, of course, inevi¬
table that the point should come up in the Debate, and it will need careful and
delicate handling. I should have thought it highly undesirable to make any
fresh statement of constitutional importance earlier than the second reading of
the Bill. The Viceroy suggests that supplementaries should be refused, but this
seems obviously impracticable.

4. I suggest we put these considerations to the Viceroy. If the Question is
actually asked meantime, I suggest the answer should be that the matter cannot
be appropriately dealt with in the limits of Question and Answer, and that it
will of course be fully covered during the passage of the Bill.

L.

2 Vol. X, No. 533.

3 Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 4.

327

Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , R/j/ 1/176: f 207

BY secraphone 24 June 1947 , 3.45 pm

Your secraphone message of today.1 I discussed similar proposal yesterday with
Lahore Area Commander and I.G. Police and later with Party Leaders.2 I
decided against it.

2. I have again discussed with Bruce and Bennett and am still against pro¬
posal for following reasons :

1 No. 320.

2 No. 305

6o6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(a) Trouble in Lahore/Amritsar is not rioting but continuous and widespread
cloak and dagger activity. Decisive action by troops therefore out of the ques¬
tion.

(b) Bruce says that although he will take on anything he is told he does not
think Martial Law could make any difference. He could not in any case
operate without Police whose strength in Greater Lahore is about 2000.
Commander 23rd Bde (Cazenove) with whom he discussed yesterday was
against martial law even if Police were retained.

(c) If Martial Law is declared troops must succeed immediately or we shall
be in a very difficult position. Civil control could not be restored with disorder
continuing and troops would be exposed to same communal attack as Police.

3. I admit that situation is causing me grave anxiety but I do not think
Martial law is the answer to trouble of this kind. We have recently improved
our intelligence and investigation arrangements and may within a reasonable
time get better information about organisation behind the outrages. Real
remedy is active intervention by political leaders not by Press Statements but
by contacts which they unquestionably possess with violent elements. Muslim
League in my opinion started Muslim burning and stabbing and Hindu
bombing is work of R.S.S.S. I explained this to leaders yesterday. They pro¬
mised to cooperate but I doubt if they will be effective. Mamdot was very
strongly opposed to Martial Law.

4. Police are physically tired and services generally are disintegrating. I
would adopt any measures including Martial Law that I thought would do the
trick. The Party Leaders would like to relieve all British Officers and this
change will have to be made anyhow during next few weeks. But no change in
organisation or personnel will work unless Parties bring genuine private
pressure to bear on their own goonda supporters.

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rl3M9i:fi9

24 June 1947

H.E.

Here are the views of the Governor of the Punjab1 on the proposals that we
put to him this morning after your talk with Mr. Nehru.

2. I admit that I find Sir Evan Jenkins’ arguments very convincing. Admit¬
tedly the removal of the police and their replacement by the military would be a
spectacular move and might have a good psychological effect to start with : but

JUNE I947

607

we must face it that it is not a military problem, and that if the military fail, we
will have played our last card.

3. I suggest that you should read this message, suitably expurgated, at the
Cabinet meeting tomorrow, and press the leaders to make whatever contacts
they can with the local politicians with a view to controlling extremists.

ISMAY

1 No. 327.

329

Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery to General Simpson ( via Viceroy and India

Office)

Telegram , i^/j/i/^2:/ 8-9

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 24 June I947 , 7 pm

top secret Received: 24 June , 6pm

No. 1560-S. pepper 74. Please pass following to War Office personal for
VCIGS from CIGS.

1. In continuation of pepper 73.1 I had a talk with Jinnah at 1830 hrs last
night.

2. Jinnah was agreeable that the withdrawal of British Troops should begin
on 15th August but he was most anxious that the withdrawal should not be
conducted too quickly as he considered that troubles might possibly arise.

3 . I told Jinnah that I would do everything I could to help him and that the
withdrawal would be spread over a period of months so that it would not
finish till February 1948. He accepted this and said that would suit him very
well.

4. Jinnah then said that he would definitely require British Officers to serve
in the Pakistan Army. I told him that it was beyond my powers to grant this
and that he must submit an application through Governmental channels
stating clearly the terms of service and so on that he proposed to offer. I said
that he should do this without delay and before the majority of the present
British Officers of the Indian Army began to go off to other occupations or
appointments. He said he was quite clear on this matter and would do as I
suggested.

5. The question will arise as to the status of the British Troops in India after
15th August 47. My own view is that die British Government should become

1 No. 315.

6o8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

financially responsible for die pay and administration of these troops from that
date. We should leave Whistler with a suitable H.Q. to command them his
status being changed from that of adviser to the present C.-in-C. to one of a
Command. The British Government should lay down clear cut rules as to the
employment of the British Troops in the event of widespread disturbance
threatening British life and property. In general the British Troops would be
regarded as lodgers in the Dominions of Pakistan and Hindustan until such time
as they can be withdrawn in accordance with the programme given in para. 3 of
pepper 73. You should immediately begin an examination of these problems
and get Governmental instructions issued about them as soon as possible.

6. I have given copies of pepper 73 and 74 to the Viceroy and have no
objection to you giving them to Scoones if you wish.

7. A c k [nowledge] .

330

Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery to Mr Attlee ( via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram , I^/j/1/147:/ 84

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 24 June I947, 7.I5 pm

top secret Received: 24 June, 7.10pm

No. 1565-S. pepper 75. Please pass following personal to Prime Minister from
Field Marshal Montgomery, with copy to Minister of Defence and VCIGS,
War Office. Begins. In accordance with your instructions1 I have had talks in
Delhi with Mr. Nehru concerning the grant of facilities for the employment of
Gurkha Troops in the British Army. I have now to report to you that Mr.
Nehru has agreed in principle that we can proceed in the matter. There are of
course many details still to be settled and I am arranging for a Mission from the
War Office to come to Delhi to work out these details and then to proceed to
Nepal in company with a Mission from India. I would like to tell you that
throughout our talks in Delhi Mr. Nehru has shown the greatest sympathy and
friendliness and it was due to this that we reached agreement so quickly. Ends.

1 See No. 173 and its note 1.

JUNE 1947

609

331

Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery to Pandit Nehru

L/WS/i 1 1024: f 36

24 June 1947

My dear Vice-President,

As I told you yesterday, the Prime Minister of Great Britain empowered me to
come to an arrangement with you concerning the grant of facilities for the
employment of Gurkha Troops in the British Army. As a result of our dis¬
cussions I am delighted to be able to inform Mr. Attlee that you and I have
reached agreement in principle on the matter, and I enclose for your retention
a copy of the telegram1 I have sent to him.

There remain of course many details still to be settled. As I told you today, I
am telegraphing the War Office for my Mission to come out immediately to
Delhi so that these further details can be settled in full consultation with your
Mission; when the two Missions have worked out the details my suggestion to
you was that they should both proceed to Nepal to get the agreement of the
Nepalese Government.

I would like to express to you my very great appreciation for the kindness
and sympathy which you have shown during our talks. It has been a real
pleasure for me to meet you. I hope that we may have many more such
friendly meetings in the future.

As arranged with you yesterday, we will now plan to begin the movement of
the British Troops from India on 15th August, 1947 and we shall aim to com¬
plete this withdrawal by the end of February, 1948.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN

No. 330.

332

Pandit Nehru to Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery

LIWSI1I1024: f 37

17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 24 June I947

My dear Field Marshal,

Thank you for your letter of the 24th June1 which I have just received. As I
told you, we have approached this question with every desire to meet the

1 No. 331.

6 io

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

wishes of the British Government. We have our difficulties and we do not wish
to do anything which might perhaps add to them in future. I am glad, however,
that in this matter there has been agreement in principle as you have informed
the Prime Minister of Great Britain. The details will have to be worked out in
consultation with representatives of the War Office.

2. It has been a great pleasure to meet you. I have long been looking forward
to doing so. I should have liked to have had occasions to see more of you, but I
hope that the future may bring additional meetings.

With all good wishes,
Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

333

The Earl oj Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &SI12I4638: JJ 143-5

immediate India office, 24 June 1947, 6.25 pm

Received: 25 June, 6.30 am

8122. 1 have already replied in my telegram No. 78931 on question of interna¬
tional status of new India. Further question remains as to assumption by Indian
Dominions of international obligations (a) which were concluded expressly on
behalf of present India and (b) which were concluded in the name of H.M. or
H.M.G. but which are applicable to India.

2. I agree with statement of legal position in paragraph 6(b) of your telegram
No. 143 9-S2 to the extent that if Hindustan continues international personality
of present India, she will prima facie inherit all India’s existing international
Treaty obligations, i.e. both (a) and (b) above. But it is clear that she cannot be
bound in international law by those obligations which by their nature can only
be carried out in territory not belonging to Hindustan or under her control.
Some obligations (for instance those relating to frontiers) run with the land and
consequently pass to the future sovereign of the land whoever he may be.
There are also others which can only be performed in the future Pakistan and as
to which it is perhaps more open to question whether they pass to the successor
by automatic operation of law. Former obligations must clearly pass to whatever
successor authority (Pakistan or a non-acceding State) becomes responsible for
the territory concerned, and latter should also pass.

3 . Foreign Office advise,3 however, that H.M.G. in the U.K. (who will in the
eyes of foreign Governments have brought about the change) will still not be
relieved of their political (repeat political) duty towards those Governments to
see4 that the Treaty position of the new Dominions (which will remain within

JUNE 1947

6ll

the Commonwealth at least for a time) is satisfactorily regularised. Foreign
Office point out that, when senior Dominions became international persons,
they and all parties concerned apparently accepted without question position
not only that Dominions inherited all Treaty rights and obligations which had
any local or territorial application to them, but also claimed the benefits and
accepted the obligations of Treaties whose provisions applied territorially to the
whole Commonwealth and Empire and from which all repeat all British
subjects benefited in foreign countries. I should not expect that Government of
India would dissent from the view that both new Dominions will similarly
inherit Treaty rights and obligations which have local and territorial application
to them respectively but I should be glad if you could obtain confirmation that
this will be the position.

4. The question arises particularly in connection with Treaties in category
(b) of paragraph 1, i.e. those concluded in the name of the Crown or of the
U.K. Government most of whose stipulations can only be fulfilled in India or
can only be wholly fulfilled if successor authorities observe them. (Examples
are Anglo-Afghan Treaty, 1921; Anglo-Tibetan Convention, 1914; Anglo-
Nepali Treaty, 1923).

5. Assuming that no question could arise as to category (a) with a united
India we had in mind at one stage attempting to provide for acceptance by the
new Indian authorities of obligations in category (b) by including clause in
projected Treaty relating to matters arising out of transfer of power.5 We had
intended to seek agreement to the effect that “all obligations and responsibilities
heretofore devolving on H.M. or on U.K. Government which arise from any
international instrument applicable to India shall henceforth, insofar as their
application to India is concerned, devolve on India alone”. There would have
been corresponding provision for transfer to successor authorities of reciprocal
rights and advantages associated with obligations.

6. Now, however, that we cannot hope to negotiate any Treaty with the
new Indian authorities before the introduction of legislation, only alternative is
to try to secure some assurance from the existing Interim Government on behalf
of both the future Dominions in the sense desired.

7. I should be grateful for your views whether an assurance of this kind
would be likely to be forthcoming and, if so, whether there is any possibility of
securing it in such a form as to ensure its being implemented by the two new
Governments when set up.6

1 No. 270. 2 No. 202. 3 See Nos. 52, 192 and 244, Minute 3.

4 ‘to see’ deciphered as ‘even in’.

5 See e.g. Vol. VIII, No. 447.

6 Lord Mountbatten replied in tel. 1599-S of 26 June that he accepted the position as stated in paras. 1-4
above. As regards paras. 5-7 he entertained ‘no doubt that desired assurances will be forthcoming
from Indian leaders whom I propose to consult in due course’. L/P &S/12/4638: f 141.

6 12

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

334

Secretary of State to Government of India , External Affairs and Commonwealth

Relations Department

Telegram, L/P &SI12I4197: f 44

secret India office, 24 June 1947, 7.30 pm

8125. Your express letter dated 25th April, No. F.io(i4)-NEF/47.1 British
Mission, Lhasa.

2. H.M.G. note that Government of India intend to be represented in Tibet
by a Mission headed by an Indian Officer, and that a change is expected to take
place in about 4 months’ time.

3. H.M.G. themselves will not wish to maintain a separate Mission at
Lhasa after the transition has been made but, subject to the consent of the
Tibetan Government, would like to provide for the continuance of contact
with that Government by arranging for visits to be paid to Lhasa from time to
time, by members of the staff of the U.K. representative in India.

4. It is observed that the transition from a British to an Indian Mission is
intended to take place unobtrusively and without publicity in order to avoid the
risk of any constitutional issue being raised by China. H.M.G. fully appreciate
the reasons for this precaution in present circumstances, but doubt whether the
Tibetan Government will be content with the proposed assurance that the
Mission will continue in being as an earnest of India’s continued friendly
interest in Tibet. They would indeed have expected that an intimation of the
kind proposed would provoke an enquiry from the Tibetan Government as to
the future of the Treaty relations which have hitherto subsisted between them¬
selves and H.M.G. Even if the Tibetan authorities do not raise this matter,
H.M.G. would wish to make their own position clear before the British Head
of the Mission is replaced.

5. H.M.G. note that the Government of India wish to see Tibetan autonomy
maintained and the Govt of India will therefore, we presume, be prepared to
assume until other arrangements are made the obligations under the Simla
Convention 1914 and associated trade regulations hitherto devolving on
H.M.G. A statement to this effect to the Government of Tibet by the Head
of the present Mission at Lhasa or by Political Officer in Sikkim (your telegram
17th June No. 4694)* on behalf of the Government of India 3 would no doubt
re-assure the Tibetans of India’s friendly interest in Tibet and would be consis¬
tent with the maintenance of the proposed Indian Mission at Lhasa. H.M.G.

JUNE 1947

613

would be glad to have an early expression of the views of the Government
of India on this matter.

6. I will reply separately to your telegram No. 4694 of 17th June.

7. Please pass copy to U.K. High Commissioner.

1 Vol. X, No. 219.

2 No. 245.

3 Emphasis in original.

335

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , jR/j/j/^2: ff 10-12

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 24 fune 1()4J , 10 pm

secret Received: 24 June , 11 pm

No. 1570-S. Withdrawal of British Forces from India.

1. You will recall that at India/Burma Committee meeting on 28th May1 I
stressed advantages of withdrawing British Forces as soon as possible after
enactment of legislation providing for the transfer of power. Committee
decided to resume consideration of this question after the views of the Chiefs of
Staff had been obtained.2

2. I have in the meanwhile discussed question with Auchinleck.3 His
recommendations were:

(a) Provided that a formal request is received from the Governments of
India and Pakistan, the provisional date for the withdrawal of British
Forces should now be fixed at 1st April, 1948, and reviewed on 1st
January, 1948.

(b) If no such request is received from the Governments in question, HMG
should insist that British forces should remain until 1st January, 1948, to
fulfil HMG’s moral obligation to safeguard British lives until all
civilians who want to quit India have had the chance of doing so.

3. In making these recommendations he stressed that, during the forth¬
coming period of reconstitution of the Indian Army, the majority of its units
will be immobilised and incapable of rendering armed assistance to the civil
power, even if the Indian officers and men composing them were willing to

1 Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 9.

2 A Report by the Joint Planning Staff of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, dated 23 June 1947, will be
found on L/WS/1/1091: ff 60-66.

3 See Nos. 159, 213, 239, Item 6, 274, 307 and 308, Item 6.

6 14

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

carry out these duties for the protection of Europeans, which he can in no way
guarantee. Nor can he guarantee that the Indian Army will retain its cohesion
and remain a reliable instrument for use in aid of the civil power.

4. I can well understand Auchinleck’s anxieties but I am convinced that the
following wider considerations are overriding : —

(a) Presumably, if British forces were retained against the wishes of the two
new Governments, HMG would demand safeguards. These would be most
unpalatable to the two new Governments and would defeat our primary object
of introducing complete autonomy from the date of the transfer of power. As I
have always emphasised, it is by the introduction of this complete autonomy,
with no reservations, that we are going to stand the best chance of India
indefinitely retaining Dominion status.

(b) Although (as Auchinleck points out and I agree) British forces could
probably ensure protection of British nationals in large cities in India; they
could do very little to protect them in country districts, where their danger is
much greater though their number is less.

(c) The responsibility for the protection of all foreign nationals, after the
transfer of power, will in any case rest with the two new Governments and not
with the C-in-C, although it is possible that both Governments might look to
him while reconstruction of the Armed Forces is in progress. Insistence on
retention of British forces would be tantamount to an admission that we did not
trust them.

(d) The general impression given in India, although no statement on the
subject has been made, has been that British forces will be withdrawn on the
transfer of power.

5. I therefore have no doubt that our correct policy is to start withdrawing
British forces from India on August 15th and to continue the process as shipping
permits.

6. C.I.G.S. saw Nehru and Jinnah yesterday.4 Both agree to the withdrawal
starting on 15th August, and being completed by about the end of February,
1948.

7. The situation is therefore clear for a very early announcement. I suggest
the following :

Begins. On the transfer of power on 15th August, British Forces will im¬
mediately start to be withdrawn from India. This withdrawal will be completed
as shipping permits. Ends.

Please confirm that I may make this announcement at once.

8. The presence of British forces in India from 15 th August until the date on
which the withdrawal is completed raises a number of questions such as —

JUNE I947

615

(i) Their functions;

(ii) By whom are they to be paid;

(iii) System of command; and so forth. I would be glad if I could receive the
instructions of HMG on these matters as soon as possible. Meanwhile,
I will consult C-in-C. and send you our own ideas.

4 See Nos. 315 and 329.

336

Sir F. Burrows (Bengal) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram , ff 27-8 , 30

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

24 June 1947, 11.13 pm

Received: 23 June, 7 am

No. 170-S. Your telegram No. 1552-S of June 24th.1 I understand that sug¬
gestion is that Shadow’ ’ Cabinet would consist of small number of Ministers
sworn as such but without portfolio to whom all decisions of government
affecting West Bengal whether believed to be Cabinet or Departmental level
would be shown before being implemented : that these Ministers would attend
Cabinet and have a right to see all papers affecting such decisions. Subject to the
point made in para. 2 below I am personally prepared to accept this and to do
my best to make it work if my Ministry here and respective High Command
verdicts agree.

2. I presume that veto will not extend to any matters relating to my special
responsibility but a (gr. cor) individual judgement cases; and I regard it as vital
that for this purpose should be added the matter of “food” which since Ministry
(gr. cor) formed, I have (gr. cor), with their tacit acquiescence confront
[’treated] virtually as a special responsibility. I must (gr. cor) exception as the
food problem of the province is one and indivisible at this time of the year, but
it would be first to attract by means of veto because the deficit areas just now are
mainly east southward.

3. 2 If the foregoing is agreed to, I think it most important that Congress
High Command should be persuaded to accept it on behalf of themselves and
their local representatives, as Hindu feeling here is very strong against con-

1 See No. 311, note 6.

2 The text of paras. 3 and 4 as originally transmitted contained a number of corrupt groups and a repeat
was called for. It is the text of this repetition contained in the Governor’s tel. 173-S of 25 June
(received 26 June, 1 am) which has been reproduced here.

6i 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

tinuance of the present Ministry and we cannot face the possibility of a “move¬
ment” in West Bengal.

4. Speculation about Section 93 is so rife here that I must put out a press note
and broadcast explaining continuance of the present Ministry with addition of
“shadow” Ministers, and I seek your permission to broadcast.

5. I am seeing Suhrawardy at 11 a.m. tomorrow standard time. Perhaps
Abell could telephone Tyson about reactions to this telegram before I see him.3

3 A note by Sir G. Abell of a telephone conversation with Mr Tyson on 26 June 1947 indicates that no
answer had been sent on 25 June — possibly because of difficulties in the transmission of No. 336 (see
note 2). He had now told Mr Tyson that Lord Mpuntbatten ‘agrees to the Governor broadcasting if
necessary and that the special powers and responsibilities of the Governor are not affected by the
proposal’. Sir F. Burrows was going to try to see the Bengal political leaders that evening. R/3/1/159:

f 3i.

337

Sir T. Shone to Secretary to the Cabinet
LIWSI1I1024: ff 30-32

TOP SECRET OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED

DESPATCH NO. 6 1 KINGDOM, 6 ALBUQUERQUE ROAD, NEW

Delhi, 23 June 1947
Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith records which I made of two con¬
versations1 between Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein and
Pandit Nehru at the External Affairs Department on the 23 rd and at my house
on the 24th June.

2. The employment of Gurkha troops in the British Army, in regard to
which Pandit Nehru had been reluctant to make any further move during the
past few weeks, was the main subject of discussion. As will be seen, all the old
doubts and queries came up again — with one or two new ones — before Pandit
Nehru gave his agreement in principle to our proposals. Viscount Mont¬
gomery’s visit to Delhi at this moment was most fortunate in that his inter¬
vention, with the powers given to him by the Prime Minister,2 has resulted in
securing this agreement.

3. There will, of course, be many matters of detail to be arranged when the
British military mission arrives; and it may be that some of the Indian sugges¬
tions, for instance, that the Gurkha troops should all be employed in the Indian
Army which would lend some of them to His Majesty’s Government, will

JUNE 1947

617

come up again. But I hope that the way has now been cleared for a satisfactory
settlement of this matter.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

TERENCE SHONE

Enclosure to No. 337

23 June 1947

I accompanied the Chief of the Imperial General Staff when he called on
Pandit Nehru this afternoon. After exchange of courtesies, in the course of
which Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery told Mr. Nehru that he desired to
help India in any way possible, the question of Gurkha troops was raised.
Viscount Montgomery said that he had been empowered by the Prime Minister
to come to an arrangement with Mr. Nehru about the employment of Gurkha
troops in the British Army, to the extent and on the lines with which the
Government of India were familiar, from the conversations which Major-
General Lyne and I had had with them in March and April. Viscount Mont¬
gomery made it clear that this was a matter on which an urgent decision was
needed; he was making arrangements to place the British Army on a peace¬
time footing and it was essential to know the position as regards the Gurkha
battalions which His Majesty’s Government wished to employ. There had
been a long delay since Sir Girja Bajpai and Major General Lyne had gone to
Katmandu in April together to obtain the consent of the Nepalese Govern¬
ment to the employment of Gurkha troops in both the Indian and the British
Armies. The British military delegation which it was proposed should come
out to Delhi to make a concerted plan with the Indian military authorities, had
been held up, pending the agreement of the Government of India to grant the
necessary facilities for the employment of Gurkha troops by His Majesty’s
Government. Viscount Montgomery was anxious that it should start work as
soon as possible, and before the division of the Indian Army took place, as that
was likely to complicate the preparation of the plan for employing Gurkhas.

2. Mr Nehru spoke at some length of the difficulties which had arisen over
this question both in Delhi, with his colleagues, and with regard to the Nepalese
Government, who had been unwilling to define their attitude. He indicated that
it was not a matter which he wanted to be raised again in the Cabinet; the
Cabinet was tending more and more to work in two parts; presently there
would no doubt be changes of personnel. (I fancy that in saying this, he meant
to convey his reluctance to commit any future government of the Indian

1 Only the record of the first of these conversations has been reprinted. For an account by Pandit
Nehru of the talks see Enclosure to No. 388.

2 See No. 173 and its note 1.

6i8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Union. His attitude, while perfectly friendly, was at first unforthcoming ; and
he did not mention that the visit of Sir G. Bajpai and Major General Lyne to
Katmandu had resulted in a definition of the Nepalese Government’s attitude.
He did not, however, allude to the report which we have heard Sir G. Bajpai
gave him after his return, to the effect that the Nepalese Government would not
be averse from the employment of Gurkhas in the Indian Army alone; nor did
he say that the Indian Army would now want to employ all the existing
Gurkha battalions, as we had some reason to believe he might).

3. I interposed at this stage to say that we had understood from Major
General Lyne, who had acted in the closest collaboration with Sir G. Bajpai,
throughout the proceedings in Katmandu, that the Maharaja of Nepal had
made a very definite statement regarding the attitude of his Government, and
that he would welcome the proposals for employing Gurkha troops in both
Armies, if agreement were reached between the Government of India and His
Majesty’s Government. We had taken particular care to act in the closest
collaboration with the Government of India in our approach to the Nepalese
Government, and we were now desirous of coming to an agreement with the
Indian authorities without further delay.

4. Viscount Montgomery made it clear that he did not wish the matter to be
decided by the Indian Cabinet if that presented difficulty ; he would be satisfied
if he could obtain a satisfactory assurance from Pandit Nehru. He pressed Pandit
Nehru to give this assurance before he left Delhi, in order that he might be able
to inform the Prime Minister.

5. Pandit Nehru, whose attitude became rather more forthcoming towards
the end of the conversation, said he must consult some of his colleagues.
Viscount Montgomery urged Pandit Nehru to do this without delay and said
he would be glad to call on Pandit Nehru at any time or place convenient to
him tomorrow, to hear his answer.

6. I told Pandit Nehru that Viscount Montgomery was lunching with me
tomorrow and that I hoped he would come too and would be able to give us an
answer by then. Pandit Nehru accepted the invitation but did not promise a
reply by then.

7. Viscount Montgomery then raised the question of British troops in India.
Was it correct that Pandit Nehru wished them to be withdrawn on the transfer
of power, on 15th August? Pandit Nehru replied in the affirmative. Viscount
Montgomery said that after the transfer of power, British troops would be in
India merely as sojourners; it would not be possible to withdraw them all at
once; the plan he had been working on was for complete withdrawal by June,
1948, but he wished to get the British troops out as soon as possible and the plan

JUNE I947

619

could be speeded up to make withdrawal complete by the end of February,
1948. Pandit Nehru agreed. Viscount Montgomery said it was important for
him to know whether there was any likelihood of the Government of the
Indian Union changing their minds and asking for British troops to remain.
Pandit Nehru said “we shall not ask you to stay”.3

8. It was pointed out to Pandit Nehru that the forthcoming withdrawal of
British troops was an additional reason for reaching an early agreement about
the employment of Gurkhas.

9. The conversation then turned to the arrangements for the division of the
Indian Army, in regard to which Pandit Nehru’s ideas seemed to be rather
nebulous and impractical.

10. Before we took our leave, there was some general talk about conditions
in India with particular reference to the division of the country. Viscount
Montgomery congratulated Pandit Nehru on the fact that the Indian leaders
had reached agreement. Pandit Nehru spoke of the great amount of work to
be done in connexion with the division of India, and of the relative poverty of
Pakistan, industrially, as compared with the Indian Union. But Pakistan would
possess many of the most productive food-growing areas, which showed how
necessary it was for the two parts of India to have good relations. He also
alluded to the French and Portuguese colonies in India which, he said, would
inevitably come into the Indian Union sooner or later. He spoke ot M. Baron’s
“strange” proposal that France should continue to exercise some sort of
cultural control in the French Colonies; and he said that the Portuguese title
to Goa derived from a Papal Bull. The Government of India had made an
approach to the Vatican on this, through the Catholic Primate in India. The
Vatican, it appeared, were more concerned with the maintenance of their
religious institutions throughout India, than with the question of Goa itself.

t. s.

3 Emphasis in original.

620

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

338

Meeting of the Indian Cabinet Case Nos. 132 and 133/32/47
Mountbatten Papers. Minutes of Indian Cabinet Meetings

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held on 23 June 1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Pandit Nehru, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Patel,
Dr Rajendra Prasad, Mr Abdur Rab Nishtar, Mr Rajagopalachari, Dr Matthai,
Sardar Baldev Singh, Mr Bhabha, Sir R. Pillai1 ; Mr Abell, Mr H. M. Patel,
Mr Osman Ali ( Secretariat )

Case No. 152/32/47. Proposal for the establishment of a States Department of

the Government of India
MINUTES

His Excellency said that at his meeting with the political leaders on the 13 th of
June2 the question of liaison between the States and the two future Dominion
Governments had been discussed and the memorandum3 now before the
Cabinet embodied the conclusions that had been reached at that meeting. He
had himself felt the need for such a department to take the place of the present
Political Department which was now in process of liquidation. The new
Department would, on his advice, negotiate ‘standstill’ agreements with the
States and would advise him on other matters concerning both the States and
the Central Government.

In the course of subsequent discussion it was agreed that the Hon’ble the
Home Member, who would be responsible for the work of the new depart¬
ment, should work in consultation with a League member of the Interim
Government so that the Government of Pakistan would be in a position to take
over the responsibility for relations with those States which would have dealings
with it when it was established. The Hon’ble the Finance Member undertook to
recommend to His Excellency the name of a League member to be associated
with the Hon’ble the Home Member.

After further discussion, His Excellency stated that he would arrange to issue
a Press communique in his capacity as Crown Representative announcing that
with the approval of the Cabinet he had decided to set up this new Department.

DECISION

The Cabinet agreed :

(1) that a new Department to be called the “States Department” should be
set up in charge of the Hon’ble the Home Member.

(2) that the Hon’ble the Home Member should work as far as possible in
consultation with a League member of the Interim Government.

JUNE I947

621

(3) that the functions and organisation of this department should be as stated
in paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Summary.

(4) that the Crown Finance Department should be continued as part of the
new States Department.

(5) that a Press communique should be issued by the Crown Representative
in consultation with the Political Department announcing the decision to set
up this new Department.

(6) that care should be taken in drafting the communique not to give the
impression that anything was being done to upset any permanent arrangements
between the States and the Government.

Case No. 155/32/47. Communal situation in Lahore and Amritsar

MINUTES

His Excellency said that he had been in touch with His Excellency the Governor
of the Punjab regarding the situation in Lahore and Amritsar.1 2 3 4 The Governor
had also held meetings with the Army Commanders, the Police and the
political leaders of the Punjab at which various proposals had been put forward,
for example, the imposition of martial law, withdrawal of police and drafting
more troops into the area, extension of curfew orders and the general tightening
up of security measures. The difficulty in tackling the situation lay in the fact
that they were faced with what he might call ‘cloak and dagger activities’
organised and carried into effect by a small body of well-trained men. The
General Officer Commanding Northern Command5 and the Commander of
the 23 rd Brigade were of the opinion that while martial law might assist in
dealing with large numbers of rioters it would not be of value in tackling a small
organisation of this nature which operated mostly in ones and twos at night.
They also felt that the assistance of the police force which knew every inch of
Lahore and Amritsar could not be dispensed with. He realised that in some
quarters the police were being accused, probably unjustifiably, of being in
league with the offenders. This was a common occurrence not only in India
but in other countries also whenever the police force failed to stop a crime wave.
There was, however, much force in the argument that if they were withdrawn
the army could not perform all their duties. Further, since martial law is gen¬
erally imposed only after the civil administration breaks down, it would be
necessary to make certain before it was actually introduced that there were good
chances of martial law succeeding in restoring order promptly. On the whole,
therefore, the expert advice was against martial law and the local leaders had
acquiesced in that view. The Governor of the Punjab was doing his best to

1 Secretary, Commerce Dept attending in the absence of Mr Chundrigar.

2 No. 175, Item 1.

3 Enclosure to No. 288.

4 See Nos. 320 and 327.

5 This was evidently intended to be a reference to the Lahore Area Commander: see No. 327.

622

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

improve liis intelligence resources with a view to tracking down the organisa¬
tions responsible and he had reason to believe that they were meeting with a
certain degree of success. To his mind, the real remedy, however, seemed to lie
in contact being established by political leaders with the people and he hoped
that the High Commands of the different political parties would impress upon
the Punjab leaders the necessity of establishing and sustaining such contact. He
was anxious to know what suggestions his colleagues had to make as to the best
manner in which the situation could be tackled.

In the course of subsequent discussion the following points were made: —

(1) The excuses made by the officers for their inability to stop communal
trouble in Lahore and Amritsar were not convincing. The fact had to be faced
that these officers were unable to handle the situation and the administration
had broken down.

(2) There was a general feeling rightly or wrongly that the present set of
officers were complacent and they did not enjoy the necessary confidence. The
best way of giving effect to the desire of the political leaders would be to man
the administration by officers in whom all parties had confidence. That would
create a sense of security among the people.

(3) The only alternative to this course was to place the administration in the
hands of the Army.

(4) The imposition of martial law had been strongly opposed by the Punjab
leaders. It might perhaps succeed in frightening the people but would not
secure their cooperation in the same manner as the appointment of generally
acceptable officers would do.

(5) The need of restoring peace in Gurgaon had also to be considered. This
might be achieved if the same course were adopted of posting suitable officers
in that district, and increasing the number of troops. It was pointed out,
however, that in Gurgaon the problem was different in that it was a question of
dealing with armed mobs. An adequate armed and mobile force of mixed
composition was essential. Two additional battalions had recently been moved
into Gurgaon, but it had to be borne in mind that the area they had to cover
was large and mostly hilly and inaccessible and gave little scope therefore for the
required degree of mobility.

Summing up, His Excellency said that his colleagues were agreed that the
Governor of the Punjab should invite the political party leaders to suggest the
names of officers acceptable to all of them for service in Lahore and Amritsar.
He would also suggest to the Governor that he should invite the political
leaders and officials to form a permanent security committee which might meet
daily and review events. As regards the situation in Gurgaon, he would now
request the Hon’ble the Defence Member to examine again the question
whether there were adequate numbers of troops in Gurgaon.

JUNE 1947

62 3

DECISION

The Cabinet agreed —

(1) that the Governor of the Punjab should be requested to invite the political
party leaders of the Punjab (a) to make agreed recommendations regarding the
names of officers in whom they had confidence to be posted in Lahore and
Amritsar and (b) to form a permanent security committee of officials and non-
officials who would meet daily to review events, and to suggest steps necessary
for the maintenance of law and order.

(2) that the Hon’ble the Defence Member should be requested to examine
afresh the position in Gurgaon and satisfy himself that the district had a suffi¬
cient number of mixed troops.

(3) that leaders of parties should continue to use their influence to encourage
local leaders to do all in their power to stop this violence.

339

Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

RI3I1I176: ff 211-15

SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 25 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

There have been various developments here which I think I should report to
Your Excellency without waiting for my fortnightly letter.

2. Lahore and Amritsar, which have never really settled down since the
first week in March, flared up again about the middle of June. It is necessary to
be quite clear about the nature of this trouble and the causes of the deterioration
and of our failure to control it.

3. During the first week in March we had, in Lahore, Amritsar, Rawalpindi,
Multan and Jullundur communal riots of the usual kind — a series of incidents
in which hostile crowds clash with one another or with the police or troops.
Such riots are commonly followed by several days of stabbing, which is gradu¬
ally brought under control.

In Rawalpindi and Multan affairs followed the normal course.

In Lahore and Amritsar, on the other hand, people seem to have discovered
during the actual riots how easy it is to burn the average building in an Indian
city. The expected stabbing campaign began; but it was accompanied by an
entirely new campaign of incendiarism. I have no doubt whatever that the
Muslim League approved, and in some degree directed, the burning. Most of it
was done by Muslims.

624

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Our first problem was thus to deal with stabbing and burning — not by
crowds or even groups of people, but by individuals. We seldom saw or
apprehended the offenders — an assassin does not stab his victim without
choosing his moment carefully, and the incendiarists threw their fireballs
through windows and sky-lights making full use of the rooftops and
the maze of narrow city lanes. The flight of Hindus from Lahore and the large
number of empty houses made our task more difficult. It was a fight against
time, for it was clear that if we failed to control the burning there would be
reprisals from the Hindus, who were losing far more property than the other
communities. Sometimes for two or three days together we seemed to be on
top — we tried roof-pickets and fire-spotting on A.R.P. lines — but progress
was always arrested by some new outrage — on one occasion the brutal murder
of four Muslims sleeping in the open in one of the suburbs of Lahore. In the
upshot we failed to forestall the reprisals, which took the form of bombing.

The Hindus and Sikhs had been practising with bombs for some time, but
had done little damage except to themselves. Suddenly on ioth June they began
to use bombs offensively and with success in Lahore :

(1) On ioth June a bomb (probably a Mills) was thrown into a cart carrying
Muslim passengers. The thrower is believed to have been a Sikh on a bicycle.
Two Muslims were killed and five injured.

(2) On 15th June a bomb (possibly a booby-trap) exploded in a bathroom
drain at a private hospital outside the Shahalmi Gate of the city. When a police
party went to investigate and a considerable crowd had been collected in the
courtyard some person unknown lobbed a bomb (probably home-made) over
the wall killing one and wounding forty-three.

(3) On the night of i6th/i7th June a bomb was thrown on to the roof of a
Muslim house in the city where several persons were sleeping, killing one and
injuring five. The house concerned stands among a number of much higher
Hindu houses. The thrower and make of the bomb are unknown.

(4) On the morning of 19th June a bomb was thrown at a party of Muslim
labourers going to work along Brandreth Road, killing one and injuring eleven.
The thrower is unknown and was probably in, or on the roof of, a house. The
bomb appears to have been a Mills.

(5) On the 20th June a bomb exploded in a truck carrying Hindu labourers,
injuring sixteen. It is not known whether the bomb was thrown into the truck,
or placed in it, or was being carried by one of the passengers.

(6) On 2 1 st June two bombs were thrown in the Sabzi Mandi killing nine
and injuring thirty-eight.

There have been other bomb incidents, but these are, I think, the most
important. Of the six I have listed all, except probably No. (5), were in my
opinion Hindu or Sikh outrages. There have been some Muslim bomb out¬
rages, but so far no really effective one.

JUNE 1947

625

In Amritsar there have been fewer major outrages other than burning, but
the use of bombs by all communities is common; and some Hindus have been
using revolvers for communal attacks on Muslims. There have also been one or
two actual riots in which it has been possible for the Police and Troops to inflict
severe punishment on those taking part.

We are thus in general faced not with a series of incidents in which hostile
crowds clash with one another or with the Police and Troops; but with a series
of “cloak and dagger” outrages. It is necessary to be quite clear about this
because unless the problem is understood it is impossible to solve it.

4. The deterioration in Lahore and to some degree in Amritsar is in my opin¬
ion due to the bombing. The Sabzi Mandi outrage (No. (6) in the preceding
paragraph) led immediately to the Shahalmi Gate burnings and to a large
number of stabbing outrages by Muslims. In Amritsar there is also the under¬
lying feeling that the Muslims are doomed and may as well do as much damage
as they can before they migrate or perish.

5. Our failure to control the situation is due mainly to the following causes:

(a) The nature of the trouble is such that decisive action by the Police and
Troops is impossible. The Brandreth Road outrage (No. (4) in paragraph 3) is
fairly typical. Someone who had a Mills bomb and was probably in, or on the
roof of, a house adjoining the street threw it at a party of working men against
whom, presumably, he had no personal grudge at all. Two police pickets came
up on hearing the explosion and searched the neighbouring houses. They
detained (I think) about 20 people; but there was nothing to connect any of
them immediately with the outrage. It is not possible in such a case to shoot the
people who are detained — nearly all of them are almost certainly innocent, and
it is quite possible that the guilty man or men have already escaped. Outrages
of this kind can be dealt with only by patient investigation; we have recently
overhauled and improved our intelligence and investigation system, and hope
for early results.

(b) I have no doubt that the Political Parties approve and in some measure
direct the outrages. I do not mean that Jinnah, Nehru and Patel or even Mamdot
and Sachar personally abet murder and/or arson. But somewhere connected
with the Party organisations here there are people who control the campaign
and are given the money to do so. Fire raisers actually caught include an Indian
Christian (at Rs. 15/-) and three Purbia Hindus (salary not stated) who had
been engaged to burn Hindu property. Evidence is accumulating that on the
Hindu side the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh are the organisers. This body
has highly respectable gentlemen at its head; but it makes and uses bombs, and
acquires and distributes arms and ammunition. It has close contacts with the
Congress. At my instance,1 and after a lot of havering Mamdot, Sachar and

1 See No. 305.

626

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Swaran Singh have promised to cooperate in stopping the trouble. So far they
have not gone beyond pious statements. What is needed is direct and private
pressure on the party underworld and a stoppage of funds.

(c) Justice is far too slow. We have caught some murderers and fire-raisers,
but have not hanged one yet. I am considering fresh legislation on which I am
addressing Your Excellency.2 Moreover, in spite of their clamour for Martial
Law and “stern measures”, the communities — particularly the Hindus — are
resentful of any arrests and detentions under section 3 of the Punjab Public
Safety Act, 1947, and the High Court have virtually demolished the section.
Many goondas whom we had picked up have been released, and the destruction
of the Mozang bazar coincided with one of these jail deliveries. In many respects
the High Court are right, for the Section has been used with inadequate atten¬
tion to detail; but the results of the Habeas Corpus hearings have been disastrous
for Lahore.

(d) The Services are now beginning to disintegrate. It is impossible to blink
the fact that the outlook of a Muslim magistrate or policeman is different from
that of a Hindu magistrate or policeman. Many of the stories of partiality are
inventions; it has been the deliberate policy of the parties here to smash the
Services, and they have in some measure succeeded. A Muslim officer who sets
out to do his job, quickly finds that whatever he does he will be vilified by the
Congress Press. The converse applies to Hindu and Sikh officers. If a man is
driven to take sides, he naturally sides with his own community, and there has
been partiality. There has also been some negligence and indiscipline. In
Amritsar certain sections of the Police became scandalously corrupt. We pulled
them out, whereupon fifty eight resigned and ostentatiously placed their
services at the disposal of the Muslim League. We are now working with
imperfect and unreliable instruments ; but it is the Political Leaders who wished
them to be unreliable, and on the whole I am surprised that the Services have
stood up so long and so well to the incessant communal attack.

6. As to the remedy, I do not think Martial Law would make any great
difference. My judgment may be wrong; but talk of “utter ruthlessness” and
“shooting down the offenders”3 seems to me misconceived in a situation in
which the offenders are seldom seen. The Political Leaders do not, I suppose,
really mean that we should shoot the residents of any area in which an outrage
occurs, or the people who happen to be standing by at the time at which an
outrage is committed. The real remedies are, I believe, (a) a genuine effort by
the Party Leaders to stop the trouble not by peace appeals, but by pressure on
their own goondas ; (b) better intelligence and more coordinated investigation ;
and (c) speedier justice especially where offenders are caught red-handed. I gave
Your Excellency my general views, in which the Lahore Commander con¬
curred, in reply to a Secraphone Message yesterday, 24th June.4

JUNE 1947

627

7. The Partition developments have been as follows. As I have already
reported in a letter of 16th June,5 I had a satisfactory talk with Mamdot,
Sachar and Swaran Singh on that date. They have since (on 17th June) unani¬
mously invited me to preside over the Partition Committee when it is set up.6
The composition of the Expert Committees has been finally settled, and a
Steering Committee is at work.

On 23rd June the two halves of the Punjab Legislative Assembly met; the
decision was for Partition.7 1 saw the three Party Leaders that afternoon.8 They
have not been able to give me the names of the members of the Partition
Committee yet, and as Sachar is away in Delhi and Mamdot seems to want to
go to the N.W.F.P. for the referendum I do not know when they will get
started. Relations are still strained and Mamdot has written me two letters9 (i)
demanding “standstill” orders of a most drastic kind; and (ii) asking for the
removal of non-Muslims from canal headworks in the Western Punjab, which
he thinks will be sabotaged by the Sikhs. I was able to discuss (i) with all three
leaders on 23rd June, and they are to send me an agreed proposal. In the mean¬
time I have issued orders stopping new appointments to gazetted posts, new
land grants, and new original works of provincial importance.

The elections to the Constituent Assemblies will be on 4th July.

The official progress is fairly satisfactory, but I doubt if our local leaders are
capable of putting the Partition through in a businesslike way. They are always
out of Lahore and some of them are unaccustomed to sustained effort.

8. There are signs of dissension within the Muslim League. Jinnah has
apparently made it known that Pakistan must be a militant one-party State. He
will nominate the Provincial Ministries ; the Provincial Legislatures will meet
once a year to pass the budget, but there will be no contested elections or other
political activities likely to split the party. The average Leaguer in the Punjab
is an old Unionist, and thought Pakistan would give him some political in¬
fluence and pickings. Firoz (who belongs to the Shahpur district) has taken

2 In tel. 143-G of 25 June 1947 Sir E. Jenkins explained the lines on which he had directed that legisla¬
tion should be considered to provide for a summary procedure ‘in limited number of cases’ where
‘offenders are caught red-handed’. He remarked that it seemed to him that ‘if a man is caught
actually stabbing another or in possession of explosives or bombs or in the act of manufacturing the
same it should be possible to try him summarily in the morning, to have the sentence confirmed in the
evening and to hang him next day. I believe that this would have a very good effect.’ Sir E. Jenkins’s
formal proposals were to follow; in the meantime he suggested Lord Mountbatten might like to
consult his legal advisers on the possibility of legislation of the kind indicated. R/3/1/176: ff 208-9.

3 See No. 320.

4 No. 327.

5 No. 219.

6 No. 233, para. 1.

7 See No. 304.

8 No. 305.

9 Not traced.

628

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

advantage of the prevailing uneasiness to obtain the signatures of 53 out of the
60 Muslim members for the Western Punjab appointing him to be their leader.
He has had his differences with Jinnah and now proposes to confront him with
this paper and demand his rights — perhaps the Premiership. Marndot belongs
to the Eastern Punjab and sits for an Eastern Constituency; he is not universally
liked. Khizar tells me that with free elections the League would split within
four or five months — there are too many personal animosities and economic
differences within it. I doubt if Firoz will win; he is not sufficiently determined.
But his move is interesting.

Incidentally on 21st June the Punjab Muslim League passed a very rude
resolution10 demanding my immediate resignation or recall. I was trying that
day to get the three Party Leaders together to discuss law and order, and Mam-
dot (in a rude letter)11 declined to see the others until he, Daultana and Shaukat
had seen me. I accordingly saw12 Marndot and his friends after they had passed
the resolution, and waited with some amusement for them to mention it.
They did not do so ! Marndot had presumably forgotten that on 17th June he
had signed, with Sachar and Swaran Singh, a letter13 inviting me to preside over
the Partition Committee.

9. The Sikhs are still on the boil about the Boundary Commission, and a
resolution of the Shiromani Akali Dal published today14 indicates that they may
go back on the plan or force us to go slow. Swaran Singh hinted pretty broadly
on 23 rd that Partition could not go very far until the boundary had been
determined.

10. Outside Lahore and Amritsar and Gurgaon (where things seem slightly
better) the Punjab is reasonably quiet.

Yours sincerely,

E. M. JENKINS

10 See No. 305, note 1.

11 R/3/1/177: F 58.

12 For a note of this interview see R/3/1/176: f 198.

13 No. 233.

14 The ‘Sikh Akali High Command’ was reported to have sent on 24 June a ‘secret circular’ containing
a ‘charter’ of eight demands to Sikh organisations. The demands included: driving the western
boundary of Pakistan ‘further westward enabling them [the Sikhs] to have the maximum area
under Eastern Punjab’; exchange of property and population; the right of pilgrimage to their
sacred places and of management of property attached to them; and the retention in Hindustan of a
number of districts, including canal districts, of which the circular was quoted as stating: ‘Economi¬
cally this area is the spinal cord of the Sikh nation and the Sikhs will not part with it’.

Other demands envisaged the creation of a homeland in Flindustan for Punjabi-speaking Hindus
and Sikhs, and the strengthening of the Sikhs’ political position in Hindustan by giving them special
weightage. The Statesman, 26 June 1947, p. 7, col. 1.

JUNE 1947

629

340

Pandit Nehru to Lord Ismay

RhMwff 174-80

SECRET EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 23 June 1$47
Dear Lord Ismay,

I enclose three copies of our draft “standstill” agreement applicable to the
States. After much consideration we have decided to keep it as short as possible
and to adhere to the previous draft.1

I have added some notes on the clauses so as to explain their significance.
May I suggest that this draft should also be circulated to all the people to
whom the previous draft was sent, so that they may have full time to consider
it?

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Enclosure 1 to No. 340

SECRET

The “standstill” agreement should be on the following lines:

Preamble

Whereas it is expedient that certain existing relations and arrangements between
the Indian States and the rest of India should, for their common benefit,
continue in force while negotiations for new or modified relations and arrange¬
ments are in progress between the authorities concerned.

Now, therefore, it is agreed between the parties that : — -

1. No State shall be liable to pay any cash contribution falling due after

2 in so far as it exceeds the value of any privilege
or immunity which the State enjoys.

2. Until otherwise provided by mutual agreement, a State shall be entitled

to the continuance of any privilege or immunity which it enjoyed immediately
before ,2 provided that it continues duly to fulfil all

conditions or reciprocal obligations attached to each such privilege or im¬
munity.

Explanation

The term “cash contribution” and “privilege or immunity” in the above clauses
have the meanings assigned to them in section 147 of the Government of India
Act, 1935.

1 Presumably Enclosure to No. 198.

2 [Sidenote in original:] Here mention date on which Dominion Constitution comes into operation.

630

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

3. (1) Until new agreements in this behalf are completed, all relations and
arrangements as to matters of common concern now existing between the
Crown and any Indian State shall continue as between the appropriate successor
Government and the State.

(2) In particular, the matters referred to above shall include those specified
in the Schedule annexed.

4. Until otherwise provided by mutual agreement, the criminal, revenue and
civil jurisdiction heretofore exercisable in any Indian State of Clause III as
defined in para. 11 of the Indian States Committee’s Report 1928-29, 3 by, or by
persons acting under the authority of, the Crown Representative shall hereafter
be exercisable by, or by persons acting under the authority of, the appropriate
successor Government.

SCHEDULE

1. Air Communications

2. Arms and equipment

3 . Control of Commodities

4. Currency and coinage

5. Customs

6. Defence

7. External Affairs

8. Extradition

9. Import and Export Control

10. Irrigation and Electric Power

1 1 . Motor vehicles

12. National Highways

13. Opium

14. Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones

15. Railways

16. Salt

17. Taxation

18. Wireless.

Enclosure 2 to No. 340
NOTES ON CLAUSES

Clauses 1 and 2 correspond to clauses (1) and (2) of the Political Department’s
draft,4 except in one respect. The effect of the latter is to remit all cash con¬
tributions payable by the States while preserving to them for two years the
privileges or immunities which they are enjoying. This seems rather one-sided:
even section 147 of the Act of 1935 did not permit the remission of any cash
contribution except in so far as it exceeded the value of any privilege or
immunity enjoyed by the State. The effect of the clauses as re-drafted is to

JUNE 1947

63I

remove the two-year limit, and to set off the privileges or immunities against
the cash contributions.

Clause 3 corresponds roughly to clause (3) of the Political Department’s draft,
but with certain important differences. First, it will be noticed that in the
Schedule referred to in the clause, we have proposed to insert three new sub¬
jects, defence, external affairs, and extradition. Defence and external affairs are
the most important matters of common concern, as they involve the security
of the whole of India. Extradition is also an obvious matter of common
concern. Secondly, clause (3) of the Political Department’s draft is limited to the
scheduled matters, whereas, according to the present draft, the enumeration in
the Schedule is merely illustrative and not to be regarded as exhaustive. Every
matter of common concern, whether it is mentioned in the Schedule or not,
comes within the meaning of the new clause, although for greater certainty
some of the more important matters have been enumerated in the Schedule. A
third point of difference between the two drafts is that the two-year limit
occurring in the Political Department’s draft has been omitted in the revised
draft, which substitutes the phrase ‘‘until new arrangements in this behalf are
completed”, following in this respect the wording of paragraph 4 of the
Cabinet Mission’s memorandum of May 12, 1946.3 4 5 Lastly, while the Political
Department’s draft refers to “existing administrative arrangements”, the redraft
refers to “all relations and arangements”, which is a more comprehensive
phrase. In regard to external affairs in particular, the term “relations” is more
appropriate than “arrangements”.

It should be noted that relations and arrangements as to defence and external
affairs are not only covered by the phrase “regulation of matters of common
concern” occurring in para 4 of the Memorandum, but also by the phrase
“political arrangements” occurring in para 5.

Clause 4. This is new, there being no corresponding clause in the Political
Department’s draft. It applies only to certain petty States, particularly in
Kathiawar and Gujerat. According to paragraph 11 of the Butler Committee’s
Report, there are 327 of these petty States classed by the Committee as estates,
jagirs, etc. The total area of these States is less than 6,500 sq. miles and the
population at the time of the Committee’s Report was less than one million.
The Rulers of these States exercise petty judicial powers, such as, trying
criminal cases punishable with not more than three months’ imprisonment and
Rs. 200/- fine, and disposing of civil suits up to Rs. 500/- in value. The residuary
powers have been exercised in the past by the Crown Representative or by
persons acting under his authority. It cannot be the intention that after the
termination of Paramountcy, say in August 1947, these petty States are to

3 Cmd. 3302.

4 Enclosure to No. 198.

5 Vol. VII, No. 262.

632

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

attain a status that they never had during the last 150 years and to acquire
almost overnight powers of life and death. Obviously, therefore, some kind of
standstill agreement is necessary for the exercise of the residuary jurisdiction.
In a large number of cases, the Crown Representative has under various
attachment schemes transferred his jurisdiction to the “Attaching State”. The
effect of clause 4 is that the residuary jurisdiction will in future fall to be
exercised by, or by persons acting under the authority of, the successor Govern¬
ment. If the successor Government chooses to adopt the existing attachment
schemes in regard to the Attached States, it can do so by passing an appro¬
priate order to that effect, and, in that event, the residuary jurisdiction
will fall to be exercised by, or under the authority of, the Ruler of the Attaching
State. If, however, the successor Government chooses to depart from the
attachment scheme in any particular instance, it is free to do so. Clause 4 as
drafted leaves the successor Government free to adopt any course which it deems
best.

34i

Mr V. P. Menon to Mr Abell

R-hl1 It49: f 87

d.o. no. 24-S/47-R new Delhi, 2 5 June 1947

My dear George,

Please refer to your letter No. 1299/2 dated the 16th June1 regarding the
destruction of confidential records.

I have already destroyed all my copies of the Governors’ fortnightly letters.
As regards other papers, all our confidential records have been assembled by the
office and when I get some time I shall go through them and have them des-

Yours sincerely,
v. p. menon

1 This was a reminder from Sir G. Abell asking to be informed about the latest position regarding the
destruction of confidential records in the Reforms Office. Sir G. Abell had originally raised this
question with the Secretaries to the Governor-General (Reforms) and (Public) on 27 November:
see Vo. IX, No. 108, para. 3. Mr Menon had told A.P.S.V. in January that he had practically com¬
pleted his destruction. On 14 February the Public Secretariat sent a letter stating that secret papers
including Governors’ Reports and D.I.B.’s Daily Summaries and Weekly Reports, were examined
periodically with a view to destruction of those not needed which normally took place after comple¬
tion of the Quartery Survey. The Public Secretariat was also going through its files to see whether
they contained anything embarrassing with a view to destruction. R/3/1/149: ff 38, 42 and 86.

The last note on the file concerning the records of Reforms Office and Secretary to the Governor-
General (Public) is a note dated 11 July by Mr Scott (D.P.S.V.) as follows: ‘I have spoken to Pub.,
about this. It is in hand, and there is no need to remind him again. Put up on 1/8 for verifying that
Rjeforms] C [ommissioner] has finished his destruction.’ Ibid, f 88.

JUNE I947

633

342

Sir O. Caroe (North-West Frontier Province) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten

oj Burma

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: North-West Frontier ,

Situation in , Part II

immediate 25 June 1947, 11.5° am

secret Received: 25 June, 5 pm

No. CA/126. Kabul telegram No. 51 of June 23rd.1

2. I am unaware of reactions of Foreign Office or of Government of India
to this Afghan incursion into Frontier affairs. But Your Excellency should
know that there is reason to conclude that this move was to some extent inspired
by Frontier Congress leaders with certain Afghan elements and considered
when Abdul Ghaffar Khan visited Kabul for Qashan2 last summer. Moreover
fact that Gandhi is wedded to Pathanistan idea will make it difficult for E. A.
Dept at present juncture to approach this issue objectively.

3 . On merits arrival of official Afghan Mission to interfere in crucial Indian
constitutional and political issue seems to me more than objectionable particu¬
larly during the referendum period.

4. Disturbing effect on tribes must also be borne in mind. In no case as I see it
could Mission be given access to our tribal territory or Frontier States.

5. Lockhart has seen and fully agrees.

1 No. 309.

2 A small town in the U.S.S.R. just north of the Afghan border.

343

Mr Abell to Mr Abbott

Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Situation in,

Part II (a)

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 2J June 1947, 12. JO am

secret Received: 2j June, 6pm

No. 1571-S. Viceroy has just had a very difficult time in Cabinet over Lahore.1
Fie explained why martial law was not likely to be effective, and asked for
suggestions. Nehru blew up and said that the situation must be controlled, and
that officials concerned from top to bottom should be replaced. Viceroy replied

1 See No. 338, Case No. 155/32/47.

634

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

very strongly that this was a totally irresponsible suggestion and that he could
not consider anything of the sort.

2. Patel followed with great feeling about the failure to restore order. He
advocated (a) martial law or failing that, (b) withdrawal of all police from the
City of Lahore and (c) replacement of all local officials in Lahore by men
agreed upon by all three communities; he said that the first need was to get
men in whom all communities would repose confidence.

3. Liaquat Ali Khan was against martial law, and the withdrawal of the
police, but was strongly in favour of course (c).

4. It was unanimously agreed that course (c) should be adopted and that
Viceroy should request Governor to call leaders again, tell them of this decision
and ask if they could agree on a set of local officials in whom they would all
undertake to repose complete confidence, and support in every way. Viceroy
requests that action to this effect should be taken at once and result reported.

5. It was also agreed that local leaders of communities should be asked to
form a Standing Security Committee and meet daily with Governor to review
arrangements.2

2 On 25 June Abell wrote to Abbott with reference to this telegram stating that Lord Mountbatten had
asked him to add that ‘he [Mountbatten] pressed the leaders of both parties very strongly to use their
influence to secure that political pressure is brought to bear at all levels to stop these outrages’.
R/3/1/91: f 30.

344

Minutes of Viceroy's Forty Seventh Staff Meeting, Item 7

Mountbatten Papers

SECRET

Those present during discussion oj Item 7 at this Meeting held at The Viceroy's
House, New Delhi, on 25 June 1947 at 4 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mount¬
batten of Burma, Lord Ismay, SirE. Mieville, Mr Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon,
Mr Christie, Captain Brockman, Mr I. D. Scott, Mr Campbell-] ohnson, Lieutenant-
Colonel Erskine Crum

BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS

The Meeting considered a paper summarising the decisions which were now
required in connection with the setting-up of the Boundary Commissions.1
Reference was made to a telegram2 from the Governor of Assam asking that

JUNE I947

635

there should be appointed for Assam a Boundary Commission separate to that
which was going to deal with the partition of Bengal, his excellency
the viceroy said that, in view of the fact that the Indian Leaders had already
agreed that the Bengal Boundary Commission should deal also with Assam,
and because the establishment of a separate Commission for Assam would
cause further delay, he considered that it was not practicable to accede to the
Governor of Assam’s request.

his excellency said that he intended further to discuss the question of the
chairmanship of the Boundary Commissions at the Partition Committee
Meeting the following day.

It was pointed out that terms of reference for Assam did not include an

instruction to the Boundary Commission concerned to “ . also take

into account other factors.” ins excellency the viceroy said that, in view of
the fact that these terms of reference had been agreed by Pandit Nehru and
Mr Jinnah,1 2 3 he did not proprose to take the initiative in amending them.

Reference was also made to a letter from the Secretary to the Governor of the
Punjab, covering a paper presented to the Governor by Chaudhri Sunder
Singh.4 This asked that the Scheduled Castes should be given representation
on the Boundary Commission, his excellency said that it was not prac¬
ticable to accede to this request as the composition of the Boundary Com¬
mission had already been decided; but Chaudhri Sunder Singh should be
informed that the Boundary Commission would certainly call upon represen¬
tatives of the Scheduled Castes to give evidence before them.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

(i) directed P.S.V. to arrange for a letter to be sent to the Dewan of
Bahawalpur informing him that Bahawalpur’s case would be con¬
sidered by the Punjab Boundary Commission; that he should inform
that Commission of the necessary details ; and be prepared to send a
representative to give evidence before it;

(ii) decided to raise the question of chairmanship of the Boundary
Commissions at the Partition Committee Meeting the following day ;

(iii) directed P.S.V. to ensure that the broadcast which he had made on 3rd
June was among the papers put before the Punjab Boundary Com¬
mission ;

(iv) approved, subject to amendments agreed in discussion, a draft tele-

1 V.C.P. 93 of 25 June. The matters listed as requiring decision were: (a) whether there should be a
separate Boundary Commission for Assam; (b) the method of selecting the Chairmen; (c) whether
the acceptance of the terms of reference of the Boundary Commissions by Pandit Nehru and Mr
Jinnah would be taken as decisive or whether the Sikhs would be ‘further consulted in this respect’ ;
also the method of promulgating the terms of reference. Mountbatten Papers.

2 No. 314.

3 See Nos. 158 and 311, para. 2.

4 Not printed.

636

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

gram to the Governors of Punjab, Bengal and Assam at Annex ‘B’ to
V.C.P. 93 ;5

(v) directed P.S.V. to ask the Secretary to the Governor of the Punjab
to inform Chaudhri Sunder Singh that it was not possible that the
Scheduled Castes should be given representation on the Boundary
Commission; but their case would certainly be heard by the Punjab
Boundary Commission.

5 In this telegram (which issued as tel. 1580-S of 25 June 1947) Lord Mountbatten informed the three
Governors concerned of the position reached regarding the composition and terms of reference of the
Boundary Commissions, and asked the Governors of Punjab and Bengal to obtain the concurrence
of their Chief Justices to the appointment of the Judges nominated to serve on the Boundary Com¬
missions, and to ‘convene Commissions as quickly as possible, and arrange accommodation for them
in Lahore and Calcutta respectively’. He also informed the Governor of Assam, in reply to No. 314,
that: ‘I regret that I am unable to comply with your request for a separate Boundary Commission
for Assam. Leaders have now agreed on composition (except question of chairmen) and terms of
reference, and I am loath to reopen the issue. It took three weeks to get this agreement, and the time
factor does not allow of further major changes’. R/3/1/157: f 60.

345

Lieutenant-General Sir L. Hollis to Mr Alexander1
L/WS/i I1032: ff 69-70

25 June 1947

[. Para . 1 , listing the memoranda to he considered by the India and Burma Committee
that morning, omitted.]

2. The two main issues, from the Defence point of view, arising out of these
Memoranda are as follows :

(a) ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ISLANDS

[Paras. 3-6 summarised the position regarding the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and
suggested that the Minister of Defence mould not ‘ wish to do more than reiterate your
previous statements on this issue’ .]

(b) RELATIONS OF H.M.G. WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN

7. The Viceroy has reported that Gandhi is pressing for an assurance to be
given that H.M.G, will not differentiate in any way between India and Pakistan
in the agreements to be made with each after the transfer of power.

8. The Secretary of State for India sees considerable dangers and disadvan¬
tages for us in acceding to any such proposal, and attached to his Memorandum
(I.B. (47) 124)2 is a draft reply to the Viceroy for consideration by the India and
Burma Committee, advising against committing ourselves to any statement on
the lines Gandhi wishes.

JUNE I947

637

9. 1 feel sure that the Chiefs of Staff would, advise against our being com¬
mitted to any statement which might preclude us from accepting a request by
Pakistan to remain a Dominion while Hindustan elected, to be independent,
and that they would therefore support the views of the Secretary of State for
India in this matter.

1 Sir L. Hollis informed, the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on 25 June that, since the India and Burma
Committee was to meet later that morning, he had already submitted this minute to the Minister of
Defence in order to inform him of the views which he felt the Chiefs of Staff would wish to express.
The Chiefs of Staff approved this action, and invited General Hollis to submit a further minute (i.e.
No. 346) to inform the Minister of Defence of their views expressed in discussion at the Meeting.
L/WS/1/1032: f 68.

2 See No. 360, Minute 3.

346

Lieutenant-General Sir L. Hollis to Mr Alexander

L\WS\ili032: f 71

23 June 1947

I have two further points to bring to your notice before the India and Burma
Committee meeting this morning.

WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES FROM INDIA

2. A telegram1 has just come in this morning from the Viceroy (copy
attached) which the Secretary of State for India may raise at this morning’s
meeting. You will see in Part III2 the Viceroy states that both Nehru and Jinnah
agree to start withdrawing British troops on August 15th, the movement being
completed by about the end of February, 1948. The Chiefs of Staff have seen
this telegram and recommend, from the military point of view, that we agree
to the movement and to the announcement in paragraph 7. As regards the
questions which the Viceroy has put in paragraph 8, the Chiefs of Staff feel that
we should wait until he has consulted the Commander-in-Chief and sent us the
views of the people on the spot.

ANDAMANS AND NICOBARS

3 . The Chiefs of Staff asked me to let you know that they are very worried
about the line taken by the Viceroy about the Andamans and Nicobars. They
attach such importance to these Islands that they feel grave anxiety that we may
lose any control over them if the matter is allowed to be left open for negotia¬
tions at some distant date. They feel strongly that some reference to the
Andamans and Nicobars should be included in the Bill.

1 No. 335.

2 i.e. para. 6 of No. 335.

63 8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

347

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. LB. [47)3 3th Meeting
L/P&J/ 10/123: ff 89-93

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.W.i, on 23 June 1947
at 11.43 am were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Hugh Dalton, Sir S. Cripps, Mr
A. V. Alexander, the Earl of Listowel, Mr C. P. Mayhew, Mr A. G. Bottomley,
Mr Arthur Henderson

Also present were: Viscount Jowitt, Mr W. Whiteley, Sir A. Carter, Mr J. Rowlatt ,
Mr M. J. Clauson; Mr S. E. V. Luke, Mr F. F. Turnbull ( Secretariat )

Minute 1

Recruitment of Gurkha Troops for British Army
the prime minister informed the Committee that he had received a tele¬
gram1 from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff reporting that he had had
talks in Delhi with Pandit Nehru about the grant of facilities for the employ¬
ment of Gurkha troops in the British Army. Pandit Nehru had agreed in
principle that we could proceed in the matter, and had shown the greatest
sympathy and friendliness in die discussions.

The Committee —

Took note of the Prime Minister’s statement.

Minute 2

The British Army in India

(Previous Reference: I.B.(47) 28th Meeting, Minute J)2
theminister ofdefence reminded the Committee that, at their meeting on
28th May, the Viceroy had raised the question of the arrangements to be made
for the withdrawal of the British Army from India. The Committee had
decided to resume consideration of this question after the views of the Chiefs of
Staff had been obtained. In a telegram No. 1570-S of 24th June3 to the Secretary
of State for India, die Viceroy had expressed the view that the correct policy
was to start the withdrawal of the British Forces from India on 15 th August,
the objective being to complete the operation by about the end of February,
1948. Lord Mountbatten had suggested that the way was clear for an early
announcement of our intention to take such action and had asked for authority
to issue a statement on the matter immediately. The Minister was doubtful
whether the stage had yet been reached when a firm date for the transfer of
power could be announced. Apart from this, he thought that the first announce¬
ment regarding the plans for the withdrawal of the British Army should be
made in the Flouse of Commons; a Question on the subject had been put down

JUNE 1947

639

and he had persuaded the Member concerned to postpone it until 2nd July.
The Committee —

Invited the Secretary of State for India to consult with the Minister of
Defence on the terms of the reply to the Viceroy regarding the timing of
the announcement on the question of the withdrawal of the British Army
from India.

Minute 3

Indian Independence Bill

(Previous Reference: 13.(47)3 2nd Meeting, Minute 3)1 2 3 4
the secretary of state for India said that it was hoped that the final
comments of the Viceroy on the draft would be received by the morning of
27th June. Consultation with the Opposition ought to take place this week, so
that the Viceroy could show the draft to the Indian leaders during the weekend,
or at the beginning of the following week.

the prime minister said that he proposed to report the position generally
to the Cabinet at their meeting on 26th June. It was not essential that the final
details of the Bill should be settled before his discussions with the Opposition.

The Committee had before them the following papers circulated by the
Secretary of State for India —

13.(47) 121:5

I.BJ47) 122 :6
13.(47) 123 :7

13.(47) 125 :8

I.BJ47) 126 :9

1 No. 330.

2 Vol. X, No. 553.

3 No. 335-

4 No. 265.

5 No. 323.

6 No. 324.

7 Not printed.

8 Not printed; see note 14 below.

9 Not printed; see note 15 below.

covering a summary of the detailed points on the draft Bill
on which agreement had not been reached with the Viceroy ;
on certain major points on the Bill raised by the Viceroy;
covering the 5th Revise of the draft Bill embodying the
amendments on which the Committee had taken decisions,
other than those still under discussion with the Viceroy;
on the financial obligations arising under Clause 13 of the
draft Bill;

covering telegrams Nos. 1483-S and 1484-S from the Vice¬
roy to the Secretary of State for India, asking for a ruling
whether the lapse of States’ treaties and agreements neces¬
sarily covered commercial, economic or financial agreements
affecting British India, together with the drafts of two tele¬
grams in reply; and

640

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

I.B.(47) 127 :10 on the considerations arising from the proposal put forward

by the Indian political leaders that provision should be made
in the Bill to give effect to guarantees which the Government
of India had agreed to give to those officers of the Secretary
of State’s services after the transfer of power.

The Committee reached the following conclusions on the draft Bill —

Clause 1(3) and elsewhere in the Bill as required: The phrase “the Indian
Dominions” should be changed to “the new Dominions”.

Clause 4: The titles East and West Punjab should be used.

Clauses j(i) and 4(1): The Committee thought that it should be made clear
to the Viceroy that, if the Provinces were partitioned before the appointed
day, the new Governments [? Governors] could be appointed without any
question of formal advice being tended [ ? tendered] to the Crown by
Indian Ministers. If the appointments were made “as from the
appointed day”, there might be a demand by the Dominion Executive
formally to advise the Crown as to who should be appointed, and we
should be forced to decide whether to act on the Canadian or the Australian
precedent. If after considering this point the Viceroy still desired that the
division of Provinces should take place on the appointed day there was no
objection to the Clause beginning “As from the appointed day”.

Clause 1 6: The Committee noted that the Viceroy had come to the firm
conclusion that no provision should be included in the Bill about the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In his view we should have to seek to
obtain such strategic facilities as we might require by negotiations through
the High Commissioner for India in due course. The Committee thought,
however, that the Viceroy should be asked to put to the Indian leaders the
clause to the effect that these Islands would belong to the two Indian
Dominions jointly pending agreement, unless he was convinced that this
would have definitely unfortunate repercussions. It could be put to them
on the basis that His Majesty’s Government thought that this would be a
convenient arrangement as between the two Dominions. The Viceroy
should, however, be informed that, if the Indian leaders could not agree to
it, we should be prepared to omit any reference to these Islands from the
Bill and to leave our interests to be dealt with by negotiation with the
new Dominion of India alone.

Clause 21(3): The Committee agreed that an addition should be made to
the proviso to make it clear that representatives of the Tribal areas are not
precluded from participation in the Constituent Assemblies.

Further points discussed on the Bill were —

(a) The Committee noted that agreement had not yet been reached with the

JUNE 1947

641

Viceroy on the terms of Clause 6 of the draft Bill.11 The original intention had
been merely to give the Constituent Assembly in each Dominion full power to
legislate until further provision was made by them in exercise of their con¬
stituent powers. It was, however, understood to be the desire of the Congress
leaders that specific provision should be made in the Bill for the Constitution
established by the Government of India Act, 1935, to be made applicable (sub¬
ject to necessary modifications) separately in each of the two Indian Dominions
until such time as other provision was made by the Constituent Assembly. The
Committee agreed that the draft12 of the new Clause 8 handed to the Com¬
mittee at the meeting should be communicated to the Viceroy, with whom the
ultimate choice between the original provisions of the draft and the new Clause
should be left.

(b) The Committee considered that provisions should be made in the Bill to
give effect to the two guarantees which the Government of India had agreed
to give to those officers of the Secretary of State’s Services, who continued in
service after the transfer of power.13 They felt that it would be inexpedient to
fail to take advantage of the offer made by the Indian leaders in this matter. On
the other hand, they felt that there were substantial arguments against the
inclusion of such a Clause in the Bill. The fact that it would be confined to the
Secretary of State’s Services would make the members of other services feel
that they had inferior security as to their future. It was very likely that the
question would be raised in Parliament why no statutory guarantees were given
for these other classes and His Majesty’s Government might be pressed to make
such provision. The Committee were satisfied, therefore, that this Clause could
be included only on the understanding that, when the Viceroy showed the Bill
to the Indian leaders, he would obtain their express concurrence in it and their
agreement that it should be stated in Parliament that the Clause had been in¬
cluded at the direct request of the Indian Interim Government. The Com¬
mittee also thought that the words “to receive from the Government of the
Dominion or Province in which he is from time to time serving” should be
added after the words “entitled to” in the draft Clause suggested by the Indian
Interim Government. This was necessary to make it clear that the Clause
outlined a guarantee by the Government of India and not by His Majesty’s
Government.

10 No. 325.

11 See No. 324, paras. 3-5.

12 L/P &J/10/123 : f 81 ; not printed. This draft was the same, except for minor amendment, as Clause 8
in No. 428.

13 See No. 325.

642

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(c) The Committee considered the suggestion in paragraph 7 of 1.13.(47)
12514 that Clause 13(1) of the draft Bill should be deleted, but their view was
that this would be inadvisable. The justification for including a reference in this
Clause to the Secretary of State and not to the Indian High Commissioner in
London lay in the fact that the Secretary of State was under the control of
Parliament. If no reference was made, the matter would undoubtedly be raised
in Parliament.

(d) The Committee agreed with the terms of the draft telegrams annexed to
I.B.(47) 12615 on the question whether the lapse of States’ treaties and agree¬
ments necessarily covered agreements of a commercial, economic or financial
character.

The Committee —

(1) Took note that the Prime Minister would inform the Cabinet at their
meeting on 26th June of the position with regard to the draft Indian
Independence Bill and of the procedure proposed for consultation with
the Opposition and the Indian political leaders.

(2) Invited the Secretary of State for India to consult the Viceroy further
on the terms of the draft Bill in accordance with the conclusions
reached in their discussion.

(3) Invited the Secretary of State for India to telegraph to the Viceroy as
proposed in I.B.(47) 126.

14 Para. 7 of Paper 1.13.(47)125 of 24 June 1947 summarised the exchange in Nos. 249 and 271 regarding
Clause 13(1) of the draft Bill (No. 191) and pointed out that, as a result, the only portion of the
Clause now remaining was that which authorised the Secretary of State to continue to perform
‘agency’ functions similar to those which he was performing on the appointed day. The memoran¬
dum proceeded to the conclusion that this portion was not worth retaining. L/P &J/10/123 :
ff 108-111.

15 Paper 1.6.(47)126 of 24 June 1947 drew attention to No. 279, para. 2, and to Nos. 246 and 247, and
circulated drafts of the telegrams at No. 349 and its note 4. L/P &J/10/123 : ff 112-18.

348

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram, L/P &Jj 10)123: ff 78-9

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 2j June 1947 , 2.$0 pin

secret Received: 25 June, 8pm

8156. Cabinet Committee considered this morning1 your telegram 18-S.K.2
and other telegrams commenting on draft Bill.3

2. In view of strong views expressed on point taken on Clause 6(1) and (7) in
paragraph 3 of 18-S.K. in Menon’s telegrams4 and in your 19-S.K.,5 we are
prepared to meet your views. We are, however, satisfied that this cannot be

JUNE I947

643

satisfactorily done without more substantial amendments than you propose.
Parliamentary draftsman has substantially revised and rearranged Bill to pro¬
duce desired effect. Text of amendments is contained in my immediately
preceding telegram6 with duplicates by air mail.

3. Time is getting very short. We must show Bill in substantially its final
form to Opposition on Friday. We should give them week-end to study Bill
and obtain their views on Monday. We should hope then to be able to enable
you to consult Indian leaders. For this programme to be followed we must
know without fail by Friday morning whether you desire amendments in the
manner proposed in my immediately preceding telegram or existing layout.
We are quite satisfied that there is no via media and in view of time shortage we
must ask you to choose one or other. We should be willing of course to con¬
sider minor amendments to text of revised passages at a later stage but could not
alter the main layout after showing it to Opposition.

4. Even on this programme we only have one week for consultation with
Indians and any alterations resulting from them and this is not much time since
Opposition will have to be consulted on any important alterations desired by
Indians.

1 No. 347, Minute 3.

2 No. 286.

3 See No. 191.

4 Nos. 255 and 290.

5 No. 293.

6 The revision and rearrangement indicated by this telegram (No. 8155 of 25 June 1947) was as follows:

(i) A completely new Clause 8, entitled ‘Temporary provision as to government of each of the
new Dominions’, was inserted;

(ii) Existing Clause 8 was renumbered as Clause 9 and its existing sub-sections (1) and (2) were
replaced by a single new sub-section (1), existing sub-sections (3)-(6) being renumbered

(iii) Existing Clause 9 was completely omitted and a new Clause 10, entitled Secretary of State s
services, etc.’, inserted.

The text of the new Clauses was the same, except for minor verbal differences, as Clauses 8, 9(1) and
10 of No. 428. The telegram also indicated the consequential amendments made necessary by these
major changes. L/P &J/10/123 : ff 80-82.

349

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &J/ 10/102: ff 78-80

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 25 June I947, J.JO pm

secret Received : 25 June , 9 pm

8162. Your telegrams 1483-S and 1484-S.1 States agreements. FI.M.G. fully
appreciate importance attached by your Reforms Department to avoidance if

1 Nos. 246 and 247.

644

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

possible of complete severance of relations with States and necessity for
negotiations between parties over whole field. But we consider views of Political
Department must be accepted and are in line with our policy as stated in Cabinet
Mission memorandum of May 12th 1946.2 It is impossible to distinguish
between agreements freely negotiated and those imposed. In any case all were
made under the authority of the Crown and not of the executive governments,
central or provincial, of British India.

2. It might perhaps originally have been possible to proceed on some such
lines as suggested by the Reforms Department and have assumed that provisions
of treaties and agreements will remain in force until denounced or replaced by
fresh agreements, the only essential initial denouncement being the termination
of all rights and obligations exercised by the Crown Representative on behalf
of His Majesty. This would have left States and Provinces and the two new
Central Governments as inheritors of all rights and obligations not falling
strictly within the field of paramountcy control over the States, thus preserving
the status quo until changed by financial and economic agreements without of
course impeding their future libery of action.

3 . However that may be, it is now too late to consider the merits or demerits
of such a course since a different attitude was taken in paragraph 5 of the
Cabinet Mission’s memorandum of 12th May which definitely states that
“political arrangements between the States on the one side and the British
Crown and British India on the other” would be brought to an end and that the
void will have to be filled. It is we think impossible in the context to interpret
“political” in a narrow sense as excluding financial or economic arrangements.
The statement of 3rd June3 specifically endorsed the memorandum of 12th May
1946. We must abide by this and we think it is inevitable that we must make the
position clear in some more formal way than a Government statement. In any
case Parliament would require this.

4. We think that much the best method is to make specific provision in the
Bill. Individual formal denouncement by the Crown State by State seems much
too elaborate a process and would also involve the difficult question of how to
deal with those who have no written treaty relation. One single instrument of
denunciation by His Majesty might be possible but this would be politically
undesirable. Accordingly we think we should retain sub-section 7(1) (b) of the
Bill in the latest revise sent to you subject only to the modification indicated in
the immediately succeeding telegram4 to make it plain that obligations are
covered as well as rights. In your telegram of 20th June5 you do not give your
reasons for deprecating denunciation in the Bill. We admit there are some
objections but we think any other course would lead us into worse difficulties.

5. The whole question of the status of existing agreements is we consider a

JUNE 1947

645

practical rather than a legal issue and are convinced that the line that you took at
your meeting on the 13 th June6 is correct, namely that it is essential to bring
about direct agreement between parties in regard to their future relations over
the whole field. I gather from the documents forwarded with Crum’s letter of
17th June to Harris7 that the draft of a standstill arrangement8 as envisaged in
para. 4 of the memorandum of 12th May is already in existence as a basis for
discussion.

6. You will probably wish to consider making some communication to
States either when Bill is introduced or when it receives assent.

2 Vol. VII, No. 262.

3 No. 45, para. x8.

4 In tel. 8163 of 25 June 1947 Lord Listowel transmitted the full text as revised of Clause 7(i)(b) and
also Clause 7(i)(c). This text was the same as that in No. 428. L/P &J/10/102: f 81.

5 No. 279, para. 2.

6 No. 175, Item 1.

7 This letter forwarded copies of the Briefs (Enclosures 1-3 to No. 146) prepared for the meeting of
13 June (No. 175, Item 1) and copies of the letters sent to Residents after it (Nos. 197 and 198).
L/P &J/10/102: ff 129-38.

8 See No. 198.

350

The Earl of Listowel to Sir Hartley Shawcross
L/PO/61122 : f 228

top secret India office, 25 June ig4y

As you will doubdess be aware we have of late been hard at work at the draft
Indian Independence Bill at the cost of much midnight oil. Up to this stage I
have refrained from troubling you but I feel that the draft Bill has now reached
a sufficiently firm state to ask you to be good enough to have a look at it. I
therefore enclose a copy of the 5 th Revise1 of the Bill.

I should explain that, broadly speaking, the draft Bill has been devised on the
principle that its object is to tide over an interim period in India until the
respective Constituent Assemblies have had time to work out constitutions for
the two new Dominions. We understand from the Viceroy, however, that it
has been strongly represented to him in India that the principle underlying the
Bill ought rather to be that the provisions of the 1935 Act, in so far as they relate
to the Central Government and the Provinces and to the relations between
them, ought to continue in operation in both of the new Dominions to the
maximum possible extent and the draft amendments, of which I also send you a
printed copy, have been designed to meet this point of view.

1 This intermediate draft has not been printed.

646

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Following a meeting of the India and Burma Committee this morning2 the
draft amendments have been telegraphed3 to the Viceroy (who should by now
have received by air mail a copy of the 5 th Revise of the Bill) who has been
asked to let us know definitely by Friday morning whether he prefers the Bill
as it stands in the 5th Revise or subject to the amendments in the separate print.

I hope what I have said above will give you a sufficient indication of the
considerations underlying the present draft and the draft amendments to it. If
you should have any comments to offer on the draft or on the amendments at
the present stage, 1 should indeed be grateful if you would let me have them as
soon as you can.

LISTOWEL

2 No. 347, minute 3.

3 See No. 348, note 6.

351

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L[P &Jf 10/12 3: Jf 36-8

most immediate India office, 25 June 1947, 7.30 pm

top secret Received: 26 June , 2 am

8184. My telegram 8156.1 Cabinet Committee today2 reached following con¬
clusions on other outstanding points dealt with in previous correspondence
with you as follows. References in this telegram are to Edition of Bill Num¬
bered uo-43 enclosed with TumbulFs letter to Abell of 13th June.4

Clause 1, sub-Clause 3. “the Indian Dominions” will be changed to “the new
Dominions”.

Clause 4. The titles East and West Punjab will be used. Necessary consequen¬
tial amendments have been made on copy of 5 th Edition of Bill marked A5
sent to Abell with letter of 20th June.

Clauses 3(1) and 4(1). We are prepared to agree to “As from the appointed
day” provided that you feel this is still desirable when you have considered my
telegram No. 81856 which is issuing simultaneously. The point is that if
Provinces are split before appointed day, new Governors can be appointed
without any question of formal advice being tendered to Crown by Indian
Ministers. If the appointments are made as from appointed day there may be
demand by Dominion Executive formally to advise Crown as to who should be
appointed and we should be forced to decide whether to act on the Canadian

JUNE 1947

647

or the Australian precedent whereas this question should be decided by the
form of the ultimate constitution.

Clause 21(3). Words will be added to proviso to this clause in sense you
suggest. Precise text will be telegraphed later. I telegraph separately7 about
Clause 16. Point raised by you on Clause 6(1) and (7) has been covered by major
amendments in my telegram 8 155. 8

2. Last paragraph of your telegram 1481-S.9 Clause in terms proposed by
you1 0 has been included in amendments already telegraphed as sub-Clause 2 of
Clause io.11 There are substantial arguments against its inclusion. These are
briefly that fact that it is confined to Secretary of State’s services will make non
Secretary of State personnel feel that they have inferior security as to their future
and that it does not cover comparable personnel such as judges who have been
appointed by Crown. We may be asked in Parliament why no statutory
guarantee is given for these other classes and pressed to make such provision.
We are therefore clear that we can only include this clause provided that when
you show the Bill to Indian leaders you get their express concurrence to it and
their agreement that we should state in Parliament that it has been included at
the direct request of the Indian Interim Government. We feel the difficulty of
rejecting such a request and are prepared on that basis to include it subject to the
addition of the words given in sub-paragraph (3) of para. 1 of my telegram
8 1 76. 12 These are necessary to make it clear that this clause enshrines a guarantee
by the Indians and not by H.M.G.

1 No. 348.

2 No. 347, Minute 3 ; see also Nos. 323 and 324.

3 No. 191.

4 No. 189.

5 This intermediate draft has not been printed.

6 No. 352.

7 No. 353.

8 No. 348, note 6.

9 No. 249.

10 No. 286, para. 8.

11 See No. 348, note 6.

12 Tel. 8176 of 25 June communicated minor amendments to the major revision outlined in No. 348,
note 6. The words to be inserted in Clause 10(2) were: ‘receive from the Governor of the Dominion
of Province in which he is from time to time serving’. L/P &J/10/123 : f 76. For the Clause as finally
embodied in the draft Bill as shown to the Indian leaders, see No. 428, Clause 10(2).

648

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

352

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram, L/P &J/ 10/141: jf 163-5

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 25 June I947 , Q.40 pm

secret Received: 26 June, 7 am

8185. I have been considering the position of the Governors of split Provinces
as from the appointed day.1 You will observe that there is no special provision
in the Bill about this and situation will be that as from the date of partition the
existing Governors’ appointments will lapse. It will be necessary for you or for
the Governor before division takes place to make an Order under Clause 8
modifying the Government of India Act 1935 in relation to the new Provinces
and providing for the Legislature to be split into two new Legislatures (pre¬
sumably the parts of the Legislature which have determined the question of
partition). It will also be necessary for the Crown to issue letters patent con¬
stituting the offices of Governors of East and West Bengal and East and West

2. Difficult question arises as to how these new appointments are to be filled.
Provinces are not given Dominion status by the Bill and therefore Ministers in
Provinces are not, as Dominion Ministers are, Ministers who are entitled to
advise the Crown. I understand that in Australia which has a Federal Dominion
constitution, Governors of States are appointed by the Crown on the advice of
the Secretary of State for the Dominions. The Governor General of Australia
does not come into the matter at all but private correspondence takes place
between the Secretary of State (normally through the retiring Governor) and
the State Ministry or the leading party in the Legislature and various unofficial
methods are used of sounding opinion as to who should be appointed. It is
doubtful whether we should do anything to encourage the idea that the Central
Go vermnent of each Indian Dominion is entitled to advise the Crown on the
appointment of a Governor in a Province within that Dominion, although it
may be that the new constitutions when framed will be such that that will be
the position. This would be the case if the Canadian practice were followed.
Under the Canadian Constitution the Lieutenant Governors of the Canadian
Provinces are appointed by the Governor General in Council i.e. on the advice
of the Dominion Government. Moreover strictly speaking the question does
not arise in regard to the appointments made with effect from the appointed
day because those appointments must be made before any form of Ministry
can be set up and therefore there is no Ministry to advise.

3. I suggest that you instruct Governors of Bengal and the Punjab, if it splits,
to prepare the necessary order and also to consult the political leaders as to who

JUNE I947

649

they wish should be appointed Governor. Language should be used which
gives no ground for them to allege that they have a constitutional right to
advise the Crown. The position is that the Crown in fact takes steps to ascertain
opinion but is not formally advised by Ministers on this matter.

4. Under the Bill emoluments of Governors remain as fixed by the Govern¬
ment of India Act and instruments thereunder. They are alterable only by law
of the Dominion or by Governor or Governor General’s Order. It may be that
the split Provinces cannot be expected to pay new Governors the emoluments
previously paid to Governor of the whole. It seems necessary to raise this
matter with the leaders in each part of the Province as it can be pointed out to
them that whoever they desire should accept the position will wish to know
what his emoluments will be. Question of course also arises of accommodation
for the new Governor of one part of the Province.

5. I do not think consultation with provincial leaders on this can take place
until the Bill is published but immediately thereupon I suggest that the Gover¬
nors concerned take the matter up as it is one which may be raised in Parlia¬
ment.2

1 cf. Nos. 324, para. 2, and 347, Minute 3.

2 On 27 June 1947 Mr Attlee sent a Minute to Lord Listowel commenting that he understood ‘that
you were not in touch with the Palace’ before this telegram was despatched. ‘I think it is desirable
that in matters of this kind the Palace should be kept informed before telegrams of this nature are
sent.’ Prime Minister’s Personal Minute M. 259/47. L/PO/11/4: f 40.

353

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram, L/P &JI10I140: f 11

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 2j June 1947, 11 pm

top secret Received: 26 June, 7 nm

8194. Andamans. Your telegram 11-S.K.1 was considered by Cabinet Com¬
mittee today.2 You had not when it was despatched seen text of proposed new
clause which you will find as Clause 153 in edition of Bill forwarded by
Turnbull to Abell with letter of 20th June. Committee felt that sub-Clause (a)
of this should go far to make it acceptable to Indians and unless you are strongly
of the view that inclusion of this clause in the draft to be shown to Indian
leaders will seriously prejudice chances of their accepting the Bill we should
like you to put the Clause to them on the basis that we suggested4 as a con-

1 No. 284. 2 No. 347, Minute 3. 3 See No. 324, note 9. 4 No. 258.

650

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

venient arrangement as between the two Dominions. If however the Indian
leaders cannot agree to it being included we should be prepared to omit it and
leave our interests in the matter to be dealt with by negotiation with the new
Dominion of India only.5

If it is omitted consequential omission of Clause 2(4) is required.6

5 ‘the new Dominion of India only’ deciphered as ‘any Dominion to India only’. Mountbatten Papers,
Official Correspondence Files: Indian Independence Bill — Draft Bill, Part 1(b).

6 An additional sub-Clause (4) had been added to Clause 2 in No. 191 which read: ‘The provisions of
this section shall have effect subject to the special provisions of this Act relating to the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands’. L/P &J/10/123 : f 138V.

354

Meeting oj the Special Committee of the Indian Cabinet
Mountbatten Papers. Partition Committee Minutes

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held on 26 June 1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , Sardar Patel , Dr Rajendra
Prasad , Mr Abdur Rab Nishtar ; Lord Ismay, Sir E. Mieville , Mr Mohamad Ali ,
Mr H. M. Patel, Mr Osman Ali ( Secretariat )

Also present for Items iv, vi and vii were: Sardar Baldev Singh , Field Marshal
Auchinleck

MINUTES

i. Procedure for the appointment of Governors of Provinces
His Excellency stated that it would be necessary to decide who would be the
appointing authority for Governors of the two Dominions. There was no
uniform practice; in Canada, for example, such appointments were made on
the recommendation of the Govemor-General-in-Council whereas in Australia
the State Governments advised on this subject. His own opinion was that the
Canadian practice was the more suitable one. It was also necessary to give some
indication to the present Governors as to whether they would be kept on after
the 15th of August. As far as the Governors of the Punjab and Bengal were
concerned they had informed him that they would ask to be relieved of their
offices as it would be embarrassing for them to serve in either part of those
provinces after division.

Sardar Patel said that the Congress preferred the Canadian method; Mr
Liaquat Ali Khan said he wished to consider the matter further and would
give his reply the following day.

It was agreed that recommendations on the above questions would be made
in consultation with the leaders of the two parties and should bind the respective
successor Governments.1

JUNE 1947

65I

ii. The replacement oj the Special Committee of the Cabinet by the Partition Council
His Excellency said that the question of the date on which the present Special
Committee should be replaced by the Partition Council and the composition
of the latter had to be settled. He suggested that as the Punjab, Bengal and Sind
had all voted in favour of Partition, in accordance with the decision previously
taken,2 the Partition Council should be set up immediately. It would be
composed of three members from the Congress, and three from the League,
but meetings would be attended by only two members from each party. The
Viceroy would be in the chair as at present. It was agreed that the first meeting
of the Partition Council should be on the following day and that before then,
Sardar Patel and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan should intimate to the Cabinet Secretary
the names of the members their respective parties wished to nominate on the
Council.

iii. Preliminary arrangements for the setting up of the Central Pakistan Government
in Karachi

His Excellency said he was faced on two occasions during the war with prob¬
lems similar to those which now faced the future Government of Pakistan
when he had to move the Headquarters of South East Asia Command first
from Delhi to Kandy and then to Singapore. He could appreciate, therefore, the
difficulties of the Pakistan Government and he hoped the committee would
agree to the requests for assistance made on its behalf and accord them top
priority.

In the course of subsequent discussion the following points were made:

(1) The original note which had come through the Steering Committee
was acceptable as it provided for demands being vetted by the Steering
Committee. The revised note3 of the Hon’ble Mr Liaquat Ah Khan,
however, sought a general directive from the Partition Council to all
departments to meet demands without providing for their prior scrutiny.
Some of the requests in the latter list could not be agreed to. It would
not be possible, for example, to spare a Government press for the use of
the Pakistan Government because the existing number of Government
presses was inadequate to cope with the work they had to do.

(2) The question was raised whether it was in order for a member of the
Council to send any paper direct and not through the Steering Com¬
mittee for consideration in the Council. After some discussion, it was
agreed that a member was entitled to bring up any subject directly
before the Partition Council, if necessary and without its having been

1 In tel. 1704-S of 2 July 1947 Lord Mountbatten referred to No. 256, para. 6, and notified Lord
Listowel that both Congress and the League had informed him that they wished appointments to
Governorships to be made on advice of respective Dominion Governments. L/P &J/10/141: f 155.

2 No. 100, Item 1, conclusion (iv).

3 Both the original and revised notes may be found in Mountbatten Papers, Partition Committee
Papers.

652

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

first passed through the Steering Committee, care being taken, save in
exceptional circumstances, to see that the Steering Committee had
sufficient time to examine the proposals involved, and if necessary to
brief the concerned members of the Council. If this were not conceded
the work of the Council, which was the body to take all high level
decisions, would be impeded.

Summing up, His Excellency said the Committee was agreed that the
original note should be accepted and top priority given both to the con¬
sideration of the matters mentioned in it and to the execution of non-contro-
versial items. A list of items in the revised note which were considered
controversial might be drawn up by the Steering Committee together with
brief notes on each point which would assist the Council in arriving at a
decision and be placed before the Council at its meeting tomorrow.

DECISION

The Committee agreed —

(1) that the procedure for meeting any of the requirements in the note
submitted by the Steering Committee should be as indicated in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of that note and that the approved demands
should receive top priority.

(2) that the Steering Committee should place before the Partition Council
for the consideration at its meeting tomorrow a note dealing with the
request for the transfer of a Press and any other controversial items.

(3) that members of the Partition Council would be entitled to bring up
matters directly before the Council, it being understood that the
Steering Committee should, as far as possible, be given sufficient time
before the meeting to enable them to examine the proposals in
question, and to brief, where necessary, the members of the Council
on such subjects.

iv. A note4 by the Commander-in-Chief on the retention of British Officers in India
His Excellency said that it must be recognised that the process of nationalisation
and the division of the armed forces could not proceed together. In effect this
would mean that the special programme of nationalisation would in the
meantime have to be put on ice and that division would have to be given
preference. That would mean retaining a proportion of British officers in the
Dominion Governments for some time. He had discussed this question with the
Cabinet in London which was generally agreeable to some officers being kept
on provided they were first transferred to the British service. They might
perhaps be known as belonging to the British service (Indian Branch). A similar
method had been adopted by the other dominions of the Commonwealth
when they were building up their armed forces. British officers, however,
could only be asked to volunteer to stay on and not be compelled to do so. He
did not, however, anticipate much trouble on this score although in the past

JUNE I947

653

year many of them had been discouraged by the communal troubles and the
prevailing uneasiness in the country. A paper was being prepared on the
proposed terms on which these officers might be kept on, and it would be put
to the Partition Council.

The Commander-in-Chief explained that it was essential to avoid the
possibility of chaos in the Units, and every effort will be made to retain the
British officers as far as possible in the Units in which they were now serving
during the process of reconstitution. He emphasised the desirability of the
leaders making it known that they wished some British officers to stay on for a
time in order to help the dominion Governments to build up their armed
forces. If this were done they would be assured of getting the required number
of officers who would give of their best.

In the course of subsequent discussion, the following points were made:

(1) It was desirable to retain some British officers for such purposes as
training Indians to take their place but they should not be used to quell
communal trouble. The Indian Parties had been accused in the past of
relying on British arms to put down communal rioting and further
charges of that nature must be avoided. His Excellency undertook to
prepare a draft common message to British officers for the consideration
of both parties. This message would be put out by the Partition Council
expressing its desire that officers should stay on and assist in the building
up of the two Dominion forces.

(2) As was proposed to be done in the case of Indian officers, British officers
also might be given the option of deciding in which of the two domin¬
ions they would prefer to serve. It was pointed out, however, that this
would be a wrong approach calculated to put into their heads the idea of
taking sides. In any particular case where an officer had strong personal
reasons for serving in a particular area, he could ask for transfer to another
unit in that area.

DECISION

The Committee approved His Excellency’s proposal to have a paper prepared
in the light of today’s discussion, and in consultation with Sir Chandulal
Trivedi, among others. The paper should be placed before the Partition Council
for consideration on Monday next.

v. Letter5 regarding option to Secretary oj State’s Officers issued in anticipation of
approval

4 No. 312.

5 A circular letter dated 21 June 1947 was issued by the Partition Office to all Officers of the Secretary
of State’s Services in order to ascertain how many of those wishing to continue in service after the
transfer of power would wish to serve under the Government of Pakistan. This followed an earlier
circular, dated 18 June 1947, asking Officers to indicate their intentions regarding their continuance
in service after the transfer of power and their wishes in respect of any possible transfer to another
Province. Mountbatten Papers, Partition Committee Papers.

654

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The Committee took note of the letter,
vi. Division of Armed Forces

His Excellency said he had discussed the question of the division of the army
with the Commander-in-Chief and they were both in agreement that the two
Dominions should each have an operational Commander-in-Chief responsible
for the forces in their respective territories. Until the division was completed
administrative control for the whole of the Army would be with a joint
Headquarters under the Commander-in-Chief. This general administration
related to matters such as food, clothing, equipment, ordnance and medical
supplies and moving of units from one Dominion to another. Meanwhile, the
disposition of troops would be so arranged that by the 15th of August or as
soon thereafter as might be possible there would be a maximum number of
troops in the respective dominions to which they belonged.

The Commander-in-Chief explained that in order to avoid a breakdown,
the process of transferring administrative control would have to be done by
stages but it would proceed as rapidly as possible. Details would have to be
worked out by the Expert Committees and approved by the Partition Council.
Each dominion would thus gradually be building up its own administrative
organisation. For some time to come it would be necessary to continue certain
establishments under joint control until each dominion was in a position to take
over the whole work. This control could be exercised by the Joint Head¬
quarters, the policy being determined by a Defence Council consisting of the
Governor General or Governors General, the two Defence Ministers and the
Commander-in-Chief or alternatively by the Partition Council with which
might be associated the Defence Members of the two Dominions.

In the course of subsequent discussion it was pointed out that under existing
circumstances, tension would be greatest in the areas through which the
boundaries would be drawn between Pakistan and the rest of India. There was
a possibility of a clash of operational control over the two armies in that area
and it was necessary to avoid such a contingency. The suggestion was made that
the boundary commissions which would be required to finish their work by the
15 th August might be asked to stay on for two or three months to exercise joint
control over such areas and secure a common policy for the operation of troops
in them. Alternatively, a common policy could be evolved by the proposed
Defence Council. This would be a matter for the Partition Council to consider.

In answer to a question the Commander-in-Chief said that the basis for
division of the armed forces was primarily a matter for the Armed Forces
Reconstitution Committee to decide but he thought that a suitable guiding
principle on which the Expert Committees could start work would be to move
units composed predominantly of Muslims and of non-Muslims to Pakistan
and to rest of India respectively.

Summing up, His Excellency said the Committee seemed to be agreed in

JUNE 1947

655

principle that operational command should pass to the respective dominions
but that joint administration should remain with a common body until such
time as it could be transferred to the respective dominions. He would prepare a
paper in the light of today’s discussion for consideration by the Partition
Council on Monday.

His Excellency went on to request the Commander-in-Chief to prepare two
separate panels of names of officers considered suitable for appointment as
operational Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of the two dominions and to
discuss these lists separately with each party.

vii. Withdrawal of British Army

H.E. said that Field Marshal Montgomery has discussed6 with Pandit Nehru
and Mr Jinnah the question of the rate of withdrawal of the British Army from
India after the 15th of August. H.M.G.’s views were that the withdrawal of
British Units should commence on the 15 th of August, proceed gradually and
be completed by the end of February, 1948, at the latest.

viii. Boundary Commissions

H.E. said that at the time of giving the Boundary Commissions their terms of
reference he proposed to hand over to them certain documents, namely, a
copy of his broadcast,7 the letter8 of the Dewan of Bahawalpur regarding the
Sutlej and the use of its waters and the scheduled castes’ request9 for special
consideration.

After some discussion, it was agreed that as it would be open to interested
parties to submit any documents which they wished to be considered direct to
the Boundary Commissions they need be given nothing beyond their terms of
reference.

H.E. further said that all parties had unanimously expressed the opinion that
it was most desirable that the Boundary Commissions should finish their work
by the 15th of August. If this was to be done, it would be necessary, he felt, to
modify the previous decision10 that the Commissions should elect their own
Chairmen. In his view it would expedite work if the Partition Council could
agree upon the names of two eminent men enjoying the confidence of both
parties to serve as Chairmen and having a casting vote. He had accordingly
asked the Secretary of State if he could suggest suitable persons for appointment
as Chairmen and the latter had recommended Sir Cyril Radcliffe,11 a man of
high integrity, legal reputation, and wide experience. If it proved difficult to

6 Nos. 315, 329 and 337.

7 No. 44.

8 Not traced; but see No. 101, penultimate para, and No. 246, para. 5.

9 R/3/I/I57: ff 37-8.

10 No. 175, Item 2, conclusion (v).

11 In fact, in the correspondence between Lord Mountbatten and Lord Listowel regarding Sir
C. Radcliffe, he had so far been mentioned only as a possible Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal
(No. 135, note 1, and No. 224, note 2). See also, however, No. 311, para. 2.

656

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

find any other person he would suggest that Sir Cyril might be considered for
the Chairmanship of both Boundary Commissions. The advantage of such a
course would be that Sir Cyril Radcliffe would be enabled to adjust any slight
loss one State might have to suffer in one particular area by compensating it in
another and generally to see that justice was done uniformly to all claims.
Further if, as was probable, the work of the Arbitral Tribunal would arise
mostly after the 15 th of August, it might be possible to retain Sir Cyril for that
work also. The idea generally appealed to the members and they agreed to
consider it further. H.E. for his part agreed to write formally to Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan asking them to consider the
suitability of Sir Cyril Radcliffe and setting out details of his experience and the
terms on which he might be invited to come to India. His fees would be
debited to the general expenses of Partition,
ix. Reconstitution of Governments at the Centre and in Bengal
His Excellency said that the decision to partition the country and divide Bengal
necessitated the reconstitution of both the Central Government and the Bengal
Government. These appeared to him to be inter-related matters which would
have to be considered together. He was of the view that the best way of
handling the situation in Bengal was to appoint Congress ministers for West
Bengal, and to give them the right to veto any action, which they considered
was likely to be harmful to the interests of West Bengal. Mr. Jinnah, with
whom he had discussed the matter approved of this idea, and he had com¬
municated it to the Governor of Bengal.12 It had occurred to him since that the
position at the Centre was no different from that in Bengal, and an identical
course of action should be pursued. He had accordingly asked the Governor of
Bengal to stay his hand until a decision was reached in regard to the Centre.

He would have liked the present arrangement to continue at the Centre but
if that were done, it would be only fair to make corresponding arrangements
for Bengal by appointing a coalition ministry.

In the course of subsequent discussion the following points were made : —

(1) The two cases were not parallel. In Bengal a ministry was functioning
which was responsible to and commanded a majority in the provincial legis¬
lature whereas the Executive Council Members at the Centre were not respon¬
sible to the Central Legislature.

(2) It was necessary to consider this question on a commonsense basis
rather than by a legalistic approach. Only then would our action command
public confidence.

(3) A possible solution would be to have two Cabinets at the Centre, one
dealing with Pakistan and the other with the rest of India. No decision would
be taken by either which was likely to affect the interest of the other without
mutual consultation. Under this scheme there would, of course, be only a
single Secretary in each Department who would put up papers to the Member

JUNE 1947

657

concerned. Correspondingly, in Bengal Congress Ministers would have to be
appointed for the Western part of the Province.

(4) Since the economy of the country was at present integrated it would be
impossible to ensure that any proposed action would apply only to one part
and not to the whole country. The best working arrangement would be to
lay down that all action would be taken only by mutual agreement between the
two parties in the present Central Government.

(5) Another course would be to replace the present Central Government by
Congress Members who would hold the portfolios and appoint League
Members who would have a watching brief on behalf of Pakistan and see all
papers. The League Members would have the right to veto any decision which
they considered prejudicial to the interests of Pakistan. Corresponding to this
set-up at the Centre, Congress Ministers could be appointed in Bengal with a
watching brief while the League Members would hold the portfolios.

(6) If action on any of the lines indicated were to be taken it would be
necessary to make similar provision for Sylhet also.

Summing up, His Excellency said that he himself was in favour of the
continuance of the present Government at the Centre with a strict adherence
to the ‘stand-still’ agreement and a coalition Government or regional Govern¬
ments in Bengal. That was calculated to hold up least the work of partition. The
other two alternatives were the ones set out at (3) and (5) above. He requested
the members of the Partition Council to consider these alternatives carefully
and to discuss them or any other arrangement they could think of with him on
the following day.

12 See No. 311, para. 3.

355

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: States , Relations with, Part 11(a)
1446/32 26 June 1947

Lord Ismay has shown me your letter of June 19th1 and the Note on the States
which you sent with it.

2. You will not expect me to comment in detail on the views expressed. I
do agree, however, that accommodation between the States and the two
Dominions is most desirable. This will, I hope, be secured at the meeting next
month between representatives of the authorities concerned, i.e. the Dominions

No. 264.

1

658

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

and the States, who must, of course, decide between themselves what their
future relationship is to be. I myself, I need hardly add, will do what I can to
promote an agreed settlement.

Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN

356

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten °fB urma

R bill 153 :.ff 234-5

SECRET EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI,

26 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

It has been announced in the press and on the radio that legislation is going to
be introduced in Parliament in regard to amending the Government of India
Act on or about July 7th. You were good enough to inform us that before any
legislation was so introduced, we would have an opportunity of examining it.
It would be unfortunate if the draft was finally prepared and there was some¬
thing in it to which we took strong exception. Although the main fines have
been agreed upon, it is a matter of vital importance what the approach should
be.

The question is not one of repealing the Government of India Act but of
amending it. Any repeal would create grave difficulties and would leave us
without any kind of a constitution. In fact, you mentioned in your broadcast1
that one of the reasons for giving Dominion Status was to enable India to have
a constitution until the Constituent Assembly made a new constitution.

The amending Act would confer Dominion Status on India and delimit the
territory of India by the exclusion of the seceding areas. It would constitute the
Constituent Assembly into a sovereign legislature with power necessarily to
amend the Constitution Act as it thought fit. It would thus bring this Act into
line with the Statute of Westminster. The Act would apply to all the territories
of India, with the exception of those that have seceded, which territories would
be dealt with separately and constituted into a Dominion.

There would thus be two Acts. If there is only one Act dealing with these
processes in India and in Pakistan then there will be a great deal of confusion
and the status of India would be affected. We are naturally interested in the
continuing entity that is India. As regards Pakistan, though we may be interes¬
ted, it is for the representatives of Pakistan to say what they want and how they
want it. Mixing up the two will lead to obvious difficulties. Parliamentary
legislation will embody our constitution till such time as our Constituent

JUNE 1947

659

Assembly draws up another constitution. If that parliamentary legislation deals
widi Pakistan also it will mean that our constitution is contained in a Statute
which also contains the constitution of another country. That would not only
be incongruous but legally and constitutionally inadvisable.

The two processes of creating a Dominion of India and a Pakistan Dominion
are not simultaneous, even though they might follow each other in quick
succession. The Pakistan Dominion follows the secession of certain areas.
Therefore, the Act for creating the Pakistan Dominion has to be a new and
separate Act following the constitution of India as a Dominion.

There may also be other practical difficulties in the way of dealing with
India and Pakistan together in the same legislation. India is not only a contin¬
uing entity but also a running organisation. Pakistan as a state is starting from
scratch. Any attempt to tie them up legally will mean putting two things
together with are dissimilar and which are functioning differently. That would
not be good either for India or for Pakistan. The legislation, therefore, has to
deal with each separately and on merits.

These are some points that I should like to place before you again, as I am
anxious that parliamentary draftsmen should not ignore them at this stage. If a
single Bill is drafted for parliamentary legislation dealing with all these pro¬
cesses, it will raise all manner of complications and difficulties and it would be
unfortunate if we have to raise objections at that stage.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU2

1 No. 44.

2 Lord Mountbatten acknowledged this letter on 27 June remarking that he hoped to have authority
to show the draft Bill after next week end, and that he thought Pandit Nehru would be satisfied it
fulfilled the essential requirements. R/3/1/153: f239.

357

Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rteffa1-' f 36

SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 26 June ig4J

NO. 687

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

In compliance with the instructions contained in Your Excellency s telegram of
yesterday1 1 saw my three Party Leaders at 12.30 p.m. to-day. I have asked them
to suggest the names of the new team of executive gazetted officers for the

1 No. 343.

66o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Lahore district. I have told them that their suggestions must be unanimous and
must include only the names of those who, in their opinion, will enjoy the
complete confidence of all the communities. I have also formed the Security
Committee and issued a press note about it.

2. I adhere to the opinion that the parties can stop the trouble if they really
wish to do so. Nearly all of it is caused by persons or organisations under some
degree of party control. If by permitting the poachers to select their own game-
keepers we can stop them poaching, so much the better.

3. I trust that the present arrangements will not have to continue for very
long. I am gradually being forced into a position in which I shall in fact have
two Cabinets, one consisting of the Party Leaders and the other consisting of
the Partition Committee, who will have no actual or constitutional responsi¬
bility but will claim to interfere (probably on communal lines) whenever it
suits them to do so. I am still not very hopeful of quick partition proceedings —
I have just been told that the Committee cannot meet before Tuesday, the
1 st July. I shall endeavour to push the proceedings as quickly as possible to a
point at which two separate Governments can be set up even if a good many
loose ends are left, and I hope that when that point is reached Your Excellency
will be able to relieve me. I am assuming that I shall in any case be relieved not
later than 15 th August.

Yours sincerely,

E. M. JENKINS

358

Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma

Rbli/82 : f 14

top secret 26 June i$4y

C.-in-C.’s Paper 6/47

1. I have just seen telegrams pepper 73 and pepper 741 from CIGS to
VCIGS. I have already started planning the withdrawal of British Troops, but
before executive action can be taken, I shall no doubt receive official instruc¬
tions from yourself confirming agreement of Pandit Nehru and Mr Jinnah.

2. Reference pepper 74. Para. 2. The remark by Mr Jinnah that he wished
that “the withdrawal should not be conducted too quickly as he considered
that troubles might possibly arise” is significant. I hope the CIGS did not in any
way suggest to Mr Jinnah (even unintentionally) that British Troops could be
used in communal disturbances. I have no doubt that the CIGS did not intend
to convey this, and I note he refers in para. 5 to their use in protecting British

JUNE 1947

66l

life. But if Mr Jiniiah clearly realizes British Troops will not be available in
communal disturbances, why should he be anxious lest they depart too quickly?

3 . Reference pepper 74. Para. 4. The immediate aspect is the terms proposed
by HMG rather than the terms Mr Jinnah proposes to offer. I hope that nothing
that was said by the CIGS will cause Mr Jinnah to get out of step with the
programme which we are following here with regard to the retention of British
officers.

4. Reference pepper 74. Para. 5. Although I told the CIGS that I agreed that
General Whistler should become G.O.C. British Troops in India, the responsi¬
bility for implementing this rests with me and not with the CIGS. It is my
responsibility, for instance, to decide the size of the staff required, and to decide
exactly how General Whistler will exercise command. Local administration of
British Troops must remain as at present.

5. You may wish to ensure with the Secretary of State that executive action
is not taken by the War Office on personal telegrams from the CIGS to the
VCIGS until officially confirmed by the Government of India. British Troops
in India, and Gurkhas serving under HMG are cases in point.

C. J. AUCHINLECK2

1 Nos. 315 and 329.

2 Lord Ismay replied to this note on 27 June 1947 on Lord Mountbatten’s behalf. He stated that the
answers to its paras. 1 and 2 were contained in No. 335 ; that, as regards para. 3, the Viceroy had ‘no
intention of allowing anything the CIGS may have said to Mr Jinnah to interfere with our pro¬
gramme for the retention of British officers’; that the Viceroy agreed with para. 4; and that, as
regards para. 5, ‘the Viceroy took care to get off his No. 1570-S [No. 335] in order to regularise
CIGS’ irregular communications to VCIGS’. R/3/1/82: f 16.

359

Note by Sardar Patel
Rl3li/i88:f 12

home department, 26 June lg^y

Reference Cabinet Secretariat No. 90/C.F./47 dated the 25th June 19471
regarding the question of financial liability arising out of the payment of
compensation to the officers of the Secretary of State’s Services.

2. The position now taken up by His Majesty’s Government requires a
considered reply from the Cabinet. At the previous meeting, when this question
came up for discussion, the Cabinet was clearly and strongly of the opinion that
the Government of India owed no liability on this account and that the matter

1 Sec No. 103, note 4.

662

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

should not be linked with the negotiations in regard to Sterling Balances.
In my opinion, that position requires to be re-stated. H.M.G. should be in¬
formed that we do not regard this matter as one of negotiation. I would,
therefore, suggest that the question may be taken up again in the Cabinet.2

v. J. PATEL
H.M. Home

2 Lord Mountbatten agreed to this procedure.

360

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. LB. (4 7) 3 6th Meeting , Minutes 2-3

L/WSli/1032 : jf 60-63

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.W.i , on 26 June 1947
at 9.43 am were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Hugh Dalton , Sir S. Cripps , Mr A. V.
Alexander , the Earl ofListowel, Mr A. G.Bottomley , Mr A. Henderson, Lord Chorley
Also present were: Viscount Jowitt, Mr W. Whiteley, Sir A. Carter, Mr M. J.
Clauson, Mr K. Anderson ; Mr S. E. V. Luke, Mr F. F. Turnbull ( Secretariat )
[Minute 1, on ‘ Financial Obligations under Clause 13 of the Draft Indian Indepen¬
dence Bill — i.e. the payment of pensions to European members of the Services,
omitted.]

Minute 2

Relations between His Majesty’s Government and the Indian States after the

Transfer of Power

(Previous Reference: I.B.(47)28th Meeting, Minute 4)1
The Committee considered a memorandum by the Secretary of State for India
(I.B.(47) 128), 2 on a proposal made by the Viceroy that an early statement
should be made in Parliament regarding the relations between His Majesty’s
Government and the Indian States after the transfer of power.

the secretary of state for India said that the Viceroy had reported
that the States, particularly Hyderabad, had been perturbed by references in
the Congress press to the possibility that the future Indian Government might
not tolerate the States having independent relations with His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment. Lord Mountbatten had suggested that the following reply might be
made to an arranged question: —

“His Majesty’s Government hope that all States will associate themselves
with one or other of the two Dominions, and thus become partners in the
British Commonwealth. Should, however, any State or States decide

JUNE 1947

663

otherwise His Majesty’s Government would review the situation in the light
of the then existing circumstances. All that can be said at this stage is that,
while they are not prepared to recognise any such States as separate Domin¬
ions, they would certainly not refuse to have direct relations with them.”
The reply proposed by the Viceroy went substantially further than the Com¬
mittee’s decision on 28th May (I.B.(47) 28th Meeting, Minute 4), when the
view was taken that, if the British Government should admit at this stage that
they would be prepared to maintain separate relationships with States, they
would be charged with disintegrating India. There appeared to be strong
objections to making any definite statement at this stage.

The Committee were in general agreement that no new statement on the
subject should be made at this stage. They thought that if the question should
be raised in Parliament during the debates on the Indian Independence Bill, the
Government spokesman should take the line that His Majesty’s Government
felt that it would be inopportune to make any statement on the subject until
the States had had full opportunity of considering their position in the light of
the arrangements made for the transfer of power in British India and of their
discussions with each other and with the Governments of the new Indian
Dominions. In the meantime, individual Members should, if possible, be
dissuaded from asking questions in the House of Commons on the subject. It
was pointed out that certain practical problems would arise in the international
field from the indeterminate position of the Indian States in the period between
the lapse of paramountcy and the final determination of their international
status. It was agreed that these questions should be examined.

The Committee —

Invited the Secretary of State for India to inform the Viceroy that His
Majesty’s Government considered that it would be inopportunate [? in¬
opportune] to make any statement at this stage on the relationship between
His Majesty’s Government and the Indian States after the transfer of
power.3

Minute 3

Relations of His Majesty’s Government with India and Pakistan
The Committee considered a memorandum by the Secretary of State for

1 Vol. X, No. 553-

2 No. 326.

3 In tel. 8259 of 27 June 1947 Lord Listowel referred to the enclosure to No. 261 and stated that the
Committee ‘felt that it would be unwise to make any statement before second reading of Bill’,
explaining that the ‘principal objection seen to reply as drafted was that it implied a departure from
policy indicated in last sentence of para. 5 of Cabinet Mission’s memorandum of 12th May 1946
[Vol. VII, No. 262]. He added that they hoped in the meantime to forestall any questions: cf. A.
Henderson’s letter to Mr Harold Macmillan dated 27 June 1947 asking him not to put the Question
given in the enclosure to No. 261 on the grounds that only a stalling reply could be given and that
there would be opportunity to cover the point fully during the passage of the Bill. L/P &S/13/1839:
ff 92, 94.

664

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

India (1. 13.(47) 124)4 regarding a request made by Mr. Gandhi that His Majesty’s
Government should give an assurance that they would not differentiate in any
way between India and Pakistan in the agreement to be made with each after
the transfer of power.

The Committee were in general agreement that this request could not be
acceded to ; it was certainly not a proposal which could be seriously considered
in advance of the forthcoming treaty negotiations, the minister of defence
pointed out that acceptance of Mr. Gandhi’s proposal might seriously prejudice
our prospects of obtaining the defence facilities which we required in the two
Indian Dominions.5
The Committee —

Approved the draft letter (Annex C to 1.13.(47) 124) which the Secretary of
State for India proposed to send to the Viceroy on the subject.

[Minute 4 , on Burma policy , omitted.]

4 In Paper 1.13.(47)124 of 24 June 1947 Lord Listowel circulated the text of Nos. 161, para. 4, and 281,
para. 4, together with the draft of the reply which he proposed to send to Lord Mountbatten for
which see No. 376, paras. 2-6. See also No. 266.

5 cf. No. 345.

361

Cabinet C.M.(4y)^yth Conclusions , Minute 4
R 1 30 1 1 \n: ff 29-30

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.W.i , on 26 June 1947
at 11 am were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Herbert Morrison, Mr Ernest Benin,
Mr Arthur Greenwood, Mr Hugh Dalton, Sir S. Cripps, Mr A. V. Alexander,
Viscount Jowitt, Mr J. Chuter Ede, Viscount Addison, Mr A. Creech Jones, the Earl
of Listowel, Mr E. Shinwell, Mr Aneurin Bevan, Mr T. Williams, Mr George
Tomlinson

Also present during discussion of item 4 were: Mr Alfred Barnes, Mr John Strachey

INDIA

Constitutional Changes

(Previous Reference: C.M.(4y)56th Conclusions, Minute 4)1
4. the prime minister informed the Cabinet that good progress had been
made in drafting the legislation to give effect to the decision to transfer power in
India on the basis of establishing two independent Dominions. The Viceroy’s
final views were still awaited on certain Clauses, but the main lines of the Bill
were now settled. It would provide that from 15 th August two independent
Dominions would be set up in India, to be known respectively as India and
Pakistan. It would define their territories and provide for the appointment of a
Governor-General for each. The original intention had been to do no more than
give the Constituent Assembly in each Dominion full power to legislate until

JUNE I947

665

other provision was made by them in exercise of their constituent powers, but
it was understood that the Congress leaders wished the constitution established
by the Go vermnent of India Act, 1935, to be made applicable separately in each
of the two Dominions until such time as other provision was made by the
Constituent Assemblies and it was proposed to agree to this. The Governor-
General would have power to make by order such provision as was necessary
to bring the legislation into effective operation; and the Bill would also provide
for dividing the Indian armed forces and safeguarding the position of the British
forces in India. It had been hoped to obtain Indian agreement to a provision
separating the Andaman and Nicobar Islands from India, but it was now clear
that we should have to seek to secure our defence requirements in these Islands
by negotiation. The Indian Interim Government had asked that provision
should be made in the Bill to give effect to their guarantee that any officer of
the Secretary of State’s Services who continued in service after the transfer of
power would receive the same conditions of service from the successor authori¬
ties; and this proposal was still under discussion with Indian Ministers. The title
“Indian Independence Bill,” which had been adopted at his suggestion, would
be acceptable to the Indian leaders and to Dominion Governments.

The aim was to introduce the Bill not later than 9th July, and he hoped that
the Cabinet would agree that he should discuss it with the Opposition leaders
on 27th June, though its final details might then be still undecided, and that
thereafter the Viceroy should be authorised to show it to the Indian political
leaders, who had pressed to see it before its introduction.

The Cabinet —

Agreed that the Prime Minister should discuss the terms of the draft Indian
Independence Bill with the Opposition, and that the Viceroy should be
authorised to show the draft to the Indian political leaders.

1 No. 322.

362

Chiefs of Staff Committee. Paper C. 0.8.(47)134(0)

L/WS/i/iogi: jf 23-30
British Forces in India

REPORT BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

ministry of defence, 26 June ig47

At a Meeting of the India and Burma Committee1 we were asked to consider
the question of the withdrawal of British forces from India and to submit our
views. This paper is confined to this point alone and does not deal with methods

1 Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 9.

666

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

of obtaining our long term strategic requirements in India, about which he
have already addressed a letter2 to the India Office.

2. We have taken into account the views expressed by the Viceroy at the
Meeting of the India and Burma Committee, and in particular his opinion that
there would be every advantage in withdrawing British forces as soon as
practicable after the enactment of legislation providing for the transfer of power
on the basis of the grant of Dominion Status to the two Successor States. We
understand that the Viceroy is intending to submit further views in the near
future.

3. We assume that there can be no question of beginning any withdrawal of
British forces while we remain responsible for the defence of India and for
internal security. That is to say, withdrawal could not begin before the appoin¬
ted day for the transfer of power, and, although no detailed movement pro¬
gramme has been worked out, it could not be completed for about six months
from that date.

4. Whether it would be desirable to begin withdrawal at the transfer of
power, or if possible to retain British forces in India, is the problem examined
in this paper. It must be judged against the background of the latest p oh tical
developments.

5. We would however point out that there are in India certain stores which
must be evacuated and which may need protection until this process is complete.
Our present forecast is that evacuation of these stores will be complete by
March, 1948. If we leave the country this commitment should be liquidated
during the progress of the withdrawal of our troops.

There is also the question of the retention of some R. A.F. personnel to operate
the air route to the Far East until agreement on our air transit rights has been
reached and the Indians themselves can meet our needs.

Considerations affecting the problem.

6. As a result of political developments, the following considerations are
relevant to the problem of withdrawal or retention of British forces in India: —

(a) As the Successor States will be Dominions, we can only retain forces in
India if asked to do so. Conversely, if asked to do so it would be difficult
and imprudent to refuse. We must also however allow for the possibility
that Pakistan will ask us to leave forces and Flindustan not.

(b) The Commander-in-Chief, India, has stated3 that it is unlikely that the
reorganisation of the Indian Forces will be completed in under two-three
years, and that during this period India will be virtually undefended. The
period might even be as much as five years. The Indian Air Forces,
especially those of Pakistan, are likely to be inadequate for a considerably
longer period. We have however assumed that some Indian forces will
remain in being and adequately organised to keep watch and ward on the
N.W. frontier and to maintain some measure of internal security.

JUNE 1947

667

(c) If British forces were retained they could not be employed on internal
security duties. This means that they could not take any preventive
action for the protection of British lives and could only render direct
assistance in extreme emergency.

(d) If British forces were retained, they would have to remain under our
control, and it might, therefore, be necessary to agree that they should be
paid for by the United Kingdom Government.

7. The question is, therefore, whether in these circumstances it would be
desirable from the point of view of both India and ourselves that British forces
should be retained in India after the transfer of power. The length of time for
which they might be invited to stay cannot be definitely estimated, but it is
unlikely to be less than the time taken by the Successor States to organise their
own armed forces.

DESIRABILITY OF RETAINING BRITISH FORCES IN INDIA
A. IN HINDUSTAN AND PAKISTAN

8. We first discuss the advantages and disadvantages which would result from
the retention of British forces in both Hindustan and Pakistan.

Advantages to India.

9. India would obtain the following advantages : —

(a) The presence of British forces, even if only in token strength, would have
a steadying effect from the points of view both of external aggression and
internal trouble in India.

(b) British forces in North West India would deter aggression by the tribes
and could assist and support the Dominion forces in repelling them
should they invade the settled districts in force.

Disadvantages to India.

10. We cannot see that either Pakistan or Hindustan would suffer any
practical disadvantage by the retention of British forces.

Advantages to us.

11. An increase in stability is as much an advantage to us as it is to India. Our
strategic requirements in India in a major war are of such importance that we
should not miss any opportunity of trying to obtain them. It is certain that they
would never be obtained if, as a result of the withdrawal of all British forces,
India relapsed into general unrest and disorder or if both governments of India
decided to appeal elsewhere for support. The presence of British forces in India
would not only contribute a steadying influence but would help to ensure that
India did not pass into a foreign and hostile orbit. We should, moreover, be
more easily able to maintain our influence with neighbouring states, notably
Afghanistan.

2 See No. 186 and Annex to No. 221, para. 5.

3 See Vol. X, No. 547.

668

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

In addition to these broad strategic considerations, our immediate advantages
would be: —

(a) The security of British stocks of war material would be assured, until they
are removed.

(b) Facilities for the military air route to the Far East would be maintained.

(c) British forces would be able to render direct assistance to British civilians
in case of extreme emergency.

Disadvantages to us.

12. Against these advantages we must weight the following disadvantages : —

(a) There is always a risk of becoming involuntarily embroiled in com¬
munal disturbances and in any conflict between Pakistan and Hindustan.

(b) If conditions in India deteriorated we might later be forced to evacuate
our forces in unfavourable circumstances.

(c) The retention of British forces would mean an additional call on British
man-power. We deal with this point in paragraphs 17-21 [22] below.

B. IN PAKISTAN ALONE

13. The main advantages conferred upon India and upon us by the retention
of British forces apply equally if they are retained in Pakistan alone. For geo¬
graphical reasons they would have the same steady effect in relation to both
external aggression and tribal incursions. We should be taking the same step
towards achieving our long term strategic requirements, in so far as these can
be met in Pakistan alone.

14. On the other hand, there is a risk of some additional disadvantages
arising. Hindustan would react unfavourably and the presence of British forces
might increase the tension between Hindustan and Pakistan and both increase
the danger of our being involved in a conflict between them, and also render
still more remote our chances of getting the communications, administrative
facilities and industrial potential of Hindustan which would so much increase
the value of India to us in a major war. But it could be argued that the presence
of British forces might have exactly the opposite effect in both cases.

Air transit facilities in Pakistan alone would not be sufficient to maintain our
air route to the Far East.

Conclusion on desirability of retaining British forces in India.

15. We recognise that in the present situation we cannot insist on retaining
British forces in India and that if neither Hindustan nor Pakistan ask for them
we have no option but to withdraw them.

Nevertheless, we feel that whatever political advantage the Viceroy may see
in their immediate withdrawal, the balance of military advantage lies decisively
in their retention. The advantages are greater if both Hindustan and Pakistan
ask for them but they are still decisive if only Pakistan asks.

JUNE I947

669

PROVISION OF THE NECESSARY FORCES

16. Apart from long term strategic requirements the immediate purpose of
leaving forces in India would be to deter external aggression and assist in
preventing tribal incursion. The safeguarding of our transit rights and stocks of
war material could be accomplished with a small number of men.

17* The total numbers required would not vary very much whether
Pakistan and Hindustan or Pakistan alone invited us to stay, since the frontier
areas of military importance are in Pakistan. Nevertheless, if they both invited
us, it would clearly be unacceptable to locate all our forces solely in Pakistan
and to that extent somewhat larger forces might be wanted.

Army Forces.

18. As regards the provision of army forces for India, we have planned to
retain there the present six Brigades until June, 1948. Thereafter, these will run
down quickly and no provision for any forces in India has been made in any
future order of battle, although in fact for a few months after June 1948 the
process of run down would allow us to leave some forces.

The provision of forces for India on any longer term basis can therefore only
be made either by reallocating our resources or by increasing the regular content
of the army, since forces in India must be composed of regulars only.

19. As it already appears that it will be difficult to obtain sufficient regulars to
fill the regular ceiling, as at present planned, the mere approval to raise that
ceiling would not solve the problem. We are, therefore, faced with the other
alternative of reallocating our resources.

20. Existing British forces in India are dependent on Indian administrative
backing. In time of civil disturbance it would not be possible to rely on Indian
Administrative Services for supplies to British Forces. It would therefore be
necessary to allow for some British Administrative troops for certain essential
services. The remaining administrative services might be undertaken by Indian
troops, depending on the plans made for re-constituting the Indian armies.

21. The only two areas from which these troops could be provided are
Middle East and Malaya.

As regards Middle East, given a satisfictory solution to the Palestine problem
leading to tranquillity in that country by the second half of 1948, it should be
possible to provide an absolute maximum of two Infantry Brigade Groups from
Middle East resources. This would, however, mean disorganising the infantry
division located there. The provision of more than one brigade would, there¬
fore, be difficult.

As far as Malaya is concerned, it should be possible to withdraw three British
battalions from Malaya for use in India, if good progress is made with the
formation of the Gurkha division in Malaya.

670

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

22. To sum up; given the necessary conditions in Middle East and Malaya
it is considered that two British Infantry Brigade Groups could be found for
India. At the best diese would be only token forces but in view of the prestige
enjoyed by British services in India should serve the purpose for which they are
required.

Air Forces.

23. The R.A.F. could probably provide 4 or 5 squadrons, though possibly
at reduced strength for a time. Limited technical backing and advice could also
be found for some five R.I.A.F. squadrons. But, as with the Army, retention of
R.A.F. units would depend on being able to make arrangements with the
Successor governments for certain aspects of administrative backing, which are
at present undertaken by the Indian Army.

We believe that an R.A.F. Force of this size, would provide a powerful
deterrent both to tribal incursions and external aggression.

CONCLUSIONS

24. The following is a summary of the factors affecting the conclusion: —

(a) It is of great strategic importance to us that British forces should be
retained in India, particularly during the period in which India is re¬
organising her armed forces.

(b) The political arrangements for the transfer of power make it impossible
for British forces to be retained in India unless the Successor States ask for
them. At the same time it would be a great mistake to refuse a request.

(c) Although the R.A.F. Squadrons could be provided, there can be no
certainty that after June, 1948 we can find even token British land forces
for India. In any event we are unlikely to be able to make available more
than two Brigade Groups.

25. We conclude that: —

(a) No obstacle should be placed in the way of the Successor States asking us
to leave forces.

(b) If either Indian government asks us to leave forces in India, we should
accept, but in doing so should point out that whereas it should be possible
to make the necessary provision up to June 1948, thereafter we can give
no promise that we shall be able to find land forces, though we should be
able to leave some air forces, and should do our best to make available
land forces up to two brigade groups.

26. Since completing this report we have seen in a telegram4 from the
Viceroy that both Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah have agreed that withdrawal of
British Troops should start on 15th August and that the withdrawal should be

JUNE 1947

671

completed by the end of February 1948. We do not however consider it
necessary to modify our above conclusions in the light of this fresh in¬
formation.

TEDDER.

R. R. MCGRIGOR, V.C.N.S.

F. E. W. SIMPSON, V.C.I.G.S.

4 No. 335.

363

Sir F. Burrows [Bengal) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , Rfe/ 1/153: f 231

important 26 June 1947, 7.40 pm

secret Received: 27 June , 9 am

174-S. My telegram 161-S dated 1 8th June.1 Indian Dominion Bill. I have
following supplementary comment. Under clause 3 (3 ) (b) of the Bill2 Chitta¬
gong Hill Tracts will, until otherwise determined, fall within the new Province
of West Bengal. For reasons indicated in my immediately succeeding telegram
I regard this as entirely impracticable proposition since all of the Hill Tracts’
links are with Chittagong District. Pending negotiations between the two
Dominions, I would strongly press for amendment of the Bill to allow Hill
Tracts to be treated at all events temporarily as part of territories of East Bengal.

1 See No. 271, note 10.

2 See No. 191.

364

Sir F. Burrows ( Bengal ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram, RI3I1I153: ff 232-3

important 26 June 1947, 7.40 pm

confidential Received: 27 June, 9 am

No. 175-C. My immediate preceding telegram. Chittagong Hill Tract.
Constitutional position of the Hill Tracts was fully discussed in memorandum
about their future administration forwarded with para. 4 of my General Letter
F.J.B. -24 dated May 7th.1 It was recommended that Hill Tracts should continue
to remain attached to the Province of Bengal and that their future administra-

1 Not printed.

672

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

tion should rest with the Provincial Government. Their only easy means of
communication with outside world is through Chittagong District and all their
commerce and administrative ties are with that District. It would be wholly
impracticable for them to be administered as part of West Bengal Province.
Population figures in 1941 Census are:

Tribals —233,392

Muslims — 7,270

Hindus — 4,881

Others — 1,510

Total — 247,053

When I saw the three Chiefs of the Tracts on May 3rd they strongly depre¬
cated being placed under the Muslim Province of East Bengal and indicated
preference for federation with Tripura and Assam States; (group corrupt)
admitted that all their links were with Bengal. Great weight need not be
attached to opinion of the Chiefs who are more concerned with personal
aggrandisement than the welfare of the population.

3. Neither major political party has yet evinced any strong interest in tracts
which as an excluded area have been outside the main stream of political life of
the province. But League are hkely to press for inclusion in East Bengal, if only
because hydro-electrical project for electrification of Chittagong Area depends
on the dam at Barkal on Karnaphuli River in the interior of tracts. Congress will
naturally try to keep any non-Muslim Area out of Muslim hands.

4. Though reference to “Other factors” in terms of reference of the Boun¬
dary Commission gives Commission considerable scope, I assume that the fate
of Hill Tracts would be a matter for negotiation between the two Dominion
Govts, or their Constituent Assemblies and not for decision of Boundary
Commission.

5. Your Joint Secretary Christie was Deputy Commissioner Hill Tracts for
two years and will be able to give you much local colour.

365

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , Rfe/ 1/153: ff 227-8

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 26 June 1947, 10 pm

secret Received: 26 June , 7.20 pm

No. 1598-S. Indian Independence Bill. Your telegrams 8155, 8156, 8162, 8163,
8176, 8184, 8185 and 8194 of 25th June.1 All textual amendments communi-

JUNE 1947

673

cated therein and consequential renumbering of clauses have been carried out
in master copy of Bill. References are to text as so amended and re-numbered.

2. Clause 2(2) (a). Definite article before names East Punjab and West Punjab
appears out of place and may be omitted.

3. Clause 3(1). In view of time factor we still think that balance of con¬
venience lies in reconstituting Provinces on appointed day. I accept view that
section 48 of 193 5 Act should be left to its operation1 2 3 but I should note for your
information that informal consultation will take place not between Provincial
leaders and Governors but between myself and all-India leaders who will
doubtless themselves sound leaders in Provinces concerned. This holds good
equally in the case of Provinces which will continue undivided but where
existing Governors will resign unless they are asked and are willing to continue
in office. Subject to this remark I agree with your suggestions in paras. 3 and 4
of your 8 1 85s and I shall take up questions with leaders here as soon as possible.

4. Clause 3(2). Point mentioned in my telegram 148 i-S of 17th June4 has not
been fully met in revised draft clause. Referendum is in terms of para. 13 of
Statement of 3rd June5 to ascertain whether Sylhet District is in favour of
amalgamating with new Province of East Bengal and not repeat not whether it
is in favour of representatives of that district taking part in Pakistan Constituent
Assembly. I suggest therefore that in lines 38 to 406 the words “representatives
of that district taking part in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan” should be
replaced by the words “that district forming part of the new Province of East
Bengal”. Reference to “that date”7 in line 40 may be mistaken to mean date of
passing of Act and clarification seems required.

5. Clause 7(1). In view of your 81628 I see no alternative but to accept your
redraft of paragraph (b) and also of paragraph (c). But I am certain that Pandit
Nehru will vehemently protest against statutory denunciation of all the existing
treaties many of which in his view and in the view of his constitutional advisers
may arguably have survived but for the statutory provision.

1 See Nos. 348 and its note 6, 349 and its note 4, 351 and its note 12, 352 and 353.

2 Presumably a reference to the views expressed about the appointment of Governors in No. 352,
paras. 2-3 and 4. Clause 48 of the Government of India Act, 1935, provided (1) for the appointment
of Governors ‘by His Majesty by a Commission under the Royal Sign Manual’, and (2) for the salary
and allowances of Governors.

3 No. 352.

4 No. 249.

5 No. 45.

6 Lines 38-40 referred to a verdict in the Sylhet referendum in favour of ‘representatives of that
District taking part in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan’. L/P &J/10/123 : f 138V.

7 The intention was to refer to the appointed day — that date (rather than the date of the passing of the
Act) being the date on which the amalgamation of Sylhet with East Bengal was to be effected. Ibid.

8 No. 349.

674

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

6. New Clause 8. Referring to para. 3 of your 81569 my Advisers have no
hesitation in accepting amendments proposed in your 8 1 551 0 which they regard
as eminently satisfactory.

7. Clause 10(2). 11 I now understand that intention of my Cabinet was to
confine statutory guarantee to members appointed to regular services and not to
persons appointed to ad hoc non-cadre posts. In that view words “or civil post
under” will have to be omitted. I do not consider fact that provision is confined
to Secretary of State’s Services is a weighty argument against its inclusion but I
agree with you that fact that it does not cover Judges of High Courts and Fed¬
eral Court and other persons appointed by His Majesty is strikingly anomalous.

I shall consult leaders when I show them draft Bill and telegraph to you if they
agree to widen scope of clause so as to include these persons. I understand Con¬
gress is prepared to continue existing Judges on their present conditions of
service.

8. Clause 16.12 I am convinced that the clause as amended will be entirely
unacceptable to Congress. The arrangement would be unworkable adminis¬
tratively and would in any case leave no chance of satisfactory negotiations
about the Islands with either Dominion. This clause and clause 2(4) should
certainly be omitted, as these clauses would create such suspicion in Indian
minds that even if they were omitted at their request the damage would have
been done as far as future negotiations are concerned.

9 No. 348.

10 No. 348, note 6.

II See No. 351, para. 2. For the Clause as finally embodied in the draft Bill as shown to the Indian
leaders, see No. 428, Clause 10(2).

12 i.e. the Clause on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands: see No. 353 and, for the text of the Clause as
amended, No. 324, note 9.

366

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/3/1/153: f 230

most immediate 26 June 1947 , 9.13 pm

SECRET

PRIVATE

No. 1600-S. I have been thinking over the terms of Clause V(i) of the Bill.1 I
do not want it to appear that if I stay I have in any way been forced on the
political parties. Would it not be possible to amend the proviso on the follow¬
ing lines: — “provided it shall be lawful for one person to hold both appoint-

JUNE 1947

675

ments of Governor-General for such period as may be determined by either
Dominion after the 15th August.”

1 See No. 19 1, Clauses 5(1) and (2) as amended in No. 256, note 6.

367

Meeting of the Partition Council Case Nos. P.C.1I1I47 and 5/1/47
Rl3/ili6o:ff 11-13; f 255

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held on 27 June 1947 were: Rear-Admiral Viscount
Mounthatten of Burma, Mr Jinnah , Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , Sardar Patel, Dr Rajendra
Prasad; Lord Ismay, Sir E. Mieville, Mr H. M. Patel, Mr Mohamad Ali
Case No. P.C.1/1/47. Reconstitution of the Government at the Centre and in

His Excellency said that the Bengal Ministry was responsible to the Legislature
and was, as such, entitled to continue. It was proposed, therefore, and Mr.
Jinnah had agreed to this,2 that the Bengal Governor should be asked to invite
the leaders of West Bengal to form a shadow Cabinet and be responsible for
matters solely or predominantly concerning West Bengal. In the event of any
disagreement, matters would come up before a full Cabinet meeting at which
the Bengal Governor would be invited to preside. As regards the Centre, he had
discussed this question with the Cabinet when he was in London3 and the law
officers of the Crown had been consulted as to the legality of an arrangement
similar to that now proposed for Bengal. It had been necessary for him to do
this as, in agreeing to partition, the Congress had asked for an assurance that
they would be allowed a free hand in dealing with the area which would fall to
them.4 He for his part had given this assurance subject to its being found to be
legally feasible, and provided the Congress agreed to give to Muslim League an
equally free hand in their areas. The Congress were agreeable to this condition.
When he realised the amount of work that had to be done to implement the
decision to partition, he had hoped that it would be possible to carry on on the
standstill basis. The Congress, however, had made an issue of the matter
and wished immediately to be masters in their own house.5 He had considered
the whole question very carefully and suggested for the consideration ot the
Council the following arrangement : firstly, that he should ask for the resigna-

1 For the previous Partition Committee Meeting on this subject see No. 354, Minute ix; for further
accounts of the crisis see No. 369, paras. 14-18, and No. 379.

2 See No. 311, para. 3.

3 See Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 3; No. 517, Minute 7; Nos. 545—6; and No. 553, Minute 7.

4 See Vol. X, No. 472.

5 cf. No. 73, Item 1; No. 80, para. 1; No. 200; and No. 239, Item 5.

6j6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

tion of all existing members of the Cabinet ; secondly, that he should invite the
leaders of the two future governments to nominate an equal number of men for
appointment as members. He would suggest a set of 9 members on each side,
each of whom would hold about two portfolios. The Congress members would
be in actual charge of the portfolios but would be responsible only for their own
future area. The League members holding corresponding portfolios would see
all papers and would have over-riding powers both to refer to the full Cabinet
and, in the event of disagreement, to the Viceroy for his own decision on any
proposal which solely or predominantly affected Pakistan and to which they
objected. They would also have the right to initiate any action required for the
Pakistan area which must be acted upon by the member concerned. The
standstill agreement would of course still continue to operate, since we had to
concentrate all our energies to getting on with the partition work. The only
real difference between this suggestion and Dr. Rajendra Prasad’s6 was that in
the case of the latter proposal both members would sign, whereas under the
former only one would sign and that wouM be the Congress member who
would be in actual charge.

Concluding his remarks, His Excellency said that he hoped that this sugges¬
tion would be acceptable to the two parties. So far as Muslims were concerned,
they would be setting up a machinery which they would have to pack up and
remove to Karachi after some 40 odd days. His suggestion would give them
and their government a certain measure of continuity.

Mr. Jinnah remarked that this was now only a matter of 40 odd days. He
would appeal to the Congress to rise to the occasion and not to put forward a
proposal which may be humiliating to either side. We were already agreed that
nothing should be done which was prejudicial to either side, and although he
realised that there was distrust on both sides, which he hoped would disappear
soon, he trusted that no attempt would be made to dishonour any agreement
which we had entered into as honourable men. His suggestion therefore was
“Do not do anything which would make it appear that it was the Congress
which would have the authority while the League would be merely a watch¬
dog”. While this was his appeal he thought it necessary to emphasise that legally
and constitutionally the proposal was wrong and untenable.

Sardar Patel said that he in his turn would appeal to Mr. Jinnah to look after
his own area and to leave them to look after theirs. What was the good of
going into the legal side of the question ?

His Excellency reiterated his own preference for the continuance of the
existing arrangement but in view of the assurance that he had given to the
Congress and the legal opinion that had been given to him he could not accept
Mr. Jinnah’s view. As regards the legal issue, his advice was, and that was
supported by what Mr. Jinnah had earlier quoted from Parliamentary debates,
that he could appoint anybody, have as many portfolios as he considered

JUNE 1947

677

desirable, and distribute the work among the members appointed as he con¬
sidered suitable.

It was agreed that Mr. Jinnah should prepare a note on the legal aspect of the
proposal and submit it to His Excellency the Viceroy by Sunday morning.7
His Excellency the Viceroy for his part would warn H.M.G. that a telegram on
this question would be coming. He would despatch Mr. Jinnah’s note as soon as
it was received asking H.M.G. to let him have a reply in time for the matter to
be finally settled at the Cabinet meeting on Wednesday.8

After a brief discussion, it was further agreed that in so far as Bengal was
concerned, the existing League Ministry would continue in office for the whole
of Bengal but that the representatives of the future government of West Bengal
would be included in the Ministry and be given over-riding powers both to
refer to the full Cabinet and, in the event of disagreement, to the Governor for
his own decision on any proposal which solely or predominantly affected West
Bengal and to which they objected; they would also have the right to initiate
any action required for the West Bengal area which must be acted upon by the
League Minister concerned.

In the case of the Punjab, which was under Section 93, it was agreed that the
Governor would be invited to appoint two bodies of advisers one from each
of the future parts of the Province to advise him on matters concerning their
respective territories.

Case No. P.C. 5/1/47. The draft India Bill
His Excellency said that by a special dispensation9 it had been arranged for the
draft India Bill to be sent to India in order that the Indian leaders might have
an opportunity of studying it. It had also been agreed that the bill must not leave
the Viceroy’s House and he proposed therefore as soon as the Bill was received,
to invite two leaders from each side to come and study it. Each side might bring
with them a legal expert. The two Steering Committee members would also
be asked to attend.

6 No record of Dr Prasad’s suggestion has been traced.

7 29 June.

8 2 July.

9 See Nos. 257; 279, note 2; and 348, paras. 3-4.

368

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary of State

private AND top secret 2y June ig4y

Thank you for your letters of the 13th and 20th June, 1947;1 I did not write to
you last week as I was away for brief visits to Simla and Kashmir.

1 Nos. 182 and 281.

678

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

2. I was very glad to hear of the possible appointment of Sir Cyril Radcliffe.
I saw a certain amount of him when he was Director-General at the Ministry of
Information during the war and formed a high opinion of him. I have put the
matter in confidence to the Leaders and I hope to let you have a reply shortly to
your telegram.2

3. There is, as might be expected, some difficulty in finding a Chairman for
the Boundary Commissions, for the setting up of which the Leaders have just
agreed, and, as the Arbitral Tribunal will probably not have much to do in the
early stages, Jinnah has suggested3 that Radcliffe, if he proves acceptable, might
perhaps serve in the first instance as Chairman of both Boundary Com¬
missions to sit only to settle disputes within the Commissions. This is so far a
purely tentative proposal. If anything comes of it I will let you know by
telegram.

4. I was interested to read4 of the proposal for the establishment of a Com¬
monwealth Relations Office to take over the duties at presented entrusted to the
Dominions Office and the India and Burma Office. I feel that this change of
name will be a popular move as the title ‘‘Dominion’’ seems to be going out of
fashion these days and becoming almost unpopular.

5. I am glad to note, from Press accounts, that there is now a possibility that
Burma may follow India’s lead and ask for Dominion status in the first instance.

6. In this connection, I was interested to read the suggestion put forward by
Ranee in his telegram No. 15 15 of the nth June, suggesting that the time was
now ripe for investigation of a form of association within the British Common¬
wealth. I feel that the British Empire must move with the times and that it
might well prove possible to find a somewhat looser form of association on the
lines that Ranee suggests. There are other parts of the Empire which might be
placed in a similar position to India, Burma and Ceylon in the next few years,
particularly the West Indies, where some form of federation seems to be quite
possible in the future.

7. At this point may I say how much I appreciate your giving me advance
information of the Colonial Secretary’s announcement about Ceylon. One of
the first things I had to do after reaching Kandy in April 1944, was to advise
H.M.G. that an inquiry into the political future of the island was an urgent
necessity if trouble was to be avoided in one of our principal bases in the Far
East. The result was the Soulbury Commission and I have retained an interest
in Ceylon’s affairs from that time.

8. I am so glad to hear6 7 8 that the Ministry of Defence are being consulted
about the possible renewal of the invitation to India to attend the Common¬
wealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science and on the subject of the

JUNE 1947

679

disclosure of classified information to India. These points, together with the
offer of facilities for Indian Officers to attend the I.D.C. and the Joint
Staff College, Chesham, will make a very good impression out here
and will be a great help in convincing India of the advantages to be derived
from membership of the Commonwealth.

9. Thank you also for your reply7 about Honours and Awards. I feel that the
best solution is to include the final Indian List with the New Year’s Honours
List 1948, and to back date it to the 14th August, 1947. It will thus, I think,
attract less notice and will not appear as if we are celebrating our departure by a
triumphant Honours List.

[Para. 10, on re-employment prospects in the Colonial Service for Irrigation
Engineers; and para. 11, on the position of certain U.P. Officers who had
retired on proportionate pension between 1 January 1947 and the announce¬
ment of compensation terms on 30 April 1947, omitted.]

12. Paragraph 10 of your letter8 about the late hours worked by the Cabinet
Secretariat Staff reminded me of the war years in Whitehall, and, although, we
had not yet managed to achieve as late an hour as 0500 it is only with the
greatest difficulty that I manage to avoid after-dinner work and “midnight
follies” are all too frequent. But in spite of it all the whole party out here are as
keen and cheerful as ever.

MOUNTBATTEN

2 No. 224, note 2.

3 No. 3 1 1, para. 2; see also No. 354, Item viii.

4 No. 182, para. 6.

5 Not printed; but see No. 121.

6 No. 182, para. 8.

7 Not printed; but see Nos. 78, para. 12, and 161, para. 9.

8 No. 281.

369

Viceroy's Personal Report No . 1 0

L/POI6/12J: ff 137-5°

top secret and personal 27 June 1(347

I forwarded no Personal Report last week, as I was away from Delhi for brief
visits to Simla and Kashmir.

2. The internal situation in the country is much quieter with the unfortunate
exception of the Punjab, where trouble has flared up again ha Lahore, Amritsar
and the Gurgaon district. In the two former the trouble is confined to arson and
stabbing on a widespread scale. It is carried out by “cloak and dagger” methods

68o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

and is therefore very difficult to put down. In Gurgaon, where my wife went
again on the 26th June there has been a longstanding feud between the Meos
and Jats, and now that additional troops with increased vehicles and wireless
facilities have been sent in I hope that we shall be able to control the troubles. A
similar Meo-Jat flare-up in the United Provinces was dealt with very quickly,
as the authorities were ready for it.

3. Every responsible person is particularly worried about the situation in
Lahore and Amritsar, for if we cannot stop this arson both cities will soon be
burnt to the ground. In his interview with me on the 23 rd June, Jinnah begged
me to be utterly ruthless in suppressing trouble in Lahore and Amritsar. He
said : “I don’t care whether you shoot Muslims or not, it has got to be stopped”.
On the 24th June, Nehru came to see me and talked in the same strain,1 He
suggested turning over the cities to the military, withdrawing the police and
declaring martial law.

4. I accordingly asked Jenkins for his views by secraphone,2 so that I could
raise the matter in Cabinet on the following day. Jenkins replied3 to the effect
that he had discussed a similar proposal on the 23 rd June with the Lahore Area
Commander and the Inspector General of Police and later with the local Party
leaders, and had decided against it. His reasons were that since decisive action by
troops against “cloak and dagger” activities was out of the question, martial
law might well fail, and the troops would soon be exposed to the same com¬
munal attack as the police. To sum up, Jenkins, while admitting that the situa¬
tion was causing him grave anxiety, did not think that martial law was the
answer to trouble of this kind.

5. The meeting of the Cabinet on the 25th June was a very difficult one.4 I
was violently attacked by leaders of both parties for the complete failure of the
“British” to maintain law and order under Section 93. Nehru, as usual, com¬
pletely lost control of himself and demanded the sacking of every official, from
the Governor downwards, that same day. I had to reprimand him publicly for
this irresponsible suggestion. I must admit he took the rebuke very well. Patel
then ranted against the British, saying that in the days when they were putting
down Congress and freedom movements, they had no difficulty in keeping
law and order. He said it was a case of the British covering up for the British. I
told him I could not take such a slur, and he immediately said he had not meant
it as a slur. Then the League started attacking me and saying that there would
soon be no city left for them to inherit. Baldev chimed in with a “shoot
everyone on sight” cry; upon which Patel pointed out that the only people
shot by the troops were the wretched householders who were forced into the
streets during curfew hours when their houses were set on fire !

6. Finally I obtained unanimous agreement that the Governor should be
invited to form a Security Committee of the local leaders of the Hindus, Mus-

JUNE 1947

68l

lims and Sikhs; that this Committee should draw up an agreed list of local
officials in whom all three parties would have confidence; and that they should
be put in power wherever possible. I suggested that the Security Committee
should meet every day and that all the leaders, from the High Commands
downwards, should use every effort to call off all violence. These proposals
were well received and I passed them on to Jenkins at once.1 2 3 4 5 I am glad to say
that the news from Lahore is now better.

7. On the 20th June the members of the Bengal Legislative Assembly met and
decided on the partition of Bengal. At the preliminary joint meeting it was
decided by 126 votes to 90 that the Province, if it remained united, should join
a new Constituent Assembly (i.e. Pakistan). At a separate meeting of the mem¬
bers of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly on the same day, it was decided
by 58 votes to 21 that the Province should be partitioned and by the same
majority that West Bengal should join the existing Constituent Assembly. At a
separate meeting of members of the East Bengal Legislative Assembly, it was
decided by 106 votes to 35 that the Province should not be partitioned, and by
107 votes to 34 that East Bengal should join the new Constituent Assembly
should partition eventuate. It was also decided, by 105 votes to 34, that in the
event of partition East Bengal would agree to amalgamation with Sylhet.

8. The Punjab has also decided for partition. At the preliminary joint session
of the two Assemblies held on the 23rd June 91 members voted for joining a
new Constituent Assembly and 77 for the present Constituent Assembly if
there were no partition. The East Punjab Assembly, meeting separately, decided
in favour of partition of the Province by 50 votes to 22, and by the same majo¬
rity for joining the present Constituent Assembly. The Western Punjab
Assembly, meeting separately, voted against partition by 99 [? 69] 6 votes to 27,
and by the same majority for joining a new Constituent Assembly.

9. As anticipated, the Sind Legislative Assembly at its special sitting on the
26th June, decided by 33 votes to 20 that Sind should join the new Pakistan
Constituent Assembly. Thus we can now look upon the creation of Pakistan on
the 15th August as legally decided upon.

10. I have been discussing the Boundary Commissions for the Punjab and
Bengal with the leaders including Baldev Singh, and I am glad to say that very
simple terms of reference have now been agreed upon.7 They are as follows : —

1 See No. 320.

2 Ibid.

3 No. 327.

4 No. 338, Case No. 155/32/47.

5 No. 343 ; for Sir E. Jenkins’s reply see No. 357.

6 The correct figure here should apparently be 69. Report in Times of India, 24 June 1947, p. 5, col. 1;
see also No. 304.

7 See No. 158; No. 175, Item 2, conclusion vi; and No. 311, para. 2.

682

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

For the Punjab:

The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of
the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous
majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so it will also take
into account other factors.

For Bengal:

The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of
the two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority
areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so it will also take into account
other factors.

For Sylhet:

In the event of the referendum in Sylhet District of Assam resulting in
favour of amalgamation in Eastern Bengal the Boundary Commission for
Bengal will also demarcate the Muslim majority areas of Sylhet District and
contiguous Muslim majority areas of adjoining districts.

11. The Boundary Commissions are now being set up, Congress and the
League having each nominated two representatives to each Commission.8
The question of the Chairman has been causing a lot of trouble. At the first
meeting of the Partition Council held to-day Jinnah’s proposal9 was accepted
by Congress, namely that Sir Cyril Radcliffe should be appointed as the
Chairman of both Boundary Commissions with a final casting vote, as this was
considered to be the only way in which the boundaries could be definitely
settled before the 15th August. Meanwhile the Boundary Commissions would
start work at once and only what is in dispute would be laid before the Chair¬
man.10

12. We held the last meeting of the Partition Committee on the 26th June
and it was highly acrimonious. When Liaquat asked that one of the six Govern¬
ment printing presses should be moved from Delhi to Karachi,11 as they only
had one small press there which was not sufficient for the Provincial Govern¬
ment’s needs and could not possibly handle the Pakistan Government’s require¬
ments, Patel flared up. He said that all six presses were fully occupied with
Government of India work and could not be spared. When I appealed to him to
release at least one press to Pakistan, even if it meant inconvenience to the new
Government of India, he flared up again and said “No one asked Pakistan to
secede. We do not mind their taking their property with them but we have no
intention of allowing them to injure the work of the Government of the rest of
India merely because they have not sufficient resources of their own”. I told
Patel that I thought that this was a shocking spirit in which to start partition,
and Liaquat remarked that if that spirit persisted there would be no possible
hope of the Pakistan Government being ready to take over on the 15 th August.

13. It was decided12 that the Partition Committee should be turned into the

JUNE 1947

683

'‘Partition Council” at the next meeting, which was held on the 27th June. It
was agreed that the Partition Council should consist of any two of three mem¬
bers nominated by each side and thus Jinnah was able to attend this meeting.
By means of private discussion with Patel I was able to move him to agree to
Pakistan having the use of one of the six Government presses forthwith,
provided it was not moved, and that this press should continue to work for
them until a new press had been bought and set up in Karachi. I undertook to
send a telegram home urging that the highest possible priority should be given
to the purchase of the necessary press and sending it to Karachi forthwith, since
Congress are unwilling to allow their press to work one unnecessary day for
Pakistan. Congress also want another press. I might add that this amicable
solution was not obtained without a lot of hard work on my part.13

14. The biggest crisis with which I have been faced however has been the
reconstruction of the Interim Government.14 As there are only seven weeks left
before partition I had hoped that all parties would be content to continue
working with the present Interim Government under the Standstill arrange¬
ments to which all parties had agreed. But it appears that Nehru,15 who is
becoming more and more temperamental through overwork, protested that
this would be a breach of faith in that I had agreed16 to obtain His Majesty’s
Government’s consent to giving the Congress party complete control over their
own area whilst giving the League adequate safeguards for Pakistan areas. He
apparently informed his Working Committee that he would resign forthwith
unless this arrangement were honoured, and there was a danger of other
Congress leaders following his example and my being left without a responsible
Congress Government.

15. In the case of Bengal, which was about to be partitioned, Jinnah had

8 Nos. 207 and 317.

9 See Nos. 311, para. 2, and 317.

10 The minutes of the meeting of the Partition Council on 27 June 1947 record that Congress and the
Muslim League agreed to the proposal made by the Viceroy the previous day [see No. 354, Item
viii] that Sir Cyril Radcliffe should be invited to come out as Chairman of the two Boundary
Commissions. The Boundary Commissions would be asked to start work on Monday (30 June)
without waiting for his arrival. Microfilm of Partition Council Proceedings supplied to IOLR by
National Documentation Centre, Pakistan. IOR Pos. 3659.

11 See No. 354, Item iii.

12 No. 354, Item ii.

13 The minutes of the meeting of the Partition Council on 27 June record that the Viceroy suggested
that he should send a telegram to H.M.G. at the highest level requesting them to arrange for top
priority for the supply of two presses for India, the first off the line to go to Karachi and the second
for use in the rest of India. Microfilm of Partition Council Proceedings (see note 10). The telegram
referred to was duly despatched by Lord Mountbatten to Lord Listowel as tel. 1617— S of 27 July
1947. L/P &J/10/81 : f 174.

14 For a further account of this crisis see No. 379.

15 See No. 379, para. 4.

16 See Vol. X, No. 472.

684

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

refused to allow Regional Ministries or a Coalition Ministry to be formed, but
bad agreed17 that West Bengal should be allowed to have Ministers without
portfolio who could hold a watching brief over the League Ministry and see
that they did nothing to harm West Bengal. I pointed out to Jinnah18 that if he
considered that the interests of West Bengal were adequately looked after by
this proposal, then I considered he should accept a similar proposal for the whole
of India. The proposal I put up was that I should call for the resignation of all
members of the Cabinet and then invite the leaders of both parties to nominate
nine members each to form two Committees of the Cabinet. The Union of
India members would each take two of the eighteen actual portfolios, but
should confine their activities to the area which would belong to the Union of
India after the 15th August. The League Members would be given only
“Pakistan portfolios” and would be responsible for looking after the interests of
Pakistan areas for the remaining six or seven weeks. They would be shown all
papers and would have the right of veto, as well as the right of asking for action
to be taken.

16. In the event of a corresponding Pakistan and Union of India member
disagreeing, the matter would be brought to the full Cabinet of eighteen
members. There would be parity in the Cabinet and I would give a decision as
to whether the matter affected the interests of one or other of the future Dom¬
inions, and action would be taken accordingly. In any case everyone is so busy
on partition that practically all other action is at a standstill.

17. I saw Jinnah about all this, but was unable to move him. I therefore
raised the matter at the Partition Council meeting,19 at which I forced Jinnah to
admit that the arrangement I proposed would adequately safeguard the interests
of Pakistan; but he maintained that the system I proposed was an insult to the
League since they were to be deprived of actual portfolios. I personally drafted
out a press amio uncement20 which was so worded that the general consensus of
the meeting appeared to be that the announcement could not be construed into
an insult. Jinnah then shifted his ground by saying that it was illegal; but as he
had for quite different reasons maintained that the Cabinet was no Cabinet but
merely consisted of Members of the Executive Council nominated by the
Viceroy, he weakened his own case.

18. He finally said that he wished to put in a note protesting at the illegality
of my proposed action, and asked me to refer it to His Majesty’s Government.
I told him that if he would let me have the note by Sunday the 29th June I
would ask for a reply before the next Cabinet meeting on Wednesday the 2nd
July. But I warned him that if His Majesty’s Government upheld the legality of
my action it would have to go through. He shrugged his shoulders, and I
quickly passed on to the next item. He may not like this new decision, but it is
perfectly fair, and I am convinced that he will accept it; the more so since he

JUNE 1947

685

was kind enough to say that he realised that I was acting in good faith and that
he did not hold me responsible for the situation created by Congress.

19. We have reached a complete stalemate about the Arbitral Tribunal.
Jinnah would like Radcliffe to be the Chairman;21 but Congress opposed this
(apparently under the impression that he is a Conservative and therefore likely
to favour the League !) and then put up the proposal that they should use the
existing Federal Court.22 Jinnah said he could not possibly accept this. Judicious
enquiry from the Chief Justice (who is staying with me in the house at present)
has revealed that he chose his Muslim colleague Mr. Justice Fazl Ali for his
non-communal outlook and fairmindedness ; and presumably Jinnah would like
to nominate a pro-League judge ! In the meanwhile Congress have stuck to their
guns, and so has Jinnah, and I have now got a new headache in trying to get
agreement about the personnel of the Arbitral Tribunal.23 Jinnah glibly re¬
marked that until the Tribunal was set up, it would be for me to give the
arbitrary decisions, but I made it abundantly clear that I have no intention of
doing this.

20. I am glad to say that general agreement has been reached between the
three parties in the Punjab about the partition machinery, which is to be on
the same lines as that at the Centre.

21. It will be recalled, that when His Majesty’s Government’s announcement
of the 3rd June was shown to Nehru in draft, that he objected to the method of
election proposed for Baluchistan, and it was eventually agreed that an attempt
should be made to evolve a more democratic procedure. This has not proved
feasible in the time available and Nehru expressed himself as satisfied with the
original arrangement that the election should be left to the members of the
Shahijirga, excluding the Sirdars of Kalat State and including for this purpose
elected representatives of Quetta municipality. However, Jinnah who had in the
first place expressed himself as satisfied with the proposed arrangement, wrote
to me a few days ago24 saying that he could not now agree and that he too
would like something more democratic. I saw him personally25 and after
explaining to him that considerable delay would be involved by any other

17 No. 3 11, para. 3.

18 See No. 379, paras. 5-6.

19 No. 367; see also No. 379, paras. 7-9.

20 See No. 379, para. 5.

21 See Nos. 311, para. 2, and 317.

22 See No. 175, Item 3.

23 The minutes of the meeting of the Partition Council on 27 June record that it was agreed that the
two sides would let the Viceroy have a list of those whom they considered suitable for appointment
to this Tribunal and that the Viceroy himself would endeavour to find a suitable Chairman. Micro¬
film of Partition Council Proceedings (see Note 10).

24 See No. 298.

25 No. 3 11, para. 4.

686

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

method he agreed to leave the matter in my hands, and I have therefore adopted
the original arrangement.

22. The referendum in the N.W.F.P. has been the subject of considerable
discussion. I saw Gandhi about it on the 17th June,26 when he still wanted
Jinnah to go and see the N.W.F.P. leaders, to “woo them” as suggested in the
statement he had prepared with Ismay27 and which was sent to Jinnah. He was
most dissatisfied at Jinnah’s reply stipulating that there should be no Congress
interference in the N.W.F.P.;28 but he still wanted me to urge Jinnah to go, as
their correspondence had come to a full stop.

23 . I asked him whether he would agree to see Jinnah right away, and on
obtaining his agreement, sent a telephone message to Jinnah, asking if he would
come earlier than his original time, to see Gandhi. He came at 1 1 a.m. and joined
the meeting until 12 noon. Both these great men spoke in such low voices that
they could not hear each other, so I had to move their chairs closer together.
After a good deal of mutual recrimination about their correspondence, I
finally solved the problem by suggesting that since Abdul Ghaffar Khan had
been invested with plenary authority by the Frontier Ministry, Jinnah should
take advantage of his presence in Delhi to meet him here.

24. Both leaders seemed to think this a good idea, but Gandhi said that Abdul
Ghaffar Khan was most mistrustful of Jinnah and would not come unless he
received a written invitation. Jinnah said he had frequently extended verbal
invitations, and that if Abdul Ghaffar Khan was not prepared to accept these,
he certainly had no intention of sending him a written invitation. After this
wrangle had gone on for some time, I offered to invite all concerned to meet me
at 7.45 the same evening. Both accepted and honour was satisfied. Unfor¬
tunately, Abdul Ghaffar Khan had had an engagement 100 miles outside Delhi,
and although he was due back between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m., he did not get back
in time for the meeting. I personally telephoned Jinnah and Rajkumari Amrit
Kaur, Gandhi’s secretary, and got them to agree to a meeting with Abdul
Ghaffar Khan at the Viceroy’s House the following day under the chairmanship
of Ismay.

25. This meeting was held at 4.30 on the following day,29 but Jinnah refused
to have any discussion at all with Abdul Ghaffar Khan beyond extending an
invitation to him to come and visit him at his house. Nothing anyone could say
could shake Jinnah, and so the meeting broke up after half an hour and was
continued at Jinnah’s house at 7.30 the same evening. Jinnah subsequently
told me that this meeting was not a success and that Abdul Ghaffar Khan in fact
had decided to boycott the referendum since they still wished to have authority
to vote for an independent Pathanistan.30 Fortunately the Congress High
Command is not agreeing to this,31 so the referendum will be a walk-over for
the League, and I hope that bloodshed may be avoided.

JUNE 1947

687

26. I have had some difficult meetings, particularly one with the leaders on
the 13 th June, about the position of the Indian States.32 Nehru pursued the
traditional Congress party line that any Indian successor Government is
entitled to assume paramountcy after the transfer of power and strongly
denying the right of States to declare their independence. He attacked the
Political Adviser, Sir Conrad Corfield, to his face and said he ought to be tried
for misfeasance. In fact, as usual he completely lost control of himself. Jinnah,
of course, took the opposite point of view that Indian States were Sovereign
States for every purpose, except in so far as they had entered into treaties with
the Crown. After a long and acrimonious discussion all agreed that the Govern¬
ment of India should set up a new department, to be called the “States Depart¬
ment”, to deal with matters of common concern with the States; in fact that it
should take over everything not connected with Paramountcy from the present
Political Department.

27. I am glad to say that Nehru has not been put in charge of the new States
Department, which would have wrecked everything. Patel, who is essentially a
realist and very sensible, is going to take it over in consultation with Nishtar.
Even better news is that V. P. Menon is to be the Secretary. By this means, I
think we shall avoid a really bad break with the States with all the endless
repercussions that this would have entailed.

28. I am arranging to get representatives of the States up on the 25 th July,
to discuss and if possible ratify Standstill Agreements with the new States
Department. I was only able to prevent the future Indian Government from
trying to send in agents against the will of the States to take over the Residencies
and Political Agents’ offices by getting them to agree that the States should be
given the opportunity of sending representatives to Delhi or Karachi instead, to
maintain liaison with the Dominion Governments.

29. On the subject of the States, Nehru and Gandhi are pathological. Nehru
said he must go to Kashmir to get his friend Sheikh Abdullah (the President of
the States National Conference) out of prison and to support the Freedom
movement in the State. Gandhi came to see me and suggested that he should go
to Kashmir to prepare the way for Nehru. Finally I told them I had an invitation
from the Maharajah, who is an old friend, and that I would greatly prefer that
they should let me go and have some discussions with the Maharajah and his
Prime Minister before they tried their hand. They were both very anxious that

26 No. 230.

27 Annex to No. 99.

28 See Nos. 156, 176 and 177.

29 No. 253.

30 cf. No. 321.

31 No. 228.

32 No. 175, Item 1.

688

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

he should make no declaration of independence and should, in fact, indicate a
willingness to join the Constituent Assembly.

30. Accordingly I went to Kashmir from the 18th to the 23rd June. I had
several preliminary talks with the Maharajah and with his Prime Minister
(Kak), but nearly always in the presence of others. I therefore asked for an hour’s
interview alone with the Maharajah, to be followed by an hour with him and
his Prime Minister.33 The Maharajah suggested this should take place on the
last day, the 22nd June. I agreed and on that last morning the Maharajah
remained in bed with colic and was unable to have his interview. Corfield
remarked that this was his usual technique to avoid unpleasant discussions. The
same view was expressed by Nehru,34 who was bitterly disappointed at my not
being able to discuss the release of Sheikh Abdullah. However, I think he was
pleased at the Maharajah and Prime Minister agreeing not to make any inde¬
pendence declaration for the present and agreeing to give serious consideration
to joining one or other Constituent Assembly as soon as the picture about
Pakistan was a bit clearer.

3 1 . On the 26th June Gandhi came to see me3 5 in high distress about Kashmir.
He said that either he or Nehru must go at once to Kashmir. I did my best to
dissuade him and have finally written36 to the Maharajah suggesting that he
should accept a visit from Gandhi as very much the lesser evil than a visit from
Nehru from his point of view, particularly as Gandhi gave me an undertaking
that he would make no propaganda speeches.

32. I had an interview with the Nawab of Bhopal, Sir Walter Monckton and
Zafrullah Khan (Advisor to the Nawab of Bhopal and late of the Federal Court)
on the 17th June.37 This interview was mainly in connection with the Nawab’s
letter of the 14th June, of which copies have been sent to the Prime Minister and
to the Secretary of State for India.38 The Nawab of Bhopal and Zafrullah Khan
between them re-stated the case for the Indian States as set out in the note. I
told them that in the short time available to me to arrive at a solution of the
problem of how to transfer power, I had discussed the matter as far as possible
with different rulers and dewans, and I had sent Corfield home to look after the
interests of the States in Ismay’s discussions with the Cabinet.

33. I also told the Nawab that I had sent home his idea of States being
allowed to group together and have Dominion Status,39 and that the Nizam of
Hyderabad’s telegram40 asking for Dominion Status had been placed before the
Cabinet Committee. I told him that Corfield had assured me that if I could get
the memorandum of the 12th May41 reaffirmed and the statement of the 3rd
June accepted by all parties, it would give fresh life to this memorandum and
be looking after the interests of the States in the best possible manner. Zafrullah
Khan explained that the memorandum of the 12th May, when taken in con-

JUNE 1947

689

junction with the Cabinet Mission Plan of the 16th May 1946, presented a
different picture from that presented by the Memorandum of the 12th May,
taken in conjunction with the plan of the 3rd June 1947, since, in the former
case, there would have been a united but very loosely-knit India : whereas in the
latter case, there were two communal Dominions with very tight centres.

34. I told him that I believed Congress would be quite willing to accept
States coming in on an agreement for the three central subjects of the Cabinet
Mission Plan. The Nawab of Bhopal, however, pointed out that his population
included 150,000 warlike Muslims, who would never agree to his joining a
purely Hindu Dominion. He reiterated that His Majesty’s Government had
left the Princes in the lurch again, but was kind enough to absolve me personally
from any blame, although I told him I must take responsibility for the plan. I
told him that basically Congress would never have accepted the plan if there
had been more than two Dominions: they had even refused to allow Bengal to
vote for independence and separate Dominion status to avoid partition.

35. The Nawab asked me for my advice about what he should do and I
strongly urged him to get together with Walter Monckton and follow the same
general line as the Nizam of Hyderabad had done, since both States had the
same communal problems, though on a different scale. I begged him on no
account to declare independence, but to come forward in a generous manner
and offer to enter into relations with the appropriate Dominion, since I was
certain that the only abiding harm he could do himself and his State was to
throw down the glove and take on a straight fight with Congress, as C. P.
Ramaswamy Iyer had done in the case of Travancore.42

36. I had a further interview with the Nawab of Bhopal, on Wednesday the
25th June,43 and informed him about the new States Department and that
Vallabhbhai Patel would be the Member in charge, with Mr. V. P. Menon as
Secretary. He could hardly contain himself with pleasure at this unexpected bit
of good news, and said “This alters the whole outlook for the States. By a
coincidence I had already written to Patel : now if I may I will add my congratu¬
lations and good wishes on his new appointment.” I told him that I thought it
would be a good thing for him to do so.

33 For the interview with Pandit Kak see No. 294.

34 No. 319, para. 5.

3 5 No record of this interview has been traced.

36 See No. 386.

37 Not printed.

38 No. 273.

39 cf. Vol. X, Nos. 9, 59 and 225.

40 Vol. X, No. 548.

41 Vol. VII, No. 262.

42 cf. No. 226.

43 Not printed.

690

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

37. The Home Department of the Government of India have circularised
Provincial Governments and Secretary of State’s Services asking them to state
their intention about serving on, transferring to other Provinces or retiring.44
The Home Member does not, however, intend to appeal to British officials to
serve on in India and, although Pakistan will probably welcome British offi¬
cials, and in the Sind at any rate they are likely to stay, the official Pakistan
attitude is not yet known. There is no doubt that Nehru’s speech to the All-
India Congress Committee meeting, of which I attach extracts at Appendix
A,45 is likely to reduce to negligible proportions the number of British officials
who will stay on in the Congress Provinces. In this connection I attach as
Appendix B46 the Governor of the Punjab’s remarks on Nehru’s speech.

38. Nehru, was also reported (in the Indian News Chronicle of the 23rd
June) as having made the following statements at Hardwar: —

(a) The Frontier Congress, will, in all probability, decide to boycott the
proposed referendum.

(b) In the event of a one-sided referendum, the present Ministry will resign
and fight elections afresh on the issue of Pakistan versus Free Pathanistan.

(c) Whatever may be the immediate future of the Province, the freedom-
loving Pathans will continue their struggle for an independent Pathan
State.

39. When I saw Nehru on the 24th,47 on my return from Kashmir, I showed
him this article and told him that Jinnah had the night before protested to me
about this, on the ground that his statement was highly improper coming from
a leader of Congress who had accepted that there should be no alternative for
the N.W.F.P. except to join Hindustan or Pakistan. Nehru defended himself
by saying that he had made no statement to the Press, nor had he seen any
pressmen. This statement appeared to have been extracted by a reporter from
refugees with whom he had been in conversation, and did not represent either
what he said or his views. I told him I would inform Jinnah accordingly.

40. I have designed flags for the two Dominions consisting of the Congress
and League flags with a small Union Jack in the upper canton. On account of
the design of the original flags, instead of the Union Jack extending to half the
depth of the flat it only extends to one third. I have given copies to Nehru and
Jinnah and it remains to be seen what their reactions will be.

41. Jinnah recently asked48 for my advice where to hold the Pakistan Con¬
stituent Assembly meeting, which he proposed to call in mid-July; and asked
whether I thought it would be a good thing to hold it in Delhi. Knowing that
the Congress were calling their Constituent Assembly at the same time and that
the Legislative Assembly chamber would be empty, I thought it would be an
excellent idea that they should meet simultaneously in different chambers and

JUNE I947

691

have an opportunity of getting together socially in the evenings. I even offered
to give a party myself to bring them together. Jinnah was all for this, but when
I mentioned it to Nehru,49 Patel, Rajendra Prasad and Gandhi, all four absolu¬
tely blew up and said that in no circumstances would they agree to allowing the
Pakistan Constituent Assembly anywhere near Delhi. No amount of argument
could make them see that this would be a good gesture for the future happy
relations between the two Dominions.

42. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff has been staying with me and has
had a most useful series of talks with Nehru,50 Jinnah,51 Auchinleck and Ismay.
I am so glad that the withdrawal of British troops from India and also the
employment of Gurkha troops in the British Army both appear to be on the
way to a satisfactory settlement. Jinnah would have liked the withdrawal to take
longer but Nehru regretted it would take as long as six months, though he
accepted this.

43. Plans are going ahead for the partition of the Army and both Congress
and League leaders have been insistent that on the 15th August the respective
armies should be reconstituted under separate operational Commanders in
Chief. I am insisting however that the administration of the Army shall remain
under Auchinleck until the partition of personnel and physical assets is complete.
Trivedi (Governor of Orissa) who has had more experience than any other
Indian official on defence problems has come to Delhi at my suggestion, and
with the concurrence of both leaders, to assist in these partition arrangements.52

M. OF B.

44 See No. 354, note 5. 45 Enclosure to No. 218. 46 No. 218.

47 No. 319, para. 1. 48 No. 311, para. 7. 49 cf. No. 319, para. 4.

50 Nos. 315, 330-2, and 337. 51 No. 329.

52 See No. 217, second item; No. 354, Item vi; and No. 372.

370

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab)
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Situation in , Part 11(a)

27 June IQ47

Dear Jenkins,

Thank you for your letter of the 22nd June.1 I have decided in the end not to
give a copy of your letter of the 16th June to Nehru,2 at any rate at present, as
he is in a rather difficult state of mind, and I do not wish to add to the state of

1 No. 299.

2 No. 218; see also No. 263.

692

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

emotional attrition in which he now exists. I am therefore holding it to show
him later on.

2. I can assure you that I personally fully sympathise with you and all your
officials; and that only the overriding necessity of getting this political settle¬
ment through compels me to avoid anydiing which tends to a break with the
principal Indian leaders.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

371

Mr Moon to Lord Ismay

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Sikh Problem , Part 11(a)
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL AS FROM BAHAWALPUR, 2 7 June 1Q4J

Dear Lord Ismay,

I write with reference to our conversation a few weeks ago regarding the
Sikhs.

Feroz Khan Noon made, I understand, a direct approach to them, indicating
that the Muslims would grant them special concessions if they would throw in
their lot with Pakistan, but he met with a rebuff.

This was to be expected. The Sikhs are still smarting from the injuries
inflicted on them by the Muslims in the Rawalpindi division. Temporarily
they’ve been thrown off their balance. But an influential section of them
(including Master Tara Singh and Gyani Kartar Singh) know, in their heart of
hearts, that they must come to a settlement with the Muslims if the Punjab is to
be spared disaster. Hence, though one must not look for any immediate results,
there is yet hope that with patience and perseverance the Sikhs will be brought
to the view that Eastern Punjab — which must in any case be formed — should
join Pakistan. If this is achieved, then the civil war, not to mention adminis¬
trative complications, which must inevitably follow an attempt to draw a
frontier between two National States somewhere in the middle of the Lahore
Division, will be averted.

Meanwhile what steps are to be taken?

Certain Sikhs, in touch with both Baldev and Tara Singh, are going to
formulate, informally and entirely privily, the Sikh conditions for joining
Pakistan. If these offer, as I believe they will, a possible basis for negotiation,
certain Muslim League leaders will be informally approached. The Sikhs are

JUNE 1947

693

anxious that it should not leak out1 that any such negotiations are afoot or
contemplated.

It will considerably facilitate matters if it can be so arranged that the new Eas¬
tern Punjab has the strongest possible Sikh complexion and does not , therefore ,
include Gurgaon, Hissar, Rohtak and Karnal. The Sikhs have already put this
demand to Congress who hesitate to accept it. I would suggest that this Sikh
demand should be encouraged and conceded. You can doubtless be of assistance
in this regard. If the Sikhs are taken out of Hindu clutches — as they want to be —
and put in a more or less independent position on their own, they are much
more likely to gravitate in the end towards their natural alignment with the
rest of the Punjab and Pakistan.

The next step would be to indicate that it is optional for this Sikh Eastern
Punjab to join either Hindustan or Pakistan and that there is no presumption
that it must join one rather than the other. The Sikhs will probably make this
clear themselves, but if they ask for some pronouncement to this effect from
HMG, it will probably be advisable to accede to their request.

Please forgive this unasked for effusion. My excuse is that without a Sikh-
Muslim pact there will be chaos in northern India.

Yours sincerely,

PENDEREL MOON

1 Words in italics underlined in original.

372

Note by Mr H. M. Patel
Mountbatten Papers. Partition Council Papers

NO. P.O.-1/PC/47 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, PARTITION OFFICE,

new Delhi, 27 June 1947

The undersigned is directed to circulate to the Members of the Partition Council
with a view to discussion at a date to be notified later a copy of a note by His
Excellency the Viceroy relating to the Partition of the Armed Forces.

H. M. PATEL

To Mr M. A. Jinnah.

The Hon’ble Mr Liaquat Ali Khan.

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.

The Hon’ble Dr Rajendra Prasad.

The Hon’ble Mr Abdur Rab Nishtar.

694

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Partition of the Armed Forces

NOTE BY THE VICEROY

I have prepared this note in consultation with H.E. the C-in-C, Sir Chandulal
Trivedi and my other Advisers as a basis for discussion by the Partition Coun¬
cil.1

2. The division of the Indian Armed Forces is bound to be a complicated
process. If it is to be accomphshed without confusion and without any marked
loss of morale and efficiency, it is essential that all the existing forces in India
should be under a single administrative control until —

(a) they have been finally sorted out into two distinct forces ; and

(b) the two Governments are in a position to administer, i.e. to pay, feed,
clothe and equip their respective forces.

3. On the other hand, it is essential that the Union of India and Pakistan
should have each, within their own territories, forces which :

(a) are with effect from the 15 th August under their own operational
control;

(b) are on the 15 th August predominantly composed of non-Muslims and
Muslims respectively; and

(c) are as soon as possible after the 15th August reconstituted predominantly
on a territorial basis.

4. The requirements set out in paragraph 3 above necessitate that partition
should be in two stages. The first stage would be a more or less rough and ready
division of the existing forces on a communal basis. Plans should be made
forthwith for the immediate movement to the Pakistan area of all Muslim
majority units that may be outside that area, and similarly for the movement to
India of all exclusively non-Muslim or non-Muslim majority units at present in
the Pakistan area.

5. The next stage would be to comb out the units themselves with a view to
eliminating non-Pakistan personnel by transfer to the Armed Forces of the
new India and vice versa. These transfers must be on a voluntary basis and this
may mean, for example, that Hindu and Sikh personnel from Pakistan may
elect to serve in the Armed Forces of the new India, and Muslim personnel from
the new India may elect to serve in the Pakistan forces. While this reconstitution
is being carried out, arrangements should be put in train to ensure that each
Dominion shall have as soon as possible its own administrative machinery to
enable it to maintain its own Armed Forces. It is not until these two processes
have been completed that central administrative control can be dispensed with.
Every effort should be made not only to complete the reconstitution of units,
but also to provide each Dominion with its own administrative and mainten¬
ance services for its own Armed Forces by the 1st April 1948, thus making it

JUNE I947

695

possible to dispense with central administrative control by that date. This of
course does not preclude arrangements or agreements between the two
Governments for sharing any administrative or training establishments.

6. If both Governments are to have operational control over their respective
Armed Forces by the 15 th August, they must each have heads for the three
services, i.e., the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, and headquarters staffs
through which to exercise their functions. It is therefore important that these
six heads should be selected forthwith, and that they should have authority to
begin setting up dieir headquarters so as to be ready to take over command by
the 15 th August. The heads of these Services will be direcdy responsible to their
respective Ministries through their Defence Members and will have executive
control of all the Forces in their territories.

7. So far as central administration is concerned (see paragraph 2 above), the
Indian Armed Forces as a whole will remain under the administrative control
of the present C-in-C in India who in his turn will be under the Joint Defence
Council. This Council might consist of:

(1) The Governor-General or Governors-General ;

(2) Two Defence Ministers ; and

(3) C-in-C in India.

The Commander-in-Chief in India will have no responsibility for law and
order, nor will he have operational control over any units, save those in transit
from one Dominion to another; nor will he have any power to move troops
within the borders of either Dominion.

8. In order to avoid confusion, it is suggested that the existing C-in-C in
India might be entitled Supreme Commander from the 15th August until his
work is completed. His existing staff would of course be reduced progressively
as his functions diminish.

9. Attached to this note are :

(1) a paper by H.E. the C-in-C giving outline proposals for control of
Armed Forces during the reconstitution (annexure I) ; and

(2) draft Terms of Reference of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Com¬
mittee (annexure II).

Annexure I to No. 372

OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES DURING

THEIR RECONSTITUTION

i. In the following paragraphs, proposals for control of the Army are given
in some detail as the Army is the largest and most complicated of the three
Services. It is suggested that the control of the Navy and Air Forces should be
on the same general lines.

1 For previous discussions by the Partition Committee of the division of the Armed Forces see Nos.

152, Item iii; 217, Item iv; and 354, Item vi.

696

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

2. PROPOSALS FOR CONTROL OF ARMY DURING RECONSTITUTION

NOTES :

INDIA Govt.
Policy

PAKISTAN Govt.

Policy

Joint Defence Council
(Policy)

Policy

GHQ Policy

(As now constituted)

ARMY HQ INDIA

ARMY HQ

PAKISTAN

(C-in-C)

(C-i

n-C)

(Operational

(General Administration

(Operational

Control)

and Reconstitution)

Control)

(Training)

(Training)

(Reconstitution,

(Reconstitution

etc.)

etc.)

Eastern

Southern

Command HQ

Command HQ

(GO C-in-C)

(GO C-in-C)

U.P.

Delhi

Bihar & Western

Deccan Madras Bombay

Area

Area

Orissa Bengal

Area Area Area

Area Area

Sind

Waziristan

Peshawar Lahore

Area

Area

Area

Area Area

(Eastern

(on assumption

(on assumption

Pakistan)

that N.W.F.P.

that N.W.F.P.

forms part

forms part

' of Pakistan)

of Pakistan)

(i) Pakistan Army H.Q. to be formed from existing Northern Command
H.Q. and to remain at Rawalpindi until accommodation and com¬
munications are available at Karachi.

(ii) Area Commands in Pakistan to remain as at present, except that Lahore
Area will be exclusive of the Eastern Punjab districts transferred to the
new India and will absorb the present Rawalpindi area.

(iii) A nucleus Army H.Q. with a new C-in-C will have to be set up for the
new India; and on this nucleus will be built up the administrative
machinery required for the future control of the army of the new
India.

JUNE 1947

697

(iv) The area of the new India is too large to be controlled directly by one
Army headquarters, so the existing two “Command” H.Q. at Ranchi
and Poona should be retained, becoming subordinate to the new “Army
H.Q.” at Delhi. This “Army H.Q.” should be set up in Meerut, until
eventually it takes over the accommodation from the existing G.H.Q. in
Delhi.

(v) “Delhi District” which at present is responsible only for the military
control of the area comprised in the Delhi Province should become an
“Area” Command and be enlarged to include those districts of the
Eastern Punjab transferred to the new India. It would then become a
Maj or-General’s command.

(vi) The other areas in the new India would remain as at present, except that
the present Bengal and Assam Area would become the “Western
Bengal (or Calcutta) Area” under the new Army H.Q. India and the
“Bengal (or Eastern Pakistan) Area” under the new Army H.Q.
Pakistan with Headquarters at Dacca or Chittagong. A new area
headquarters will have to be formed for this purpose.

3. Responsibilities

(i) During the actual process of reconstitution of and re-allocating the
Army and its establishments, continuity of maintenance and administra¬
tion can only be ensured by the retention of control centrally by the
existing G.H.Q. India. Similarly all movement necessary to give effect
to reconstitution plans from one Dominion to another and vice versa can
only be centrally controlled as this movement of individuals and units
must be related to the actual accommodation and general maintenance
facilities available in each Dominion. If there is no central control,
confusion and even chaos is almost certain to ensue to the detriment of
the welfare, morale and contentment of the troops. It is essential to keep
the morale and discipline of the troops at the highest level during the
process of re-allocation and reconstitution and no deterioration in their
general administration and welfare should be risked.

(ii) It is proposed, therefore, that during the process of reconstitution, the
existing C-in-C in India should be responsible for carrying out the
recommendations of the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee
(A.F.R.C.) as approved by the Partition Council. He will also exercise
the following responsibilities under the general direction of the Joint
Defence Council: —

(a) The general administration and maintenance of the Army, e.g. Pay,
Clothing, Equipping, Food, Medical attendance.

(b) The general administration of military law and the maintenance of
discipline.

698

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(c) Control of such military establishments as may be serving both
Dominions.

(d) Command and control, including the posting and movement, of all
British officers and British other ranks serving with the Indian
Forces.

(e) The movement of units and individuals from one Dominion to
another to give effect to reconstitution plans.

(f) The movement of stores, equipment, vehicles, arms, etc., from one
Dominion to another.

(iii) Initially the responsibilities of the Army H.Q. in each Dominion would

include : —

(a) Operational control and allocation of all troops in the Dominion as
instructed by the Dominion Government.

(b) Local (as opposed to general) administration of all troops in the
Dominion and their training.

(c) The selection of personnel, i.e. Officer Selection Boards, etc., and the
training and first appointment of officers.

(d) Recruitment of other ranks and their training.

(e) The implementation of instructions from G.H.Q. regarding general
maintenance and administration and of the reconstitution pro¬
gramme as approved by the Partition Council.

4. General Remarks

A separate administrative machinery for each Dominion Army must be built
up by re-allocation of the existing administrative units and personnel of the
Army. This will commence at once but must necessarily take some time unless
there is to be an administrative breakdown.

As this machinery is developed and new units formed by which the two new
armies can be fed, paid, clothed, housed, moved and medically attended, the
two Dominion Army H.Q. would progressively take over the responsibility of
general administration from G.H.Q. , which would be correspondingly reduced
and then disappear.

After the disappearance of G.H.Q. the two new Army H.Q. would be
completely self-sufficient under their own C-in-C’s and the two Dominion
Governments would be in a position to enlarge, reduce, re-design, reorganise
and nationalize their Armies as they wished.

Annexure II to No. 372

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE ARMED FORCES
RECONSTITUTION COMMITTEE

In close consultation with the Steering Committee acting under the orders of
the Partition Council, to make proposals for the division of the existing armed
forces of India, namely, the Royal Indian Navy, the Indian Army and the
Royal Indian Air Force (including the various installations, establishments

JUNE 1947

699

and stores owned by the present Defence Department of the Government of
India), in accordance with the principles enunciated in His Excellency the
Viceroy’s note and annexure I thereto.

The Committee will work on the following assumptions : —

(1) Existing members of the Armed Forces serving in either State will be
governed by their existing terms and conditions of service, until new
terms are promulgated, and then, if they do not desire to serve, they will
be allowed to terminate their services and proportionate benefits will be
admissible to them;

(2) Any Indian officers or other ranks it may be necessary to engage for
service in the Armed Forces between now and the date of the transfer
of power should be engaged under existing terms and conditions of
service, with the option of resigning from the service, should they not
wish to serve on under any new terms or conditions which may be
imposed by the new Dominion Governments.

(3) The liability for non-effective charges in respect of pensions, gratuities,
annuities, etc. earned by Indian officers and other ranks of the three
Services prior to the transfer of authority to the new Dominion Govern¬
ments will be undertaken by these Governments and publicly so an¬
nounced.

(4) In respect of the Armed Forces affected by division, there shall be no
changes, except as demanded by the processes of division, in the basic
organisation and nomenclature of formations, units, estabfishments and
installations of the three Services, or in the class composition of units,
until such division is completed.

(5) For the successful division of the Armed Forces, the services of a number
of British officers now serving in them will be required. Therefore the
implementation of the plan for complete nationalisation may take longer
than was anticipated.

373

The Earl of Listowel to Mr Attlee

LIP&JI10I123: f 39

India office, 27 June 1947

Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 98/47

Prime Minister

The Viceroy’s reply1 to the various amendments we propose to the Indian
Independence Bill has been received and a copy is attached. Also attached is a

No. 365.

1

700

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

note by my Office showing the outstanding points which matter. I think you
will agree that none of these points need to be taken to the India Committee.
The only one on which I have any doubt is the Andamans but we decided to
give the Viceroy discretion to omit the clause dealing with them if he thought
it would cause serious difficulties.2

As regards the Viceroy’s point on Clause 5(i)3 I think that we should try and
meet his view but that before taking a decision, the Palace must be consulted. I
am preparing a draft letter to Lascelles on the subject.4

Annex to No. 373

POINTS OUTSTANDING ON THE DRAFTING OF THE
INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

The Viceroy’s telegram 1598-S5 replies to all the telegrams sent to him on the
drafting of the Bill. It seems very satisfactory.

2. The Viceroy accepts, vide comments on Clause 8, the major re-drafting
telegraphed to him in telegram 81556 and all other amendments which have
been telegraphed. The only points now outstanding between us and the
Viceroy which are not mere drafting points which can readily be met are the
following :

(1) The Viceroy sticks to his view that Provinces should split on the appoin¬
ted day. He proposes to discuss the question of new Governors with all-
India leaders and not with Provincial leaders. As we told the Viceroy
that we would accept [his] view on this after he had considered what we
had said,7 I presume that the Viceroy’s view will be accepted.

(2) Clause 5(1). The Viceroy wishes8 the existing proviso which states that
unless and until another appointment is made, the person who is now
Governor General of India shall, from the appointed day, become
Governor General of each of the new Dominions to be amended in order
to make it clear that he has not in any way been forced on the political
parties as Governor General. He proposes that the proviso should read :

4 ‘provided it shall be lawful for one person to hold both appointments
of Governor General for such period as may be determined by either
Dominion after August 15th.”

The disadvantage of this is that it involves the re-appointment by the
King of Lord Mountbatten as Governor General of each Dominion and
this would have to be done on formal advice.

(3) Clause 7(1). The Viceroy protests against (b) and (c) on the ground that
Pandit Nehru won’t like them. The Cabinet Committee were, however,
very firm9 on both points and I suggest it is not necessary to put it to them
again.

(4) Clause 10(2). The Viceroy says that the intention of his Cabinet was not
to cover persons outside the regular Secretary of State’s Services and that
the words “all civil posts under” will therefore have to be omitted. He is

JUNE I947

701

going, when lie discusses with the leaders, to try and get it widened to
cover judges.

(5) Clause 16. The Andamans. The Viceroy is adamant that this clause and
2(4) should be omitted. The Cabinet Committee decided to leave this to
him.10 It is assumed that the clause can now be omitted.

2 Mr Harris noted on this minute on 27 June 1947: ‘P.M. has no comments,J and in tel. 8295 of 27 June
Lord Listowel informed Lord Mountbatten that the amendments which the latter had proposed in
No. 365 to Clauses 2(2)(a), 3(1), 3(2) and 10(2) would be made, and that Clauses 16 and 2(4) would be
omitted. L/P &J/IO/I23 : f 19-

It may be noted that, in addition to the amendments discussed in the telegraphic exchanges
between Lord Mountbatten and Lord Listowel, a number of minor drafting changes had been made
in London. Letter from Turnbull to Abell, 27 June 1947, despatching copies of revised text of Bill.
R/3/I/I53: f 242.

3 No. 366.

4 No. 374.

5 No. 365.

6 No. 348, note 6.

7 See Nos. 347, Minute 3, 351 and 352.

8 No. 366.

9 See No. 349.

10 See Nos. 347, Minute 3, and 353.

374

The Earl of Listowel to Mr Attlee
L/P &JI10I124: ff 234-8

India office, 27 June 1947

Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 102/47

Prime Minister

In my minute No. 98 /471 I said that 1 would be submitting to you a draft letter
to Lascelles dealing with the Viceroy’s private telegram No. 1600-S2 on Clause
V(i) of the Bill. I attach a draft of a letter from yourself to Lascelles accordingly.3

LISTOWEL

Annex to No. 374

DRAFT LETTER TO SIR ALAN LASCELLES

SECRET

My dear Lascelles,

You will have received, with the papers of the India and Burma Committee
of the Cabinet, copies of the draft Indian Independence Bill. I now send you a

1 No. 373.

2 No. 366.

3 The letter as issued, dated 28 June 1947, was the same as the draft. P.R.O. PREM 8/541, part 11 .

702

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

revised text incorporating all the latest amendments and upon which, apart
from certain relatively minor points, agreement has now been reached with the
Viceroy.

The Viceroy has raised a point on the proviso to Clause V(i) which, as printed
in the Bill, provides that from the appointed day (15th August) the present
Governor-General of India shall, until other provision is made, be Governor-
General of each of the new Dominions of India and Pakistan. The Viceroy’s
point is that he does not want it to appear that if he does stay on as Governor-
General of each of the new Dominions, he has, in those capacities, in any way
been forced upon the Indian political leaders. He therefore suggests that this
proviso should be revised in the following sense : —

“provided it shall be lawful for one person to hold both appointments of

Governor-General for such period as may be determined by either Dominion

after August 15th.”

(If this were adopted it would have to be reworded by Parliamentary Counsel
here.)

I feel that there is great force in what the Viceroy says. As the new India and
Pakistan will each be Dominions it follows (though it is not, of course, expressly
stated in the Bill), that the Govemors-General of those Dominions will be
appointed by His Majesty on the advice of Dominion Ministers. Our hope is
that the leaders of both major parties will agree that Lord Mountbatten should
remain as Governor-General of both during a period in which the Central
administration of India as it now exists is being split up and allocated between
the two new States. The processes will be greatly facilitated if this can be
arranged. On the other hand, once the new States are declared to be Dominions
their Ministers will be entitled to advise the Crown to make a new appoint¬
ment of Governor-General at any time. The realities of the position therefore
are that Lord Mountbatten can only remain with the assent and approval of the
Indian leaders but it is desirable that he should not only remain with their
approval but should overdy appear to the Indian public to do so.

The technical difficulty about meeting Lord Mountbatten’s desire is that if the
existing provision is removed from the Bill, His Majesty will have to make a
new appointment of Governor-General for each of the Dominions with effect
from the 15th August, and, although they are Dominions as from that date,
there can be no Ministers formally to advise the Crown until a Governor-
General has been appointed and has selected Ministers. Thus there would in a
sense be some departure from strict Dominion practice, but I feel that hi the
unusual circumstances this can be overcome if His Majesty would be willing to
agree to an arrangement whereby Lord Mountbatten consults the recognised
leaders of Congress and the Muslim League as to whom they would wish to
have appointed by His Majesty to be Governor-General of India and Pakistan
respectively as from the 15 th August. This consultation would be of an informal

JUNE I947

703

character and the appointments would be made formally on the advice of His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. We should, in the circum¬
stances, have to see that publicity was given to the fact that, although for the
last time, the appointments were being made on the advice of Ministers here,
there had been full consultation with the recognised Indian political leaders as
to the appointments and that they were being made in accordance with the
wishes expressed by Indian leaders.

A rather similar situation will arise in regard to the appointment of Governors
of the new Provinces which are being created out of the Provinces of Bengal,
Assam and the Punjab. In these cases the Viceroy proposes4 to take the advice of
the main leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League respectively according
as to whether these Provinces are within India or Pakistan and not to take advice
of local political leaders. In Indian conditions, I think that this is the right course,
because I think that better advice will be tendered to His Majesty in this way
than if local provincial politicians are consulted. But, of course, the procedure
proposed by the Viceroy does prejudice to some extent the question whether
Governors of Provinces will in future be appointed by His Majesty after taking
informal soundings of provincial opinion as is done in the case of the Australian
States or whether the appointments are made on the advice of the Dominion
Government as is the practice in Canada.

From the political standpoint I consider that as regards the Governor-
General’s appointment, the Viceroy is right in maintaining that he should only
remain in the two new appointments on the expressed and publicly known
desire of the Indian political leaders and that an amendment in the sense which
he desires should be made to the Bill. As regards the Provincial Governorships
also I recommend that the Viceroy’s advice should be followed.

Would you be so kind as to take His Majesty’s pleasure.5

4 No. 365, para. 3.

5 Sir A. Lascelles replied on 2 July 1947 that, ‘after carefully considering’ the points raised, the King
was of the opinion that, as suggested by Mr Attlee, the Viceroy’s advice should be followed regarding
both the appointment of Govemors-General and of Governors. L/PO/6/122: f 149.

375

Mr Beards to Mr Attlee

P.R.O . PREM 8/541 , Part n

27 June ig47

Prime Minister

You agreed with the Secretary of State for India to send to the Leaders of the
Opposition copies of the India Bill and the covering memorandum before the

704

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

week-end so that they would have an opportunity of reading them before
meeting you on Monday afternoon.1

I understand that Mr. Macmillan will not now be able to attend the meeting
after all as he is going abroad to-day. Sir John Anderson also has to catch a train
about 4 p.m. that day and so will be unable to attend the meeting.

I assume in view of this that you would only wish to send copies of the India
Bill and the memorandum to the following : —

Mr. Eden
Mr. Stanley
Mr. Clement Davies
Lord Salisbury
Lord Samuel
Lord Simon2
Drafts are attached.3

p. F. R. B.

1 30 June 1947.

2 A further note on the file indicates that Mr Attlee saw Lord Teniplewood at Wimbledon on 28 June
and that, as a result, arrangements were made for Lord Teniplewood to come and have a talk with
him about the Bill on 1 July 1947 at 10 am.

3 Not printed.

376

The Earl of Listomel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma
Mounthatten Papers . Letters to and from the Secretary of State

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, 2y June

Dear Mounthatten,

I have no letter from you to answer this week — not that I was expecting one
after what you said in the last paragraph of your last letter.1

2. In paragraph 4 of your Private and Top Secret letter of the 12th June2 you
said that Gandhi was pressing for an announcement to be made to the effect that
H.M.G.’s wish was either to enter into tripartite arrangements with both the
new Dominions or to have similar bilateral agreements with each of them and
that in any event there would be no question of differentiation. You suggested
that this might be referred to by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons
in his speech on the Second Reading of the Bill.

3 . This proposal of Gandhi’s seems to me to be of such importance that I have
put the matter before the India Committee.3 We all felt strongly that we should
be extremely guarded in dealing with it.

JUNE 1947

705

Clearly one of the main objections to partition from the Congress point of
view has been the danger that Pakistan would fortify itself with outside assis¬
tance from ourselves, the Americans or others. It seems to have been the fear of
this happening through Pakistan remaining in the Commonwealth which in the
end brought Congress to agree to temporary Dominion status and several
utterances have been made to the effect that anyone who indulges in giving
support to Pakistan will incur the hostility of Congress. The Congress would
hardly pay so much attention to this point if they did not regard it as a serious
danger.

4. Our position is that we want good defence arrangements with India as a
whole and from our point of view it would be much best if they were on the
same basis with both the Dominions and if the Commonwealth relationship
provided the nexus between the two. But we feel that we should be very careful
not to say that we shall not in any circumstances have closer relations with
Pakistan than with India. Once we have said that, it will be open to the Congress
to refuse any definite arrangements with us in regard to defence and other
matters and then to say that we are precluded from having any better relation¬
ship with Pakistan. The best hope of getting an effective relationship with the
Congress derives from their fear that if they do not play up we shall have
differential and better relationships with Pakistan and possibly with non¬
acceding Indian States. The probability is that this is the strongest bargaining
point we have with the Congress and it is one that may continue to operate for
a substantial period. We feel that we should be very ill-advised to throw it
away.

5. Further we do not think that we should say at this stage that it is our wish
to enter into tripartite arrangements. Of course, if all parties were co-operating
fully a tripartite arrangement would be the best but there can be a great deal of
difference in the way in which an identical agreement is operated by two dif¬
ferent parties. If we had a tripartite agreement all the arrangements under it
would require the assent of the three parties. If, on the other hand, we had
separate agreement with Pakistan and India we should be free, even though the
agreement were in identical terms, to develop our relations with Pakistan under
agreement without India having the right to object. In practice, formal
agreement about defence matters cannot contain more than general principles
and what really matters is the kind of arrangements which are reached between
the Chiefs of Staff or between the Governments in implementing the general
agreement. Clearly Gandhi’s idea is that we should commit ourselves before we
even begin to negotiate not to have any arrangements with Pakistan different
from those which we have with Flindustan. Once we have said that, Hindustan

1 and 2 No. 161.

3 No. 360, Minute 3.

7 o6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

can decide what arrangements, if any, we shall be committed to have with
either of the new Indian Dominions.

6. At the same time we recognise that it is of immense importance to have,
if possible, good and close relations with the new India and we agree that the
Prime Minister in the Debate on the India Bill should refer to our desire to have
close and effective arrangements with both the new Dominions in all fields and
particularly in the defence and economic field on a basis of free negotiation. It
might be added that what we hope for is to have equally good and close
arrangements with both the new States in India.

7. I regret that I have not yet been able to let you know the outcome of my
efforts reported in para. 13 of my last letter4 to obtain from H.M.G. a gesture in
the matter of food, but I am not letting the matter rest and shall hope to reply
to your telegram soon.

8. We are indeed grateful to you for your prompt reply to our latest tele¬
grams to you about the draft Indian Independence Bill. The receipt of your
telegram No. 1598-S5 this morning has made it possible for the Prime Minister
to send copies of the draft Bill to Opposition Leaders before the weekend with a
view to discussing it with them on Monday afternoon.6 It is to be hoped that
after that discussion the way will be clear to authorise you to discuss the Bill
with Indian leaders.

9. Thank you for your letter of 20th June (1446/ 1 8) 7 enclosing one you had
received from Bhopal forwarding a statement of views upon H.M.G.’s policy
towards the States. It is certainly to be regretted that any of the Princes should
feel as he does about our policy but much of what they criticise is an inevitable
consequence of the termination of British rule in India rather than a result of the
particular way in which we have thought it best to handle matters.

10. You will like to know that the discussions with the Burmese Goodwill
Mission which is here at present have been on a very friendly basis although it
has now become quite clear that, in spite of what appear to be their own
personal inclinations, the AFPFL leaders feel bound by the ignorances and
prejudices of their rank and file to persist in their determination to take Burma
out of the Commonwealth. It has been made clear to them that there can be
no question of legislation to transfer power during the present Session except
on the basis of dominion status for a reasonable period of time and that, if it is a
question of transferring power to a sovereign republic, H.M.G. cannot do more
than promise to introduce legislation next Session and secure its enactment as
soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

LISTOWEL

4 No. 281; Lord Listowel’s reply on this subject did not in fact issue until II July 1947 (tel. 8928).

L/E/8/3387: ff 128-30.

5 No. 365. 6 See No. 375.

7 No. 273.

JUNE I947

707

377

H.M. Minister at Kabul to Government of India , External Affairs and Commonwealth

Relations Department

Telegram, LfP&Sli2li8n: f 83

immediate Kabul, 27 June 1947, 4.30 pm

Received in India Office: 27 June, 8 pm

No. 52. Northwest Frontier Province telegram No. 331/CB, 25th June.1

Afghan Government have made two alternative requests :

(1) for immediate statement that Pathans are free to choose independence,

(2) for permission for mission to proceed at once to India vide paragraph No.
3 of my telegram No. 51.2

They naturally hope for reply before referendum takes place.

2. If both requests are refused on the ground that the question is not die
concern of Afghanistan results are unpredictable. The Afghan Government by
instigating or allowing unwise publicity have aroused much excitement and if
their representations fail will have to take some action if only to placate public
opinion.

3 . Possible action might be :

(i) to attempt to suppress agitation by promise of appeal to UNO,

(ii) to allow press campaign to continue while maintaining present policy of
advising tribes to keep aloof,

(iii) to leave tribes free to act,

(iv) actively but of course secretly to encourage the tribes to interfere with her
if choice of independence can be now conceded this would cut the ground
from underneath Afghan agitation [sic]. If this is impossible perhaps
mission could be permitted to visit Delhi ostensibly to discuss the future
diplomatic relations with whatever governments will now be set up.
This is in any case a matter to which both countries must now pay early
attention.

5 . Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday again asked for urgent reply
to their suggestions. Fie should not of course leave Kabul until I receive your
reply.

Repeated to Secretary of State, and North West Frontier Province.

1 Possibly a repeat of No. 342.

2 No. 309.

708

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

378

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , RI31 1 1 157: f 6g

most immediate new Delhi, 27 June 1947, 4. jo pm

secret Received: 27 June, 5.5 pm

No. 1610-S. Your telegram No. 72 ofjune 18th.1 At a meeting of the Partition
Council which I held this morning,2 both parties agreed that it was of the
utmost importance that the Boundary Commissions should finish their work by
August 15th and they felt that there would be no great difficulty in achieving
this object, provided a really first-class Chairman could be made available. The
Indian members of both Commissions for Punjab and Bengal have been
appointed and will be starting work within the next day or two. It was agreed
that one Englishman should be appointed Chairman of both Commissions and
the man whom they wanted was Radcliffe. At the moment, Congress will not
look at him as Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal because they say it is un¬
dignified and humiliating to have to ask anyone from outside India to come and
take on this task.

2. I very much hope that Radcliffe will see his way to accepting the Chair¬
manship of both Boundary Commissions. The matter is very urgent. The
sooner he gets here the better and from what I have said above it looks very
unlikely that he would be required to stay after August 15th. I foresee no
difficulty whatsoever about emoluments, indeed both parties said they would
treat him generously. I had thought that he might be Chairman of the Boun¬
dary Commissions and then of the Arbitral Tribunal afterwards, but both
parties agree that this would not do since the report of the Boundary Com¬
missions would almost inevitably upset one party or the other or both, whose
confidence he would thus lose. However, if, as I sincerely trust will not, repeat
not, be the case, he feels unable to accept, I will try again to get the leaders to
accept him as Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal, but I frankly cannot hold out
much hope.

3. In the extremely unfortunate event of Radcliffe not accepting the Boun¬
dary Commissions Chairmanship, have you any other names to suggest?3

1 See No. 224, note 2. 2 See No. 369, paras. 11 and 19.

3 In tel. 8415 of 1 July Lord Listowel reported to Lord Mountbatten that Sir C. Radcliffe was prepared
to accept the Chairmanship of the Boundary Commissions subject to certain conditions regarding
his salary, allowances, etc. (the cost of which was to be borne by the Governments of India and
Pakistan). In the event Sir C. Radcliffe was paid J200 from the Ji,ooo set aside to meet his expenses
and drew no salary. On his return to England he wrote, on 21 August 1947, as follows to the Secre¬
tary of State for Commonwealth Relations :

‘I came to the conclusion at an early date that my post was one which I should prefer to regard as
being an unpaid one and subsequent events have tended to confirm me in this view. I did not raise
the matter while I was in India, but it is my desire that I should be enabled formally to relinquish
any claim to salary or remuneration for my services as Chairman.’

L/P&J/7/12500: ff 82, 62, 42-3, 37, 18-19.

It was also arranged that Mr H. C. Beaumont, I.C.S., then on leave in England, should fly out to
India with Sir C. Radcliffe to act as his Secretary. Ibid.: ff 58, 42.

JUNE 1947

709

379

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl of Li stow el

Telegram , R/3/1 / 160: ff 23-3

immediate new Delhi, 27 June 1947, 10.30 pm

secret Received: 27 June , 9.30 pm

No. 1616-S. At the meeting of the India/Burma Committee on 28th May1 the
future of the present Interim Government was considered in the light of papers2
by the President of the Board of Trade and the Secretary of State for India, and
I was invited to discuss this question with the Indian leaders and keep you
informed.

2. I had hoped that it would be possible for the present Interim Government
to carry on for the 7 weeks that remain until the transfer of power, since any
change must inevitably distract Departments from their all important task of
partition. Congress have, however, been insistent and have reminded me that
they only agreed to partition in the belief that I would dismiss the Interim
Government at the earliest possible date after the decision of the Provinces
became known.3

3. We had a long discussion on the problem at the Partition Council4
yesterday, Congress being represented by Patel and Rajendra Prasad, and the
League by Liaquat and Nishtar. The discussion was inconclusive and I sent them
away with three alternative solutions and the request that they should let me
know which they preferred today. It was clear that the League would not
commit themselves without consultation with Jinnah.

4. I had arranged a meeting for 10.00 a.m. this morning with the same party,
except that Jinnah was to come in place of Nishtar. Before the meeting started,
however, I go an urgent telephone message from my own sources that Nehru
had blown up and was determined to resign unless the Interim Government
were dismissed.

5. I postponed the meeting an hour and saw Patel and Jinnah separately.5
I got the former to agree to the following draft announcement: Begins: Now
that Bengal and the Punjab have voted for partition, and East Bengal, West
Punjab and Sind have voted to form a separate Constituent Assembly for
Pakistan, the question of the Governments of the Centre and the partitioned

1 Vol. X, No. 553, Minute 7.

2 Ibid., Nos. 545-6.

3 See Ibid., No. 472.

4 Lord Mountbatten evidently meant to refer to the discussion at the Partition Committee: i.e. No. 354,
Minute ix.

5 No notes have been traced of these private talks with Sardar Patel and Mr Jinnah.

7io

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Provinces arises. The Viceroy has called for the resignations of all Members of
the Central Government and is asking the leaders each to nominate their own
future Governments. Legally these will form Committees of the Cabinet, and
Cabinet meetings will be attended by all members of both Governments.

In view of the fact that the Government of the Union of India will continue
in Delhi whilst the Government of Pakistan will move to Karachi, the Union
of India Members of the Cabinet will hold the portfolios but be responsible only
for their own future areas. The League Members holding corresponding
portfolios will have overriding powers both to refer to the full Cabinet and in
event of disagreement to the Viceroy for his own decision, any proposal which
solely or predominantly affects Pakistan and to which they object, and also to
initiate any action required for the Pakistan areas, which must be acted upon
by the Member concerned. Ends.6

6. I propounded the scheme to Jinnah in my private talk with him, but the
above statement had not been typed before it became necessary to start the
meeting.7

7. When I unfolded the plan Jinnah resisted it on grounds of equity and
legality. As regards equity, he said that the Congress Ministers would hold the
actual portfolios and sign all the orders, while the Muslim members would be
merely watchdogs. This was not a position which he could possibly accept with
honour and he would have nothing to do with it. I argued that whatever the
facade, Pakistan’s interests would, in fact, be completely safeguarded and new
Pakistan Ministers would have a chance of learning their business.

8. At this point the draft statement appeared and was circulated. Jinnah gave
me the impression of being slightly less dissatisfied, and in the ensuing dis¬
cussion he concentrated more on the legal aspect of the case. He contested that I
had no right in law to do this. I countered by saying that I had taken the pre¬
caution of consulting the Cabinet Committee when I was in England, and that
they had, on advice, assured me that my proposition was entirely legal.8

9. Mr Jinnah said that legal opinions were often influenced by the manner in
which a problem was presented. I therefore told him that if he would present
his case, I would submit it to you for legal opinion. He agreed to do so and has
undertaken to let me have a paper tomorrow night. I will telegraph this to you
at once, and I shall be most grateful if you could let [me] have a reply as a
matter of the greatest urgency.

10. The next meeting of the Cabinet is at 10.00 a.m. on Wednesday, 2nd July.
This will be the last meeting of the present Cabinet. I shall call for their resigna¬
tions and inform them of the new arrangements. It is therefore most important
that I should have the legal opinion by Monday night9 at latest, so that I can

JUNE I947

7II

inform Jinnah on the Tuesday. I cannot help hoping that if this is favourable,
Jinnah will reluctantly accept and in any case he has no other choice.

11. Both parties agreed to the reconstitution of the Bengal Government on
the lines proposed for the Centre in para. 5 above, and both also agreed that the
Punjab Governor should appoint two groups of advisers representing East and
West Punjab respectively. Action is being initiated at once in Calcutta and
Lahore by the Governors.10

6 Sir G. Abell communicated the text of the draft Press statement to the Governor’s Secretaries in
Bengal and the Punjab and to Mr V. P. Menon. The first two paragraphs of this text were the same
(except for insignificant verbal differences) as the extract given here, but it also contained two addi¬
tional paragraphs, dealing with arrangements in Bengal and the Punjab, as follows:

‘The same system will be followed in Bengal where the existing League Ministry will continue in
office for the whole of Bengal, but where the future Government of West Bengal will be brought
in with similar powers in regard to their corresponding portfolios.

In the case of the Punjab, which is in Section 93, the Governor will appoint two bodies of advi¬
sers, one from each of the future parts of the Province, to advise on matters concerning their
respective territories.’

Note by Abell of telephone conversation with Tyson, Abell to Abbott, and Abell to Menon, 27
June 1947. R/3/1/160: ff 14-17 and 19.

7 See No. 367.

8 cf. Vol. X, Nos. 494, Minute 3, and 546, paras. 2-7.

9 30 June 1947.

10 Sir G. Abell had telephoned the Governor’s Secretary, Bengal. The Governor was going to send for
the party leaders and would telegraph or telephone a draft communique to the Viceroy’s office as
soon as the matter was settled. Abell also telephoned and wrote to the Governor’s Secretary, Punjab,
explaining that Lord Mountbatten would like Sir E. Jenkins to discuss with the Punjab leaders the
question of setting up two bodies of advisers as contemplated in the last para, of the press statement
(see note 6).

380

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma

Telegram , LjP &J 1 10 ]8i: ff 1 72-3

important India office, 27 June 1947, 7pm

secret Received: 28 June , 11 am

No. 8270. Reference Minutes of your 17th Miscellaneous Meeting on 7th
June,1 Item 1. Under draft Bill2 it is contemplated that administrative con¬
sequences of partition will be dealt with both before and after appointed day by
Governor General’s Orders under Clause 8. By Clause 8(4) any Order made by
yourself or a Governor of a split Province after the 3rd June will be retro¬
spectively validated.

1 No. 100.

2 See No. 191.

712

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

2. This provision was designed to meet the fact that action as regards
partition cannot properly be taken on the advice of Government of either
Dominion or of Interim Government acting by majority vote but must be the
product of consultation and agreement between the representatives of the two
new Dominions. There is surely some force in Jinnah’s contention whatever its
merits as an interpretation of the 1935 Act that the Interim Government is not
a suitable body to decide these matters at any rate by majority decision in
accordance with the statutory provisions of 9th Schedule.

3. Whatever opinion Spens may give, I suggest that you might seek to bury
this controversy as soon as Bill has been shown to Indian leaders by pointing
out the provision in Clause 8(4) and proposing that this power should be
exercised to give effect to the decisions of the proposed Partition Tribunal and
Arbitrary [sic] Tribunal. You could then get the arbitration machinery set up
forthwith and use the order-making power at any rate as soon as the Second
Reading has been given to the Bill in the Commons.

4. It seems to me a dangerous idea that the Interim Government is the body
which will take decisions for the execution of partition and one which we
should get away from as soon as possible.

381

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma1

Telegram, LjWS 1 1 1 1091 : jf 31-2

immediate India office, 27 June 1947, 8.30 pm

secret Received: 28 June, 6.30 am

No. 8284. Your 1570-S of 24th June.2 Withdrawal of British forces from
India. In view of your paragraphs 5 and 6 H.M.G. agree that British forces
should start withdrawing from India on 15th August and continue the process
as shipping permits.

2. Necessity for very early announcement suggested in your para. 7 is not
apparent, and unless cogent reasons to the contrary exist, H.M.G. would prefer
to defer any announcement on this matter until 2nd reading of Bill in Parlia¬
ment, provisional date for which is 15th July. This would avoid piecemeal
announcements. Announcement when made should be simultaneous in
Parhament and in Delhi.

Draft announcement as suggested by you appears to require inclusion of
terminal date. Suggest therefore that last sentence should read: “This with-

JUNE 1947

713

drawal will continue as shipping permits, and is expected to be completed
about end of February, 1948”.

3 . Full consideration of the questions which you raised in your paragraph 8
must await C-in-C s views and your own. I should be grateful if we could have
these as soon as possible.

1 As directed by the India and Burma Committee (No. 347, Minute 2) the terms of this telegram had
been agreed between Mr A. V. Alexander and Lord Listowel. The latter submitted it on 27 June
1947 for Mr Attlee’s approval which was received the same day. L/WS/1/1091 : f 36.

2 No. 335.

382

Mr Gandhi to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rfe/i I156: ff 100-101

new Delhi, 27/28 June ig47

Dear Friend,

I sent you a note1 in the afternoon. The time after the evening prayer and walk
I wish to devote to talking to you on certain matters I was able to touch but
could not develop when we met.2

I told the Parliamentary delegation that heralded the Cabinet Mission and the
Cabinet Mission itself that they had to choose between the two parties or even
three. They were doomed to fail, if they tried to please all, holding them all to
be in the right. I had hoped that you were bravely and honestly trying to
extricate yourself from the impossible position. But my eyes were opened when,
if I understood you correctly, you said that Qaide Azam Jinnah and the
League members were equally in the right with the Congress members and that
possibly Qaide Azam Jinnah was more so. I suggest that this is not humanly
possible. One must be wholly right in the comparative sense. You have to make
your choice at this very critical stage in the history of this country. If you think
that Qaide Azam Jinnah is on the whole, more correct and more reasonable
than the Congress, you should choose the League as your advisers and in all
matters be frankly and openly guided by them.

You threw out a hint that Qaide Azam might not be able even to let you quit
even by 15 th August especially if the Congress members did not adopt a helpful
attitude. This was for me a startling statement. I pointed the initial mistake of
the British being party to splitting India into two. It is not possible to undo the
mistake. But I hold that it is quite possible and necessary not to put a premium

1 Not traced.

2 No record of this interview has been traced .

714

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

upon the mistake. This does not in any way impinge upon the very admirable
doctrine of fairplay. Fairplay demands that I do not help the mistaken party to
fancy that the mistake was no mistake but a belated and only a partial discharge
of an obligation.

You startled me again by telling me that, if the partition had not been made
during British occupation, the Hindus being the major party would have
never allowed partition and held the Muslims by force under subjection. I told
you that this was a grave mistake. The question of numbers was wholly un¬
tenable in this connection. I cited the classic example of less than one hundred
thousand British soldiers holding India under utter subjection. You saw no
analogy between the two instances. I suggested the difference was only one of
degree.

I place the following for your consideration:

(a) The Congress has solemnly declared that it would not hold by force any
province within the Union.

(b) It is physically impossible for millions of caste ridden Hindus to hold well
knit though fewer millions of Muslims under subjection by force.

(c) It must not be forgotten that Muslim dynasties have progressively sub¬
jugated India by exactly the same means as the English conquerors later

did.

(d) Already there has been a movement to win over to the Muslim side the so
called scheduled classes and the so called aboriginal races.

(e) The caste Hindus who are the bugbear are it can be shown conclusively a
hopeless minority. Of these the armed Rajputs are not yet nationalists as a
class. The Brahmins and the Banias are still untrained in the use of arms.
Their supremacy where it exists is purely moral. The Sudras count, I am
sorry, more as scheduled class than anything else. That such Hindu society
by reason of its mere superiority in numbers can crush millions of Mus¬
lims is an astounding myth.

This should show you why, even if I am alone, I swear by nonviolence and
truth, together standing for the highest order of courage before which the
atom bomb pales into insignificance, what to say of a fleet of dread-naughts
[sic].

I have not shown this to any of my friends.

If I have misunderstood you in any single particular you have only to correct
me and I shall gladly accept the correction. If I am obscure anywhere, I shall try
to remove the obscurity either by letter or by meeting according to your wish.

My anxiety to save you from mistakes as I see them is the sole excuse for this
letter.

Yours sincerely,

M. K. GANDHI

JUNE I947

715

383

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab)

RI3I1I176: jf 221-2

no. 40/5 the viceroy's house, new delhi, 28 June ig47

Received: 30 June, g pm

Dear Jenkins,

Thank you for your most interesting letter of 25th June1 about the situation in
the Punjab.

2. I appreciate the type of trouble that you are up against in Lahore and
Amritsar and I took pains to explain to the Cabinet at the last meeting2 exactly
what the difficulties are and why it was considered that martial law would not
be effective.

3 . The tendency to ‘blame it all' on the officials and especially on the British
officials is difficult to bear but you know the psychology behind it all, and of
course if all three parties could agree to the appointment of a set of local officials
in Lahore whom they would pledge themselves to support, it would make a
great deal of difference.3 Merely to prove their previous allegations right, they
would probably see to it that the trouble stopped. I realise how strongly you
will feel that any transfers at this stage will be unfair to officers who have done
remarkably well in an almost intolerable situation. But the time is exceptional
and those who feel they must go will soon be free to go with compensation and
proportionate pension. Though they may resent the injustice of the allegations
against them I expect few of them will be sorry to have a rest.

4. You have had a message4 saying that the Congress and the League have
agreed that you should appoint two sets of advisors, one for East Punjab and
one for West Punjab. I hope you will find that the local leaders will accept the
instructions of the High Command and join you at once.

5. I am having examined your proposals for legislation to provide for
speedier justice.5 1 quite agree with you that something on these lines would be a
great improvement if it can be arranged, though usually formidable difficulties
arise over proposals of this sort.

Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 No. 339.

2 See No. 338.

3 cf. Nos. 343 and 357.

4 See No. 379, para. 11 and its note 10.

5 See No. 339, note 2.

yi 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

384

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab)

RI3JI91 • / 4i

133/14 28 June 1947

Dear Jenkins,

Thank you for your letter, No. 687, of the 26th June.1 As Abell informed your
Secretary,2 I did press the leaders to use their own influence to stop the trouble
in Lahore, and a decision that this would be done was recorded after the last
Cabinet meeting.3 What the effect will be I cannot say.

2. As you know, I have informed the leaders that you wish to be relieved
from the 15th August in any case, and I confirm that you will be free to go then.
I am trying to get the parties to make their nominations in the next day or two.
When they do so the position will be clearer, but I do not think it would be
legal to instal the two new Governors until the 15 th August.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 No. 357.

2 See No. 343, note 2.

3 No. 338, Case No. 155/32/47, conclusion (3).

385

Sir C. Corf eld to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rhlil94:fi4

IMMEDIATE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 28 June I947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I return the enclosures to Your Excellency’s letter of the 27th instant1 regarding
Mr Gandhi’s proposed visit to Kashmir.

I have suggested an amendment in and an addition to the first letter to His
Highness. I think the amendment is advisable in case the correspondence were to
become public property later and it might be alleged that a declaration of
independence at a later stage had been approved by Your Excellency.2

The addition3 is an attempt to ensure that any letter sent to Mr Gandhi is
couched in suitable terms.

I enclose for Your Excellency’s information a copy of the letter4 which was
sent to Mr Nehru in a similar but more explosive situation last year, after Mr
Nehru’s arrest in Kashmir. I spent three days with His Highness and his Prime

JUNE 1947

717

Minister before I could get them to accept the draft of this letter in place of
another draft, which they wished to send and which would have blown Mr
Nehru sky high’. They will remember these discussions and will I hope draft
the letter to Mr Gandhi in a similar vein, so that everyone’s ‘face’ can be saved
as on the last occasion when Mr Nehru paid his second visit to Kashmir without
any real untoward incident.

May I suggest that it would be as well to let Mr Jinnah know the background,
since Mr Gandhi’s visit at this stage will cause deep suspicion in Pakistan, which
might be allayed by a previous explanation?

Yours sincerely,

C. L. C ORFIELD

1 Asking whether Sir C. Corfield agreed with the letters (i.e. No. 386 and its Enclosure) which Lord
Mountbatten proposed to send to the Maharaja of Kashmir and Mr Gandhi. R/3/1/94: f 11.

2 In No. 386 as originally drafted the end of the first sentence of the second para, read: ‘essential not
to make any statement claiming independence at this stage, since your legal right to this was un¬
questioned’. Sir C. Corfield suggested the substitution of the words actually used in No. 386.
R/3/1/94: f 16.

3 The addition was the last sentence of the fmal para, of No. 386. Ibid.: f 17.

4 Maharaja of Kashmir to Pandit Nehru, 11 July 1946. Ibid.: f 15.

386

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Maharaja of Kashmir

Rbli/94 : ff 6, 18-19

27 [28]1 June 1947

My dear Maharajah Sahib,

As you know, I had promised Mr. Nehru and Mr. Gandhi that I would take up
the question of Sheikh Abdullah with you. I had to inform them, however, that
owing to your having colic on the very day that we had arranged for a dis¬
cussion on this matter, it had not been discussed.

I told them2 that I had had discussions both with you and your Prime
Minister about the future of Kashmir; and that I thought I had succeeded in
convincing both you and your Prime Minister that it was essential not to make
any statement about independence, since your freedom of choice on the lapse of
paramountcy remained constitutionally the same. I told them that I understood
that you were willing to enter into agreements with both the new Dominion
Governments and that you were seriously considering the question of linking
yourself up from the military point of view with one or the other new Domin-

1 Though dated 27 June this letter was evidently not despatched until 28 June following receipt of
Sir C. Corfield’s comments on the draft in No. 385.

2 See Nos. 319, para. 5-6, and 369, para. 31.

7i8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

ion, and might consider sending representatives to that Constituent Assembly
provided that this did not involve you in a closer association than you desired.

I further went on to say that you were most anxious not to have any political
leaders coming up at this time, since any form of propaganda speeches at this
moment might well rouse communal feelings and provoke bloodshed which
you have been so successful in avoiding up to now.

Mr. Nehru was very upset, and said he felt he must go up to Kashmir
himself at once. I told him that I did not feel that his services could be spared
from the Centre with only seven weeks remaining in which to fix up the details
of partition and the transfer of power; and he promised to think it over.

Mr. Gandhi then came to see me and said that Mr. Nehru had agreed not to
go provided he, Mr. Gandhi, went in his place. Mr. Gandhi, however, offered
not to go and to let Mr. Nehru go if I would prefer that.

I told him that provided he would give me the necessary assurances not to
indulge in propaganda, I would put the case to you personally; and I dictated an
official letter to you in his presence yesterday, which I now enclose. I have also
sent a copy of the official letter to Gandhi.

May I suggest that you should send an answer direct to Mr. Gandhi, and that
if you do decide to accede to his visit you should stress that you do so under the
conditions mentioned in my letter.

I need not remind you that I have not the power to stop either of these two
coming up to visit you, and so you will have to make up your mind which of
the two you would sooner have. I sincerely hope for all our sakes that, if you do
accept a visit from one of them, you will be able to so arrange matters that there
is no clash. I am sure that you and your Prime Minister, with your great tact
and knowledge of the situation, will be able to handle this matter. My attention
has been drawn to Your Highness’ letter of the nth July 194 63 to Nehru, as a
result of which I understand that the latter paid a second visit to Kashmir last
year without any untoward incident.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

Enclosure to No. 386

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Maharaja oj Kashmir

26 June 1947

My dear Maharajah Sahib,

I am writing to tell Your Highness that I have had a talk with both Mahatma
Gandhi and Pandit Nehru, who are both still anxious to visit Kashmir. I
pointed out to them that any visit from a big Congress leader in which speeches
were made could not fail to cause the League to send speakers of the order of
Mr Jinnah to counter their propaganda. This would in effect produce the elec¬
tioneering atmosphere which you so rightly wish to avoid, since, as you pointed

JUNE I947

719

out to me, there has been no bloodshed up to date and only violent pohtical
speeches could now bring about this bloodshed.

Mr Gandhi tells me that Pandit Nehru is prepared to forgo his visit if he
(Mr Gandhi) goes instead.

I am therefore writing this at Mr Gandhi’s request (and dictating it in his
presence) to suggest that you should agree to his visit in the near future and
make things as easy as possible for him.

He has given me his firm assurance that he will make no pohtical speeches or
carry out any form of propaganda. The object of his visit would be to see
Madame Abdullah; and, if you granted permission (but only if you did grant
him permission), he would like to see Sheikh Abdullah. He would like to meet
the people in a general way, but has no desire to address them or to collect large
crowds.

May I suggest that Your Highness or your Prime Minister should communi¬
cate direct with him to save time.

I am sending Mr Gandhi a copy of this letter.4

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

3 R/3/I/94: f 15.

4 Lord Mountbatten did this under cover of a letter dated 27 June 1947 in which he remarked: ‘I
enjoyed our interview so much; it is always most refreshing hearing your point of view and obtaining
the benefit of your advice*. R/3/1/94: f 7.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Lieutenant-Colonel Webb

Rhlil94:ff 20-21

28 June 1947

Dear Webb,

Since writing you the attached letter, I have received from Gandhi the letter of
which a copy is enclosed together with a copy of my reply.1 1 would be grateful
if you would warn His Highness that it will be dangerous to postpone the visit

1 In a letter of 27 June Mr Gandhi stated that Pandit Nehru had expressed anxiety at the delay involved
if Lord Mountbatten’s letter (Enclosure to No. 386) to the Maharaja of Kashmir was sent by post
rather than by wire. Mr Gandhi added that he shared Pandit Nehru’s anxiety ‘that the matter brooks
no delay. For him it is one of personal honour.’ Lord Mountbatten replied on 28 June that the letter
had gone by post but that he was now telegraphing to the Resident to ask him ‘to inform the Maha¬
raja of the despatch of my letter and its subject’. This telegram (1625-S of 28 June, 3.50 pm) read as
follows : ‘Please warn His Highness that the only way I could persuade Nehru to postpone an im¬
mediate visit to Kashmir was to agree to forward a request that His Highness should receive Gandhi
instead. Letters to this effect from myself to Llis Highness are on their way. Congress attach great
importance to an early and favourable answer’. R/3/1/94: ff9, 12, 13.

720

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

too long, and that the main thing is to send off an answer to Gandhi as soon as

I am also telegraphing to this effect.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

Enclosure to No. 387

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Lieutenant-Colonel Webb
confidential 28 June ig47

Dear Webb,

1 enclose copies of two letters2 I have sent to the Maharaja, which explain
themselves.

For your private information I can tell you that Nehru is over-working
himself to such a degree that he practically is not sleeping at night and is having
real difficulty in controlling himself at meetings. He is under a very great strain
and I consider that a visit by him to Kashmir at this moment could only produce
a most explosive situation; whereas if His Highness can be persuaded to handle
Gandhi tactfully, I believe there is a good chance that his visit could be passed
off without any serious incident.

I am afraid that to refuse to allow Gandhi in at all would precipitate a crisis
and would certainly not prevent Gandhi from going up, probably accompanied
by Nehru.

Gandhi absolutely refused to consider accepting seven weeks delay before
paying his visit, but it is possible that the Maharaja might be able to produce
special reasons why his visit should not take place until say mid-July.

It was so nice seeing you and Mrs Webb again, and we enjoyed our lunch at
the Residency enormously.

Thank you for all the trouble you took in connection with the visit, and do
not forget to look us up in Delhi on your way home.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

2 No. 386 and its Enclosure.

Sir T. Shone to Secretary to the Cabinet
L/S &G\7\i2$3: fj 103-10

TOP SECRET OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE

DESPATCH NO. 63 UNITED KINGDOM, 6 ALBUQUERQUE ROAD,

new Delhi, 28 June 1Q47

Sir,

With reference to my Top Secret Despatch No. 61 of the 25th June,1 I have the

JUNE 1947

721

honour to transmit herewith a copy of Pandit Nehru’s record of the con¬
versations between him and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff about the
employment of Gurkha troops in the British Army. I have to thank the Vice¬
roy’s Secretariat for sending me a copy of this record.

2. I think it will be found that, in general, the record tallies fairly closely with
my own. The order in which the questions of the Gurkha troops and of the
British troops in India came up was correctly given in my account — i.e. the
former and not the latter was in fact raised at the beginning of the first con¬
versation. There are occasional differences of emphasis on certain points and
Pandit Nehru goes into greater detail here and there, notably in regard to some
of Viscount Montgomery’s replies to his enquiries.

3. Paragraphs 20 and 21 of Pandit Nehru’s account, emphasize the personal
character of the agreement reached between him and Viscount Montgomery.
He made it clear more than once that he could not commit the future govern¬
ment of the Indian Union, let alone the present Government of India.

4. I would also draw attention to Pandit Nehru’s concern lest the employ¬
ment of Gurkha troops in the British Army might be used as a precedent for
that of, e.g., Afridi battalions, and to Viscount Montgomery’s assurance on this
point (paragraph 15 of the enclosure).

5. The care which Pandit Nehru, a very busy man, has devoted to his account
of these conversations (which he must have made himself, as no other Indian
was present), goes to show what importance he attached to them.

6. I request that copies of this despatch and of my despatch under reference
may be sent to the War Office as soon as possible.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

TERENCE SHONE

Enclosure to No. 388

24 June ig47

NOTE ON AN INTERVIEW WITH F.M. MONTGOMERY ON THE
EMPLOYMENT OF GURKHA TROOPS IN THE BRITISH ARMY

AND OTHER IMPORTANT MATTERS

Field Marshal Montgomery came to see me yesterday, accompanied by the
United Kingdom High Commissioner, Sir Terence Shone. He told me that as
head of the British Army he was arranging for the complete withdrawal of
British troops in India. He intended beginning this process on the 15 th August.
He wanted to do so as rapidly as possible, but there were shipping and other
difficulties which would delay the process. In any event he said that the end of
1 No. 337.

722

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

February 1948 was the final date for the withdrawal of the last soldier of the
British Army from India.

2. He asked me if I was agreeable to this withdrawal. I said I was entirely
agreeable to the withdrawal as soon as possible. I could not fix any definite
date, as this would depend on various facilities. A few weeks this way or that
way would not matter, but I hoped that the withdrawal would be speedy and
complete.

3 . He asked me if there was any chance of our changing our minds later and
asking for some British troops to be left in India. If this happened it would upset
his programme. I told him that there was not the least chance of this happening
and we wanted British troops in India to be taken away completely.

4. He then spoke to me about the British proposal about taking Gurkha
troops in the British Army. This, of course, had been discussed previously with
Major General Lyne, who came here some months back. It had been before the
Cabinet on two or three occasions and it was in this connection that Sir Girja
Shankar Bajpai and Brigadier Rudra had visited Kathmandu, on behalf of the
Government of India.

5 . The position was that the Government of India had agreed to the inclusion
of Gurkha battalions — probably eight in number — in the Indian Army, on the
express understanding that they would be officered by Indian officers or
possibly Gurkha officers. This had been agreed to on behalf of the Nepalese
Government informally.

6. As regards the employment of Gurkha troops in the British Army, no
decision had so far been reached, though some light had been thrown on the
attitude of the Nepalese Government by the visit of Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai
and Brigadier Rudra to Nepal.

7. Field Marshal Montgomery pointed out that the British Government were
very anxious for a decision in principle of this matter and their plans were hung
up because of this. Also, in view of the division of the Indian Army which was
now taking place, it might be difficult to tackle this question at a later stage
when facilities for doing so might not be forthcoming. Therefore a quick
decision by us was necessary. That decision need be only of the principle
involved and not of any details. He did not want any formal decision either of
the Cabinet. He is satisfied if I could give the assurance and he would com¬
municate it to his Prime Minister and go ahead with the proposal. This meant
that some representatives of the British War Office would visit India in the near
future and discuss the matter more fully with representatives of the Govern¬
ment of India or our Defence Department. Later the two could go to Kath¬
mandu for final discussions and decisions.

JUNE I947

723

8. I told the Field Marshal that while we were anxious to meet the wishes of
His Majesty’s Government, there were considerable difficulties in our way and
many questions of principle were involved. I could not possibly, therefore, give
him any answer at that stage committing our Government. Indeed, it was
impossible for me to commit the future Dominion Government of India as that
has not been formed. This did not seem to worry the Field Marshal and he said
that my own assurance was quite enough for him. Ultimately, I said that I
would consider the matter further, consult some of my colleagues and give
him our reactions the next day, that is today.

9. Having consulted a number of my colleagues this morning, I met the
Field Marshal this afternoon. Sir Terence Shone was also present. I told him
that Gurkha troops especially, and, to some extent the whole Indian Army, had
become unpopular because of their use for imperial purposes by the British
Government in the past. A year ago Gurkha troops came into conflict with
Indonesians and there was much resentment in Indonesia against Gurkhas.
Anything that we might do and which might lead to a continuation of the old
tradition of Gurkha troops for imperial purposes would be subject to adverse
comment in India. While the present was no doubt different from the past and
the future was likely to be still more different, it was the past that had produced
the present psychological approach of our people. They would judge every
action by their past and any hang-over from the past would be objected to. It
would be looked upon as a continuation of the old Imperialist method of
holding down colonial territories. It might also appear as a continuation of the
Imperialist link with India. We were entirely opposed to any such thing, and
would object strongly to the use of any troops, much more Gurkha troops,
against any people struggling for their freedom. “What were the Gurkha
troops required for?”, I asked.

10. The Field Marshal said that they were required as a reserve for emergen¬
cies and to carry out the British commitments in the Far East. These troops were
not to be used locally and certainly not against any peoples’ movement for
freedom. They were not to be used at all in fact, unless war came. Malaya was a
suitable place for them to be stationed; otherwise they had nothing to do with
Malaya. He told me how Gurkhas had been misjudged in Indonesia, as they
really helped in keeping the peace and preventing grave developments. So also
in Syria, Sir Terence Shone added, where the Gurkhas became very popular
with the people.

1 1. I said that we could not come in the way of any arrangement between the
United Kingdom and Nepal, as Nepal was an independent country; but, owing
to the geographical situation of Nepal, surrounded as it was by India, certain
facilities were required of us. What were these facilities? He said, in the main,

724

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

they required transit facilities, not for troops as such, but for individuals or
groups of Gurkhas travelling as civilians across India. There might also be some
facilities for transfer of moneys from the Gurkhas soldiers to their country.
Apart from this, practically nothing more was required of us at a later stage. To
begin with, of course there would have to be some kind of a division of the
present Gurkha battalions in India. They did not propose to have any training
or big recruiting centres in Nepal. At the most, they would have some recruit¬
ing agents in Nepal for replacements in the future. Training would take place
where the battalions were stationed normally. As soon as these battalions were
separated from the Indian Army, they will be taken away to Malaya and lodged
there. Immediately arrangements will be made for them in Malaya.

12. He pointed out the grave man-power difficulty of the United Kingdom
leading to the necessity of their retaining Gurkha troops in South-East Asia for
emergencies, notably war. He hoped they would never be used for any other
purpose. They naturally turned to the Gurkhas because of their past association
with them in the British Army. He referred to our taking Gurkhas in the Indian
Army.

13. I pointed out that though Nepal was an independent country, it was very
closely allied to India in culture and tradition and we did not look upon it as a
foreign country. It was natural therefore for us to develop the closest bonds with
it and I hoped that this would grow closer still in the future. That did not apply
to any other country in regard to Nepal, though we recognised the long¬
standing association of the Gurkhas with the British Indian Army.

14. Our talk ranged over many matters and I pointed out to the Field
Marshal the psychological background of the problem and how the average
Indian must necessarily look upon any such agreement with suspicion and
how it might be misunderstood in other countries also, especially of Asia. I
then said that it might become a precedent. The British Army might think of
recruiting troops from the North-West tribal areas, the Afridis, etc., and might
come to terms with Pakistan. The Field Marshal said that this was quite out of
the question. They never thought of it and they did not propose to think of it.
The Gurkhas stood quite apart from others for many reasons and on no account
would this be treated as a precedent. Indeed, he was prepared to guarantee that
no other arrangement would be arrived at by the British Government in regard
to any part of India as a whole without the consent of the Indian Union, or
Greater India as he called it. He was quite emphatic that the Gurkha matter
could not and must not be treated as a precedent.

15. I suggested to him if it would at all be feasible for all the Gurkha regi¬
ments to be formally incorporated in the Indian Army and then some of them
loaned out to the British Army. In fact, they will be under the British Army,

JUNE 1947

725

but they would technically belong to the Indian Army. He said this was a
difficult and complicated matter and probably not feasible. All manner of
confusion might arise.

16. I asked him what would be the primary allegiance of a Gurkha soldier
serving in the British Army. He said that while the soldier would obviously be
under the discipline of the British Army, his primary allegiance would be to
Nepal and nothing could or should be done which might come in the way of
that allegiance.

17. Again, I pointed out, the fact that Gurkhas were employed both by
India and by United Kingdom would produce confusion in peoples’ minds.
The Field Marshal thought that there was no particular reason why all this
could not be clarified in subsequent discussions. For the present, he wanted a
general assurance of an agreement on principle, so that he could go ahead.

18. I pointed out that the Nepalese Government had, while expressing their
willingness to allow Gurkhas to serve both in the Indian and the United
Kingdom Army, made it perfectly clear that they must not be regarded as
mercenaries and must not be used against each other or against any popular
movement. He agreed that this could be clarified later.

19. After a considerable discussion of various aspects of the question, I told
him that we felt reluctant to agree to his proposals because of a large number of
implications involved, but we were anxious not to put any difficulties in the
way of the United Kingdom or of Nepal, if they wanted to come to an agree¬
ment. Therefore, taking everything into consideration, we were prepared to
give them the facilities for transit, etc., asked for, subject to further con¬
sideration of details and an agreement with the Nepalese Government. He said
that that was all he wanted for the present and he could proceed immediately on
this assumption. He was going to inform his Prime Minister accordingly and
probably in the course of ten days or so a small commission of two or three
persons might come to India from the British War Office to discuss this matter
further. He hoped that these discussions will be carried out quietly without
much fuss and later the venue would be transferred to Kathmandu. I said that
we were frightfully busy as present, what with this partition and division of the
Army, etc. and it might be better to postpone this for a while. He said that we
were not likely to be less busy later on and when the British Army and the
British element in the Indian Army were leaving India it would be more
difficult. Therefore, it is better to do it as soon as possible in a quiet way without
any fuss.

20. I told him that we had considered this question in isolation from the
other problems that might arise in regard to the relations of India with Britain,
though, of course, it was a part of those problems. Possibly, this may be incor-

72 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

porated in any future settlement or kept apart, as might be the better course.
Further, I again made it clear to him that it was beyond my power or authority
to commit the future Dominion Government to any course of action.

21. He said that he thoroughly appreciated this, but he was quite content
with my personal assurance. Indeed, he did not want a written reply even and
an oral answer was enough for him to proceed.2 He expressed his gratitude for
our agreeing to give the transit facilities the United Kingdom Government had
asked for.

22. There the conversation ended. Presumably, some representatives of the
War Office are likely to come to India soon, to pursue this matter further. They
are not likely to be any very senior officers. The Field Marshal said that he
would send a Colonel and one or two others.

23 . Field Marshal Montgomery told me that in case we required his services
in any way in future he would be glad to come to India to advise us, but, of
course, he would only come if invited by us, and not otherwise.

J. NEHRU

2 cf. Nos. 331 and 332.

SECRET

389

Minutes of Viceroy’s Forty Eighth Staff Meeting , Item 1

Mounthatten Papers

Those present at this Meeting held at The Viceroy’s House, New Delhi, on 28 June
1947 at 11 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma, Lord Ismay,
Sir G. Ahell, Mr Christie, Captain Brockman, Mr I. D. Scott, Mr A. Campbell -
Johnson , Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

MR GANDHI

his excellency the viceroy read out a letter1 which he had received that
morning from Mr Gandhi. He stated that throughout this letter Mr Gandhi
had completely misinterpreted what he had said at his meeting two days
previously. In fact, he had told Mr Gandhi that he was finding increasing
difficulty in helping to get matters connected with Partition settled. He had
pointed out that it was for Congress not a question of fair play to ensure that the
various issues were settled speedily, but of sheer expediency. If Congress took
the line that they were not going to help, Mr Jinnah would point out to the
world at large that Congress’s acceptance of the Statement of 3rd June2 had not
been honest. He had told Mr Gandhi that it would be very foolish of Congress
to give Mr Jinnah any excuse for not being ready to take over power on 15 th

JUNE I947

727

August. He had assured Mr Gandhi that he intended in any event to hand over
power on that date, but had explained that Congress would be put in a very
poor position in the eyes of the world if they made it difficult for Mr Jinnah to
take over. Mr Gandhi had stated that the words “fair play” did not exist in any
Hindustani dialect. He (The Viceroy) had reiterated that he was not expecting or
demanding fair play; all that he was requesting was a degree of common sense
so that Congress would not put themselves in the position of wrecking an
agreement which had been honourably reached.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed P.S.V. to draft, for his approval, a reply to Mr Gandhi’s letter.

1 No. 382.

2 No. 45.

390

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Gandhi

RI3I1I156: f 106

28 June ig4j

Dear Mr Gandhi,

Thank you for your letter of this morning,1 which I have read with much
interest.

I am glad you wrote because after reading your letter I feel that almost from
first to last I must have failed to make clear to you my meaning. I am glad that
you have not shown your letter to others, since I should be very sorry that
views should be attributed to me which I did not, in fact, express.

I hope you will agree to discuss these matters again at our next meeting.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 No. 382.

391

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P&Jl 10/81: f 196

important India office, 28 June 1947 , 9.33 ant

private Received: 28 June , 4.40 pm

73. My telegram 8185.1 I assume that it would gready facilitate the process of
partition of the three [sic] Provinces and the constituting of new Provinces if

1 No. 352.

728

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

political leaders could agree that for a limited period the existing Governors of
Bengal and the Punjab should be appointed Governor of both East and West
Bengal and East and West Punjab. I do not know what are the chances of that
happening or whether you would think it wise to attempt to steer in that
direction. I should be glad to know your view when you reply to my telegram.

392

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Rhl1l153: ff 263-4

17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 28 June 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

In your letter of the 27th June1 you have said that you hope to have authority to
show me the draft legislation after the next week-end. I should like to point out
that this legislation is of the utmost consequence to India and we shall necessarily
have to consider it very carefully and to take constitutional and legal advice on
it. We are eager to get the Bill through Parliament as early as possible. But
unless it is thoroughly vetted, the hurry may lead to unfortunate results.

2. I think you told me that parliamentary legislation is kept secret till it is
actually placed before Parliament. How far this rule is applied to legislation
affecting Dominions, I do not know. My own recollection is that in the case of
the Union of South Africa Act, the Bill was drawn up completely in South
Africa and then sent to Parliament for formal adoption. Someone in Parlia¬
ment pointed out a small grammatical error. It was stated by the then
Prime Minister that he would not correct that error as he had given an assurance
to accept in its entirety what the South African leaders had produced. This does
not indicate that parliamentary secrecy was functioning when the Bill was being
drafted in South Africa. Indeed in legislation of this type where the future of a
country is concerned, it seems to me an entirely wrong approach to proceed
secretively and without taking a sufficient number of people into one’s con¬
fidence. Legislation is always a complicated affair requiring the utmost scrutiny
not only of one person but of many minds. I trust that this full opportunity will
be given to us before the Bill is introduced in Parliament.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

No. 356, note 2.

I

JUNE 1947

729

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

R/3/1 1157: jf 88~9

FINANCIAL MEMBER OF COUNCIL, NEW DELHI,

28 June ig47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am herewith sending our draft for terms of reference of Boundary Com¬
missions. This is strictly in accordance with the statement of the 3rd of June.1

Yours sincerely,

LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

Enclosure to No. jpj

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS2

For the Punjab .

The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the
two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority
areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. The Commission will also take into
account other factors.

For Bengal.

The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the
two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of
Muslims and non-Muslims. The Commission will also take into account other
factors.

2. In the event of the referendum in Sylhet District of Assam resulting in
favour of amalgamation with Eastern Bengal, the Boundary Commission for
Bengal will also demarcate the Muslim majority areas of Sylhet District and
contiguous Muslim majority areas of adjoining districts to be transferred to
Eastern Bengal.

1 No. 45.

2 cf. No. 369, para. io. In a minute dated 28 June 1947, Sir G. Abell commented: ‘The elimination of
the words “in doing so it” [at the beginning of the second sentence] makes a substantial difference.
These words indicate that the main emphasis is on the duty of demarcating the boundaries according
to the population figures. If they are eliminated and it is simply stated “that the Commission will
also take into account other factors” the Commission is given considerably more freedom than was
intended by the terms of reference which were proposed by the Congress [No. 158] and definitely
accepted by Mr Jinnah at his interview on the 23rd June. The interview record states “Mr Jinnah
accepted the terms of reference which had been put up by the Congress leaders based on H.M.G.’s
statement of the 3rd June”. [No. 311, Conclusion 2]. R/3/1/157: f 9°-

It may be noted that the terms of reference proposed by Mr Liaquat Ali Khan differed in one other
respect not mentioned by Sir G. Abell : namely the addition of the words ‘to be transferred to Eastern
Bengal’ at the end of para. 2 on Sylhet.

730

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

394

Mr Tyson to Sir G. Abell

R-tel1 h59:f 3$

D.O. NO. II3/C. R. GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CALCUTTA, 28 June 1947
My dear Abell,

As I informed Ian Scott by telephone this morning, Dr P. C. Ghosh1 refuses to
play though Suhrawardy has agreed.2 Dr Ghosh told H.E. this morning that he
had been summoned by the High Command and that he is leaving for Delhi
today by plane, will reach Calcutta again on Monday and will give H.E. his
final word after meeting his party members on Monday afternoon. It looks,
therefore, as though we should be unable to make an announcement before
Tuesday.

In the meantime here is the text3 of the announcement we should like to
make. The references to promises of cooperation by the leaders of both parties
may require a little modification if Dr Ghosh’s acquiescence is very half¬
hearted.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN D. TYSON

1 Dr P. C. Ghosh was elected leader of the Congress Assembly Party of West Bengal on 22 June 1947.
Mr Kiran Sankar Roy, previously leader of the undivided Congress Party in Bengal, was elected
leader of the East Bengal Assembly Party on 24 June. The Indian Annual Register, 1947, Vol. I.

2 See No. 379, para. 11 and its note 10.

3 Not printed.

395

Government of India , External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Department ,

to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P &SI12I1811: f 82

important new Delhi, 29 June ig47, 1.53 am

Received: 29 June, 4.30 pm

No. 5047. Our telegram No. 4755 of 19th June.1

2. Nanking telegram No. 187 repeated to you in our telegram No. 4854 of
2 1 st June2 leaves no room for doubt that the Afghan press campaign is officially
inspired. In effect Afghan Government have come into open with Irredentist
claim recently raised informally in course of exchanges on mutual frontier
policy questions. There is this difference that whereas in conversations territorial
scope of Afghan interest in frontier areas was somewhat vaguely defined it is
now specifically related to whole area between Durand Line and Indus River ;
and Pathans living in this area are referred to throughout the articles enclosed

JUNE I947

731

with Squire’s despatch1 2 3 as Afghans; possibly intention is to claim that they are
Afghan subjects.

3. Since Afghan Government have chosen to come out into the open
Government of India assume H.M. Government will reaffirm unequivocally the
views expressed during informal conversations that took place in 1944-46.
Any claim that Pathans who have for generations been domiciled between
Durand Line and Indus are Afghan subjects cannot possibly be accepted by
Government of India. By article two of Durand agreement of 1893 Amir
Abdur Rahman Khan bound Afghanistan to refrain from interference in
territories lying beyond Durand Line “on the side of India” in return for under¬
taking by Government of India that they would not interfere in territories on
Afghan side of line. That agreement has been respected up to present day by
successive Indian and Afghan Governments. In other words Afghan Govern¬
ment have at least since 1893 recognised that Pathans living East of Durand
Line are British Indian nationals or British protected persons. (Inhabitants of
tribal areas are classed as British protected persons.) It follows that present
press campaign in Afghanistan and language used by Afghan Minister in
Nanking to Indian Ambassador constitute unwarranted attempt by Afghan
Government to interfere in internal affairs of India.

4. The Afghan Government must be aware that under the terms of His
Majesty’s Government’s announcement of June 3rd the people of settled dis¬
tricts of North West Frontier Province are to be given the opportunity to
express their wishes regarding their future and that Pathans of tribal areas after
transfer of power are left free to negotiate their future relations with whatever
successor government is concerned with the Frontier.4 There is thus no repeat no
question whatever of compulsion (c.f. paragraph No. 5 of Squire’s telegram No.
47 of June 10th).5 Issue of independent Pathan State is also a matter entirely

1 See No. 140, note 2.

2 In this telegram the Indian Ambassador in Nanking reported a conversation on 19 June 1947 with the
Afghan Minister there, during the course of which the latter had said that Afghanistan had always
wished to see a united India, but ‘now that India was going to be divided the claims and sentiments of
Afghanistan regarding the Afghan portions of India should not repeat not be ignored. By Afghans he
meant Pathans. Why, he asked, should they be forced to join either Hindustan or Pakistan? Why
should not repeat not the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan be formed into an indepen¬
dent State in intimate relations with Afghanistan?’ The Afghan Minister added that Afghanistan
‘now expected recompense for all wrong done to her in the last century’. He did not define the
recompense ‘but one thing Afghanistan would insist on was an outlet to the sea’. He stated that
‘these were his personal views’ and that he was speaking ‘as brother to brother’. L/P &S/12/1811 : f 98.

3 In Despatch No. 51 of 14 June 1947 Sir G. Squire enclosed translations of the articles referred to in
No. 140, discussed the Afghan Government’s motives in launching the press and publicity campaign,
the extent to which the Afghan public supported the Government’s policy, and how far the Govern¬
ment were prepared to go in pursuance of it, and reported on a further interview with the Afghan
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Ibid.: ff 100-108.

4 See No. 45, paras. 11 and 17.

5 No. 140.

732

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

within the Indian orbit and therefore one in which the Afghan Government
have no locus standi.

5. Squire has mentioned6 the possibility that objective of Afghan Govern¬
ment may be to forestall public attention in Afghanistan from the internal
situation. We think this quite likely and do not ourselves altogether exclude
further possibility of Afghan Government embarking on some diversionary
adventure in tribal areas. Such development would of course be disastrous to
the peace of the border and we think everything possible should be done to
prevent it. A clear reminder of probability of developments dangerous to
Afghan security on Kingdom’s northern frontier and of certainty of cessation
of generous aid that Afghanistan has been receiving from India in recent years
should have a sobering effect. Afghan M.F. A. has often himself expressed the
fear that Soviet [s] would be only too ready to take advantage of tribal dis¬
turbances to further their designs. As regards economic assistance which
Government of India, at some sacrifice to themselves, have been affording to
Afghanis tan in many directions and also supply of military equipment, Afghans
can hardly expect India to continue this form of assistance in face of an attitude
that threatens the peace of her own frontier.

6. In recent years, the Afghan Government have shown great solicitude for
friendship of U.S.A. H.M. Government might wish to consider the desirability
of (? requiring) [^requesting] U.S. Government to utter, in season, an informal
word of warning to Afghan Minister in Washington against this adoption of a
policy of adventure which, in the present state of international tension, may
have international repercussions and, instead of profiting Afghanistan, do her
incalculable harm.

Repeated to H.M. Minister, Kabul (No. 149) and Nanking (No. 123). Copies
by post to North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and United Kingdom
High Commissioner.

6 In his Despatch: see note 3.

396

Mr Gandhi to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Rl3li/i5i: f 234

NEW DELHI, 28/29 June 1947

Dear Friend,

I have to inflict another letter on you — this time about the Frontier referendum.
Badshah Khan writes to me to say that he is carrying out the plan I had

JUNE I947

733

discussed with you and he with Qaide Azam Jinnah. The plan was to move for
free Pathanistan framing its own local constitution and when the Pakistan and
the Union Constitutions were out to decide either to belong to one state or the
other. In this move he has failed. Therefore the referendum would go on with¬
out any interference by his followers, the latter abstaining from voting either
way. He fully realises that in this case the Frontier would probably go to
Pakistan.

He wants me also to draw your attention to the fact that Punjab Muslims
men and women are being freely introduced in the Frontier Province to affect
the referendum and that notable non-Frontier Muslims too have been sent to
the Frontier Province for the same purpose. This increases the risk of bloodshed
and worse.

He also says that the non-Muslim refugees numbering many thousand will
have no chance, so far as he is aware, of taking part in the referendum and they
are threatened with dire penalty should they dare to exercise the vote.

I see in today’s papers that Qaide Azam Jinnah contends that if the Pathans
abstain from voting, the abstention will constitute a breach of the terms of the
referendum. I do not see the force of the contention.

Many thanks for your telegram to the Resident in Kashmir.

Yours sincerely,

M. K. GANDHI

397

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru

Rbl1 1153: ff 2 7 5-6

2 8 [2 9]1 June 1947

Dear Mr Nehru,

I received your letter of 28th June2 after the attached invitation had been
drafted.

I trust that the fact that you can have Sir B. N. Rau accompanying you on
Tuesday will satisfy you that constitutional and legal advice will be available.

We can, as I suggest in the attached invitation, continue consideration of the
Draft Bill on Tuesday and Wednesday evenings. Let us further discuss this on
Tuesday morning.

In any case you can rely on my doing everything in my power to help.

Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN

1 Though dated 28 June a note on the file copy indicates that it was not in fact issued until 29 June
1947.

2 No. 392.

734

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Enclosure to No. 397

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru3

29 June 1947

Dear Mr Neliru,

1. I hope shortly to receive from London copies of the Draft “Indian Inde¬
pendence Bill”, which is going to be introduced into Parliament next month.

2. His Majesty’s Government has agreed that I should show you copies of
this Draft. In doing so, they have pointed out that it is completely contrary to
usual Parliamentary practice to show texts of Bills to other parties concerned
before publication.

3. His Majesty’s Government has therefore insisted that I should not give
you copies of the Draft Bill for retention. I am sure that you will appreciate the
reasons for this.

4. I invite you to come to the Viceroy’s House at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, 1st July
to study this Draft. I would propose that the representatives of Congress and of
the Muslim League should sit in separate rooms for two hours and read the
Draft through. The Muslim League representatives would be in Her Excel¬
lency’s sitting-room, and the Congress representatives in my study. I shall be
obliged to withdraw copies of the Draft Bill after you have studied them.

5. I am also inviting

Mr Jinnah

Sardar Patel

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan

6. I suggest that Sir B. N. Rau should be available to give you any assistance
you require when you read through the Draft. Mr. H. M. Patel will be present
in any case as Secretary. I am similarly suggesting to the Muslim League
representatives that Mr. Justice Rahman and Mr. Mohammed Ali should be
available for them. My Reforms Commissioner will also be in attendance, ready
to be summoned by either party to elucidate any points.

7. I myself will be available towards the end of the morning to hear any
points which you might wish to suggest that I should take up with H.M.G.

8. Let us arrange, on Tuesday morning, any further meetings that are
required — either that evening or on Wednesday evening, perhaps.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

3 Lord. Mountbatten also sent letters dated 29 June 1947 in similar terms to Sardar Patel, Mr Jinnali and
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan inviting them to come to study the draft Bill. All three replied the same day
with brief letters of acceptance. He had informed Lord Listowel of the arrangements he was making
to show the Indian leaders the draft Bill in tel. 163 8-S of 28 June, adding that he would like to put out
a communique announcing that he was to show the draft Bill to the Indian leaders during the
morning of 1 July. R/3/1/153 : ff 266, 273-4, 277, 279-80, 285.

JUNE I947

735

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Jinnah

Rhff 57' ff 101-2

29 June 1947

Dear Mr Jinnah,

Lord Ismay has told me about your conversation with him last night1 on the
subject of the terms of reference for the Boundary Commissions : and mean¬
while I have received Mr Liaquat Ali Khan’s letter2 in which he suggests
amendments to the draft which was discussed by the Partition Committee as
long ago as 13 th June,3 and sent to him the following day.

I am afraid that there appears to have been a complete misunderstanding on
this matter. You will remember that, in the course of our conversation on the
23rd June,4 1 raised this question with you, and Sir Eric Mieville and I were left
with the impression that you had categorically agreed. The record of our talk
which was prepared by Sir Eric the following morning and initialled by me
immediately afterwards contains the following passage :

“Boundary Commissions. Mr Jinnah said that he accepted the terms of reference
that had been put up by the Congress party and that he would have names of
his nominees for both Boundary Commissions ready for submission to the
Viceroy within the next day or two. He then said that he felt it would be
impossible for both parties to agree upon the two Chairmen and he therefore
suggested that a distinguished member of the Bar from England might come
out as an independent Chairman for both Commissions and that his decision
should be final.”

Again, at the Partition Committee meeting on Friday, the 27th,5 you will
remember that I definitely asked Sardar Baldev Singh whether he agreed with
the terms of reference and that he signified that, though not content, he accepted
them. Neither you nor Mr Liaquat Ali Khan gave the slightest indication that
you demurred or that you still had the matter under consideration.

Accordingly, there has never been a shadow of doubt, either in my own
mind, or in the minds of my Staff, that the League had agreed.

You yourself have always emphasised the necessity for speed and I have
therefore gone ahead as fast as possible. I have already informed the Secretary
of State and a notice is being issued simultaneously tomorrow in England and
in India in which the terms of reference are set out as originally suggested. I have

1 See No. 399, Item 2.

2 No. 393.

3 Presumably a reference to the Viceroy’s meeting with the Indian leaders on that date: see No. 175,
Item 2.

4 No. 311.

5 See No. 369, paras. 10-11.

s

736

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

also informed the Governors concerned, and have asked them to summon the
members of their respective Boundary Commissions and make arrangements
to get them to work at once.

I am sure that you will agree with me that we ought not to incur the delay
which would result from re-opening this question, particularly as I understand
that you told Lord Ismay that your amendments were really more a matter of
form than of substance.

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

399

Lord Ismay to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Interviews [2)

2g June ig4?

H. E.

I had two hours talk with Mr Jinnah yesterday. Mr Liaquat Ali Khan was also
present. The following were the main topics of discussion:

I. Interim Government

Mr Jinnah said that he had consulted legal opinion who had confirmed the
illegality of your proposed action. I reminded him that you had agreed to get
the opinion of Law Officers at home and that he (Mr Jinnah) had undertaken
to present his case. He accepted this and said that he would let you have his
presentation by Sunday evening, the 29th.1

Continuing, he said that he had only raised this question of illegality in order
to let you out of your undertaking to Congress : and that whatever the Law
Officers said, he could not in honour take any part in the Interim Government
as now proposed. His representatives would be merely spies and watchdogs. I
brought out all the old arguments — only 48 days to go — Pakistan interests would
be fully safeguarded and he would thus have the substance, even if he had to let
the shadow go — and so forth. But I failed to move him; while Liaquat Ali
Khan intervened to say that he himself could not possibly play second fiddle in
the Financial Department after having had Ministerial charge of it for so long.

At the end of our discussion on this point, I was not absolutely convinced
that, when it came to the point, Jinnah would refuse to play.

2. Boundary Commissions

Mr Jinnah said that he had now sent in his proposed amendments to the terms
of reference suggested by Congress. His amendments were designed to bring
the terms more in line with the announcement of 3rd June.2

I told him that we were all under the firm impression that the League had

JUNE 1947

737

already agreed to the Congress draft and that it was probably too late to take
his suggestions into account. It would be a tragedy, I said, if we were to delay
the business of the Boundary Commissions by having any further wrangles over
the terms of reference. I added that I would report to you at once, and you have
already written him a long letter3 on the subject.

3 . Purnea

He asked what was happening about Purnea and reminded me that in one of
his many letters to you on the subject of the announcement he had said that
there must also be a referendum in Purnea, which should be given a chance of
joining Eastern Bengal,4

I said I was not fully in the picture, but if I remembered aright, Congress had
also demanded a fat slice of Sind. If the question of Purnea were reopened, this
demand would also be pressed. Was it not better to leave well alone? Mr
Jinnah was inclined to think otherwise and I undertook to report our convers¬
ation to you.5

4. Referendum in the N.W.F.P.

Mr Jinnah said that he agreed to the proposed poster provided that the Pakistan
areas in the map of India were painted green instead of blue. I said that I would
look into this at once.

In point of fact, the Governor of the N.W.F.P. has today reported that this
change has already been made and agreed to by his Ministry.

5. Sir George Cunningham

Mr Jinnah said that he was very anxious to have Sir George Cunningham as
Governor of the N.W.F.P. and that he would give him any terms within
reason. I expressed considerable doubt as to whether Sir George would be
prepared to make this immense sacrifice, but undertook to get in touch with
him at once. I have today telegraphed Sir Archibald Carter.6

1 See No. 379. 1 2 See No. 393. 3 No. 398.

4 cf. Vol. X, Nos. 463 and 473.

5 Notes on file R/3/1/167: ff 10-11 by Lord Ismay and Sir G. Abell show that they subsequently
discussed the advice that they should give to the Viceroy on this subject. After seeing the papers Lord
Ismay reached the conclusion that ‘we should let the matter drop. Mr Jinnah has, by implication,
abandoned his claim to Purnea since he has accepted: (a) The Plan of 3rd June: and (b) The terms of

reference of the Boundary Commissions, which could not be interpreted as allowing the examination
of the Purnea problem ... If Mr Jinnah raises this again, we can always counter by saying that

Nehru will insist on Thar Parkar [in Sind].’ Minute by Lord Ismay of 3 July 1947.

6 In tel. 1659-S of 30 June Lord Ismay reported this part of the conversation to Sir A. Carter. He
mentioned that Mr Jinnah had said that he would give Sir G. Cunningham ‘any terms within
reason to induce him to accept’, added that Lord Mountbatten thought ‘it would be grand if Cun¬
ningham would make this sacrifice’, and asked Carter to get in touch with him.

He also asked for information on how the question of Sir A. Rowlands was proceeding (see para. 6).
Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files : Governors-General and Governors of Provinces,
Appointment of, (2).

738

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

6. Sir Archibald Rowlands

Mr Jinnah asked how the question of Sir Archibald Rowlands was proceeding.7
He wanted him very badly as Financial Adviser and general administrator. I
said that we had not been handling this question. (I believe that it was conveyed
to England by Sir Walter Monckton.) I would, however, find out the position.
I pointed out that, in any case, there could be no question of getting Rowlands,
who is an officer serving the British Government, before the transfer of power
on 15 th August. Mr Jinnah entirely accepted this argument.

ISMAY

7 See No. 168.

400

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir H. Dow (Bihar)

RI3/1/167: f 12

592/92 29 June 1947

Dear Dow,

I am sorry to have been so long in replying to your letter of the 12th June,1 on
the question whether the Boundary Commission’s work will include considera¬
tion of Bihar boundaries.

2. This is not so. The purpose of the two Boundary Commissions is to
achieve the final partition of the provinces of the Punjab and Bengal; and to
demarcate the Muslim majority areas of Sylhet district and contiguous Muslim
majority areas of adjoining districts in Assam, if Sylhet decides to join East

3. There are claims by the Congress to an area of Sind (Umarkot), but they
have been told that the possible alteration of the boundaries of the two domin¬
ions will be a subject for negotiation between the dominions themselves in due
course.2 That applies equally to the Kishengunj part of Pumea district, and
there is no agitation by the League High Command to get the Boundary
Commission to consider this area.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

PS : One can never exclude the possibility of Jinnah raising this matter again
but I hope to be able to adhere to the above.3

1 Not printed.

2 cf. No. 23.

3 cf. No. 399, para. 3 and its note 5.

JUNE 1947

739

401

The Nawah of Bhopal to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

RI3I1I137: jf 201-2

SECRET QASR-I-SULTANI, BHOPAL, 2g June 1Q47

Your Excellency,

I am writing to invite Your Excellency’s personal attention as Crown Represen¬
tative to the agitation engineered against Travancore from British India.
H.M.G.’s Statement of 3rd June, 1947, 1 re-affirming the Cabinet Mission’s
Memorandum of 12th May, 1946, 2 has been accepted by all parties. That Plan
gives various options to the States and it is the duty of all concerned, to ensure
that no extraneous interference or pressure is brought to bear on the free choice
of any State in deciding on any of the alternatives open to it under the accepted
Plan. Otherwise, the orderly transfer of power in India, to which Your
Excellency and H.M.G. have openly pledged yourselves, may, it is feared, be
seriously endangered. Moreover, all parties who have accepted that Plan are
bound to render bona fide co-operation in the implementation of that Plan.
Nevertheless, what is now happening in regard to Travancore is the reverse of
what one is entitled to expect after Your Excellency’s public declaration and
that of the party leaders that have accepted the Mountbatten Plan.

It has also been recognised by responsible leaders of all parties concerned and
by H.M.G. that the decisions of the States will be voluntary, and left to their
free choice. The attitude of certain parties in this matter, is I am afraid not in
conformity with their formal undertakings, and runs counter to what some of
the leaders of the parties had accepted during the discussions between the
Negotiating Committees.

The States have been invited by Your Excellency and the new States Depart¬
ment to discuss Standstill agreements for the future. Your Excellency will
appreciate that it is necessary for each side to respect the integrity of the other
and to desist from any action contrary to the letter and spirit of the accepted
Plan, in order to create an atmosphere needed in the country for devising
suitable relationships and Standstill arrangements for joint action on many
matters of common concern vital to the two Dominions and the States.

1 No. 45, para. 18.

2 Vol. VII, No. 262.

740

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

I have cited Travancore as an example. My State is equally concerned with
and interested in what is done to another State.

Yours very sincerely,

HAMIDULLAH3

3 Sir C. Corfield advised Lord Mountbatten to take the line in reply that he appreciated the Nawab’s
point of view and would discuss with Sardar Patel the effect that any unfriendly action might have
on the success of the joint discussions to be held at the end of July. Brief notes on the file indicate that
Lord Mountbatten saw the Nawab of Bhopal on i July 1947 and spoke to him on the lines suggested.
Corfield to Abell and note by I. D. Scott, 1 July; Abell to Corfield, 2july 1947. R/3/1/138: ff 11-12,
24.

It may also be noted that on 30 June 1947 the Nawab of Cambay, as Acting President of the
Gujarat States Rulers Council, wrote to Sir C. Corfield expressing similar views to those contained
in the Nawab of Bhopal’s letter above. He asked that his letter should be laid before Lord Mount¬
batten and concluded with a request that the Crown Representative should use his good offices to put
a stop to this ‘sinister trend’. On 4 July Corfield sent a copy of this letter to Abell for Mountbatten’s
information stating that he would merely acknowledge it and say that it had been laid before the
latter. Ibid: ff 37-8.

402

The Nawab of Bhopal to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rhl 1/137 : f 203

qasr-i-sultani, bhopal, 29 June 1947

Your Excellency,

The proposed amending legislation for the future Governments in India would
be receiving Your Excellency’s active consideration. The States unfortunately
are being made to feel at every step in the recent developments that nuisance
value is at a premium and tried and trusted friendship of over a century is at a
discount. Nevertheless, I am writing to request that Your Excellency may be
pleased to use your personal good offices to ensure that the proposed legislation
clearly provides, in terms of the Cabinet Mission’s Statement of 12th May,
1946,1 and the assurances given us before and thereafter, that there shall be no
paramountcy after the transfer of power and that all powers and rights in
relation to the States ceded to or assumed by the Crown will revert to the
States, and that this position would apply to the States that join any of the
Dominions as well as to others which decide to stay out of both.

Yours very sincerely,

HAMIDULLAH2

1 Vol. VII, No. 262.

2 Sir C. Corfield advised Lord Mountbatten to take the line in reply that he had every reason to
expect that the proposed bill would implement to the fullest extent that could be done by parlia¬
mentary legislation the policy contained in the Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum of 12 May 1946
(Vol. VII, No. 262). Brief notes on the file indicate that Mountbatten saw the Nawab on 1 July 1947
and spoke to him on the lines suggested. R/3/1/138: ff 11-12, 24.

JUNE 1947

741

403

Sir G. Abell to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rhl1 1137: ff 197-8

29 June 1947

Lord Ismay received from Pandit Nehru, with his letter of the 25th June,1 a
new draft Standstill Agreement. The Political Adviser thinks that this should be
referred to the new States Department as, if it is circulated, the result will be to
prejudice the negotiations which that Department will shortly begin. His
letter dated the 27th June is below.2

2. I have spoken to V. P. Menon and he thinks that Pandit Nehru has no
business to circulate a paper like this and that the paper will certainly do harm if
circulated, apart from the offence caused to Home Member.

3. Mr Menon agreed with me that I should write to him, as in the letter
below,3 and that Lord Ismay might reply to Pandit Nehru as in the second
draft.4

G. E. B. ABELL

Annex to No. 403
Sir G. Abell to Mr V. P. Menon

29 June 1947

Dear V. P.,

I enclose a copy of a letter which Lord Ismay has received from Pandit Nehru
and a copy of a draft Standstill Agreement, which he enclosed.

His Excellency presumes that if circulation is considered advisable it should
be done by the States Department, and would be grateful if you would show
the papers to your Honourable Member. If the draft is circulated, it should
please be stated that it has been put forward by the successor authorities for the
Union of India, and does not originate from the Crown Representative.

Lord Ismay is informing Pandit Nehru that this letter has been sent to you.

Yours sincerely,
GEORGE ABELL

1 No. 340.

2 Not printed. Sir C. Corfield commented that ‘the practical effect of this draft is the acquisition of the
powers of paramountcy over a very wide field by the successor governments’. R/3/1/137: f 184.

3 See Annex.

4 Lord Mountbatten noted ‘Agree’, and on 30 June 1947 Lord Ismay wrote to Pandit Nehru stating
that he had shown No. 340 to Lord Mountbatten who had given instructions that it ‘should be sent
to the new States Department for necessary action’. Ibid.: f 206.

742

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

404

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper 1.8.(47)131
LjP &JI10IS1 : Jf 182-gi
The Interim Government

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 29 June ig47

I circulate:

Annex I. The Viceroy’s report on developments in his discussions with
Indian leaders on this subject. (Telegram 1616-S of 27th June.)1

Annex II. A draft reply. The legal advice referred to has been given by my
Legal Adviser, Sir Kenneth Kemp. With reference to paragraph 9 of the
Viceroy’s telegram the promised further telegram giving Jinnah’s case had not
been received when the draft reply was prepared (mid-day Sunday).

Annex III. Sections 40 and 41 of IXth Schedule of the Government of India
Act 1935 which are the main relevant statutory provisions.

The Committee’s previous consideration of this subject during the Viceroy’s
visit is recorded in 1.13.(47)87 and 88 and 1.13.(47) 28 th Meeting Minutes.2

L.

Annexure II to No. 404
Secretary of State to Viceroy

MOST IMMEDIATE

Your telegram 1616-S of 27th June. Interim Government.

2. Draft announcement in your paragraph 5 is so full of obscurities and
apparent inconsistencies that it is impossible to give fully considered legal
Opinion that would have direct application to it.

[The remainder of para. 2 and para. 3 of the draft are substantially the same as in the
telegram as issued: see No. 433]

4. As regards arrangements proposed in your draft announcement these
differ from what was contemplated in my paper to I. & B. Committee, No.
I.B. (47)88 paragraph 3 in that —

(a) so far as I understand the position League Members of Interim Govern¬
ment will not be Joint Ministers working within existing Secretariats and
seeing all decisions but rather Ministers Without Portfolio having a right
of protest and giving their authority to any executive action required
within Pakistan;

(b) League Members can only object and bring to full Council a matter which
“solely and predominantly affects”3 Pakistan. It appears that Central
subjects will in practice be almost entirely in hands of Congress under this

JUNE 1947

743

arrangement. They could generally claim that Pakistan was not pre¬
dominantly affected. Phrase “solely and predominantly”4 seems much too
restrictive.

5. Is it out of the question to secure a compromise whereby —

(a) there are Joint Ministers for each Portfolio, each of whom receives full
information of what is being done, each of whom is entitled to authorise
without question action solely affecting his own area and each of whom
can protest against acts of his colleague and bring them to Council on the
ground that they substantially affect interests of his area ;

(b) Co-ordinating Committee (in fact the Partition Council) to deal with
major policy questions of Defence and Foreign Affairs, to supervise
communications and collection of Central Revenues.

Such an arrangement could, however, operate only after results of forthcoming
Referendum are known.

6. As time will not permit further consultation before Wednesday morning,
H.M.G. authorise you to deal with this most difficult situation as seems best to
you in light of this telegram, but they would like you to bear in mind that [it]
is important, in order to ensure a smooth and quick passage of the Bill through
Parliament, to be able to continue to maintain that partition is being carried out
by agreement and to avoid giving any grounds for an assertion that fair partition
has been prejudiced by giving to Congress in advance undue advantage in
relation to all Central subjects and particularly defence.

7. It is desirable that any Statement on lines of your paragraph 5 should be
released simultaneously here if possible. Please therefore give me text and time
of release in India as far in advance as possible.

[Para. 8 of the draft is substantially the same as para. 7 of the telegram as issued:
see No. 433]

Annexure III to No. 404

40. (1) All orders and other proceedings of the Governor-General in

Council shall be expressed to be made by the Governor-General in Council, and
shall be signed by a secretary to the Government of India, or otherwise as the
Governor-General in Council may direct, and, when so signed, shall not be
called into question in any legal proceeding on the ground that they were not
duly made by the Governor-General in Council.

(2) The Governor-General may make rules and orders for the more con¬
venient transaction of business in his Executive Council, and every order made
or act done, in accordance with such rules and orders, shall be treated as being
the order or the act of the Governor-General in Council.

1 No. 379. 2 Vol. X, Nos. 545, 546 and 553, Minute 7.

3 Elsewhere these words read ‘solely or predominantly , see Nos. 379, para. 5; 4*3> P» 751 2 * 4> 43 3 »

para. 4.

4 Ibid.

744

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

41. (1) If any difference of opinion arises on any question brought before a

meeting of the Governor-General’s Executive Council, the Governor-General
in Council shall be bound by the opinion and decision of the majority of those
present, and, if they are equally divided, the Governor-General or other person
presiding shall have a second or casting vote.

(2) Provided that, whenever any measure is proposed before the Governor-
General in Council whereby the safety, tranquillity or interests of British India,
or of any part thereof, areormaybe,inthejudgementof the Governor-General,
essentially affected, and he is of opinion either that the measure proposed ought
to be adopted and carried into execution, or that it ought to be suspended or
rejected, and the majority present at a meeting of the Council dissent from that
opinion, the Governor-General may, on his own authority and responsibility,
adopt, suspend or reject the measure in whole or in part.

(3) In every such case any two members of the dissentient majority may
require that the adoption, suspension or rejection of the measure, and the fact
of their dissent, be reported to the Secretary of State, and the report shall be
accompanied by copies of any minutes which the members of the Council have
recorded on the subject.

(4) Nothing in this section shall empower the Governor-General to do any¬
thing which he could not lawfully have done with the concurrence of his
Council.

405

Sir G. Abell to Mr Harris
Telegram, L[P &J/ 10/124: f 267

IMPORTANT

new Delhi, 2g June 1947, 4.13 pm
Received: 29 June , 4.30 pm

No. 1643-S. Harris from Abell.

Your 8338 dated June 28th.1 Liaquat Ali Khan as reported in Viceroy’s 1439-S
of June 14th2 said he did not wish to waste time asking whether Hindustan
should take the title of “India”. Subsequently title of “Union of India” has been
used in Cabinet to describe Hindustan without any protest from Moslem
League members. Had Jinnah wished to object presumably he would have made

1 Explaining that it was thought that Opposition leaders might enquire what was the ‘attitude of
Muslim League, and particularly of Jinnah himself, to proposed adoption of title of “India” (as
opposed to “Hindustan”) by those areas adhering to existing Constituent Assembly’, and asking for
latest available information on this point. L/P &J/10/130: f 246.

2 No. 202.

JUNE I947

745

some protest. There is every possibility of Jinnah objecting later but he would
certainly never positively accept it and it would be a waste of breath to discuss
subject.3

3 Later, in tel. 1654-S of 29 June 1947, despatched at 11.55 pm, Sir G. Abell drew attention to No. 413
for evidence ofjinnah’s view about use of name Union of India. R/3/1/160: f 33.

406

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Governors-General

and Governors of Provinces , Appointment of (2)

important new Delhi, 29 June 1947, 7.30 pm

PRIVATE

No. 1650-S. Your 73 of the 28th June.1 As I have already informed you the
Governors of Bengal and the Punjab are unwilling to stay on after partition,
and I think there is no chance of persuading the parties to agree that they should
stay on temporarily as Governors for both of the Provinces. Jenkins against
whom the Muslim League have recently waged a most unfair campaign of
abuse is anxious to be relieved as soon as possible. Burrows told Abell that
though the Muslim League might ask for him he was quite sure that the Con¬
gress would not do so.

1 No. 391.

407

Mr Abbott to Sir G. Abell
Express letter , Rffi/i 1 160: f 41

SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 2g June ig47

NO. G.S. 401

Your letter 1446/36 of 27th June.1 Governor records following observations: —
“I am not concerned with arrangements at Centre, but I very much doubt if
communique will be readily intelligible even to persons with long experience
of working of present constitution. In Punjab I understand appointment of
regular advisers in charge of portfolios is contemplated. In present conditions
advisers would for all practical purposes be Ministers but would not relieve me
of any responsibility whatever. I foresee endless disputes which may interfere

1 See No. 379, notes 6 and 10.

746

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

seriously with Partition proceedings and law and order. It would be necessary
to have two advisers (one from each half of Punjab) in charge of each portfolio
and effect on law and order matters might be disastrous. I recommend either
installation of Ministry (which Parties have already rejected) or continuance of
present arrangement in which Partition Committee will in many ways perform
functions of Cabinet. I deprecate most strongly further transfer of authority
without reponsibility until final transfer of power.”2

2 On the 4 July Lord Mountbatten wrote to Sir E. Jenkins confirming a telephone message sent
on i July that the latter might dispense with Advisers. He indicated, however, that his agree¬
ment was based on the assumption that the local leaders had no real desire for the establish¬
ment of Advisers and were satisfied with the arrangement for a Partition Committee and a
Security Committee (see also No. 426, paras. 5-8). If there was a strong demand for a change
either at the Centre or in the Punjab, they would have to think again. R/3/1/160: ff 75, 83.

408

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten ofB urma

Rl3M153:ff 283-4

17 york road, new Delhi, 2g June ig47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your two letters of today's date.1 I shall come as suggested on
Tuesday the 1st July at 10 a.m.

2. I am not competent to say anything about the procedure in regard to draft
Bill for Parliament. But we are naturally deeply concerned with any legislation
which is going to affect the future of India vitally. Indeed this Bill is likely to be
the basis for the interim constitution of India. It will not only define the relations
of India to the United Kingdom but also to Pakistan. It may deal with the
position of the States in India. All these are highly intricate and sometimes con¬
troversial matters and require the most careful consideration.

3. So far as I know, any Bill establishing Dominion Status has not only
originated in the Dominion in question but has also received full consideration
there before it became a Bill for Parliament. The procedure being adopted
here is entirely different and the whole drafting of the Bill takes place without
any reference to us and we are only given a chance to see the draft and perhaps
suggest some amendments at the last stage. I am afraid this will prove very
unsatisfactory. Sir B. N. Rau’s presence will, no doubt, prove helpful and we
would welcome it. But we would like to consult a number of other eminent

JUNE I947

747

lawyers, experts and constitutionalists such as Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyer,
Sir N. Gopalaswami Aiyengar, Mr K. M. Munshi and possibly others who may
be available here. In any complicated piece of legislation it is desirable that
several minds view it so that no important matter is overlooked.

4. I should particularly like Gandhiji to see the draft Bill and to advise us in
regard to it. His advice is especially valuable in such matters as he has con¬
siderable experience of this kind of thing and is interested in it. For him to see it
after it has been finalised and then to point out some deficiencies would be
unfortunate.

5. It is your desire, as it is ours, to have a Bill which carries with it the willing
assent of all parties concerned. If this is not obtained, then the object of the Bill
is somewhat nullified.

6. I would, therefore, earnestly request you to consider this matter afresh
and, if necessary, consult H.M.G. in regard to it so that we may have the fullest
opportunities of consulting our colleagues and our advisers.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1 No. 397 and its Enclosure.

409

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir F. Burrows ( Bengal )

Telegram , R/5/ 1/160: f 31

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 29 June 1947, 9 pm

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 165 i-S. My immediately succeeding telegram gives text of exact instruc¬
tions for you based on the draft press statement which was sent to you a day or
two ago.1 You will find this is different in important particulars from the paper
which Tyson gave to Ghosh2 and which I have seen here. I am satisfied this will
be acceptable to the Congress and if it is possible to get hold of Ghosh before he
leaves he will be approached on these lines by the Congress High Command to
whom I am giving a copy of the instructions.

1 See No. 379, note 6.

2 See No. 394.

748

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

410

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir F. Burrows ( Bengal )

Telegram , R/j/i fi6o: f 32

immediate new Delhi, 29 June 1947, 9 pm

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1652-S. Following is text of instructions. Begins:

The Governor of Bengal will send for the leader of the West Bengal part of
the Legislative Assembly and ask him to nominate a Cabinet (not exceeding the
strength of the present Ministry) in respect of that part of the Province. These
persons will then be sworn in as Ministers and will be entitled to participate in
all the meetings of the Cabinet.

The present Ministry of Bengal will be in actual administrative charge of the
various portfolios, but the policies which they formulate shall be implemented
only in East Bengal, unless the West Bengal Ministers agree to their application
to and implementation in West Bengal. On all questions affecting West Bengal
the West Bengal Ministers shall be consulted. In the event of a difference of
opinion, the case will be referred to the Cabinet. The West Bengal Ministers
will have the right to call for relevant papers and to comment thereon or on
their own initiative to ask the Secretariat to examine any proposals. They will
also have the right to initiate policies in matters solely concerning West Bengal
and any decision reached by them shall be implemented by the Government.
Ends.1

1 On Lord Mountbatten’s behalf Sir G. Abell sent a copy of this telegram to Mr Jinnah on 29 June,
remarking that the latter had agreed to the proposal at the last meeting of the Partition Council
(No. 367) ‘so far as Bengal was concerned’.

In tel. 183-C of 2 July Sir F. Burrows informed Lord Mountbatten that that evening Dr P. C.
Ghosh had given him a list of ten persons for his shadow cabinet (an eleventh name was to follow
later), and that arrangements had been made to swear them in the next morning (3 July 1947).
R/3/1/159: flf 37, 43.

411

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , jR/3/1/153:/ 286

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 29 June 1947, 1 1 pm

confidential Received: 29 June , 10 pm

No. 1653-S. Nehru has asked me1 that the Bill should be shown on Tuesday
to the following in addition to those mentioned in my No. 163 8— S, dated the
28th June:2

1 No. 408.

2 See No. 397, note 3.

JUNE 1947

749

Gandhi

Sir A. Krishnaswami Aiyer
Sir A. Gopalaswami Aiyengar
K. M. Munshi

2. Patel also emphasises3 the importance of consulting Gandhi and I think
this must in any case be done.

3. 1 intend to allow the Bill to be seen by additional persons named above
and also by three additional lawyers nominated by the League on the clear
understanding that Jinnah and Nehru will accept personal responsibility that
there will be no leakage, if necessary asking Patel to impose censorship.

4. It is of great importance that we should take parties with us and I think
that except for the denunciation of treaties and agreements with States and tribal
areas4 which is HMG’s business the Bill is likely to be acceptable.

5. Nehru has written5 protesting at the procedure since he claims that any
Bill establishing Dominion Status has not only originated in the Dominion in
question but has also received full consideration there before it became a Bill for
parliament. Nevertheless I hope by yielding to his request to carry Congress
Leaders with me.

3 No record of this conversation has been traced.

4 See No. 349.

5 No. 408; see also No. 392, para. 2.

412

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , jR/3/1 \i6o: f 34

immediate new Delhi, 29 June 1947 , u. 55 pm

confidential Received : 30 June , 7 am

No. 165 5-S. My immediately succeeding telegram gives text of Jinnah’s note
objecting to legality of proposal discussed in Partition Council’s last meeting1
for reconstitution of Interim Government. I am advised that arrangement
proposed is legal. Both Congress and League representatives would be sworn
in as members of Cabinet. Congress would hold actual portfolios but League
members would have a watching brief and though without portfolio would
divide departments between them for purpose of that brief and would act as a
Committee of the Cabinet for Pakistan. Proposal is on the lines of that made by
India Office in paper2 submitted to Cabinet Committee just before I left

1 No. 367; see also No. 379.

2 cf. Vol. X, No. 546, para. 3.

750

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

London. League have accepted similar proposal for reconstitution of Bengal
Government.

2. Jinnah told Ismay last night3 that his objection on legal grounds was a
device to let me out if I wished to postpone the reconstitution of the Central
Government. Though I would prefer to leave things as they are I am sure I must
go ahead if the course proposed is not unconstitutional, since Nehru in particu¬
lar is most insistent.

Grateful for early advice.

3 See No. 399, para. 1.

413

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , U/j/i/itfo; jf 33-40

immediate new Delhi, 29 June 1947, 11. 53 pm

confidential Received: 30 June , 9.30 am

No. 1656-S. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is text of Jinnah’s
note.1

Begins: The proposal has been made that the Union of India Members of the
Cabinet should hold the actual portfolios but be responsible only for their own
future areas and that the League Members holding corresponding portfolios
should have overriding powers both to refer to the full Cabinet and in the event
of disagreement, to the Viceroy for his own decision, any proposal which
solely or predominantly affects Pakistan and to which they object, or to initiate
any action required for the Pakistan area, which must be acted upon by the
Member concerned. In other words, it is proposed that the Union of India
Members of the Cabinet shall be invested with full powers but the League
Members should merely hold a watching brief or adopt the undignified and
invidious role of spies on behalf of Pakistan.

In the preamble to the proposal it is recited2 — “In view of the fact that the
Government of the Union of India will continue in Delhi whilst the Govern¬
ment of Pakistan will move to Karachi . . .” This preamble has no relevancy
whatever to the question under discussion. In the first instance, the Congress has
made no announcement so far that Delhi will be their capital. Secondly the
question is not where the capitals of the two States may be located but the
question before us is what provision should be made for the next 47 or 48 days
for the standstill arrangement of the present administration of the Government
of India, in which both parties are equally and vitally concerned with regard

JUNE 1947

751

to their respective interests, before the final partition of all the assets and liabili¬
ties takes place as laid down in H.M.G.’s Statement of June the 3rd.1 2 3

The proposal is open to several grave objections.

Legal and Constitutional

In the first place, it represents a fundamental departure from the proper practice
under the Constitution. The relevant constitutional provisions are contained in
the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 (hereinafter referred
to as the Constitution Act), which have been continued in force by Section 317
of that Act. It is clear on reference to those provisions that the members of the
Governor-GeneraFs Executive Council are appointed by His Majesty under the
Royal Sign Manual, which means in practice that their appointment is made by
the Crown on the advice of the Secretary of State for India, acting on the
recommendation of the Governor-General. They are consequently responsible,
through the Governor-General, to the Secretary of State who in turn is respon¬
sible to the British Parliament and not to the Indian Legislature. They do not in
any sense of the term, constitute a “Cabinet” — a term unknown to the Con¬
stitution Act. They hold office during His Majesty’s pleasure and according to
recognised practice, would not be removable from that office except for grave
misconduct or a like cause. They would be expected to resign at the end of their
normal term.

It is expressly provided in sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Ninth Schedule
to the Constitution Act that at any meeting of the Council, the Governor-
General or other person presiding and one member of the Council (other than
the Commander-in-Chief), may exercise all the functions of the Governor
General-in-Council. The proposal under examination militates strongly against
the letter, as well as the spirit, of this provision. Supposing that at a meeting of
the Council, besides the President, the only other member present happens to
be a League Member. It would be absurd to say that in the case envisaged, the
League Member would suddenly divest himself of his watching brief and
become a full-fledged responsible member of the Council for that meeting.
The plea that such a contingency was not likely to arise in practice, cannot
affect the validity of the argument on the legal and constitutional plane. On the
contrary, this extreme case would provide a good test of the validity of the
proposed measure.

Again under Section 41 of the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution Act,
where a difference of opinion arises on any question brought before a meeting

1 Mr Jinnah sent this memorandum to Lord Mountbatten on 29 June 1947 stating that he hoped the
latter would communicate ‘our objections and opposition’ to the proposal for reconstituting the
Interim Government to H.M.G. as agreed. Mountbatten replied on 30 June that he had telegraphed
the memorandum to London and awaited ‘the opinion of the experts there’. R/3/1/160: ff 43, 45.

2 See No. 379, para. 5.

3 No. 45.

752

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

of the Council, the opinion of a majority of those present, is to prevail. The
proposal under examination, in so far as it assigns a mere watching brief to
some of the Members, is clearly repugnant to this provision. It is obvious that a
Member’s right to dissent to any matter brought before the meeting cannot be
arbitrarily curtailed, in this fashion. During the interim period, any member
could raise a discussion on a matter whether relating to an area which will be
included in the future Union of India or to that which shall be allotted to
Pakistan. The position would of course be different if the right to dissent on
matters pertaining to a particular region, were allowed to fall into desuetude,
by tacit agreement but such a convention could not be established in the face of
opposition.

The proposal in question is unprecedented and unconstitutional There can
be no such constitutional change without the Government going to Parliament
for authority. Reference may in this connection be made to the answer given
by the Hon’ble Minister without Portfolio — (Mr A. V. Alexander) — to Sir
John Anderson, during the Parliamentary debate on India, on Friday, the
13th December 1946, printed in Flansard Vol. 431, Nos. 22, 23 and 24 at page
1 17 et seq .4

In the background of the proposal seems to be the wholly unwarranted
assumption that Pakistan would be an area seceding from the Indian State. The
actual position is that widi the creation of the two new Dominions, the State
will be split up, by a fiat of the British Parliament, into two wholly new States
none of which could by itself by identified with the existing Indian State. The
future Union of India consequently could not justifiably be described as a
successor state vis-a-vis the present Indian Government.

Administrative and Practical

In practice, the proposal, if put through, would be fruitful of dissensions and
difficulties. “Watching Brief” Members, having no effective control over the
administrative machinery in their hands, may be reduced to the position of
ineffective and unwilling spectators of the activities of the opposite group. If
they do assert themselves, the vague expression “proposal which solely or pre¬
dominantly affects Pakistan” would be bound to lead to sharp cleavages of
opinion, which may well prove irreconcilable. Indeed the word “predomin¬
antly” carries within itself great potentialities of mischief. For instance it may
be admitted that the removal of cloth control is a measure which does not
solely affect Pakistan and it may be argued by the other side that it does not
predominantly affect Pakistan inasmuch as the major portion of the country
would fall within the future Union of India. It would be recognised, however,
that this is a matter with which Pakistan is vitally concerned.

Moreover, the duplication of work involved in the proposal and the con¬
flicts it is bound to raise, would gravely prejudice an early settlement of the

JUNE 1947

753

partition problems facing us and in view of the urgency of these problems, the
position cannot be regarded with equanimity.

The League Members entertain the reasonable apprehension that the Con¬
gress Members who would, under the proposal, entrench themselves in
possession of the machinery and assets of the present Government, might refuse
to part with any of the assets in favour of the Pakistan Government, after the
date of creation of the two Dominions, on the principle of “what we have, we
keep”. This would create an extremely delicate situation whose repercussions
might well spell disaster for the country and its peoples.

The position of League Members of the Council, under the proposal would
be humiliating in the extreme. Every effort would be made by the other side to
curb their curiosity into matters of moment. Deprived practically of all power
and responsibility and relegated either to the position of passive spectators of
their colleagues’ activities or to the invidious role of spies ferreting out informa¬
tion by indirect means, they would be hard put to it to keep up the dignity and
prestige of their office.

The genesis of the proposal, it is understood, is a promise said to have been
given to the Congress Party by H.E. the Viceroy to the effect that as soon as
partition is a settled fact, they would be given a free hand in their area and the
League Party in theirs.5 But it may be pointed out that so long as the adminis¬
trative machinery continues to be one and undivided, there would be no
practical means available for effectively carrying out such an intention.

As it is, the present proposal goes far beyond the scope of the promise
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. It is clear that the Congress Members
who would hold the actual portfolios would have complete charge, in fact as in
law, of the whole of British India including the future Pakistan areas, and not
merely of the areas to be allotted to the future Union of India. The League
Members of the Council would be there merely on sufferance — more or less
ornamental pieces in the constitutional parlour.

Elardly 47 or 48 days are now left up to the deadline of the 15th August
1947. No cogent reason exists for not continuing the existing arrangements for
this interim period, with both parties undertaking to strictly follow the
standstill arrangement, as in honour bound. It would be statesmanlike to take
this course rather than face grave issues pointed out above, which raise grave
constitutional difficulties and make the proposal impossible as a practical and
workable proposition. Further it would be a most humiliating position for the
representatives of the League to which they cannot be a consenting party. Such

4 Mr Jinnah annexed to the original of his note a copy of the exchange between Mr A. V. Alexander
and Sir J. Anderson reprinted in Pari. Dehs ., 5th ser., vol. 431, 13 December 1946, from the last para,
beginning in col. 1548 to the first para, concluding in col. 1550.

5 See Vol. X, No. 472; also No. 367 in this Vol.

754

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

a revolutionary change fraught with great difficulties for the sake of 48 days is
not at all advisable or worth while to pursue.

If this eminently reasonable suggestion is, however, not considered accep¬
table, the League Party would strenuously urge that both the Congress and the
League Members should be placed on a footing of equality, in the Council and
the proposal amended accordingly. This could be ensured by allotting half the
actual portfolios to the League Members and the other half to the Congress
Members and then associating [with the actual holders of the portfolios,]6
Members from the opposite party with watching briefs, as contemplated under
the present proposal. This would be fair to both parties and damaging to none.
Both Members attached to a portfolio could see and sign relevant files though,
while issuing orders, this fact would not be revealed as orders normally issue
under the signatures of a Secretary under the rules of business framed by die
Governor General, under S.40 of Schedule 9 to the Constitution Act.

Another alternative that suggests itself is a scheme of partial division of
functions on a regional basis with provision for joint deliberations and decisions,
in matters of common concern. Such a scheme would be evolved on the basis
of an agreed convention. Under this scheme, each portfolio would be assigned
to two Members, one drawn from the Congress Party and the other from the
League Party. The Congress Members would deal exclusively with matters
that solely concern the future Union of India and likewise, the League Members
with those appertaining to the Pakistan areas. On matters relating to both areas,
the two members concerned or the Council as a whole, as the case may be,
would sit together under the presidentship of the Governor General and arrive
at decision. Ends.

6 The words in square brackets do not appear in the original of the note on the file.

R/3 / 1/160: f 49.

414

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, R/3[ 1/153: f 287

most immediate new Delhi, 29 June 1947, 11.30 pm

secret Received: 29 June, 10.10 pm

No. 1657-S. Clause 6(2). I have reason to believe that Congress would insist on
Dominions Legislatures having power to amend Indian Independence Act itself.
Is there any objection to restoration of words “this or”1 before words “any
existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom”. The issue is

JUNE I947

755

fundamental and the acceptance of the Bill by the Congress may largely depend
on this issue. I very much hope it will be possible to restore the original wording
of the sub-clause. I shall be grateful for an immediate reply,

1 For the insertion of these words in clause 6(2) of the draft Bill (No. 191), see comment on clause
9(2)(a) in No. 271. The words were subsequently deleted as a consequence of the general revision
of the draft Bill (outlined in No. 348 and its note 6) which was undertaken in response to the
telegrams at Nos. 255, 286, 290 and 293.

415

The Gazette of India Extraordinary

Rfrl 1/157 : / 104

new Delhi, 30 June ig47

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

SECRETARIAT OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL (REFORMS)

NOTIFICATION

New Delhi , the 30th June ig4y

no. D. 50/7/47-R. — The following Announcement by the Governor-General
is published for general information.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

Whereas in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 5 to 8 of the
Statement by His Majesty’s Government dated the 3rd June 19471 it has been
decided that the Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab shall be partitioned:

Now therefore, in pursuance of paragraph 21 of the Statement, His Excellency
the Governor-General is pleased to make the following announcement with
reference to paragraphs 9 and 13 thereof: —

(1) There shall be two Boundary Commissions, one for Bengal and the
other for the Punjab, consisting of the following: —

For Bengal: —

Chairman . . . To be appointed later.

Members . . . Mr. Justice Bijan Kuman Mukherjea.

Mr. Justice C. C. Biswas.

Mr. Justice Abu Saleh Mohamed Akram.

Mr. Justice S. A. Rahman.

1 No. 45.

756

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

For the Punjab: —

Chairman . . . To be appointed later.

Members . . . Mr. Justice Din Muhammad.

Mr. Justice Muhammad Munir.

Mr. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan.

Mr. Justice Teja Singh.

(Note. — It is intended to appoint the same person as Chairman of both the
Boundary Commissions.)

(2) The two Boundary Commissions shall be summoned to meet as early as
possible by the Governors of the respective Provinces, and shall submit their
reports at the earliest possible date.

(3) The terms of reference for the two Commissions shall be as follows: —

For Bengal. —

The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the
two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas
of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into account other
factors.

In the event of the referendum in the District of Sylhet resulting in favour of
amalgamation with Eastern Bengal, the Boundary Commission will also
demarcate the Muslim majority areas of Sylhet District and the contiguous
Muslim majority areas of the adjoining districts of Assam.

For the Punjab. —

The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of
the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of asscertaining the contiguous
majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so it will also take into
account other factors.

K. V. K. SUNDARAM

Officer on Special Duty

41 6

Meeting of Partition Council Case No. P.C. 7/2/47
Mountbatten Papers. Partition Council Minutes

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held on 30 June igqy at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Mr Jinnah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Patel,
Dr Rajendra Prasad; Sardar Baldev Singh, Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck, Sir
C. Trivedi, Lord Ismay, Mr H. M. Patel, Mr Mohamad Ali, Mr Osman Ali
Case No. P.C. 7/2/47. Note1 by His Excellency the Viceroy regarding

the partition of the Armed Forces

JUNE 1947

757

In answer to a question the Commander-in-Chief said that there would be no
residue of troops outside the operational control of either dominion on the
15th August although the allocations between the dominions after that date
might be subject to further adjustments. The only body remaining outside
the control of the two dominions on the 15th August would be the central
administrative machinery. The intention was that after that date each dominion
would be responsible for the financing of the forces in its operational control
and that the expenses of the central administrative machinery would be based
on the proportion which the respective ultimate forces of the two dominions
bore to the combined total.

It was agreed that each dominion would be responsible for financing the troops
under its operational control after the 15 th August and that the allocation
between them of the expenses of the central administrative machinery would
be based on the proportion which the respective forces of the two dominions
bore to the combined total.

It was agreed further that movable stores and equipment such as vehicles,
guns, tanks etc. would be divided between the two armed forces in proportion
to their respective strengths. The division of fixed installations presented more
difficulties and would be separately considered.

Para. 3. In answer to a question as to what the strength of the respective
forces of the two dominions would be on the 15 th of August, the Commander-
in-Chief said that he could only give a rough idea. The disposition of troops
by that date would be affected (a) by the withdrawal of British troops from the
country and the return of Indian troops from abroad, (b) by the transfer of
sub-units from one Dominion to another, (c) the accommodation available
in the two dominions and (d) the numbers required for internal security purposes.
He hoped that demands under category (d) would cease or at any rate be
substantially reduced so as not to hold up the transfer of troops between the
two dominions. Subject to these considerations, which rendered his estimate
more of a guess than a precise forecast, he reckoned that on the 15 th August
the disposition would be as follows :

Kind of formation
Infantry Battalions

Armoured Regiments
Artillery Regiments
Engineer Companies

Pakistan
Equivalent of
30 to 35
6
12
16

Rest of India
70 to 75 (including
12 Gurkha battalions)
12

25

35 to 38

The Commander-in-Chief explained that this roughly represented the
present proportion of Muslims to Non-Muslims in the Army which was
30:70. The Armoured Regiments and the Artillery Battalions in Pakistan would

1 No. 372.

758

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

be composed wholly of Muslims. 9 of the Engineer Companies were composed
entirely of Muslims while three were still mixed and would have to be combed
out.

DECISION

It was agreed: (1) that the Commander-in-Chief would place before the
Council Progress Reports showing the allocation of Units between the two
future dominion Governments from time to time, (2) that His Excellency would
impress upon the Provincial Governments on behalf of the Partition Council
the need to reduce to the absolute minimum the number of troops they required
for internal security purposes and (3) that the replies of the Provincial Govern¬
ments on their minimum requirements would be consolidated and placed
before the Council.

Para. 4. The Commander-in-Chief explained that in moving units to the
Pakistan area non-Muslim Coys, would as far as practicable be detached and
similarly Muslim Coys, would be detached from units being moved into the
rest of India.

Para. 5. As regards future recruits to either army they should be at liberty
to say whether they wished to serve Pakistan or the rest of India. Some restric¬
tions, however, had to be placed on the freedom of choice of existing members
with a view to avoiding the possibility of men belonging to one dominion
electing to serve in the other with mischievous intent.

After some discussion it was agreed (1) that all personnel now serving in
the armed forceswould beentidedto elect which dominion they chose to serve
in. To this however there would be one exception, namely, that a Muslim
from Pakistan now serving in the armed forces would not have the option to
join the armed forces of the Indian Union and similarly a non-Muslim from the
rest of India now serving in the armed forces would not have the option to
join the armed forces of Pakistan. There would however be no objection to
non-Muslim personnel from Pakistan and Muslim personnel from the rest
of India electing to serve in the armed forces of the Indian Union and of
Pakistan respectively. The serving personnel will have the option to resign,
if they did not wish to serve in the armed forces of either dominion, (2) that as
regards future recruitment to the Armed Forces of the two Dominions, this
would be a matter for each of them to decide, and (3) that the Steering Com¬
mittee should prepare the basis for a draft questionnaire in suitable terms
embodying decision 1 above.

Para. 6. The Committee approved of His Excellency’s proposal to prepare
in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief lists, arranged in order of
preference, of officers considered suitable for appointment as heads of the
three services in each of the two dominions and discuss them separately with
the leaders of the two parties.

JUNE I947

759

Para. 7. It was agreed that: (1) the Joint Defence Council would consist of
(a) the Governor General or Governors General, (b) the two Defence Members
and (c) the Commander-in-Chief in India, (2) that if for any reason either or
both of the Defence Members were unable to attend, another Minister or
Ministers might attend in their place, and (3) that each Defence Member (or
the Minister acting for him) should be entitled to call in one other Minister
and Experts to assist him if he so chose.

Para. 8. It was agreed that the existing Commander-in-Chief in India should
be called Supreme Commander in order to distinguish him from the two
dominion Commanders-in-Chief from the 15 th August until his work of
setting up separate administrative machinery for the armies of both dominions
was completed.

OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES
DURING THEIR RECONSTRUCTION (ANNEXURE i)

The Council approved the outline proposals for control of the Armed
Forces during their reconstitution as set out in annexure (1) to the note by
His Excellency subject to the following:

Paragraph 2. Note (ip): The Army Sub-Committee should examine and
report to the Council on the pros and cons of setting up the Army H.Q. for
the Union of India at Meerut rather than at Delhi.

Paragraph 3(1): It was noted that the control of Ordnance Depots, Arsenals,
Factories and other such installations would remain with the Supreme Com¬
mander acting under the directions of the Joint Defence Council until such time
as the central administrative control remained.

Paragraph j(m) (c): It was decided that the responsibility of the Army H.Q.
in each dominion would include the posting and promotion of officers, both
British and Indian, with the proviso that in the case of British officers the
promotion and posting would be done in consultation with the Supreme
Commander as a single list would be maintained.

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE ARMED FORCES
RECONSTITUTION COMMITTEE (ANNEXURE II)

Assumption (/) :

In answer to a question, the Commander-in-Chief explained that the option
of being allowed to terminate their services and remain eligible for proportion¬
ate benefits would apply only in the case of personnel serving on regular
engagements as against temporary members of the Armed Forces. It was
agreed that the assumption should be reworded as follows: “Existing members
of the armed forces serving in either state will be governed by their existing
terms and conditions of service. If, subsequently, new terms are promulgated
and if they do not desire to serve on the new terms, they will be allowed to
terminate their services and proportionate benefits will be admissible to them.”

760

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Assumption [Hi): It was agreed that the allocation of pensionary liability
between the two governments would be dealt with by the relevant Expert
Committee.

Assumption [iv) : It was agreed that this assumption should be reworded as
follows :

“Except as demanded by the processes of reconstitution of the Armed
Forces, there shall be no changes in the basic organisation and nomenclature
of formations, units, establishments and installations, of the three services or
in the class composition of units until such reconstitution is completed.”

The Council approved of the draft terms of reference of the Armed Forces
Reconstitution Committee as set out in Annexure (ii) of the note before the
Council subject to Assumption (i) and (iv) beiug reworded as above.

417

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma
and Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy's Interview No. 134

30 June ig47

H.E. spoke about four points which the Giani had made in his letter, dated the
13 th June.1 He pointed out that after the 15th August he would have no special
powers at all, and even if he was Governor-General would be purely constitu¬
tional. He thought there was some consolation for the minorities in Maulana
Azad’s appeal.2 He promised that in regard to weightage and safeguards he
would bear the Sikh point of view in mind and use his influence with the major
parties.

2. Sardar Baldev Singh said that neither of the major parties would give
any safeguards or weightage.

3. Giani Kartar Singh said that the time for action was now, while the
Governor-General still had his powers.

4. H.E. said that he had already talked to both sides about the minorities
and both had given assurances. He thought that the presence of so many
representatives of the world Press in India would provide the minorities with
an important safeguard if they used it properly.

5. After some discussion Giani Kartar Singh said that the main points

JUNE I947

761

which the Sikhs wished to press were two. First that they should have weight-
age in the Legislature of the East Punjab, or, alternatively, the Hindi-speaking
parts of the East Punjab should be separated off and there should be a Province
comprising the Punjabi-speaking areas. The Home Member had said that he
preferred the second alternative, to the first.

6. Next Giani Kartar Singh said that the Sikhs wanted more representation
in the existing Constituent Assembly, because they were at a great disadvantage
in committee as a result of having only two representatives.

7. Giani Kartar Singh then put forward some further points. He said that
the Sikhs were very anxious :

(a) That the boundary should be drawn more favourably to them.

(b) That transfer of population should be arranged, and

(c) That H.E.’s broadcast1 2 3 should be given to the Boundary Commission
as part of the Plan of the 3rd June.4

H.E. explained that he had not agreed5 to putting his broadcast to the
Boundary Commission in this way because the result would have been that
the Muslim League would have put in a large number of documents to the
opposite effect. He had authorised Sardar Baldev Singh to put in a copy of the
broadcast. He thought that the Sikhs would have greater bargaining power than
they imagined owing to their military importance in the new Union of India.

8. H.E. undertook to write to the leaders and say that as a result of discussion
with the Sikh leaders he wished to put their point of view. They asked for
assurances about weightage in the Legislature of the East Punjab and for
extra representation in the existing Constituent Assembly.

They hoped the question of the transfer of population would be taken up, and
H.E. thought that this might be examined.

G. E. B. ABELL

1 No. 178.

2 In a press statement dated 29 June 1947 Maulana Azad referred to the apprehensions of minorities
in the Indian Union and in the seceding areas and suggested a joint meeting of representatives of the
two Constituent Assemblies to draw up a common charter of rights of minorities in both States.
Times of India , 30 June 1947, p. 7, col. 1.

3 No. 44.

4 No. 45.

5 cf. No. 354, Item viii.

762

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Annex to No. 417
Note by Giani Kartar Singh6

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Sikh Problem, Part 11(a)

DEMARCATION OF BOUNDARIES

1. The main problem confronting the Sikh community, at the moment, is
the line of demarcation, separating the Eastern Punjab from the Western
Punjab. Our anxiety in the matter is well-known. Our cultural, linguistic
and spiritual affinities as also our economic well being, and the solidarity and
integrity of our populace have been placed in jeopardy by the notional division
of the Punjab. Every Sikh in whatever situation he is placed feels most acutely
about it. Faith is put in the words used in Your Excellency’s broadcast speech
and it is hoped that the permanent division will be fair and just to the Sikhs,
as it is expected that the boundary line will be demarcated in such a manner
that it brings a substantial majority of the Sikh population in the Eastern
Punjab. The Sikhs will not be satisfied unless at least 80% of their population
is brought into the Eastern Punjab by demarcating the boundary line properly.
Nankana Sahib the birth place of Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikh faith
and the adjoining Hindu-Sikh majority belt spreading in Lyallpur, Sheikhupura
and Gujranwala Districts and a just share of the colony areas ought to be
included in the Eastern Punjab, wherein the Sikh population can be shifted.
After the wholesale massacre of the Sikhs in the Rawalpindi Division, the
Sikhs are in no mood to cast their lot with Pakistan. While demarcating the
boundary of the Eastern and Western Punjab Provinces, greatest good of
both of the Provinces should be kept in view.

TRANSFER OF POPULATION

2. Next to die demarcation of boundary line, the Sikhs insist that the exchange
and transfer of Sikh population from the Pakistan areas and the Muslim
population from Eastern Punjab area must be arranged. Unless this is done,
bitterness and frustration will prevail on both sides. Resistance to and flouting
of authority will occur again and again, intrigues will go on on either side and
perhaps will make peace impossible of achievement. The exchange of Hindu
and Muslim minorities all over India is an impossibility but exchange of the
Sikhs in Pakistan area with the Muslims of eastern Punjab will involve not a
very large number of persons. Even transfer of a million of Sikhs with a
similar number of Muslims will solve the problem to a great extent so far as
the Sikhs are concerned. If at least a million of the Sikhs or so are brought to
the Eastern Punjab and similar number of Muslims from Eastern Punjab is
sent to Pakistan, after demarcating suitable boundary line, and Hindi speaking
area of Eastern Punjab is separated from the non-Hindi speaking population of

JUNE 1947

763

this Eastern. Province, then the Sikh problem is solved. The British Government
and Your Excellency have devised means to give Hindus and Muslims their
own separate countries, resourcefulness should not fail in the case of Sikhs
and their problem must also be resolved to their satisfaction.

SAFEGUARDS

The Sikhs can exist as an entity in political affairs in Hindustan if the follow¬
ing safeguards are granted to them:

(i) Federation of Hindustan :

(a) The Sikhs shall have at least one Minister in the Federal Cabinet.

(b) 6 % representation in both Houses of Federal Legislature.

(c) Guarantee that the traditional strength of Sikhs shall be maintained in
the Armed Forces of Hindustan both in Officers and ranks.

(d) Constitutional provision for protecting the Sikh interests in case of
major communal issue affecting the Sikhs.

(ii) Eastern Punjab and Other Provinces:

(a) 1 /3rd share in the Legislature of the Eastern Punjab.

(b) Convention that either of the Governor and the Premier of the Eastern
Punjab Province shall be a Sikh.

(c) Sikhs in Delhi and U.P. to have adequate representation in their
respective legislatures and one seat reserved for Sikhs in the Western
Bengal Legislature.

(iii) Dominion Act:

(a) In the Dominion Act which is now on the anvil provision shall be
made empowering the Governor-General to nominate a few repre¬
sentatives say 10 to each of the two Constituent Assemblies — existing
as well as new — in consultation with the representative organisations
of minority communities to give them some voice in the affairs of
respective Constituent Assemblies, so that their case may be adequately
represented and pressed in the Constitution-making bodies. This
provision will neither upset communal balance in either of the Con¬
stituent Assemblies nor hurt general interests,

(b) provision should be made for the inclusion of the representative of
the Sikhs in both the Dominion Governments.

6 A note indicates that Giani Kartar Singh gave this note to Lord Mountbatten at his interview.

764

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

418

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Sir C. Corf eld

^hl1l137: ff 207-8

592/89 30 June 1947

Dear Conrad,

The Raja of Bilaspur came to see me on Saturday1 to consult me about the
future of the Punjab States. He told me that with the exception of Patiala all
the other Punjab States were proposing to act together in the manner that
would best safeguard their future. I suggested that they would be well advised
to continue to act together as a unit. I pointed out that the new States Depart¬
ment (which His Highness said he warmly welcomed) would be acting on
behalf of both dominion Governments and that on the 25th July Standstill
Agreements would be negotiated between each State and one or both of the
new Dominion Governments.

His Highness asked what the machinery would be to get each State to sign
the agreements. I told him that you were organising this2 and presumed an
accredited representative would have to come from every State or group of
States, which would probably fill the whole Chamber of Princes ! I hoped they
would then elect a small committee to represent them.

I pointed out that Standstill Agreements affecting railways, posts, telegraphs,
etc., would not in themselves cover every interest of the States, and that
commercial agreements particularly as to irrigation and so forth might also
be necessary.

I also told His Highness that I was quite certain that the Punjab States must
make up their minds to send representatives to one of the two Constituent
Assemblies when they met in mid-July, since by so doing they would indicate
their willingness to enter into military relations with the particular Dominion
Government they had chosen, and ensure the goodwill of that Government.

I gave it to him as my strong view that no State would be well advised to hold
out for the complete independence, to which the Cabinet Mission Statement
of 1 2th May3 entitled them, even though this had been accepted by all
parties in their statements of 3rd June. His Highness quite agreed.

I suggested that he might prepare a paper for consideration at the next
meeting of the Punjab States, setting out fully the following considerations
as to which of the two Constituent Assemblies they should join:

(a) Geographical situation.

(b) Composition of the population of the States.

(c) The wishes of the people of the States.

(d) The direction in which their principal commercial interests lay.

(e) The terms likely to be offered by the respective Dominion Governments
to the States adjoining them.

JUNE 1947

765

His Highness asked me how any State or group of States could elect to join
a Dominion Government with whose areas they were not contiguous. I replied
that whereas legally they could do so this would only be feasible by negotiating
transit agreements witli the other Dominion. For this reason he might well
find that the geographical situation was the overriding factor to be considered.

His Highness asked advice on what the position would be if for geographical
considerations States had to join a Dominion Government with whom they
would not be in close commercial relations. I pointed out that this was a matter
which would have to be negotiated on 25th July, since I could not now answer
for the future Dominion Governments whether they would agree either to give
transit facilities to States whose commerce naturally flowed from a Dominion
whose borders they did not touch, or alternatively whether a Dominion with
whom they were in commercial relations would agree to continue those
relations if they joined the other Dominion.

Finally I told His Highness that I had made it a point of principle not to
advise any State which of the two Dominions they should join.

I should be grateful if you would discuss this letter with V. P. Menon and
through him try and sound the views of the future Union of India and Pakistan
representatives in the States Department.

I should like you to keep in touch with the Raja of Bilaspur on this matter
so as to facilitate his discussions with his fellow rulers.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA4

1 No record of this interview has been traced.

2 See No. 287.

3 Vol. VII, No. 262.

4 In the course of his reply, dated 2 July 1947, Sir C. Corfield remarked that progress in setting up
the States Department had been slow, adding that that Department would ‘need every day’ between
now and the end of the month to prepare for the discussions then to be held with States repre¬
sentatives. R/3/1/138: £2,6.

419

Sir Hartley Shawcross to the Earl of Listowel
LIP&JI10I130: f 244

TOP SECRET ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE, LONDON, JO June 1Q47

Dear Listowel,

Thank you for your Top Secret letter of the 25 th June1 about the draft Indian
Independence Bill. I have had a long talk with John Rowlatt about it, and in
die result I think there are no comments which I can usefully offer.

1 No. 350.

7 66

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

My own preference is, however, for the second version of the Bill, containing
the amendments which have been suggested in order to meet the points
raised by the Viceroy.2 Whilst this version of the Bill gives more limited
powers to the Constituent Assemblies, it is, I think, a neater and tighter draft.

As far as I can judge, the Bill does not give wider powers than those enjoyed
by existing Dominions, and it appears to meet a situation of extraordinary
difficulty and complexity as well as can be done in existing circumstances. I
have no doubt, however, that legalistically minded M.P.s could raise a very
large number of troublesome Committee points, to which the only answer
would have to be that the Bill is drafted in the hope and on the assumption
that the Indians will play and not make technical difficulties. I hope that the
negotiations with the Opposition will result in their refraining from putting
down detailed amendments in Committee.

If at any time there is any help I can give, you will of course call upon me.

Yours sincerely,

HARTLEY SHAWCROSS

2 See No. 348 and its note 6.

420

The Earl of Li stow el to Mr Attlee
LlP&J[ioli24:ff 263-6

India office, jo June 1947
Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 103/47

Prime Minister

There are one or two points to which I should wish to draw your attention
before our meeting with the Opposition Leaders this afternoon :

(a) I understand that when you saw certain Conservative Members on Friday
afternoon they asked what was the attitude of Mr Jinnah to the proposal that
the areas adhering to the existing Constituent Assembly should constitute
themselves into a “Union of India”1 which would be regarded as the successor
State — the areas not adhering to the existing Constituent Assembly being
regarded as seceding areas.

The latest indication of Jinnah’s attitude on this question is contained in
telegram No. 1656-S2 from the Viceroy (received this morning) the relevant
paragraph of which runs as follows:

“In the background of proposal seems to be the wholly unwarranted
assumption that Pakistan would be an area seceding from the Indian State. The

JUNE 1947

767

actual position is that with creation of two new Dominions, the State will
be split up, by a fiat of British Parliament, into two wholly new States none
of whom could by itself be identified with existing Indian State. The future
Union of India consequently could not justifiably be described as a successor
State vis-a-vis the present Indian Government.”

(b) You may wish to warn the Opposition Leaders that the exact terms of
Clause V(i) are still indefinite. You will remember that you have just written1 2 3
to Sir Alan Lascelles seeking His Majesty’s pleasure on the Viceroy’s suggestion
that the draft clause should be modified to make it clear that, if Lord Mount-
batten does stay on as Governor-General of each of the new Dominions, he
has not in any way been forced upon the Indian political leaders.

(c) You will have seen from telegram No. 83404 sent in reply to the Viceroy’s
telegram No. 163 8-S5 that I have promised the Viceroy that we would let him
know, after seeing the Opposition Leaders, whether it is all right for him to
issue a communique to the effect that he will be showing the Bill to Indian
leaders and that their views will be forwarded to His Majesty’s Government.
Y ou may feel that it would be of advantage to mention this point to Opposition
Leaders.

(d) I suggest also that it would be desirable to explain to the Opposition
that we have deliberately not stated in the Bill that the Order making power
under Clause 9 is not exercisable on advice. Equally we have not stated that
it is so exercisable. The reason is that we hope that Lord Mountbatten will
continue as Governor-General for both Dominions during the period in which
partition of the Central subjects is being completed and that he will in fact
exercise considerable influence on how this is done. We do not want to limit
his initiative as would be the case if he could act [?only] on formal advice,
and further, if he had so to act he would sooner or later, and probably sooner,
receive conflicting advice in his two different capacities and be unable to continue
in that position. On the other hand, he clearly cannot do anything by Order
unless he is satisfied that both Dominion Governments will acquiesce in it
and operate it. We think that the Governor-General may be able to do a good
deal in this way provided his position is not too closely defined at the outset.
For this reason it would be undesirable for this point to be discussed in debate
or for the Opposition to press the Government for a precise statement in regard
to the Governor-General’s position.

LISTOWEL

1 See No. 405 and its notes 1 and 3.

2 No. 413.

3 See Annex to No. 374.

4 Dated 29 June 1947. L/P &J/10/130: j 248.

5 See No. 397, note 3.

y68

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

421

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. LB. [47) 37th Meeting
LjP &Jlioj8i: jf 160-4

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.W.i, on 30 June 1947
at 12 noon were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir S. Cripps , Mr A. V. Alexander ,
Viscount Addison , the Earl of Listowel , Mr C. P. May hew, Mr A. G. Bottomley,

Mr Arthur Henderson , Lord Chorley

Also present were: Viscount Jowitt ( for Item 2 ), Mr C. IV. Key ( for Item 1 ),
Sir A. Carter , Sir K. Kemp , Mr J. Rowlatt ; Mr S. E. V. Luke , Mr F. F. Turnbull

[Secretariat)

Minute 1

The Future of the India Office and Its Contents
(Previous Reference: I.B. (47)32^ Meeting, Minute 3)1
The Committee considered a memorandum by the Secretary of State for
India (1.13.(47)1 3 o)2 regarding the disposal of the India Office and its contents.

the minister of works recalled that the Committee, at their meeting on
19th June,3 had decided that Clause I9(2)(a) of the draft Indian Independence
Bill (4th Reprint)4 should be omitted and that the disposal of the India Office
and its contents should be left for negotiation with the Indian Government.
In effect, this would leave in operation the provisions of Section 172 of the
Government of India Act, 1935, which vested in His Majesty, for the purpose
of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, the control of the
India Office and its contents but prohibited their sale or diversion to “uses
not connected with the discharge of the functions of the Crown in relation to
India or Burma” save with the consent of the Governor-General. He thought
that serious difficulties might later arise from this decision if there should, for
example, be a deadlock between the Govemors-General in India and His
Majesty’s Government about any proposed change in the use of the India
Office building.

the prime minister pointed out that the original intention had been to
legislate in the Bill to remove the Governor-General’s power of veto on
diversion, but the Viceroy had advised very strongly against raising this
issue at the present time. He did not think, however, that it would be difficult
to negotiate in due course a satisfactory solution of the problem, or that there
need be embarrassing delay in reaching a settlement. In view of the Viceroy’s
attitude, there could be no question of pressing further the matter at this stage.
A reasonable solution might be for the building to be taken over by the Minister

JUNE 1947

769

responsible for handling the relations of His Majesty’s Government with
India.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS pointed OUt that, if
responsibility for relations with India should be transferred to the new Com¬
monwealth Relations Office, it would be very inconvenient if Indian affairs had
still to be handled in the present India Office building, while the remainder
of the Department occupied the present Dominions Office building. He
suggested that the staff responsible for Indian matters in the Department
of Commonwealth Relations should be accommodated in the premises shortly
to be vacated by the Colonial Office and that part of the present India Office
building should, as required, be made available for the Foreign Office, instead
of the Foreign Office staff being moved, as had previously been suggested,
into rooms now occupied by the Colonial Office.1 2 3 4 5
The Committee —

Agreed that no provision should be made in the Indian Independence
Bill regarding the control of the India Office and its contents, but that
this should be left for negotiation with the Indian Governments.

Minute 2

The Future of the Present Interim Government (Previous Reference:
I. B. (47) 2 8th Meeting, Minute 7) 6

The Committee had before them the following documents —

I. B. (47) 13 1 :7 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India covering

telegram No. 1616-S of 27th June8 from the Viceroy reporting
developments in his discussions with the Indian leaders on the
future of the Interim Government, together with the draft of a
reply.

Telegrams Transmitting representations by Mr Jinnah against the pro-
Nos. posals for a new Interim Government contained in the Viceroy’s

165 5- S and telegram No. 1616-S.

1656- S of
30 th June9

the secretary of state for India said that the Viceroy’s hopes that
it might be possible for the present Interim Government to continue unchanged

1 No. 265.

2 Not printed.

3 No. 265, Minute 3.

4 No. 191.

5 The wording of this sentence given here is taken from a corrigendum slip issued by the Cabinet
Office on 5 July.

6 Vol. X, No. 553.

7 No. 404.

8 No. 379.

9 Nos. 412 and 413.

770

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

until the transfer of power had been disappointed. Congress had insisted that
the Interim Government should be dismissed as soon as the decision of the
Provinces became known, and their pressure had now been backed by a
threat of resignation by Pandit Nehru himself. In the circumstances the Viceroy
had felt that there was no alternative to calling for the resignations of all the
members of the Central Government and the formation of a new Interim
Government on different lines. He had agreed with Sardar Patel the terms of a
draft announcement as set out in paragraph 5 of his telegram No. 1616-S. The
proposal was that the leaders of the Congress and Muslim League Parties should
be invited to nominate their own future Governments, which would then form
committees of the Cabinet; the Cabinet meetings would be attended by all
Members of both Governments. The formula agreed with Sardar Patel
appeared to be extremely ambiguous, particularly as regards the position of
the Muslim League Members of the Cabinet, as it was not proposed that they
should hold portfolios. It was not clear how they would have access to inform¬
ation as to what was being done by the Union of India Members ; it was also
obscure whether they could initiate policy in respect of their own areas or only
refer to the whole Cabinet proposals solely or predominantly affecting Pakistan
to which they objected, and issue consequential orders giving effect in Pakistan
areas to policy initiated by the Union of India Members. Mr Jinnah’s note
(Viceroy’s telegram No. 1656-S) showed that he was opposed to this formula
on both equitable and legal grounds; his alternative proposal was either that
portfolios should be held in equal numbers of Members of each Party, Members
of the other Party having watching briefs in respect of each Department,
or that there should be a partial division of functions on a regional basis under
which each portfolio would be assigned to two Members. In his telegram
No. 1655-S, however, the Viceroy seemed to think that Mr Jinnah might be
prepared to acquiesce in the Viceroy’s formula in view of the fact that similar
arrangements had already been agreed with the Government of Bengal.

In discussion the following points were made —

(a) Some Ministers thought that there was much substance in the objections
raised by Mr Jinnah to the formula set out in paragraph 5 of the Viceroy’s
telegram No. 1616-S. It was felt that, whatever might be the practical effect
of these proposals, they gave the appearance of imposing an excessive limitation
on the powers of Muslim League Members who might, in any event, find
great difficulty in keeping in touch with the activities of Departments. It seemed
that their effect might be to leave the Congress Party Members with a mono¬
poly of power, of initiating policy and action and of making public appoint¬
ments, and that they might well be publicly acclaimed by the Congress Party
as a political victory. An arrangement which might be acceptable to the Muslim
League for Bengal was not necessarily applicable to the Central Government.

(b) On the other hand, it was pointed out that serious difficulties could hardly

JUNE I947

771

arise within the very limited period during which the new Interim Government
would remain in existence. The arrangement proposed by the Viceroy would
provide an opportunity for the Muslim League to create a Government which
could, in due course, take over the administration of Pakistan; Muslim League
Members would have a watching brief over the whole field of government ;
the Muslim League would have, for the first time, full equality of numbers in
the Viceroy’s Cabinet.

The Committee considered that it would be inadvisable to fetter the Viceroy’s
discretion in his handling of the negotiations with the Indian political leaders
on this subject. The aim was to reach agreement on some arrangements
which would function effectively until 15th August. The Viceroy should,
however, be informed that Ministers considered that there was much force
in the contentions in Mr Jinnah’s note (Viceroy’s telegram No. 1656-S)
and in his proposal that the portfolios should be divided equally between the
Congress Party and Muslim League Members.

The Committee —

Invited the Secretary of State for India to telegraph10 to the Viceroy as
proposed in Annexure 2 to 1.13.(47)131, subject to the substitution for
paragraph 5 of the suggestion that he should, if possible, try to secure by
agreement the adoption of an arrangement on the lines suggested in the
penultimate paragraph of Mr Jinnah’s note (Viceroy’s telegram No.
1656-S).

Minute 3

Indian Independence Bill

(Previous Reference: I.B. (47)3 5th Meeting, Minute 3)11

The Committee considered a telegram No. 1657-S of 29th June12 from the
Viceroy, reporting that he had reason to believe that the Congress Party
would insist that Dominion Legislatures should have power to amend the
Indian Independence Act itself. He hoped, therefore, that the words “this or”
might be restored before the words “any existing or future Act of Parliament
of the United Kingdom” in Clause 6(2) of the draft Bill.

The Committee —

(1) Invited the Secretary of State for India to inform the Viceroy of the
reasons for which the words “this or” had been deleted from Clause
6(2) of the draft Indian Independence Bill but agreed that the Clause
could be amended to enable Dominion legislatures to amend the Indian
Independence Act, if after considering the explanation the Viceroy
thought it desirable.

10 See No. 433 for the telegram as issued.

11 No. 347.

12 No. 414.

772

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The Committee then considered telegram No. 163 8-S of 28th June 13 in
which the Viceroy asked for authority to announce publicly his intention to
show the draft Indian Independence Bill to the Indian leaders on 1st July.

The Committee recognised that the procedure proposed, under which the
Indian leaders would be shown the actual text of the draft Indian Independence
Bill, might be open to the criticism of involving a breach of Parliamentary
privilege. On the other hand, they did not feel that it would be possible to
refuse to comply with the wishes of the Indian leaders in this matter; it might
reasonably be assumed that Parliament would recognise that in this case there
were special circumstances which rendered unavoidable some departure from
normal practice. This was a matter which would have to be discussed first
with the Opposition leaders, and, in the meantime, the Viceroy could not be
authorized to make any announcement on the subject.

The Committee —

(2) Invited the Prime Minister to give directions regarding a reply to the
Viceroy’s telegram No. 163 8-S in the light of his discussions with the
Opposition that day.

The Committee next considered the Viceroy’s telegram No. 1653-S of 29th
June,14 regarding a request of Pandit Nehru that certain persons additional to
those mentioned in telegram No. 163 8-S should be allowed to see the draft
Indian Independence Bill. Special efforts would be made to avoid any leakage.

The Committee —

(3) Agreed that the Viceroy should be authorised to show the draft Indian
Independence Bill to the persons mentioned in paragraph 1 of his
telegram No. 1653-S.

13 See No. 397, note 3.

14 No. 411.

422

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Gandhi

Rh! 1/151: f 236

1446/3 30 June 1947

Dear Mr Gandhi,

Thank you very much for your letter of the 29th June1 about the Frontier.
I am glad to hear that the referendum will be allowed to proceed without any
interference by the followers of Badshah Khan. I am sending a copy of your
letter to the Governor so that he may take any action that may be necessary
as a result of the points you make about Punjabi Muslims being introduced in

JUNE I947

773

the Frontier to affect the referendum, and non-Muslim refugees having no
chance to vote.

I sent a copy of the letter2 I wrote to the Maraharajah of Kashmir to the
Resident,3 as well as to you. My telegram4 instructed him to ask the Maharajah
for an early reply to my letter.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 No. 396.

2 Enclosure to No. 386.

3 See Enclosure to No. 387.

4 See No. 387, note 1.

423

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Gandhi

Rbl1l153: f 295

no. 1446/8 jo June ig47

Pandit Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and I all feel that you should un¬
questionably be shown the Indian Independence Bill. I therefore invite you to
come with them at 10.00 a.m. tomorrow to see the Bill at the Viceroy’s
House. I hope you will be able to do so.

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

424

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru

Rbl 1 1157: f 294

1446/8 30 June ig47

Thank you for your letter of the 29th June.1

I agree to those gentlemen named therein attending the meeting to-morrow,
Tuesday, and seeing the Bill. I should be grateful if you would extend invita¬
tions accordingly. I enclose a copy of a letter2 I have written to Mr. Gandhi.

It is, however, extremely important that there should be no leakage of the
contents of the Bill prior to its publication in London, for the reasons given
in my letter of the 29th June.3 I hope, therefore, that you will impress the
vital importance of this on the additional members that you are bringing.

1 No. 408.

2 No. 423.

3 Enclosure to No. 397.

774

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

I told4 Mr. Jinnah you would be bringing a larger party than I had informed
him of, and said that he could increase his party similarly if he so wished, but
that I sincerely hoped that he would keep his numbers down. He thought he
would be able to manage with his original party.

4 No record of this conversation has been traced.

425

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Jinnah

Rhl1l153: f 293

NO. 1446/8 NEW DELHI, 30 June 1Q4?

Dear Mr Jinnah,

I am so glad to knowT that you are satisfied with the composition of your party
for considering the Indian Independence Bill tomorrow, for I feel that the
fewer people who are in the know the less chance there is of leakage. You with
your great experience with the Privy Council in London will realise what
great importance H.M. Government attach to there being no leakage; and I
am therefore appealing to both leaders to ensure that there will be no leakage
from their teams.

I also thought it would be advisable to authorise Congress to bring
Mr. Gandhi if they wished to ; for although, of course, he does not as a rule
attend such meetings, I particularly do not wish any difficulties caused
through his omission.

You will find that die new Bill includes a provision for each Dominion to
have a separate Governor-General and a clause making it lawful for one
person to hold both appointments for such period as may be determined by
either dominion after 15th August. I therefore trust that you will be able to
let me have a letter by Wednesday morning informing me whom you wish
to nominate as the first Governor-General of Pakistan, so that I may communi¬
cate this to the King. Congress, as you know, have already sent me their
nomination.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 No record of this communication has been traced.

JUNE 1947

775

426

Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma

(Extract)

Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Governor oj the Punjab 1
SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, JO June 1Q47

5. The new Security Committee2 has held three meetings on 27th, 28th and
30th June. There was no meeting on 29th as two of the Party Leaders, Sachar
and Swaran Singh, were away. The Party Leaders have, I think, really tried
to restore peace. How far the improvement in Lahore and Amritsar is due to
them I cannot yet say. There is usually a lull after the more savage outbursts
of trouble in these cities and our new police methods are beginning to bear
fruit. Before long we shall have a great deal of information about the activities
of individuals and we are already beginning to pick up men who thought
they were secure.

6. I have discussed with the Security Committee (in the absence of Sachar
who was away at Delhi) the changes in the district staffs at Lahore and Amritsar.
Mamdot said frankly that he could not make any selection himself and wanted
me to help. He also seemed to think that the idea was for each party to select
its own officers independently — a kind of “balance of power” arrangement.
I said that I wanted the Party Leaders to take responsibility for the selections
and added that the whole idea was that there should be a joint list of officers
in all of whom all the Party Leaders had confidence. Personally I was satisfied
with the present staffs and if we eliminated half a dozen good British officers
at one stroke there would naturally be difficulty in replacing them. Sardar
Swaran Singh said he hoped that the feelings of the British officers would not
be hurt, and to this I replied that if a good man was turned out of an appoint¬
ment on purely political grounds we could not expect him to be pleased: in
fact, it would be necessary for me to recommend to Your Excellency the
immediate release with entitlement to compensation of any officer displaced
under the new arrangements. I did not see how I could keep men who did
not wish to serve on hanging about in the Punjab for a few weeks after the
Party Leaders had publicly expressed their lack of confidence in them. We
settled a provisional list of names, but Swaran Singh wanted to talk it over
further with Sachar and I expect a joint list to be submitted within a few days.

7. The Partition Committee will, I hope, hold its first meeting at 10 a.m.
tomorrow. The members are Daultana and Zahid Husain for the Western
Punjab and Gopi Chand Bhargava and Swaran Singh for the Eastern Punjab.
Zahid Husain is not a Punjabi and is, I understand, Jinnah’s nominee. He
retired not very long ago from the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and is

1 Lord Mountbatten acknowledged this letter in tel. 1900-S of 11 July adding that he would be
sending Sir G. Abell that night to see the Governor. Mountbatten Papers, ibid.

2 See Nos. 343 and 357.

776

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

now the Vice-Chancellor of the Aligarh University. He was my Financial
Adviser in the Delhi Province and later in the Supply Department and I have the
highest opinion of his ability and integrity. Daultana is clever but inexperienced.
Gopi Chand Bhargava is an experienced politician who has never held office
and Swaran Singh is of course the former Development Minister in the Coali¬
tion Government.

The Steering Committee seems to be working all right. In view of the new
arrangements and the decision that no British official should serve on the
expert committees I told Askwith3 that he had better not return to India. I am
sorry about this, as he would, I think, have been invaluable. The partition
work really requires an objective rather than a party outlook.

8. Sachar mentioned at this morning’s meeting of the Security Committee
the proposal for the appointment of two teams of Advisers of which he had
heard in Delhi.4 He said that he was not sure how the Advisers would fit in
with the Security Committee and the Partition Committee. It seemed to him
that with a “standstill” order there would be little administrative business
other than routine, and in practice the only Cabinet business would go before
the Partition Committe. I had not intended to discuss this question with the
Party Leaders until I had heard further from Your Excellency. As Sachar
brought it up I simply said that I agreed with him that there might be some
difficulty in running Advisers in conjunction with the Security Committee and
the Partition Committee, and that I would be grateful if the Party Leaders
would think the matter over and let me know in a day or two what they thought
the best arrangement would be.

9. At one of the meetings of the Security Committee I discussed my rather
draconian bill for the establishment of special tribunals.5 All the Party Leaders
thought the main provisions of the bill much too severe — I was a little amused
at the attitude of Sachar and Swaran Singh in view of their recent demands
for Martial Law.

10. I have just been interrupted for an interview with Mamdot and Sadiq
Hassan, a leading Muslim Leaguer from Amritsar. Mamdot is clearly not at
all happy about the communal position, and he seems particularly sore at a
considerable operation we are carrying out today at Misri Shah — a northern
suburb of Lahore — where we hope to find explosive and incendiary material
and also to pick up some wanted men. I told Mamdot that Jinnah had asked6
Your Excellency to ensure that the most drastic measures were taken to restore
and maintain order. I added that the Misri Shah operation was only a part of
a much larger plan and we had no intention of concentrating entirely on
Muslims — Misri Shah is largely a Muslim area. Mamdot is full of stories
about non-Muslim plots to sabotage canal headworks and to import arms.

JUNE 1947

111

He wants to add another Muslim member to the Security Committee and I
have told him that we must discuss this in the Committee tomorrow. Person¬
ally I see no objection, but I cannot properly add to the Committee without
the concurrence of Sachar and Swaran Singh.

3 See No. 209, para. 4, sub-para. 2.

4 See No. 379, notes 6 and 10, and No. 407.

5 See No. 339, note 2.

6 See No. 320, para. 1.

427

Mr Qureshi to Major Davy 1

Rfclifa&ff 4-6

d.o. no. 370 bhopal, 30 June 1943

My dear Major Davy,

Reference Bhopal Agency letter No. 4719-28-A and No. 4730-39/A/35-A/47,
dated the 20th June, 1947 relating to, —

(1) Proposed creation of State Department by the Successor Governments of
British India,2 and

(2) Formula for Standstill arrangements on the lapse of Paramountcy.3

As the two subjects referred to above are inter-related, Bhopal Government
is sending this joint reply to your two letters.

His Highness’ Government have considered the alternative suggestions made
in para. 4 of your letter No. 4719-28-A and have decided to appoint a repre¬
sentative or representatives to be located at the Headquarters of Government
to provide appropriate information on a reciprocal basis, to elicit replies and
to secure reciprocal co-operation. Immediate steps are being taken to make the
necessary appointments.

Bhopal Government will much appreciate if the composition, personnel
and functions of the new State Department are communicated to it at an
early date.

His Highness’ Government recognise the need for some sort of Standstill
arrangements, envisaged in your letter No. 4730-39-A35-A/47 of June the
20th 1947. It will be appreciated that without full discussion to clarify the
points at issue it will be difficult to arrive at definite conclusions in regard [to
the draft formula appended to your letter. This matter can best be settlec.

1 A copy of this letter was sent to Lord Mountbatten by the Nawab of Bhopal on 1 July. R/3/1/138
f 3-

2 See No. 197.

3 See No. 198.

778

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

after discussion between Representatives of the Successor Governments and
of Bhopal State.

His Highness’ Government welcome this opportunity for discussion. As
the lapse of Paramountcy is now imminent, it is suggested that no time should
be lost in holding these discussions with representatives of the Successor
Governments.

There is no indication in the two letters referred to above as to the method by
which the Crown Representative intends to setde certain matters directly
arising from the exercise of Paramountcy powers by the Crown or from the
obligations undertaken by the Crown as a result of agreements between the
State and the Crown in British India. The fulfilment of certain contractual
obligations by Government of India is essential in view of the commitments
made by and on behalf of the Crown, before, during, and subsequent to the war.

There are questions such as the retrocession of jurisdiction on Railway
running through the State territories, and of Railway lands. There are pending
cases which the Crown promised to settle before the lapse of Paramountcy.
There is also the question of supply of necessary arms and ammunition for
essential security purposes. This supply has been promised to us and we have
relied on the assurance, given by Crown Representative and the Political
Department in this respect. The delay, it was explained, was due only to
administrative dislocation etc. It is entirely due to Paramountcy restrictions
imposed on us that we find ourselves in a state of unpreparedness today. We
cannot even meet properly our internal security obligations to our people.
We relied on the assurances given by the Political Department in this matter
and we think it is essential that these supplies should be forthcoming before
power is transferred to Successor Government and Paramountcy lapses. It
may be noted that His Highness the Ruler wrote in the matter to the Political
Adviser as long ago as 24th March, 1947.4 He also addressed His Excellency the
Crown Representative directly on 30th April, 1947. 5 Copies of the corres¬
pondence with Political Adviser referred to above were forthwith communi¬
cated to the Polical Agent for immediate action. If the formal communication
of such matters is delayed in transit between Indore and Delhi for three months,
this Government cannot be blamed for it. His Highness’ Government cannot
believe that it would be the intention of the Crown Representative to give the
States an unfair deal in regard to even their minimum requirements for the
maintenance of peace and order within their territories. The denial to the
States now of the supply of necessary arms, ammunition and equipment for
their legitimate requirements on the ground that the Central Government
may not be willing to sanction is most unfair. Paramountcy has not yet lapsed
and the Crown Representative still has authority to take necessary action and
secure to the States justice and fairplay.

Fiscal matters such as die share of the States in Sterling balances and in the

JUNE I947

779

contribution to general revenue from Post Office etc., Reserve Banks
and in the assets of the Government of India to which the peoples of the
State have also contributed, arc also questions, which require immediate
attention.

If H.M.G. without any warning to the States has decided to transfer power
in August, 1947, instead of June 1948, it is no ground to deny the States their
legitimate requirements and due claims. This is not a plea for delaying transfer
beyond die 15th August. The States are happy that the transfer is coming earlier,
but they have a right to expect that proper arrangements will be made to
secure and safeguard the interests of die States arising from the sacred
obligations undertaken by the Crown and the repeated solemn assurances
given in this connection very recently. Every effort is being made to safeguard
the interests of Pakistan and Hindustan, the Bhopal Government is constrained
to observe that the only party that is suffering and is being neglected is the
Indian States. It cannot in justice be the price for the closest and consistent
cooperation freely and loyally given by the States to die British Crown for
well over a century. Bhopal Government therefore trust that His Excellency
the Crown Representative will be pleased to take necessary action in all these
matters.

Very sincerely yours,

SHUAIB QURESHI

4 and 5 Not traced; but sec Vol. X, No. 354, para. 31.

428

Viceroy's Conference Paper V.C.P. 97
Mountbatten Papers

SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

jo June 1947

THE DRAFT BILL

Attached is a copy of die Draft Bill, amended to 29th June 1947.'

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

1 The draft of the Bill reprinted here is the one shown to the Indian leaders on 1 July. The principal
changes made to it between that date and its publication on 4 July 1947 have been indicated in the
following way:

(a) words in square brackets were deleted from the published Bill;

(b) words in square brackets and printed in italics were inserted in the published Bill.

Most of these amendments were decided on at the India and Burma Committee meeting on 3 July
1947 (No. 486, Minute 3) in the light of points raised by the Congress and Muslim League leaders.

There were also a number of technical amendments made to the draft Bill before its publication
which have not been indicated. Readers wishing to follow up such detailed technical points should
consult files L/P&J/10/123-124 and R/3 /i /i 53-1 54* The full text of the Bill as published is at
L/P &J/10/124: ff 103-113. The Act as passed by Parliament on 18 July 1947 will be reprinted in full
in the next Volume.

780

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

SECRET

Indian Independence Bill

ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES

Clause

1. The new Dominions.

2. Territories of the new Dominions.

3. Bengal and Assam.

4. The Punjab.

5. The Governor-General of the new Dominions.

6. Legislation for the new Dominions.

7. Consequences of the setting up of the new Dominions.

8. Temporary provision as to government of each of the new Dominions.

9. Orders for bringing this Act into Force.

10. Secretary of State's services, etc.

11. Indian Armed Forces.

12. British forces in India.

13. Naval Forces.

14. Provisions as to the Secretary of State and the Auditor of Indian Flome
Accounts.

15. Legal proceedings by and against the Secretary of State.

16. Aden.

1 7. Divorce j urisdiction.

18. Provisions as to existing laws, etc.

19. Interpretation, etc.

20. Short title.

SCHEDULES2

First Schedule — Bengal Districts provisionally included in the new Province
of East Bengal.

Second Schedule — Districts provisionally included in the new Province of
West Punjab.

Third Schedule — Modifications of Army Act and Air Force Act in relation to
British forces.

2 Not printed.

DRAFT

OF A
BILL
TO

Make provision for the setting up in India of two independent
Dominions and for other matters consequential on or connected
with the setting up thereof.

Be it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by and
with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal,
and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the
authority of the same, as follows :

1. (i) As from the fifteenth day of August, nineteen hundred
and forty-seven, two independent Dominions shall be set up
in India, to be known respectively as India and Pakistan.

(2) The said Dominions are hereafter in this Act referred
to as “the new Dominions”, and the said fifteenth day of August
is hereafter in this Act referred to as “the appointed day”.

2. (1) [Subject to the provisions of subsections (5) and ( 4 ) of this
section ,] The territories of India shall be the territories under the
sovereignty of His Majesty which, immediately before the
appointed day, were included in British India except the terri¬
tories which, under subsection (2) of this section, are to be the
territories of Pakistan.

(2) [Subject to the provisions of subsections (3) and (4) of this
section ,] The territories of Pakistan shall be —

(a) the territories which, on the appointed day, are included
in the Provinces of East Bengal and West Punjab, as
constituted under the two following sections;

(b) the territories which, at the date of the passing of this Act,
are included in the Province of Sind and the Chief Com¬
missioner’s Province of British Baluchistan; and

(c) if, whether before or after the passing of this Act but
before the appointed day, the Governor-General declares
that the majority of the valid votes cast in the referendum
which, at the date of the passing of this Act, is being or
has recently been held in that behalf under his authority in
the North West Frontier Province are in favour of repre¬
sentatives of that Province taking part in the Constituent
Assembly of Pakistan, the territories which, at the date
of the passing of this Act, are included in that Province.

The new
Dominions

Territories of
the new
Dominions

782

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Bengal and
Assam

(3) Nothing in this section shall prevent any area being at any
time included in or excluded from either of the new Dominions,
so, however, that —

(a) no area not forming part of the territories specified in
subsection (1) or, as the case may be, subsection (2), of
this section shall be included in either Dominion without
the consent of that Dominion; and

(b) no area which forms part of the territories specified in
the said subsection (1) or, as the case may be, the said
subsection (2), or which has after the appointed day been
included in either Dominion, shall be excluded from that
Dominion without the consent of that Dominion.

[( 4 ) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub¬
section (3) of this section , nothing in this section shall be construed as
preventing the accession of Indian States to either of the new Dominions.]

3. (1) As from the appointed day —

(a) the Province of Bengal, as constituted under the Govern¬
ment of India Act, 1935, shall cease to exist; and

(b) there shall be constituted in lieu thereof two new Provinces,
to be known respectively as East Bengal and West Bengal.

(2) If, whether before or after the passing of this Act, but before
the appointed day, the Governor-General declares that the
majority of the valid votes cast in the referendum which, at the
date of the passing of this Act, is being or has recently been held
in that behalf under his authority in the District of Sylhet are in
favour of that District forming part of the new Province of
East Bengal, [then, as from the appointed day —

(a) the Province of Assam, as constituted under the Govern¬
ment of India Act, 1935, shall cease to exist; and

(b) there shall be constituted in lieu thereof a new Province
to be known as Assam; and

(c) a part of the territories of the Province of Assam which
ceases to exist shall, in accordance with the provisions
of subsection (3) of this section, form part of the new
Province of East Bengal.] [then, as from that day , a part of the
Province of Assam shall, in accordance with the provisions of
subsection (5) of this section, form part of the new Province oj
East Bengal.]

[(3) The boundaries of the new Provinces aforesaid shall be
such as may be determined, before the appointed day, by order
of the Governor-General, in the light of the relevant reports of
any boundary commisions appointed or to be appointed by him

JUNE 1947

783

in that behalf, or as may be determined, on or after the appointed
day, by agreement between the two new Dominions in the light
of any such reports, but until the boundaries are so determined — ]

[(3) The boundaries of the new Provinces aforesaid and, in the
event mentioned in subsection (2) of this section , the boundaries after
the appointed day of the Province of Assam, shall be such as may be
determined, whether bejore or after the appointed day, by awards of
boundary commissions appointed or to be appointed by the Governor-
General in that behalf, but until the boundaries are so determined — ]

(a) the Bengal Districts specified in the First Schedule to this
Act,3 together with, in the event mentioned in subsection
(2) of this section, the Assam District of Sylhet, shall be
treated as the territories which are to be comprised in the
new Province of East Bengal;

(b) the remainder of the territories comprised at the date of
the passing of this Act in the Province of Bengal shall be
treated as the territories which are to be comprised in the
new Province of West Bengal; and

(c) [in the event specified in subsection (2) of this section, the
territories, other than the District of Sylhet, comprised at
the date of the passing of this Act in the Province of Assam
shall be treated as the territories which are to be comprised
in the new Province of Assam.]

[in the event mentioned in subsection (2) of this section, the
District of Sylhet shall be excluded from the Province of Assam.]

4. (1) As from the appointed day —

(a) the Province of the Punjab, as constituted under the
Government of India Act, 1935, shall cease to exist; and

(b) there shall be constituted two new Provinces, to be known
respectively as West Punjab and East Punjab.

(2) [The boundaries of the said new Provinces shall be such
as may be determined, before the appointed day, by order of
the Governor-General, in the light of the relevant reports of
any boundary commissions appointed or to be appointed by him
in that behalf, or as may be determined, on or after the appointed
day, by agreement between the two new Dominions in the
light of any such reports, but until the boundaries are so deter¬
mined — ]

[The boundaries of the said new Provinces shall be such as may be
determined, whether before or after the appointed day, by awards of
boundary commissions appointed or to be appointed by the Governor -

The Punjab

3 The First Schedule listed the Muslim majority districts of Bengal (see Appendix to No. 45).

784

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The Governor-
General of the
new Dominions5

Legislation for
the new
Dominions

General in that behalf, but until the boundaries are so determined — ]

(a) the Districts specified in the Second Schedule to this
Act4 shall be treated as the territories to be comprised in the
new Province of West Punjab ; and

(b) the remainder of the territories comprised at the date of the
passing of this Act in the Province of the Punjab shall be
treated as the territories which are to be comprised in the
new Province of East Punjab.

5. For each of the new Dominions, there shall be a Governor-
General who shall be appointed by His Majesty and shall repre¬
sent His Majesty for the purposes of the government of the
Dominion:

[Provided that it shall be lawful for one person to hold both
appointments of Governor-General for such period as may be
determined by either Dominion after the appointed day.]

[Provided that, unless and until provision to the contrary is made
by a law of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions, the same
person may be Governor-General of both the new Dominions .]6

6. (1) The Legislature of each of the new Dominions shall
have full power to make laws for that Dominion, including
laws having extra-territorial operation.

(2) No law and no provision of any law made by the Legis¬
lature of either of the new Dominions shall be void or inoperative
on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to
the provisions of [this or]7 any existing or future Act of Parlia¬
ment of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation
made under any such Act, and the powers of the Legislature of
each Dominion include the power to repeal or amend any such
Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as it is part of the law of
the Dominion.

(3) The Governor-General of each of the new Dominions
shall have full power to assent in His Majesty’s name to any law

4 The Second Schedule listed the Muslim majority districts of the Punjab (see ibid.).

5 In tel. 1676-S of 1 July 1947 Lord Mountbatten informed Lord Listowel that he had removed
Clause 5(2), dealing with the emoluments of the Governor-General, from the text of the Bill to
be shown to the Indian leaders. The Clause included a proviso that, if the same person was Governor-
General in both Dominions, he should not receive any greater emoluments than he would have done
as Governor-General of only one Dominion [cf. No. 191, Clause 5(3)]. Lord Mountbatten stated that
he could not possibly run two Government houses simultaneously on his present emoluments.
He added that, if it should be decided that he was to stay on after 15 August, he thought the neces¬
sary arrangements could be made under Clause 9(1) (c). R/3/1/153: f 3 1 3 .

6 For the substitution of this proviso for the one printed above, see correspondence concluding with
No. 440.

7 For insertion of these words see correspondence concluding with No. 452, para. 2.

JUNE 1947

785

of the Legislature of that Dominion and so much of any Act as
relates to the disallowance of laws by His Majesty or the reserva¬
tion of laws for the signification of His Majesty’s pleasure
thereon or the suspension of the operation of laws until the
signification of His Majesty’s pleasure thereon shall not apply to
laws of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions.

(4) No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed on
or after the appointed day shall extend, or be deemed to extend,
to either of the new Dominions as part of the law of that Domin¬
ion [unless it is expressly declared in that Act that the Dominion
has requested and consented to the passing thereof]

[unless it is extended thereto by a law oj the Legislature of the Dominion.]

(5) No Order in Council made on or after the appointed day
under any Act passed before the appointed day, and no order,
rule or other instrument made on or after the appointed day under
any such Act by any United Kingdom Minister or other author¬
ity, shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to either of the new
Dominions as part of the law of that Dominion.

(6) The power referred to in subsection (1) of this section
extends to the making of laws limiting for the future the powers
of the Legislature of the Dominion.

7. (1) As from the appointed day —

(a) His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have
no responsibility as respects the government of any of the
territories which, immediately before that day, were
included in British India;

(b) the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses,
and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date
of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the
rulers of Indian State*, all functions exercisable by His
Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all
obligations of His Majesty existing at that date towards
Indian States or the rulers thereof, and all powers, rights,
authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that
date in or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant, usage,
sufferance or otherwise; and

(c) there lapse also any treaties or agreements in force at the
date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and any
persons having authority in the tribal areas, any obligations
of His Majesty existing at that date to any such persons
or with respect to the tribal areas, and all powers, rights,
authority or jurisdiction exercisable at that date by His

Consequences of
the setting up
of the new
Dominions

786

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Temporary
provision as to
government of
each of the new
Dominions

Majesty in or in relation to the tribal areas by treaty,
grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise.

[Provided that , notwithstanding anything in paragraph ( b ) or
paragraph (c) of this subsection , effect shall, as nearly as may be
continue to be given to the provisions of any such agreement as is
therein referred to which relate to customs, transit and communications,
posts and telegraphs, or other like matters, until the provisions in
question are denounced by the Ruler oj the Indian State or person
having authority in the tribal areas on the one hand, or by the
Dominion or Province or other part thereof concerned on the other
hand, or are superseded by subsequent agreements.]

(2) The assent of the Parliament of the United Kingdom is
hereby given to the omission from the Royal Style and Titles
of the words “Indiae Imperator” and the words “Emperor of
India” and to the issue by His Majesty for that purpose of His
Royal Proclamation under the Great Seal of the Realm.

8. [(1) In the case of each of the new Dominions, the powers
of the Legislature of the Dominion shall, in the first instance and
so far as appears necessary for the purpose of establishing the
fundamental laws thereof, be exercisable by the Constituent
Assembly of that Dominion.]

[(1) In the case of each of the new Dominions, the powers of the
Legislature of the Dominion shall, for the purpose of making provision
as to the constitution of the Dominion, be exercisable in the first
instance by the Constituent Assembly of that Dominion, and references
in this Act to the Legislature of the Dominion shall be construed
accordingly.]

(2) Except in so far as other provision is made by or in accord¬
ance with a law made by the Constituent Assembly of the
Dominion under subsection (1) of this section, each of the new
Dominions and all Provinces and other parts thereof shall be
governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the Government
of India Act, 1935; and the provisions of that Act, and of the
orders in Council, rules and other instruments made thereunder,
shall, so far as applicable, and subject to any express provisions
of this Act, and with such omissions, additions, adaptations and
modifications as may be specified in orders of the Governor-
General under the next succeeding section, have effect accord-
ingly;

Provided that —

(a) the said provisions shall apply separately in relation to each
of the new Dominions and nothing in this subsection shall

JUNE I947

787

be construed as continuing on or after the appointed
day any Central Government or Legislature common to
both the new Dominions;

(b) nothing in this subsection shall be construed as continuing
in force on or after the appointed day any form of control
by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom over
the affairs of the new Dominions or of any Province or
other part thereof;

(c) so much of the said provisions as requires the Governor-
General or any Governor to act in his discretion or exercise
his individual judgement as respects any matter shall
cease to have effect as from the appointed day;

(d) as from the appointed day, no Provincial Bill shall be
reserved under the Government of India Act, 1935, for
the signification of His Majesty’s pleasure, and no Pro¬
vincial Act shall be disallowed by His Majesty thereunder;
and

(e) the powers of the Federal Legislature or Indian Legislature
under that Act, as in force in relation to each Dominion,
shall, in the first instance, be exercisable by the Consti¬
tuent Assembly of the Dominion, [in addition to the powers
exercisable by that Assembly under subsection (1) of this
section.]

(3) Any provision of the Government of India Act, 1935,
which, as applied to either of the new Dominions by subsection
(2) of this section and the orders therein referred to, operates
to limit the power of the legislature of that Dominion shall,
unless and until other provision is made by or in accordance
with a law made by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion
in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1) of this
section, have the like effect as a law of the Legislature of the
Dominion limiting for the future the powers of that Legislature.

9. (1) The Governor-General shall by order make such
provision as appears to him to be necessary or expedient —

(a) for bringing the provisions of this Act into effective
operation ;

(b) for dividing between the new Dominions, and the new
Provinces to be constituted under this Act, the powers,
rights, property, duties and liabilities of the Governor-
General in Council or, as the case may be, of the relevant
Provinces which, under this Act, are to cease to exist;

(c) for making omissions from, additions to, and adaptations

Orders for
bringing this
Act into force

788

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

and modifications of, the Government of India Act, 193 5 ,
and the Orders in Council, rules and other instruments
made thereunder, in their application to the separate new
Dominions;

(d) for removing difficulties arising in connection with the
transition to the provisions of this Act ;

[(e)8 for authorising the carrying on of the business of the
Governor-General in Council between the passing of this Act
and the appointed day otherwise than in accordance with the
provisions in that behalf of the Ninth Schedule to the Govern¬
ment of India Act , 1 935 ;

(f)9 for enabling agreements to be entered into, and other acts done,
on behalf of either of the new Dominions before the appointed
day ;]

(e) [(^)] for authorising the continued carrying on for the
time being on behalf of the new Dominions, or on behalf
of any two or more of the said new Provinces, of services
and activities previously carried on on behalf of British
India as a whole or on behalf of the former Provinces
which those new Provinces represent ;

(f) [(h)] for regulating the monetary system and any matters
pertaining to the Reserve Bank of India ; and

(g) [(/)] so far as it appears necessary or expedient in connec¬
tion with any of the matters aforesaid, for varying the
constitution, powers or jurisdiction of any legislature,
court or other authority in the new Dominions and
creating new legislatures, courts or other authorities
therein.

(2) The powers conferred by this section on the Governor-
General shall, in relation to their respective Provinces, be
exercisable also by the Governors of the Provinces which, under
this Act, are to cease to exist; and those powers shall, for the
purposes of the Government of India Act, 1935, be deemed to be
matters as respects which the Governors are, under that Act,
to exercise their individual judgement.

(3) This section shall be deemed to have had effect as from the
third day of June, nineteen hundred and forty-seven and any
order of the Governor-General or any Governor made on or
after that date as to any matter shall have effect accordingly, and
any order made under this section may be made so as to he

8 For the insertion of this sub-clause see correspondence concluding with No. 469.

9 For the insertion of this sub-clause see No. 452, para. 5, and 466, para. 6.

JUNE 1947

789

retrospective to any date not earlier than the said third day of
June:

Provided that no person shall be deemed to be guilty of an
offence by reason of so much of any such order as makes any
provision thereof retrospective to any date before the making
thereof.

(4) Any orders made under this section, whether before or
after the appointed day, shall have effect —

(a) up to the appointed day, in British India ;

(b) on and after the appointed day, in the new Dominion or
Dominions concerned; and

(c) outside British India, or as the case may be, outside the
new Dominion or Dominions concerned, to such extent,
whether before, on or after the appointed day, as a law of
the Legislature of the Dominion or Dominions concerned
would have on or after the appointed day, but shall, in

the case of each of the Dominions, be subject to the same powers
of repeal and amendment as laws of the Legislature of that
Dominion.

(5) No order shall be made under this section, by the Governor
of any Province, after the appointed day, or, by the Governor-
General, [after six months from the appointed day] [after the
thirty-first day of March , nineteen hundred and forty-eight,] or such
earlier date as may be determined, in the case of either Dominion,
by any law of the Legislature of that Dominion.

\{6) If it appears that a part of the Province of Assam is, on the
appointed day, to become part of the new Province of East Bengal, the
preceding provisions of this section shall have effect as if, under this
Act, the Province of Assam was to cease to exist on the appointed
day and be reconstituted on that day as a new Province.]

10. (1) The provisions of this Act keeping in force provisions
of the Government of India Act, 1935, shall not continue in
force the provisions of that Act relating to appointments to the
civil services of, and civil posts under, the Crown in India by the
Secretary of State, or the provisions of that Act relating to the
reservation of posts.

[(2) Every person who, having been appointed by the Secre¬
tary of State, or Secretary of State in Council, to a civil service
of the Crown in India, continues on and after the appointed day
to serve under the Government of either of the new Dominions
or of any Province or part thereof, shall be entitled to receive from
the Governments of the Dominions and Provinces or parts

Secretary of
State’s
services, etc

790

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Indian armed
forces

which he is from time to time serving the same conditions
of service as respects remuneration, leave and pension and the
same rights as respects disciplinary matters, or rights as
similar thereto as changed circumstances may permit, as that
person was entitled to immediately before the appointed day.]

[( 2 ) Every person who —

(a) having been appointed by the Secretary of State , or
Secretary of State in Council , to a civil service of the Crown in
India continues on and after the appointed day to serve under
the Government of either of the new Dominions or of any
Province or part thereof; or

(b) having been appointed by His Majesty before the appointed
day to be a judge of the Federal Court or of any court which is
a High Court within the meaning of the Government of
India Act , 1935, continues on and after the appointed day to
serve as a judge in either of the new Dominions , shall be
entitled to receive from the Governments of the Dominions
and Provinces or parts which he is from time to time serving
or, as the case may be, which are served by the courts in which
he is from time to time a judge, the same conditions of service
as respects remuneration, leave and pension, and the same
rights as respects disciplinary matters or, as the case may be,
as respects the tenure of his office, or rights as similar thereto
as changed circumstances may permit, as that person was
entitled to immediately before the appointed day.]

(3) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as enabling the
rights and liabilities of any person with respect to the family
pension funds vested in Commissioners under section two
hundred and seventy-three of the Government of India Act,
1935, to be governed otherwise than by Orders in Council
made (whether before or after the passing of this Act or the
appointed day) by His Majesty in Council and rules made
(whether before or after the passing of this Act or the appointed
day) by a Secretary of State or such other Minister of the Crown
as may be designated in that behalf by Order in Council under
the Ministers of the Crown (Transfer of Functions) Act, 1946.

11. (1) The orders to be made by the Governor-General
under the preceding provisions of this Act shall make provision
for the division of the Indian armed forces of His Majesty between
the new Dominions, and for the command and governance of
those forces until the division is completed.

(2) As from the appointed day, while any member of His

JUNE 1947

791

Majesty s forces, other than His Majesty’s Indian forces, is
attached to or serving with any of His Majesty’s Indian forces—

(a) he shall, subject to any provision to the contrary made by a
law of the Legislature of the Dominion or Dominions
concerned or by any order of the Governor-General under
the preceding provisions of this Act, have, in relation to
the Indian forces in question, the powers of command
and punishment appropriate to his rank and functions; but

(b) nothing in any enactment in force at the date of the passing
of this Act shall render him subject in any way to the
law governing the Indian forces in question.

[Clauses 12 and 13, regarding the governance, as from the
appointed day, of British forces in India and of Naval Forces, not
printed.]

14. (1) A Secretary of State, or such other Minister of the
Crown as may be designated in that behalf by Order in Council
under the Ministers of the Crown (Transfer of Functions) Act,
1946, is hereby authorised to continue for the time being the
performance, on behalf of whatever government or govern¬
ments may be concerned, of functions as to the making of
payments and other matters similar to the functions which, up
to the appointed day, the Secretary of State was performing on
behalf of governments constituted under the Government of
India Act, 1935.

(2) The functions referred to in subsection (1) of this section
include functions as respects the management of, and the making
of payments in respect of, government debt, and any enact¬
ments relating to such debt shall have effect accordingly :

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as
continuing in force so much of any enactment as empowers the
Secretary of State to contract sterling loans on behalf of any
such Government as aforesaid or as applying to the Government
of either of the new Dominions the prohibition imposed on the
Governor-General in Council by section three hundred and
fifteen of the Government of India Act, 1935, as respects the
contracting of sterling loans.

(3) As from the appointed day, there shall not be any such
advisers of the Secretary of State as are provided for by section
two hundred and seventy-eight of the Government of India
Act, 1935, and that section, and any provisions of that Act which
require the Secretary of State to obtain the concurrence of his
advisers, are hereby repealed as from that day.

Provisions as to
the Secretary of
State and the
Auditor of
Indian

Home Accounts

792

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Provisions as
to existing
laws, etc

Interpretation,

etc

(4) The Auditor of Indian Home Accounts is hereby authorised
to continue for the time being to exercise his functions as
respects the accounts of the Secretary of State or any such other
Minister of the Crown as is mentioned in subsection (1) of
this section, both in respect of activities before, and in respect
of activities after, the appointed day, in the same manner, as
nearly as may be as he would have done if this Act had not

[Clauses 15, 16 and 17, regarding Legal proceedings by and
against the Secretary of State on and after the appointed day,
Aden, and Divorce jurisdiction, not printed.]

18. [Subclauses (i)-(2), regarding adaptation of United
Kingdom law, not printed.]

(3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the law
of British India and of the several parts thereof existing immedi¬
ately before the appointed day shall, so far as applicable and with
the necessary adaptations, continue as the law of each of the new
Dominions and the several parts thereof until other provision
is made by laws of the Legislature of the Dominion in question
or by any other Legislature or other authority having power in
that behalf.

(4) It is hereby declared that the Instruments of Instructions
issued before the passing of this Act by His Majesty to the
Governor-General and the Governors of Provinces lapse as
from the appointed day, and nothing in this Act shall be construed
as continuing in force any provision of the Government of
India Act, 1935, relating to such Instruments of Instructions.

(5) As from the appointed day, so much of any enactment as
requires the approval of His Majesty in Council to any rules of
court shall not apply to any court in either of the new Dominions.

19. (1) References in this Act to the Governor-General shall,
in relation to any order to be made or other act done on or
after the appointed day, be construed —

(a) where the order or other act concerns one only of the
new Dominions, as references to the Governor-General of
that Dominion ;

(b) where the order or other act concerns both of the new
Dominions and the same person is the Governor-General of
both those Dominions, as references to that person; and

(c) in any other case, as references to the Governors-General
of the new Dominions, acting jointly.

(2) References in this Act to the Governor-General shall,

JUNE 1947

793

in relation to any order to be made or other act done before the
appointed day, be construed as references to the Governor-
General of India within the meaning of the Government of
India Act, 1935? an-d so much of that or any other Act as requires
references to the Governor-General to be construed as references
to the Governor-General in Council shall not apply to references
to the Governor-General in this Act.

(3) References in this Act to the Constituent Assembly of a
Dominion shall be construed as references —

(a) in relation to India, to the Constituent Assembly, the
first sitting whereof was held on the ninth day of December,
nineteen hundred and forty-six, modified —

(i) by the exclusion of the members representing Bengal,

the Punjab, Sind and British Baluchistan; and

(ii) should it appear that the North West Frontier Pro¬
vince will form part of Pakistan, by the exclusion of
the members representing that Province; and

[ (iii) should it appear that the Province of Assam constituted
under the Government of India Act, 1935, is to cease
to exist under this Act, by the exclusion of the members
representing that Province; and
(iv) by the inclusion of members representing West
Bengal, East Punjab and, if there is to be such a
Province, the new Province of Assam ;]

[(iii) by the inclusion of members representing West Bengal and
East Punjab; and

(iv) should it appear that , on the appointed day , a part of the
Province of Assam is to form part of the new Province of
East Bengal, by the exclusion of the members theretofore
representing the Province of Assam and the inclusion of
members chosen to represent the remainder of that Province ;]

(b) in relation to Pakistan, to the Assembly set up or about
to be set up at the date of the passing of this Act under the
authority of the Governor-General as the Constituent
Assembly for Pakistan :

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed
as affecting the extent to which representatives of the
Indian States take part in either of the said Assemblies, or
as preventing the filling of casual vacancies in the said
Assemblies, or as preventing the participation [of repre¬
sentatives of the tribal areas in either of the said Assemblies

794

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

in accordance with such arrangements as may be made in
that behalf.]

[in either of the said Assemblies, in accordance with such
arrangements as may be made in that behalf, of representa¬
tives of the tribal areas on the borders of the Dominion for
which that Assembly sits, and the powers of the said Assemblies
shall extend and be deemed always to have extended to the
making of provision for the matters specified in this proviso.]

(4) In this Act, except so far as the context otherwise requires —
“India”, where the reference is to a state of affairs existing
before the appointed day or which would have existed but for
the passing of this Act, has the meaning assigned to it by
section three hundred and eleven of the Government of India
Act, 1935;

“Indian forces” includes all His Majesty’s Indian forces
existing before the appointed day and also any forces of
either of the new Dominions ;

“Province” means a Governor’s Province;

“remuneration” includes leave pay, allowances and the cost of
any privileges or facilities provided in kind ;

“pension” means, in reference to any person, a pension,
whether contributory or not, of any kind whatsoever payable
to or in respect of that person, and includes retired pay so
payable, a gratuity so payable and any sum or sums so payable
by way of the return, with or without interest thereon or
other additions thereto, of subscriptions to a provident fund.

(5) Any power conferred by this Act to make any order
includes power to revoke or vary any order previously made in
the exercise of that power.

20. This Act may be cited as the India Independence Act,
1947-

Short title

JUNE I947

795

429

Note1

Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Indian Independence

Bill — Draft Bill , Part 11(a)

SECRET

THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL
POINTS FOR DISCUSSION

The following points are for discussion with leaders :

1. Assumption by the new Dominions of international obligations.2 3

The position under international law is understood to be that the new
Dominion of India will continue the international personality of the existing
India, and as such, assets of the present Government of India outside the country
will pass to the Dominion of India. This however will not in any way prejudice
the inclusion of those assets in the equitable division of all assets and liabilities
of the present Government of India between the new Dominions. The further
question remains as to the assumption by the new Dominions of international
obligations under treaties (a) which were concluded expressly on behalf of the
present India, and (b) which were concluded in the name of His Majesty or
His Majesty’s Government but which are applicable to the present India.

2. Since as stated above the new Dominion of India continues the inter¬
national personality of the present India, she will prima facie inherit all India’s
existing international treaty obligations that is, both (a) and (b) above. But it
is clear that she cannot be bound in international law by those obligations which
by their nature can only be carried out in territory not belonging to her or
under her control. Some obligations, for instance, those relating to frontiers,
run with land and consequently pass to the future sovereign of the land whoever
he may be. There are also other treaty obligations which can only be performed
in the future Dominion of Pakistan and as to which it is perhaps more open to
question whether they pass to the Government of that Dominion by automatic
operation of law. The former obligations must 3 apparently pass to whatever
successor authority becomes responsible for the territory in question, and the
latter obligations should also pass to that authority.

3. When the other Dominions of the British Commonwealth became
international persons, they and all the parties concerned accepted without

1 A draft of this Note, prepared by the Reforms Commissioner, had been circulated to the Viceroy’s
staff under reference V.C.P. 99. This draft was considered and, after some amendment, approved
at the Viceroy’s Fiftieth Staff Meeting on 30 June 1947* Mountbatten Papers.

2 See No. 333.

3 Words in italics underlined in original.

796

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

question the position not only that the Dominions inherited all treaty rights
and obligations which had any local or territorial application, but also claimed
the benefits, and accepted the obligations, of treaties whose provisions applied
territorially to the whole Commonwealth and from which all British subjects
benefited in foreign countries. It is suggested that the Dominions of India and
Pakistan will similarly inherit all treaty rights and obligations which have
local or territorial application.

4. The question arises more particularly in connection with treaties con¬
cluded in the name of His Majesty or of His Majesty’s Government, most of
whose stipulations can only be fulfilled in India or can only be wholly fulfilled
if the successor Government or Governments concerned observe them.
Examples are Anglo- Afghan Treaty, 1921, Anglo-Tibetan Treaty, 1914, and
the Anglo-Nepali Treaty, 1933.

5. It is for consideration whether the leaders could give an assurance to the
effect that the Dominion Governments when set up will consider themselves
as the successors to all treaty rights and obligations in the sense indicated above.

II. Orders for bringing the Act into Force ( Clause 9).

It will be noted that under sub-clause (5) of Clause 9, the Governor-General’s
power to make orders under that Clause continues for a period of six months
from the appointed day, unless it is curtailed by a law of either Dominion
Legislature.

2. It is possible, (especially in view of the fact that the Reconstitution of the
Armed Forces will probably not be complete until 1st April, 1948), that six
months may not be a sufficiently long period.

3. It is for consideration whether this period should not be increased now
to, say, eight or nine months. It is pointed out that the chosen period can easily
be curtailed after the passing of the Act, whereas it could not be extended.

III. Guarantee to members of Secretary of State's Services who continue in service .4

In clause 10(2) of the Bill the statutory guarantee is given only to members
of the Secretary of State’s Services who continue in service after the transfer
of power. This was based on the decision of the Interim Government. The
terms of the draft clause are subject to the express concurrence of the leaders.

2. It is however pointed out that to give a statutory guarantee of this kind
to members of the Secretary of State’s Services and not to give a similar
guarantee to Judges of the Federal Court and the High Courts who may also
continue in service seems to be highly anomalous. It is suggested that the
guarantee may appropriately be extended to these Judges. If the leaders agree,
an appropriate amendment could be made in Clause 10(2) of the Bill before
introduction.

JUNE 1947

797

IV. Clause 14.4 5

The Secretary of State for India and the High Commissioner for India in the
United Kingdom, between them, discharge certain financial functions on
behalf of the Government of India and the Provincial Governments. These are
broadly in regard to the management of the Government debt and the making
of payments in respect of that debt, and the meeting of claims in the United
Kingdom on the Government of India and the Provincial Governments, includ¬
ing the paying of salaries and pensions, to or in respect of persons who are or
have been in the service of the Crown in India. Provision has to be made in
one form or another for the continued performance of these functions on
and after the appointed day, when the Secretary of State for India will cease
to function and each of the new Dominions will appoint its own High
Commissioner.

2. Without an express authorisation by an Act of Parliament, H.M.G. cannot
make payments on behalf of the new Dominion Governments, although
there may be no doubt as to the latter subsequently accepting liability and
agreeing to reimburse H.M.G. the payments so made. Clause 14 accordingly
authorises a S/S or other Minister to continue to make payments on account
of (i) existing sterling debt of India, and (ii) remuneration, pensions, etc.,
payable to service personnel. The question of the ultimate incidence of the
liability is intended to be subsequently settled by H.M.G. with the two
Dominion Governments.

3. It was at first proposed that the clause in the Bill should refer expressly
to the High Commissioner and authorise him jointly with a S/S to continue
meeting payments on behalf of both Dominions in the anomalous situation
which must continue for a short period until adequate provision is made by
the Dominion Legislatures. That would have assured those who are accustomed
to draw those payments in the United Kingdom that the existing machinery
for such payments will continue. It was however felt that it would not be
appropriate to impose duties on the Dominion High Commissioners in this
fashion by Statute.

4. H.M.G. are prepared to omit the reference to the High Commissioner
and confine the provision to a S/S or other Minister (as in the draft clause)
provided an assurance can be obtained from leaders that they agree that the
High Commissioner and the S/S should continue to discharge these functions
and that the Dominions will undertake to continue to provide the necessary
funds. H.M.G. desire an assurance in this respect which can be quoted in
Parliament.

4 See Nos. 249, last para; 286, para. 8; 351, para. 2; and 365, para. 7.

5 See Nos. 249, comment on Clause 13; 271; and 286, para. 7.

798

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

430

Minutes by Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum , Sir G. Abell and Rear-Admiral

Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Rl3l*li53: f 29°

jo June 1947

1. Since the Staff Meeting, Sundaram and I have been in communication with
V. P. Menon about the proposal to raise, at the meeting tomorrow, the
question of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.1 Menon is very strongly of the view
that to raise this question tomorrow would lead to extreme trouble. He even
offered to dress immediately and come over and personally convince H.E. on
this point. He says that the Governor of Bengal2 is looking at the matter from a
purely provincial point of view. To depart from the Muslim-maj ori ty ”
principle at this stage would be exceedingly dangerous and lead to endless
complications.

2. I have also looked up an extract from a letter of 16th May3 from Pandit
Nehru, which reads : —

“8. There is no mention in the document of the Chittagong Hill areas which
are predominantly Hindu and Buddhist. These are Excluded areas lying to the
east of East Bengal. They have nothing in connnon with Chittagong District
or with East Bengal. They will naturally line up with some of the Hindu
States to the north of them and possibly with Assam.”

3 . I have prepared thepapers about the Chittagong Hill Tracts, but recommend
that these should not be produced unless the Muslim League representatives
raise the matter tomorrow. Sundaram agrees.

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

I am going to see V. P. Menon tonight, but I put this up for immediate
information. I think the Chittagong Hill states must at least be mentioned
though the feasible alternatives are limited to :

(1) leaving things as they are for future discussion, and

(2) insisting that some arrangement be made before the appointed day to
ascertain the will of the inhabitants.

G. E. B. ABELL

No action is to be taken to raise this issue with any of the leaders unless the
League raise it. I hope to discuss it with VP about 10.15.

M

1 The Minutes of the Viceroy’s Fiftieth Staff Meeting record that: ‘There was discussion on the
Chittagong Hill Tracts, and His Excellency indicated the outline of a note which he wished to be
prepared on this subject’; and that the Viceroy ‘directed Con. Sec. to draft a note on the Chittagong
Hill Tracts, for discussion, if necessary, with the Indian Leaders the following day’. Mountbatten
Papers.

2 Nos. 363 and 364. 3 Vol. X, No. 464, para. 8.

JUNE 1947

799

43i

Government of India, External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations

Department, to Secretary of State

L/P &SI12I1S11 : f 81

most imedi ate new Delhi, jo June 1947, J.15 pm

top secret Received: jo June, 7 pm

5078. Katodon telegrams Nos. 51 and 52.1 (both received here on night of
June 28th).

2. In our telegram No. 5047 dated June 29th2 we reaffirmed the view
expressed on behalf of H.M.G. with the full concurrence of the Government
of India during the 1944-46 conversations with the Afghan Government that
the territory between the Durand Line and the Indus is solely India’s concern.
The historical grounds on which Kabul now claims a special interest in them
would if pushed back far enough chronologically justify India’s claiming
Afghanistan. Such arguments from whichever side they may be pressed only
lead to a reductio ad absurdum. We have to deal with things as they are not as
they were in some less or more distant past. The Afghan proposal to send a
Mission now to discuss the frontier question with us is as much an attempt to
interfere in what is an internal affair of India as other proposals designed to
claim a voice in settlement of this question and we cannot repeat cannot
accept it.

We have always recongnised that both India and Afghanistan are interested
in the welfare and development of the tribes inhabiting their respective zones
of tribal territory. The appropriate time for discussing these common problems
will be after the new Governments of India and Pakistan come into being ; it
is not now.

3. As regards the first alternative mentioned in para. No. 1 of Katodon
telegram No. 52 “independence” in the rense of freedom to people of the
territory in question to join (? Afghanistan) or to separate from both the
Dominions of India and of Pakistan cannot be conceded. The fact that what is
now India is soon to be succeeded by two sovereign Federal States cannot
affect the strategic importance of the territory in question to these two States.
Changes in the political status of India cannot alter geographical factors that
govern her security. A small independent State like the North West Frontier
Province cannot (? possibly) safeguard its own security and therefore must
be a source of weakness to India. It can legitimately claim to exercise the fullest
autonomy within the framework of one of the two Federal Dominions which

1 Nos. 309 and 377.

2 No. 395.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

800

will replace the present Government of India. This measure of self determina¬
tion the plan of 3rd June3 does not exclude.

4. We desire nothing but friendship with Afghanistan; the help that, in
recent years, Government of India have given to the Afghan Government is
proof of the sincerity and measure of that desire. It can be confidently stated
that successors of the present Government will be equally anxious to maintain
and promote amicable neighbourly relations with Afghanistan. But neither
the present Government nor its successors can afford to surrender any vital
interest or right. It is to be hoped that the Afghan Government will be per¬
suaded that, in being firm, we are not being unfriendly, and that, at this
juncture in her history, India is more entitled to expect Afghan goodwill
than Afghan intervention in her internal affairs.

5 . Of the four possibilities mentioned by the Minister, we do not know which
will materialise if the Afghan Government are not satisfied with our answer.
We can only express the hope that in their interest even more than in ours,
(? they will) desist from any course which may disturb the peace of the border.
Once more we would urge the desirability of asking a friendly third party
such as the U.S.A. to put in a word of caution which may serve to deflect
the Afghan Government from the path of rash adventure.

Repeated to Chief Sec. to Govt of the N.W.F.P. and H.M. Minister, Kabul
No. 150) and copies by post to Baluchistan and U.K. High Commissioner.

3 No. 45.

432

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/3/1/153: f 301

immediate new Delhi, 30 June 1947 , 8. jo pm

secret Received: jo June , 7.55 pm

No. 1674-S. My 1657 of 29th June.1 I now understand main point of amend¬
ment is to allow India to declare independence by legislation. It is desirable
that this freedom should be given by the Act.

1 No. 414.

JUNE 1947

80I

433

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &J f 10/81 : ff 136-9

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, JO June 1947, 6.45 pm

secret Received: 1 July, 6.15 am

No. 8360. Your telegrams 1616-S of 27th June1 and 165 5-S and 1656-S of
30th June2 regarding Interim Government were considered by Ministers this
morning.3

2. We find draft announcement in your paragraph 5 difficult to understand
in the details of its operation so that it is impossible to give fully considered
legal Opinion that would have direct application to it. In particular, the posi¬
tion of the Muslim League Members is obscure. It is not clear how they will
have access to information as to what is being done by the Union of India
Members or whether they can initiate policy in respect of their own areas or
only refer to whole Cabinet proposals solely or predominantly affecting
Pakistan to which they object and issue consequential orders giving effect
in Pakistan areas to policy initiated by Union of India Members.

3. Generally, the legal position is, however, as follows. Sections 40 and 41
of the 9th Schedule of the 193 5 Act are in wide terms permitting many varieties
of methods of conducting business. At the same time Section 41 cannot be
openly disregarded. Phrases “overriding powers” and “must be acted upon”
come very near being breach of section. This is particularly awkward if this
part of the formula is publicly announced. Nevertheless, something on the
lines which you contemplate can legally be done provided that repeat provided
that there is general agreement among Members- of your Council that such a
procedure should be followed. In particular, it would be within the Constitu¬
tion.

(a) to double the number of Portfolios and for members to operate in two
Committees representing Hindustan and Pakistan areas, each taking
decisions in respect of their own area ;

(b) even4 for Pakistan Committee to go to Karachi and operate there at
once. (I assume, however, that it is not intended that any form of
Pakistan Government should operate from Karachi till after the appointed
day. Formula in its present form rather suggests Pakistan Members will
go to Karachi at once. It is important to avoid any misunderstanding on
this point.)

1 No. 379.

2 Nos. 412 and. 413.

3 No. 421, Minute 2.

4 ‘(b) even’ deciphered as ‘till (gr. cor)’.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

802

If, however, anything is done except with the full agreement of all the
Members of the Council there is always a possibility that validity of the acts
done may be challenged. Essence of any such arrangement must, therefore,
be that there is agreement on the procedure and that it is adhered to.5 Possibly,
however, there may be some remedy for any acts which are challenged as
being unconstitutional by means of Governor-General’s orders under
clause 9(3) of Indian Independence Bill6 when it becomes law.

4. Arrangements proposed in your draft announcement differ substantially
from what was contemplated in my paper to Cabinet Committee, No. I.B.
(47) 8 8 7 paragraph 3 and limitation of League Members’ rights to bringing
before full Council only matters “solely or predominantly” affecting Pakistan
seems dangerously restricted. It appears that Central subjects will in practice
be almost entirely in hands of Congress under this arrangement. In general,
Jinnah seems to us to make out a strong case; but as indicated above proposals
might be deemed to be constitutionally possible provided all Members of the
Council accept them and abide by them. If it is not too late to propound a
fresh solution, something on lines of the suggestion in penultimate paragraph of
Jinnah’s note8 seems to us preferable course to adopt.

5 . As time will not permit further consultation before Wednesday morning,9
H.M.G. authorise you to deal with this most difficult situation as seems best
to you in light of this telegram but they would hke you to bear in mind that
it is important to be able to continue to maintain that partition is being
carried out by agreement and to avoid giving any grounds for an assertion
that fair partition has been prejudiced by giving to Congress in advance undue
advantage in relation to all Central subjects and particularly defence. Smooth
and quiet passage of bill through Parliament might turn on this.

6. It is desirable that any statement on lines of your paragraph 5 whether in
its present form or in a new shape should be released simultaneously here if
possible. Please therefore give me text and time of release in India as far in
advance as possible.

7. It is proposed to take general line here that these changes are not of the
first importance and are only a convenient re-arrangement of the work of the
Indian Government preparatory to its constitutional conversion which will
occur on the appointed day. I hope that the same line can be taken in India.
Otherwise there may be pressure for a discussion in Parliament before the
Second Reading of the Bill which would inevitably be embarrassing. If,
however, either Congress or League are likely loudly to claim this as a victory
such a line would be difficult and in that event please telegraph before the
formula is released your views as to the line to be taken.

5 ‘is adhered to’ deciphered as ‘adheres’. 6 No. 428. 7 Vol. X, No. 546.

8 No. 413. 9 2 July.

JUNE 1947

803

434

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &J/ 10/124: Jf 257-8

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 30 June 1947, 5-20 pm

secret Received: l July , 6.15 am

8361.1 Your telegram 1657-S.2 Words “this or” were included in Clause
6(2) in previous version of draft Bill but have been excluded from text in
117-13 on the ground that they were inconsistent with the concluding words
of Clause 8(3) which purport to limit the powers of the Dominion legislature
unless other provision is made by Constituent Assembly under Clause 8(1).
I understood that both you and the Indian leaders attached importance to this
limitation and I am advised that restoration of the words “this or” would
make its legal effectiveness doubtful.

2. For these reasons it would seem desirable to avoid reinserting words
“this or” in Clause 6(2) if possible but we do not attach vital importance to
this and if you judge it desirable they may be re-inserted before Bill is shown
to leaders or you can let them know if they raise the subject that we should
be prepared to meet them to this extent. It should of course be clearly under¬
stood by them that power of the Dominion Legislature to amend the new
Act will be in relation to territories of that Dominion only.

3 . Please inform me most immediate whether you have decided to include
these words or not and if not what outcome of consultation with leaders on
this point is.

1 Deciphered as ‘8371’.

2 No. 414.

3 See No. 428.

435

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rhff 53: jf 297-8

17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 30 June , 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 30th June.1 I am grateful to you for your
agreeing to some additional experts and lawyers accompanying us tomorrow
morning. I shall convey your invitation to them.

1 No. 424.

8c>4

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

2. It was not my intention to have a larger party at the Viceroy’s House
tomorrow morning. What I was thinking of was to have the time and oppor¬
tunity to consult my colleagues as well as these experts. You will appreciate
that it is very awkward for us to ignore our colleagues in the Cabinet in a
matter of this kind. I have mentioned to them that Sardar Patel and I had been
invited by you to see the draft Parliamentary legislation. They felt hurt at
being kept out of this business and I feel that they were completely right. As
members of the Cabinet it concerns them much more than others and we have
to consult them at every stage. I feel, therefore, that it is very necessary for us
to take them into our confidence in regard to this bill. I realise fully the import¬
ance of secrecy in this matter and that there should be no leakage of the contents
of the Bill. We shall make every effort to prevent a leakage. I suggest that you
should allow us to have a copy of the Bill so that we may show it to our
colleagues in the Cabinet. That copy will be kept by me and it will not go
out of my possession. Without the draft Bill it is difficult to get any proper
idea of it or to consider it carefully.

3. I do not know if Mr Gandhi will be able to come tomorrow at 10 in the
morning as that is a very inconvenient time for him.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

436

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Attlee ( via India Office )

Telegram , Rffij 1/133: f 299

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 30 June 1947, 11 pm

confidential Received: 30 June , 8.43 pm

No. 1675-S. Following for Prime Minister. Krishna Menon came this evening
to warn me that Nehru intended to come with an ultimatum tomorrow that
unless he was allowed to take away copy of Bill he would resign. Since then I
have received letter1 from Nehru insisting that he must have copy to show
colleagues in the Cabinet. Nehru is in very difficult state and maintains that
it is gross insult to his people not to be allowed a copy of the Bill at this historic
moment &c. He promises that if I will let him take away one copy of the Bill
he will not let it go out of his possession and will make every effort to prevent
leakage.

2. May I have your authority to use my discretion to avert a crisis? You can
rely on me not to give anything away unnecessarily, but it would be tragic
if Congress at this stage were to refuse to cooperate.

1 No. 435.

JUNE I947

805

437

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl of Li stow el

Telegram, R/jj 1 / 160: jf 52-3

immediate new Delhi, jo June 1947, 11.45 pm

secret Received: i July, 12.5 am

No. 1677-S. My 1655-S and 1656-S1 forwarding Jinnah’s memorandum of
legal objection, of the 29th June.

2. Jinnah told Ismay on 29th2 that even if the Plan for the reconstitution of
the Centre was held to be legal he would not accept it. Liaquat Ali Khan said
that he himself could not possibly play second fiddle in the Finance Department
after having had charge of it for so long. At the end of the discussion Ismay was
not completely convinced that when it came to the point Jinnah would refuse
to play.

3. I have considered whether we could not postpone the reconstitution of
the Central government, which on the merits is the obvious thing to do.
Patel would probably accept this, but Nehru, who is in a highly tempera¬
mental state, would very probably resign.

4. On the assumption that because of Nehru’s attitude I must go ahead I
have considered what Jinnah could3 do if he decided to withdraw the League
members and oppose the new move. Provided it is clear to him that the date
of 15th August is firm I think he is bound to take part in the Partition Council
and try to get the maximum assistance in setting up his new Government.
Otherwise Pakistan will have a very bad start.

5. Jinnah might refuse to let the Pakistan Constituent Assembly meet,4
and there would then be no authority to which to transfer power under the
Bill.

6. I do not see, however, where any such obstruction would lead Jinnah,
and I do not think he would adopt this policy.

7. Since he probably wants to put off the 15 th August date, and to embarrass
the Congress as much as possible, he is likely to be more dangerous on the
Westminster front. If he could persuade the Opposition that he was having a
raw deal I suppose the Bill would not go through this Session. I need not tell
you that in that event we would be in an absolutely irretrievable mess.

8. To avoid Nehru’s resignation which would undoubtedly be followed by

1 Nos. 412 and 413.

2 No. 399, Item 1. The interview actually took place on 28 June but Lord Ismay s note is dated
29 June.

3 ‘could’ deciphered as ‘would’.

4 ‘Pakistan Constituent Assembly meet’ deciphered as ‘Liaquat Ali Khan (sic) Constituent Assembly
meeting’.

8o6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

the other Congress members I may have to go ahead since the plan is unques¬
tionably perfectly fair to the future Pakistan interests, even if it does hurt
Jinnah’s pride.

9. In this case I suggest that it would be wise to keep the Opposition fully
in touch with these latest moves so that they may have material on which to
judge any approach from Jinnah.

438

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &J/io[i24: jf 245-6

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 30 June I947 , 8.20 pm

top secret Received: 1 July , 6.15 am

\

8380. Your telegram 1653-S1 was considered by Cabinet Committee this
morning.2 As an exceptional case we have secured concurrence of Opposition
leaders to Bill being shown in draft to Indian leaders and we therefore agree
with what you propose in paragraphs 1 and 3 of your telegram under reference
and para. 1 of your telegram 163 8-S of 28 June.3 You will no doubt emphasise
importance of secrecy at the time.

2. Committee were strongly of the view that it must be made clear to the
Indian leaders that this is the Bill which it is the intention of H.M.G. to intro¬
duce and that in view of the shortage of time due to the fact that we are
undertaking legislation at extremely short notice to meet the wishes of Indian
leaders we cannot consider drafting points. If there are points of principle on
which Indian leaders wish to make representations H.M.G. will consider them
to the best of their ability in the time now available.4

3. Your paragraph 5. 1 suggest that this point can be countered by pointing
out that Dominion legislation in question was passed by much more leisurely
processes and in the case of Australia and South Africa gave effect to new
constitutions made by agreement. Present legislation is of transitional nature and
provides for full power for the Legislature of each new Dominion to legislate
at will in the constitutional field.

JUNE I947

807

4. Argument on this point will however be affected by the manner in
which you decide to handle the question of the inclusion of the words “this or”
in Clause 6 (2) 5 If those words are inserted line proposed gives a complete
answer to Nehru.

5. It is of course impossible to prevent it being known in India that you are
consulting Indian leadeis on the Bill, but it is desirable to avoid if possible any
formal communique of kind suggested in para. 2 of your telegram of 28th
June.

6. Any views they express to you on the Bill should be kept as secret as
provisions of the Bill itself. It would be most unfortunate if Indian reactions
to the Bill began to appear before it has been published.

7. I am telegraphing privately some account of our discussion with Opposi¬
tion, but you are now free to show Bill to Indian leaders.

1 No. 411.

2 No. 421, Minute 3.

3 See No. 397, note 3.

4 Lord Mountbatten noted on this telegram in the margin by para. 2: ‘Paraphrase read over to

Nehru’. R/3/1/153: f 302.

5 See Nos. 414 and 434.

439

Mr Attlee to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

(via India Office)

Telegram, LlPOl6ji22: f 166

most immediate India office, l July 1947, 1.33 am

top secret Received: 1 July, 8.30 am

8393. Personal from Prime Minister to Viceroy. Your telegram 1675-S.1

I agree that you may use your discretion in allowing Nehru to take away
copy of Bill.

You will appreciate desirability of giving Jinnah similar facilities.

1 No. 436.

8o8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

440

The Earl oj Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma 1

Telegram, L/PO/6li22: f 162

most immediate india office, i July ig47, 2.25 am

private Received: 1 July, 8.50 am

74. Your private telegram 1600-S.2 Proviso to Clause 5(1). I cannot yet give
you final answer on this since His Majesty’s pleasure has to be taken and there
has not yet been time to do so. Our provisional views are however as follows.
We should have no objection to proviso being re-drafted as follows:

Begins: Provided that unless and until provision to the contrary is made by
law of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions, the same person may
be Governor-General of both the new Dominions. Ends.

2. It might however be better to try out proviso as it now stands. It may
conceivably be more acceptable to leaders in this form since it obviates the
necessity for them to offer advice to the Crown that you should remain as
Governor-General which they might find embarrassing though I appreciate
that if they offer such advice your position would be fortified.

3. If nevertheless you feel that proviso you recommend, redrafted as above,
is definitely preferable you might hint that you would be willing to suggest
modification in this sense for consideration of H.M.G., but if you take this
course you must not commit yourself too far in view of fact that H.M.’s
pleasure is not yet known.3

1 Lord Listowel, in minute 104/47 of 30 June 1947 to Mr Attlee, referred to No. 374 and suggested
that, pending receipt of the King’s pleasure in the matter, it would be helpful to give Lord Mount-
batten some provisional indication of H.M.G.’s views. Fie therefore attached the draft of this telegram
which Mr Attlee approved the same day. L/P &J/10/124: ff 232-3.

2 No. 366.

3 In tel. 76 of 1 July Lord Listowel informed Lord Mountbatten that the draft proviso in para. 1 above
was acceptable to the King. Lord Listowel wished to know most immediately whether this form
should appear in the draft Bill. In tel. 1686-S of 2 July Sir G. Abell informed Mr Harris that the
Viceroy was unwilling to accept the text of the proviso until he knew whether Mr Jinnah would
invite him to be Governor-General. Mr Jinnah was being asked to give his reply immediately. In
tel. 1693-S of 2 July Lord Mountbatten informed Lord Listowel that he accepted the text of the
redraft. L/P &J/10/124: f 230 and Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Indian
Independence Bill — Draft Bill, Part H(a).

JULY 1947

809

441

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma1

Telegram , L/PO/6/i22:/ 169

immediate India office, i July 1947, 2. jo am

private Received: l July , 8.30 am

75. Discussion with Opposition leaders from both Houses took place this
afternoon.2 * * * In general their attitude was helpful and the Bill was on the whole
well received. There was however, not unnaturally, a general undercurrent of
anxiety though this did not crystallise in any form of counter proposals. Only
two points appeared likely to give rise to any considerable criticism. These
were:

(a) Use of title India for Hindustan. There was a certain uneasiness about this
based on a feeling that it would antagonise the Muslims and was not
justified on merits. There was moreover a feeling that “Union of India”
should be kept for any organisation wider than either Dominion which
may develop.

(b) Strong feeling was expressed by Conservatives against the title “Indepen¬
dence Bill” and we were pressed to agree to “Indian (Self Government)
Bill” and to substitute “two self governing Dominions” for “two
independent Dominions” in the long title and in Clause 1. We put all
the arguments and finally pointed out that time factor made it impossible
to alter Bill on this point before it was shown to Indians. Opposition to
this title was not withdrawn but we are not disposed to alter it.

2. There wras general feeling that it would be suitable to have a preamble to
the Bill, but proposal was not pressed in view of difficulty of finding a form of
words which would command general assent.

1 Lord Listowel had submitted the draft of this telegram to Mr Attlee who approved it on 30 June.

L/P &J/I0/I24: 226-7.

2 i.e. 30 June. For the Opposition leaders invited to this Meeting see No. 375. On the Government

side, in addition to Mr Attlee, the Earl of Listowel was presumably present, and Sir S. Cripps and

Viscount Addison were also invited. It is not known whether any other Ministers attended. Mr

Rowlatt was among the officials who were present. L/P &J/10/124: ft 285-7.

8io

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

442

Report of Mr Gandhi's remarks on 30 June 1947
Public Record Office. CAB 127/109

GOVT OF INDIA, NEW DELHI, 1 July I947

Mr Gandhi in an after prayer speech on 30th June, said that the question of a
referendum in the Frontier Province just now looms large in the public eye
because it has been and still is officially a Congress province. Khan Abdul
Ghaffar Khan and his co-workers do not relish being asked to choose between
Hindustan or Pakistan bearing respectively an unjust meaning for the Hindus or
the Muslims. How is Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan to get over the difficulty?
Congress has pledged its word that there should be a referendum in consulta¬
tion with Doctor Khan Sahib but under the Viceroy’s direct supervision. So it is
going to take place at the appointed time. The Khudai Kidmatgars (Red Shirts)
will not exercise their vote thus providing a walk over for the Muslim League
and at the same time doing no violence to their conscience. Is there in this
procedure any breach of the terms of the referendum ? The Khudai Kidmatgars,
who bravely fought the British, are not men who shirk defeat at the polls.

Referring to the charge of a new cry for Pathanistan made against Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan Mr Gandhi said, “even before the Congress Ministry
came into being so far as I know Khan Ghaffar Khan had on his brain Pathan
independence in internal affairs. He does not want to create an additional state.
If he can frame his own local constitution he will gladly make his choice of one
state or the other.”

Mr Gandhi also referred to the allegation that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan
was playing into the hands of Afghanistan and said that he considered Ghaffar
Khan incapable of any underhand dealing. The Frontier Leader would not
allow the Frontier to be absorbed by Afghanistan.

443

Cabinet C.M.(47)$8th Conclusions, Minutes 2 and 6

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.W.i, on 1 July 1947
at 11 am were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Herbert Morrison , Mr Arthur Green¬
wood, Mr Hugh Dalton, Sir S. Cripps, Viscount Jowitt, Mr J. ChuterEde, Viscount
Addison, Mr J. Westwood, Mr A. Creech Jones, the Earl of Listowel, Mr G. A.
Isaacs, Mr E. Shinwell, Mr T. Williams, Mr George Tomlinson
Also present during discussion of Items 2 and 6 were: Mr John Strachey, Mr Hector
McNeil (Item 2 only)

JULY 1947

8ll

Minute 2
Rfeolilu: f 36
DOMINIONS OFFICE
Change of Title

the prime minister said that it was proposed that the titles of the Secretary
of State for Dominion Affairs and the Dominions Office should be changed to
the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations” and ‘‘the Common¬
wealth Relations Office respectively. This proposal had been warmly wel¬
comed by the Dominion Governments,1 and the new titles would also be
more acceptable to the Indian Governments after the transfer of power. The
changes would be announced in Parliament immediately.

The Cabinet —

Took note, with approval, of the Prime Minister’s statement.

Minute 6

L/P &JI10I124: f 224

INDIA

Constitutional Changes

(Previous Reference: C.M. (47) 57th Conclusions, Minute \)2
the prime minister informed the Cabinet that he had now discussed the
terms of the draft Indian Independence Bill with the Opposition leaders.3 The
only criticism of substance which they had made related to the title of the Bill,
which, in their view, suggested that the Indian successor States were being
granted independence outside the British Commonwealth.

In discussion there was general agreement that there were no grounds for
modifying the proposed title of the Bill, which would be acceptable both to the
existing Dominions and to Indian opinion, as indicating and confirming the
real nature of Dominion status. It was felt, however, that special pains ought to
be taken to explain the implications of the title, and, since not less than a week
would have to elapse between the publication of the Bill and its Second Reading
in the House of Commons, it was suggested that it would be advisable for the
Prime Minister to hold a Press Conference immediately before the publication
of the Bill, at which he could explain fully its purpose and meaning.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS Said that it Was
desirable that the Bill should reach the House of Lords as soon as possible and,
in any event, not later than the last week in July.

The Cabinet —

(1) Took note that the Prime Minister would hold a Press Conference on
the Indian Independence Bill on the day of its publication ;

1 See No. 313 and its note 2.

2 No. 361.

3 See No. 441.

812

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(2) Invited the Lord President of the Council and the Secretary of State
for Dominion Affairs to consider what arrangements might be made
to enable the Bill to reach the House of Lords as soon as possible.

444

Mr Attlee to Mr Churchill 1
Public Record Office. PREM 8 1 541 Part 11

1 July 1947

My dear Churchill,

I have discussed our proposed Indian legislation with Eden and other of your
colleagues.

I am not sure when we shall have the Second Reading of the Bill, but I fear
that it will not be possible to hold it up until you return2 as I should have wished
to do, had time permitted. We must allow time for the House of Lords and this
limits the possibilities.

I hope that you continue to make good progress.

Yours sincerely,

C . R . A .

1 The draft of this letter is in Mr Attlee’s own hand. R/30/1/11: ff 39-40.

2 Mr Churchill was recuperating after an operation for hernia.

445

Mr Churchill to Mr Attlee
Public Record Office. PREM 8/541 Part 11

28 HYDE PARK GATE, LONDON, S.W.7, 1 July I947
My dear Prune Minister,

I am much concerned to hear from my colleagues whom you consulted yester¬
day that you propose to call the India Bill, “The Indian Independence Bill”.
This, I am assured, is entirely contrary to the text, which corresponds to what
we have previously been told were your intentions. The essence of the Mount-
batten proposals and the only reason why I gave support to them is because
they establish the phase of Dominion status. Dominion status is not the same as
Independence, although it may be freely used to establish independence. It is

JULY 1947

813

not true that a community is independent when its Ministers have in fact taken
the Oath of Allegiance to The King. This is a measure of grave constitutional
importance and a correct and formal procedure and nomenclature should be
observed. The correct title would be, it seems to me, “The Indian Dominions
Bill . I should however be quite willing to support it if it were called, “The
India Bill, 1947 or ' The India Self-Government Bill”.

I am glad to hear you are considering such alterations.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

446

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma and

Sardar Panikkar

Viceroy's Interview No. 155. 1 R/j/i 1 138: f 15

1 July ig47

sardar panikkar spoke of the detrimental effect from the States’ point of
view of the lapse of paramountcy. He said the States had not appreciated how
many agreements there were which were advantageous to the States and the
lapse of which would be extremely inconvenient. He gave as an example the
rights in water from the Punjab enjoyed by Bikaner and he asked how such
agreements could be terminated at six months’ notice, as was proposed in the
draft standstill agreement which had been circulated.2 He suggested that when
negotiations were begun about the standstill agreements an attempt should be
made to classify the existing agreements into :

(a) those which might be on a six months’ notice basis, e.g. agreements
about opium and salt;

(b) those which were of a more permanent nature, e.g. about railways,
Post Offices, telegraphs, water rights, for which there should be a two
years standstill agreement and no notice.

h . e . agreed that this was a matter which should certainly be considered when
the discussions began on the standstill agreements.

sardar panikkar also mentioned the embarrassment that would be
caused to the States by disputed succession cases. He hoped some arrangement
would be made for a Committee of Privileges to which such disputes could be
referred.

1 Interview number taken from Mountbatten Papers.

2 See Enclosure to No. 198.

814

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

h . e . agreed that this matter ought to be considered by the States and he said
he would see what could be done.

Finally, sardar panikkar mentioned H.FL’s desire that he should con¬
tinue to be eligible for honours and H.E. said that this was permissible and that
the Congress had no objection to it.3

3 On i July Sir G. Abell sent a copy of this interview to Sir C. Corfield. Replying on 5 July the latter
sought (and the following day received) Lord Mountbatten’s agreement to send a copy of the first
part of the interview on the draft standstill agreement to the States Department ‘who are taking
charge of the negotiations with the States in this matter’. As regards disputed successions, Sir C.
Corfield drew attention to a Model Succession Act which had been drawn up and sent to all States.
He also stated that on 4 July he had discussed with Sardar Patel the question of setting up a Com¬
mittee of Privileges, that obviously no such body could be set up by the Crown, and that it had been
agreed that Mr Menon should consider including this matter in the agenda for the forthcoming
discussions with the States. Subsequent notes by Sir G. Abell dated 17 and 22 July show that, because
of its delicacy, the subject was not put on the agenda, but that it was intended to discuss it informally
during the Conference. R/3/1/138: ff 14, 73, 82, 160, 187.

447

Mr Attlee to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma ( via India Office )

Telegram , LjPOl6lii2: ff 31-2

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 1 July 1947, 2.13pm

secret Received: 1 July, 9.30 pm

No. 8402. Following for Viceroy from Prime Minister. Your telegram 1677-S
of 1st July1 to Secretary of State. Jinnah’s attitude on proposed new set-up of
Interim Government. You will see from Secretary of State's telegram 8360 of
30th June2 that I and my colleagues do not share the view you express in
paragraph 8 of your telegram under reference that formula in paragraph 5 of
of your telegram 1616-S of 27th June3 (so far as we understand it) is perfectly
fair to future Pakistan interests and further that it is clear that it cannot be
brought within framework of existing constitution unless Jinnah and Muslim
Members of Cabinet accept it. Accordingly it cannot be forced down his
throat.

If you find it absolutely essential to reach some decision on Wednesday4
H.M.G. will support you, but unless you can secure agreement of both sides to
some plan, dangers set out in your telegram 1677-S are so great that you should,
if possible, secure a little more time in which to seek a fresh solution. A new
open split at this stage between Congress and League will certainly endanger
chance of getting any bill through Parliament this session.

1 No. 437 sent late on 30 June. 2 No. 433. 3 No. 379. 4 2 July.

JULY 1947

815

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, Rffilijrfotf 63

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 1 July 1947, 6.4O pill

SECRET

PRIVATE

No. 168 i-S. Your 8360. 1 There is still a very slight hope that I may be able to
persuade Nehru not to insist on reconstitution of Interim Government.

2. It might be very useful to me to be able to show Nehru a self-contained
telegram expressing your doubts, as indicated in your 8360, about legality of
procedure proposed, and risk of validity being challenged in the courts. Please
send such a telegram.

1 No. 433.

449

Sir S. Cripps to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma ( via India Office )

Telegram, L/POl6[ii2: jf 29-30

MOST IMMEDIATE 1 July 194J, 6.10 pm

private Received: 2 July, 4 am

No. 78. Following personal from Sir Stafford Cripps. Begins: Following is
message from me to Nehru.1 Begins: I have not worried you with any letters
because I know how desperately busy you must be with all the changes that are
taking place but I want now to ask you to help us in getting through the
necessary legislation before the beginning of August. You will realise that we
can only do this on the basis of an agreement here with the Opposition to
facilitate the passage of the Bill. This depends very largely upon the con¬
tinuance of agreement in India upon all the major steps that are taken. This
applies particularly as regards the question of the interim form of Government

1 In tel. 77 of 1 July Sir S. Cripps told Lord Mountbatten that he was sending this message for Pandit
Nehru in case it might be of assistance. He left it entirely to Lord Mountbatten to decide whether it
would be helpful to deliver it or not. L/PO/6/112: f 28.

In tel. 173 i-S of 3 July Lord Mountbatten thanked Sir S. Cripps. He said that as he had shifted his
ground after consideration of the legal position he thought now that it would be a tactical mistake to
use his message to Nehru. Nonetheless he was most grateful for what might have been a very
valuable help. R/3/1/160: ff 67, 77.

8i6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

up till August 15 th next. If there were to be a major dispute upon this it would
most seriously jeopardise our chance of getting the legislation through in time.

I understand that there is a strong difference of opinion as to the steps if any
which should be taken to reconstitute the present Indian Government for the
short period that will elapse before the coming into force of the new legislation.
I am sure that you will realise our difficulties especially in view of all that the
Viceroy and the Government here have done to meet you and to facilitate your
most difficult task and that is why I make the strongest personal appeal to you to
help us at this critical moment.

It seems to me that as you will be realising your independence on August 15 th
if all goes well it is hardly worth while to jeopardise that date by insistence
upon a particular form of interim Government for the intervening few weeks.

Would it not be possible for you to leave matters as they are for the present
and until the major change is made. This would certainly be most helpful to us
in our task here. If this cannot be done for some reason which I do not at the
moment appreciate then is it not possible to arrive at some method of sharing
power with the Muslim League which will enable them to retain at least the
appearance of effective administrative control over some of the portfolios. It
does not seem quite fair that in this interim period all the portfolios should pass
to your Party in view of what is to happen immediately afterwards. We have
got so far together along the road we have both been seeking out that I hope
you will feel able to give us your help to complete the final stages of the journey
smoothly and safely.

You know how passionately I wish for the independence of India and how I
and others at this end have worked for it. It would indeed be tragic if some
incident were now to make it impossible for us to complete the final stages by
the time fixed. Please do all you can to help.

When you see Vallabhbhai will you pass on a message from me to him in the
above sense.

I send you all my very best wishes and Godspeed in your difficult and trying
times and when August 15 th comes and with it Indian Independence I shall
indeed have a song in my heart. Stafford. Ends.

JULY 1947

817

450

Mr Vellodi to Pandit Nehru
Telegram , R/jj 1/138: f 18

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL HIGH COMMISSION FOR INDIA,

London, 1 July 1947 , 6.50 pm
Received: 2 July , 6.30 am

No. 1016. Personal for Pandit Nehru from Vellodi. Begins: Life appears to be
just one damned thing after another. There are signs that agents for Indian
States are at present very active in London. Very shrewd propaganda being
carried on with help of Walter Elliot, Tweedsmuir and others. Understand that
money being freely spent in influencing people in key positions in British press
with object to misleading British public in regard to question of States Indepen¬
dence. Times Leader writer1 very much under influence of these men and has
done a great deal to compare [? confuse] issues involved. Some counter
propaganda appears necessary. Though how and on what lines does not seem
very clear. Would appreciate your guidance. Ends.

1 In the course of a leader on 2 July entitled ‘The Congress Party and the Plan’, The Times said ‘ . full
allowance should be made for the difficult position in which many of the Indian States now find
themselves. A statesmanlike generosity will not only be appropriate to the strength of the position
the Congress Party occupies but will prove the one means of fostering the spirit of amicable co¬
operation through which its declared ideal of a united India may ultimately draw the two Domin¬
ions together.’

451

Sir A. Carter to Lord Ismay
Telegram, MSS. EUR. D 714/81

immediate India office, l July 1947, 7 pm

top secret Received: 2 July, 4 am

No. 8413. His Excellency may like to know that announcement text of which is
given in my immediately following telegram will be made in Parliament
tomorrow Wednesday 2nd July regarding the new title for Dominions
Secretary of State and Dominions Office.1 Announcement should not be

1 See No. 443, Minute 2. In tel. 8414 of 1 July Lord Listowel sent Lord Mountbatten the text of the
announcement which stated that the titles ‘Secretary of State for the Dominions and Dominions
Office’ were to be changed to ‘Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations’ and ‘Commonwealth
Relations Office’ respectively. MSS. EUR. D 714/81.

8 1 8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

released in India from any Government source. It will reach India through
ordinary channels.

One of the reasons for the change thus announced is to pave the way for a
different set-up for the Secretary of State for India and the India Office but
present intention is to say nothing about this in Parliament.

Final Ministerial decisions have not yet been taken about new India Office
set-up though presumably they will have to be announced not later than second
reading of the bill.

452

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/^/ 1/154: ff 2-4

SECRET NEW DELHI, 1 July 1947, 11-55 Pm

most immediate Received: 2 July , 2 am

No. 1684-S. Congress and League leaders met today and I gave them copies of
Bill. Both parties were seated in separate rooms. Preliminary reaction of
Jinnah is very favourable and detailed discussion will take place tomorrow.
Congress raised three points in today’s discussion with my Advisers.

2. The first point was the re-insertion of the words “this or” in Clause 6(2).
Despite inconsistency pointed out by you in your telegram 83 711 Congress
leaders and their legal advisers insist on re-insertion of these words. Since
inconsistency is not likely to be of practical importance I have decided that the
words should be re-inserted.

3. The second point was that Clause 8(1) might be held not to empower
Constituent Assembly to include in fundamental laws of the Dominion pro¬
vision for accession to and consequent inclusion in the Dominion of Indian
States and for manner in which fundamental laws of the Dominion would
apply in respect of Indian States subsequently included therein. They referred in
this connection to sub-clause (1) of clause 2 and suggested that reference to any
area in sub-clause (3) thereof might be taken to embrace only areas included in
territories distnbuted between India and Pakistan by sub-clauses (1) and (2).

4. The third point, as I had already warned you,2 was about clause 7(1) (b).
Congress leaders expressed themselves very strongly that complete wiping out
of all treaties and agreements with States proposed in this clause would produce

JULY 1947

819

administrative chaos of gravest kind. Railway agreements, customs agreements,
agreements regarding harbours, irrigation agreements would all disappear and
very existence of States like Benares and Mysore which rest on instruments of
transfer from Crown would be without legal basis. They pointed out that
paragraph 4 of Memorandum of May 12th 19463 contemplated standstill
agreements in matters of common concern until conclusion of new agreements
but that bringing forward date of lapse of paramountcy from June 1948 to
August 1947 made it much more difficult to conclude such agreements.
Individual negotiation of new agreements some of them multipartite with a
large number of States would necessarily be a long and laborious task. They
therefore suggested that a standstill clause should be included in Bill itself. The
effect of the provision which would be in the nature of a proviso to paragraphs
(b) and (c) of Clause 7(1) should be to the effect that until new agreements are
concluded existing relations and arrangements between the Crown and an
Indian Ruler or Tribal Chief in all matters of common concern shall continue
as between the appropriate successor authority or authorities and the Ruler or
Chief concerned. It was strongly urged that such a provision would be in
accordance with spirit of Memorandum of May 12th and would obviate
immediate necessity for individual standstill agreements. It was pointed out that
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Clause 7(1) as drafted put an end as from appointed day
to treaties and agreements in force on date of passing of Act so that agreements
concluded between those two dates, though during Crown’s paramountcy,
would not lapse. Possibly intention of draft is that standstill agreement should
be negotiated during this period with the help of HMG and Crown Represen¬
tative as mentioned at end of paragraph 4 of Memorandum of May 12th. It was
argued that if HMG was prepared to lend such assistance easiest way of doing
so would be to insert standstill provision on lines indicated above in Bill itself.
Congress leaders and their advisers attach greatest importance to this matter.

5. Arising incidentally out of last point it was suggested that a paragraph
should be inserted in Clause 9(1) for enabling agreements to be entered into and
other acts done on behalf of either or both of the new Dominions before the
appointed day: c.f. clause 8(2)(d) of original version of Bill dated June 13 th.4
It was thought that such a provision would be useful for concluding before
August 15th standstill agreements with States which are willing.

Above are impressions gained by my staff. Objections have not yet been
formally communicated. Please be ready with your reply to the points in
paras. 4 and 5. I shall send considered views tomorrow on objections actually
raised then.

1 No. 434.

2 No. 365, para. 5.

3 Vol. VII, No. 262.

4 No. 191 ; cf. No. 428, Clause 9(f) in italics.

820

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

453

Secretary of State to H.M. Minister at Kabul

Telegram, L jP &S / 12/ 181 1 : jf 73-3

immediate India office, i July 1947, has pm

No. 56. Correspondence ending with G. of I. telegram 30th June 5078. 1 Future
of North-West Frontier Province.

2. Subject to views of Government of India, H.M.G. are disposed to return
reply to Afghan Minister’s Note (Forminka 52)* to following effect on their
own behalf, and trust that Government of India will agree to reply in similar
terms being returned to Afghan Foreign Minister in Kabul as representing
views of both Governments. H.M.G. are anxious, if possible, to make this reply
before referendum in North-W est Frontier Province begins on 6th July. The
matter is therefore very urgent.

3 . (a) H.M.G. have given full and sympathetic consideration to the represen¬
tations made by the Afghan Minister. They are bound to point out, however,
that these representations relate to an area which forms an integral part of India
and is recognised as such by the Afghan Government in the Anglo-Afghan
Treaty of 1921.

(b) The statement of policy in regard to India made by H.M.G. on 3rd June3
was issued with the assent of the leaders of the principal political parties in
India and has since been endorsed by responsible Indian opinion. This declaration
sets out the procedure which it has been decided after full consultation with all
interests concerned to adopt in order to bring about the transfer of power in
India in orderly fashion from British to Indian hands and to fulfil H.M.G.’s
pledges to the Indian people.

(c) While therefore H.M.G. readily appreciate the friendly interest which the
Afghan Government naturally feel in the future constitutional structure of the
territories on their southern frontier and the feelings of kinship arising from
ties of blood and religious affinity which the Afghan people share with many
of the inhabitants of those territories, they cannot admit the right of any foreign
government to intervene in matters which are the sole concern of the inhabi-
tants of the territories in question.

(d) Indeed H.M.G. would regard as incompatible with the undertakings
exchanged by the British and Afghan Governments in Article 1 of the Treaty of
1921 (by which they mutually “certify and respect each with regard to the other
all rights of internal and external independence”) any attempt by the Afghan
Government to intervene in the internal affairs of any territory situated on the
Indian side of the Anglo-Afghan frontier mutually accepted by the two con-

JULY I947

821

tracting parties in Article II of the Treaty and as defined in the map attached
thereto.

4. As regards the specific enquiries which the Afghan Foreign Minister has
made in Kabul, H.M.G. suggest that, if the Government of India agree, you
should explain, on behalf of both Governments, that the arrangements con¬
templated in the statement of 3rd June are there expressed in general terms and
will require to be elaborated in due course by further announcements which will
be made from time to time by the Governor-General. You might add state¬
ment on the lines of para. 4 of G. of I. telegram 50474 coupled with the warnings
as to future consequences contained in last three sentences of para. 5 of that
telegram.

5. H.M.G. would appreciate an urgent expression of the Government of
India’s views on above suggestions. They are themselves considering urgently
valuable suggestion that U.S. Government might be asked to put in word of
caution.5

Repeated to Government of India, External Affairs and Commonwealth
Relations Department, No. 8419.

1 No. 431.

2 No. 272.

3 No. 45.

4 No. 395.

5 This reply was approved by Mr Attlee who was also shown Nos. 395 and 431. Mr Attlee had seen
Nos. 309 and 377 and had indicated a wish to be kept informed. L/P &S/12/1811 : f 77.

In tel. 5139 of 2 July the G. of I., External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Dept informed the
S. of S. that the G. of I. concurred in the terms of the proposed reply to the Afghan Foreign Minister.
In tel. 57 of 3 July the S. of S. notified Sir G. Squire that the agreed answer would be handed to the
Afghan Minister in London on 4 or 5 July. Squire was to reply in similar terms to the Afghan
Government. An account of the interview in the Foreign Office on 4 July with the Afghan Chargd
d’ Affaires was sent to Squire in tel. 60 of 7 July. Ibid.: ff 63-5, 67.

454

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram, L/P &J/ 10/81: ff 149~5°

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 2 ftlly 1947, 12. JO am

secret Received: 2 July , 6.jo am

8453. I have taken legal advice as to the constitutional validity of the arrange¬
ments proposed in the draft announcement regarding the Interim Government
which you have had under discussion with Indian leaders.1

1 See No. 448 for the background to this telegram.

822

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

2. I am advised that generally the legal position is that Sections 40 and 41 of
the 9th Schedule of the 1935 Act are in wide terms and would permit many
varieties of methods of conducting business. At the same time Section 41 cannot
be openly disregarded. The phrases “overriding powers” and “must be acted
upon” come very near being a breach of the Section. Nevertheless something
on the lines which you contemplate can legally be done provided that repeat
provided that there is general agreement among members of your Council
that such a procedure should be followed. If, however, anything is done except
with full agreement of all the members of the Council there is always the
possibility that validity of the acts done may be challenged. Essence of any such
arrangement must therefore be that all members of Council accept your pro¬
posals and agree to abide by them.2

2 Mr Attlee was shown and approved the issue of this telegram.

455

The Nawab of Mamdot to Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab)1

R/j/ 1/176: jf 224-6

MAMDOT VILLA, DAVIS ROAD, LAHORE, 2 July 1Q47

Received: 2 July , 11.30 am

My dear Sir Evan,

It is already too well known to Your Excellency that as a result of the joint
efforts by the Muslim and non-Muslim leaders an appeal for peace2 was made
to the people of the Punjab calling upon them to stop internecine hostilities
immediately, since definite decision had been taken that India was to be
divided into Pakistan and Hindustan. The result of the peace appeal has been
most salutary and remarkable. During the last few days there has been a
marked decrease in cases of arson, stabbing and bomb-throwing. You, no
doubt, know that I, on behalf of the Muslim League, undertook full responsi¬
bility for safeguarding the life and property of non-Muslims and gave assurance
that so far as Muslims were concerned, they would preserve peace and would do
their utmost to restore law and order. After the peace appeal many of my
colleagues and I myself have gone round the city of Lahore and have exhorted
the people fully to respect the pledge which I had given on their behalf.

2. After all this, it was most astounding and shocking for me to learn that a
72-hour curfew had been clamped down on the Muslim abadi of Misri Shah,
where for a long while there has been no communal incidents of any kind. I
understand that a huge Military and Police force has been collected there in

JULY 1947

823

order to carry out intensive searches in the locality. You will remember that I
protested to you yesterday and today3 against this unwarranted attack upon a
peaceful and law abiding Muslim locality.

3 . Throughout the recent riots in Lahore the remarkable thing has been that
provocation has always come from the side of the non-Muslims. It has been the
Hindus and Sikhs who have taken the initiative in starting the trouble. The
Muslims have never been the aggressors, and have only tried to defend them¬
selves against bombs, firearms and hand-grenades. In the peaceful atmosphere
created by our peace appeal, when the Muslims were doing their best to create
an atmosphere of amity and concord, it is ununderstandable why punitive and
repressive measures should be started against the Mussalmans of Lahore. Not
only rigorous and merciless curfew is being imposed on Muslim mohallas and
abadis without any warning and without any previous provision for their food,
sanitation, and drinking water, but large scale arrests continue to be made of
Muslims all over the city. All this is happening when it is well known that it is
not the Muslims who are the aggressors. I have no doubt that it is not a secret
for you that very high people among the Hindus and Sikhs are seriously
involved in the conspiracy which had led to the orgy of bomb-throwing and
bloodshed in Lahore and other cities of the Punjab. According to my informa¬
tion, there is proof that the recent raids on Rajgarh, Singhpura and Sabzi Mandi
in Lahore City, and Rasulpura and Bohl villages in the Amiitsar district, and the
atrocities in Gurgaon district were the result of premeditated and well-organ¬
ised plans. In spite of this it is not the non-Muslims but the Muslims who are
being crushed by the repressive and oppressive machinery of your administra¬
tion. I understand that a Special Staff has been brought into existence under the
immediate supervision of the D.I.G. (CID) in the Mental Hospital Lahore. In
this Special Staff there is a huge preponderance of non-Muslim personnel, who
are, according to my information, using the cruellest methods of torture to
extort false statements from the Mussalmans who are arrested and taken there.

4. I have already protested before you that the action which has been taken
by the administration after our peace appeal is calculated to disturb the peaceful
atmosphere which we were trying to build and will lead to distrust among the
Muslim public against their leadership. It is noteworthy that no searches have
so far taken place in those localities where explosives, hand-grenades and

1 Earlier on 2 July the Nawab of Mamdot had written to Mr Abbott saying that as he was not feeling
well he would not be able to attend the meeting arranged for that morning. R/ 3/1/176: f 223.

2 On 24 June, after a four hour meeting at Mamdot Villa, the leaders of the three main political parties
in the Punjab — the Khan of Mamdot, Mr Bhimsen Sachar and Sardar Swaran Singh — issued an
appeal for peace to the three communities. This was to be followed up by joint efforts to combat
lawlessness which were to take the form of joint meetings, formation ot joint self-protection
committees and joint tours of the affected areas and towns . Statesman, 25 June I947> P- T> c°b 3 and
p. 7 col. 4.

3 cf. No. 426, para. 10.

824

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

firearms have been freely used by Hindus and Sikhs against Muslims and no
non-Muslims have been taken into custody for intensive interrogation by the
Special Staff from any of these localities, nor, as far as I know, has any action
been taken to bring to the book the real offenders among the non-Muslims who
organised the raids on Rajgargh, Singhpura, Sabzi Mandi in Lahore and
Rasulpura and Bohl villages in Amritsar district. All these things lead me to the
conclusion that the hand of cooperation which I, on behalf of the Mussalmans
of the Punjab, extended for the restoration of peace, is being spurned and we
are being forced into a position of non-cooperation. Before, however, we
finally decide to sever our connection, I should like to impress upon you the
desirability of immediate action on the following points:

(i) There are at the moment three non-official members of the Security
Council of whom there is only one Muslim and two non-Muslims.
Keeping in view the principle of parity, which has been uniformly
observed in the matter of partition work and all other measures, both at
ibe Centre and in the Punjab, it is essential that there must be two
repre. entatives of the Muslims on the Security Council.

(ii) All repressive and oppressive administrative mea. ures must cease forth¬
with.

(iii) If any such measures are really necessary, they should be adopted only
after consultation with the Security Council.

(iv) There should be complete parity of Muslim and non-Muslim officers
in the Special Staff which has been brought into existence and which is
working at the Mental Hospital.

Yours sincerely,

IFTIKHAR HUSAIN KHAN

456

Sardar Baldev Singh to Pandit Nehru
Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Part 11(b)
SECRET 17 TUGLAK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 2 July ig47

My dear Pandit N.,

Yesterday, I glanced through the India Independence Bill1 which is to go before
the Parliament shortly. You will have studied the clause dealing with the Indian
State. I wish however to draw your attention to the provisions relating to the
Western Punjab. Some of the districts included that side, according to the

JULY 1947

825

annexure attached to the bill, as you know are disputed territory and it is our
case that control over them should remain joint till final settlement is made.

The other day when we discussed the question of Armed Forces Reconstitu¬
tion in the Partition Council Meeting,2 1 pointed out the difficulties inherent in
allowing one Government s control over these very disputed districts. The
Viceroy appreciated my point and instructed the C-in-C to prepare a scheme
for joint administration of Armed Forces stationed in this area.

The districts concerned are — Lahore, Gurdaspur, and Sheikhupura in the
Division of Lahore. I would like you to please see that suitable amendments are
made in the Bill or the Annexure or both to ensure that these districts do not
automatically go over to Pakistan when the Bill becomes law. The Boundary
Commission will take some time investigating the rival claims. We believe
that it will be prejudicial to us if the administration of these districts is allowed
to pass into the hands of Pakistan Government until such time as the Boundary
Commission has announced its findings. I hope you will take necessary steps to
exclude these areas from Pakistan territory at this stage.

Yours sincerely,
BALDEV SINGH

1 No. 428.

2 See No. 354, Item vi, para. 3. Reference was made to this discussion at the Partition Council Meeting
on 30 June 1947 and it was agreed that the Commander-in-Chief should be requested to examine ‘the
possibility of a clash of operational control in the areas through which the boundaries would be
drawn between Pakistan and the rest of India’ and submit proposals on the best means of dealing with
this contingency. Mountbatten Papers, Partition Council Minutes, Case No. P.C.9/2/47.

457

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to Mr Jinnah

R\3\i\i62: f 16

2 July ig47

I must confess I was astounded when you informed Sir George Abell this
morning that you would not be able to let the King have your advice about the
future Governor-General by Friday,1 for the reasons which he reported.

I should be glad if you would look in and see me when you have finished
your meeting today to let me know what answer you wish me to telegraph to
London.

[mountbatten of burma]

1 4 July.

826

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

458

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Mr Attlee (via India Office )

Telegram, R/j/i / 160: ff 72-4

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 2 July 1947, 4pm

secret Received: 2 July, 5 pm

PERSONAL

No. 1690-S. Please pass following to Prime Minister.

Most grateful for your telegram No. 77. 1 Situation here incredibly explosive
and more dangerous than any I have seen to date. Have been using Krishna
Menon as contact with Nehru and V. P. Menon as contact with Patel, and had a
meeting with them today at which both agreed that all Congress leaders are
firmly united in their complete refusal to be dictated to by Jinnah any longer.
Disastrous consequences of withdrawal of Muslim League on chances of getting
Bill passed unopposed through Parliament this session were fully explained.
Both Nehru and Patel said they would face any consequences rather than yield
once more to Jinnah which they consider would be quite fatal to their standing
with their own followers.

2. They point out that in that case they will in any event hold all the port¬
folios for India and that this will suit them quite well.

3. My private opinion is that Gandhi2 is adopting his usual Trotsky attitude
and might quite well like to see the present plan wrecked, so he is busy stiffen¬
ing Congress attitude.

4. I am advised that no compromise on any different system will be accepted.

5. In these circumstances the legal objections contained in Secy of State’s
telegram 84532 have come as a Godsend, since I now propose to take up the line
that I cannot legally put this through until the Bill has been passed in Parliament
giving me necessary legal cover. I am advised that Clause 9(c) may not give me
necessary cover and if so it will help me to be able to say that Bill is being
modified for the purpose.

6. I have pointed out that July the 4th was always the date on which I
proposed to call for resignations of the Cabinet, and that I proposed to adhere
to this date and ask them to carry on provisionally. To adhere literally to my
word would involve setting up the new form of government before next
week’s Cabinet meeting about 9th or 10th July.

7. Since it now transpires that the legality of such action can be challenged I
propose to say that H.M. Government will not permit me to put this new pro¬
cedure into effect until the Bill is passed.

JULY 1947

827

8. Krishna Menon has stressed the great urgency of getting the date on which
the Bill becomes law advanced as far as possible. He feels that if we could give a
target date of the 20th July Congress might accept with good grace, but if it
were put off much later they would feel that they had been cheated out of the
reconstruction.

9. If therefore you could send me a most immediate telegram undertaking
to use your best endeavours to get the Bill passed by the earliest possible date
and that you were enquiring whether it could be as early as July the 20th, I
could use this to show to Nehru and Patel when I meet them on Thursday4
prior to the Cabinet meeting on Friday.

10. As regards Jinnah, I understand that he proposes to start moving the
League members of his Government to Karachi on 7th August, and the League
Members of the Interim Government will therefore presumably start winding
up their Cabinet activities a few days before this. If therefore the reconstruction
of the Cabinet does not take place before the 20th July, there would only be
approximately a fortnight left for the Muslim League to have to serve under the
new conditions which they so dislike.

11. Observing that Congress accepted Jinnah’s exactly similar proposals for
Bengal when he refused to give them regional ministries or a coalition, and
observing that Jinnah could very well say that he was setting up his new Minis¬
try on the 20th July and that they would be so busy organising their secretariat
and getting ready for the move that they did not wish to be burdened with the
responsibility of a few more days in the Central Government, I have a feeling
that this really is a compromise which might prove equally acceptable to both
sides. It would certainly be fair to the League.

12. At any rate this is what I am aiming at and a telegram from you along
the lines of my immediately following telegram5 would be of the utmost help.

1 See No. 449, note 1. The telegram was in fact from Sir S. Cripps.

2 cf. No. 382.

3 No. 454.

4 3 July.

s Tel. 1691-S of 2 July contained the text of telegram that Mr Attlee might send Lord Mountbatten.
This draft was the same as No. 468 except that it did not include the last two sentences. In addition
there was the same verbal difference mentioned in No. 467. R/3/1/160: f 76.

828

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

459

Mr Rajagopalachariar to Sir S. Cripps
Public Record Office. CAB 127/146

INDUSTRIES AND SUPPLIES DEPT, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

new Delhi, 2 July 1Q47

My dear Sir Stafford,

I thank you for your kind letter dated the 23 rd June1 which reached me
yesterday.

You will not, I am sure, misunderstand if I frankly express what I feel. The
case demands this. You say —

“It is a case for co-operation and goodwill on the administrative level in
the first instance — like so much of the business now before you all in India—
and cannot be settled on a legalistic basis ; I feel sure that in practice means will
be found to avoid undue administrative confusion.”

I think the position taken up by H.M.G. in this matter is on an ultra-legalistic
plane and has resulted in tremendous complications threatening almost to
nullify all the good done by the present changes in India. To take the first step
on a legalistic plane and then to ask us not to be legalistic is unfair. I can under¬
stand the cessation of obligations on the part of His Majesty and his government
as a result of the present changes but why should the treaties and engagements
cease to have operation altogether? The obligations arising out of these may
terminate as far as H.M.G. or the Crown is concerned, but if there are any
obligations that have arisen as between any Indian State and the Govt of India
as such, they should and must continue. Why should these lapse? And why
should this theory of lapse of all obligations be incorporated in the present Bill
for the Constitution of the Dominion of India?2 If the treaties disappear, they
disappear as between the Crown and the States. Why should this enter into
the Dominions Bill? Why should Parliament now enact that they lapse not
only as relating to H.M.G. but also as relating to the new Dominions? Why
should we be statutorily prevented from claiming whatever obligations have
arisen out of past transactions which should enure to the benefit of the successor
government?

I am sorry to have to write at this length and in this manner. I feel verbal
changes in the formula to be adopted are necessary to limit the doctrine of
lapse to the obligations of H.M.G. that arose under the treaties and so as not to
cover the consequences that affect the successor governments in India. We can
have no objection to the express termination of the functions and obligations
of the Crown or H.M.G. but we do have very serious objection to the stat¬
utory termination of all legal consequences in re,3 so to say. This is not legalism.

JULY 1947

829

I am dreadfully earnest about the political and economic consequences of this
theory of complete independence of all yellow India.4 We may and must tackle
it all at this end but how can we hope successfully to do it, and peacefully, if
we start with an uncalled for parliamentary enactment of this kind on the sub¬
ject? I feel you must somehow find a way to change the language of this
declaration of consequences as resulting from lapse of British Sovereignty or
at least remove it from this Bill in which it is really irrelevant.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

C. RAJAGOPALACHARIAR

1 No. 303.

2 See No. 428, Clause 7 (i)(b).

3 In the matter.

4 The colour often given in maps to the territory of the Indian States.

460

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, R/j/i 1 154: f 12

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 2 July 1Q47, 7. JO pm

secret Received: 2 July, 6pm

1695-S. Following is note of points on which objection was raised informally
by Muslim League at meeting this morning. Both parties will present com¬
ments to me tomorrow morning.

Begins. (1) Clause 3(3). — It was alleged that the Partition Council had agreed
that boundaries should be conclusively determined by Boundary Commissions
who would present not a report but an award. Consequently they asked for
replacement of words from “before the appointed day” to “in the light of any
such reports” by some such words as “by relevant awards, whether presented
before or after the appointed day, of any Boundary Commissions appointed or
to be appointed by the Governor General in that behalf”.

(2) Clause 9(1). — They desire insertion of words making express the fact that
the Governor General’s powers under this sub-clause when exercised after the
appointed day will not be exercised on advice.

(3) Clause 9 (i)(f). — They desire insertion of a sanction for the enforcement of
orders of Governor General or arbitral awards dividing property between the
two Dominions. They put the case of an order or award involving handing over
to Pakistan after the appointed day of movable property situate in the Domin¬
ion of India and a refusal by that Dominion to hand over the property. They
suggested insertion of provision whereby H.M.G. in the U.K. would assume
responsibility for enforcing orders of Governor General or awards of arbitral
tribunals regarding the division of property between the two Dominions. (One

830

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

mode of enforcement suggested was the payment to the aggrieved Dominion
of a compensatory sum from the sterling balances and the debit of that sum to
the share in die sterling balances of the offending Dominion.)

(4) Clause 20 [19] (3), proviso. — On the audiority of the reference to the
appropriate successor authority in para. 17 of the Announcement of June 4th
[3rd],1 they ask for amendment of the reference in the proviso to “either of the
said Assemblies” so as to confine the participation of representatives of tribal
areas on the Assam frontier to the Constituent Assembly for India and to
confine the participation of representatives of the Baluchistan (and assuming the
inclusion of the N.W.F.P. in Pakistan) the N.W.F.P. tribal areas to the Con¬
stituent Assembly for Pakistan.

(5) Clause 2(1). — They strongly resent the inclusion of the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands in the Dominion of India and claim drat for geographical and
strategical reasons they should be included in Pakistan. They point out that the
Islands were given no representation in the existing Constituent Assembly and
that their constitutional future had not been discussed at all. It was not, they say,
till they saw the Bill that they realised that the Islands would be included in
the Dominion of India. Arising out of this point they urge incidentally the
recasting of clause 2(1) so as to define “India” on the lines of the definition of
“Pakistan”2 by express mention of territories. Ends.

1 No. 45.

2 “Pakistan” was received corrupt.

461

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl oj Listowel

Telegram , LjP&Jl 10/141: f 157

important new Delhi, 2 July 1947, 7-55 pm

Received: 2 July , 7.45 pm

1701-S. My next succeeding telegram gives text of letter from Nehru about the
Governors. I am delighted that Nye and Colville have been invited and I need
not point out to you how valuable it is likely to be to be able to tell the opposi¬
tion about these invitations.

2. I have telegraphed to Nye and Colville urging them to stay on and empha¬
sising the importance of the invitations from the point of view of India-British
relations and of world publicity.

3. I have also informed the other Governors concerned.1

1 In tel. 1748-S of 4 July, Lord Mountbatten informed Lord Listowel that Lieutenant-General Nye
and Sir J. Colville had both accepted Pandit Nehru’s offer though Colville would probably ask for
an understanding about a short term. L/P &J/10/141 : f 154.

JULY 1947

831

462

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , L/P &JI10I141: f 156

important new Delhi, 2 July 1947, 7-55 Pin

Received: 2 July , 6.10 pm

1702-S. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is text of Nehru’s
letter. Begins.

Thank you for your letter of 29th June1 about Governors for the Provinces.
We shall be glad if Sir John Colville and General Nye stay on as Governors after
August 15 th. Sir Chandulal Trivedi and Sir Akbar Hydari will, of course, stay
on though it might be considered desirable to transfer them or one of them to
another Province.

The question will then arise of finding Governors for the remaining Pro¬
vinces. These will include West Bengal and East Punjab. Ends.

1 In this letter Lord Mountbatten indicated that he felt he should let Governors know whether or not
they would be relieved on 15 August since more than one had enquired about this. He therefore
asked whether Congress intended that new Governors should be appointed as from 15 August in the
U.P., Bihar, the C.P., Orissa, Assam, Bombay and Madras. A letter in similar terms was sent to Mr
Jinnah in regard to Sind. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Govemors-General
and Governors of Provinces, Appointment of, Part (2).

463

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, RI3I1I154: f 13

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 2 July I947, 8 pill

secret Received: 2 July, 11.33 P1"

No. 1703-S. Further to my 1695-S of 2 July,1 following are points raised
informally by the Muslim League Leaders at the afternoon session today.

(i) Clause 9(5). The Leaders would accept an extension of the post-appoin¬
ted day period to eight months.2

(ii) Clause 10(2). Mr Mohd Ali expressed die view that the guarantee con¬
ferred by this sub-clause as respects remuneration was wider than that

1 No 460.

2 See No. 429, part II.

832

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

embodied in a letter issued by the Home Department. The Leaders
desired the terms of the clause to be checked against the relevant decis¬
ion3 of the Interim Government that statutory effect would be given to
the guarantees which the Government of India had agreed to give to
those officers of the Secretary of State’s services who would continue in
service after the transfer of power.

(iii) Clause 10(2). Reference your 8184 of 25 June4 and 8295 of 27 June,5
they agreed to an extension of the guarantee to High Court Judges
appointed before the appointed day, who after the appointed day serve
in a High Court in Pakistan. They pointed out that in Pakistan there
would be no judges of the Federal Court appointed before the appointed
day and that no question would therefore arise of enacting a guarantee
in respect of Federal Court Judges in relation to Pakistan.

(iv) Clause 14. The Leaders gave the assurance desired. (See your 7897 of
19 th June.)6

(v) Reference your 7893 of 19 June,7 the Muslim League Leaders did not
accept the view that the Dominion of India would inherit the inter¬
national personality of the existing India and as at present advised they
were not prepared to give an assurance to the effect that the Dominion
Governments when set up would consider themselves as the successors
to all treaty rights and obligations as indicated in your telegram under
reference. They would strongly resent the insertion in the Bill of pro¬
vision (understood to have been suggested at today’s meeting of the
Congress Leaders) affirming in terms that the Dominion of India is the
successor of the present India. In fact if any such insertion were made the
Muslim League Leaders would wholly withdraw their acceptance of the
Plan.

(vi) Reverting to paragraph 5 or my 1695-S (Andamans and Nicobars) the
Leaders pointed out that it would be open [to] India to refuse to allow,
e.g. the passage through India of Pakistan troops proceeding from
Western Pakistan to Eastern Pakistan or vice versa ; that in that event the
sea route would be the only available route and that the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands constituted an essential coaling station for a voyage from
Chittagong to Karachi.

3 See No. 249, note 10; also No. 429, part HE

4 No. 351.

5 See No. 373, note 2.

6 No. 271 ; see also No. 429, part IV.

7 No. 270; see also No. 429, part I.

JULY I947

833

464

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, Rfli/82: f 33

SECRET NEW DELHI, 2 fuly 1947, 10 pm

Received: 2 fuly, 11.40 pm

No. 1714-S. Following a fortnight’s hard work separately with all the Leaders
in which Trivedi’s help was invaluable I had a most satisfactory meeting of
Partition Council on 3 1st [30th],1 at which they agreed to my proposals for the
partition of the Indian Armed Forces, including the necessity for a single
central2 administrative control thereof until both Armed Forces were ready to
administer themselves. I had to release this to the Press yesterday as otherwise
there would have been garbled leakages. Regret not having informed you
earlier, but we have been going hammer and tongs at draft Bill and the delicate
problem of the interim Government. Full text was wired by Campbell-
Johnson to Joyce (see my telegrams Nos. 454-GT and 453-GT dated 1st July).3

2. I was pressed by Partition Council as to what was to happen to British
troops and I said that they would start withdrawing on 16th August, and that
the withdrawal would continue as shipping permitted. The process would be
slow owing to shortage of shipping and to movements necessitated by partition
of Indian Armed Forces, but it would be completed by end of February, 1948.
This also is bound to leak here soon and I therefore feel strongly that time has
come for simultaneous announcement in Parliament and in Delhi. If PLM.G.
agree, please let me know what date and hour would suit you.

3. Terms of announcement would be as set out in para. 7 of my 1570-S,4
with addition suggested in your 8284, 5 namely: Begins, “and is expected to be
completed about end of February 1948”. Ends.

4. Reference para. 3 of your 8284, will forward my views and those of
Commander-in-Chief within two days.

1 No. 416.

2 ‘central’ deciphered as ‘neutral’.

3 R/3/1/82: ff 26-34.

4 No. 335.

5 No. 381.

834

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

465

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. LB. (47)39^ Meeting
L/P&JliolSuff 116-18

Those present at this Meeting held in The Prime Minister s Room, House of Com¬
mons, S.W.i, on 2 July 1947 at 10 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir S. Cripps,
Mr A. V. Alexander, Viscount Addison, the Earl of Listowel , Mr Arthur Henderson
Also present were: Mr W. Whitely, Sir A. Carter, Sir K. Kemp, Mr J. Rowlatt;
Mr S. E. V. Luke ( Secretariat )

Minute 1

The future of the present Interim Government
(Previous Reference: 13.(47)3 7th Meeting, Minute 2)1
The Committee had before them telegrams Nos. 1690-S and2 1691-S3 of
2nd July from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India reporting that the
Congress Leaders were pressing strongly for the immediate dismissal of the
present Interim Government and for the formation of a new Interim Govern¬
ment on the lines proposed in paragraph 5 of the Viceroy’s telegram No.
1616-S.4 The Congress Party was strongly opposed to the alternative proposal
put forward by Mr Jinnah (Viceroy’s telegram No. 1656-S)5 that portfolios in
the new Interim Government should be held in equal numbers by Members of
each party, Members of the other party having watching briefs in respect of
each Department. The Viceroy proposed that the legal objections to the
reconstruction of the Interim Government on the lines supported by Congress
should be explained to them and that he should take the line that he could not
legally comply with their wishes until the United Kingdom legislation had been
passed. He proposed to call for the resignations of the Cabinet on 4th July, and
to ask the Members to continue on a caretaker basis for a brief period. The
Viceroy thought that he could hold the position on this basis, provided that an
assurance could be given that the United Kingdom legislation would, as far as
could be seen, be enacted by 20th July. In his telegram No. 1691-S, the Viceroy
suggested the terms of a telegram which the Prime Minister might send to him,
confirming the legal position and giving an assurance regarding the urgent
enactment of the United Kingdom legislation.

the secretary of state for India said that the Viceroy’s proposal
appeared to be open to two objections. In the absence of agreement, the
reconstruction of the present Interim Government in a manner acceptable to
the Congress leaders would have to be validated by a special provision in the
Indian Independence Bill. This would call attention to the fact that such action
could only be taken contrary to the provisions of the Government of India

JULY 1947

835

Act, 1935, and might well make an unhappy impression on the Opposition.
In that event, the progress of the Bill in Parliament might be delayed. Secondly,
the legal basis on which the Interim Government would function would be
known to be unsatisfactory and this might invite widespread refusal to comply
with its directions.

The Committee considered, however, that His Majesty’s Government ought
to give full support to the Viceroy in his handling of a most difficult situation.
If he felt that the best hope of meeting the immediate difficulties lay along the
lines he had suggested, it was incumbent on the Government to make every
effort to secure the enactment of the Indian Independence Bill with as little
delay as possible. Ministers thought that it should not be difficult to arrange for
the Bill to pass through both Houses of Parliament by 20th July; it was not
expected that any amendments to the Bill would be put down in either House.
It was thought, however, that it would be advisable for the Prime Minister to
see the Opposition leaders in order to explain the grounds on which it was now
desired to secure the enactment of the Bill rather earlier than had originally been
proposed. It was proposed that the Bill should be published on 4th July and that
the Second Reading should be taken in the House of Commons on Thursday,
10th July; it was hoped that the remaining stages in the blouse of Commons
could be taken on Friday, nth July, the secretary of state for domin¬
ion affairs said that there would be no difficulty in adhering to the proposed
timetable if the House of Lords could receive the Bill by 15th July. Ministers
pointed out, however, that it was essential that the comments of the Indian
leaders on the draft Bill should be sent immediately so that the final terms of the
draft Bill could be determined in time for its publication on 4th July.

The Committee —

Invited the Prime Minister to send a telegram to the Viceroy on the lines
suggested in the latter’s telegram No. 1691-S of 2nd July, modified to
emphasise the necessity for reaching immediate finality on the terms of
the Indian Independence Bill.

Minute 2

Indian Independence Bill

(Previous Reference: LB. (47) 3 7th Meeting, Minute 3)6
the secretary of state for dominion affairs said that the Oppo¬
sition were likely to be critical of the title of the Indian Independence Bill.
The Committee agreed, however, that there were no grounds for modifica-

1 No. 421.

2 No. 458.

3 See No. 458, note 5

4 No. 379.

5 No. 413.

6 No. 421.

836

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

tion of the title which, in their view, would be most acceptable to both Domin¬
ion and Indian opinion. They thought that it would be very helpful if some
expression of support for the title could be obtained from the Dominion Prime
Ministers. It could be explained to them that it had been thought advantageous
to entitle the Bill in such a manner as to indicate that the units of the British
Commonwealth were in fact independent, and to stress thereby the complete
equality and freedom shared by all members of the Commonwealth. It might
be explained that His Majesty’s Government were confident that the title
proposed would not cause embarrassment; on the contrary they felt that it was
in line with the accepted policy. An assurance from Dominion Prime Ministers
of agreement with the title would, however, dispel any uneasiness that might
exist. It was thought that this approach might best be made through the United
Kingdom High Commissioners in the Dominions, but the secretary
of state for dominion affairs said that he would like to have an oppor¬
tunity for giving further consideration to the procedure to be followed.

The Committee —

Invited the Prime Minister to consult with the Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs regarding an approach to Dominion Prime Ministers
on the lines suggested by the Committee in their discussion.

466

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , LJP &J/io/ 124: ff 205-6

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 2 July lp47, 11. 50 pill

secret Received: 5 July, 6 am

8499. Your telegram of 1st July, 1684-S.1 I note that Jinnah was not associated
with points raised by Congress. As regards these three points views of H.M.G.
are as follows.

2. Your paragraph 2. I note your decision on clause 6(2).

3 . Your paragraph 3 . If possible a drafting alteration will be made to remove
any such doubt. This is being examined.

4. Your paragraph 4. H.M.G. have of course fully appreciated consequences
in administrative field of failure to reach an understanding with States regarding
matters of common concern on lines indicated in para. 4 of Cabinet Mission’s
Memorandum of 12th May2 and urgency of entering on necessary negotiations

JULY 1947

837

created by advancing date of transfer of power. Their considered views on this
issue were communicated in my telegram of 25th June, 8 162.1 * 3 Congress
request amounts to continuing for some period by Parliamentary legislation
effect of agreements negotiated under paramountcy by substituting successor
authorities for Crown Representative. To this proposal we see following
insuperable objections, namely:

(1) Indian States not being British territory are not subject to Parliamentary
legislation placing obligations on them without their consent.

(2) Consent could not be presumed since enforcement of such legislation
would pass from H.M.G. to successor authorities with effect from
appointed day, in other words paramountcy would be transferred to
them.

(3) We cannot contemplate one date for transfer of power in British India
and another date for termination of paramountcy in Indian States.

(4) Acceptance in Bhopafs letter of 19th June 19464 on behalf of States of
general principles of attainment of Indian independence and agreement
to set up Negotiating Committee were obtained on basis of Cabinet
Mission’s declaration regarding termination of paramountcy to which
H.M.G.’s adherence was announced in Statement of 3rd June.5 Congress
proposal would in our view be tantamount to repudiation of that
undertaking.

5. For above reasons we cannot accept proposal in your paragraph 4,
though opportunity will be found in course of debate to express H.M.G.’s
sincere hope in interests of all parties that early progress will be made in
negotiation of standstill agreement, provisional draft of which we are glad to
note has already been sent to Residents for communication to States.

6. Provision referred to in your para. 5 will be restored.6

1 No. 452.

^ Vol. VII, No. 262.

3 No. 349.

4 Vol. VII, No. 567.

5 No. 45, para. 18.

6 Mr Attlee was shown and approved the draft of this telegram. Public Record Office, PREM 8/541,
Part 11.

838

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

467

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &J/ 10/81 : j 125

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, J July 1947, 12.10 am

secret Received: 3 July, 6 am

No. 8509. Your telegram 1690-S of 2nd July,1 to Prime Minister. My imme¬
diately following telegram is message from Prime Minister in the form you
desire with one small change substituting “authority” for “indemnity” and an
addition stressing the point that terms of Bill must be settled at once if target
date of 20th July is to be adhered to.

1 Mo. 458.

468

Mr Attlee to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma ( via India Office)

Telegram , L/P &J/io/8i: f 124

most immediate 3 July 1947, 12.30 am

secret Received: 3 July , 6 am

PERSONAL

No. 8510. Following for Viceroy from Prime Minister. I have myself been most
carefully into the legal objections to your proposed reconstruction of Interim
Government and consider this method could be challenged. You know that I
would do anything in my power to help you in your grave difficulty but in the
circumstances His Majesty’s Government are unable to sanction your recon¬
structing Government in this way until legal position has been assured by
passing of Bill, in which Clause 9, which we are prepared to amend for this
purpose, will give you necessary authority. I appreciate the extreme need for
speed in order that this reconstruction may take place at the earliest possible
moment to enable you to keep faith with Congress leaders and I am therefore
taking every possible step to ensure speeding up of passage of this Bill in
Parliament and am aiming at target date of July 20th though I cannot of course
at this stage promise an exact date. But, for that purpose, it is essential that we
should have by most immediate return any comments which Indian leaders
may wish to make on draft Bill. This will enable us to approve draft Bill
tomorrow and to introduce forthwith.

JULY 1947

839

469

The Earl oj Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P&//i0/£j : f 123

most immediate india office, 3 July ig47, 12.20 am

secret Received: 3 July , 6 am

No. 8511. Telegram No. 8510 containing personal message from Prime
Minister.

The amendment to Clause 9(1) which is in mind is to add after paragraph (d)
following paragraph : [Begins) (e) for the carrying on of the business of Gover¬
nor-General in Council between the passing of this Act and the appointed day
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions in that behalf of the Ninth
Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. (Ends.)1

1 cf. No. 428, Clause 9(i)(e) in italics.

470

Note by Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Governors-General and Gover¬
nors of Provinces , Appointment of Part (2)

TOP SECRET 3 Juh 1947

1. A Viceroy’s Meeting was held at Lord Ismay’s House at 9.45 p.m. on
Wednesday, 2nd July, to consider the situation arising from Mr Jinnah’s
declared wish1 to be Governor-General of Pakistan from 15th August, 1947.
Note : As yet Mr Jinnah has only in fact asked the Viceroy’s advice about this,
and has not nominated himself firmly.

COURSES OPEN

2. It was felt that the possible courses were as follows:

A. To accede to Mr Jinnah’s request, and for H.E. to stay on as Governor-
General of India alone,

B. To accede to Mr Jinnah’s request and to ask Congress to nominate
someone other than H.E. as Governor-General of India, or

1 For an account of Lord Mountbatten’s interview with Mr Jinnah see No. 506, paras. 23-25.

840

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

C. To devise a formula whereby H.E. would be enabled to remain as
Governor-General of both Dominions, and at the same time to satisfy
Mr Jinnah’s vanity.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

3. COURSE A

Advantages (i) The benefit of H.E.’s help and advice would remain for

anyhow the greater part of the present India.

(ii) British officers and officials at least in that part would
stay on.

Disadvantages (i) Although Mr Jinnah evidently hopes to get many senior

British officers, including Lord Killeam as a Governor, it is
doubtful whether they would come, and indeed whether
any British officers or officials would agree to remain in
Pakistan.

(ii) Pakistan would be likely to get less than their fair share of
all-India assets.

(iii) It is probable that there would be Conservative opposition
to the Bill, and there might be difficulty in getting it
through before the end of the present Session.

(iv) H.E. would probably go on leave until 15th August and
would have to stop being Chairman of the Partition
Committee, the work of which would be seriously com¬
promised. Even then, he, and the British as a whole, might
get a reputation for partiality.

4. COURSE B

Advantages (i) EI.E. could remain as Chairman of the Partition Com¬
mittee.

(ii) The British, and particularly H.E. and his Staff, would go
“on the crest of the wave” — particularly if suitable
publicity was given to Mr Jinnah’s action. All accusation of
partiality would be avoided.

Disadvantages (i) It is very doubtful that Congress would choose another

Englishman. As a result, very few British officers or
officials, including senior officers and probably Governors,
would remain in either Dominion.

(ii) Pakistan would get nothing like their fair share of all-
India assets except in such matters as were fully settled
before 15th August.

(iii) The Conservatives would probably bitterly oppose the
Bill and there would be no chance of getting it through
during the present Session.

JULY I947

841

5. COURSE C

Advantages The advantages of H.E. staying on for a period as Governor-
General of both Dominions are too obvious to enumerate. They include, of
course, a strictly fair partition; a flying start for both Dominions ; the Bill would
go through without any difficulty; and a large number of British officers and
officials would stay on.

Disadvantages The main disadvantage is that Mr Jinnah might try to be a
“Hitler” and take no notice of what H.E. said. This would lead to an exceed¬
ingly difficult situation.

6. Possible Variations of course c

(a) The following suggestions were made for the name of the post which
H.E. would hold:

Governor-General for Partition
Supreme Governor-General
Overall Governor-General
Viceroy

(b) The following suggestions were made for the name of the post which
Mr Jinnah (and probably an equivalent in India) would hold :

Governor-General Designate
Acting Governor-General
Lieutenant Governor-General
Deputy Governor-General
Head of State
President

Officer Administering the Government
Note: The suggestions in (a) and (b) are in the order in which they were most
favoured.

(c) It was felt that any formula conferring such titles should be based on the
necessity for a Governor-General not to leave his Dominion except on special
occasions with the permission of the King; and on the impossibility of his
being in two places at the same time.

(d) it was felt that the appointment of a Governor-General Designate might
be made optional.

(e) It was emphasised that any formula devised in this behalf must be one
which Congress would accept.

(f) it was felt that it would have to be made clear in such a formula that H.E.
would stay only until 31st March.

9. [7] A possible proviso to Clause 5 of the bill might read: “Provided that,
until 31st March 1948, or for such shorter period as may be determined by
provision made by law of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions, the
same person shall be Governor-General of both new Dominions and there may

842

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

be appointed by His Majesty for either Dominion a Governor-General Desig¬
nate.”

Consequent amendments to the Bill would of course be necessitated. For
example, the powers of the Governor-General Designate in the absence from
either Dominion of the Governor-General would have to be made clear.

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

471

Draft Note by Mr Campbell-] ohnson1

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Governors-General and Gover¬
nors of Provinces , Appointment of Part (2)

undated

With regard to the Conference Secretary’s note,2 the following are my views
on the publicity implications of the three courses proposed.

1. I consider that while Course C is the most desirable from every point of
view, Course A would be favourably received in the British and World Press,
while Course B would not avoid serious criticism.

2. Left Wing expectation has always been that Pakistan would be the last
outpost of British imperialism and that the anti-British bias of Congress would
quickly prevail. Congress invitation to H.E., Colville and Nye3 knocks that
criticism on the head. From the viewpoint of British prestige it is a tremendous
thing that Congress at the moment of victory in its 70 years’ struggle with the
British should go out of its way to invite Englishmen to stay on in this way.

3 . Such an invitation can hardly be criticised by the Right Wing either, for it
gets our relations with the new India off to a start good beyond all expectations.
At the same time the suggestion that H.E. has sold out to the Congress is met
by obvious evidence that Pakistan and Jinnah have got exactly what they
asked for. In fact H.E.’s presence at the head of the new Indian State
would naturally be interpreted as the best guarantee that its relations with
Pakistan would be carried on in a friendly and constructive manner and as a
buffer against excessive Congress claims.

4. The argument that with Jinnah in his present mood and enjoying full
powers and with H.E. simply as a constitutional Governor-General, H.E.
would not be able to exercise any substantial influence on Pakistan-Indian
relations is a major issue but not directly a publicity problem. While no doubt
it would be a limiting factor to H.E.’s usefulness, I think it would be widely

JULY I947

843

realised that no-one else would be able to do more, and in view of H.E. ’s close
association with Jinnah at this critical time no other Governor-General would
be likely to be in a position to do as much.

5. If the choice is between Jinnah as Governor-General or President, Gover¬
nor-General is surely preferable. He gives his prestige inside Pakistan to a title
which is peculiarly associated with Commonwealth status and in the last
analysis — however dictatorial or Fascist inclined he may be — with constitu¬
tional government. At least it gives his successors good grounds for becoming
constitutional.

6. The argument that a climb down is involved from Viceroy of all India to
Governor-General of India less Pakistan cannot I submit be sustained nor would
it be strongly stressed. Climb down from what? The whole emphasis of H.E.’s
mission here has been on the future — on the beginning of a new chapter in our
relations with Indians and not on “the last Viceroy”.

7. When one considers Course B, it is obvious that H.E. would be leaving on
the crest of the wave but once it is known that H.E. had been invited by
Congress and had turned down their invitation I believe there would be a
considerable volume of criticism, both immediate and long term, that he was
leaving the job half done and making “a quick getaway”. Congress publicity
would certainly interpret it as capitulation to Jinnah.

8. I therefore submit that Course C offers the best solution but there are
positive advantages in Course A which outweigh those of Course B while on
the negative side criticisms arising from Course B are likely to be more serious
and widespread.

1 Mr Campbell-Johnson recounts in his book Mission with Mountbatten , (London, 1951), pp 128-30,
that he read out this note at a discussion at the Viceroy’s Staff Meeting on 3 July, 1947. This discussion
was not recorded in the minutes of the meeting: see No. 504, first sentence.

2 No. 470.

3 See No. 462.

472

Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Express letter , JR/j/i \gi : ff 58-61

NO. 689 GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, J July ig4y

Mamdot resigned last night1 from Security Committee formed in compliance
with paragraph 5 of your telegram of 25 th June.2 Earlier in day he had sent me

1 R/3/1/176: f 230.

2 No. 343.

844

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

long letter3 claiming credit for improvement in Lahore situation, asserting that
Muslims had from first been victims of Hindu and Sikh aggression and had
merely defended themselves, and complaining bitterly of Misri Shah search
(already reported)4 and conduct of interrogations by Special Police Control
Staff. He ended with four demands. First. Inclusion of second Muslim in
Security Committee. Second. Immediate abandonment of “all repressive and
oppressive administrative measures”. Third. If any measures as in Second
inevitable, they must be undertaken only after consultation with Committee.
Fourth. Communal composition of Special Police Control Staff to be adjusted
to give Muslims parity with non-Muslims. I had replied5 that remedy for
general grievances was rapid completion of Partition. On First demand I said I
was personally ready to agree, but felt that concurrence of Sachar and Swaran
Singh was needed. Demand had already been discussed with Sachar absent.
Second and third demands could certainly be considered by Committee.
Actually to be effective searches and special interrogations have to be on Top
Secret basis, and participation of Committee would mean their virtual aban¬
donment, but I did not say this. I would enquire about fourth demand. I hoped
Mamdot would attend meeting of Committee at 0930 hours today. This letter
evidently failed to satisfy Mamdot.

2. Mamdot’s attitude is primarily due to growing fear of Hindus and Sikhs.
He contends (a) that administration is strongly anti-Muslim; (b) that searches
and arrests are practically confined to Muslims; and (c) that the Special Police
Control Staff has been organised to extort confessions and information from
Muslims and has done nothing to bring Hindus and Sikhs to book.

3. Under (a) it is worth remembering that in 1941 Great Lahore had a
population of roughly 671,000 including 433,000 Muslims and 238,000 non-
Muslims. The Muslim League contention that the Muslims are entirely blame¬
less is not in my judgment tenable, and assuming that all communities are
equally responsible, it is clear that over any given period more Muslims than
non-Muslims are likely to receive attention from the Police.

4. Under (b) the Misri Shah search was the first of several elaborate opera¬
tions planned by the Police and the Army. Misri Shah is a largely Muslim
quarter, and I am informed that its inhabitants have been responsible for a good
many outrages. The method of search is to seal an area with troops and barbed
wire and to put the Police in to make thorough search of every house. A long
curfew is necessary. An operation of this kind must cause inconvenience and
hardship, but I can see no alternative if searches are to be made at all. Misri Shah
search in fact yielded most disappointing results. As for arrests, total for Greater
Lahore from 25th June to 1400 hours 2nd July was 419 including 285 Muslims,
88 Hindus and 46 Sikhs.

JULY 1947

845

5. Under (c) Special Police Control Staff was organised owing to delay and
confusion caused by attempt to co-ordinate information received from accused
and suspected persons by large number of overworked and frequently inexpert
Police Officers. It was essential to link results of important interrogations with
intelligence reports and to isolate and deal with gangs responsible for murder
and arson. Staff consists of 20 officers, including three British, nine Muslim, six
Sikhs and two Hindus. Ranks are — British: One D.I.G. and two Superinten¬
dents of Police; Muslims: One Superintendent, one Deputy Superintendent,
four Inspectors and three Sub-Inspectors; Sikhs: One Superintendent, three
Inspectors and two Sub-Inspectors; Hindus: One Inspector and one Sub-
Inspector. The persons so far interrogated number 37 including 20 Muslims,
12 Hindus and 5 Sikhs. The Control has already proved most valuable, and has
enabled us not only to arrest some dangerous men, but to clear several men who
had been falsely accused. Improper methods are not used, nor with a staff so
composed is it likely that they could be used.

6. Mamdofs non-cooperation is not easy to understand in view of Jinnah’s
demand for “utter ruthlessness” (Abell’s telephone message of 24th June).6 But
he must be acting under instructions and since Security Committee was formed
by Your Excellency’s direction in the light of a Cabinet discussion, I require
guidance. The broad possibilities are: —

(1) To accept Mamdot’s demands (the fourth demand is in fact based on a
misapprehension). If this is done, Sachar and Swaran Singh may resign;
but if they do not, actual responsibility for law and order passes to the
Committee. Nothing will be kept secret, and searches and other opera¬
tions must for practical purposes be abandoned.

(2) To acquiesce in the dissolution of the Security Committee and either : —

(a) to carry on as before; or

(b) to go very slow on any measures likely to stimulate party resent¬
ment.

Personally I recommend 2(a), but I have suspended the search programme
pending instructions. The next search was to have been in another area which
happens to be predominantly Muslim.

7. The MuslimLeague may intend a further series of outrages. Since Mamdot
claims that he stopped the last series, it is legitimate to suppose that he can (if he
chooses) prevent any recrudescence.

8. In view of the length of this message, I am sending it by air, with a copy
of my correspondence with Mamdot.

E. M. JENKINS
GOVERNOR, PUNJAB

3 No. 455. 4 See No. 426, para. 10.

s R/3/1/176: f 229. 6 No. 320.

846

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

473

Lord Ismay to Sardar Baldev Singh
Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab , Part 11(b)
secret 3 July ig47

Dear Sardar Baldev Singh,

The Viceroy received through the Reforms Commissioner your letter to
Pandit Nehru dated 2nd July,1 on the subject of the disputed territory in the
Western Punjab, and His Excellency has asked me to write to you on his behalf.

In your letter you refer to an instruction given by the Viceroy to the C.-in-C.
at the meeting of the Partition Council held on 30th June, to the effect that he
should prepare a scheme for the joint administration of Armed Forces stationed
in the disputed area.

According to my recollection, the point that was raised was the possibility of
a clash of operational control over the forces of India and Pakistan stationed in
that area, and the instruction given to the C.-in-C. by the Partition Council
was that he should place before them his considered proposals on the best means
of dealing with such a contingency. I have now looked up the minutes2 of the
meeting in question, and find that they support my memory.

The possibility of exercising joint administration over disputed areas until
such time as the Boundary Commissions have reported has often been exa¬
mined in the past, but invariably ruled out as impracticable.3

Yours sincerely,

ISMAY

1 No. 456.

2 See No. 456, note 2.

3 On 3 July Lord Ismay sent Pandit Nehru a copy of this letter saying that Lord Mounthatten had
asked him to reply to No. 456 on his behalf. Mounthatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files:
Punjab, Part 11(b).

474

Lord Ismay to Mr Moon

Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Sikh Problem , Part 11(a)

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL 3 July ig47

Many thanks for your letter of 27th June.1

The Viceroy had an interview with Baldev Singh and Giani Kartar Singh on
30th June.2 Sardar Baldev Singh said that there was no sign at all of either of the
major parties making any concessions to the Sikhs and I doubt very much

JULY 1947

847

whether there will be any settlement between them and the Muslims. Indeed,
all the emphasis at the interview was on concessions to be obtained from the
Union of India and not from Pakistan.

The idea of eliminating the Hindi speaking parts of the Eastern Punjab and
thus dividing the poor Punjab into three bits, instead of two, was put to His
Excellency, but both leaders agreed that it was not possible for H.E. himself to
meet their claims now. They seemed fairly content with his promise to write
and draw the attention of the leaders to their requests and H.E. has done this.

From the point of view of avoiding a row in the Central Punjab, I expect that
you are right about the best course to adopt. But things have now gone much
too far for H.M.G. to be able to take a hand: and if the provincial boundaries
are again to be re-drawn, it would have to be done by the successor authorities.

ISMAY

1 No. 371.

2 No. 417.

475

Major-General Sir R. Lockhart (. North-West Frontier Province) to Rear-Admiral

Viscount Mounthatten oj Burma

Rl3li/i3i:ff 197-200

D.O. NO. GH-I06 GOVERNMENT HOUSE, PESHAWAR , 3 July I947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I forward herewith a Statement of the Provincial Ministry, dated 26th June
1947, in the matter of the proposed Referendum.

This Statement was sent to me by Dr Khan Sahib on the 26th — the day I
assumed office — under a forwarding letter in which he requested me to send the
statement to your Excellency.

2. I had before receiving this letter arranged for Dr Khan Sahib to come and
discuss matters with me on 27th. He came and I took the opportunity to discuss
the statement. Although Dr Khan Sahib seemed to admit that the reasons given
in paragraph 1 of the statement against holding a referendum were not valid
because of the changes inherent in the plan of June 3rd, he held out no hope of
his Ministry or party agreeing that Pakistan was inevitable, or even of agreeing
to modify their statement. He agreed however to our bringing up the statement
for discussion at a meeting of Council which I fixed for Monday 30th June.
My discussion with Dr Khan Sahib was entirely amicable.

848

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

30. The Council meeting was duly held on 30th June and the statement
of the Ministry discussed at length.

Discussion centered chiefly on paragraph 1. I attempted to persuade my
ministers that the statement that the last General Election of 1946 gave an
unambiguous verdict against Pakistan was not relevant to the present situation.
I argued that the issue then was between Pakistan and an undivided India. Now
a decision had been made that India would be divided. It was therefore now no
argument to say that because people had voted in favour of a united India
instead of Pakistan in 1946 they would not in the new situation prefer to join the
Pakistan rather than Hindustan Constituent Assembly.

Although the Ministers admitted that there was no question of the North-
West Frontier Province wishing to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly,
and appeared to agree that there was no way of putting any other alternative
before the people except Pakistan or Hindustan without changing the Plan of
3rd June 1947, they would not agree to modify their statement.

The only modification they would admit was in paragraph 3, where they
agreed that it was incorrect to use the words ulong before” in line 1 of that
paragraph.

4. They finally said that the Statement was written in continuation of
Dr Khan Sahib’s interview with Your Excellency1 and in accordance with an
undertaking he then gave you to send to you in writing the views of his
Ministry as held at the time of his visit.

5. I accordingly forward the Statement for Your Excellency’s information.

6. Meanwhile arrangements for the Referendum are going ahead. The
Ministers assure me of their desire that it should be conducted peacefully. They
have agreed to the promulgation of the Ordinances, and to the poster2 of which
Your Excellency gave me a draft the day I left Delhi.

7. I am writing separately about the general situation and my actions since I
took over.

Yours sincerely,

R. M. M. LOCKHART3

Enclosure to No. 475

26 June 1947

1. The Ministry have given careful thought to H.M.G.’s Announcement of
3rd June, 1 947, 4 regarding the transfer of power in so far as it affects the
N.W.F.P. They are of the opinion that the proposal to hold a Referendum in
the N.W.F.P. on the issues mentioned in para. 4 of the Announcement is
unjustified. The last General Elections of 1946 were contested by our organiza¬
tion on the clear issue of Pakistan and the electorate gave an unambiguous
verdict against it. Therefore, it is unnecessary to hold a Referendum now.

JULY 1947

849

2. It is a fact that a violent communal agitation was launched by the Muslim
League in this Province about 7 or 8 months ago. The Nazi methods used by
them, which resulted in the murder of hundreds of innocent men, women and
children, and considerable loss of property amounting to crores of rupees,
struck terror into the minds of all those who were unable to defend themselves.
This lead to the exodus of a large section of the population from the Province.
The agitation was still going on when H.M.G. announced the partition of
India on communal lines i.e. Hindu India & Muslim India. Similarly due to the
widespread riots in the Punjab, the partition of that Province on communal
lines became inevitable. The partition of Punjab naturally created a physical
barrier between Hindustan and N.W.F.P. Under the terms of the Announce¬
ment, Referendum in the N.W.F.P. was to be held only after the partition of
the Punjab had become an accomplished fact. In these circumstances, to call
upon the 94 per cent Muslim population of N.W.F.P. to vote whether they
wished to join Hindustan or Pakistan is highly unfair and unjustified.

3. Long before the Announcement, it was made abundantly clear by the
leaders of our organization, both in Press and on the platform, that they did not
wish to join either Hindustan or Pakistan but that they desired to have a free
Pathan State of their own in N.W.F.P. The Ministry, therefore, feel that with a
view to ascertain the will of the Pathans of N.W.F.P., a Referendum should
have been held on the issue of Pathanistan and Pakistan.

4. It may be explained that the two Members of our Organization attended
the meetings of the existing Constituent Assembly because under the Cabinet
Mission Plan of 16th May, 1946, only one Constituent Assembly had been set
up and they had rightly hoped that the Muslim League will also ultimately
join it, in view of their earlier acceptance of the said Plan.

5 . The Ministry also feel that whereas in the case of other Provinces which are
affected by the partition, it was Members of the Legislative Assemblies con¬
cerned that were given the right to express their opinions, in this Province
alone a departure was made.

6. The campaign of violent crime, arson, loot and forcible conversions in
which the Muslim League Party indulged for the last 7 or 8 months, has
created an atmosphere in which the holding of a free Referendum is not
possible. The responsible leaders of the Muslim League still hold out open
threats of violence both against the minorities and the weaker section of the

1 No. 81.

2 Not printed.

3 On 9 July Lord Mountbatten acknowledged receipt of this letter. He asked Sir R. Lockhart to thank
Dr Khan Sahib for the statement, and stated that he entirely agreed with the line Lockhart had
taken. R/3/1/151 : f 271.

4 No. 45.

850

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

general populace that if they cast their votes against Pakistan they will do so
only at their peril. The Ministry feel that the holding of Referendum under
such conditions will lead to violence and bloodshed. They, therefore, protest
against H.M.G.’s proposal to hold a Referendum in the N.W.F.P. on the issues
mentioned in para. 4. They also wish to state for the information of H.E. the
Viceroy that the Khudai Khidmatgars will not associate themselves with the
proposed Referendum.

K. SAHIB

476

Minutes by Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck and Sir G. Abell

Rbl1l144: f

3-6 July 1947

Field Marshal Auchinleck to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
urgent 3 July 1947

SECRET

C. in C.’s Paper 47/8

1. It is possible that there may be disorder in Travancore State in the near
future.

Application may be made to the Central Government through the local
Political Officer and the Crown Representative for military assistance, in
accordance with existing instructions.

2. Before 15 August, it is clear that such a request should be acted on, and
military assistance sent. In this event however a situation might arise whereby
after 15 Aug troops found themselves committed to internal security duties,
and this would be objectionable in a State which does not elect to join the
Union of India or Pakistan.

3. In the case of Travancore, British units might be available. In view of the
political situation it is, I think, particularly undesirable that they should be used.

4. An extract of the current orders is attached.1

5. A decision is required as to whether troops (British and Indian) should be
sent into such States before 15 August, should a request for military help be

made.

C. J. AUCHINLECK

JULY I947

85I

Sir G. Abell to Field Marshal Auchinleck

6 July 1947

H.E. has considered this matter. He is having enquiries made from the Resident
about the likelihood of trouble in Travancore State.2 He does not think that
Travancore or any other State will ask for such assistance in present circum¬
stances without realising the implications. If, as Crown Representative, H.E.
decided that assistance must be sent then clearly at any time up to the
15th August action would have to be taken accordingly, though the assistance
would be offered on the specific condition that it must be withdrawn on the
15 th August.

2. In any case the assistance of the Crown Representative’s Police will be
available until the 15th August and should be adequate for ordinary purposes.

G. E. B. ABELL

1 The extract was from para. 9 of the ‘Internal Security Instructions, India, 1937’ and was headed
‘Principles in regard to the Indian States Forces’. R/3/1/144: f 17.

2 In Political Dept tel. 181 i-P of 7 July 1947 the Resident, Madras States, was asked whether he thought
disorder was likely in Travancore in the near future, and if so whether the Travancore Govt was
likely to ask for assistance from the Indian Armed Forces. In such a case ‘there could be no guarantee
that military or any British units would be sent’. The Resident replied in tel. 5 5 /P of 8 July that he
saw no reason to anticipate disorder unless introduced on a large scale from outside. He did not think
Travancore would ask for assistance to deal with internal disorder, but ‘would justifiably ask that
neighbouring Provinces and administrations’ should take steps to prevent infiltration of disorderly
elements from outside. R/3/1/144: ff 26-7.

477

General Sir A. Smith to Lord Ismay

Rbl 1 1 144: ff 18-19

NO. I91/CGS NEW DELHI, 3 July 1947

My dear Ismay,

In forwarding to H.M. Defence the enclosed copy of a note to the Viceroy,1 the
Commander-in-Chief sent die attached note marked ‘A’2 to H.M. Defence. He
might also have added that in no circumstances can British officers on the
borders of Pakistan be employed with troops operating against those under
British officers in Hindustan and vice versa.

Yours ever,

ARTHUR SMITH

1 No. 476.

2 See Enclosure.

852

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Enclosure to No. 477

Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck to Sardar Baldev Singh (through Secretary , Defence

Department )

urgent 3 July 1947

SECRET

C. in C.’s Note No. (47)42

I enclose a copy of a note I have just sent to the Viceroy. In view of the political
situation and the urgency of the matter I have felt it wise to send this direct to
the Viceroy, and, no doubt, should you have any remarks to offer you will
approach the Viceroy direct in the matter.

2. There is a further matter which will require urgent consideration during
the next few weeks. If, after the 15th August, a Dominion Government wishes
to use the armed forces under its operational control to coerce States within its
orbit, the question of the employment of British officers in command of such
forces will have to be decided.

I propose to take this matter up with the Viceroy as H.M.G. in the U.K. are
intimately concerned in it.

C. J. AUCHINLECK

478

Minutes of Viceroy's Fifty First Staff Meeting , Items 2 , 3 and 5

Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET

Those present during discussion of Items 2, 3 and 3 of this Meeting held at The
Viceroy's IFouse , New Delhi , on 3 July 1947 at 4.30 pm were: Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma, Lord Ismay, Sir G. Abell, Captain Brockman,
Mr I. D. Scott, Mr Campbell-Johnson, Mr Sundaram, Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine
Crum

Item 2

THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT

his excellency the viceroy said that Mr Krishna Menon, who had
come to see him that evening, had informed him that there was now a chance
that the Congress Leaders would accept the continuation of the present
Interim Government for a further period. Mr Krishna Menon had suggested
that, each evening, all Honourable Adembers should send over to Viceroy’s
House, for approval, a list of orders to be given and appointments to be
made.

his excellency said that he would probably exclude from this pro¬
cedure the Honourable Member for External Affairs.

JULY 1947

853

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

(i) directed P.S.V. to arrange for the lists, to be sent in each evening by
Honourable Members, to be checked ; to give approval, in his name,
to any uncontroversial points; and to refer controversial points to
himself;

(ii) directed Pers. Sec. to draft for his approval a telegram in answer to the
one1 from Sir Stafford Cripps;

(iii) directed P.S.V. to draft, for his approval, a telegram to the Prime
Minister informing him of the latest situaiion in respect of the
continuation of the present Interim Government, after the Cabinet
meeting the following day.

Item 3

THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL

his excellency the viceroy said that he considered that the Arbitral
Tribunal would best be composed of Sir Patrick Spens as Chairman, and of one
Muslim and one Hindu.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY*.

directed Pers. Sec. to draft for his approval a letter to the Congress and
Muslim League Leaders suggesting that the Arbitral Tribunal should be
composed of Sir Patrick Spens as Chairman, and one Muslim and one
Hindu.

Item 3

GOVERNORS

HIS EXCELLENCY the viceroy said that Pandit Nehru had asked2 that Sir
John Colville and Sir Archibald Nye should stay on, after the transfer of power,
as Governors of Bombay and Madras respectively. Pandit Nehru had also
nominated Sir Akbar Hydari and Sir Chandulal Trivedi to remain as Gover¬
nors — but they might be transferred to other Provinces.

his excellency said that Mr Jinnah had declared that he wanted Sir
Francis Mudie to be Governor of West Punjab after the transfer of power; Sir
George Cunningham to be Governor of the N.W.F.P., if he and the Provincial
Government of the N.W.F.P. agreed; The Hon’ble Lt. Col. H. M. Poulton for
British Baluchistan; and (in order of preference) either Lord Killearn,3 Sir
Arthur Lothian or Sir William Slim for East Bengal.

1 See No. 449 and its note 1.

2 See No. 462.

3 Lord Killearn visited India in late July to discuss the possibility of bis becoming Governor of East
Bengal with Mr Jinnah, but the proposal was dropped in view of the fact that Lord Killearn, because
of his family commitments, did not feel able to make the financial sacrifice involved in leaving his
present position. Letters exchanged between Mr Mohamad Ali, Lord Killearn and Mr Jinnah,
26 July 1947. Mountbatten Papers, Demi-Official Correspondence.

854

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

directed Pers. Sec. to draft for his approval a letter to Mr Jinnah, asking
him whether he wished these recommendations for the posts of Governor
in Pakistan to be forwarded to His Majesty the King.

479

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/j/ 1/134: ff 22-30

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, J July 1Q47, 5 pm

confidential Received: 3 July , 3.20 pm

No. 1719-S. Reference my immediately preceding telegram.1 Following is
text of Congress comments on Draft Bill.2 Begins:

Congress Comments on the Draft Bill

We have considered the Draft Bill and have the following comments to offer:

1. Form of Bill —

(a) We understand that in the opinion of H.M.G. the form of the present Bill
makes it sufficiently clear that the new Dominion of India will continue the
international personality of the existing India. But the point is so vital that all
avoidable doubt should be removed.

(b) For international purposes, the whole of India, including British India
and the Indian States, is at present a single State. Under the Bill, two indepen¬
dent Dominions are set up in British India and the Indian States are detached
from both. This simultaneous fragmentation may create doubts as to whether
even the Dominion of India is anything more than one of the new fragments
and whether as such it can continue to represent the old entity, since even the
two Dominions are described in the Bill as 4 ‘new Dominions”. To avoid all
possible doubt in this respect, and to preserve the continuity of the parent State
for other essential purposes, there should be two separate Bills: the first,
creating the Dominion of India to consist of the whole of the existing India
excluding the Pakistan Provinces and such of the contiguous Indian States as
may accede to Pakistan; and the second, creating the Dominion of Pakistan to
consist of the excluded territories.

(c) If, owing to the time factor, it is not possible to have two Bills at once, we
would suggest that the single Act now being passed should be divided as soon as
possible into two separate Acts, in much the same way as the Government of
Burma Act was separated from the Government of India Act in December 1935
although the two were originally passed as a single measure in August 1935.

JULY 1947

855

(d) We would in any case suggest the insertion of a provision in the Bill
explicitly stating that the rights and obligations of India under any treaty or
agreement with foreign States shall as from the appointed day become the
rights and obligations of the Dominion of India, saving only those obligations
which by their nature, can only be performed in territories outside the Domin¬
ion. Such a provision will, incidentally, contain the assurance which H.M.G.
apparently desire hi this behalf.1 2 3

2. We now proceed to the details of the Bill in its present form.

Preamble — For the reasons mentioned above, the preamble should read —

“A Bill to make provision for the establishment of the Dominion of India
and the creation of a separate Dominion of Pakistan and for other matters
consequential etc., etc.,”

Clause 1(1 ) — For the same reasons, this sub-clause should provide that as
from August 15, 1947, India shall be a Dominion and Pakistan a separate
Dominion.

Clause 2(1 ) — India should be defined to be the whole of India as under the
Act of 1935 excluding Pakistan; Pakistan should be defined to be the British
Indian areas mentioned in the Bill plus such of the contiguous Indian States as
may accede thereto.

Clause 2(3) — It should be made clear that ‘‘any area” in this sub-clause
includes acceding Indian States. There is no specific provision in the Bill in its
present form for the accession of Indian States.

Clause 3(2)^)— We see no reason why merely because of the transfer of
Sylhet to East Bengal, the present Province of Assam should cease to exist. This
would merely furnish an additional argument to those who might wish to
contend that the State now recognised as India ceases to exist with the separa¬
tion of Pakistan. Sylhet is only one district out of about a dozen in Assam,
although it has a large population. Bombay did not cease to exist as Bombay
owing to the separation of Sind.

Clause 6(1) — Now that we have suggested a new definition of India so as to
make it consist of existing India excluding Pakistan, a proviso will have to be
inserted under this sub-clause on the following lines :

“provided that save as otherwise provided by or under this Act, the Legis¬
lature of the Dominion shall exercise jurisdiction only over the Governors’
Provinces and Chief Commissioners’ Provinces or parts thereof included in
India”.

Clause 6(2) — The words “any existing or future Act of Parliament” may not

1 Tel. 1718-S of 3 July merely announced the despatch of tel. 1719-S and promised Lord Mountbatten’s
comments later. R/3/1/154: f 21.

2 No. 428.

3 See No. 429, part I.

856

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

cover the Act that is being now passed. The words should be “this Act or any
existing or future Act of Parliament”.

Clause 6(4) — Owing to the ambiguity of the words “as part of the law of the
Dominion”, a written assurance was given to the Dominion delegates at the
Imperial Conference of 1930 in connection with a similar phrase then proposed
to be inserted in the Statute of 'Westminster that it was not Parliament’s inten¬
tion, under the provision in question, to enact any law in relation to the Domin¬
ions which, if enacted in relation to a foreign State, would be inconsistent with
international comity. The same object can be better achieved by substituting
for the words “unless it is declared in the Act that the Dominion has requested
and consented to the passing thereof”, which occur in the Bill, the words
“unless extended thereto by an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion” which
occur in section 2 of the Status of the Union Act, 1934, in South Africa.

Clause 7(i)(b) — The complete wiping out of all treaties and agreements in
force at the date of passing of the Act will create administrative chaos of the
gravest kind. Railway agreements, customs agreements, harbour agreements,
agreements ceding criminal and civil jurisdiction, extradition agreements,
agreements connected with the administration of Posts and Telegraphs, Irriga¬
tion agreements, agreements for the protection of Indian States from external
aggression, and more generally, agreements relating to defence and external
affairs and a host of other agreements will all lapse and even the existence of
States like Benares and Mysore which rest on Instruments of Transfer from the
Crown might be deprived of all legal basis. Even the Cabinet Mission’s
Memorandum of May 12, 1946, 4 contemplated in paragraph 4 that pending the
conclusion of new agreements, existing arrangements in all matters of common
concern should continue. Paragraph 5 of the same memorandum, after referring
to the lapse of paramountcy and the consequent cessation of all rights and
obligations flowing therefrom, goes on to state that the void so created must be
filled by the States entering either into a federal relationship or into new political
arrangements with the successor government. To negotiate new agreements —
some of them multipartite — with a large number of Indian States will be a long
and laborious task. Therefore, both to save time and trouble, instead of indi¬
vidual standstill agreements, a standstill proviso of general application to all the
States should be inserted in the Bill itself.

It may be pointed out that under the clause as drafted, treaties and agreements
in force at the date of the passing of the Act lapse as from “the appointed day”.
This seems to imply that agreements which may be negotiated between the
passing of the Act and the appointed day do not lapse. It may be that the
intention of the provision is that standstill agreements should be negotiated
during this intervening period, while the paramountcy of the Crown continues.
This is borne out by the statement in the Memorandum of May 12, 1946, that
the British Government and the Crown Representative — i.e., the Paramount

JULY I947

857

Power — will lend such assistance as they can in negotiating such agreements.
There is, however, no intrinsic difference between such agreements and the
agreements which the Bill seeks to terminate. Moreover, owing to the time
factor, it will not be possible to arrive at new agreements before the appointed
day and the easiest way of achieving what was the intention of the Memoran¬
dum of May 12, 1946, would be to insert in the Bill itself a proviso on the
following lines:

“Until new agreements are completed the existing relations and arrange¬
ments between His Majesty and any Indian Ruler in all matters of common

concern shall continue as between the new Dominion Government and the

State concerned.”

The proviso should be added to clause 7(1) (b) and we would suggest that the
three alternatives mentioned below (in order of preference) be considered in
this connection:

Clause 7(i)(b) should read:

“The suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, provided
that, — (here insert the proviso mentioned above). Under this alternative,
all the words occurring in the sub-clause except those relating to the lapse
of suzerainty go out.

(2) The sub-clause should read :

“The suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses and with it all
functions exercised by His Majesty . . . sufferance or otherwise, provided
that — (here insert the proviso mentioned above). Under this alternative,
the words “all treaties and agreements in force between His Majesty and
the Rulers of Indian States” occurring in the Bill go out.

(3) The sub-clause may be retained in its present form, but with the
proviso mentioned above.

Clause 7(i)(c) — There should be a proviso similar to that suggested in con¬
nection with Clause 7(i)(b); otherwise there is the danger of agreements
relating to the Khyber Pass, the Bolan Pass etc. lapsing, with prejudicial
consequences to the security of the country.

Clause 9(5)5 — We agree to the substitution of “31 March 1948” for “six
months from the appointed day”.

Clause 1 0 6 — We have no objection, on the merits, to any suitable amendment,
but we consider that the security of tenure provided for the Judges of the
Federal Court and of the High Courts in the Government of India Act 1935, is
adequate.

Clause 14 — 7 We see no reason why the Secretary of State should continue
to make these payments but if he does make them the Dominion will of course

5 See No. 429, part II.

7 Ibid., part IV.

4 Vol. VII, No. 262.
6 Ibid., part III.

858

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

provide the necessary funds. The High Commissioner should in future do this
work. The Clause is unnecessary and should be deleted.

Clause 1 g(f)(a)(iii) — We have already pointed out that the Province of
Assam should not cease to exist merely because of the transfer of Sylhet.
Therefore this sub-clause will need modification.

Proviso: The proviso to Clause 19(3)^) is at present vaguely worded. We
consider it essential that the powers and functioning of the Constituent Assem¬
blies in respect of the making of the new constitutions should be placed beyond
doubt. The Constituent Assemblies should have full power on their own to
provide for the filling of casual vacancies and the participation in their work of
representatives from Indian States and Tribal Areas. We would therefore sug¬
gest that the proviso, as drafted, be dropped and in its place the following be
inserted as a new sub-clause 3 A:

“Nothing in this Act shall be construed as detracting from the full power of

either Constituent Assembly

(a) to frame a Constitution for India or Pakistan, as the case may be,

(b) to give full effect to such Constitution in supersession of the Constitution
previously in force,

(c) to make provision for the filling of casual vacancies, and

(d) to regulate the participation of representatives of the Indian States and of
the Tribal Areas in the Assembly in accordance with such arrangements
as it may make in this behalf.” Ends .

480

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/3/1/154: Jf 31-5

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI , 3 July 1947, $ pm

confidential Received: 3 July, 6.50 pm

No. 1723-S. Reference my immediately preceding telegram.1 Following is text
of Muslim League comments on Draft Bill.2 Begins:

Muslim League Comments on the Draft Bill

SECRET

Clause 2:

The territories of the Dominion of India should also be defined in the same way
as those of Pakistan have been defined as otherwise the impression will be
created that the new Dominion of India succeeds to whatever is not specifically
transferred to Pakistan which in fact is not the case.

JULY I947

859

One result of the manner in which the Dominions of Pakistan and India have
been defined is that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands have been allotted to
India although they have never formed the subject of discussion or agreement
between the two parties at any time and this sudden inclusion in and allotment
to India raises a very grave issue. Neither historically nor geographically they
are part of India. They were British possessions which were administered by the
Central Government, but were to be excepted from the competence of the
Federal Ministers, being reserved to the Governor-General under the Constitu¬
tion Act of 1935. Therefore they are not in the same category as the other Chief
Commissioner’s Provinces. The majority of the population of these Islands
consists of tribes who are not connected with the peoples of India by ethnical,
religious or cultural ties. Pakistan’s claims to these Islands are very strong,
inasmuch as the only channel of communication between the eastern and
western parts of Pakistan will be by sea and these Islands occupy an important
strategic position on the sea route involved. They could also serve to provide
convenient refuelling bases for vessels plying between the two parts of
Pakistan.

On the other hand, no such pressing considerations could be urged in favour of
allotting them to the Dominion of India. These Islands should consequently
form part of Pakistan. If no decision is feasible on this point immediately, these
Islands should be specifically excluded from the scope of the present bill to be
dealt with later on separately.

Clauses 3 and 4:

It has been agreed between the parties that they would be bound by the
awards of the Boundary Commissions. These clauses fail to embody the agree¬
ment that the Governor-General is bound to accept and give effect to the
awards inasmuch as it is stated in Clauses 3 and 4 that the Governor-General
will determine the boundaries in the light of (and not in accordance with) the
awards of the Commissions, before the 15th August 1947 and further the
determination of boundaries is made to depend upon agreement between the
Dominions after that date which again is wrong as the Dominions would be
bound by the awards of the Boundary Commissions. It is therefore imperative
that provision should be made in the Bill for making the awards of the Boun¬
dary Commissions final and binding on the two Dominions so that the boun¬
daries are determined strictly in accordance with the terms of the awards of the
Commissions concerned.

Clause 6(2):

It is presumed that the legislatures of either Dominion would be competent
inter alia to pass any Act which may be repugnant to the provisions of the India

1 Tel. 1722-S of 3 July merely announced the despatch of tel. I723~S and promised Lord Mount-
batten’s comments later that day. L/P &J/10/124: f 155.

2 No. 428.

86o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Independence Act, 1947 or to amend or repeal this Act. This may be clarified
by a suitable amendment of the clause.

Clauses 9 and 1 1 :

It may be made clear by a suitable amendment that where the Order or other
act concerns both Dominions the Governor-General would exercise the powers
vested in him by these clauses, in his individual judgment, i.e., he would not
be bound by the advice of ministers in this regard. The period after the appoin¬
ted day, mentioned in sub-clause (5) of clause (9) may be extended up to the
3 1st of March 1948 since six months may not provide a sufficient period of time
for giving effect to the provisions of these clauses.3 In sub-clause (4) of clause 9,
it should be made clear that until the 3 1st of March, 1948, the powers of repeal
and amendment possessed by the legislatures of the two Dominions would not
extend to orders of the Governor-General which concern both of the Domin¬
ions.

Clause 19(3) Proviso:

This Proviso allows representatives of tribal areas generally to participate in
either of the two Constituent Assemblies. According to H.M.G.’s Statement of
the Plan of 3rd June 1947, 4 agreements with tribes of the N.W. Frontier of
India will have to be negotiated by the appropriate successor authority. It
should therefore be specifically provided in the Bill that the appropriate autho¬
rity to negotiate with the tribal areas on the N.W. Frontier shall be the Domin¬
ion in which the N.W.F.P. is included. The same principle applies to the tribal
areas in Baluchistan and on the N.E. Frontier of India.

General:

As observed above, it has already been agreed by the parties diat the awards of
the Boundary Commissions shall be binding on both the parties. With regard
to matters covered by clauses 9 and 11, which concern both Dominions, the
principle has been accepted by the parties that if a difference of opinion arises
between the two Dominions, the dispute will be referred to an arbitration
tribunal whose award shall be final, though the personnel of such a tribunal is
still under consideration. Provision should be made in the bill so as to make it
clear that the awards shall be binding on both the Dominions.

Moreover, it is absolutely necessary that provision should be made in the
Bill for setting up an authority with sanction behind it, which could enforce the
awards that may be made by the Boundary Commissions and the Arbitration
Tribunal. If such provision is not made, the result would be that any Dominion
dissatisfied with an award may refuse to carry it out. This would create a very
serious situation and lead to very grave consequences as there would be no
means left to enforce the execution of the terms of the award. We consider that
H.M.G. is the only appropriate authority that should undertake and guarantee
that the awards that may be made, will be given effect to and carried out in all
respects. This guarantee will only remain in force till such time as the partition

JULY I947

86l

is finally and completely effected. This would necessitate consequential amend¬
ments in certain clauses of the Bill.

The view has been put forward in the Points for Discussion5 furnished to us
that the new Dominion of India will continue the international personality of
the existing India. In other words, it is being contended that the Dominion of
India alone will be the successor to the present Indian Government in the
international sphere. We strongly contest the correctness of dais view and would
be entirely opposed to any amendment of the Bill intended to give effect to this
view, directly or by implication. The correct position is that there are going to
be set up two Independent Dominions as successors to the existing Government
of India which disappears altogether as an entity.

3 See No. 429, part II

4 No. 45, para. 17.

5 No. 429, part I.

481

Commonwealth Relations Office to British High Commissioners in Canada , Australia,

New Zealand and South Africa
Telegram, LjPOl6ji22: f 66

immediate 3 July 1947, 2 pm

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

Z. No. 37. Developments of last few days in India have given rise to acute
differences between Congress and Moslem League regarding carrying on of
interim government. In order to get over these difficulties it is thought essential
that legislation here providing for Dominion status should be passed as soon as
possible this month.

As will have been seen from my telegram D. No. 566, 1 we have given die
Bill the title India Independence Bill since we think that this is the best term to
make entirely clear to opinion in India and elsewhere the realities of the position.
Anxiety however has been expressed in certain quarters here whether use of
this term might lead to embarrassment in relation to other Commonwealth
countries.

In view of this will you please make immediate personal approach to Prime
Minister and ask him whether he agrees that the title proposed will create no
difficulties so far as his country is concerned and is acceptable. If so and if the
odier Prime Ministers are of the same opinion, we should like to be able to say
publicly if necessary that as a result of enquiries, we are satisfied that the other
members of the Commonwealth take the above view.

Grateful for reply by Monday if possible.

1 Not printed.

862

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

482

Lord Addison to Mr Attlee
LIPO/ii/4: f 39

TOP SECRET DOMINIONS OFFICE, J July 1947

Prime Minister.

In pursuance of my statement at the meeting of the Cabinet on the 24th of June
(C.M.(47)56th Conclusions)1 I authorised the United Kingdom Representative
to Eire to approach the Eire authorities, on the same lines as die approach made
to the Prime Ministers of the other Dominions, about the omission of the
words “Emperor of India” from the King’s Title.

The United Kingdom Representative was instructed that, aldiough it
appeared unlikely that the Eire Government would regard it as necessary to
bring the matter before the Eire Parliament, (where debate might ensue which
would be embarrassing to them and to the United Kingdom Government) it
was nevertheless important that we should be able to state in Parliament here,
in general terms, that the other Commonwealth Governments (i.e. other than
the United Kingdom Government) had agreed to die proposed change and
were prepared to take such steps as they might consider necessary to obtain the
assent of their respective Parliaments ; further, that we should wish to have an
agreed formula to use if we were, in the course of debate 011 the India Indepen¬
dence Bill, asked in Parliament whether an approach had been made to Eire.

Lord Rugby has now reported that, on this latter point, the following
formula has been agreed by Mr de Valera, for use if such a question is asked:

“Mr de Valera has been informed of the proposed alteration and has indicated

that it presents no difficulty so far as Eire is concerned.”

It is important that his wording should be followed textually. It is satisfactory
that we have obtained Mr de Valera’s agreement without special qualifications
as might have been feared in view of his recent utterance about Eire’s relation
to the Crown (with which you are acquainted as a result of Mr Delargy’s recent
Question addressed to you).

The whole Dominion position in this respect now seems to be satisfactorily
covered and I am having a note prepared for use in Parliament on this particular
aspect of clause 7(2) of the Indian Independence Bill.

I am sending a copy of this minute to the Lord Chancellor, and the Secretary
of State for India.

ADDISON

1 No. 322.

JULY 1947

863

483

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Attlee ( via India Office )

Telegram , R^j 1/162: f 17

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, J July 1947, 8 pm

top secret Received: 3 July , 6.15 pm

No. 1725-S. Following personal and private for Prime Minister from Viceroy.

1. Mr Jinnah came to see me last night1 and told me that he wanted to be
Governor-General of Pakistan from the date of the transfer of power.

2. I have spent four hours since then trying to make him realise the advan¬
tages that Pakistan would gain from having the same Governor-General as
India for the initial period, until partition is complete. He is so adamant that he
openly says that he would prefer to lose the crores’ worth of assets which he
would get in a fair partition, under my supervision, than share a Governor-
General.

3. I now am faced with the appalling problem of whether to accept Nehru’s
offer to stay as Governor-General of India or whether to pull out on
August 15th.

4. I will telegraph Jinnah’s full points of view and arguments and my
recommendations later. This is intended to give you a preliminary indication
of this unexpected course of events, as I realise that it may result in amendments
to the Bill. But I would suggest that you take no action until I inform you
further.

1 For an account of this interview see No. 506, paras. 23-25.

484

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , Rff/i /134: jf 37-9

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, J July I947

secret Received: 3 July , 8.10 pm

No. 1728-S. Following are my comments on the points raised by Congress.*
Form of Bill. I presume time will hardly permit the Bill to be redrafted into
two Bills at this stage. For the same reason the alternative suggested in para¬
graph (c) appears equally impracticable. As regards suggestion in paragraph (d)
you will have noticed the strong reaction of Muslim League2 to the view that

1 No. 479.

2 See No. 463, para, (v), and No. 480, General.

864

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Dominion of India will continue international personality of existing India.
On the other hand the advice received both by me and Foreign Office supports
Congress contention even on Bill as at present drafted. Whilst I am in sympathy
with the Congress suggestion for further clarification as regards treaty rights
and obligations, I realise that this may make difficulties with the Opposition.

Preamble and clause 1(1). I cannot support proposals and personally persuaded
Mr. Jinnah to retract a proposal of his own to alter preamble in the contrary
sense.

Clause 2(1 ) and (5). Though I do not like the form of amendment suggested
by Congress there is a substantial point that clause 2 as drafted leaves the position
of acceding Indian States vis-a-vis the new Dominions entirely in the air. The
definitions of both Dominions should be modified so as to cover Indian States
and other areas which may hereafter become part of the particular Dominion
by accession on federal basis or in any other circumstances. This is not suffi¬
ciently covered by the negative formula adopted in clause 2(3).

Clause 3 (2) (a). I entirely agree with the Congress point and strongly suggest
that it should be met by saying that quote As from the appointed day a part of
the territories of Assam shall in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (3)
be separated from that Province and comprised in the new Province of East
Bengal unquote. Consequential amendments will be necessary in sub-clause (3)
and subsequent clauses, such as 9(i)(b) and 9(i)(e).

Clause 6(1). Suggested proviso will not be necessary if the definition of the
Dominions is amended only to the extent suggested in comment on Clause
2(1) and (3) above.

Clause 6(2). I have informed both Congress and the League that this has been
accepted.

Clause 6(4). I support the proposal.

Clause 7(1). As anticipated by me, Congress took very serious exception to
paragraph (b) of this clause. This is a very crucial issue with them. Mr Panikkar
(Dewan of Bikaner) also represented to me3 that unconditional lapse of treaties
and agreements will hit States equally hard. I am inclined to support the third
alternative suggested. I recommend for the earnest consideration of H.M.G. that
something should be done on those lines though of course omitting the word
“relations” and making it clear that arrangements to be preserved include
arrangements as between a State and a Province. If necessary a time limit may
be fixed, say, 3 1st March 1948, for the operation of the proviso. Same provision
may be made in respect of paragraph (c) of clause.

Clause 9(5).' This was inserted at my suggestion4 and both Congress and
League have accepted it because partition of armed forces cannot be completed
before this date.

Clause io{2):5 Both Congress and League have agreed to extending the
scope of this clause to judges of the Federal Court and the Fligh Courts. Terms

JULY 1947

865

of this clause as well as definitions of remuneration and pension have been
accepted by them.

Clause 14:6 On further discussion with me, Congress leaders are prepared to
accept this clause if the provisions are absolutely necessary from a purely
British point of view. Otherwise their preference is to omit the clause and rest
the matter on their assurance that payments will continue to be made by their
High Commissioner.

Clause 19(3): I support proposal regarding proviso. In view, however, of
Muslim League point to which I refer later, 7 proviso on following lines should
be added to new sub-clause proposed by Congress. Begins. Provided that
representatives of tribal areas shall participate in that Assembly only in which
representatives of the province adjoining the tribal areas concerned participate.
Ends.

3 No. 446.

4 See No. 429, part II.

5 Ibid., part III.

6 Ibid., part IV.

7 See No. 485.

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, RI31 1/134: f 40

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 3 July 1947 , 8.43 pm

confidential Received: 3 July, 7.55 pm

No. 1729-S. Following are my comments on points raised by Muslim League.1

Clause 2. I am unable to recommend any change in respect of the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands.

Clauses 3 and 4. This point was originally raised by Congress, but was not
specifically included in their comments. However, they definitely support it
and I consider it of the utmost importance.

Clause 6(2). Covered in my comments on Congress points.

Clauses 9 and 11. On careful consideration I can recommend this.

Clause 19(3) Proviso. See my telegram on Congress points.

General. I told Mr Jinnah that no sanction would be accepted by Congress or
be enforceable by H.M.G. I entirely disagree with views expressed in the last
paragraph, though I understand that League would be violently opposed to any
amendment of the Bill itself on this point.

1 No. 480.

866

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

486

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. I.B.(4y)40th Meeting
LIP&JI10I124: ff 143-8

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.i, on 3 July 1947 at
3.43 pm and g.30 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir S. Cripps, Viscount
Addison, the Earl of Listowel, Mr C. P. Mayhew, Mr Arthur Henderson

Also present were: Sir A. Carter, Mr J. Rowlatt; Mr S. E. V. Luke, Mr G. M.
Wilson, Mr F. F. Turnbull ( Secretariat )

Minute 1

Defence Arrangements in India

The Committee had before them a Note by the Minister of Defence (I.B.(47)
135)1 covering the draft of a telegram to the Viceroy of India, seeking advice
on the method of approach to the respective Indian authorities regarding the
initiation of discussions on certain defence issues.

the minister of defence said that there were three outstanding defence
issues : —

(i) What arrangements were to be made for external defence from 15 th
August onwards.

(ii) The continued provision of certain military or transit facilities.

(iii) Our long-term British strategic requirements.

In addition, there was the important question of the provision of the safety
of British subjects in India after 15 th August, 1947, in view of the recent decis¬
ion to stop [?start] die withdrawal of British Forces as from that date. The first
stage was to agree with the Indian leaders about the initiation of talks, and he
suggested that it was desirable to obtain the views of the Viceroy on this point
without delay.

The Committee:

Invited the Secretary of State for India to telegraph to the Viceroy in the
terms of the draft telegram annexed to I. B. (47) 135, amended to indicate
that His Majesty’s Government would be expected, on the Second
Reading of the Indian Independence Bill, to make some reference to the
future arrangements for the external defence of India and Pakistan.2

Minute 2

The British Army in India

(Previous Reference: I.B. (47)45 th Meeting,3 Minute 2)
the secretary of state for India said that the Viceroy had again raised4
the question whether an immediate announcement might be made about the
arrangements contemplated for the withdrawal of the British Army from

JULY 1947

867

India. Lord Mountbatten was afraid diat, unless such an announcement was
made without delay, there would be serious risk of leakage in India.

The Committee thought, however, that there were strong reasons against
making any announcement on this subject in advance of the Second Reading of
the Indian Independence Bill in the House of Commons ; if the statement to be
made by His Majesty’s Government on that occasion were anticipated in this
respect, there was a risk of misunderstanding. In any event, it did not seem that
serious harm would be done even if a leakage should occur in India.

The Committee:

Invited the Secretary of State for India to inform the Viceroy that His
Majesty’s Government considered it inadvisable to make any public
announcement on the subject of the withdrawal of the British Army in
India in advance of the Second Reading of the Indian Independence Bill
in the House of Commons.1 2 3 4 5

Minute 3

Indian Independence Bill

(Previous Reference: I.B.(47)39th Meeting, Minute 2) 6
The question was raised whether it was necessary to attach an Explanatory
Memorandum7 to the Indian Independence Bill. The Committee were in¬
formed that, while it was the normal practice for such a Memorandum to be
attached to a Bill on its introduction in the House of Commons, this was done
merely as a matter of convenience for Members and was not a constitutional
requirement. The Committee felt that, in the present case, there were strong
arguments against the attachment of an Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill ;
it would merely invite scrutiny in India with the object of ascertaining whether
there were any inconsistencies between the Bill and the Memorandum, and
this might lead to serious practical difficulties.

The Committee:

(1) Agreed that an Explanatory Memorandum should not be attached to
the Indian Independence Bill.

The Committee had before them the following telegrams from the Viceroy
to the Secretary of State for India in connection with the discussions in New
Delhi with the Indian political leaders on the text of the Indian Independence
Bill —

1 L/P&J/10/121: #30-1.

2 See No. 487 for the telegram as sent.

3 35th Meeting evidently intended: see No. 347, Minute 2.

4 No. 464.

5 Lord Listowel did this in tel. 8561 of 4 July. L/WS/1/1091: f 23.

6 No. 465.

7 A draft of an Explanatory Memorandum, sent by Lord Listowel to Mr Attlee under cover of
Minute 112/47 of 3 July 1947, is on P.R.O. PREM 8/541, part 11.

868

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

No. 1695-S.8

No. 1703-S.9

No. 1719-S.10
No. 1723-S.11
No. 1728-S.12

Summary of points raised informally by the Muslim League
on the 2nd July.

Further points raised informally by the Muslim League on
2nd July.

Summary of Congress Comments on the Draft Bill.

Text of formal Muslim League comments on Draft Bill.

The Viceroy’s comments on the points raised by Congress,
set out in No. 1719-S.

No. 1729-S.13 Viceroy’s comments on points raised by Muslim League.

The Committee noted that the main criticism of the draft made by the
Congress Leaders was that it failed to indicate sufficiently clearly that the new
Dominion of India would continue the international personality of the existing
India. They had urged that this position should be precisely stated in the pro¬
posed legislation, and that for this purpose the Dominion of India and the
Dominion of Pakistan should be established by two separate Bills. The Com¬
mittee considered, however, that there was no possibility of meeting these
representations. It was not, in any event, a matter for His Majesty’s Govern¬
ment to legislate regarding the future international personality of the new
Indian Dominions; their status would have to be determined by international
recognition. There was, indeed, every reason to suppose that the Union of
India would in fact, under the proposed legislation, be accepted as the inter¬
national successor of the existing India. But to frame the Bill in terms which
suggested that Pakistan was no more than a seceding fragment of India would
provoke serious criticism in Parliament and would endanger the prospects of a
speedy enactment of the Bill. Moreover, there was no reason to doubt that the
Muslim League leaders felt sufficiently strongly on this subject to implement
their threat to withdraw acceptance of the plan (Tel. No. 1703-S), if the Con¬
gress representations on this point should be met.

The Committee noted that the most important criticism of the Draft Bill put
forward by the Muslim League related to the exclusion of any reference to the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands. This was a matter to which they had given very
careful consideration, and they did not feel that it was practicable to modify the
decision already reached.

In discussion, it was agreed that the following amendments14 should be made
to the Draft Bill in the light of the criticisms put forward by the Congress and
Muslim League Leaders and of the Viceroy’s comments thereon —

(a) It was agreed that Clauses 3 and 4 should be amended to meet the
proposal of the Muslim League (Tel. No. 1723-S) that the parties should be
bound by awards of Boundary Commissions.

(b) It was agreed that a new sub-clause should be inserted after Clause 2(h)
which would have the effect of bringing out more clearly the possibility of the

JULY I947

869

accession of the Indian States. This would meet the Congress proposal in
paragraph 2 of Tel. No. 1719-S.

(c) The Committee noted that the Congress Leaders had pointed out that
there was no reason why, on the transfer of Sylhet to East Bengal, the present
Province of Assam should cease to exist. It was agreed that the Bill should be
amended to meet this criticism.

(d) it was agreed that the Bill should be amended to meet the Congress
proposal that for the words “unless it is declared in the Act that the Dominion
has requested and consented to the passing thereof” there should be substituted
the words “unless extended thereto by an Act of Legislature of the Dominion”.

(e) The Committee were impressed by the criticisms made by the Congress
Leaders of the terms of Clause 7(i)(b) and (c). They felt that there was justifica¬
tion for the view that the complete wiping out of all treaties and agreements in
force at the date of the passing of the Act would create administrative chaos,
and they considered that a proviso should be added to Clause 7(1) (b) to the
effect that all agreements relating to customs, communications, posts and
telegraphs administration, irrigation and other similar matters should be
deemed to continue in force until such time as they were either denounced by
one of the parties concerned or superseded by fresh agreements. There was
some discussion whether it would be appropriate for a similar proviso to be
added to Clause 7(1) (c). The Viceroy had given an assurance to the Frontier
Tribes that suzerainty would not be transferred, and it would be undesirable to
give any impression that this was being done in the Bill. On the other hand, the
automatic lapse of the existing arrangements for such matters as the main¬
tenance of communications through the Khyber and Bolan passes would cause
great inconvenience, and it was thought that the best course would be to extend
the proposed proviso to cover Clause 7(1) (c), making it clear that the intention
was to continue only those provisions of the agreements relating to matters
such as communications, transit and commerce, and not those relating to
suzerainty.

(f) It was agreed that, in Clause 9(5) the words “31st March, 1948” should be
substituted for the words “six months from the appointed date”.

(g) Parliamentary Counsel handed to the Committee the text of a revised
Clause 10(2) which was agreed.

(h) It was agreed that, as suggested by the Congress Leaders, provision
should be made in Clause 19(3)^), making it clear that the Constituent Assem-

8 No. 460.

9 No. 463.

10 No. 479.

” No. 480.

12 No. 484.

« No. 485.

14 For the amendments made to the draft Bill following this meeting: see No. 428 and its note 1.

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

blies would have full power to prescribe the methods of filling casual vacancies
and of the participation in the work of the Assemblies of representatives of the
Indian States and of tribal areas. They did not, however, feel that it would be
appropriate to insert in this Clause any formal definition of the Constituent
Assembly’s powers. A re-draft of Clause 8(1) and 8(2), handed in by Parlia¬
mentary Counsel, to meet the Congress views on that subject was agreed.

(i) The Committee were informed that no reply had been received from the
Viceroy regarding the suggestion15 that Clause 9(i)(e) should be amended to
enable him to set up,16 between the enactment of the Bill and 15th August, to
conduct the business of the Governor General in Council otherwise than in
accordance with the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. It was
agreed that this amendment should be made in the Bill.

The Committee:

(2) Agreed that the draft Bill, as amended in discussion, should be printed
for presentation to Parliament on 4th July.
the prime minister raised the question whether, under the Bill, it would
be possible for different persons to be appointed Governors-General of the two
new Indian Dominions.

The Committee were informed that the Bill made legal provision for this
situation. They felt, however, that, if it should prove necessary to appoint two
Governors-General, the task of partition and of effective establishment of the
new Dominions would be greatly complicated and prejudiced. It seemed that,
in that event, the appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal and agreement to accept
its awards would be essential.

Minute 417

Relations with Afghanistan

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN

affairs informed the Committee that the Afghan Government had put
forward a proposal that the terms of the referendum to be held in the North-
West Frontier Province should be extended to allow the additional choice of
becoming independent or of joining Afghanistan.18 It was proposed to inform
the Afghan Minister in London that these representations related to an area
which formed an integral part of India and was recognised as such by the
Afghan Government in the Anglo- Afghan Treaty of 1921, and that His
Majesty’s Government could not admit the right of a foreign government to
intervene in the internal affairs of these areas. The Afghan Government also
contended that, with the change in status in India, the obligations created by the
Anglo- Afghan Treaty will no longer be binding. As regards international
obligations, the Muslim League in telegram No. 1703-S19 had said that as at
present advised they were not prepared to accept the present international
obligations of His Majesty’s Government in relation to Afghanistan. If this
attitude was persisted in it would destroy the case we were making to the

JULY I947

87I

Afghan Government. He thought that the Viceroy ought to be asked to point
out to the Muslim League leaders the embarrassment and difficulties to them¬
selves which the maintenance of such an attitude would cause; and that mean¬
while the Foreign Office should be authorised to continue to resist the Afghan
representations on the ground that there could be no question of the Treaty of
1921 lapsing.

15 No. 469.

16 The words ‘set up’ appear to be superfluous.

1 7 The text of this Minute is taken from that given in a corrigendum issued by the Cabinet Office on
11 July 1947. L/P &J/10/81 : f 34.

18 See Nos. 212, 272, 377, 395, 431 and 453.

19 No. 463.

487

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Telegram, L/P &Jj 10/121 : f 33

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 3 July 1947, 10.20 pm

secret Received: 4 July, 9.30 am

8560. H.M.G. are deeply concerned about several defence questions in India,
particularly about initiating discussions with the Indians on our long term
strategic requirements in that country.

2. Before you took up office in India, the Chiefs of Staff considered British
strategic requirements in India under the alternatives of remaining within the
Commonwealth or choosing an independent Republic.1 It was contemplated
that these requirements would be incorporated as military clauses in a future
Treaty. As events have turned out, however, there will be no formal Treaty
with the Dominions of Hindustan and Pakistan, and no provision has been
made for future British strategic requirements in the Indian Independence Bill.

3 . There are three outstanding defence issues : —

(i) What arrangements are to be made for external defence from
August 15 th onwards.

(ii) The continued provision of certain military air transit facilities.

(iii) Our long term British strategic requirements.

4. There is also the important question of the provision for the safety of
British subjects in India after 15 th August, 1947, hr view of the recent decision
to start withdrawing British forces as from that date.

1 See Vol. IX, Nos. 544 and 545.

872

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

5. The importance of coming to some arrangement with Hindustan and
Pakistan about their external defence needs no emphasising. There may well be
a considerable period of time, from August onwards, when litde or no pro¬
vision can be made for external defence unless some understandings are reached
in the near future.

6. The most urgent and immediate problem is to obtain agreements allow¬
ing us to continue to maintain facilities for the transit of military aircraft
through India. The present military routes carry mail, troops and Government
passengers to destinations in the Far East, including Japan, Hong Kong,
Malaya, Singapore and Ceylon. It is essential that there should be no gap in the
continuity of the provision of these facilities and arrangements to this end should
be concluded with the minimum of delay, otherwise we stand to face with¬
drawal of facilities, involving a complete cessation of service on some routes,
and in others a temporary stop until alternatives can be arranged. This problem
also has wider ramifications which need not now be expanded, affecting our air
reinforcement routes to other Far East countries.

7. It is of the greatest importance to ensure that, in the struggle to resolve the
political difficulties of the future of India, the question of some form of military
agreement runs no risk of being allowed to go by default. The fact that we do
not arrange formal Treaties with Dominions must not blind us to the necessity
for taking early and concrete steps to obtain our defence requirements should, at
a later date, either Pakistan or Hindustan decide to leave the Commonwealth.
It may, in fact, be most desirable to have written agreements with these tem¬
porary Dominions.

8. There are two stages to these problems. First, the method of approach to
the Indians to initiate talks must be decided upon and secondly, we must be
quite clear what our detailed requirements are.

9. Your views on the first stage are requested. Meanwhile, the Chiefs of
Staff are reviewing defence requirements to bring them up to date.

10. Your views are also requested on what should be said in Parliament on
this subject on second reading of bill.

JULY 1947

873

488

Sir A. Clutterhuck 1 to Commonwealth Relations Office
Telegram , LlPO/6/122: f 67

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL 3 J^Y 1 947 > 5-19 p™

Received: 4 July , 3.15 am

No. 572. Your telegram Z. No. 37.2

Prime Minister is grateful to you for consulting him and sympathises with
objective. But he feels that use of word “independence” in title of Bill would be
liable to cause misunderstanding, since it would he thinks denote to the ordinary
person independence of the Commonwealth.

2. He developed this view to me in long talk this afternoon, in course of
which he said that same point had arisen in connection with the famous Balfour
formula at the 1926 Imperial Conference. General Hertzog had then insisted
that the word “independent” should be included in the formula. A long struggle
had ensued over this in which he (Mackenzie King) had taken a leading part and
finally, after much coming and going behind the scenes, he and Hankey
between them had succeeded in coaxing Hertzog out of it.

3. Prime Minister said that he had explained at the time that it would be
impossible for him to justify word “independent” to Canadian public opinion,
since Canadians would certainly take it to mean a cutting of the painter and
complete separation from Britain and the Commonwealth, c.f. the American
War of Independence. He had argued that, since there was no intention on
anyone’s part of breaking the Commonwealth Association, what was really
meant was not “independence” but “self-dependence”, i.e. the right to govern
oneself without interference and Hertzog had finally accepted this view.

4. He continued that, if he were asked for a personal opinion now in relation
to India, he could only say again today what he said then. He did not think that
Canadian public opinion would be unduly excited whatever title was adopted
for the Bill, but seeing that whole object was to set up two Dominions in
India, and to encourage them to remain within the Commonwealth, he could
not help feeling himself that the word “independence” did not fit the facts, and
might convey the wrong notion. He thought that some such title as “India
(transfer of Powers) Bill” would be a safer and more appropriate alternative.

1 British High Commissioner in Canada.

2 No. 481.

874

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

489

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/j/ iji6o: f 81

important new Delhi, 4 July ig47, 2 am

secret Received: 4 July, 2.10 am

No. 1732-S. It was stated in Prime Minister’s telegram No. 8402 of 1st July
19471 that my Plan for the reconstitution of the Central Government was not
considered by H.M.G. to be altogether fair to the League. Though I propose
not to implement it until after the Bill has been passed I do not agree that the
Plan was unfair to the League.

2. It may not have been appreciated that we have a standstill agreement here
under which nothing that is likely to cause offence to the opposite Party is
decided by any member of the Cabinet without reference to the Cabinet as a
whole. Consequently almost all ordinary administrative work is at a standstill.
Secondly, the important work that is being done goes to the Partition Council,
where the League have parity.

3. There are two main issues involved in the Congress campaign, which is
pressed mainly by Nehru. One is the prestige point, the other is the Congress
desire to make sure that the standstill agreement is likely to be implemented in
the Finance Department. The second is a reasonable request, and I cannot see
that my Plan, as a whole, is unfair on the Muslim League.

4. I repeat in my immediately succeeding telegram2 the text of the instruc¬
tions given to the Governor of Bengal, and accepted by both parties, about the
reconstitution of the Bengal Government. This puts the matter rather more
precisely than the draft Press statement which I forwarded with my telegram
No. 1616-S dated 27th June3 and indicates how the Plan will work, though at
the Centre the League will probably insist that a reference to the Viceroy
should be provided as in the original draft Press statement.

1 No. 447.

2 Tel. 173 3— S repeated the text of the Instructions in No. 410. R/3/1/160: f 82.

3 No. 379, para. 5.

JULY 1947

875

490

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram , L/lVS/i ji 033 : f 162

important India office, 4 fuly 1947, 2 am

8578. Your telegram No. 1617-S dated 27th June.1 I realise that combined
needs of printing plant for two new Dominions will exceed those of existing
Central Government and my Office have already been in touch with depart¬
ments concerned here to press for expediting of orders for such plant. Every¬
thing possible will be done here by continued pressure and persuasion to
accelerate manufacture and shipment. But there is no longer any system where¬
by H.M.G. can ensure priority by issue of directions to manufacturers. This
obviously precludes my giving assurance upon which reliance can be placed.
More detailed explanation of the position will be sent in reply to promised
official telegram.

2. I suppose the same question may arise in regard to other requirements and
it would only lead to misunderstanding and disappointment if Pakistan interests
thought that Government priority here can be used to secure adequate pro¬
vision for their needs. It is rather upon proper operation of partition machinery
in India, purpose of which is to secure equitable division, that they must rely.
But as I have said we shall do what we can to help within limited possibilities of
situation.

1 See No. 369, note 13.

491

The Earl oj Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram, L/P &]/ 10/124: jf 141-2

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 4 fuly 1947, 2.1 3 am

secret Received: 4 fuly, 9.30 am

No. 8587. My following telegram1 indicates text of bill which will be published
here about 16.00 hours D.B.S.T. Friday 4th July. You will no doubt arrange
for simultaneous release in India. Exact hour of release will be confirmed later
with specific authority to you to release in India at same time.

1 Not printed. For the principal amendments made to the draft Bill see No. 428 and its note 1.

876

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

2. Any later time for publication would have made impossible a target date
of 20th July for passing of the bill. Second Reading will be on 10th July.

3. We have considered2 comments of Congress and Muslim leaders on draft
bill and have accepted (subject to some redrafting) most of the suggestions on
which there was not marked disagreement. We have in fact largely accepted
your own recommendations.3

4. Brief account of our reasons for being unable to accept certain suggestions

will so far as they have not already been communicated to you be telegraphed
4

5. In the view of H.M.G. bill faithfully carries out plan in announcement of
3rd June5 which both Congress and League accepted. If time had permitted we
should have been happy to discuss further the points they have raised on the
bill which we have not accepted but this would have imperilled passage of the
bill this Session and would certainly have made passage by about 20th July out
of the question.

6. We will consider whether we can move at Committee stage any amend¬
ment which you consider vital on which both Parties are agreed.

3 See No. 486, Minute 3.

2 See Nos. 484 and 485.

4 See No. 514.

5 No. 45.

492

Mr Costar 1 to Commonwealth Relations Office
Telegram, L/POI6/122: f 68

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL 4 July 1947, 4. 10 pm

Received: 4 July, 11.1s am

No. 193. Your telegram Z. No. 37 of 3rd July.2 India Independence Bill.

1. Prime Minister says that it will be necessary for him to consult Cabinet
and Leader of Opposition before replying. Prime Minister will, however, do
his best to let us have reply as soon as possible.

2. Prime Minister himself appears to consider proposed employment of term
‘ ‘independence’ ’ as unfortunate. However, greater difficulty is that he much
doubts whether Opposition will willingly agree. Reason for this view is that
only this morning he learned that Opposition were preparing to attack him in

JULY 1947

877

House of Representatives for agreeing to change in title of Secretary of State
and Dominions Office in a direction which Opposition regard as step towards
cutting the painter” without consulting them. He was, however, able to
anticipate trouble by hurriedly making statement immediately House met this
morning, in which after repeating statement made in London3 (your Z. No. 35
of 1st July) he emphasised that New Zealand made no request for the change,
which arises primarily out of changing situation in India, that she was of course
consulted, and raised no objection, though her preference was for Common¬
wealth Affairs rather than Commonwealth Relations. He added that the change
had no particular significance so far as New Zealand was concerned. Full text
of statement by despatch.

3. Will telegraph again as soon as further information is available re India
Independence Bill.

1 Acting British High Commissioner in New Zealand.

2 No. 481.

3 See No. 451 and its note i.

493

Meeting of the Indian Cabinet. Case Nos. 162 , 170 and 171I33I47
Mountbatten Papers. Minutes of Indian Cabinet Meetings

SECRET

Those present at this Meeting held on 4 July 1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral
Viscount Mountbatten of Burma , Pandit Nehru , Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , Sardar Patel ,
Dr Rajendra Prasad, Mr Rajagopalachari, Dr Matthai, Sardar Baldev Singh ,
Mr Bhabha, Sir R. Pillai, Sir H. Shoobert; Sir G. Abell, Mr H. M. Patel, Mr
Osman Ali ( Secretariat )

Case No. 162/33/47 Financial liability arising out of the payment of com¬
pensation to the officers of the Secretary of State’s
Services

MINUTES

His Excellency said that his note1 which had been circulated explained H.M.G.’s
view on this subject, namely while they had not yet finally decided whether the
question of responsibility for the payment of compensation should be linked
with the negotiations in regard to sterling balances, they did not regard them¬
selves as debarred from raising the question of financial liability regarding

1 See No. 103, note 4; also No. 359.

878

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

compensation to Secretary of State’s officers during any negotiations about the
sterling balances.

The Hon’ble the Home Member said that the Cabinet had already expressed
its opinion in clear and unambiguous terms diat the Government of India did
not admit any liability to pay compensation to officers of the Secretary of
State’s services beyond that which had been expressly admitted in the announce¬
ment made by His Excellency the Viceroy on the 30th April.2 In order to avoid
any misunderstanding on this score, it was necessary to reiterate the stand
already taken by the Cabinet.

DECISION

The Cabinet took note of H.M.G.’s view, and reiterated its view that the
Government of India did not admit any liability to pay compensation to the
officers of the Secretary of State’s services save in the circumstances explained in
the announcement made by His Excellency the Viceroy on the 30th April,
1947. His Excellency the Viceroy undertook to convey this view to H.M.G.3

Case No. 170/33/47 Afghan claims on the NorthWest Frontier
The Hon’ble Member for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations said
that about a month ago the Press and the Radio in Afghanistan had started a
campaign giving prominence to Afghanistan’s interests in the North West
Frontier and the claim was made that Pathans were Afghans rather than Indians
and they should have the utmost freedom to decide their own future and should
not be debarred, as the proposed referendum would appear to do, from deciding
either to form a separate free State or to rejoin their mother-land, viz. Afghanis¬
tan. These claims had later been taken up on an official level with H.M.G. and
the Government of India. The Government of India had refuted this irredentist
claim of Afghanistan to the area lying between the Durand line and the Indus
river, and had pointed out that the issue regarding an independent Pathan State
was a matter entirely for the Government of India and the Afghan Govern¬
ment had no locus standi. H.M.G.’s Minister at Kabul had mentioned the
possibility that the Afghan Government’s object might be to divert public
attention in Afghanistan from the internal economic situation which was
precarious.

Case No. 171/33/47 Reconstitution of the Central Government
His Excellency said his colleagues would recall that on his return from London
lie had informed them that as soon as the question of partition was legally
decided on the votes of the Punjab, Bengal and Sind, he would request his
colleagues for their resignations. Voting had since taken place in the Legislatures
of those provinces in favour of partition. He now invited his colleagues to
tender their resignations. It was his intention, however, to request them to
carry on with their present portfolios until the Indian Independence Bill was
passed when he would reconstitute the Government. During the intervening

JULY I947

879

period, lie thought that the ‘standstill’ agreement might be modified so as to
make it more effective. At present, Departmental decisions came up to the
Cabinet for scrutiny too late, at times, to prevent action being taken on them,
if they were considered to be objectionable from any standpoint. His Excel¬
lency proposed accordingly that in future all departments should send to his
Private Secretary’s Office every night the gist of all decisions of some impor¬
tance taken during the preceding 24 hours and not implement them until they
were informed by that Office that it would be in order to do so. This would give
him an opportunity of holding up further action on any decision, which
appeared prima facie likely to affect adversely or to embarrass one or the other
of the future Governments. This would not, of course, do away with the
necessity of the departments continuing to submit weekly lists of decisions in
accordance with the ‘standstill’ agreement.

In regard to appointments, it was pointed out that unlike policy matters,
which might conceivably affect both the future Governments, the future
Pakistan Government clearly would not be concerned at all. It might, therefore,
reduce inconvenience and delay , if the appointments of only those who had
elected to or were likely to go to Pakistan were submitted to the Cabinet for its
approval.

After a brief discussion it was agreed that the ‘standstill’ agreement should be
revised as follows : —

(1) No appointments in Class II and above should be made in respect of any
person who had elected to go to Pakistan without the approval of the Cabinet.
Appointments of those who had elected to stay on in India might be made in
the ordinary way.

(2) As in the ordinary course, decisions on important matters should be
taken with the approval of the Cabinet.

(3) In regard to other matters of some importance on which decisions would
have ordinarily been taken by an Hon’ble Member whether on his own res¬
ponsibility or in consultation with one or more of his colleagues, but without
reference to the Cabinet or on his behalf by his departmental officers, each
department should send to the Office of the Private Secretary to His Excellency
the Viceroy at the end of each day a list of decisions taken during the day in the
department. The description of each decision should be brief, but sufficient to
indicate whether it is likely to be controversial. (The Private Secretary to His
Excellency the Viceroy will ring up the Secretary of the Department the
following morning and inform him whether there are any cases in his list on

2 Cmd 7116. See Vol. X, No. 144, p. 237 for an indication of the exceptions admitted in the announce¬
ment.

3 In tel. 1893-S of 10 July Lord Mountbatten referred to No. 103 and continued as follows: ‘I informed
Cabinet on 4th July of H.M.G.’s attitude. Unanimous opinion of Cabinet was that Govt of India
must re-assert their own position. Recorded decision was: [there follows the text oj the decision as given
in the final paragraph above]. R/ 3/1/188 : f 19.

88o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

which His Excellency wishes to see the papers before the decision is imple¬
mented.)

All these decisions should in any case be included in the weekly report to the
Cabinet.

494

Mr Hankinson 1 to Commonwealth Relations Office
Telegram , LjPOj6ji22: f yo

IMPORTANT 4 July 1947, 5-45 Pin

top secret and personal Received: 4 July, 1.30pm

No. 451. Your telegram Z. No. 37.* Title of India Bill.

Following from Hankinson. Begins.

As High Commissioner was away from Canberra I made appointment to
see Prime Minister this afternoon 4th July and left with him letter containing
substance of your telegram. Dr. Evatt was present. After some talk, Prime
Minister said that he would like to consider matter further with Dr. Evatt and
undertook to let me have their considered answer as soon as possible. I explained
that you were anxious to receive reply by Monday if possible and Prime
Minister made note of this.

2. I gathered from our preliminary talk that, while Prime Minister and
Dr. Evatt were not at first sight disposed to think that proposed title would be
likely to create any real difficulty so far as Australia was concerned, they were
not at all happy about use of word “independence” in the title of the Bill
(which is to provide for Dominion status) and might be hesitant to say title is
acceptable to them if that acceptance might be quoted publicly. On die other
hand they realised that the title “India Bill” by itself would be somewhat
colourless and might not be regarded as sufficient vis-a-vis Indian opinion,
while on the spur of the moment they could not think of any appropriate
substitute for “independence”. (Dr. Evatt remarked on the coincidence that
they should be approached on this matter on American Independence Day) .

3 . I will telegraph considered answer immediately this is received from Prime
Minister, but I thought it desirable to pass on the above at once though it
represents merely my impression of the Commonwealth Ministers’ first

1 British Deputy High Commissioner in Australia.

2 No. 481.

JULY 1947

88l

tli oughts on die matter and may not in any way coincide with their final views
when they have had time to give further consideration to it. Ends.3

3 tel. 350 of 4 July the Commonwealth Relations Office thanked Mr Hankinson for the action he
had taken and sent him a personal message similar to that given to Mr Costar in No. 512. In tel. 454
of 7 July Mr Hankinson reported that Mr Chifley had told him in conversation that he had heard on
the wireless that the Bill had been introduced under the title ‘India Independence Bill*. Mr Chifley
was therefore sending him a letter which contained the passage: ‘in these circumstances it would
appear that any comment by me one way or the other on the subject is unnecessary’. L/PO/6/122:
ff 7U75-

495

Viceroy s Conference Paper V.C.P. 107

Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Governors-General and Gover¬
nors of Provinces, Appointment of Part 2

TOP SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI , 4 July I94J

GOVERNORS-GENERAL

The attached paper will be considered at The Viceroy’s Meeting at 4 p.m. on
Friday, 4th July, 1947.

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

part 1

[This section is not printed; it was substantially the same as Enclosure 2 to No. 522.]

PART 11

1. H.E. indicated that, before making his final decision on whether to
remain as Governor-General of the Dominion of India, he would require from
Mr Jinnah reaffirmation of the fact that the latter welcomed H.E.’s acceptance
of the appointment.

2. In view of the difficulty of ever getting Mr Jinnah’s signature to a letter, it
is for consideration whether a verbal statement, in the presence of witnesses,
would not suffice. This would then be quoted in Parliament, and be given
world- wide publicity. However, a draft letter is attached as Annex ‘A’ (to
follow).1

PART III

1. The question arises as to what amendments should be made to the Indian
Independence Bill. The proviso to Clause 5, as approved by the King, at
present reads :

1 See Annex.

882

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Provided that, unless and until provision to the contrary is made by law
of the Legislature of either of the new Dominions, the same person may be
Governor-General of both new Dominions.

2. It is understood that Mr Nehru would prefer the Governments, as opposed
to the Legislatures, to be empowered to make the necessary provision to the
contrary. However, he has not put this suggestion up officially.

3. Any amendment that is now made would have to be introduced during
the second reading.

4. There are three possible courses:

A. To leave the proviso as it stands. This will entail Mr Jinnah having to
summon his Legislature after 15 th August, and for that Legislature to pass the
necessary amending legislation. Thus, for a period, if only a day, after 15th
August, H.E. will in fact be Governor-General of both Dominions.

B. To amend the proviso (and subsequent clauses as necessary) to arrange
for there to be one “Common Governor-General” and two “Officiating
Govemors-General” (or whatever terms are chosen). Such an amendment
might be made if the Nawab of Bhopal’s efforts with Mr Jinnah are success¬
ful, and if Congress agrees.2

C. If Mr Jinnah remains adamant, to delete the proviso (and make sub¬
sequent amendments) at the second reading. This would surely give an
admirable opportunity for explanation, in Parliament, of the course of
events which have led up to this step.

Annex to No. 495
Draft of letter (1 not sent )

From H.E.

To Mr Jinnah

You will remember that on the 17th May3 when you and Liaquat met Mieville
and myself you invited me to stay on after the transfer of power, in order to
complete all the details of partition in some capacity superior to the two
Govemors-General envisaged; and I reported your statement to H.M.G.

2. On the same date I received an invitation from Congress inviting me to be
Governor-General of the Indian Union after transfer of power,4 and, in accept¬
ing this honour, I pointed out how difficult it would be for me to remain on as
Governor-General of one Dominion only : I, therefore, qualified my acceptance
by adding that it would be subject to a similar invitation being received from
the League by which I could act as Governor-General for both Dominions for
the short period until partition was completed.

3. While I am anxious to return to England and resume my career in the
Royal Navy, I am, on the other hand, most reluctant to leave a job half done
and no one can contend that with the setting up of the two new Dominions on
the 15th August that partition will have been completed. I should therefore like

JULY 1947

883

to remain for a few months representing both Dominions to see the job
through properly.

4. On the other hand you have now informed me that it is your wish that
you personally should be nominated as Governor-General of Pakistan. I shall
be glad if you will confirm that it is your desire that I should submit your
name to The King, and, at the same time, I should be glad if you would con¬
firm that you would have no objection to my remaining as Governor-General
of the Indian Union, and that you are satisfied that your interests will not,
therefore, be prejudiced, as the decision, which I have not yet taken, whether to
remain or not with the Indian Union is one in which I shall be guided largely by
the attitude you may take up.

2 Words in italics underlined in original.

3 Vol. X, No. 473.

4 See ibid.. No. 471.

496

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Gandhi 1

Rb/i I151: f 250

no. 1446/3 4 ply ^947

Dear Mr Gandhi,

In your letter of 28/29 June2 to me you said that the Referendum on the
Frontier would go on without any interference by the followers of Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

It is reported to me from the Frontier that Red Shirts are now “persuading”
people not to vote.

I think you will agree that any action of this sort is likely to lead to the very
violence you and I are so anxious to avoid. I trust that if the reports are true, in
view of the policy stated in your letter you will be able to persuade Khan Abdul
Ghaffar Khan to implement that policy.

Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 This letter was sent in response to a suggestion made by Sir R. Lockhart and contained in tel. CA-138
of 2 July. R/3/1/151: f 242.

2 No. 396.

884

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

497

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to Pandit Nehru
Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Sikh Problem, Part 11(a)
no. 592/63 4 July 1947

Dear Mr Nehru,

As a result of discussions I have had from time to time with the Sikh leaders1 1
should like to put to you their point of view.

2. They are naturally worried about the position in the Punjab, where,
unless major alterations are made by the Boundary Commission, the Sikh
community will be so divided that almost half will remain in the Muslim
Province of Western Punjab.

3. They hope that the Boundary Commission will make such major
alterations, but that is not a point which immediately concerns the political
parties. Apart from this, they ask for assurances that they will receive weightage
in the Legislature of Eastern Punjab. They hope also that they will have weight-
age in the Central Houses of the Union of India and a seat in the Union
Government.

4. They have suggested that they should have special representation in the
existing Constituent Assembly. Clearly I cannot help them on this point or,
indeed, on any of the others except by approaching you, but you may wish to
consider the matter.

5. Finally, they have suggested that the transfer of population should be
seriously considered in the Punjab.

6. I expect all these points have been put to you but I should like to tell you
how much I sympathise with the Sikhs and how much I hope you will be able
to help them.

Yours sincerely,

M OF B

1 cf. No. 417, para. 8.

498

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma to Mr Jinnah
Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Sikh Problem, Part 11(a)
no. 592/63 4 July 1947

Dear Mr Jinnah,

As a result of discussions I have had from time to time with the Sikh Leaders1
I should like to put to you their point of view.

JULY 1947

885

2. They are naturally worried about the position in the Punjab where,
unless major alterations are made by the Boundary Commission, the Sikh
community will be divided into two almost equal parts.

3. They have asked for certain special consideration in the Union of India
and in the Eastern Punjab but they also urge that the transfer of population
should be seriously considered in the Punjab and I hope that at the proper time
this will be considered by you, whether as the result of the Boundary Com¬
mission or otherwise. They also hope they will have weightage in the Central
Houses of Pakistan and a seat in the Pakistan Government.

4. I sympathise with the Sikhs, as I am sure you do, and I hope everything
possible will be done to allay their fears.2

Yours sincerely,

M OF B

1 cf. No. 417, para. 8.

2 No reply to this letter has been traced.

499

Minutes of Viceroy's Fifty Second Staff Meeting, Item 2

Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET

Those present during discussion of Item 2 of this Meeting held at The Viceroy s House,
New Delhi on 4 July 1947 at 4 pm were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of
Burma, Lord Ismay, Sir E. Mieville, Sir G. Abell, Rao Bahadur V. P. Menon,
Captain Brockman, Mr I. D. Scott, Mr Campbell-] ohnson, Lieutenant-Colonel
Erskine Crum

GOVERNORS- GENERAL

(V.C.P. 107)1

The Meeting considered a paper prepared by the Conference Secretary, putting
forward the reasons, as brought out in an unrecorded discussion the previous
day, why His Excellency should accept the appointment of Governor-General
of the new Dominion of India alone. This question had arisen because of
Mr Jinnah’s intention, first declared two days previously,2 to put forward his own
name for the post of Governor-General of Pakistan.

1 No. 495.

2 For an account of Lord Mountbatten’s interview with Mr Jinnah see No. 506, paras. 23-5.

886

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

his excellency the viceroy said that his conscience was clear that
he had taken every possible step of which he knew, in order to put clearly
before Mr Jinnah the advantages of Pakistan having the same Governor-
General as India during at least the initial period after the transfer of power. The
final step which he had taken had been to send for the Nawab of Bhopal and
ask him again to point out the advantages to Mr Jinnah. This step had been
unsuccessful, his excellency said that to him the most painful part of all this
was that he had, though unintentionally, deceived Congress. They had made
their offer that he should remain as Governor-General of the Dominion of
India on the understanding that he would be Governor-General of Pakistan
also.3 his excellency emphasised that Mr Jinnah’s decision had come as a
complete surprise to him. For example, Mr Jinnah had not told the Nawab of
Bhopal, when he had seen him four days previously, what was in his mind.

the viceroy stated that the Nawab of Bhopal had given his opinion that
the only hope for Pakistan now was for him (His Excellency) to stay on as
Governor-General of India. The Nawab of Bhopal had said that he con¬
sidered that this was the only hope for the States too. He had added that from
the personal viewpoint he thought that the decision was much more difficult
and had suggested that three days would be required in order to make it.

rao bahadur menon stated that Mr Mohd. Ali had told him that infor¬
med Muslim League opinion shared the Nawab of Bhopal’s view that it would
be in the interests of Pakistan for His Excellency to remain as Governor-
General of India.

A separate part of the paper before the Meeting dealt with the question as to
whether, in the light of Mr Jinnah’s decision, it would be desirable to amend the
proviso to the Indian Independence Bill which allowed the same person to be
Governor-General of both Dominions, his excellency decided that it
would be best to leave this proviso as it stood.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

(i) took note of V.C.P. 107;

(ii) approved a draft telegram4 to the Prime Minister, handed round at the
Meeting, informing him of the latest situation;

(iii) directed Prin. Sec. to draft a telegram5 to His Majesty the King to
inform him of the course of events ;

(iv) decided to ask Mr Jinnah, when next he saw him, whether he would
accept a G.C.M.G. or similar decoration.6

3 cf. Vol. X, No. 471, p. 869.

4 Presumably the draft of No. 508.

5 This telegram has not been traced.

6 See No. 533, para. 3.

JULY I947

887

500

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Jinnah

RI3I1I162: f 27

NO. 1446/16 4 July

Dear Mr Jinnali,

I would be grateful if, on behalf of the successor authority, you would let me
have in writing the name recommended for Governor General of Pakistan, in
order that I may make a formal submission to The King.

As I told you, I ought to have submitted the name today at latest. I would
therefore be most grateful if you could let me have an immediate reply.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

501

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

R/3l 1 1 154: ff 56-8

SECRET EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, 4 July ig47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I enclose a note containing our comments on the comments of the Muslim
League1 on the draft Bill.2

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Enclosure to No. 301

The following are our comments on the League comments on the draft Bill : —
Clause 2. — The Dominion of India does continue the international person¬
ality of the existing India, retaining whatever is not specifically transferred to
Pakistan. We cannot possibly agree to any amendment which will throw doubt
on this position. On the contrary, we have proposed amendments designed to
confirm it beyond any possibility of doubt.

As regards the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, their total population,
according to the census of 1941, was about 34,000, of whom about 12,000 were
Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists; about 11,000 aboriginal tribes; about 8,000

1 See No. 480.

2 Lord Mountbatten sent Pandit Nehru an acknowledgement on 5 July. R/3/1/154: £78. The note was
circulated as V.C.P. 111 of 5 July.

888

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Muslims; and about 3,000 others. It will thus be seen that they are very pre¬
dominantly a non-Muslim area; it is not even correct to say that the majority
of the population consists of tribes. In the judicial sphere, their administration is
for certain purposes linked with the High Court at Calcutta. In other respects
they are administered as a Chief Commissioner’s Province.

The islands do not He on the direct route between the two parts of Pakistan.
If they are of strategic importance to Pakistan, much more so are they to the
Dominion of India. The claim that these islands should be allotted to Pakistan is
therefore wholly untenable. There can be no question of their being allotted
to or forming part of Pakistan; only such areas can be included in Pakistan as
have expressed a wish to that effect; the rest remains with India.

Clauses 3 & 4. — We have no objection to the decisions of the Boundary
Commission being treated as awards binding on all concerned.

Clause 6(2). — We have made a similar recommendation.

Clauses 9 & 11 . — There is no reason why the Governor General should not
act on the advice of Ministers. If the Ministers of the two Dominions differ in
respect of some order which concerns both, the matter may go to arbitration.

We have already agreed that the period mentioned in sub-clause (5) of clause
9 may be extended to March 31, 1948.

The powers of repeal and amendment of the Legislatures of the Dominions
extend only to their respective territories. It is unnecessary to restrict them in
any way.

Clause 19(3), proviso. — It is unnecessary specifically to provide in the Bill
who the appropriate authority to negotiate with the tribal areas on the N.W.F.
or elsewhere should be; no such provision has been made in respect of the
Indian States.

General— We strongly object to H.M.G. or any other external authority
undertaking to enforce the awards made by the Boundary Commissions or
any arbitration tribunals that may be set up in future. The implementing of the
awards should be left to the good sense of the two States concerned, as in the
case of any two independent States.

502

Pandit Nehru to Mr Velio di
Telegram, Rfe/i {138: ff 43-6

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN, NEW DELHI, 4 July I947

SECRET

No. 5211. Personal for Vellodi from Nehru.

Your telegram first July.1 Sorry to leam of your distress at activities of agents
of Indian States in London. We fully realise this, though we do not think it can

JULY 1947

889

produce much effect in present context. Time for making decisions in London
is passing. However, every effort should be made to keep in touch with
situation and inform us of it. Please meet Katju reaching London Sunday.
Krishna Menon starting Friday next.

2. Our position regarding States as follows:

Quite apart from question of lapse of paramountcy of British Crown,
geography and questions of security make it impossible for us to recognise
independence of any State; nor can we recognise any State joining Pakistan,
unless it is contiguous to it and its people wish it to join. Most States have
already joined Constituent Assembly of India. We expect others to do so soon.
Those remaining over may do so, subject inevitably to their defence, foreign
policy and some other matters being controlled by Indian Union. I have stated
formally1 2 that any recognition by a foreign State of independence of an Indian
State will be considered by us an unfriendly act. Foreign trade relations of
Indian States, leading to creation of foreign vested interests, also considered
objectionable by us.

4. Sudhir Ghosh’s telegram to me, dated 3rd July3 regarding Frontier
referendum: no breach of pledge involved in abstention from referendum by
Frontier Congress.

Referendum nevertheless takes place. Method of asking people to choose was
objected to as it became a communal question. Ideal of free Pathanistan does
not mean complete independence or isolation from India. It means full auto¬
nomy for province and liberty of choice as to which Dominion to join. Frontier
Congress entirely opposed to any intrusion of Afghanistan in a matter which
appertains to India only.

4. On Muslim League side propaganda to build up pan-Islamic State from
Frontier to West Asia. Frontier congressmen entirely opposed to this as well as
to joining Pakistan. However in order to avoid contest on purely communal
issue and possibility of conflict on such issue they decided to abstain from taking
part in referendum. Quite clear that there is no demand for separate sovereign
state as everyone realises Frontier province too small and weak for such exis¬
tence.

5. Sudhir Ghosh’s statement regarding continuity of India completely
correct position that certain areas have seceded from India and have been
formed into a separate State of Pakistan. The rest of India continues as before
and all treaties and engagements with it continue as when Burma was separated.

1 No. 450.

2 cf. No. 206, note 5.

3 Not traced.

890

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

503

Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

Rbl1l157: f

SECRET GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE, 4 July 1947

NO. 69O

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

After this morning’s meeting of the Partition Committee, Dr. Gopi Chand
Bhargava and Sardar Swaran Singh asked to see me privately. Dr. Gopi Chand
raised some points about the future of the University, with which I need not
trouble Your Excellency. Sardar Swaran Singh then raised two points, which
may later be of some importance: —

(1) He said that Partition proceedings could not go very far until the boun¬
dary was finally settled. The Panthic Party would certainly not agree to the
installation of two new Governments on the basis of the “notional” boundary.
I replied that the Boundary Commission might take a considerable time over its
report, and that since it was the policy of His Majesty’s Government and of
Your Excellency to bring the new Dominions into being as soon as possible, I
had assumed that the new Dominion and Provincial Governments would be
set up on the basis of the “notional” boundary, subject to adjustments to be
made later. It was clearly impossible to allow present conditions to continue in
the Punjab indefinitely, and now that every one had agreed on partition, the
sooner we could get the two new Governments going the better. Sardar
Swaran Singh did not seem satisfied and repeated that the boundary must be
determined finally before effect could be given to partition.

(2) He said that quite apart from the question of the boundary, the time
allowed for the partition proceedings was much too short. It would in his
opinion be impossible to get the work done in an orderly way before
15th August. I replied that I had been given to understand that the two new
Governments were to be established on or about 15th August and that my own
services would not be required after that date. I was sure that neither His
Majesty’s Government nor Your Excellency wished to protract the pro¬
ceedings. Every one intimately concerned with the problem was satisfied that
the present arrangements would not do, and must be changed as soon as
possible. I referred again to conditions in the Punjab. Sardar Swaran Singh
asked whether a representation to Your Excellency would have any effect. I
said that if a joint representation were made by all three parties asking for more

JULY 1947

891

time, I would certainly forward it to Your Excellency; but the matter was one
on which I did not think all three parties would agree.1

Yours sincerely,

E. M. JENKINS

1 Lord Mountbatten replied on 10 July stating (i) that since Sir E. Jenkins wrote, the party leaders, the
Partition Council and Sir Cyril Radcliffe had all agreed that the Boundary Commissions should
fmish their work by 15 August 1947; and (ii) that as far as the Centre was concerned it had also been
decided that partition should be completed by 15 August except for tying up of loose ends.
R/3/1/157: f 152.

504

Mr Attlee to Mr Churchill1
Public Record Office. PREM 8/541 Part 11

4 July 1947

My dear Churchill,

I have delayed replying to your letter2 while awaiting any further communica¬
tion from the Viceroy on the point raised by your colleagues as to the title of
the Bill. Owing to the time factor, it was impossible to make a change even if it
was desirable.

I do not agree with the point which you make. Dominion Prime Ministers
constantly stress the point that they are independent States within the British
Commonwealth. They bear allegiance to The King who is The King of all the
Dominions. The insistence on independence does not touch the point of
allegiance, but emphasizes the complete freedom of every member of the
Commonwealth from control by any other member.

I think this is a most valuable counter to the demand for independence
outside the Commonwealth as it shows that this demand can be satisfied within
it. This is, in fact, the meaning of Dominion Status.

Yours sincerely,

C. R. ATTLEE

1 The draft of this letter is in Mr Attlee’s own hand.

2 No. 445.

892

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

505

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel
Mountbatten Papers. Letters to and from the Secretary of State

4 July 1947

My dear Listowel,

Thank you for your letter of the 27th June.1 I quite see the point of view
expressed in the first few paragraphs of your letter. I, of course, entered into no
commitment with Gandhi beyond promising to refer the matter to you. The
line the Prime Minister intends to take, as described in paragraph 6 of your
letter, may not satisfy Gandhi, but I feel it will have a reasonably good effect
out here.2

2. I am sorry to hear that it appears likely that Burma will leave the Com¬
monwealth. I am sure, from their point of view, it will be a retrograde step ;
there is much we could have done to help them and their departure can only
result in the end in their being a more backward country than they would have
been with our assistance.

3. Can you not go ahead on the basis of an interim Dominion period as in
India and Pakistan until Burma have completed their new constitution and
completed the legal drafting ? If you were to rush legislation through now this
session and made it last until such time as the new constitution were accepted, I
feel sure Ranee could convince them of the advantages in the meanwhile.

4. You will remember in my letter of the 5 th June3 1 referred to the question
of outstanding appeals with the Privy Council. I am glad to see that Clause 9(c)
of the draft Bill allows for the continued use of the Privy Council. The question
of outstanding appeals to the Privy Council and also whether the Privy Council
is to be used in future for appeals is at present being considered by the expert
Sub-Committee of the Partition Council dealing with legislative matters.

5. Nehru has shown to me a copy of his letter to you dated 20th June,4 in
which he asked that arrangements might be made for the acting High Com¬
missioner for India to meet the Colonial Secretary in regard to proposals
concerning Indians resident in East Africa, West Indies, Fiji and Mauritius. I do
not, of course, know the background of the case, but anything that you can do
at the present time to meet Nehru’s request will be a great help to me in view of
his peculiar frame of mind and the difficult negotiations I have on hand.

6. This letter and attached Report are rather shorter than usual, but I have
had a very full week and a particularly difficult one dealing with the Indian
leaders in regard to the draft Bill and the Reconstitution of the Interim Govern-

JULY 1947

893

ment. The latter, as you will have realised from the exchange of telegrams, has
been, I think, the most difficult matter I have had to handle since I came out
here.

Yours sincerely,
MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 No. 376.

2 Lord Listowel sent Mr Attlee a copy of this paragraph in his minute 117/47 of 9 July 1947.
L/PO/6/122: f 82.

3 No. 90, paras. 3-4.

4 Not traced.

506

Viceroy's Personal Report No. 1 1
LjPOj6ji23: ff 135-62

[

TOP SECRET 4 July 1947

1. This report is being taken home by Ismay. The three main matters,
which have been dealt with at a series of meetings throughout this week have
been the Partition of the Armed Forces; the draft Bill; and the proposed
Reconstitution of the Interim Government. Another vital matter has been the
question of whether to have a common Governor-General for the two Domin¬
ions. These matters are dealt with below.

2. All of us had feared that the partition of the Armed Forces (the details of
which were issued in a long communique on 1st July)1 was going to be a major
stumbling block. The attitude of both parties in demanding to have their own
armies of their own nationals, under their own control by 15 th August, and the
objections raised by both sides to any form of supreme administrative control
made us all apprehensive. I then had the brain wave of sending for Trivedi, the
Governor of Orissa, who had been Secretary of the Defence Department during
the war, and who is the only Indian who has any idea of high level defence
organisation. Not only is he trusted by Nehru and Patel, but fortunately he has
been a life long friend of Liaquat Ah Khan. In eight days’ hard work he was
able to obtain concessions from the leaders and lobby the final paper so success¬
fully that the Partition Council meeting itself2 went off more smoothly than any
meeting I have ever seen. This is one of the most important successes we have
had to date, and Auchinleck is delighted beyond measure.

1 See No. 464 and its note 3.

894

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

3 . Nehru has written3 asking me if Nye and Colville will stay on as Gover¬
nors of Madras and Bombay, and wishes me to help him select three British
officers as Heads of the three India Defence Services. There is no question that
Congress is falling over at this moment to make friendly gestures to the
British.

4. The Draft Bill gave me endless trouble. The leaders of both sides were not
only insistent that they must see the Bill, but Congress worked themselves up
into a great state about not being adequately consulted and it was with the
greatest of difficulty that I calmed them down. I had to give way on their
bringing in Gandhi, and all Congress members of Government and four
constitutional lawyers. I felt that we should never reach the end if Congress and
League parties sat together, so I had them sitting in two adjoining rooms in
Viceroy’s House for nearly three days (and nights!).

5. The rate at which the voluminous comments of both sides and my own
comments on their comments were dealt with in London, within less than 24
hours of despatch, has left us all breathless with admiration for a marvellous
piece of work. All of us here are most grateful and appreciative.

6. In regard to the country in general, the situation remains quiet except that
conditions in the Punjab are still very unsettled. There has been some improve¬
ment in Lahore and Amritsar, but it may be that there has not yet been enough
time for the Security Committee, to which I referred in my last Report, to
start functioning properly.

7. Since drafting the above paragraph Jenkins has just sent me a report4 that
Mamdot, the useless Muslim League leader in the Punjab (aptly nicknamed the
“dumb wrestler”) has resigned from the Security Council mainly on the
grounds that Jenkins is anti-Muslim League. One thing Mamdot wanted was
that instead of having one leader of each community — Muslim, Sikh, Hindu —
there should be two Muslims on the Security Council; and he also wished to
institute steps which would nullify the value of searching Muslim areas. In fact,
the League appear to be doing their best to wreck the peace of Lahore, and I am
sending Mieville round right away to see Jinnah about this.

8. I have been trying for some time to obtain the winding-up of the enquiry
into the Calcutta riots of last August and I mentioned the matter at my meeting
with the leaders on 13 th June.5 The Chief Justice, Sir Patrick Spens, had told me
that witnesses were far too frightened to give evidence. He subsequently went
into the matter and he has now informed me that all the parties appearing
before the Commission are agreed that the proceedings of the Commission
should be put an end to. Now that the resolution for partition of Bengal has
been carried a formal petition, signed by all the parties, will be presented in the

JULY I947

895

next day or two, that the work of the Commission be dissolved. I think this is a
most satisfactory conclusion, to all except Gandhi who quite particularly wants
the enquiry to continue.

9. In paragraph 15 of last week’s Report I referred briefly to the arrange¬
ments which were proposed for the Government of Bengal during the interim
period until 13 th August. As a result of discussions during the week the
following is the text of the instructions which I sent to Burrows, and which are
being implemented: —

[There follows the text in No. 410.]

10. Jinnah’s absolute refusal to allow Suhrawardy to accept either a coalition
of [or] regional ministries for East and West Bengal till after the partition ofthe
Province had been decided upon, had made the above inevitable. I need hardly
say that it annoyed Congress a great deal and they only accepted it on the
understanding that I was going to impose an idential set of conditions upon the
League in the Interim Government at Delhi. When, therefore, Jinnah categori¬
cally refused to accept this arrangement on the grounds that it was deliberately
insulting to the League and illegal, I was placed in a quandary. One of the
objects of Nehru and Patel, of course, is to humiliate the League, for they are
sick and tired of Jinnah apparently always winning his point. They were,
therefore, quite uncompromising in their attitude that unless I reconstituted the
Interim Government on the same lines as Bengal but this time of course in
favour of Congress, they would all resign and refuse to take any further part in
the Government of the country until the 15th August.

11. In the meanwhile Jinnah had put forward the legal objections which I
telegraphed6 to London, and which fortunately proved to hold enough water
for me to be able to refuse to carry this out. For Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan
saw Ismay privately7 and informed him that if it were found to be legal and I
attempted to enforce this, the League would leave the Interim Government. In
either case, I realised that the passage of the Bill in Parliament unopposed would
be almost impossible.

12. I am extremely grateful to the Prime Minister for his great help in
sending me the telegram8 which finally convinced Nehru and Patel of the
impossibility of reconstructing the Government forthwith, and they resigned
themselves to its reconstruction as soon after the 20th July as the Bill was
passed. Even this took V. P. Menon and Krishna Menon several hours of hard
lobbying.

3 See No. 462.

4 No. 472.

5 No. 175, Item 4.

6 No. 413.

7 No. 399.

8 No. 468.

896

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

13. The Cabinet Meeting this morning9 passed off very peacefully. I called
for the resignation of all the members and told them I would ask them to carry
on until the Bill was passed when I would reconstitute the Government on the
same lines as Bengal. At the request of Nehru, I also arranged that all appoint¬
ments and action taken at ministerial level were to be reported to me every
night by every department, and were not to be implemented until I had
approved them or referred the matter to the opposite party if I felt that their
future territories’ interests were at stake. This great amount of extra work for
myself and my staff is a small price to pay to have been spared the major
catastrophe of the resignation of one side or the other within six weeks of the
transfer of power.

14. The Referendum in Sylhet, which is due to be held on the 6th and 7th
July, has been causing a little trouble. Jinnah handed to me a number of
complaints about the referendum, some of which might have had some
substance, but others of which were, to my mind, very trivial. For instance, he
complained that Mr. Stork of the I.C.S., who had been appointed Referendum
Commissioner, was a prisoner in Turkey during World War I and was there¬
fore known to be anti-Muslim. He also stated that the symbol on the ballot box
for joining East Bengal, i.e. an axe, according to local superstition symbolises
the causing of an injury to oneself. I have, however, been in touch with Hydari
and agreed with him that Stork should be relieved of his post of Legal Remem¬
brancer to avoid any suspicion of ministerial direction, and have also instructed
the Commander in Chief to send down some military officers to act as observers
on my behalf. I expect things to go quietly and I do not think there will be any
grounds for the League to make any complaints.

15. As expected the voting in Baluchistan was completely in favour of
joining Pakistan. Three members of the Shahi Jirga and five out of the ten
members of Quetta municipality were not present, but the remaining fifty-four
voted unanimously without a debate for joining Pakistan.

16. The attitude of Gandhi continues to be quite unpredictable and as an
example of what I have to contend with I attach as Appendices ‘A’ and ‘B’ a
copy of a letter I received from him dated 27th June, together with the reply I
sent him on the next day. Needless to say everything he wrote in his letter was
a complete misinterpretation, either deliberate or otherwise, of what I had said
to him. He is an inveterate and dangerous Trotskyist. I also attach as Appendix
*C’ a letter I have written to him about the N.W.F.P. Referendum.10

17. The refugee problem has now assumed great proportions, and is par¬
ticularly acute in Delhi where it is estimated there are no less than 70,000
refugees; the United Provinces and some neighbouring States have also had to
cope with large numbers of refugees. At last week’s Cabinet Meeting11 it was

JULY 1947

897

agreed that the task of coping with this problem called for the appointment of a
special officer with appropriate staff to organise suitable measures, such as the
provision of food and clothing, proper sanitation in the refugee camps, medical
facilities and so on. The Home Department is examining the problem and I
have asked that my wife, who has had much experience in these matters,
should be associated with the steps which are being taken.

18. I have, without much difficulty, succeeded in convincing the Congress
Members of Cabinet that unless they have at least one cruiser in the future
Indian Navy, it will never be worth anything; but they did not think they
could afford more than one cruiser at present; and Pakistan have said they can¬
not afford any. Thus, I am afraid that two of the three original cruisers will not
be required anyway for the present, but the sooner the third cruiser can be got
ready for sending out to India the better. I understand from Miles (Commander
in Chief, Royal Indian Navy) that were partition of the Royal Indian Navy not
carried out, only the Captain, the Commander, the Commander (E) and eight
Warrant Officers (five of whom would be Warrant Engineers) would be
required on loan from the Royal Navy for the cruiser. Obviously some
officers and ratings will now be required on loan from the Royal Navy and
details will be given in an official telegram which will issue from the Defence
Department shortly.12

19. This loan of R.N. personnel is, I suggest, excellent, since it will enable us
to extend a helping hand to their Navy and make them realise more than ever
the value of having remained within the Commonwealth. I realise how difficult
it will be for the R.N. to spare these key officers and ratings, but I feel it would
be worth while laying up one of our own cruisers if necessary to start the
Indians off with one, particularly as it will take two or three years before they
can have trained up Indian personnel to take the place of ours. I hope therefore
that this will be treated as a matter of great political importance.

20. The officers and men would presumably serve under the terms now being
negotiated with the Partition Council. I fear that these terms may be difficult
to get through, but I will do my best at the next meeting of the Partition
Council.

21. The main object of Ismay’s visit is to lay before the Prime Minister and

’ No. 493, Case No. 171/33/47-

10 See Nos. 382, 390 and 496.

11 Case No. 156/32/47 of 25 June 1947, not printed. Mountbatten Papers, Minutes of Indian Cabinet
Meetings.

12 In tel. 1749-S of 4 July Lord Mountbatten reported that he had spoken to Pandit Nehru and dis¬
cussed the subject of cruisers in the Cabinet that day. The Union of India definitely wanted one
cruiser with the least possible delay but Pakistan did not require one at present. The number of
officers and artificers required from the Royal Navy was to be stated in an official telegram which
was to be sent shortly L/WS/1/1006.

8p8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Cabinet Committee the very difficult position in which I now find myself in
connection with the question of a common Governor General. It will be
remembered that I reported to the Cabinet Committee13 that Nehru had put in
writing a request to me to remain on as the Governor General of India. As
Jinnah had consistently impressed on me the absolute need for me to remain
until the process of partition was completed I managed (not without difficulty)
to persuade Congress to agree that I must also be allowed to accept a similar
offer from Pakistan so that I could impartially look after the interests of both
dominions during the period of partition.

22. Before I went to London Jinnah said that although he thought two
Governors-General would be better than one, he asked me specifically to stay on
as a Super Governor General over the other two.14 From that day to this he has
repeatedly impressed on myself and my staff the need for us all to stay and see
the partition through fairly; and we have all consistently told him that this can
only be satisfactorily done by myself as a common Governor General and that
fortunately for him Congress had already agreed to this system.

23. For the last three weeks we have been trying to get an answer out of
Jinnah and he has always put off an answer, and finally said he could not let me
know until he had seen the Bill. After he had seen the Bill, he still did not wish
to answer until he had consulted two of his leaders who were away at the two
Referendums. However, he finally came “to seek my advice as to what he
should do”. He began by saying that he wished to have British Governors in
every province of Pakistan except Sind which, since it would be under his
personal observation in Karachi, could have a Muslim Governor. He pointed
out that he had already agreed to the three heads of the Pakistan Defence
Services being British; but remarked that the only way in which he could sell
the idea of all these British high officials to the inhabitants of Pakistan would be
if he himself became the Governor General.

24. He said he had been unwilling to take this step but had been urged to do
so by three or four intimate friends and colleagues whom he had consulted. As
the Nawab of Bhopal is his principal friend and adviser and had told me three
days previously that Jinnah had specifically consulted him on this point, and
that Bhopal had told him that he thought that he would be mad to reject the
chance of having a common Governor General with a British team to see
partition through till the 31st March 1948 (which has been taken as the end of
the partition period), and as it is quite clear that Liaquat Ali Khan strongly
shares this view, I am afraid that the only adviser that Jinnah listens to is Jinnah.

25. He is suffering from megalomania in its worst form for when I pointed
out to him that if he went as a Constitutional Governor General his powers
would be restricted but as Prime Minister he really could run Pakistan, he

JULY 1947

899

made no bones about the fact that his Prime Minister would do what he said.
“In my position it is I who will give the advice and others will act on it”.

26. I then conceived the idea of putting a clause in the bill to have an offi¬
ciating Governor General in Pakistan whenever the Governor General was not
in the territories of that dominion. I got this passed by Congress at their meeting
about the Bill and then went in to see the Muslim League representatives at their
corresponding meeting.

27. By a fortunate coincidence Mr Jinnah immediately on my appearing
attacked me on the question of sanctions against the Union of India if they
failed to comply with awards of the Arbitral Tribunal and hand over to
Pakistan their fair share of assets. For, as he pointed out, nearly all the common
assets happened to be situated in the Union of India’s territory. This gave me a
good opportunity of saying in the presence of Jinnah’s henchmen that the
provision which had been devised to safeguard Pakistan’s interests in partition
had been the system of a common Governor General with a high class British
staff whom both sides would trust to see fair play.

28. I pointed out that Congress had agreed to this system, had nominated
me, and that I and my British staff were willing to serve until the end of the
partition period on 31st March. I said I quite appreciated that most of the
partition work would go on in Delhi, and that I should have very little time to
spare for Karachi. I had therefore got Congress to agree that an officiating
Governor General should be appointed during those 7I months and that I
would only visit Pakistan territory by mutual arrangement with its officiating
Governor General.

29. Jinnah categorically refused to accept this. I told him I could hardly
believe it was his intention to reject the only practicable means of safeguarding
the division of the assets — and a means to which Congress had agreed — for
the sake of having a substantive Governor General instead of an officiating
Governor General until the 31st March in Karachi; for after that I pointed out
that they would of course have their own Governor General.

30. Jinnah solemnly assured me that he realised all the disadvantages of
giving up the common Governor General, that his one ambition was that I
should stay as Viceroy or overall Governor General to see the partition through,
but he was unable to accept any position other than that of Governor General of
Pakistan on the 15 th August.

31. I asked him “do you realise what this will cost you?”. He said sadly “It
may cost me several crores of rupees in assets”, to which I replied somewhat

13 See Vol. X, No. 494, Minute 2.

14 See Vol. X, No. 473.

900

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

acidly “It may well cost you the whole of your assets and the future of Pakis¬
tan”. I then got up and left the room.

32. Mohammad Ali, the Secretary of the meeting, lunched with my PSV
(George Abell) afterwards, and said the meeting had spent the next hour
discussing my bombshell, but they had been quite unable to shake Jinnah.
Liaquat Ali Khan came to see me after lunch, and begged me to stay on as an
overall Governor General which he said Jinnah would accept, but that I could
not expect Jinnah, having achieved his supreme desire of Pakistan, to give up
being its first Governor General. “Not even if it means that he will be its last” ?,
I asked Liaquat. He shrugged his shoulders and said sadly, “We must do our
best, but whatever happens I hope that you will stay on with India for otherwise
there will be terrible trouble and Pakistan will suffer severely”. Jinnah also
curiously enough begged me to remain as the Governor General of India since
he said that unless there were a steadying influence he was afraid of what the
Congress Government might do to Pakistan.

33. I am now in a complete quandary. I have always held the view that I
should stay on with both sides or with neither of them. I never dreamt that both
sides would ask me to stay with one side.

34. My own inclination is to go, for I have always felt and said that I
considered it morally wrong to stay on with only one of the two sides. But
unfortunately I fear that I have unintentionally led Nehru and all the Congress
leaders up the garden path and that they will never forgive me for allowing
Jinnah once more to have his way. I therefore feel that this is a matter on which I
require higher guidance, and have considered it essential to send Ismay home
to seek it.

M. OF B.

507

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Attlee (via India Office)

Telegram , R^/i/ifio: f 83

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 4 July I947, 3. 10 pm

secret Received: 4 July , 3.13 pm

1736-S. Many thanks for your telegram No. 8510 dated 3.7.471 which for the
moment saved the situation. Nehru has been persuaded not to press for recon¬
struction of the Cabinet until the Bill has been passed subject to certain accept¬
able safeguards. I mentioned the matter in Cabinet this morning2 and said that

JULY 1947

901

it had been decided that there should be no reconstruction until the Bill had
been passed, by which time the Muslim League members would in a few days
be making preparations to move to Karachi. This was taken quite peacefully.

2. Situation is however so full of difficulties and so liable to produce a fresh
crisis each day that I propose to send Ismay home at once to be available for a
few days to you and your colleagues to give the very latest explanation of the
very tangled situation at this end.3

1 No. 468.

2 No. 493, Case No. 171/33/47.

3 In tel. 1747-S of 4 July, Lord Mountbatten asked for the following sentence to be added to the
present telegram: ‘I called for resignations of members of Cabinet but told him [?them] that I should
ask them to carry on until the reconstitution of Government’. R/3/1/160: f 86.

508

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Attlee ( via India Office)

Telegram, R/j/ 1/162: f 28

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 4th July 1Q47, 6 pm

SECRET

No. 1743-S. Personal and Private for Prime Minister from Viceroy.

Reference my 1725-S of 3rd July.1

I have today2 asked Jinnah to let me have in writing the name of the indi¬
vidual whom he would wish me to recommend for formal submission to The
King. This is going to be Jinnah.3

2. Ismay arrives Monday night and will explain whole position as regards
Governor-Generalship of India. I should be grateful if Opposition leaders
might be brought into this since I told them, when I was in London, that
Indian leaders had led me to expect that they both wanted me as Governor-
General.

3. Before I make up my mind as to my own course of action, I would be
deeply grateful for guidance from HMG, in which I hope Opposition would
concur, as to what I should do.

4. Since decision ought to be made by Wednesday at latest, in view of
Debate on Thursday, could I possibly have your reply by Tuesday night,
8 th July?

1 No. 483.

2 No. 500.

3 In tel. 1769-S of 5 July Lord Mountbatten informed Mr Attlee that he had received No. 509 and
said that Lord Ismay would bring this letter with him. R/3/1/162: f 43.

902

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

509

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

R\3\i\i62 : f 18

SECRET GUL-I-RAANA, HARDINGE AVENUE, NEW DELHI,

4 July 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Mr. Jinnah has received your letter of the 4th.1 late in the evening at 6-30 and I
am authorised to inform you that the All India Muslim League, the successor
authority, tender advice to His Majesty the King to accept the name of Mr.
M. A. Jinnah as the Governor-General of Pakistan.

We understand that the Congress desire that you should be the Governor-
General of India Dominion, and if you decide to accept it, we shall be glad and
feel that the two Governors-General will work in harmony and co-operation to
effect equitably final and complete partition.

Yours sincerely,

LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

1 No. 500.

510

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers . Letters to and from the Secretary of State
PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, 4 July I947

Dear Mountbatten,

I am writing this letter whilst we are still in the throes of launching the Bill.
Copies of the Congress and Muslim League comments on the Bill and of your
views on those comments1 only became available shortly before a meeting of
the Cabinet Committee was due to be held at 9.30 p.m. last night.2 The
Committee sat until midnight by which time the final terms of the Bill had
been decided upon and it was just possible to get a copy to the Clerk at the
Table by i a.m. this morning, which was the latest possible time if the pro¬
gramme was to be adhered to. The Bill was printed off during the course of the
night and was formally presented by the Prime Minister at 1 1 a.m. this morn¬
ing. Copies were made available in the Vote Office at 2 p.m. and the Prime
Minister and I immediately held a Conference with the Lobby Correspondents.
I have also this afternoon had Press Conferences with the Indian correspondents
and the Empire and Foreign Correspondents.

2. The Congress insistence on a change in the Interim Government, which
has made it necessary for us to telescope still further an already foreshortened

JULY I947

903

programme, appears at this end as most unreasonable but the risks of not
making any attempt to meet them were undoubtedly too great to be run. We
must now do our utmost to achieve our target date of 20th July although it is
not going to be easy.

[Para. 3, on a minor procedural problem relating to payments from Indian
Revenues, omitted.]

4. I was glad to get your letter of 27th June covering Personal Report
No. io.1 2 3 It is certainly excellent that you have succeeded in getting Radcliffe
as Chairman of the Boundary Commissions.4 He is approaching the whole
matter in a most public-spirited manner and will, I have little doubt, fill the
role admirably. As you have already been informed by telegram, he is hoping
to leave for Delhi on Sunday and Lady Radcliffe hopes to join him about 10
days later.

5. I thought you would like to have advance telegraphic warning5 of the
change in the title of the Dominions Office. The change has, of course, been
prompted by developments in India but it was considered desirable from the
point of view of the existing Dominions to make the change as far in advance
of August 15 th as possible in order to make it less obvious that the change had
been dictated by events in India.

[Paras. 6 and 7, on employment for four British members of the Indian
Services; and para. 8, mainly on Mr Amery’s address to the Royal Empire
Society on the Indian States, omitted.

9. It is clear from your latest report that nerves are getting on edge in Delhi —
an inevitable consequence, I suppose, of a combination of over-work and
excessive heat. I have no doubt that, if any opportunity presents itself of
inviting the key people to the cooler atmosphere of Simla for a few days, you
will take advantage of it.

10. It was good news to hear of the invitations to Colville and Nye to stay on
and I hope that they will be willing to do so.6

11. I have just heard that Ismay is arriving next week. We shall, of course,
be delighted to see him again.

Yours sincerely,

LISTOWEL

Since writing this letter I heard, with much relief, that you have succeeded in
getting the change in the Government postponed until July 20th.

T

1 No. 479, 480, 484 and 485.

2 See No. 486, Minute 3.

3 Nos. 368 and 369.

4 See No. 378.

5 No. 451.

6 See No. 461.

904

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , JR/j/i/te: jf 38-9

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 4 July 1947, 7 pm

secret Received: 5 July, 6.20 am

No. 1744-S. Withdrawal of British Forces from India.

1. Reference your 8284 of 27th June,1 paragraph 3. 1 have consulted C-in-C
and his views,2 with which 1 agree, are set out in paragraphs 2-5 below.

2. I consider that British Forces in India should, after 15th August, have no
operational function whatsoever; that they should not be available to be called
upon for internal security purposes; or for use on the North West Frontier; or,
of course, for use in the States. They would be regarded as remaining in India
and continuing their training here until transport arrives to take them away. In
emergency, they might in fact be used to save British, or even European lives.
But this would not be mentioned in any charter giving their duties, because, as
I have already pointed out, the responsibility for the protection of all foreign
nationals will lie with the two new Governments.

3 . I do not consider that it would be possible to ask the new Dominions to
pay for British Forces after 15th August. 1 strongly recommend that HMG
should pay.

4. As regards system of command I recommend that General Officer
Commanding British Troops in India should be responsible to Auchinleck as
Supereme Commander; and that the latter should report direct to the Chiefs of
Staff, keeping the U.K. High Commissioner (s) informed in any matter with
political implications. Auchinleck will send to Chiefs of Staff a draft charter to
GOC, BTI. A similar system will apply to RAF units who cannot be directly
under the Air Ministry, because they must continue to be commanded and
administered by the AOC-in-C, India, under Auchinleck’s general direction.

5. Equipment. I recommend that, when British troops leave India, they take
their personal arms and equipment only and such G.1098 stores as they will need
during their journey and on arrival at their destination.

6. Date of Withdrawal. February 1948 has been mentioned as date for com¬
pletion of withdrawal, both in CIGS’s telegrams, Pepper 73 and Pepper 74 (sent
under references 1547-S and 1560-S respectively)3 and in my telegram 1570-S.4
On further reflection I strongly recommend that this date should be brought
forward to at least December 1947, for the following reasons: —

(a) Although Mr Jinnah wants to keep British Forces until February 1948,

JULY I947

905

this is only because he hopes to be able to use them. I am convinced that
Pandit Nehru (despite what he said to the CIGS) wants them to go as
soon as possible. It is at present planned that five out of the six Brigade
Groups should be stationed in the new Dominion of India after 15th
August ;

(b) Whatever rules may be laid down about British Troops not being used
for internal security, it would in fact be impossible for them to stand idly
by if women and children were being murdered a few streets away;

(c) If there is a flare-up on the North West Frontier, Mr Jinnah will almost
certainly request that British forces should be sent there;

(d) Retention with no operational role and no real purpose cannot be good
for morale;

(e) Owing to their anomalous position, all sorts of delicate situations may
arise. The longer we keep them the greater the risk. Is there in fact any
precedent for the retention of British Forces in a Dominion in time of
Peace?

7. On all these counts the sooner all British troops are out of the country the

better. Remember Cairo.

1 No. 381.

2 For Field Marshal Auchinleck’s letter to Lord Ismay, dated i July 1947, see Mountbatten Papers,

Official Correspondence Files: Withdrawal of British Forces (2).

3 Nos. 315 and 329.

4 No. 335.

512

Commonwealth Relations Office to Mr Costar
Telegram, L\PO\6\i22: f 69

IMMEDIATE 4 1947 > 5A0 Pm

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

No. 188. Your telegram No. 193 7 India Independence Bill.

We quite appreciate Mr Fraser's position and feel that unless he has already
done so it would be better in the circumstances that he should not, repeat not,
consult the Opposition as this might lead to the issue being raised in New
Zealand which would make the position worse from our point of view.

For your information we have now heard from Clutterbuck that Mr
Mackenzie King, for his part, is not prepared to say that the inclusion of the
word “independence” is acceptable to him.2 In the circumstances therefore
there could be no question of saying in public here that all the Dominion Prime
Ministers favour it.

1 No. 492.

2 See No. 488.

90 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Position now is that text of Bill including title has been communicated to
Indian leaders and in these circumstances no change is possible.3

3 In tel. 195 of 5 July Mr Costar informed the Commonwealth Relations Office that he understood the
New Zealand Cabinet had decided to send telegrams to other Dominions saying it did not much like
the term ‘independence’ but would probably be prepared to accept it. They wished, however, to
avoid being the only Dominion to do so. The request in para. 1 of the present telegram was being
put to Mr Fraser immediately. Mr Costar felt Mr Fraser would be much relieved at not having to
answer the C.R.O.’s original query. In tel. 196 sent later on 5 July Mr Costar reported that Mr Fraser
had agreed not to consult the Leader of the Opposition or to express any view on the original
enquiry. L/PO/6/122: ff 72, 74. Further papers on this subject are on the file.

513

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma1

Telegram , L\P &J/ 10 / 102: ff 57-8

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 4 July 1947, 11. JO pm

secret Received: 5 July, 6 am

8652. You will see that despite the objections set out in my telegram 8162 of
25 th June2 and paragraph 4 of my telegram 8499 of 2nd July3 we have inserted
a standstill proviso to (b) and (c) of clause 7(1) of bill.4

The position was admittedly one of great difficulty calling for very special
steps in view of fact that apparently little or no progress had been made in
negotiating standstill agreements which would have been proper course.

The precise legal result of the new proviso may well be disputable; especially
since legislating for the States has not been the practice but we felt that the
proviso cannot be deemed inequitable since it makes it clear that there may be
denunciation by either party at any time. It purports anyhow to give cover to a
standstill in practice5 when neither party has done anything. We should of
course have liked to consult you about its terms but time did not permit.6

I suggest that you as Crown Representative have an urgent message sent to
the States explaining the position.7

1 On Lord Listowel’s instructions this telegram was sent to Mr Attlee for approval before issue. P.R.O.
PREM 8/541, part 11.

2 No. 349. 3 No. 466.

4 See No. 428, Clause 7(1), Proviso in italics. 5 ‘in practice’ deciphered as ‘proposal’.

6 In the course of a letter of 5 July 1947 to Sir G. Abell, Mr Turnbull wrote:

“I hope that the Proviso about the States agreements is not too bad. It isn’t a very easy thing to
draft but in any case it must, I suppose, be pretty well meaningless and nothing more than a
declaratory utterance by H.M.G. Whether or not the States keep the agreement will depend on
what they consider their own interests and on how frightened they are of British India.”
R/3/1/154: f 88.

7 Lord Mountbatten replied to the telegram in his 1776-S of 5 July as follows: —

“On the whole I think it would be best to await reactions of States and especially of Hyderabad
delegation which Nizam has agreed to send to Delhi for meeting with Sardar Patel and new States
Department under my Chairmanship on nth July. If we attempt to explain position in general
message we shall raise controversial issues which might otherwise be solved by practical negotia-

• 99

ti on,

R/3/1/138: f 72.

JULY I947

907

514

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma1

Telegram , L/P &f/ 10/124: jf 119-21

immediate India office, 5 fuly 1947, 12. 30 am

secret Received: 5 fuly, 8.30 am

No. 8653. My telegram 85 87, 2 paragraph 4. Following is brief explanation of
reasons why Cabinet Committee did not feel able to accept some of suggestions
made by Congress and Muslim League.

Congress Comments 3

(1) Form of Bill. Apart from the merits, it was quite impracticable to under¬
take major redrafting in the time available.

(2) Preamble and Clause 1. Amendment in this sense is equally strongly
opposed by Muslim League. Question of international position of India and
Pakistan as new Dominions cannot be determined by form of provision in the
Bill since it turns on treatment which will in fact be accorded by other Nations
and International Organisations. So far as terms of Bill may be taken by others
as affording some sort of pointer to view taken by FLM.G. and Parliament on
this subject we consider that provisions as drafted preserve a proper balance
between conflicting claims of Congress and League. The hint these provisions
afford (and it can be no more) does in our view give the best indication possible
of the position as it will in practice be immediately after 15th August.

(3) Clause 7(1). We have gone as far as we can to meet this point by our
proviso to Clause 7(1) (see my telegram No. 8652). 4

(4) Clause 19(3). Proviso has been amended in sense desired by you. It was
however strongly felt that this was not the appropriate place to deal with the
matters which Congress propose should be dealt with in a new sub-Clause 3(a).
Clause 19 is a definition clause. Amendments have, however, been made
elsewhere, in particular in lines 2-5 of page 6 of Bill5 to meet points (a) and (b)
of Congress draft Clause 19 (3) (a).

(5) Clause 14. We are glad of assurance given. Clause which is on the face of
it transitory is needed to remove doubt which would otherwise exist whether
any British Minister could after 15th August legally disburse these sums on
behalf of Indian Governments. Whatever arrangements may be made later on
regarding machinery for these payments it would be quite impracticable
suddenly to uproot existing machinery.

Muslim League Comments6

(1) Andaman and Nicobars. Geographical position of these Islands makes it
impossible to assign them to Pakistan, nor did any form of joint control by
both Indian and Pakistan Governments seem to us practicable. We felt that to

908

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

exclude Islands altogether from either India or Pakistan would not be accep¬
table.

(2) Clauses 9 and n. We are unable to meet Muslim League point of view.
This would make Governor-General an aribtrator apart from unsuitability of
defining in Bill questions of “advice”.

General

We have made the Boundary Commissions’ Reports binding but it is impossible
for H.M.G. to guarantee the carrying out of the awards or findings of Arbitra¬
tion Tribunal.

1 On Lord Listowel’s instructions this telegram was sent to Mr Attlee for approval before issue.
L/P &J/10/124: f 118.

3 No. 491; for amendments to draft Bill see No. 428 and its note 1.

3 See No. 479.

4 No. 513.

5 i.e. the amendment to Clause 8(1) of No. 428; see also ibid., Clause 8(2)(e).

6 See No. 480.

515

Mr Gandhi to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

RI3I1I151: / 255

BHANGI COLONY, NEW DELHI, 5 July lg^y

Dear Friend,

I thank you for your letter1 which came into my hands after the evening prayer.

Agitation is undoubtedly being carried on today by Badshah Khan and his
lieutenants to tell the voters that it is wrong for them to take part in the voting.
There should be no demonstration during the voting days and there should be
no approach to the voters during the voting time. If this is what you mean I
shall be glad to refer to the matter in those terms at the evening prayer. I am
quite prepared to adopt quicker means of reaching Badshah Khan, if you
suggest any.

If you have any other thing in view, you will please let me know.

Yours sincerely,

M. K. GANDHI

1 No. 496.

JULY 1947

909

516

Meeting of the Partition Council Case No. P.C. 23/3/47
Mounthatten Papers. Partition Council Minutes

SECRET

Those present during discussion of this item at this Meeting held on 3 July 1947 at
10 am mere: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma, Mr Jinnah, Mr Liaquat
All Khan , Sardar Patel , Dr Rajendra Prasad; Sir E. Mieville , Mr H. M. Patel ,
Mr Mohamad Ali , Mr Osman Ali ( Secretariat )

Case No. P.C. 25/3/47 Composition of Arbitral Tribunal

His Excellency said he had discussed with Sir Patrick Spens the question of
appointing the Federal Court as Arbitral Tribunal. Sir Patrick’s view was that it
would be most improper to appoint die Federal Court as such for this purpose.
There was no objection, however, to one or more judges of the Federal Court
being appointed to the Tribunal. His Excellency suggested that if both parties
agreed Sir Patrick should be appointed Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal. He
would do his best to persuade Sir Patrick to accept the Chairmanship but it was
certain that on completion of the work, he would ask to be relieved of his post
of Chief Justice of the Federal Court. As regards the odier members of the
Tribunal, he suggested that the two parties should separately nominate, in
consultation widi Sir Patrick, one judge each to serve on the Tribunal. The
leaders of the two paities would doubtless appreciate the desirability of nomin¬
ating men who were of the highest integrity and free from any party bias. As
had already been agreed upon between die parties, the Arbitral Tribunal
constituted as above would deal widi questions arising out of the partition of the
Punjab and Bengal as well as at the Centre.

The Council approved His Excellency’s proposals.

517

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P &S / 12/ 181 1 : f 61

important INDIA office, 3 July 1947 , 7.13 am

secret Received: 3 July , 2pm

8631. Your 1703-S1 paragraph 5 of July 2nd — Treaty obligations of Pakistan.
2. Foreign Office today handed Afghan Charge d Affaires aide-memoire in

9io

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

reply to Afghan representations that North West Frontier Province should be
allowed to opt not only whether to join Pakistan or Hindustan but also to
become an independent state or part of Afghanistan (see Govt of India E.A. &
C.R.D. telegram No. 5139 of 2nd July).2 As you are aware, H.M. Minister at
Kabul has also received instructions to communicate with the Afghan Govt in a
similar sense. The basis of these replies is that the Afghan representations relate
to an area which forms an integral part of India and is recognised as such by the
Afghan Govt in the Anglo- Afghan Treaty of 1921.

3. Were Muslim League leaders to adhere to the view indicated in paragraph
5 of your telegram 1703, the whole basis of our reply would fall to the ground,
which would be even more harmful for Pakistan than it would be for us. It is
very much to be hoped therefore that you will be able to persuade Muslim
League to adopt view that when set up Pakistan will consider itself as successor
to all applicable treaty rights and obligations, as suggested in my tel. 8122 of
24th June,3 or at any rate refrain in their own interests from committing
themselves to a view which would strengthen the Afghan pretensions with
which their Redshirt opponents appear to be associating themselves.4

1 No. 463.

2 See No. 453, note 5.

3 No. 333.

4 In tel. 1849-S of 8 July Lord Mountbatten informed Lord Listowel that he had discussed the present
telegram ‘personally with Mr Jinnah who authorises me to say that the future Pakistan Government
will consider itself as successor of all applicable treaty rights and obligations and concurs in view that
Afghan representations relate to an area which forms an integral part of India and will in future form
part of Pakistan . . .’. Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: International Status of the
new India.

518

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Gandhi

Rfe/i/ifi: f 210

no. 1446/3 5 ply 1947

Dear Mr Gandhi,

I am most grateful to you for your letter of the 5 th July,1 and for promising to
deprecate demonstrations and approaches to the voters during; the voting days
in the N.W.F.P.

If you could go a little further and deprecate any agitation before the polling
days which might lead directly or indirectly to disturbances, I should naturally
be grateful.

1 No. 515.

JULY 1947

91 1

It is important, I think, that Khan Abdul Ghaflar Khan should have your
advice as soon as possible, and if you would care to send him a letter, I could
arrange to get it delivered to Peshawar by hand of pilot, and ask the Governor
to send it on.

I am most grateful for your help.

I received a telegram yesterday, Friday,2 from the Resident in Kashmir
saying that my letters to him and the Maharajah had only just been received
and that he was going to see the Maharajah as soon as he could obtain an
interview.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

2 Presumably tel. 57 of 3 July from the Resident, Kashmir, to PSV stating that the Maharaja of
Kashmir had received No. 386 and would reply as soon as possible. R/3/1/94: f 23.

519

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Armed Forces , Reconstruction of,

Volume /, Part I

5 July 1947

Dear Lord Mounthatten,

You mentioned to me some names for the post of Commander-in-Chief of
the Army of the Indian Union. At that time I expressed my preference for
General Slim. I have now consulted some of my colleagues also and they would
very much like General Slim to assume this charge. I am writing this to you in
some haste as perhaps you might like to mention this to General Ismay before
his departure for London.

Yours sincerely,
JAWAFIARLAL NEHRU

912

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

520

Viceroy’s Conference Paper V.C.P. 112
r/31 1/154: ff 70-2

SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, J July 1Q47

MUSLIM LEAGUE COMMENTS ON THE CONGRESS
COMMENTS ON THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

Attached is a paper giving the Muslim League comments on the Congress
comments on the Indian Independence Bill.

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

Muslim League Comments on Congress Comments 1 on the Indian Independence Bill
Paragraph 1 of Congress comments

(a) The point raised is covered by the last paragraph of our original com¬
ments.2 The view advanced by the Congress is in our opinion absolutely
untenable. The Dominion of India not being the sole successor authority cannot
continue the international personality of the existing India because both the
Dominions of India and Pakistan have identical positions as regards interna¬
tional personality. We therefore repeat that no change should be made in the
Bill. The assumption that the Bill as it stands makes it sufficiently clear that the
new Dominion of India will continue the international personality of the
existing India is absolutely unwarranted.

(1 b ) The assumptions made and the arguments advanced are entirely falla¬
cious. The old entity will not exist after being split up into two Dominions.
The States stand on a different footing as laid down in H.M.G.’s memorandum
of the 1 2th May 1946 and this Bill is only concerned with two new Dominions
which are to be set up out of territories now comprising British India. There is
no possible doubt in this respect and no question arises of preserving the con¬
tinuity of the present State which will no longer exist for any purpose what¬
soever.

Moreover, the definition of the Dominion of India proposed by the Congress
will mean that even those States which have decided not to join any Con¬
stituent Assembly will be forced to become part of the Dominion of India
against their declared intention. We also do not agree that contiguity is a
necessary condition for the accession of a State to Pakistan.

We therefore urge upon H.M.G. to make no change in the Bill nor is there
any reason whatsoever for any separate bill as suggested in (b).

(c) For the reasons given above we are strongly opposed to the suggestion
made.

1 No. 479.

2 No. 480.

JULY 1947

913

(d) We are strongly opposed to the suggestion made for reasons given above
as well as those in our original comments.

Paragraph 2

Preamble and clause 1(1). The point is covered by our comments given above
and we are opposed to the proposed amendments.

Clause 2(1). The point is sufficiently dealt with in our comments above. We
reiterate the suggestion made by us in our original comments that the territories
of the Dominion of India should also be defined in the same way as those of
Pakistan have been defined.

Clause 2(3). It is not within the competence of Parliament to enact any legis¬
lative measure concerning Indian States. In regard to the point raised by the
Congress it is solely the concern of the two Dominions and the State or States
concerned to enter into such agreements or arrangements as they may think
proper.

Clause 3 [2) (a). The existing provision in the Bill merely states the correct
legal and constitutional position regarding the Province of Assam and no
change should be made. If the referendum results in favour of Sylhet amalgama¬
ting with East Bengal, not merely Sylhet but other contiguous areas in the
adjoining Districts of Assam will also be involved in the partition. In any case,
the number of Districts involved is quite irrelevant in this connection.

Clause 6(1). Since we are opposed to the definition of “India” proposed by
the Congress, the proviso suggested should not be considered.

Clause 7(1) (6). The proposed amendment seems to rest on the fallacious
assumption that the new Dominion of India will be the sole successor to the
existing Indian Government in respect of all existing agreements, relations and
arrangements with the Indian States. In actual fact, all such agreements etc are
between His Majesty7 and the Rulers of the Indian States. It will be for the two
new Dominions to negotiate and enter into such agreements with the Indian
States as they deem fit. We are therefore opposed to any amendment of this
sub-clause.

Clause The position is similar to that outlined under clause 7(I)(b) and

we are opposed to the proposed amendment even though the matter is one
which would solely concern the Dominion of Pakistan in the event of the
N.W.F.P. forming part of Pakistan.

Clause 1 0. We indicated verbally that we shall have no objection to a statu¬
tory guarantee being extended to Judges of die High Court as defined in
Section 219 of the present Constitution Act. We are not concerned with
Judges of the Federal Court since a new Federal Court will be set up for
Pakistan.

Clause 14. The clause should be retained as it stands because it will take some
time before the High Commissioner for Pakistan can take over such functions.

Clause ig(3)(a)(iii). Please see our comments on this point under Clause

914

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

3 (2) (a). No amendment should be made as no valid ground is put forward to
support such an amendment.

Proviso to Clause 19(3) (#). We have in our original comments indicated the
lines on which this Proviso should be amended. No other amendment is in our
view called for. The Proviso as it stands is quite clear and the amendment
suggested by the Congress will create confusion specially the use of the word
'regulate’ in sub-clause (d). The Constituent Assemblies are free and the
Proviso does not fetter their hands in any way.

521

Viceroy's Conference Paper. V.C.P. 113
Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 5 July 1Q47

Attached is a note prepared as a brief for C.V.S. on his visit to London.

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

THE HISTORY OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED AND DECISIONS
REACHED BY THE INDIAN LEADERS ON THE APPOINTMENT

OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL

1. On 17th May, 1947, (the day before the Viceroy left for his visit to
London) Pandit Nehru wrote to H.E. giving his comments on the Draft
Announcement. Included in this letter1 was the paragraph: “We agree to the
proposal that during this interim period the Governor-General should be
common to both the States, if there are to be two States. For our part we shall
be happy if you could continue in this office and help us with your advice and
experience”.

2. His Excellency verbally indicated, to Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel,
acceptance of this offer. He pointed out, however, how difficult it would be for
him to remain on as Governor-General of one Dominion only. He therefore
qualified his acceptance by adding that it would be subject to a similar invitation
being received from the Muslim League, whereby he could act as Governor-
General of both Dominions for a short interim period until partition was
completed.

3. Also on 17th May H.E. had an interview2 with Mr Jinnah and Mr Liaquat
Ali Khan. The following is an extract from that interview :

1 Vol. X, No. 471.

2 Vol. X, No. 473.

JULY 1947

915

His Excellency the Viceroy said that he intended to recommend to H.M.G.
that the transfer of power in India should take place as soon as possible —
preferably by 1st October. He had informed the Prime Minister of Mr Jinnah’s
expressed desire that Pakistan should remain within the British Common¬
wealth. Congress had now put forward a similar request. He intended to go
ahead and pass both requests to H.M.G. The question which now required
clarification was whether Mr Jinnah would prefer Pakistan to have its own
Governor-General or to share a common Governor-General with Hindustan.
He asked for Mr Jinnah’s personal views.

Mr Jinnah said that he could not commit himself on this subject straight
away; but he had been giving some thought to it and he felt that it would be
better to have two Governors-General. Also there should, in his opinion, be a
Representative of the Crown to be responsible for the division of assets as
between the two States. Mr Jinnah said that he was extremely keen that His
Excellency should fill this post. He said that he had complete faith in His
Excellency, all of whose awards would be binding on him. He vehemently and
repeatedly declared his desire that His Excellency should stay on in India.

His Excellency the Viceroy said that he was very honoured by Mr Jinnah’s
remarks. However, he could not consider taking on a post such as Mr Jinnah
had suggested nor could he think of anybody else who would wish to do so. It
would be an impossible position if the so-called ‘ ‘Arbitrator” was junior in rank
to the Governors-General who would be the King’s representatives.

Mr Liaquat Ali Klian asked how, if the two States wanted separate Gover¬
nors-General, it was proposed that all assets would be divided by 1st October.
His Excellency the Viceroy replied that in this case the two Governors-General
themselves would form an arbitration board. He went on to say that he was
under extreme pressure from Congress who had stated that they would not
continue in the Interim Government unless they were granted Dominion
status immediately after the announcement. He felt that he might be able to
hold the situation for a time but certainly not until the end of the year.

After further discussion, His Excellency the Viceroy suggested that Mr
Jinnah should send him a letter the following Monday (19th May) giving a full
description of his suggestion of a supreme arbitrator and two Governors-
General. However, he wished it to be quite clear that he would reserve his
personal position unless it was clearly stated by Mr Jinnah in this letter that, if
his scheme was found by H.M.G. to be impracticable, he would accept, as a
less desirable alternative and as an interim measure, the appointment of a
common Governor-General between the two States.

Mr Jinnah at first expressed himself violently opposed to this suggestion but
eventually, after prolonged discussion, he said that he would think it over. He
pointed out that, if H.M.G. decided, contrary to his own opinion that his

9i 6

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

suggestion was unworkable, there would be no reason for him not to accept an
alternative.

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan said that he quite clearly realised the point which His
Excellency the Viceroy wished Mr Jinnah to include in his letter.

It was agreed that Mr Jinnah should give this letter to Sir Eric Mieville on
Monday morning, the 19th May; and that a copy of it would be sent to
Congress. His Excellency the Viceroy pointed out that, besides requiring the
approval of H.M.G., Mr Jinnah’s suggestion would also require agreement by
Congress.’ ’

4. The letter from Mr Jinnah referred to in the above extract was never
written, despite repeated efforts by Sir Eric Mieville who, it was intended, was
to telegraph it to His Excellency in London. Accordingly Mr Jinnah’s idea of an
“arbitrator” or “stake holder” was put up verbally to representatives of the
India Office for their opinion. They were unanimous that such a system would
be unconstitutional and unworkable.

5. On the Viceroy’s return to Delhi this was explained to Mr Jinnah.

6. Soon after that return, repeated efforts were made to obtain Mr Jinnah’s
decision as to whether he wanted there to be one Governor-General or two.
Lord Ismay and Sir Eric Mieville went to see both him and Mr Liaquat Ah
Khan to press for a decision. The following extracts are examples of the inter¬
views which took place:

(a) Extract from Lord Ismay’s description of his interview with Mr
Liaquat Ali Khan on 20th June —

[There follows the text of No. 275, para. 6, first two sub-paras. ]
and (b) Extract from the Viceroy’s interview with Mr Jinnah on 23rd June —

[There follows the text of No. 311, para. 1.]

Despite all these efforts, no reply was forthcoming from Mr Jinnah until the
evening of 2nd July. He then told the Viceroy that he himself wanted to be
Governor-General of Pakistan.3 During the next 24 hours, the Viceroy spent
much time in pointing out to both Mr Jinnah and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, and on
one occasion to a meeting consisting of Mr Jinnah, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, Mr
Rahman and Mr Mohamed Ali, the enormous advantages that Pakistan would
gain from sharing, for a short initial period, the same Governor-General as
Hindustan. The Viceroy has subsequently declared that his conscience is clear
that he has taken every possible step that he knows of to put the matter clearly
before Mr Jinnah. The last effort made was by the Nawab of Bhopal, who came
specially to Delhi for the purpose.

On the morning of 5th July,4 Mr Liaquat Ah Khan confirmed in writing that
H.E. should recommend Mr Jinnah’s name to His Majesty for the post of

3 For an account of this interview see No. 506, paras. 23-25.

4 No. 509 (dated 4 July).

JULY 1947

917

Governor-General of Pakistan. In this letter the hope was also expressed that
H.E. would stay on as Governor-General of the Dominion of India only.

Also on the morning of 5th July, H.E. saw Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel,5
both of whom expressed their wish that he would remain as Governor-General
of the Dominion of India.

5 No record of this interview has been traced.

522

Viceroy's Conference Paper. V.C.P. 116
Mountbatten Papers

TOP SECRET THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 5 July ig4J

REASONS FOR AND AGAINST LORD MOUNTBATTEN STAYING
ON AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE DOMINION OF INDIA

1. Attached are —

(a) A paper setting out the reasons against Lord Mountbatten’s staying on as
Governor-General of the Dominion of India. This was prepared by the
Personal Secretary.

(b) A paper setting out the reasons in favour of Lord Mountbatten staying
on as Governor-General of the Dominion of India. This was prepared by
the Conference Secretary.

2. These papers were taken as a brief by Lord Ismay on his visit to London.

V. F. ERSKINE CRUM

Conference Secretary

Enclosure 1 to No. 5 22

REASONS AGAINST LORD MOUNTBATTEN STAYING ON AS
GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE DOMINION OF INDIA

1. If H.E. accepts the appointment of Governor-General of the new Domin¬
ion of India alone it will have a mixed reception in the Indian Union. It must
be remembered that the invitation has been extended by the Nehru/Patel
clique; in other words the conservative element of the Party who are now old
enough and wise enough to know that they need some help during the coming
months.

2. But there is a large body of opinion in the Indian Union, including the
Socialists and the Communists, who want all the British to leave on the transfer
ofp ower and Gandhi in particular has often said that the British should quit
and leave India to work out their own salvation. It will thus undoubtedly be

9i8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

said in many circles in the Indian Union that the British are attempting to retain
a hold on the country.

3. The effect of H.E. staying on with the Indian Union alone is bound to
have a depressing effect in Pakistan in spite of the unassailable position which
Jinnah holds in the minds of the Muslims. Certain organs of the Congress press
will undoubtedly write up H.E.’s decision in big headlines and the impression
on the Muslims will inevitably be that H.E. has deserted them and joined the
stronger side.

4. As regards world opinion, there will be considerable criticism by thinking
men of H.E.’s acceptance of the post. There is a big volume of opinion all over
the world that ways and means should have been found to keep India united
and grave doubts have been expressed about the necessity for partition. As far
as the world is concerned partition will have been effected on the 15th August
1947 and two new Dominions set up. The question is bound to be asked why
H.E. should stay on at all, and in particular why he should stay on with the
bigger and stronger side. There will also undoubtedly be criticism that the
smaller Muslim Dominion is being abandoned.

5. At the time when the possibility of H.E. staying on as Governor-General
of both Dominions was being considered a very strong point was made of
how advantageous this would be from the point of view of completing parti¬
tion in the months after 15th August, 1947, and it has been suggested that he
could equally well carry out this function as Governor-General of the Indian
Union alone. But as Governor-General of one Dominion only it is ill ogical to
suggest that he can be expected to act impartially when partition matters are
being discussed. Nor would it be reasonable to ask the Indian Union to allow
him to be impartial at any meeting he might attend on Partition matters. In fact
it would be impossible for him to take any part in partition were he to remain
as Governor-General of the Indian Union alone, apart from the advice which
he might give to Ministers in the ordinary way as Constitutional Governor-
General.

6. It is, therefore, quite illogical to suggest he could be of any real help to
partition by staying on as Governor-General of one side only.

7. It will be recollected that when Jenkins and Burrows decided not to stay
on in any capacity with either part of their partition provinces,1 their decision
was applauded as correct and honourable and there is nothing different in the
present case which is being considered. H.E. has accomplished all that he was
sent out here to do in that he has effected a settlement of the Indian problem
and has retained the new Dominions within the Commonwealth after the
transfer of power. It would be undignified and morally wrong for him to stay on
with one side only after the 15th August 1947 and he should accordingly quit
India on that date.

1 See No. 162, para. 32.

JULY 1947

919

Enclosure 2 to No. 522

REASONS IN FAVOUR OF LORD MOUNTBATTEN STAYING ON
AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE DOMINION OF INDIA

1 • Mr Jinnah has now confirmed his wish to have his name submitted to
His Majesty for the post of Governor-General of Pakistan. There are many
reasons why the present Viceroy should accept the appointment of Governor-
General of the new Dominion of India alone. It is emphasised that it would,
primarily, be H.E. s personality rather than his appointment — his personal
relationship with the leaders rather than his position — which would act as a
general stabilising influence.

2. Field Marshal Auchinleck has clearly stated that, if Lord Mountbatten left,
he himself would resign. The Commanders-in-Chief of the other Services and
Army Commanders have expressed similar intentions. The vast majority of
British officers as a whole would, in such circumstances, indubitably fail to
volunteer to remain. This would lead to the nationalisation of the Indian Armed
Forces taking place at the same time as partition. Opinion is unanimous among
all, including the Indian political leaders, who have any knowledge of the
problem, that this would lead to disastrous results. The one stable element in
India, namely the Indian Army, might well disintegrate; and riot and bloodshed
on an appalling scale would result.

If, on the other hand, H.E. remained, British officers and officials as a whole,
in both new Dominions, would be more likely to volunteer to remain them¬
selves. They would feel, after their experience in S.E.A.C. and latterly in
India, that there was someone to look after their interests. The result would be
that partition of the Armed Forces would go through smoothly; and chaos
would be avoided.

3. If H.E. were to stay as Governor-General of India, the Partition Council
and Arbitral Tribunal decisions would stand a far better chance of being
implemented, whether or not H.E. personally remained as Chairman of the
Partition Council or whatever body takes its place.

4. Smooth partition and H.E.’s general personal influence on other matters,
would mean that the relations between India and Pakistan would stand a good
chance of being friendly. The first object of India’s foreign policy must of
necessity be the maintenance of good relations with Pakistan — and vice versa.

If H.E. were to go, one of the main reasons which would lead to deterioration
of relations between the two Dominions would be that the Congress Leaders
would feel that it was because of Mr jinnah’s attitude that H.E. had not stayed
on, and that he had again sabotaged their plans. The patience of the Congress
Leaders with Mr Jinnah’s interference in their plans is well-nigh exhausted.

5. In the Dominion of India itself there would be a greater chance of stability
if H.E. remained. Although there is still some communal tension, the situation
has been improved out of all measure over the last three months because of

920

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

H.E.’s presence. The advantages to the new Dominion herself are surely most
apparent in the fact that Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel, who are the best
judges, have themselves asked H.E. to remain.

6. The situation in India after the transfer of power and the state of relation¬
ship between the two Dominions is going to have the greatest effect on the
situation in S.E. Asia and indeed on the world as a whole.

7 . There will be very real need, after 15th August, for some independent
agency capable of resolving the difficulties which are bound to arise between
India and the States. H.E.’s advice to the Indian Government on how to deal
with the States, and to the rulers themselves on how to deal with the Indian
Government, would be invaluable. The Nawab of Bhopal has said that the
continued presence of H.E. is “the only hope” for the States.

8. Although the reactions of the “Westminster Front” are unpredictable
from this distance, it is felt that the Opposition would be unlikely to oppose the
passage of the Indian Independence Bill if they knew that H.E. was going to
stay on. It must always be borne in mind that the Opposition, if they turned
sour at the prospect of two Indian Govemors-General in the new Dominions,
could still so delay the passage of the Legislation that it would not be possible
to transfer power on 15th August.

9. Mr Jinnah has stated that he would welcome H.E.’s appointment as
Governor-General of India. This has been confirmed in writing by Mr Liaquat
Ali Khan.2 All informed Muslim League opinion, which it has been possible to
obtain, agrees. The Nawab of Bhopal has given his opinion that Pakistan itself
would benefit enormously.

10. It is self-evident that all the advantages quoted above would be to the
benefit of the Indian people themselves. It is also apparent that there would be
considerable advantages from the purely British point of view, although these
also, in the long run, will doubtless favourably affect the welfare of India.

11. From the British point of view, it would be of the greatest prestige value
that Congress, after so long a fight for independence, should ask that their first
Governor-General and two of their Governors should be British. It is doubtful
whether these two Governors, Sir John Colville and Sir Archibald Nye, would
stay on if H.E. did not. If H.E. remained, India would be much more likely to
remain within the Commonwealth for a long period or even permanently. The
change of heart (so evident during the last three months) of Indians towards the
British would not be reversed. And the prestige of the Commonwealth, and
all that it stands for, would be increased.

If H.E. were to go, and if the Indian Government were dius turned down in
their application for a British Governor-General, they would be as a lover
scorned. The relations between India and Britain, which had improved so

2 See Nos. 506, para. 32, and 509.

JULY 1947

921

miraculously in the last three months, would again deteriorate at an un¬
foreseeable rate.

12. Finally, surely world opinion will be in no mood to criticise H.E.’s
acceptance of the post. Indeed, if he went, it is likely that there would be a
considerable volume of criticism, both immediate and long term, that he was
leaving the job half done and making a “quick get-away”.

523

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Mr Attlee
Public Record Office. PREM 8)549

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

5 July 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

I hope you will not mind my sending Pug Ismay home. But I have reached a
dangerous impasse. As you know, it was Jinnah who always begged me to stay
as Viceroy or overall Governor-General, or in some capacity over the two
Dominions until partition was complete; and it was Congress who were
unwilling that I should have anything to do with the League. It took me quite a
bit of persuasion, when Nehru asked me to become the first Governor-General
of the Dominion of India, to get him and Patel to agree that I should also be
allowed to act in the same capacity for Pakistan in order to retain my impar¬
tiality.

Ever since my return no efforts on the part of Ismay, Mieville and myself,
have ever elicited from Jinnah the smallest hint of what was in his mind ; even
his closest advisers like the Nawab of Bhopal and Liaquat Ah Khan appeared to
be seriously under the impression that he would accept me as common Gover¬
nor-General. Indeed at a meeting of the Partition Council this week he referred
to there being only one Governor-General for the two Dominions.1 You can
imagine therefore what a bombshell it was when he suddenly announced his
intention of being the Governor-General of Pakistan himself.

I have always held, and frequendy stated my view, that it would be morally
indefensible for me to stay with one side alone after having dealt impartially
and justly with both sides for so long. I still adhere to that view.

There is, however, another moral consideration, which is that, through
Jinnah having misled us, we have quite unintentionally misled Congress. There
is no doubt that from mid-May up to this moment it has never entered their
minds that I would not stay with them. Further, if I now refuse, they will say
that Jinnah has secured his last triumph over Congress and through me.

922

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

I do not want to conceal from you that I consider the whole of this situation
to be my fault. I should have foreseen it, and have cleared the position with both
Jinnah and the Congress one way or the other three or four weeks ago. As it is I
am painfully aware of having put the British in an impasse; for whichever way
the decision goes it can rightly be held that I shall have let down one side or the
other.

I feel that I must seek a decision from the King based, of course, on your
advice. I hope also that you may feel it right to consult the Opposition. If it is
your wish that I should be Governor-General of the Dominion of India, at all
events till partition is over in April, then I trust that you will be able to make
that clear in the debate. If on the other hand it is your wish that I should refuse,
I am of course prepared to take full responsibility on my own shoulders, since it
would embarrass H.M. Government with the Government of the future
Dominion of India if they were to refuse to allow an Englishman to accept the
position of first Governor-General.

I have put some of this background into my Personal Report, so that the
Cabinet Committee may know the situation, but only Pug Ismay can give you
the full background since fortunately he was present when Jinnah begged me to
stay with the Dominion of India in the interests of Pakistan !

I can only say how sorry I am to have produced this situation.

Yours very sincerely,

DICKIE MOUNTBATTEN

1 No reference in these terms by Mr Jinnah has been recorded in the Partition Council Minutes; see
however No. 416, p. 759, line 2, where the Council’s agreement is recorded that the Joint Defence
Council should consist of, among others, ‘the Governor General or Governors General’.

524

Viscountess Mountbatten of Burma to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma1
Mountbatten Papers. Political Situation in India and Constitutional Position of

Viceroy , Part 4

secret 5 July ig47

1. The first essential will be to discuss freely and openly with Pandit Nehru,
Sardar Patel and the Congress Leaders the new situation which has arisen, and
this must be done before Lord Ismay’s departure for London. In this discussion
presumably it will be necessary to tell them frankly of Mr Jinnah’s attitude and
decision and to ascertain whether their offer to you to become Govemor-

1 Copies of this note were sent to Lord Ismay and Captain Brockman.

JULY 1947

923

General of the Union of India be once again confirmed in the light of more
recent developments.

2. It is also essential I feel that Congress should be in complete agreement
with the time limit which is being proposed for your appointment, i.e. approxi¬
mately mid-April 1948. This factor seems important as it may well be that the
situation in India and in Pakistan may still be very serious at that period, and
Congress may well feel that they could not accept a Governor-General who
would be pulling out at a time when the position in India was still a very grave
one and when it would be extremely difficult to appoint a high powered
successor to deal with Mr Jinnah. Partition may not even have been effected by
mid- April and I think that if any question of accepting die Congress offer is
considered one will have to face up to the fact that, even if now diey agree to the
provisional date, they may come and ask for an extension and it may be equally
difficult to pull out then as it would be now.

3 . There is another factor which worries me and that is that if Mr Jinnah
adopts the complete Hider attitude, even if that attitude were to be for the
destruction of Pakistan and remove the chance of getting the assets he so badly
needs, you will find yourself placed in a very difficult position and might, as a
constitutional Governor-General to Congress, possibly prove a liability more
than an asset. I think this is most unlikely but it should be borne in mind.

4. Finally there is the factor that if the Congress offer is accepted one will
have both mentally and practically to be prepared to serve their interests
completely, excepting in those cases where approval will have been received for
your services to be used for the best interests of both communities in connection
with taking the Chair at Meetings, etc. If Congress felt that you were accepting
the offer with the intention of seeing that Pakistan got a square deal from Con¬
gress, I sincerely think they would decide they would sooner be served by
someone else.

Two personal views I would add are these :

A. I have read carefully the papers prepared by and discussed with your staff
on all the various schemes formulated, and particularly the advantages and
disadvantages existing if, as now, you are placed in the position where the offer
of the Governor-Generalship comes only from Congress. I am afraid that I find
the arguments they put forward in most cases contradictory in themselves such
as the point in one paper that if you accept office you and the British would
certainly be open to the criticism of partiality,2 while at a later stage the views
expressed indicate that the feeling is there would be no criticism of this kind.*

I feel however that they are right in trying to make the course as fair and as
easy as possible m what is an almost impossible situation, and in the decision on
which we must all sympathise with you, stand by you, and advise in the best

practical manner.

924

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

B. One tiling that weighs heavily with me on this whole question and makes
me consider that you have a real duty to Congress is the fact that you are in
some ways I think in honour bound to them by having let them understand
that you would remain here to give your support after the 15 th August, and
although this was only a verbal assurance and had important qualifications they
would, I am certain, feel you had broken faith with them. This however will be
cleared up presumably by your talk with them.

E. M. OF B.

2 See Nos. 470 and 522, Enclosure 1, para. 4.

3 See Nos. 471 and 522, Enclosure 2, para. 12.

525

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. Paper 1.3.(47)136
LlP&Jlio/ioi: ff 29-32
Berar

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

India office, 5 July 1947
(Reference: 13.(47)3 8th Meeting, Minute 3)1

I circulate, for the information of my colleagues, a note on Berar.

2. It will be seen that the effect of the Indian Independence Bill will be to
terminate our military guarantees to the Nizam and to bring about the rever¬
sion of Berar de jure to Hyderabad subject to any arrangement which may be
reached between the Government of India and the Nizam for its continued
administration as part of the Union of India. The prospects at present of such
an arrangement being reached are not good and I fear that trouble between the
Union of India and Hyderabad on this score after die transfer of power is likely.

3. Lord Pethick-Lawrence suggested to the Viceroy in March2 that he
might encourage Pandit Nehru to initiate negotiations for an arrangement
under which the Nizam might agree to leave Berar to be administered as at
present, in return for facilities for the importation from overseas of goods

1 At the conclusion of an India and Burma Committee Meeting on 1 July on Burma policy, Mr Attlee
had drawn attention to the question of Berar and the Committee had invited Lord Listowel to
circulate ‘a note on the exact nature of His Majesty’s Government’s obligations to the Nizam of
Hyderabad in connection with Berar’. R/30/1/11: f 44.

2 See Vol. X, No. 39; also Vol. IX, No. 557, para. 3 and Vol. VIII, No. 522.

JULY 1947

925

required by Hyderabad. Pandit Nehru was sounded on this and his reaction was
unfavourable. Apart from holding the Congress view that the new Dominion
of India should inherit the Treaties of the Paramount Power he has said that the
States should come into the Constituent Assembly before discussions about
their future relations with British India could be opened. The Viceroy also
advised us that nothing short of an outlet to the sea would be likely to satisfy the
Nizam.3

4. It would now fall to Sardar Patel, as Member in Charge of a new Depart¬
ment of the Government of India constituted to deal with the States, to nego¬
tiate a temporary arrangement with Hyderabad until its attitude towards
accession to one or other Dominion or entering into other political arrange¬
ments with the Dominions has been determined. There is, however, reason to
anticipate that the Nizam will be unwilling to negotiate. He may dispute with
us our right to terminate our Treaties with him unilaterally and may point to
the fact that the 1936 Agreement provides that it shall not be amended save with
the consent of both parties, or determined by either party so long as it is faith¬
fully observed by the other.

L.

Annex to No. 525

POSITION OF BERAR

The position of Berar is governed by an Agreement of 1936 between His
Majesty and the Nizam under which: —

(i) the sovereignty of the Nizam over Berar was recognised and the Nizam
agreed to the administration of Berar as a part of the Central Provinces
in accordance with the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935,
the Governor of the Central Provinces and Berar being appointed after
consultation with the Nizam.

(ii) An annual sum of Rs. 25 lakhs was to be paid annually to the Nizam in
respect of Berar.

(iii) It was also provided that nothing in the Agreement in any way affected
or diminished the military guarantees enjoyed by the Nizam under any
existing Treaty or Agreement.

2. These military guarantees are as follows : —

(a) Treaty of 1800 provided for a general defensive alliance between the
East India Company and the Nizam.

(b) Under Treaties of 1766, 1800 and 1853, read together, the Nizam is
entitled to the assistance, when required to protect the Nizam and his
heirs or to reduce to obedience all rebels and exciters of disturbance in the
Nizam's Dominions, of eight battalions of sepoys and two regiments of
cavalry with their requisite complement of guns and European artillery¬
men, fully equipped with warlike stores and ammunition. Except with
the consent of the Nizam, not less than five regiments of infantry and one

926

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

of cavalry (with a due proportion of artillery) of this force must be
stationed in the Nizam’s territories. In consideration of this the Nizam
ceded to the Company the Circars, which now form the northern part of
Madras.

(c) Under the Treaty of 1853, the Nizam is also entitled, in return for the
assignment to the East India Company of Berar, to the assistance in his
Dominions, whenever required to deal with rebellion, disturbance, or
resistance to the just claims and authority of the Nizam, after the reality
of the offence has been ascertained, of a further force of 5000 infantry and
2000 cavalry with four field batteries of artillery, commanded by British
officers, fully equipped and disciplined, and controlled by the British
Government. By an Agreement of 1902, which was replaced by that of
1936, the assignment of Berar was turned into a perpetual lease, in
consideration for a rent of Rs. 25 lakhs per annum.

(d) The Treaty of 1853 also provided that in the event of war, both the
forces referred to in (b) and (c) above shall be employed in such manner as
the British Government consider best calculated to oppose the enemy,
provided that two battalions of sepoys remain near the capital of Hydera¬
bad.

3 . It will be seen that there is no obligation upon us to maintain any troops
in Berar as distinct from the other parts of the Nizam’s Dominions. Nor is there
any obligation on us to maintain either in Berar or Hyderabad, as Lord Temple-
wood has suggested to the Prime Minister, British troops as such, other than the
British officers commanding the force referred to in paragraph 2(c) and the
European artillerymen which form part of the force referred to in paragraph

4. With the transfer of power in India and the withdrawal of British troops,
we are no longer in a position to implement our military guarantees to the
Nizam and Clause 7(i)(b) of the Indian Independence Bill provides for the
lapse of all political engagements with the States. The effect of this is the abro¬
gation of our military guarantees and the reversion of Berar de jure to the
Nizam, subject to any arrangement which may be reached between him and
the Government of India for its continued administration as part of that
Dominion.

3 See Vol. X, No. 372.

JULY 1947

927

526

Sir A. Carter to Sir G. Abell

MSS. EUR. D. 714/81

5 July 1947

Dear Abell,

With reference to the Secretary of State’s telegram No. 8413 of 1st July,1 I
think you should have for His Excellency’s personal information the following
short account of what is intended as regards the Secretary of State and the
India Office after 15 th August.

As from that date the office of the Secretary of State for India will pass out of
existence. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, besides being
responsible for relations with the existing Dominions, will take over the
ultimate responsibility for the two new Indian Dominions and the India Office
will also, in form at least, become a part of the Commonwealth Relations
Office. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations will, however, be
given a Minister of State to assist him and in practice he will for the most part
deal with Indian business on behalf of the Secretary of State. The office of
Secretary of State for Burma will go on until there is legislation later in the year.
In all probability it will be thought unsuitable that the same person should hold
the office of Secretary of State for Burma and Minister of State in the Common¬
wealth Relations Office dealing with Indian affairs.

It follows that the U.K. High Commissioner in India must come under the
control of the Commonwealth Relations Secretary of State (in practice under
the Minister of State), instead of that of the Prime Minister and the curious
present Special Committee, though there has not yet been a formal decision on
the point so that Terence Shone had better not be told this at present.

Part of the above has already been made public in the Press here as a result of
Prime Minister’s talk to the Lobby correspondents just after the bill was pub¬
lished yesterday. He will presumably say rather more on Thursday on second
reading.

Yours sincerely,

R. H. A. CARTER

1 No. 451.

928

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

527

Sir G. Abell to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

72

5 July 1947

I have had a talk on the Secraphone with Governor’s Secretary, Lahore, about
the situation there.

2. The Security Committee has ceased to sit because of Mamdot’s absence,1
and nothing more has been heard from Mamdot. The Governor’s Secretary
said that the Governor would be relieved to hear that the resignation was not
ordered by the High Command. He agreed that the cause might be local
politics.

2. Meanwhile, the League are participating in a most friendly way on the
Partition Council, and that side of the work is going well.

3 . The Governor’s Secretary said that the Governor would like to carry on
for the moment as he is, and await developments. He thought it would be
useful to know what was going on in Bengal about the twin Cabinets, and
agreed that something of that sort might have to be considered in the end in the
Punjab. I told him that I might go to Calcutta if time permitted, and he
suggested that in that case, I ought to go straight on to Lahore as soon as
possible, and report there.

4. If Y.E. agrees, I will arrange to fly to Calcutta on Monday, and return here
on Wednesday. Then if I have collected anything useful, I could go up to
Lahore on Thursday and back the same day, after first reporting to Y.E.2

G. E. B. ABELL

1 See No. 472.

2 Lord Mountbatten minuted: ‘O.K.b

528

Text of Statement by Sardar Patel 1

L/P &Jli°l8i: f 37

FUTURE OF THE STATES

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s Assurance

Following is the full text of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s statement on the Indian
States, made on 5th July:

“It was announced some days back that the Government of India had
decided to set up a department to conduct their relations with the States in

1 The text of this Statement was sent to the Information Department of the India Office by the Press
Information Bureau of the Government of India in tels. B 483 and 483 A and B of 7 July.

JULY I947

929

matters of common concern. This Department has come into being today and
the States have been informed to this effect.

“On this important occasion, I have a few words to say to the Rulers of the
Indian States, among whom I am happy to count many as my personal friends.
It is the lesson of history that it was owing to her politically fragmented
condition and our inability to make a united stand that India succumbed to
successive waves of invaders. Our mutual conflicts and internecine quarrels
and jealousies have in the past been the cause of our downfall and our falling
victims to foreign domination a number of times. We cannot afford to fall into
those errors or traps again. We are on the threshold of independence.

“It is true we have not been able to preserve the unity of the country entirely
unimpaired in the final stage. To the bitter disappointment and sorrow of
many of us, some parts have chosen to go out of India and set up their own
governments. But there can be no question that despite this separation, the
fundamental homogeneity of culture and sentiment, reinforced by the com¬
pulsive logic of mutual interest, would continue to govern us. Much more
would this be the case with that vast majority of States which, owing to their
geographical contiguity and indissoluble ties — economic, cultural and political
— must continue to maintain relations of mutual friendship and co-operation
with the rest of India. The safety and preservation of these States, as well as of
India, demand unity and mutual co-operation between its different parts.

“When the British established their rule in India, they evolved the doctrine of
Paramountcy, which established die supremacy of British interests. That doc¬
trine has remained undefined to this day but in its exercise there has un¬
doubtedly been more subordination than co-operation. Outside the field of
Paramountcy there has been very wide scope in which relations between British
India and the States have been regulated by enlightened mutual interests. Now
that British rule is ending, the demand has been made diat the States should
regain their independence.

“I do not think it can be their desire to utilise this freedom from domination
in a manner which is injurious to the common interests of India or which
militates against the ultimate paramountcy of popular interest and welfare, or
which might result in abandonment of that mutually useful relationship that
has developed between British India and the Indian States during the last
century. This has been amply demonstrated by the fact that the great majority
of Indian States have already come into the Constituent Assembly. To those
who have not done so, I appeal that they should join now. The States have
already accepted the basic principle that for defence, foreign affairs and com¬
munications they would come into an Indian Union. We ask no more of them
than accession on these three subjects, in which the common interests of the
country are involved. In other matters, we would scrupulously respect their
autonomous existence.

930

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

'‘This country, with its institutions, is the proud heritage of the people who
inhabit it. It is an accident that some live in States and some in British India, but
all alike partake of its culture and character. We are all knit together by bonds of
blood and feeling, no less than of self-interest. None can segregate us into
segments; no impassable barriers can be set up between us. I suggest it is,
therefore, better for us to make laws sitting together as friends than to make
treaties as aliens.

“I invite my friends, the Rulers of the States, and their States and their people
to the Councils of the Constituent Assembly in this spirit of friendliness and
co-operation in a joint endeavour inspired by a common allegiance to our
Motherland, for the common good of us all.

‘ There appears to be a great deal of misunderstanding about the attitude of
the Congress towards the States. 1 should like to make it clear that it is not the
desire of the Congress to interfere in any manner whatever with the domestic
affairs of the States. They are no enemies of the Princely Order but, on the
other hand, wish them and their people, under this aegis, all prosperity,
contentment and happiness. Nor would it be my policy to conduct the relations
of the new Department with the States in any manner which savours of
domination of one over the other; if there would be any domination, it would
be that of our mutual interests and welfare. We have no ulterior motive or
selfish interests to serve. The common objective should be to understand each
other’s point of view and come to decisions acceptable to all and in the best
interests of the country.

‘ ' With this object, I propose to explore the possibility of associating with the
administration of the new Department a standing committee representative of
both the States and British India.

“We are at a momentous stage in die history of India. By common en¬
deavour, we can raise this country to new greatness, while a lack of unity will
expose us to fresh calamities. 1 hope the Indian States will bear in mind that the
alternative to co-operation in the general interest is anarchy and chaos which
will overwhelm great and small in common ruin if we are unable to act together
in the minimum of common tasks.

“Let not future generations curse us for having had die opportunity but
failed to turn it to our mutual advantage. Instead, let it be our proud privilege
to leave a legacy of mutually beneficial relationship which would raise diis
sacred land to its proper place amongst the nations of the world and turn it into
an abode of peace and prosperity.”2

2 In tel. 1788-S of 6 July to Lord Listowel, Lord Mountbatten commented as follows on extracts from
the fifth and eighth paras, of Sardar Patel’s Statement: ‘Though I doubt whether Nehru would go as
far as Patel, this may be taken as an official statement on behalf of the Congress and it is likely to have
a valuable effect. It also may be useful to you in Parliament.’ R/3/1/154: f 89.

JULY 1947

931

529

Mr Abbott to Mr I. D. Scott
Telegram , R/j/ 1/157: f 124

5 July 1947

No. 161-G. I have shown your telegram No. 1753-S of 5th July to the
Governor. He says that much as he would like Sir Cyril Radclifte to stay at
Government House, he must advise strongly against it. Communal feeling is
so high and party suspicions are so strong that any close personal contacts
between die Governor and the Chairman or Members of the Boundary
Commission would be misinterpreted. The more innocent of the Governor’s
visitors are already suggesting that it is his business to Cad vise” the Commission
or to bring pressure to bear upon it to secure an award of a particular kind, and
it is important that the Chairman should not only be, but appear to be, free
from official influence. 1 am enquiring about accommodation at Faletti’s
Hotel.2 Will the Stenographers need local accommodation?

2. There will be no difficulty about the office staff.

1 Indicating Sir C. Radcliffe’s preliminary programme, asking whether he could be accommodated at
Government House, and requesting office staff to be made available. R/3/1/157: f 119,

2 In a letter dated 7 July Mr Scott informed Mr Abbott that he would give his telegram to Sir C.
Radcliffe on arrival the next day. Mr Scott asked Mr Abbott to confirm that accommodation would
be reserved at Faletti’s Hotel or other suitable arrangements made. R/3/1/157: f 132.

530

Mr Gandhi to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

R/3l1l151: f 258

NEW DELHI, 5 July 1947

Dear Friend,

I received your kind letter of even date1 just after I had finished my prayer
speech and was going out for my walk. Fortunately about noon I had a visit
from a Pathan whom I had known to be a Khudai Khidmatgar. He was going
to Peshawar and so I gave him the message which I have reproduced in the
letter2 I enclose herewith. You may read the letter and if you think that it
covers the new point you have raised, you may send the letter by special
messenger as suggested by you. I am hoping that there will be no disturbance
on the part of Badshah Khan and his followers. In the message that I sent

932

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

through the Pathan Khudai Khidmatgar I covered much more ground than
mentioned in my letter to Badshah Khan.

1 thank you for giving me the purport of the telegram3 received by you from
the Resident in Kashmir.

I hope Her Excellency was none the worse for her visit to the Bhangi Bastie.
It is open to you not to send the enclosed if it does not merit your approval.4

Yours sincerely,

M. K. GANDHI

1 No. 518.

2 See No. 541.

3 See No. 518, note 2.

4 On 7 July Lord Mountbatten thanked Mr Gandhi for his letter and informed him of the action taken
on his letter to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (see No. 541 and its note 2). R/3/1/151: f 267.

531

Sir E. Baring 1 to Commonwealth Relations Office
Telegram , L/PQ/6/./22: f 73

important 3 July 1947, 1.37 pm

top secret and personal Received: 3 July , 8.13 pm

No. 202. Your telegram Z. No. 37 of 3rd July.2

Following from Prime Minister. Begins .

I notice that India Independence Bill under that name already introduced
into Parliament. Name is regrettable and embarrassing in South Africa where
word “independence’" is an apple of discord and may open dangerous con¬
troversy. Statute of Westminster, which defines Dominion status, explicitly
confers sovereignty and leaves independence as inferential right to be exercised
by Dominion if it so chooses. Is it still possible to substitute “sovereignty” for
“independence”, and so avoid controversy and appearance of going beyond
terms of Statute? I would myself prefer “India Bill”, or “India Status Bill”, but
would much regret explicit reference to independence, which may suit India,
but raise Dominion difficulties and controversies. In any case I would regret
announcement that Dominions agree, and would equally regret standing alone
in not agreeing, and would therefore suggest that announcement of agreement
should be avoided if possible. India is pulling Dominions into a position which
may lead to crisis for one or more of them.

1 British High Commissioner in South Africa.

2 No. 481.

JULY 1947

933

I may further point out that use of term “independence” in India Bill may
also be a pointer to Burmese Constituent Assembly to go for independence
rather than Dominion status at their meeting on 24th July. Burma is a com
scious rival with India in the race for sovereign independence. Ends.

2. Prime Minister of New Zealand has telegraphed to General Smuts,
seeking his reaction to enquiry contained in your telegram, and text of above
reply is being repeated by Union Government to Mr. Fraser, and also to the
Prime Ministers of Canada and Australia.

532

The Earl of Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Telegram , L/P&S/i 2/4638: ff 136-7

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, S July 1947, 2.4O pm

Received: 5 July, 9.43 pm

No. 8677. Debate (B).1 International status of new Dominions and succession to
Treaty rights and obligations.

2. I propose that Government spokesman should if the question is raised
make following statement: —

3 . The question of international status of the two new Dominions is not one
which will be finally determined by terms of this Bill. It is a matter for members
of U.N.O. and other foreign States as much as for H.M.G. in the U.K. Our
own view is that new Dominion of India continues the international personality
of existing India and that she will succeed as a matter of international law to the
membership of U.N.O. which the existing India enjoys as an original signatory
of the San Francisco Charter. Similarly, representatives of the Dominion of
India will, in our view, be entitled to membership of existing international
organisations and specialised agencies in which India has hitherto participated.
Our hope is that, on the establishment of the new Dominion of Pakistan, she
will be accepted as a new member of the family of nations, and that she will
before long be able to make her proper contribution to international goodwill
and collaboration. H.M.G. will do all in their power to bring this result about.

4. The view which H.M.G. hold and will support as regards international
rights and obligations is that the new Dominion of India will prima facie inherit
all the present India’s international obligations and will be entitled to claim the
rights and advantages associated therewith. This was the view of the interna¬
tional law on State succession which was tacitly, if not expressly, applied when

934

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

the Dominions became international persons, and we believe that it is generally

accepted.

5. In the present case, however, the position is complicated by the fact that
the present India is not continuing in a unitary form. It is clear that the new
Dominion of India cannot be bound in international law by obligations which
can only be carried out in territory which is not under her effective control nor
can she claim the reciprocal benefits associated with those obligations. Certain of
those obligations (for example, those relating to frontiers) run with the land and
consequently pass by automatic operation of law to whatever successor autho¬
rity becomes the sovereign authority in the territory to which the obligations
attach. Other treaty provisions,2 which equally cannot be performed in the new
India but which have local and territorial application to the territory of
Pakistan will not automatically pass, but it will be open to Pakistan, when set
up, to establish herself in a position corresponding to that of the new India by
accepting the obligations and claiming the benefits of Treaties which have local
and territorial application to her territory. Statement ends .

6. I should hope that it might be possible to add to the above some indication
that the Indian leaders accept H.M.G.’s view of this matter, but this will
depend upon any assurances which you may receive as a result of the approach
contemplated in your telegram of 26th June, No. 1559-S.3 I should be glad to
know in this connexion whether the Muslim League leaders have reconsidered
preliminary view to the contrary stated in paragraph (5) of your telegram dated
2nd July, No. 1703-S.4

1 In tel. 8505 of 3 July 1947 Mr Turnbull explained to Sir G. Abell that the India Office were arranging
in two categories the material being prepared for the Parliamentary debate on the second reading of
the Indian Independence Bill. These categories related to matters ‘(A) ... on which we desire to make
a statement’ and ‘(B) ... on which we must be ready to make a reply’. Telegrams dealing with the
two categories were to begin ‘Debate (A)’ or ‘Debate (B)’. L/P &J/10/132: f 124.

2 In order to cover commercial and multilateral treaties the concluding passage of the statement, from
‘Other treaty provisions . . was subsequently amended to read:

“Other treaty provisions, which equally cannot be performed in the new India but which have
application to the territory and inhabitants of Pakistan, will not automatically pass. It will, how¬
ever, be open to Pakistan, when set up, to secure the continued application to her of these Treaty
provisions, by accepting the obligations and claiming the benefits of them, and thus establishing
herself in a position corresponding to that of the new India. There are also other Treaties, multilateral
and bilateral, having no localised application, which India will inherit but which will not pass to
Pakistan, in regard to which it is most desirable that arrangements should be made so that Pakistan
can in future assume the position of an independent party in regard to them. H.M.G. for their part
will be very ready to extend their good offices, if Pakistan so desires, in endeavouring to secure the
acceptance by the foreign Governments concerned of this position.”

L/P&S/12/4638: ff 135, 56, 54, 53.

3 This should read 1599-S: see No. 333, note 6.

No. 463 ; see also No. 517 and its note 4.

JULY 1947

935

533

Record of Interview between Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma and

Mr Jinnah

Mountbatten Papers. Viceroy's Interview No. 156

5 July 1947

Mr Jinnah came to see me at 6.30 p.m.

I told him that I had had a letter1 from Dr Ingram asking whether he (Mr
Jinnah) would be prepared to denounce the Poona Pact as far as Pakistan was
concerned.

2. Mr Jinnah said that he intended to see that die Scheduled Castes in Pakis¬
tan received really fair treatment and that the Poona Pact as such would cer¬
tainly not operate in Pakistan. However, he could not give me any details as to
what the future position of the Scheduled Castes would exactly be until the
Constituent Assembly had discussed die matter.

3. I asked him whether he would like me to submit his name to the King
to receive the customary GCMG bestowed on Govemors-General on appoint¬
ment in the Dominions. I also pointed out to him the desirability of reopening
to citizens of Pakistan eligibility for decorations. I added that the Orders of the
Star of India and of the Indian Empire would, in their very names, be un¬
suitable; but that the Order of St Michael and St George, which was the cus¬
tomary Order for the Dominions, appeared to me to be eminently suitable. I
promised to convey his views on this subject to H.M. Government. He
thanked me and said he would like to consider the matter carefully before
letting me have an answer.

4. I asked him whether he still wished me to be the Chairman of the Joint
Defence Committee if I remained as Governor-General of the Dominion of
India ; and he confirmed that this was what he wanted. I asked him to let me
have a letter to this effect. He promised to send me such a letter.

5. I next asked him whether he had made up his mind about the Dominions
flag and whether he liked the design I had sent him. I pointed out that the
Union Jack in the upper canton was only one-ninth of the whole area instead
of one quarter as in the case of the other Dominions. I also told him drat I
thought the Congress were likely to agree to a similar flag though it was not
yet settled. He promised to let me know in good time to have a flag made
before the 15th August.

6. I asked him whether he would like me to come down on the 14th August
for a farewell ceremony at Karachi, since the Pakistan areas would pass out of
my control on the 15 th. He said this would give him great pleasure. I promised
to 20 into the details and discuss them with him later.

O

936

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

7. I asked him when and where he was going to call the Constituent Assem¬
bly for Pakistan, and he said probably in Karachi at the end of July or beginning
of August. We agreed that it was my responsibility to call the Constituent
Assembly and he said he would let me know when he wished me to do so.

8. I discussed with him the names of suitable candidates to be Heads of the
Defence Services in Pakistan. He said he wanted all three to be British and
would like me to provide him with some more particulars of the alternative
candidates and possibly to give him an opportunity of seeing the candidates. I
promised to do this.

9. He handed me a telegram2 addressed to the Prime Minister and the Leader
of the Opposition, protesting against the exclusion of the Andamans from the
Bill. I promised to transmit this. He said he would have a further protest to
make on there having been no provision of machinery to ensure that the assets
were fairly divided and that their transfer was correctly implemented.

10. I told him that I had been informed that he had recently sent a letter to the
Maharaja of Kashmir urging him to join the Pakistan Constituent Assembly
and promising him every sort of favourable treatment if he would do so
including the continuation of autocratic government within the State. He
absolutely denied having written and said that what was more he had no
intention of writing, though he would have liked an opportunity to discuss
matters with the Prime Minister, Mr Kak, next time he came to Delhi. I told
him I would ask the Political Department to put him in touch with him when
he arrived about the 25th July.

11. We discussed the reconstitution of the Interim Government. I reminded
him that the only way I could get Congress to accept partition was to undertake
to reconstitute the Government along the lines that Mr Jinnah had himself
accepted for Bengal, at the earliest possible moment. I pointed out that the
earliest possible moment had been June 4, but that I had persuaded Congress
to wait one month. Now on the 4th July I had again succeeded in making
them wait until the passage of the Bill; but I warned him that after July 20 I
should be compelled to carry out the reconstitution, and that so far as I could
see — as there would be less than four weeks left before partition was complete
and power transferred — this could be explained in a communique in such a
manner that it would in no sense be derogatory to Pakistan. He still expressed
his regret but did not seem to be completely against it.3

1 This letter, apparently dated 14 June 1947, has not been traced. In a further letter of 24 July
Dr Ingram thanked Lord Mountbatten for saying he would mention the denunciation of the Poona
Pact to Mr Jinnah. ‘You will be doing him a great service if you can help him to realise that by doing
so, he will not only earn the gratitude of the leaders of the Depressed Classes . . . but will surely
ensure their co-operation in the plans he wants to carry out, in the Dominion of Pakistan.’ Mount-
batten Papers, Demi-Official Correspondence. For the Poona Pact, see Vol. VII, No. 45, note 3.

2 See Nos. 534 and 536.

3 See also No. 545, Item 3.

JULY I947

937

534

Mr Jinnah to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

RhN154:f79

IMMEDIATE AND MOST URGENT 10 AURANGZEB ROAD,

NEW DELHI, 5 July 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am enclosing herewith the draft telegram1 and request you to communicate
it to the Prime Minister and also to the Leader of the Opposition. I did not like
to send the telegram direct without informing you about it, but if you find any
difficulty in doing so, I hope you will not mind letting me know so that I can
then send it on directly today to the Prime Minister and the Leader of Opposi¬
tion.2

There is one more matter which I am examining and that is the authority or
sanction behind who would be able to execute and enforce the partition award
in terms of the decision of the contemplated Arbitral Tribunal. I shall send that
on to you on Monday. But if you are unable to send the enclosed telegram
today, it follows that I shall have similarly to communicate the other matter
directly on Monday.

Yours sincerely,

M. A. JINNAH

1 No. 536.

2 Later on 5 July Lord Mountbatten informed Mr Jinnah that he had sent the telegram to the Secretary
of State and had asked him to communicate it to the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition.
R/3/1/154: f 80.

535

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R^/ 1/154 : f 84

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 5 July 1947, 8 pm

confidential Received: 5 July , 9.20 pm

No. 1767-S. Following is text of note received from Nehru about Indian
Independence Bill.1 Nehru says Congress recognise that nothing should be done
to delay passage of bill but are strongly of opinion that changes suggested
should be incorporated.

2. Note Begins. While some of the suggestions have been accepted, the more
important amendments required have not been given effect to. We think that

938

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

the non-inclusion of these amendments is very unfortunate and likely to lead to

grave difficulties.

2. Even if there were no two Bills, as suggested by us, it should have been
made perfectly clear that the international personality of the existing India
continues and that India continues to be the parent state exercising all its rights
and performing all its obligations under international treaties, etc.

3 . In the Bill the argument might be ad vanced that the Dominion of India
is only one of 564 major and minor fragments into which the Bill has divided
India. This argument may be met by adducing various considerations, but the
definition should have been so clear as to prevent the possibility of doubt or
argument.

4. In clause 7(1) (b) and (c) a proviso has now been inserted.2 But this does not
go far enough and even this is subject to unilateral denunciation by any party.
The effects of this are very difficult to foresee. We think it essential that the
proviso should be in the form suggested by us previously.

5. The proviso to clause i9(3)3 has been retained almost in its original form.
The change made does not go far enough and the difficulties pointed out in our
previous note remain.4 We think it necessary that the proviso should be as
suggested by us in our previous note. It must be made perfectly clear that the
powers of the existing Constituent Assembly are in no way reduced by this
Bill. Ends .

1 Pandit Nehru sent copies of his note to Lord Mountbatten and Lord Ismay. In a covering letter to
Lord Ismay, Pandit Nehru wrote: ‘I have purposely only referred to three matters which we consider
very important ... I should like to emphasise that we attach great importance to these proposed
changes.’ R/3/1/154: If 83, 117.

2 See No. 428, Clause 7(1) Proviso in italics.

3 Ibid., Clause 19(3); see also No. 514, para. (4).

4 See No. 479.

536

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , i^/j/1/154: f 82

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, j July I947, 8 put

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1771-S. See my immediately preceding telegram.1 Following is text of
message from Jinnah. Begins .

Clause 2 of Indian Independence Bill allots Andaman and Nicobar Islands to

1 In this telegram Lord Mountbatten conveyed Mr Jinnah’s request that his message should be sent to
Mr Attlee and Mr Churchill. He added that Jinnah was examining the sanction behind the enforce¬
ment of the awards of the Arbitral Tribunal. R/3/1/154: f 81.

JULY 1947

939

Dominion of India. These islands have never formed subject of discussion or
agreement between parties at any time. Their sudden inclusion in India raises
very grave issue. They are not part of India historically or geographically. They
were British possessions administered by Government of India and are not in
same category as other Chief Commissioners’ Provinces being reserved to
Governor General under Constitution Act 1935. Majority of population con¬
sists of tribes who are not connected with peoples of India by ethical, religious
or cultural ties. Pakistan’s claim to these islands very strong since only channel
of communication between eastern and western Pakistan is by sea and these
islands occupy important strategic position on sea route and provide refuelling
bases. Dominion of India have no such claim. They should form part of
Pakistan.

I pointed out above facts on seeing Bill and suggested that if no immediate
decision was feasible islands should be excluded from scope of Bill and dealt
with separately. Surprised to find no alteration in Bill as published this morning.
Urge most strongly this grave injustice to Pakistan be rectified in Parliament.
Ends .

537

Extract from a letter of Mr Tyson
MSS. EUR, E. 341 1 41

NO. 4IO GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CALCUTTA, 5 July 1Q47

Dear Folk,1

The news of the week is that contained in today’s papers — the publication of the
“India Independence Bill” — as I see it is now to be called. I have not had time to
examine the cabled version of the bill in its present form (i.e. in its final form
as a Bill for introduction in Parliament) but I saw an earlier draft and I gather
the changes are not numerous. From our own point of view the important
thing is that Dominion Status, in the Bill, is to be conferred on the 15th Aug., —
whether or not they have partitioned Bengal, die Punjab and India by that
date. Flitherto we had always understood that the date would be “by Oct. 1st at
the latest, and earlier if the Governor General so decided”. We knew that the
G.G. himself was aiming at August 15th, but whether that was an early date
selected to bring a sense of urgency to the Indian leaders and in the hope of
ensuring that we really did hand over by August 31st (say) or September 15th
or, in the last resort, by 1st Oct. was for some time in doubt. There has been
no doubt at all, of late, that the Viceroy, by sheer persistence and by talking of

940

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

no other date, had induced what I may call a “15th Aug.” complex and
people were definitely working to that date: but so far we have always had the
feeling that if we were not ready (or if the Punjab was not ready, or some other
part of India was not ready) to be left on its own on the 15th Aug., there might
be a short postponement, say to the 3 1st. This has made all planning of a private
character difficult. From this point of view the great thing about today’s
announcement is that it settles the date of Dominion Status (and of the British
handing over of power) as August 15 th irrespective of the success of Bengal,
the Punjab and the Central Government in “partitioning” themselves by that
date. Assuming that Parliament passes the Bill in its present form — as no doubt
it will — British power in India will cease on the night of the I4th/i5th August.
It is satisfactory to know where we are. I must say, Mountbatten is a hustler :
ever since he came out he has pursued shock tactics — well, at all events after his
initial month of reconnaissance (seeing Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru and Co. inter¬
minably, which some Indians seemed to think was a waste of time ! ! Curious
people: they would have been furious if he had gone ahead without doing so).
After this rather prolonged and very intensive reconnaissance, he made his
plan. He put this in embryo form before the Governors’ Conference1 2 that I
attended. Even then there was no talk of our being out before June 1948 : but it
was from that date or soon after that the blitz began. And since the time when
he launched his blitz he has given no one any rest — the Indian leaders least of
all. He has kept them so busy — so much on the run-— that they have not had
time to draw breath and criticise. Before they know where they are we shall be
out — and I believe, now, we shall withdraw in fairly peaceful conditions —
whatever may happen after we have gone. If we can withdraw in peaceful
conditions, it will make things better for the Europeans who remain and it will
make for better feelings between Great Britain and India in the future — the two
Indias, that is. I think there will be very unsettled conditions in India for some
time to come, especially in places like Calcutta where the two communities
meet: but the trouble will be primarily between Hindus and Muslims — not
anti-European. The Europeans will suffer discomfort and, at times, the danger
inseparable from disturbed conditions, but they will probably not be the main
target as they would undoubtedly have been if we had been pushed out by
force even partially successful.

Things here are getting more and more difficult in every way and we shall
be glad to go. I would not have said this two years ago, but I say it whole¬
heartedly now. We have had about enough and the India of “after-
August 15 th” will not be the kind of country I should want to serve or line in.

1 Evidently Mr Tyson’s relatives and friends in England.

2 See Vol. X, Nos. 147 and 158.

JULY 1947

941

538

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, R/j/ 1 / 138: ff 58-9

CONFIDENTIAL NEW DELHI, 5 July 1947, ll.JO pm

Received: 6 July, 5 am

No. 1777-P. Chamber of Princes was constituted by Crown with mam object
of enabling its President the Viceroy (now Crown Representative) to take its
counsel. Obviously with lapse of paramountcy Chamber ceases to exist as
constituted by Crown.

2. There has been no move by Princes to perpetuate the organisation as a
common body of their own with suitable adjustments in constitution and
functions. A resolution passed recendy at an informal meeting of the Standing
Committee presided over by Maharaja of Patiala, who has become officiating
Chancellor as a result of Nawab of Bhopal’s resignation of Chancellorship,
states that ”the Standing Committee understand the correct constitutional
position to be that, with the lapse of paramountcy, the Chamber of Princes
will cease to exist”. Standing Committee have accordingly initiated steps for
winding up Chancellor’s organisation which is within their sole control.

3 . I have been considering whether to suggest formal dissolution of Chamber
involving presumably Royal Proclamation or message from His Majesty. I have
come to the conclusion that this would not be appropriate since —

(1) it would be very difficult to devise wording of Proclamation or Message
which would give satisfaction to Princes and would not at the same time
give offence in, or provoke criticism or derision from, other quarters;

(2) there has been no suggestion from Princes that they would like this
formal dissolution; and

(3) there can be no question of holding meeting of Chamber and Royal
proclamation or message could thus only be published and circulated.

4. Subject therefore to further consideration if I receive any request from
Princes for formal dissolution, my conclusion is that there should be no formal
dissolution and that the Chamber should be allowed to die natural and un¬
obtrusive death. I should be grateful for your views.1

1 Lord Listowel replied in tel. 9466 of 22 July : ‘I agree and have submitted the matter to the King who
approves your proposals’. L/WS/1/1034: f 41.

942

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

539

The Earl oj Listowel to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma

Telegram , LIP&SI12I46J8: f 27

immediate India office, 5 July ig47, 8.10 pm

secret Received: 6 July , 4 am

no. 8685

Debate (B)1 Position of tribal areas after appointed day.

2. Clause ?(i)(c) of the Bill is related to paragraph 17 of the statement of
3rd June2 which said that “agreements with tribes of the North West Frontier
of India will have to be negotiated by the appropriate successor authority”.
The effect of that Clause is to place the Jirgas, or tribal assemblies, (who are the
Treaty-making bodies empowered to enter into agreements on behalf of the
tribes) in the same position in relation to the Constituent Assemblies of the
new Dominions as the Indian States will be after the appointed day.

3. As the House will be aware, these tribal areas are not part of British India,
and are not administered by officers of the Government of India. Relations
with them are governed by a series of Treaties and agreements which confer
jurisdiction in certain matters on the Crown: in practice this jurisdiction is
exercised by the local political authorities.

4. The termination of those agreements will place the tribes and the appro¬
priate successor Government in a position freely to negotiate fresh agreements.

1 See No. 532, note i.

2 No. 45.

540

Sir E. Jenkins ( Punjab ) to Sir G. Abell

Telegram , Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Punjab, Part 11(b)

IMMEDIATE LAHORE, 6 July 1947

No. 163-G. Your telephone conversation of 5th July1 with Abbott about
possibility of establishing Ministry in Punjab. I understand Bengal model
would be followed with one team of Ministers (presumably Muslim League) in
charge of whole Province and second team (presumably Hindu and Sikh)
holding watching brief for Eastern Punjab.

1 See No. 527.

JULY I947

943

2. Conditions here are not the same as in Bengal because whereas in Bengal
stable Ministry existed before new arrangement was made, here we are still in
section 93 . Appointment of shadow team in Bengal can be made to appear
concession to non-Muslims, but appointment of regular League Ministry plus
shadow team in Punjab would be regarded as surrender to League. When after
3rd June Statement I suggested Coalition no party was keen and Sachar and
Swaran Singh said there could be no cooperation on law and order on which
League and other parties held irreconcilable views. I would welcome transfer of
responsibility for law and order to Ministers, but I do not see how transfer
could be effective with Muslim Ministers advising in one sense and Hindu or
Sikh applying veto.

3. Apart from general difficulty mentioned above following points are
relevant :

(a) With 40 days to go to transfer of power partition work is practically
untouched. Partition Committee is still bogged down in trivialities.

(b) First act of new Ministry on termination of section 93 is normally to meet
Assembly and pass budget. Formation of M inistry would divert attention from
Partition, and routine processes of preparing budget, meeting Assembly and
getting settled in would occupy more than the time available.

(c) Situation here is generally explosive. Hatred and suspicion are universal
and undisguised. It seems to me that this is inevitable under plan which in
Punjab converts our principal cities into Frontier Towns and drives boundary
through area homogeneous in everything except religion. Explosion may be
touched off at any time and I expect trouble when Boundary Commission
reports. Attempt to form Ministry giving League jurisdiction throughout
Punjab would be a very powerful irritant.

4. I think you should visit Lahore and discuss in some detail before Viceroy
takes final decision.

54i

Sir G. Abell to Mr Latimer 1
Telegram , R/ 5/1/151: j] 261-2

immediate 6 July 1947 , 2 pm

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1784-S. Following is text of letter dated July 5th.2
Dear Badshah,

Khudai Khidmatgar Alam Khan saw^ me before 12 o’clock and he said that he
was leaving for Peshawar tonight. I did not send you any letter through him.

944

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

But I told him that there should be no demonstration against League Muslims,
that it should be enough that in the present state of tension and misrepresenta¬
tion Kliudai Khidmatgars should not vote at all one way or the other, that they
were entitled so far as internal affairs were concerned to claim and to have
complete autonomy without any interference from Pakistan or the Union and
that they could come to a decision as to the choice between the Union or
Pakistan when the Constitutions of the two were promulgated and when the
Frontier Province had fashioned its own autonomous constitution. Above all
every occasion for clash with the Muslim League members was to be avoided.
Real Pathan bravery was now on its trial. It was to be shown by cheerfully
taking blows or even meeting death at the hands of the opponents without the
slightest sort of retaliation. Boycott would certainly result in a legal victory for
Pakistanis but it would be a moral defeat, if without the slightest fear of violence
from your side, the bulk of the Pathans refrained in a dignified manner from
participating in the referendum. There should be no fuss, no procession, no
disobedience of any orders from authority.

I had acted promptly on receipt of your letter. I wrote a long letter3 to His
Excellency on which he took action.4 You must have seen also how I had dealt
with the question of the Frontier Province in one of my post prayer speeches.5
I send you herewith a copy of my letter to the Viceroy and of my post prayer
speech. This letter is also in answer to a complaint6 received by the Viceroy that
it was reported that there was fear of disturbance to be caused by the Khudai
Khidmatgars.

I hope the strain in which you are working is not telling upon your health.

Love,

BAPU

1 Secretary to the Governor of the N.W.F.P.

2 In tel. 1783-S of 6 July Sir G. Abell informed Mr Latimer that the present tel. contained the text of an
open letter which Mr Gandhi had sent Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (see No. 530). Mr Latimer was
asked to pass on the message as soon as possible. Mr Gandhi’s original letter was being sent by special
messenger by the Frontier Mail that evening. R/3/1/151: f 260.

3 Presumably No. 396.

4 See No. 422.

5 Presumably No. 442.

6 See Nos. 496, 515, 518 and 530.

JULY 1947

945

542

Commander Nicholls to Mr Joyce
Telegram, Rfa/i/iM: f go

important new Delhi, 6 July ig47, 7.45 pm

confidential Received : 6 July , 7.30 pm

1789-S. Indian Press reactions to India Independence Bill.

First reactions are extremely favourable. Naturally while newspaper Leaders
are critical of certain details of the Bill, the British have on the whole come out
well. Some highlights, extracts from newspaper Leaders, follow in my tele¬
gram 478-GT.

2. The Reforms Commissioner V. P. Menon, held a Press Conference on
5 th July at Viceroy’s request to answer questions on Independence Bill.
Member for Information and Broadcasting, Sardar Patel, took the chair.
Conference went off well and it is felt served a useful purpose. The main
attack was on the position of the States and in particular Berar.

3. Selection of Sunday newspapers being forwarded to Campbell-Johnson.
Please inform him accordingly and show him this telegram.

543

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , Rf j 1 ji 34: f 91

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 6 July I947 , 7.15 pill

EN CLAIR

No. 478-GT. My telegram No. 1789-S of 6th July.1

Indian News Chronicle. This is the first occasion when England and her
fellow Dominions will have admitted into the fold of a free Commonwealth
people belonging to a different race, brought up in different traditions, and
cherishing an altogether different culture. It will be the first occasion in history
when a subject nation will have obtained its freedom without the firing of a
hostile bullet, and through a voluntary abnegation on the part of the ruling
power. Despite several faults of omissions and equivocation, the Bill makes a
sincere endeavour to implement the Declaration of 3rd June.

Hindustan Times. When it is placed on the Statute Book, the Indian Indepen¬
dence Act 1947 will rank as the noblest and the greatest law ever enacted by the
British Parliament.

946

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Statesman. Above all, there is that master stroke, the title: the Indian Indepen¬
dence Act, 1947.

Dawn. On the eve of independence of the peoples of India, on which this last
enactment of the British Parliament sets its final seal, Great Britain is entitled to
the highest praise from all the freedom loving peoples of the world.

1 No. 542.

544

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan

R/j/ 1/162:/ 51

SECRET 7 July 1947

NO. 1446/16

Dear Mr Liaquat Ali Khan,

Thank you for your letter of the 4di July1 informing me that the All India
Muslim League recommend to His Majesty The King the appointment of Mr
Jinnah as Governor General of Pakistan.

I am grateful to you for what you say in the second paragraph of your letter,
but I must make it clear that I have not yet made up my mind on the matter.

Yours sincerely,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

1 No. 509.

545

Minutes of Viceroy s Fifty Third Staff Meeting, Items 2-4

Mountbatten Papers

SECRET

Those present during discussion of Items 2-4 of this Meeting held at The Viceroy s
House, New Delhi on 7 July 1947 at 10 am were: Rear-Admiral Viscount Mount¬
batten of Burma, Field Marshal Sir C. Auchinleck ( Item 4), Sir E. Mieville, Rao
Bahadur V. P. Menon, Colonel Currie, Mr I. D. Scott, Commander Nicholls,
Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine Crum

JULY I947

947

Item 2

GOVERNORS- GENERAL

the viceroy stated that one of the main reasons why Her Excellency had
expressed an opinion opposed to the suggestion that he should remain as
Governor-General of the Dominion of India1 was that his whole staff had, three
or four weeks previously, agreed that it would be unthinkable for him. to stay
on with one Dominion only. He said that it had been a great surprise to him
when liis staff, with the exception of Captain Brockman, had unanimously
advised him that he should stay on. He still felt that, if he did so, there was a very
real chance that he would be accused of acting dishonourably.

colonel currie said that he held the same opinion in this matter as the
majority of the rest of the staff. He considered that the implications of His
Excellency leaving had not been fully realised before — and that these implica¬
tions were likely to be very serious. Practically, in effect, they might be disas¬
trous.

sir eric mieville suggested that the main reason why die staff had, three
or four weeks previously, advised against His Excellency remaining as Gover¬
nor-General of one Dominion only was because they felt it likely that, in such
circumstances, his usefulness would in the main disappear after the transfer of
power, and that he would not be able to take the Chair at the Partition Com¬
mittee and at the Joint Defence Council. All that, however, was now com¬
pletely changed because of Mr Jinnah’s attitude, his excellency confirmed
that Mr Jinnah, at his interview two days’ previously, had been at great pains
to emphasise what a great help to Pakistan it would be if he (His Excellency)
stayed on in any capacity. Mr Jinnah had also at that interview agreed to His
Excellency acting as Chairman of the Joint Defence Council.2 Mr Jinnah had
stated that nobody would question His Excellency’s impartiality — such a
thought would not enter the minds of members of the Muslim League.

rao bahadur menon said that Congress opinion was unanimous that
His Excellency was the only person who could possibly help diem to tide over
the difficulties which were bound to arise during the next six months or year :
this applied particularly to difficulties in connection with the States.

Later in the meeting, field marshal auchinleck gave his opinion
that there might be adverse Muslim comment to Elis Excellency staying on as
Governor-General of India only. This might be circumvented by a public
statement by Mr Jinnah. field marshal auchinleck gave his view that
His Excellency must stay on in one capacity or another. He said that he did not
think that he and other senior officers would be able to carry on without His
Excellency’s guidance and support.

Item 3

THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT

his excellency the viceroy said that, at the last Cabinet Meeting,3 he

948

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

had asked all members of die Interim Government to send to him their resigna¬
tions ; he had at the same time asked them to carry on in the meanwhile. All
present at the meeting, including Mr Liaquat Ali Khan (the only Muslim League
Member present), had appeared to agree to send in their resignations; but Mr
Liaquat Ali Khan and the other Muslim League Members had not done so. It
was now for consideration what was to be done if they failed altogether to do
so.

rao bahadur menon stated that, as soon as the Indian Independence
Bill was passed, His Excellency would be empowered, under Clause 9, to order
the existing members of the Interim Government to demit their offices.

his excellency stated that Mr Jinnah, at his last interview,1 2 3 4 had asked him
to explain why Congress were making such an issue of “throwing out” the
Muslim League Members of the Interim Government, and taking away their
portfolios before the beginning of August. He (His Excellency) had explained
the situation in full to Mr Jinnah; but the latter had replied that this was deli¬
berate humiliation, his excellency said that he had pointed out to Mr
Jinnah that there would only be an interim period of a fortnight between the
passage of the Indian Independence Bill and the time when the Muslim League
Members of the Interim Go vemment would have to leave for Karachi. He had
further pointed out that Mr Jinnah himself had demanded a similar arrangement
for Bengal.

rao bahadur menon said that he had fully explained to the Congress
Leaders why the reconstitution of the Interim Government was closely con¬
nected with the passage of the Bill ; he had also reaffirmed to them His Excel¬
lency’s intentions to take the necessary steps as soon as the Bill became law.

his excellency said that the most important point was to avoid any
impression that the Muslim League members would be humiliated. There were,
broadly, two alternative ways of dealing with the matter — either he could
dismiss the Government after a majority vote on the subject in the Cabinet; or
Mr Jinnah could be persuaded graciously to accept the situation, which could
be presented in a perfectly natural way. He would do his best to persuade Mr
Jinnah to agree to the second alternative.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY:

decided to speak further to Mr Jinnah on this subject at his next interview.

Item 4

THE STATES

raobahadurmenon said that he personally had drafted the statement on the

1 See No. 524.

2 No. 533, para. 4.

3 No. 493, Case No. 171/33/47.

4 No. 533, para. 11.

JULY I947

949

States, issued two days previously in the name of Sardar Patel.5 It was only with
the greatest difficulty that he had persuaded the Congress Leaders to agree to the
statement, his excellency congratulated Rao Bahadur Menon on the terms
of the statement, which he considered quite excellent.

5 No. 528.

546

Record of Meeting of Special Committee of the Indian Cabinet appointed to consider
the question of extending to members of non- Secretary of State’s Services , both Central
and Provincial , the assurances already given on behalf of the Secretary of State’s

Services

Mountbatten Papers. Partition Council Minutes

Those present at this Meeting held on 7 July 1947 at 11 am were: Sardar Patel ,
Mr Liaquat Ali Khan , Dr J. Matthai; Mr H. M. Patel , Mr C. F. V. Williams ,
Mr P. V. R. Rao ( Secretariat )

MINUTES

The following points were made during the discussion:1

(a) The suggestion was that European officers not belonging to the Secretary
of State’s Services should be given the same guarantees as those given to officers
of Secretary of State’s Services. The effect of such a guarantee would be that the
right of Government to alter the terms and conditions of service where such
right exists at present would disappear. One view was that while a National
Government could dictate to Indians the terms on which they would be
employed, the position of European officers was different. On the other hand, it
was realised that such a discrimination would be difficult to justify.

(b) The question of guarantees was not raised in regard to this class of
officers at the time of the enactment of the Govt of India Act 1935. Also,
European officers appointed by the Govemor-General-in-Council do not enjoy
the right to retire on proportionate pension. There is no justification for giving
these officers any rights they are not already enjoying.

(c) Government cannot divest itself of its inherent right to alter existing
terms and conditions of service; moreover, where such a right vests expressly in
Government today, there is no reason why Government should forgo it.
Government servants can only expect that their existing terms and conditions of
service, whatever they are, should be guaranteed. A demand for further
guarantees is unreasonable and cannot be accepted.

(d) The Government of India have already given a guarantee to all their
Government servants that they will continue on their existing terms and

950

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

conditions of service. (And one of diese terms is the right of the Government to

modify those terms.)

(e) In view of the guarantee to maintain existing terms and conditions of
service the question whether European officers will be retained in service does
not arise.

(f) As regards the question of a capital sum being set aside for payment of
pensions, Secretary, Governor General (Public) explained that H.M.G. had
stated in their letter [ ? telegram] that it was their intention to negotiate on this
point with the two Governments. The question would thus arise only when
negotiations began. It was agreed, therefore, that no comments should be
offered on this point.

DECISION

It was decided that H.M.G. should be authorised to make the following
statement :

“I am happy to be able to announce, now, that leaders of the Indian parties
in the Government of India have guaranteed existing terms and conditions of
service of all their employees including Europeans. This guarantee covers
pension and provident fund liabilities and excludes any question of dis¬
crimination between Indians and non-Indians.”2

1 The Special Committee had before them tel. 8547 of 3 July 1947 in which Lord Listowel pointed out
to Lord Mountbatten that questions were likely to be asked during the parliamentary debate 011 the
Bill regarding the position of European members of the non-Secretary of State’s Services, and asked
whether there was anything that the Indian leaders would agree to being said in answer to such
questions. Also before the Committee were tels. 8474 and 8475 of 2 July (sent by Lord Listowel to
Lord Mountbatten following a discussion in the India and Burma Committee on 26 June) about the
assurances to be given in the debate to members of the Secretary of State’s Services and of the non-
Secretary of State’s services regarding the payment of pension and proportionate pension, including a
suggestion that the right of retirement on proportionate pension might be extended to members of
the non-Secretary of State’s Services. L/F/7/2432: ff 56, 59-62.

2 Lord Mountbatten reported this discussion to Lord Listowel in tel. 1825-S of 8 July 1947.
L/F/7/2432 : f 46. Mr Attlee’s statement in the House of Commons at the Second Reading of the Bill on
the position of the services included the statement quoted above. He also recognised that H.M.G. had
a ‘special responsibility’ towards European members of the Secretary of State’s Services, announced
an intention ‘to negotiate, in due course, an agreement whereby a capital sum in sterling will be set
aside to cover this liability’, and stated that, meanwhile, those concerned had the assurance of H.M.G.
that they would receive the pensions to which they were entitled. Pari Debs., 5th ser., H. of C. vol.
439, 10 July 1947, cols. 2457-8. See also relevant files in India Office Services and General Dept
Collection 42 (L/S &G/7), and Mountbatten Papers, Official Correspondence Files: Compensation
for Members of the Services, Part 11(b).

JULY I947

951

547

Pandit Nehru to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten ofB urma1
Mounthatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Sikh Problem , Part 11(a)

17 YORK ROAD, NEW DELHI, 7 July 1$47

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 4th July2 regarding your discussions with the
Sikh leaders.

2. We appreciate thoroughly the anxiety of the Sikhs. They have been hard
hit by this division. They might be helped somewhat by the decisions of the
Boundary Commission. As for assurances in regard to weigh tage etc., I fear this
raises complicated issues. All our troubles, or nearly all, have been due to
separate electorates and the system of weightage, originally introduced for the
Muslims. It became clear that this did little good to the minority concerned and
only created separatist tendencies. The addition of a seat or two makes no
essential difference. But it means the acceptance of a fundamentally wrong
principle. Once admitted, this principle leads to far-reaching consequences and
ill-will. It is possible, of course, that without weightage and separate electorate
some kind of reservation might be given with freedom to contest the general
seats also. We should like to help any minorities getting additional seats from
general constituencies.

3. The question of transfer of population does not arise immediately. If the
people concerned desire it, it must be seriously considered.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1 Lord Mountbatten noted on this letter 'I entirely agree’.

2 No. 497.

548

Mr Jinnah to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Rfcli/Wff 94-7

MOST URGENT AND IMMEDIATE 10 AURANGZEB ROAD,

NEW DELHI, 7 July I947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of 5 th July1 informing me that you have sent my tele¬
gram dated the 5 th July,2 which I requested you to send to the Prime Minister
and the Leader of Opposition, to the Secretary of State asking him to com¬
municate it to the Prime Minister and also the Leader of Opposition.

952

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

I shall feel grateful if you will now similarly send the second telegram, copy
of which I am enclosing herewith, with regard to another matter which was
under my consideration and which I promised to let you have today at the
latest and was indicated in my letter of 5th July.1 2 3

Thanking you,

Yours sincerely,

M. A. JINNAH

Enclosure to No. 548

TELEGRAM

There is one most serious omission in Indian Independence Bill which might
vitiate whole scheme of partition. This is lack of provision for setting up an
audiority with sanction behind it which could enforce arbitral awards that may
be made by Boundary Commissions and the Arbitration Tribunal. I impressed
its vital importance upon Viceroy before he went to the U.K. in May and have
repeatedly urged its necessity on him ever since I have seen the Bill.

A complete division and transfer and delivery of property equitably between
two Dominions by 15th August 1947 is a physical impossibility. It will take
many months for Aribtration Tribunal to give its awards. The act of partition is
not complete until the award has been executed and physical possession of
property taken over by rightful party. Until then assets in question cannot
rightfully become property of either Dominion but must remain vested in
Crown. A fallacious proposition is advanced that in whichever Dominion
property is situated [it] belongs to that Dominion and if that Dominion refuses
to carry out terms of award there is no way of forcing defaulting Dominion to
give delivery of property to die Dominion to whom it should be transferred in
terms of the award. This, I submit, is opposed to every principle and canon of
jurisprudence of every country and particularly of Britain and India. The mere
situ of property in one or other Dominion cannot make it belong to that
Dominion but must be delivered to one or other Dominion in terms of award.
Almost all assets are located in Dominion of India which could thus not only
deny their use to Pakistan until award is given but could refuse to carry out the
award if dissatisfied with it. Adjustment of financial liability between two
Dominions would provide a poor solution indeed since grave injury to Pakistan
from lack of assets which cannot be had in the market for love or money owing
to extraordinary conditions created by war would be of most dangerous
character affecting and obstructing stability and whole economic structure and
progress of this Dominion. An exceedingly serious situation would thus be

1 See No. 534, note 2.

2 No. 536.

3 On 7 July Lord Mountbatten informed Mr Jinnah that he had sent his second telegram to the
Secretary of State and had asked him to communicate it to the Prime Minister and the Leader of the
Opposition. R/3/1/154: f 107.

JULY I947

953

created and very grave consequences would follow if there would be no means
left to enforce execution of terms of award. Same situation would arise if the
awards of Boundary Commissions are not given till after 15th August and the
dissatisfied Dominion refuses to comply.

Muslim League consider that H.M.G. alone is appropriate audiority that
should undertake and guarantee that awards are given effect to and carried out
in all respects. This guarantee will only remain in force till such time as partition
is finally and completely effected.

Provision to this effect should be made in the Bill by amending proviso (b)
to clause 8(2) and other relevant clauses. It would also be necessary to provide
that these provisions cannot be amended or deleted by either Constituent
Assembly.

If H.M.G. find it absolutely impossible to amend the Bill in the above sense,
an authoritative declaration should be made by them in the course of the
debate in Parliament that they are responsible for execution and carrying out
terms of arbitral awards in all respects. This is the least that should be done in
the name of fairplay and justice and in fulfilment of their clear responsibility.

549

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mounthatten of Burma

Rfe/i/rfo: f 93

FINANCIAL MEMBER OF COUNCIL, NEW DELHI,

7 July 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

At the last meeting of the Cabinet1 you invited the Members of the Government
to tender their resignations and stated that you intended to ask the Members to
carry on with their present portfolios until the Indian Independence Bill was
passed by the British Parliament when you would reconstitute the Govern¬
ment. I mentioned at the meeting that I would convey to my Muslim League
colleagues what you had stated at the Cabinet meeting and would let you
know our reactions. Since then I have discussed the matter with Mr Abdur Rab
Nishtar who has returned to Delhi and have not been able to discuss with other
Muslim League Members who are still away on tour.

2. I shall be grateful if you will kindly let me know the basis and details of
your plan for the reconstitution of the Government because a decision can be
taken only when the full implications of your proposal are made known to us.

Yours sincerely,

LIAQUAT ALI KHAN

1 See No. 493, Case No. 171/33/47; also No. 545, Item 3.

954

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

550

Minutes by Sir W. Croft and Mr Turnbull1

LlP&J/iol8i:ff 67-9

7 July 1947

I am in some doubt where we should now find ourselves as regards the execu¬
tive of the new Dominions. Mr. Rowlatf s notes on clause 8 bring out the fact
that the effect of this clause is. broadly speaking, to apply the 1935 Act. But the
1935 Act provides two forms of central executive, (1) the 1919 Act form for
what was meant to be a transitional period, and (2) the form set out in Part II
Chapter 2 of the Act, which was meant for the federation and has never come
into force.

I had certainly supposed that in addition to partition and the abolition of
Whitehall control, as noted in Mr. Rowlatf s fourth paragraph on clause 8, we
were now introducing responsible government. And, therefore, I supposed that
when we said we were applying the 1935 Act as far as may be to the existing
situation, we were applying the responsible government system rather than the
Governor-General in Council system.

But Mr. Turnbull, to whom I have spoken, seems to think that is not so, and
that what we are doing is to continue the Governor-General in Council
system until and unless this is altered by the new Indian authorities.2 Mr.
Turnbull said he would consult Mr. Rowlatt further upon this, and it seems to
be a matter upon which no obscurity ought to exist, as it is surely a fundamental
point and one which ought to be elucidated in the Debate.

w. d. c.

Sir W. Croft.

I have spoken to Mr. Rowlatt about the position under the Bill in regard to the
Centre in each of the two Dominions.

The position is governed by 8(2) of the Bill which says that until the Con¬
stituent Assembly of the Dominion provides otherwise, each Dominion shall be
governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the 1935 Act with such
omissions, adaptations and modifications as may be specified in Orders of the
Governor-General. The position is therefore, in a sense, fluid. The Governor-
General can adapt the 1935 Act to fit. He may adapt and bring into operation
part 2 or he may adapt the 9th Schedule.

1 Earlier on 7 July Mr Turnbull bad sent Sir W. Croft and Sir A. Carter notes prepared by Mr Rowlatt
on certain clauses of the Bill for use during the Committee Stage. (Mr Rowlatt’s notes have not been
traced.) Mr Turnbull asked for early approval of, or observations on, the notes. L/P &J/10/81 : f 66.

2 [Note by Sir W. Croft in original:] In that case I suppose the Constituent Assemblies have, in addi¬
tion to their constituent powers, only the powers of the present Central Legislature not those of the
Federal Legislature under 8(2)(e).

JULY I947

955

It seems to me quite possible that Mr. Jinnah has it in mind to get himself
made Governor-General of Pakistan, to furnish himself with a compliant
Executive Council, to retain all the powers wielded by Sir Reginald Maxwell and
Lord Linlithgow under the 1935 Act and to sway die Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan into giving authority for a virtual dictatorship. It may be possible for
Mr. Jinnah to arrange the composition of the Constituent Assembly in such a
way as to facilitate this development. The Governor-General of Pakistan will
have the overriding power possessed by the present Governor-General and he
will have non-votability of charges at present not votable. He will also have
power of certification under 67(b) and I suppose power of refusing assent under
68 of the 9th Schedule. He has also ordinance making power under Section 72
in time of emergency.

You were away at the time but we were induced to put in the provisions of
the Bill which we are now discussing, by a strong plea started by V. P. Menon
and backed I suspect by Patel, that we must provide a Government in India
which could go on and not put the whole of the central structure into the
hands of the Constituent Assembly to be re-fashioned forthwith.3 It was
argued that if we did so, a lot of wild men would start impromptu constitution
making and that the whole thing might get out of hand and end in chaos.

I don’t know that there is much to prevent the kind of thing envisaged for
Pakistan in this note above happening in Hindustan also but if this is raised as a
criticism in the Bill, I should have thought that the answer was that we have
provided for a sovereign legislature. In Hindustan at any rate the Con¬
stituent Assembly is established and is democratically based. It can do
anything including abolishing the Governor-GeneraFs Orders and refusing
supply. It can alter the existing Act to destroy non-votability where it exists. If
this does not stop dictatorship arising it is difficult to see what can stop it. The
weakness of the situation in Pakistan is that we have not got a Constituent
Assembly or made any provision for one to be established. It might be that no
Constituent Assembly would ever meet and that Orders could be made by a
Governor-General adapting the 1935 Act to finance the Centre by contributions
from the Provinces. In this way you would get a sort of central dictatorship
presiding over three democracies with Muslim League majorities. (I assume
that the Governor-General of Pakistan will pretty quickly adapt revisions of the
Act relating to the N.W.F.P. Legislature to ensure the Muslim League majority
there.)

As regards what we say in die House, I think it is (a) that the Governor-
General can adapt the 1935 Act to fit the two separate Dominions and can use
either the 9th Schedule or Part 2 of the Act as the basis for doing so, (b) that the
Constituent Assemblies have been made sovereign legislatures for all purposes

956

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

and that in the circumstances that is the best and only safeguard we can provide
against the growth of autocratic rule.4

F. f. T.

3 See Nos. 255, 286, 290 and 293.

4 Sir W. Croft minuted to Sir A. Carter:

“This is Mr Turnbull’s reply to my query on Mr Rowlatt’s notes.

The fact is that we simply don’t know whether the constitutions we purport to be providing
for the immediate post transfer phase will provide for control by the legislature over the executive
or not.”

551

Mr Attlee to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma ( via India Office )

Telegram , Rffi/ 1/162: f 43

immediate 7 July 1947, 1.24 pm

secret Received: 7 July , 7.30 pm

No. 79. Private and personal from Prime Minister.

Your 1725-S1 and later personal and private telegram.2 This news is indeed a
surprise and I am glad that you sent Ismay home. I will talk the whole matter
over with him and then telegraph to your further. I am very sorry that this
should have been added to all your other cares and worries. Whatever the
outcome no-one could have done more or better than you.

All good wishes.3

1 No. 483.

2 No. 508.

3 Lord Mountbatten replied in tel. 1831-S of 8 July 1947: ‘Thank you so much for your heartening
telegram of 7th July.’ R/3/1/162: f 52.

552

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, Rffi/ 1/134: J 104

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 7 July 1947, 4. 33 pm

secret Received: 7 July, 7.33 pm

No. 1798-S. Your telegram 8685 of 5th July.1 Position of tribal areas after
appointed day.

2. Proposed reply is satisfactory except for second sentence of para. 2. I
sueeest that this be re-worded as follows.

1 No. 539.

JULY I947

957

‘‘The effect of this clause will be to leave open to the Constituent Assemblies of
the new Dominions to initiate negotiations for fresh agreements with the
Jirgas or tribal Assemblies (who are the treaty making bodies empowered to
enter into agreements on behalf of tribes).”

3. I think that no reference should be made to the States as their position is
not analogous to the tribal areas ; and it is of course not possible for Jirgas to take
their place in Constituent Assemblies, but merely to negotiate with represen¬
tatives sent from Constituent Assemblies.2

2 The India Office decided that this amendment might be accepted. L/P &S/12/4638: f 24.

553

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl oj Listowel

Telegram, Mountbatten Papers. Official Correspondence Files: Indian Independence

Bill, Draft Bill, Debate Telegrams

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, 7 July I947, 5 pill

secret Received: 7 July, 7pm

1799-S. Your tel. No. 8677. 1 Debate (b). I agree with terms of proposed state¬
ment on international status of new Dominions and succession to treaty rights
and obligations. From para. i(d) of Congress comments on draft Bill already
telegraphed2 to you it is clear that they accept H.M.G.’s view on both points.
Muslim League do not accept view on first point but have said nothing specific
about second point although it has been expressly put to them. I think it
unlikely that they will reconsider or add to their preliminary view. I therefore
suggest that H.M.G.’s statement may be confined to an expression of their own
view of the position.

1 No. 532.

2 No. 479.

554

Draft Memorandum from the Chiefs of Staff to the Minister of Defence 1

LIWSI1I1046: ff 236-9

INDIA — STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

In your note2 to the India and Burma Committee you informed the Committee
that we would review our strategic requirements in India in order to bring
them up to date.

9>8

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

We had previously set out our requirements in a paper1 2 3 which was forwarded
in September, 1946, to the India Office under cover of a letter4 in which we
made certain suggestions on the method of obtaining them. At that time we
were working on the assumption that there would be a unified India. We have,
therefore, reviewed our requirements in order to see whether they require
adjustment in the light of the latest political developments.

2. Our requirements are based principally upon factors of Commonwealth
Strategy such as geography, manpower and resources, which do not change.
The new situation in general, therefore, only affects the method of obtaining
our requirements and not the requirements themselves. The fact that there will
now be two authorities with whom to negotiate, and that these will have
in the first instance the status of Dominion Governments, does not affect the
facilities for and assistance in Commonwealth defence which we wish to obtain
from the Indian continent.

What the method of obtaining our requirements should be in the altered
circumstances it is not our province to advise. We would only observe that in
our opinion it is essential, in view of the possibly temporary nature of the
Dominion status of the Successor States, that there should be some form of
written agreement, though this need not necessarily cover all our requirements
in detail.

3. In order that there shall be no doubt what we consider our basic require¬
ments to be, we set them out below so that they may be brought before the
India and Burma Committee. We have rephrased them where necessary to
allow for the fact that they must now be obtained from two separate states and
have made certain adjustments to bring them into line with the latest develop¬
ments.

Basic Requirements

4. The main and overriding consideration should be to retain both India and
Pakistan within the British Commonwealth or at any rate ensure that they will
cooperate with us in order that :

(a) The continent of India will continue to be a main support area in war,
i.e. we shall continue to have the active cooperation of the armed forces
of both States and the use of the reserves of manpower and of the
industrial potential which they can provide.

(b) We have the use of strategic airfields, primarily in Pakistan, in the event
of a major war.

1 This draft was prepared by the Joint Planning Staff and was annexed to their Report circulated as
J.P. (47) 90 (Final) of 7 July 1947. L/WS/1/1046: ff 232-5.

2 See No. 486, Minute 1, and its note 1.

3 See Vol. VIII, Enclosure to No. 408 where the Conclusions of this paper are reprinted.

4 Vol. VIII, No. 408 dated 4 October 1946.

JULY I947

959

(c) We have the use of the naval and air bases which are important to the
security of the Indian Ocean and to the maintenance of our world-wide
sea and air communications.

5. As regards the conditions under which the new Dominions might
cooperate with us in the event of war, at best we would like India and Pakistan
to play their full part in the defence of the Commonwealth and to be prepared
to participate actively in any war in which the Commonwealth became
involved.

The least that would make a substantial contribution to Commonwealth
defence is that the two states should:

(a) Undertake primary responsibility for their defence on land, and of their
ports and coastal communications by naval forces.

(b) Accept the obligation to participate actively in the defence of India in the
event of a threat developing in any of the neighbouring territories,
including the possibility that this might entail deployment of some of
their forces outside their own territory.

If our maximum requirement cannot be obtained, we should make every
effort to extend our immediate requirements to provide for them to assist us in
the event of war in the Middle East or South East Asia,

Detailed Requirements

6. If the basic requirements given in paragraph 4 above are to be met
satisfactorily a number of detailed requirements will have to be fulfilled. These
are as follows:

(a) The m aintenance by India and Pakistan of land forces on a scale adequate
to ensure the defence of the Indian continent,

(b) The maintenance of the efficiency and modernisation of their armed
forces, which must be capable of expansion in war, and the acceptance of
only British advice and assistance therein.

(c) The acceptance by India and Pakistan of the assistance of additional
naval, land and air forces from. Commonwealth resources together with
the technical and other assistance necessary to ensure the defence of the
continent of India and that of the Indian Ocean in the event of war, and
the admission on threat of war of R. A.F. units and of any other assistance
which may be necessary.

(d) The maintenance of the necessary bases and communications for offence
and defence at the required standard of efficiency and degree of readiness,
the acceptance of the assistance of British supervisory personnel and the
making available of these bases in war or on the threat of war. The
retention of certain armament stores in the new Dominions is also most
desirable by mutual arrangement.

(e) Air transit rights and facilities both in peace and war, irrespective of
whether the new Dominions themselves are involved in the war. Air

9 6o

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

staging facilities for military aircraft will be required at the following
airfields in peace:

Mauripur

Palam

Dum Dum

Jodhpur

Allahabad

Ranchi

Ahmadabad

Poona

Hakempet

Bangalore

Car Nicobar

(f) The right to take what defensive measures we consider necessary and to
establish such facilities as we require in the Andaman, Nicobar and
Laccadive Islands.

(g) Availability of Gurkhas for the Imperial Army and transit rights for
Gurkha personnel through India (Hindustan) and possibly Pakistan.

(h) The acceptance of British Military Representatives to act as a link between
the U.K. and the new Dominions on all military matters.

Although the question of how to obtain our air transit rights has already
been put to the Viceroy5 we have restated the requirement since we consider
that it is now a matter of such urgency that a satisfactory solution must be
found.

Requirements with Pakistan

7. We have considered whether the requirements given above would be
modified if, as seems a possible contingency, we can only obtain an agreement
with Pakistan and not with India.

An effective defence of India requires that the area be treated as a whole and
unless the bases, man-power and resources of both states are available to us the
contribution to Commonwealth defence which we can expect from them will
be seriously reduced. Moreover, the fulfilment of many of our strategic
requirements, e.g. that Indians should undertake the main burden of their
defence on land, does in fact demand that India (Hindustan) and Pakistan should
cooperate in matters of defence. We do not think that this is an impossible
requirement since it is so obviously in the interests of both states to cooperate
in the face of external aggression.

On the other hand the area of Pakistan is strategically the most important in
the continent of India and the majority of our strategic requirements could be
met, though with considerably greater difficulty, by an agreement with
Pakistan alone.

5 See No. 487, para. 6.

JULY I947

We conclude therefore that our requirements are substantially the same in the
event of an agreement with Pakistan alone.

Precise definition of detailed requirements

7. We have also considered whether it would be possible to translate our
requirements into more precise terms, such as location, numbers of personnel
etc. Except in the case of air transit rights which have been stated above, we do
not, however, consider this to be practicable since it will depend so much upon
what cooperation the new Dominions are prepared to give us. Such details will
therefore have to be worked out in the course of the negotiations once these
have been started.

555

Commonwealth Relations Office to Sir E. Baring

Telegram , LjPOl6\i22 : f 76

immediate 7 July 1947 , 2. jo pm

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

Z. No. 39. Please give following message to Prime Minister in reply to his
message in your No. 202. 1

I am sorry if use of term independence in title of India Bill should cause you
any embarrassment. Other Prime Ministers have also indicated that they would
have difficulty in allowing themselves to be quoted as favouring use of the
term and there is no longer any question of our proposing to say here that term
is acceptable to Prime Ministers of other Commonwealth countries. Position is
that text of Bill including title was communicated to Indian leaders before it
was published on 5th July, and after that no change was clearly possible.

Moreover we have throughout used term independence within or without
the Commonwealth in our discussions with both India and Burma, and while I
fully realise that term may be regarded as having different implications in other
parts of Commonwealth it remains fact that word ‘‘autonomous” used in
Balfour declaration of 1926 as defining members of Commonwealth has really
same meaning as independent. I hope that in view of this you may be able to
avoid or allay the public controversy which you fear. I need hardly say how
much I should regret it if such controversy should arise.

1 No. 531.

962

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

I am repeating this telegram to the other three Prime Ministers. Ends.
Addressed Pretoria repeated Ottawa,2 Canberra and Wellington.

2 In a supplementary message for Mr Mackenzie King (tel. 549 of 7 July) Mr Attlee referred to No.
488, said that he appreciated Mr Mackenzie King’s position and added that he was sure the latter
would appreciate the difficult position in which the U.K. Government was placed. ITowever, in tel.
585 of 8 July the British High Commissioner in Canada reported that he had not given Mr Mackenzie
King the actual text of the message to General Smuts because certain points in it might lead to fresh
argument. ‘In particular I am sure that, having regard to history which he was at pains to give me of
drafting of Balfour formula, he would never accept contention that “autonomous” has same
heading [?meaning] as “independent”/ The High Commissioner had therefore sent Mr Mackenzie
King a letter explaining the position on the general lines of the telegrams. L/PO/6/122: ff 77, 81.

556

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl of Listowel1

Telegram , R/j/i fi 61: ff 1 4-13

IMMEDIATE NEW DELPII, 7 July 1947, 6.3O pm

secret Received : 7 July , 8.13 pm

No. 1800-S. Your 8560 of 3rd July.2

1. I agree that the continued provision of military aircraft transit facilities
is an issue which must be dealt with immediately. I suggest that the High
Commissioner should be instructed by HMG to negotiate forthwith with the
party leaders, as representing the future successor authorities, with the object of
obtaining their consent to the continuation, after 15th August, of the present
facilities, in the form of a standstill agreement.3 Before negotiations begin he
would consult A.O.C.-in-C.

2. There are difficulties about immediate negotiations on arrangements to be
made for external defence after 15th August and on long-term British strategic
requirements. These are:

(a) until the two new Dominion Governments have been set up, the only
persons with whom it is possible to negotiate are the Indian party leaders,
representing the successor authorities. Although in paragraph 1 above I have
suggested that they should discuss military aircraft transit facilities, I do not
consider that it would be a correct or desirable proceedure to discuss these
wider matters.

1 This telegram follows the general line taken in a note recorded by Lord Ismay on 4 July 1947 giving
his ‘provisional views’ on No. 487. R/3/1/161: f 6.

2 No. 487.

3 In tel. 9378 of 21 July Lord Listowel reported that H.M.G. had instructed the High Commissioner to
negotiate with party leaders to obtain a standstill agreement. L/WS/1/1046: f 194.

JULY I947

963

(b) to attempt to obtain agreements and guarantees, whether written or
otherwise, at this stage would inevitably give the impression that we did not
trust the future governments of the new Dominions to negotiate to our
satisfaction when they are set up.

(c) I had not visualised that we would take the various matters on which
agreements are required piece-meal — i.e. military at one time, economic at
another, commercial at yet another. I consider indeed that it would be better to
take them all together.

3 . 1 suggest, in regard to negotiations on arrangements for external defence
and British strategic requirements,

(a) that, after the transfer of power, the Chiefs of Staff should send a delega¬
tion to India and Pakistan to conduct these negotiations ;

(b) that these negotiations should be conducted with the two new Dominion
Governments ; (there is a possibility that these Governments might accept the
Joint Defence Council as the negotiating body, but it would be dangerous to
mention this publicly at the present stage) ;

(c) that these negotiations should if possible take place concurrently with
economic and other negotiations.

4. Reference your para. 7. 1 agree that it would be most desirable to have
written agreements; but cannot agree that Pakistan and “Hindustan” should be
referred to by the term “temporary Dominions”.

5. Reference your para. 4. As I have already stated in my telegrams 1570-S4
and 1744-S,5 1 am of the opinion that responsibility for the safety of British
subjects, after the transfer of power, will rest on precisely the same shoulders as
it does in every other Dominion and foreign country, i.e. with the Government
of the Dominion concerned. I must reiterate that I adhere to this opinion.

6. Reference your para. 10. I urge that no statement should be made in
Parliament on this subject. However, if it is necessary to prepare answers to
questions, Ismay, who will be with you today, knows my views and will be
able to supply the necessary material.

4 No. 335.

5 No. 5 1 1 .

964

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

557

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to Lord Ismay (via India Office )

Telegram, R/j/ 1/162: ff

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 7 July 1Q47, 8 pm

SECRET

No. 1802-S. I have now had time over the weekend to read Conference papers
1 15 and 1 16 of which I understand you took copies to London. I have the
following comments to make.

2. V.C.P. 115.1

In the penultimate paragraph is the following sentence “In this letter2 the hope
was also expressed that H.E. would stay on as Governor-General of the
Dominion of India only”. You have the original of this letter with you and you
will see that this statement is not quite correct. The actual wording of Liaquat’s
letter is as follows : —

“We understand that the Congress desire that you should be the Governor-
General of India Dominion, and if you decide to accept it, we shall be glad and
feel that the two Govemors-General will work in harmony and cooperation to
effect equitably final and complete partition.”

3. V.C.P. 116?

First Paper — I have no comments.

Second Paper — I do not entirely agree with paragraph 2. Mieville and I saw
Auchinleck this morning and put the whole position to him. Although he has
clearly stated on several occasions that if left to himself he would resign, he now
says that he would think this over and might be prepared to stay, though he
made it very clear that he considered his own position and that of other senior
officers would be so difficult that he did not know if it would be advisable to
stay. He said that he was afraid there would be a feeling among all the Muslims
that I had deserted Pakistan, but that he would be able to get a better opinion
from his late D.P.R. Brigadier Desmond Young, who has resigned from the
army to take charge of Muslim publicity. He has sent for Young to come from
Karachi for a discussion.

Finally he said that from his point of view the matter largely turned on
whether both sides would appoint me as Chairman of the Joint Defence
Committee. He thought the whole position quite deplorable and that whatever
I did there would be criticism. After some thought he said that he considered I
should stay, and face the criticism, as he did not think they would be able to
carry on without my guidance and support.

1 No. 521.

2 No. 509.

3 No. 522.

JULY I947

965

But in general paragraph 2 is exaggerated, particularly the sentence “The
one stable thing in India, namely the Indian Army, might well disintegrate ; and
riot and bloodshed on an appalling scale would result”. I also do not entirely
agree with the sentence “They would feel after their experience in SEAC, and
latterly in India, that there was someone to look after their interests”. This
responsibility is Auchinleck’s and other senior officers, and I could only help if
both sides voluntarily agreed to appoint me as the impartial Chairman of the
Joint Defence Committee.

Para. 7. The first sentence is incorrect. As Governor-General of the Indian
Union I should not be an independent agency nor should I be capable of
“resolving” the difficulties which may arise, but the second sentence of this
paragraph is correct.

The whole of paragraph 8 is most dangerous, the implication being that the
passage of the Indian Independence Bill through Parliament is dependent on my
remaining Governor-General of the Indian Union ; the conclusion being that I
am being used for political ends; so be careful how you refer to this.

Para. 9. The first sentence is incorrect, as I have stated in my remarks above on
V.C.P. 1 15, though I admit Jinnah made a verbal statement4 in both our pres¬
ence. But I do feel that you and Mieville might be able to act as go-betweens by
visiting Karachi from time to time since you are both trusted by both sides.

Para. 11. The second sentence about the possibility of Colville and Nye not
staying on is not substantiated, and both might stay on. I have not asked them.

The last sentence of paragraph 11 about the improvement of relations
between India and Britain is, I feel, not wholly to my credit as suggested, but
largely to HMG whose statement of the 20th February5 giving a terminal date
for British power in India transformed the whole scene out here.

Para. 12. Is a matter of opinion and I do not altogether subscribe to it.

4. I am not sure what use you wish to make of these papers but I must ask
you not to circulate them at all in their present form, although there is of
course no objection to your making use of them as talking points subject to the
comments I have made above.

4 cf. No. 506, para. 32.
s Vol. IX, No. 438.

966

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

558

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, R/j/ 1/134 • / 101

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, J July 1947, 8.43 pm

confidential Received : 8 July, 12.13 am

1807-S. Jinnah has asked that the message in the next succeeding telegram1
should be communicated to the Prime Minister and also to the Leader of the
Opposition. Would you be good enough to pass it on?

2. May I suggest that Ismay should take round the statement to the leader of
the Opposition as he will be in a position to explain that from the very begin¬
ning jinnah was told that the only practicable solution to which Congress would
agree would be to have a common Governor-General who would be allowed to
retain his present British staff who would be able to follow up the division of
assets and use his impartial position to secure fair play and implementation.
When he rejected this at the meeting I held with Muslim league representatives
considering the Bill he stated that he realised the consequences of this decision.2

1 Tel. 1808-S of 7 July transmitted the text of the Enclosure to No. 548. R/3/1/154: f 102.

2 See No. 506, paras. 27-31

559

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram, R/j/ 1/134: f 98

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 7 July 1947, 10 put

confidential Received: 8 July, 6.30 am

No. 1805-S. Sir B. N. Rau came to see me in great distress today since he
considers that the present amendments to clause 71 are still not nearly strong
enough and will lead to a serious situation.

2. I invited him to give me a note which I could telegraph to you and this is
transmitted in my immediately following telegram. I am sending the note to
Political Adviser and his comments will be telegraphed as soon as received.

3. I must confess that I did not myself realise that 327 owners of such small
properties were going to be given powers of life and death where previously
their powers were limited to three months imprisonment or 200 rupees fines.

1 See No. 428, Clause 7, Proviso in italics.

JULY 1947

967

4. It has also been suggested by some Congress lawyers that in clause 7(i)(b)
the addition of the single word “as” would ease the situation. It is suggested that
the middle part of this paragraph should read “all functions exercisable as repeat
as by His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States’ . Personally I
cannot see that this makes any difference, and if it proves to be a legal quibble I
cannot recommend it.

560

Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten oj Burma to the Earl of Listowel

Telegram , R/j/ if 154: ff gg-100

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 7 July ig4J , 10 pill

secret Received: 8 July, 4.25 pm

No. 1806--S. My immediately preceding telegram. Note Begins.

Proviso to section 7(i)(b) and (c) as drafted does not seem to cover control
now exercised by His Majesty over foreign relations of Indian States; for
example, of Chitral, which is only about 15 miles from the Russian border. To
say flatly that existing control lapses without substituting anything in its place
seems risky.

Proviso is also defective in regard to the petty Indian States mentioned in
para. 11 of Butler Committee’s Report.1 There are 327 of these States whose
average area is about 20 square miles, average population about 3,000, average
annual revenue about Rs. 22,000. Their Rulers exercise petty judicial powers
such as trying criminal cases punishable with not more than three months
imprisonment or Rs. 200 fine and disposing of civil suits not exceeding Rs. 500
in value. Residuary jurisdiction is now exercised by the Crown Representative
or persons acting under his authority. It could hardly be the intention that when
paramountcy lapses on [ ? 1 5] August next, these Rulers are to attain a position
which they never had in the past and to acquire almost over-night powers of life
and death. Para. 17 of Butler Committee’s Report indicates that Committee’s
recommendation in para. 58 against transfer of paramountcy did not apply to
these petty States. In their case, there is clear necessity for some kind of stand¬
still clause providing for continued exercise of residuary jurisdiction until
otherwise provided by mutual agreement.

In a large number of cases, the Crown Representative has under various
attachment schemes transferred his jurisdiction to the “Attaching State’ . All
these schemes will fall through upon the lapse of paramountcy unless saved in
some way. Some modification of the proviso as drafted would seem to be

968

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

necessary to remove the above defects. If provision for unilateral denunciation is
regarded as unavoidable in the case of major States, I would suggest that existing
proviso be replaced by two provisos somewhat as follows : —

Provided that, notwithstanding anything in para, (b) or para, (c) of this
subsection, effect shall, as nearly as may be, continue to be given to all existing
relations and arrangements between the parties referred to therein until they are
denounced by the Ruler of the Indian State or person having authority in the
tribal areas on the one hand, or by the Dominion or Province or other part
thereof concerned on the other hand, or are superseded by subsequent agree¬
ments.

Provided further that until otherwise mutually agreed upon, the criminal,
revenue, and civil jurisdiction heretofore exercisable in any Indian State of
Class III as denned in para, n of the Indian States Committee’s Report 1928-29,
by, or by persons acting under the authority of, the Crown Representative shall
hereafter be exercisable by, or by persons acting under the authority of, the
Government of the Dominion concerned.” Ends .

1 Report of the Indian States Committee, 1928-1929. Cmd 3302.

561

The Naimb of Bhopal to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma
Mountbatten Papers . Demi-Official Correspondence Files: Bhopal

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL Q ASR-I-S ULT ANI , BHOPAL, 7 July 1947
My dear Dicky,

Since my return to Bhopal I have been thinking of our conversations1 and have
been turning over in my mind the question which you put to me ... ‘to stay or
not to stay’. I realise that this is a very difficult problem for you and that from
the point of view of anyone trying to offer advice it is even more difficult,
because it is virtually impossible to exclude considerations affecting you in your
position as Viceroy and Crown Representative, from decisions which you may
wish to make in your personal capacity. I hope therefore that you will realise
that the advice which I am about to offer is not only based on very incomplete
data but is offered by me as Hamidullah, your personal friend, to you as
Dicky Mountbatten and not as Viceroy !

I may be talking through my hat, but as a privileged spectator with a good
position in the grandstand my advice, after carefully weighing all the factors
known to me, is don’t carry on after August 15th. In offering this rather

1 No record of these conversations has been traced, but see No. 499.

JULY I947

969

negative piece of advice I am doing so purely from the point of view of your
personal considerations. There may be other aspects of the question of which I
know nothing, which may compel you to remain on for a further eight months.
I do not know what they are but I cannot help being left with the impression
that some pretty large crisis is expected in March or April next. I think it
inadvisable to say more at this stage and would prefer not to put my reasons in
writing but would welcome the opportunity of a further talk some time if you
feel that this would be useful. I have ventured to advise you not to stay in spite
of the knowledge and conviction that your presence in our midst may be most
valuable to me personally, and may help me in my effort to protect my State
and safeguard its interests. It might also be helpful to Pakistan.

To return however to your immediate problem and speaking as a close
observer of the great events which have unfolded themselves since the date
upon which you took over the Viceroyalty of this country, it seems to me that
the psychological moment for your departure will be the date upon which the
two new Dominions of Pakistan and Hindustan are officially created. They are
your2 creation and you have succeeded where all others have failed. You are the
architect of the new edifice, and though the project contemplates rasing the
edifice of the States to the ground, it nevertheless is a great achievement. This
was perhaps inevitable as those who were your strongest bulwark, and true and
loyal friends, had also inevitably to go with you. Once the plans have been
completed and approved, your job is done. If you attempt at putting bricks and
mortar together, you may fail. Why risk it ! If you leave now you will be going
out on the flood tide, and on the crest of the wave, for your personal prestige
can never be higher both in British India (which alone seems to count) and at
home. If you try and hang on, public opinion may inflict upon you the same
fate as was meted out to Churchill. Again I may be talking nonsense but I know
my country and though I am not in possession of even half the facts, I foresee a
very difficult period in this country when the two Dominions, flushed with the
first feeling of real power but probably lacking the essential qualities of experi¬
ence and restraint, will begin bickering, and hack politicians (men with vision
and realistic outlook like Patel notwithstanding) will come like a swarm of
house breakers and will start messing about with your original edifice. If you
stay you will be in a difficult position for you will probably neither be in
agreement with the alterations and modifications nor will you be in a position
to prevent them.

I know you hate leaving a task half done. It would have been different if you
were Governor-General of both Dominions. You may perhaps be able, in a
much lesser degree, of course, to help the States and Pakistan, even if you stayed
on as Governor-General of Hindustan. But if you wish to assist the States and
Pakistan as I have reason to believe you do, you can do so, perhaps to a greater
extent by giving your support to them from England. You can also help

970

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

Hindustan from there. As a Constitutional Governor-General of Hindustan
alone you are bound to come in conflict in some matters, at any rate, with the
interests of Pakistan and the States, which in view of coming international
situation, should, if at all possible, be avoided. The strategic position, vis-a-vis
Russia, of Pakistan and the Middle East which is totally Moslem would demand
the closest understanding between Great Britain, U.S.A. and the Moslem
World. You know better than I can ever pretend to do, the value of the Indus
Valley and its military importance to America and Great Britain. A friendly
Hindustan is also essential, I admit, provided we can save it from Communism.
But can this be achieved by the present leaders of the Congress ? I very much
doubt it. I may be a pessimist, but in a matter of this nature optimism must not
be allowed to ignore realities and naked facts. The States may have been a big
check, but they have been forced to merge with Congress, and will in future be
represented in the Councils of Hindustan by rabid, half educated, ignorant men
owing allegiance to Congressmen with ultra communistic tendencies. The value
of all those States who are joining Hindustan through the Constituent Assembly
to the cause you and I uphold will, to my mind, be negligible. You may feel that
you being with Hindustan may help this cause. But after the 15th of August
there is very little hope in this direction whatever the Congressmen may at
present say. Here again, I may be talking humbug. Let it be so. You wished me
to be blunt and outspoken, and I am giving you my views frankly and without
reserve.

So my advice is that, unless there are Imperial considerations which I for one
feel do exist in a broader field, making it imperative that you should carry on,
go while the going is good. If later there is a mess up it is quite possible that both
Dominions may ask you to return for a second term. Then you can again come
on the crest of the wave and if they ask you — do come. If you are Governor-
General of one Dominion only, your position will be very difficult as you will
be in control of only half the house, — may be the larger half but the other half
has a better position — and you may have unpleasant neighbours living in the
other half.

So there you are Dicky; this is my advice. Please take it in the spirit in which
it is given. I am only speaking from the boards on the side of the field and I am
only speaking to you as an unencumbered individual which I know is just what
you are not ! If ever I can be of any help to you, you know you can count on
me, and if you w^ant me for further discussions on any point such as the strategic
defence of Pakistan, just let me know and I wTill be at your door-step without
wasting any time.

You can throw this letter in the waste paper basket. I will quite understand.

2 Emphasis in original.

JULY I947

971

and please don’t misunderstand what I have said. I have given you candid
advice, only as a friend, and on the basis of things as I see them, but I fully
realise that I may be totally wrong.

Yours very sincerely,

HAMIDULLAH

562

The Earl of Listowel to Mr Attlee
L/P &JI 10/81 :ff 96-102

TOP SECRET INDIA OFFICE, 7 Jllly 1Q47

Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 115/47

1. I attach a note by my Office prepared for you, for perusal before tonight’s
meeting of the India and Burma Committee, on various aspects of the problems
that arise if there are to be two Govemors-General from 15 th August. The
points raised all need attention, though possibly some of the suggestions made
may, after discussion with Lord Ismay, not prove to be the best line of action to
take.

2. Assuming that there are two Governors-General after the 15th August, the
question arises of the date when such a decision is to be made public. The
Viceroy assumes1 that it should be next Thursday, on the Second Reading of the
Bill. This seems doubtful. No doubt it would be essential to let the leaders of the
Opposition here know, before discussion on the Bill starts, what is likely to
happen, otherwise they could well say that they had been led up the garden
path. Nevertheless presumably the right time to make any announcement
would be after the Bill becomes law and when the Viceroy is reconstructing
the Interim Government. Incidentally, it would be hardly fair to Congress to
make some pronouncement on Thursday giving them only 24 hours to define
their own attitude. There is of course the risk of leakage during the next
fortnight, and it might become necessary to make known this development
earlier. If the actual position is not to be made abundantly clear in your state¬
ment on the Second Reading, no doubt this would be so phrased as to minimise
the risk of Parliament, other than Opposition Leaders, being able to say that it
had been grossly deceived. From that point of view the form of the proviso to
Clause 5 of the Bill is less awkward than would have been its original version.2

3 . Perhaps the best course would be to take the bull by the horns and make a
statement, on the opening of the debate, on some such lines as the following :

“As soon as the bill receives the Royal Assent, the Viceroy will reconstitute

972

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

his Executive Council (or Cabinet as it is already being termed in India) so as to
transform it into two separate halves ready to divide finally on 15 th August. It is
for this purpose that Clause 9(i)(e)3 has been inserted in the Bill. As soon as this
has been done the Viceroy will ask the two sides what advice they wish trans¬
mitted to His Majesty as regards the appointment of Governor-General for
India and Governor-General for Pakistan from 15 th August. It would of course
be perfectly proper for them to decide that it would be preferable to have two
separate Governors-General from the start.

If, however, they are in agreement that they would like His Majesty to
appoint the present Viceroy to serve as joint Governor-General for both India
and Pakistan for a strictly limited period in order to facilitate partitioning
generally, and in particular to make more readily possible a wide use of the
powers in Clause 9, then His Majesty’s Government would regard it as entirely
appropriate that Lord Mountbatten’s services should be made available for
this purpose.

The choice between these two courses must of course be entirely for the
Indian Leaders. Their decision would naturally have to be made as speedily as
possible after the Bill becomes law.”

LISTOWEL

Enclosure to No. 562

TOP SECRET

SITUATION IF THERE ARE TWO GOVERNORS-GENERAL

FROM I5TH AUGUST
MEMORANDUM BY INDIA OFFICE

7 July 1947

i . Although there are no provisions in the Bill which are formally inconsis¬
tent with there being two Governors-General from the appointed day onwards,
the Bill was of course drafted on the assumption that there would be one
Governor-General during a transitional period possibly lasting up to the end of
the period mentioned in Clause 9(5), viz. originally 15th February altered at the
last moment to the 31st March.

If the Bill had been drafted from the start on the assumption that there would
be two Governors-General as from the appointed day, its form would no
doubt have been rather different and possibly slightly better fitted to such
circumstances ; but no devices and no form of drafting could ever have sur¬
mounted the obstacle that, if the timing of the establishment of the two new
Dominions had to be before the job of partitioning was complete or well on the
way of completion, potential chaos over partitioning is inevitable in the absence

1 See No. 508, para. 4; also No. 523.

2 For redrafted version of proviso, see No. 440; for original version, see No. 191.

3 See No. 469.

JULY 1947

973

of some one person (or body) clothed with constitutional authority to issue, for
partition purposes, orders affecting both the new Dominions.

2. If there are two Governors-General, Orders under Clause 9(1), if made
after the 15th August , are, by virtue of Clause I9(i)(c) Orders of the Governors-
General, “acting jointly”, except where the Order only “concerns” one
Dominion (see Clause I9(i)(a)). Accordingly if the Governors-General do not
agree and act jointly, it becomes impossible theoretically to operate Clause 9(1)
at all, as respects matters which concern both Dominions. Actually what will
probably happen is that both Governments will issue what orders they like,
contending, often plausibly enough, that only their own Dominion is “con¬
cerned”. Their own servants will obey them and in any event they can get any
necessary legal cover from their respective Constituent Assemblies afterwards.
If this position develops, “India” has of course almost all the cards in its hand.

3. Orders under Clause 9(1) can be made by the existing single Governor-
General between 3rd June and 15 th August; and, if there was any disposition on
both sides to get as much partitioning settled as possible before 15th August, it
might be possible to get constitutionally valid orders made covering some of the
ground at all events, e.g. about the Courts.

Conceivably the order making power might be used before 15 th August in a
way that was certainly never originally intended, namely to give some sort of
cover, for what it was worth, to general schemes for partition of which the
general principles have already been agreed, or for delegating power to some
arbitral body. This tentative suggestion needs further examination before it can
be said definitely whether it is likely to prove practicable or useful. Possible
examples are the following. There is an indication, not so far quite certain, that
Congress and the League have at last agreed to set up an Arbitration Tribunal
with Spens, the Chief Justice, as Chairman. If this is correct, conceivably it
might be possible, for what it is worth, for the Governor-General to appoint the
Arbitration Tribunal by order under Section 9(1) with terms of reference defin¬
ing the scope of its work and include in the order a provision that, over that
field partition is to be carried out in accordance with the award of the Tribunal.
Or again, just conceivably, an order might be made setting out the principles
for dividing the Indian Army which have already been agreed. This would be
an order under Clause 11(1).

4. The appointment of two separate Governors-General has unfortunate
reactions on Clause 9(1) from another point of view. The powers the Clause
gives to the Governor-General in matters which concern his own Dominion
only are exceedingly wide ; he has indeed virtually a free hand with the institu¬
tions (including the judiciary) of his Dominion unless and until the Constituent
Assembly succeeds in controlling him, and the Bill is (necessarily) silent as to his
tenure of office and as to the extent to which he acts on advice. This position is
innocuous and convenient if the Governor-General is a disinterested and tran-

974

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

sitory Englishman such as Lord Mountbatten. Quite different considerations
plainly arise if the holder of the office is an ambitious Indian. Firstly, a very
embarrassing position might arise for the King, if the Governor-General —
His Majesty’s Representative — sought to use his position as Governor-General
to secure for himself a position of greater importance or permanence than his
countrymen were willing to give him. Secondly there may well be criticism in
Parliament of the policy of giving to any Indian powers as wide as those
conferred by Clause 9(1). It is understood that their wideness has in fact already
been commented on unfavourably by Lord Simon.

5. Even if there are two Governors-General from the 15 th August the posi¬
tion of the British Forces after the 15th August seems constitutionally to be
satisfactory under the Bill. There can be a Commander of those Forces fully
under the operational orders of the War Office. The role of Auchinleck needs,
however, further consideration.

The Indian Governments would have power to do things which would very
much hamper the British Forces, but it does not seem likely that they would
wish to do anything to stop their withdrawal.

6. The chances of disturbances during the transitional period are possibly
rather greater if the present Viceroy is no longer there, even for a short period,
after the 15 th August. This makes it more important than ever to make sure
that there is a complete marrying up of plans for the withdrawal of British
troops and the getting out of India civilians who do not wish to stop. No doubt,
from the British point of view, the worst danger point, if there is much further
communal rioting, is Calcutta, and it seems desirable to give special attention to
this problem.

7. If the present Viceroy vanishes as from 15 th August more importance than
ever will attach to the post of British High Commissioner in India (and indeed
to some extent to the High Commissioner in Pakistan) . On the assumption that
Lord Mountbatten would still be there for a period, it has always been assumed
that, whatever the formal channels of communication, he would in fact play a
very considerable part in making agreements with the two New Indian
Governments, particularly in relation to our strategical requirements in India
of the kind described in the memorandum by the Minister of Defence LB. (47)
13 5.4 5 If Lord Mountbatten is not there, all representations which are not
written Government to Government communications will presumably have to
be carried on by the High Commissioner, though of course aided by technical
military experts. It therefore becomes desirable to review the question of the
filling of this post and the strength of his organisation.

4 Words in italics underlined in original.

5 See No. 486, Minute 1 and its note 1.

JULY I947

975

563

Mr Rowan to Mr Attlee

R^o/i/n: ff 57-9

7 July 1947

Prime Minister,

You should see the attached note1 about Governors General of India before you
see Ismay.

2. I agree that the Opposition should be told of the changed position as it is
likely to develop.

3. But I am not very happy about the draft statement submitted by the
India Office. As you know appointments of Governors General are dealt with
direct between the Dominion Prime Minister and the King. It would be
improper for the Government here to come in. Any announcement is issued
by the Palace. In the present circumstances there are no Ministers of the new
Indian Dominions to make recommendations to the King and it has therefore
been agreed by the King, after consultation with the Indian authorities con¬
cerned. The appointments will be made on the advice of Ministers here, but
after full consultation with and in accordance with the wishes of Indian leaders.

It would be clearly undesirable, if not improper, for any announcement
about names to be made by the Government. This must be made by the Palace.
All that need be said I think in the Debate is to explain that two Governors
General can be appointed or one as the Indian leaders decide; and that in the
special circumstances which I have set out above the recommendations will be
made by Ministers here in accordance with the wishes of Indian leaders.
Announcements about the appointments will be made in due course by the
Palace.

(I particularly dislike the passage which I have sidelined on page 3, 2 which
does not take into account the special circumstances of this submission for this
time only.)

T. L. R.

1 No. 562.

2 The passage sidelined was the last two sentences of the first paragraph of the statement in No. 562,
para. 3.

976

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

564

Cabinet

India and Burma Committee. I.B.(4y)4ist Meeting

HP&Jliol8i:ff 57-65

Those present at this Meeting held at 10 Downing Street , S.W.i , on 7 July 1947 at
9.45 pm were: Mr Attlee ( in the Chair), Sir S. Cripps, Mr A. V. Alexander,
Viscount Addison, the Earl of Listowel, Mr C. P. Mayhew, Mr Arthur Henderson,
Lord Chorley

Also present were: Sir A. Carter, Lord Ismay, Mr W. H. J. Christie ; Mr S. E. V.
Luke, Mr G. M. Wilson, Mr F . F. Turnbull ( Secretariat )

Minute 1

The Governors-General of the Indian Dominions
A Record of the Committee’s discussion and of the Conclusions reached is
contained in the Secretary’s Standard File.1

Minute 2

The British Army in India

(Previous Reference: I.B.(47)40th Meeting, Minute z)2
The Committee had before them telegram No. 1744-S of the 4th July3 from
the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India about the withdrawal of British
forces from India.

lord ismay explained that this telegram was despatched before receipt of
the Secretary of State’s telegram No. 8560 of 3rd July4 which had been sent in
accordance with the Committee’s conclusion at its meeting on 3rd July (I.B.
(47) 40th Meeting, Minute i).5 The Viceroy’s telegram was intended to deal
with general policy only; a separate reply would be given on the points raised
in telegram No. 8560.

the prime minister enquired whether, if British troops were withdrawn,
there would be adequate forces available to deal, for instance, with trouble
from Afghanistan and to ensure the defence of the Frontier during the process of
dividing the Indian Army, lord ismay said that there were at present six
brigades of British troops in India. With the exception of one battalion of the
Black Watch at Peshawar, none of these troops were stationed near the Frontier
and none were trained for frontier fighting. The Indian Army would be able
to deal with any trouble at the moment, but it might be somewhat disorganised
as the partition of the army proceeded. The first stage of the partition would be

1 See Confidential Annex.

2 No. 486.

3 No. 511.

4 No. 487.

5 No. 486.

JULY I947

977

very rough and ready. Troops would be allocated between Pakistan and India
by squadrons, and thereafter each of the 300,000 men involved would be asked
individually whether he wished to serve in Pakistan or India. That would be a
lengthy process, but the Army would be centrally controlled from Delhi during
the process. The Pakistan Government would have as many troops available
for the defence of the Frontier as were at present. It was doubtful whether the
Pakistan Government could for long continue to bear the cost; the time would
probably come when India also would have to share in the defence of the
Frontier.

the prime minister said that he would like to be able to say on the Second
Reading of the Indian Independence Bill that His Majesty’s Government were
satisfied that the North West Frontier could be secured during the interim

The Committee agreed that the Commander-in-Chief in India should be
asked specifically about this point.

The Committee then considered the Viceroy’s telegram No. 1744-S para¬
graph by paragraph, and the following points were raised :

(i) Paragraph 2

the minister of defence said that the Chiefs of Staff were agreed that the
new Dominion Governments would not be able to use British troops for opera¬
tional purposes ; they thought, however, if the British Government was asked to
assist in the defence of the Frontier, they would have to accede to the request.
They also felt that British forces could not stand aside if British lives were
threatened.

The Committee was informed that the feeling of the British business com¬
munity in India was one of confidence, and that British subjects generally were
calm. At the end of June the number of British subjects waiting for passages to
the United Kingdom was negligible. The additional shipping provided has
cleared a large backlog and there was no sign of any rush to get away before
15th August. Non-essential British subjects in isolated places were being advised
to leave.

(ii) Paragraph J

the minister of defence estimated that, if His Majesty’s Government were
to pay for British forces in India after 15th August, the cost would be about
-£10,000,000 for the Army alone.

sir Archibald carter said that the India Office had roughly estimated the
cost at about £5,000,000.

lord ismay thought that, unless we raised the point ourselves, the Indian
Governments might themselves meet the cost of British forces in India after
15 th August.

978

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

(iii) Paragraph 5

the minister of defence said that some of the stores involved might
belong to the War Office and should come out when British forces left.

The Committee felt that this was a matter for negotiation with the Indian

Governments.

(iv) Paragraph 6

the minister of defence was anxious lest a further speeding up in the
withdrawal of British forces might reduce our chances of reaching satisfactory
defence arrangements with the Indian Governments, and he was doubtful
whether it would be possible, within the shortened period, to evacuate the
families of British service personnel.

lord is may said that the reason for speeding up the evacuation was the
danger that, owing to the anomalous position, serious difficulties might arise;
the longer British, troops stayed, the greater the risk of unpleasant incidents.
This applied to all three services, but Royal Air Force maintenance and control
personnel could remain to operate the air routes across India, and a stand-still
agreement should be made until negotiations could take place. Similar arrange¬
ments should be made for the technical naval personnel at the ports, and at the
moment we should have no difficulty in securing our requirements. He thought
these matters should be dealt with in detail through the Commander-in-Chief
in India.

the prime minister said that Pandit Nehru wished General Sir William
Slim to become Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the New Dominion of
India and that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff considered that he should
at once be released from the Imperial Defence College for this purpose.

the minister of defence said that this could be done, although it would
cause some dislocation at the Imperial Defence College.

The Committee:

(1) Took note of the views expressed in the Viceroy’s telegram No.
1744-S;

(2) Invited the Secretary of State for India to ask the Commander-in-
Chief India if he was satisfied that, under existing arrangements, the
North West Frontier could be secured during the transitional period
after 15th August;

(3) Invited the Secretary of State for India to inform the Viceroy that he
should not himself raise the question of who was to pay for British
forces in India after 15th August;

(4) Invited the Secretary of State for India to inform the Viceroy that
War Office stores in India which were not required by the War Office
should be sold;

(5) Invited the Secretary of State for India to negotiate through the

JULY I947

979

Commander-in-Chief in India the continued provision of military air
transit facilities ;

(6) Invited the Minister of Defence to approach General Sir William Slim
with a view to his becoming Commander-in-Chief of the Indian
Army.

Confidential Annex

The Governors-General of the two Indian Dominions
the prime minister invited Lord Ismay to make a general statement.

lord ismay said that the Viceroy, before his recent visit to London, had
taken the initiative in suggesting to both the Congress and the Muslim League
leaders that, in the event of power being transferred in India on the basis of the
creation of two Dominions, there would be obvious advantages in the appoint¬
ment of a common Governor-General. This idea had been acceptable to Pandit
Nehru, but not to Mr Jinnah, who had put forward the alternative suggestion
that there should be two Governors-General and a Supreme Arbitrator to
adjudicate on such matters as the division of assets.6 Nevertheless, Mr Jinnah
had not definitely rejected the idea of one Governor-General, and the Viceroy
had certainly been under the impression until quite recently that this arrange¬
ment would ultimately be accepted by the Muslim League. In spite of repeated
pressure, the Muslim League had avoided making any definite statement of their
views on the subject, until the recommendation that Mr jinnah should be
appointed was made formally on behalf of the Muslim League in the previous
week.7 The present position was, therefore, that the Muslim League had
definitely nominated Mr jinnah to be Governor-General of Pakistan. Pandit
Nehru and Sardar Patel had been informed by the Viceroy of this development;
they had been greatly surprised but had renewed their invitation to Lord
Mountbatten to serve as Governor-General of India. Furthermore, the Muslim
League had definitely stated in their letter recommending Mr jinnah as Gover¬
nor-General that they would welcome Lord Mountbatten’s acceptance of the
Governor-Generalship of India.

lord ismay said that there were certain hopeful features in the situation. A
scheme for the division of the Armed Forces had been worked out8 which
offered a reasonable prospect that this operation could be effected smoothly
and without dislocation. It was proposed to establish a central Defence Council,
and there was some hope that Mr Jinnah would accept Lord Mountbatten as
Chairman of the Council. Both parties had shown anxiety to retain the services
of British officers, both military and civilian. For instance, Congress had asked
for a British Commander-in-Chief for the Army of the Dominion of India, and
had invited both Sir John Colville and General Nye to remain in their posts.
Mr Jinnah had said that he would wish to have British Governors for four of the
Provinces of Pakistan and British officers and advisers in many other posts.
l o r d 1 s m A Y said that the Viceroy was very uncertain what decision he should

980

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

take about his own future, and would welcome the advice of His Majesty’s
Government. He had not so far given a definite reply to the Congress invitation
to accept the post of Governor-General of India; on the other hand he had been
made aware of a general assumption on their part that he would not refuse.
Lord Mountbatten felt that, if he accepted the Congress invitation after being
largely responsible for partition, he might be subsequently criticised for siding
with Congress and for failing in impartiality during his period of office as
Viceroy; he compared his position to that of the Governors of Bengal and the
Punjab who had declined to consider taking office in one part of their existing
Provinces, after partition. From his personal point of view, he would gladly
return in August. As against these considerations the Viceroy felt that it would
be wrong to leave his work only partly done out of consideration for his
personal interests.

the prime minister said that it was no easy matter for His Majesty’s
Government to decide what advice to give Lord Mountbatten in this matter.
In his view, however, there were decisive arguments in favour of pressing him
to accept the invitation of the Congress leaders to become Governor-General of
India. It was clear that both parties had in fact complete confidence in Lord
Mountbatten; Mr Jinnah’s nomination of himself was no more than an indica¬
tion of his own egotism. If Lord Mountbatten left India on 15th August, the
alternative candidate would presumably be a Hindu; in that event there was
serious risk that grave differences would arise between himself and Mr Jinnah.
Moreover, Congress might say that, in advising Lord Mountbatten to leave
India, we were yielding to Mr Jinnah at their expense; in view of the attitude
which they had adopted on this question, we should take their interests fully
into account.

the president of the board of trade said that Mr Jinnah’s action
had created a most unfortunate and difficult situation. While it was admittedly
important that the Muslim League should have said that they would welcome
Lord Mountbatten’s appointment as Governor-General of India, there was a
serious risk, as time passed, that his position and reputation would suffer by the
continuance of his servicein India as Governor-General of Union of India alone.
He had achieved a great reputation and remarkable results by an impartiality
which had gained him the confidence of all parties. If he became the Governor-
General of one Dominion, he would have to take vigorous action, on advice, in
the interests of that Dominion, in such delicate matters as the division of
assets.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS Said
that the paramount consideration must be to secure the successful transfer of

6 See Vol. X, No. 473.

7 See No. 509.

8 See No. 416.

JULY I947

981

power in India on the lines decided upon. There was no one whose qualifica¬
tions for achieving success in this matter were comparable with those of Lord
Mountbatten; for this reason, he felt that His Majesty's Government should try
to induce Lord Mountbatten to accept the Congress invitation to become
Governor-General of India.

the secretary of state for India also thought that Lord Mountbatten
should be pressed to accept the Congress invitation. No other person could have
an equal influence on Congress policy. This factor would be important for
three reasons. First, it was still uncertain whether India would ultimately
decide to remain in the Commonwealth. Secondly, complex and important
negotiations would be necessary between His Majesty’s Government and the
new Dominion of India regarding future defence arrangements. Thirdly, the
partition of assets between the two Dominions would in any event work out
unfavourably for Pakistan; Lord Mountbatten would be in a better position
than anyone else to exercise a moderating influence on Congress policy in this
matter.

There was general agreement among the Ministers that the balance of argu¬
ments lay in favour of an attempt to persuade Lord Mountbatten to remain in
India for a period as Governor-General of India. While it was recognised that
there was some risk that this course might perhaps react unfavourably on Lord
Mountbatten’s personal position, it was generally thought that, in the interests
of the new Dominions of India, he ought to complete the work he had started
with such distinction : if his services were lost at this stage, the whole policy
embodied in the Indian Independence Bill might be endangered.

The Committee were informed that the Princes were also hopeful that Lord
Mountbatten would stay in India; if he went, there was the further probability
that many of the British officers of the Indian Army would no longer wish to
continue to serve under the new Dominion Governments.

The discussion then turned on the Viceroy’s request that an early announce¬
ment should be made of the recommendations made by the two Indian Parties
for the posts of Governor-General in the new Indian Dominions.

lord ismay said that the Viceroy’s hope had been that the Prime Minister
would be able to explain the history of the matter fully in the House of Com¬
mons on the Second Reading of the Indian Independence Bill. Lord Mount¬
batten had thought that such a statement might be made in connection with
Clause 5, which clearly contemplated the possibility there might be only one
Governor-General for both Dominions. He was extremely anxious that the full
story should be told in order that there should be no suggestion that his sym¬
pathies as Viceroy had been with the Congress Party and that he was now
openly committed to their side. If the advice of His Majesty’s Government
could be telegraphed to the Viceroy on 8th July, he would be able to convey his
decision on the following day in time for the House of Commons debate. If this

982

THE TRANSFER OF POWER

procedure was not possible, Lord Mountbatten would wish to tell Pandit
Nehru the position in confidence.

In discussion on this proposal, it was pointed out that it would be necessary to
avoid making any statement in terms which assumed that Parliament would
enact the Bill under discussion; doubt was also felt about the propriety of
mentioning at that stage, before the Bill had been enacted, the names of the
persons recommended by the Indian parties for the two Governor-Generalships.
In particular, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations felt that the
mention of names in the House of Commons might not be acceptable to the
House of Lords. Against this, it was pointed out that an announcement that
there would be two Governors-General which did not mention the names of
the persons concerned might result in grave embarrassment; there would
undoubtedly be much speculation in India which might result in strong pressure
on the Congress leaders to recommend an Indian as Governor-General. More¬
over, there was a serious risk of leakage in India during the period while the
legislation was under consideration in Parliament.

the prime minister suggested that a statement should be made on the
Second Reading of the Indian Independence Bill roughly on the following
lines :

“The House will observe that the Bill leaves it open whether there shall be
one or two Governors-General for the two Indian Dominions. It had been
intimated to us that it would be most convenient to all concerned to have one
Governor-General at least in the initial stages, and for some time we pro¬
ceeded on this assumption. It has recently become clear, however, that the
Muslim League wished a separate Governor-General to be appointed for
Pakistan. It is obviously very desirable for this matter to be settled at the
earliest opportunity in order that the position may be understood in India,
and the new Governors-General prepare themselves to take over at the
appropriate time. Both Congress and the Muslim League, who have been
recognised as the successor authorities have made recommendations, which
have been conveyed by His Majesty’s Government to His Majesty. While
formal announcement must wait the enactment of the Bill, His Majesty has
intimated that he will be prepared to accept these recommendations as soon
as the Bill is passed. The recommendations are (here the names would be
given). I wish to add that the recommendation of Lord Mountbatten is also
welcomed by the Muslim League. I am quite sure that the House will agree
with me that this recommendation shows that Lord Mountbatten has carried
out his duties in India with complete impartiality and has won the confidence
of all the people of India.”

Ministers were in agreement that a statement on the lines suggested by the
Prime Minister might be made in the House of Commons on the Second

o

Reading of the Indian Independence Bill.

JULY I947

983

lord ismay said that he had asked the Viceroy to confirm whether the
Muslim League wished him to be Chairman of the Defence Council. It was
agreed that, if this was confirmed, it would be a very valuable addition to the
statement. In that case it might be advisable to omit the reference to the Muslim
League’s welcome to the Congress recommendation on behalf of Lord Mount-
batten, in view of the possibility that this might be unwelcome to Congress.

the prime minister said that before any communication was made to the
Viceroy it would be necessary to consult the Opposition leaders on the follow¬
ing day; he would then put the matter to the King at his forthcoming Audience
with His Majesty.

The Committee —

(1) Expressed the hope that Lord Mountbatten would be prepared to
accept the Congress invitation for nomination as Governor-General of
India.

(2) Agreed that a statement on the lines proposed by the Prime Minister
might be made on the Second Reading of the Indian Independence Bill.

(3) Invited the Prime Minister to consult with the Opposition leaders on
8 th July.

A bad i The part of the village lands on which buildings are erected.

A f r i d i s A Pathan tribe.

Ahirs Caste of graziers and cowherds, sometimes cultivators, widely
distributed in northern and central India.

Ahmadzai Wazirs A Pathan tribe.

A kali Lit. : Worshipper of the eternal one. Particularly strict devotee of the
Sikh faith. In modern usage, a member of the extreme Sikh nationalist party.
Bania Hindu trader or shopkeeper, usually also a moneylender.

Bhangi The name of a low caste, employed as sweepers. Bhangi
basti means ‘area inhabited by sweepers’.

Brahman (Brahmin) The highest caste of the Hindu world. Originally
a priestly caste.

Crore i oo lakhs or ten million.

Dacoit Member of a gang of robbers.

Dal Organisation, association.

Darbar (durbar) Court; ceremonial assembly; government of a Princely
State.

Diwan (Dewan) Minister ; in Princely States Chief Minister ; also Council
of State.

Dogra Rajput inhabitant (Hindu) of the Duggar tract of the Himalayan
foothills mostly comprised in the Jammu territory of Kashmir. Dogras were
recruited in considerable numbers to the army.

Firman-E-Mubarak Lit.: Auspicious Decree. Royal proclamation of
the Nizam of Hyderabad.

Giani (Gyani) Title of respect given to one learned in the Sikh religion
and scriptures.

Goonda Hooligan.

Gujars Grazier caste of the Punjab and North-West India.

G u j e r A t i s Inhabitants of Guj erat.

Gurkha Ruling race of N epal.

Guru Spiritual adviser, religous preceptor; for Sikh Gurus see sikh.

Hur Lit. : free man. Member of a group of guerillas or bandits with a
quasi-religious background operating in Sind under the leadership of the Pir

Pagaro.

Ittihad-Ul-Muslemin Lit.: Unity of Muslims; the name given to a
political organisation in Hyderabad.

Jagir An assignment of land revenue; sometimes conditional on the main¬
tenance of troops or other services.

Jai Hind Victory to India.

GLOSSARY

985

Jamiat-ul-Ulema Lit.: association of learned men. Pro-Congress Muslim
organisation.

Jat The great agricultural tribe of north-west India found in the Punjab,
Western United Provinces and Rajputana and comprising people of the
Muslim, Hindu and Sikh faiths.

Ji Lit. : life, soul. As a suffix to a name denotes affectionate respect.

Jirga A Council of Elders.

K a c h c h 1 s Inhabitants of Kachch.

Khaksars or Servants of the Dust; Lit.: like the earth, humble; semi¬
military organisation of Muslims armed with spades, under the leadership of
Inayatullah Khan.

Khalxstan The name given to a projected Sikh State; also referred to as
Sikhistan.

Khalsa Lit. : pure ; word used by Sikhs to denote their community.
Khassadar Member of a loose irregular body of police who operated in
the Tribal Area of the N.W.F.P., choosing their own officers and finding their
own rifles.

Khudai Khidmatgars Lit. : Servants of God; otherwise known as
Red Shirts q.v.

Lakh 100,000.

Malik A Muslim title inferior to Khan and Amir. Chief man of one of the
kinship groups into which path an tribes are divided.

Maul vi Judge or Doctor of Law. Title of respect often given to learned
Muslims.

Meos A Muslim tribe of cultivators in the south-east of the Punjab.
Mohalla A quarter or area of a town.

Moplahs A fanatical Muslim sect of Malabar believed to be descended from
Arab immigrants who settled on the west coast of India in the ninth century

A.D.

Mutibars Trustworthy persons, dignitaries.

Nawab Originally a Governor under the Moghul Empire; thence a title
of rank conferred on Muslim nobles.

Nawabzada Son of a Nawab.

Pahlwan Wrestler.

Pakhtoons Pushtu-speaking people.

Pakistan Zindabad Long live Pakistan.

Panchayat Court of arbitration (properly of five persons) for determina¬
tion of petty disputes.

Path an Generic name given to Pushtu-speaking peoples inhabiting North-
West Frontier of India and Afghanistan.

Pathanistan The Land or State of the Pathans, the name given to a free
Pathan State envisaged by some Muslims in the N.W.F.P.

986

GLOSSARY

Purbia Easterner. Term used by Punjabis to denote Hindus belonging to

U.P. and Bihar.

Q A i d-i-A z a m The Supreme Ruler.

Quran (Koran) The sacred book of the Mohammedans, consisting of oral
revelations by Mohammed, collected and committed to writing after his

death.

Rajputs Generic term for land-owning and military caste in central and
north India.

Ramzan The ninth month of the Mohammedan year during which all
Mohammedans fast between sunrise and sunset.

Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (R.S.S.S.) National Volunteer
Service Association. The para-military arm of militant Hindu nationalism.
Red Shirts Congress volunteer movement of N.W.F.P. started by Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

SabziMandi Vegetable market.

San ad Grant, charter, certificate; deed of grant by a Sovereign of an office,
privilege or right.

Sardar (Sirdar) Lit. : a chief, leader. Title borne by all Sikhs, also by some
Hindus and Muslims.

Scheduled Castes or Depressed Classes. At the lower end of the scale
of castes; considered to cause pollution by touch.

ShahiJirga Royal Jirga; a principal Council of Elders.

Shiromani AkaliDal Central Akali Organisation.

Shri (Sri) Sanskrit term used by Hindus to denote 'Mr’.

Sikh Lit.: disciple. Follower of Guru Nanak (1469-1538), the first of the
line of ten Gurus (religious preceptors) who formulated the Sikh faith and
welded the Sikhs into an independent community.

Sudra The designation of the fourth or servile caste of the Hindus, or of a
member of it.

T alisil A revenue sub-division of a district.

Zalme Pakhtun Pathan Youth, the name of an organisation started by
Abdul Ghaffar’s son.

INDEX OF PERSONS
WITH BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

FOR THE PERIOD 31 MAY-7 JULY 047

The extensive correspondence of the Secretary of State (Lord Listowel) and the Viceroy
(Lord Mountbatten), whether written or telegraphed, can be readily followed in the
Summary of Documents at the beginning of the Volume and for that reason it is not listed
again in this Index.

Neither previous nor subsequent changes in office are listed unless they have an immediate
relevance to the contents of this Volume. A list giving the names of principal holders of
office in this period is to be found on pages xxxvii-xl.

The references are to Document Numbers

Abbott, Stuart Evelyn, I.C.S., Secretary
to the Governor of the Punjab 1946-7
16, 59, 98, 137, 144, 204, 209, 343-4,
379, 384, 407, 455, 527, 529, 540

ABDUL GHAFFAR KHAN See GHAFFAR
KHAN

abdul hamid, Maulana, of Badaun,
U.P., Member of the Council of the
All-India Muslim League 130
abdul majid khan, Member of
Afghan Foreign Office 309
abdul qaiyum khan, Deputy Leader
of Congress in Indian Legislative
Assembly; resigned and joined Muslim
League July/ Aug 1945 14, 65

abdul rahim, Professor; Member of the
Council of the All-India Muslim League
130

abdulrahman, Maulvi, Member of the
Council of the All-India Muslim League
130

abdul rashid, Maulvi, a Member of the
Council of Ministers, Assam, from
1946 86

abdul rashid, Sir, Chief Justice of the
Punjab High Court since 1946 12

a b d u l l ah, Sheikh Mohammad, President,
National Conference, Kashmir; Presi¬
dent, All-India States People’s Conference

1946; later Prime Minister of Kashmir
229, 319, 369, 386

Abdullah, Begum, wife of Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah 229, 319, 386
ABDUR RAHMAN khan, Amir of Afghan¬
istan from 1880 to 1901 395

abdussamadkhan, Member of Afghan
Foreign Office 309

abdus sattar, Pirzada, Member of the
Legislative Assembly, Sind 104
Abell, George Edmond Brackenbury,
I.C.S., ( cr . K.C.LE. 25 June 1947),
Private Secretary to the Viceroy from
1946; at Viceroy’s staff meetings 2, 5,
17, 26, 70, 93, 216, 239, 344, 308, 389, 478,
499; at meetings of the Indian Cabinet
95, 338, 493; favours putting British
military officers in charge of referendum
in N.W.F.P. 49; his note on inheri¬
tance by Central Government of records
and machinery of the political depart¬
ment 67; his note on discussion with
Jenkins about situation and partition
arrangements in Punjab 98; reports
good reception of the Announcement
147; reports to Monteath Viceroy’s
views on employment of Rowlands by
Pakistan 168; receives copies of draft
Indian Dominions Bill 189, 214, 256;

988

INDEX OF PERSONS

ABELL (i ont .):

seeks orders regarding an appeal to
members of the Secretary of State’s
Services to stay on 215 ; his remarks on
proposed referendum in Baluchistan
276, 298 ; considers neutral zone in
Punjab impracticable 316; and des¬
truction of confidential records 341;
conveys to Governor’s Secretary instruc¬
tions about law and order situation in
Lahore 343, 384; comments on

League’s draft of terms of reference for
Boundary Commissions 393; and
draft Standstill Agreement with States
received from Nehru 403 ; explains
League’s attitude to title of India 405 ;
minutes on Chittagong Hill Tracts
430; writes to Auchinleck about possible
disorder in Travancore 476; informed
of intentions regarding future of India
Office 526; reports talk with Govern¬
or’s Secretary on situation in Lahore
527; addressed by Jenkins about diffi¬
culty of establishing a Ministry in
Punjab 540; also 9, 16, 21,28,55,74,76,
94, 96, 100, 102, 115, 136-7, 144, 170,
201, 204, 249, 267, 269, 295, 300, 336,

35L 353, 373, 379, 394, 399, 401,
406-7, 410, 426, 440, 446, 457, 506, 513,

532, 54i

ABU SALEH MOHAMAD AKRAM, Judge

of the High Court, Calcutta from 1940;
Member of the Bengal Boundary
Commission 317, 415

addison, 1st Viscount of Stalling-
borough cr. 1945 (Christopher Addison),
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
from 1945 31-2, 42, 62-3, 1 1 8, 281,

322, 361, 368, 421, 441, 443, 465, 482,
586, 564

A deane, Major Michael Edward, Assis¬
tant Private Secretary to the King from
1937 164, 184

AFGHAN CONSUL-GENERAL IN INDIA
See GHULAM MOHAMMAD KHAN

AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER See ALI
MAHOMED KHAN

AFGHAN MINISTER IN LONDON see
MOHAMMAD NAIM

AFGHAN MINISTER IN NANKING See
TARZI

AIR OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF,
INDIA see WALMSLEY

aiyar (aiyer, iyer), Sir C. P. Ramas-
wami, Diwan of Travancore from 1936
43, 226, 295, 369

aiyer (ayyar, iyar), Diwan Bahadur
Sir Alladi Krishnaswami, Advocate-
General Madras 1929-44; Member of the
Constituent Assembly 7, hi, 146,
408, 41 1

alamkhan, a Khudai Khidmatgar 530,
54i

Alexander, Albert Victor (later Viscount
and Earl Alexander of Hillsborough),
M.P. (Co-op) for Hillsborough Division
of Sheffield ; First Lord of the Admiralty
1929-31, 1940-May 1945 and July

1945-Oct. 1946; Member of the Cabinet
Mission to India; Minister without
Portfolio Oct.-Dec. 1946; Minister of
Defence from Dec. 1946 23, 32, 42,
121, 187, 221, 244, 258, 265, 322, 345-7,
360-1, 381, 413, 421, 465, 554, 564

ALI MAHOMED (MUHAMMAD) KHAN,
Mirza, Foreign Minister, Afghanistan
in 1947 140, 272, 309, 377, 395, 43T
453

AMiR-UD-DiN, Mian, Mayor of Lahore
1947 232

amrit kaur, Rajkumari, sometime
Chairman of the All-India Women’s
Conference; worked as a secretary to
Gandhi 139, 230, 242, 369

anderson, Sir John, M.P. (Nat.) for
Scottish Universities; Governor of
Bengal 1932-7; Chancellor of the
Exchequer 1943-5 375, 4*3

anderson, Kenneth, Assistant Secre-
rary, Financial Dept, India Office from
1942 244, 360

anwar ali, Indian Audit and Accounts
Service, Under-Secretary, Govt of
India, Finance Dept 1946-7 210

ARMY COMMANDER, NORTHERN COM¬
MAND see MESSERVY

INDEX OF PERSONS

989

ask with, Arthur Vivian, I.C.S., Chief
Commissioner, Delhi 1940-5 209, 219,

426

attaullah khan, Qazi, Education
Minister, N.W.F.P. 1945 and Revenue
Minister from 1946 63

attlee, Clement Richard, M.P. (Lab.)
for Limehouse; Deputy Prime Minister
1942-5 ; Prime Minister from July 1945 ;
at Cabinet 31, 42, 118, 322, 443; at
India and Burma Committee 32, 121,
244, 265, 347, 360-1, 421, 465, 486, 525,
564; stresses need for secrecy in regard to
Statement 23 ; informed by Mount-
batten of acceptance of plan by Indian
party leaders 40; his Statement in the
House of Commons on India Policy
45 ; and Cabinet’s congratulations to
Mountbatten 56, 75; his broadcast to
India 57, 78; agrees to replacement of
Caroe by Lockhart 148, 182, 211, 223;
seeks the King’s approval to change in
the Royal Title and to proposals for
disposal of Indian Crown 164, 184;
correspondence with Dominion Prime
Ministers regarding change in title of
Dominions Office 166, 313, 443;

addressed regarding employment of
Gurkhas in British Army 173, 259,
330-2, 347, 388; and correspondence
regarding appointments of Governor-
General and Governors 183, 374, 440;
approves Radcliffe being considered as
Chairman of Arbitral Tribunal 185;
and reference to Dominion Prime
Ministers regarding change of Royal
Title 203, 482; and suggestion that King
and Queen should visit Delhi 222,
241; addressed regarding amendments
to Indian Independence Bill 373 ; sends
leaders of the Opposition copies of the
India Bill 375; and discusses it with
them 420, 441, 443; and question of
allowing Nehru to have a copy of
India Bill 436, 439; and correspond¬
ence with Churchill about India Bill
444-5, 504; and exchange with Mount-
batten about new set-up of Interim
Government 447, 454, 458, 465, 467-9,

478, 489, 506-7; and appointment of
Jinnah as Governor-General of Pakistan
483, 499, 508, 523, 551, 562-4; addressed
by Jinnah regarding enforcement of
arbitral awards 548, 558; also 2-3, 8,

19, 30, 34, 52, 59, 62, 87, 89, 91, 99,
103, 108, 125, 161, 273, 281, 337, 352,
37 6, 381, 453, 466, 505, 510, 514, 526,
533-4, 536, 546, 555

auchinleck, Field Marshal Sir Claude
John Eyre, C.-in-C., India Jan.-July 1941
and from June 1943; C.-in-C., Middle
East July 1941-Aug. 1942; and proposed
broadcast to Armed Forces 39, 43,
48, 53 ; asked to provide British Officers
for referendum in N.W.F.P. 49; and
replacement of Caroe by Lockhart 106,

1 14; and withdrawal of British forces
from India 108, 126, 159, 213, 239,

274, 307-8, 335, 346, 358, 381, 464, 5n;
and partition of the Armed Forces 126,
152, 210, 372, 416; asked to send more
troops to Gurgaon 137, 179, 234, 254,
275; his views on effect of division of
Armed Forces 216-17; remarks on
Indian Army troops in Hyderabad 296 ;
Jinnah expresses loss of faith in 3 1 1 ;
his note on retention of British Officers
312; proposal that he remain in admin¬
istrative control of whole army until
division complete 354, 369, 416, 473;
and joint control of forces in border
areas 456, 473 ; and possible disorder in
Travancore 476-7; his statements that
he would resign if Mountbatten left
522, 557; his views on Mountbatten
staying on in India 545 ; also 25, 91, 98,
162, 214, 231-2, 265, 506, 562, 564

aung san, u, Burmese political and
military leader; Commander, Burma
Independence Army 1942; Minister for
Defence 1943-5; President, Anti-Fascist
People’s Freedom League from 1945
29, 121

A yub, Muhammad, I.C.S., Deputy Sec¬
retary, Industries and Supplies Dept
1946-7 210

990

INDEX OF PERSONS

AYYANGAR (AIYANGAR, AIYENGAR,

iengar), Sir N. Gopalaswamy, Mem¬
ber, Board of Revenue, Madras 1935-7;
Prime Minister of Kashmir 1937-43;
Member, Constituent Assembly 7, 229,
403, 411

azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, President,
Indian National Congress 1923 and
I939~June 1946; Member, Interim Govt
(Education and Arts) from Jan. 1947
95, 175, 417

BADSHAH KHAN See GHAFFAR KHAN

bahawalpur, Dewan of see gurmani
bahawalpur, Nawab of 182
bajpai, Sir Girja Shankar, I.C.S., Agent
to the Governor-General in U S.A.
1 941-7; Secretary-General of Depart¬
ment of External Affairs and Common¬
wealth Relations from 1947 337, 388

baldev singh, Sardar, Minister of
Development, Punjab 1942-6; Member
of Interim Govt (Defence) from 2 Sept.
1946; at Mountbatten’s meetings with
Indian leaders on 2, 3 and 5 June 23,
39, 73> 91; at meetings of Indian
Cabinet 95, 338, 493; at Viceroy’s
miscellaneous meetings 100, 175; at
meeting of Special Committee of Indian
Cabinet 354; at meeting of Partition
Council 416; Mountbatten hopes he
will persuade Sikhs to cooperate 3 ;
reported intensely communal in talk
with Jenkins 12; agrees to broadcast
23, 27; writes to Mountbatten con¬
veying Sikh acceptance of partition
proposals and giving Sikh views on
them 36, 91; his broadcast on 3 June
48; says his broadcast was mistranslated
100; and composition of Arbitral
Tribunal 100, 162; suggests showing to
Dr Khan Sahib names of Army officers
chosen to run referendum 108, 114;
and terms of reference of Boundary
Commissions 126, 369, 398; makes
complaints against Deputy Commis¬

sioner, Gurgaon 141 ; asked to examine
whether number of troops in Gurgaon
adequate 338; has interview with
Mountbatten along with Giani Kartar
Singh 417, 474; writes to Nehru
about disputed territory in Punjab 456,
473; also 4, 11, 22, 40-1, 43, 53, 59-60,
97, 106, 152, 173, 178, 371, 477
baring, Sir Evelyn, High Commissioner
for the U.K. in Union of South
Africa from 1944 87, 481, 531, 555

barnes, Alfred, M.P. (Lab. Co-op) for
East Ham, South; Minister of War
Transport (later Transport) from 1945
265, 361

baron, Monsieur 337
barq, Muhammad Ibrahim, Minister of
Education, Punjab 1946-7 209
barry, Colonel Richard Hugh, Deputy
Director of Plans, War Office 1945-7
187

Baxter, George Herbert, an Assistant
Under-Secretary of State at the India
Office from 1943 282

beards, Paul Francis Richmond, Assistant
Private Secretary to Prime Minister
from 1945 375

beaumont, Herbert Christopher, I.C.S.,
Secretary to Sir Cyril Radcliffe 1947
378

beaumont, Sir John William Fisher,
Chief Justice of Bombay 1930-43;
Member of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council from 1944 135

beckett, William Eric, Legal Adviser to
the Foreign Office from 1945 52> T92

bellenger, Frederick John, M.P. (Lab.)
for Bassetlaw Division of Nottingham¬
shire from 1935; Financial Secretary,
War Office 1945-6; Secretary of State
for War 1946-7 42

bennett, Sir John Thorne Masey, Inspec¬
tor-General of Police, Punjab 1945-7
12, 98, 327, 369

be van, Aneurin, M.P. (Lab.) for Ebbw
Vale Division of Monmouthshire from
1929; Minister of Health from 1945
42, 322, 361

INDEX OF PERSONS

991

bevin, Ernest, M.P.(Lab.) for Wandsworth
Central since 1940; Minister of Labour
and National Service 1940-May 1945;
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
from July 1945 3L 42, 52, 118, 182,
192, 201, 244, 265, 322, 361
bhabha, Cooverji Hormusji, Member,
Interim Govt for Commerce 2 Sept.-26
Oct. 1946 and for Works, Mines and
Power from 26 Oct. 1946-1947 95,
162, 338, 493

bhalja, Govardhan Shankerlal, I.C.S.,
Secretary, Govt of India, Defence Dept
1946-7 210

bhargava, Dr Gopi Chand, Member of
the Legislative Assembly, Punjab 426,
503

bhattacharyya, Paresh Chandra,
Indian Audit and Accounts Service;
Joint Financial Adviser, Industries and
Supplies Dept 1946-7 210

bhopal, Nawab of, Chancellor of the
Chamber of Princes 1944-7 17, 43 , 64,
68, 70, 91, 1 12, 242, 264, 273, 369, 376,
401-2, 427, 466, 495, 499, 521-3, 538,
561

bikaner, Maharaja of 17, 20, 91, 446
bilaspur, Raja of 43,94,418
biswas, Charu Chandra, Judge of the
High Court, Calcutta from 1937; Mem¬
ber of the Bengal Boundary Com¬
mission 207, 262, 415
bottomley, Arthur George, M.P.
(Lab.) for Chatham Division of Roches¬
ter from 1945; Member of Parlia¬
mentary Delegation to India 1946;
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
for Dominion Affairs 1946-7 32, 121,

244, 265, 347, 360, 421
brendon, Patrick, I.C.S., Deputy
Commissioner, Gurgaon 1 946-7 1 1 , 9 1 ,

141, 232, 299

bridges, Sir Edward Ettingdene (later
1st Baron), Secretary to the Cabinet
1938-46; Permanent Secretary to the
Treasury 1946-56 31-2, 118, 182, 244,

322

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN
AUSTRALIA S€6 WILLIAMS E. J.

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN

CANADA See CLUTTERBUCK
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN

India see SHONE

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN

NEW ZEALAND See COSTAR
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER IN

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA see BARING
britter, Eric, The Times correspondent in
India 1945-7 66

brockman, Captain Ronald Vernon,
R.N., Secretary to Lord Mountbatten as
Supreme Commander in South-East
Asia; Personal Secretary to the Viceroy
from March 1947 2, 5, 12, 17, 26, 66,

70, 93, 108, 126, 300, 308, 344, 389,
478, 499, 522, 545

brook, Sir Norman, Additional Secretary
to the Cabinet 1945-6; Secretary to the
Cabinet from 1947 92, 337
Bruce, Major-General John Geoffrey,
G.O.C. Lahore District 1946-7 12, 320,
327, 339, 369

bundeh A li talpur, Mir, Minister in
charge of Home and Legal Depts, Sind
from 1946 232

Burma, Governor of see rance
burrows, Sir Frederick John, Governor
of Bengal 1946-7; sometime President
of the National Union of Rail waymen ;
informed of slender chances of agree¬
ment for a united and independent
Bengal 15; and question of declaring
Calcutta a free city 17-18, 33; and
likely voting of Scheduled Castes 17,
23, 53; and question of going into
Section 93 18, 33, 268, 289, 291-2,

301-2, 306, 308, 311; and formation of
Coalition Ministry in Bengal 54, 77,
162, 240, 289, 306, 311; and formation
of Regional Ministries in Bengal 240,
253, 268, 289, 301-2, 306, 311; presses
for 'East Bengal’ and ‘West Bengal’ as
title for new Bengal provinces 271, 286,
323 ; reports the voting in Bengal 277-
8; and proposal for ‘Shadow’ Cabinet
for West Bengal 336, 354, 367, 379,
409-10, 489, 506; wishes to be relieved
of office on 15 August 354, 406, 522;

992

INDEX OF PERSONS

BURROWS (cotit. ):

favours treating Chittagong Hill Tracts
as part of East Bengal 363-4, 430; also
2, 82, 98, 152-3, 344, 352, 391
butler, Richard Austen (later Life
Peer), M.P. (Con.) for Saffron Walden
division of Essex since 1929; President of
the Board of Education 194 1-5 (Min¬
ister from 1944); Minister of Labour
May-July 1945 88, 261

CABINET SECRETARY SCO BROOK
CABINET SECRETARY (iNDIA) SCO PATEL
H.M.

cambay, Nawab of 401
campbell-johnson, Alan, Press Attache
to the Viceroy from March 1947 2, 5,
17, 26, 59-60, 66, 70, 84, 93, 108, 126,

344, 389, 464, 47L 478, 499, 542
c A r o e, Lady, wife of Sir Olaf Caroe 1 8 1 ,
227

caroe, Sir Olaf Kirkpatrick, I.C.S.,
Secretary, External Affairs Dept, Govt
of India 1939-45; Governor of the
N.W.F.P. 1946-7 14-15, 49, 61, 65,
81, 83, 85, 91, 95, 106, 108, 114, 142, 143,
148, 154, 161-2, 181-2,211, 223, 227-8,
237, 281, 310, 321, 342
carter, Sir (Richard Henry) Archibald,
Assistant Under-Secretary of State for
India 1936; Permanent Secretary of the
Admiralty 1936-40; Chairman, Eastern
Group Supply Council, Delhi 1 941-2;
Chairman Board of Customs and
Excise 1942-7; Permanent Under¬
secretary of State for India 1947 282,
347, 360, 399, 421, 45L 465, 486, 526,
550, 56

cat to 1st Baron (Thomas Sivewright
Catto), Chairman of Andrew Yule &
Co., Calcutta; Financial Adviser to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer 1940-4;
Governor of the Bank of England
1944-9 275

cazenove, Colonel (temp. Brig.) Arnold
de Lerisson, Commander of the 23rd
Brigade 1947 327, 338

ceylon, Governor of see moore

CHANCELLOR OF THE C FI AMBER OF
PRINCES See BHOPAL

che em A, Abdul Ghani, a Sub-Judge in
Lahore 1947 305

chhatari, Lieutenant-Colonel Nawab
Sir Muhammad Ahmad Said Khan,
President, Executive Council of the
Nizam of Hyderabad 1941-6 and 1947
112, 150, 239, 242, 249, 260

CHIEF COMMISSIONER BALUCHISTAN

see prior

CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA see SPENS
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE PUNJAB S0€
ABDUL RASHID, Sir

CHIEF OF TFIE GENERAL STAFF (iNDIA)

see smith

CEIIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL
STAFF see MONTGOMERY

chief secretary, N.W.F.P. see de la

FARGUE

CHIEFS OF STAFF (iNDIA) I59
CHIEFS OF STAFF (U.K.) 1 74, 1 86-7,

221, 244, 257, 266, 335, 345-7, 361, 487,
554, 556, 564

chifley, Joseph Benedict, Prime Minister
of Australia from 1945 166, 203, 313,

322, 494, 531

CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO INDIA see
LO CHIA-LUN

chorley, 1st Baron of Kendal cr. 1945
(Robert Samuel Theodore Chorley),
Member of Parliamentary Delegation to
India 1946 32, 121, 244, 265, 360, 421,

564

Christie, Walter Henry John, I.C.S.,
Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy
1939-43 ; Joint Secretary to the Govt of
India, Food Dept 1945-7; Joint Private
Secretary to the Viceroy 1947 26, 28,
53, 93, 108, 344, 364, 389, 564
chundrigar, Ismail Ibrahim, Member,
Bombay Legislative Assembly 1939;
President, Provincial Muslim League,
Bombay 1940-5; Member, Working
Committee, All-India Muslim League
from 1943 ; Member, Interim Govt
(Commerce) from 26 Oct. 1946 3, 78,

95, 338

INDEX OF PERSONS

993

Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer,
M.P. (Con.) for Epping Division of
Essex; Prime Minister and Minister of
Defence 1940-5 ; Leader of the Opposition
from 1945 2-3, 23, 56, 59, 66, 68, 78,

87, 89, 161, 444, 445, 504, 533-4, 53C
548, 558, 561

Claus on, Miles John, Assistant Secretary,
Political (States) Department, India
Office 1944-Feb. 1946 and from Sept.
1946; Private Secretary to the Secretary
of State for India Feb.-Sept. 1946 347,

360

cliff, Norman, Foreign Editor of the
News Chronicle from 1946 6

clow, Sir Andrew Gourlay, I.C.S.,
Governor of Assam 1942-7 182

clutterbuck, Sir (Peter) Alexander,
High Commissioner for the U.K. in
Canada from 1946 89, 281, 481, 488,

512, 555

Colville, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir (David)
John, cr. 1st Baron Clydesmuir 1947;
M.P. (Unionist) for North Midlothian
1924-43; Governor of Bombay 1943-8
2, 12, 90, 220, 308, 461-2, 471, 478,
506, 522, 557, 564

COMMANDER, 4th INDIAN DIVISION

see rees

COMMANDER, 23rd BRIGADE see
CAZENOVE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (iNDIA) see
AUCHINLECK

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, ROYAL INDIAN
navy see MILES

COMMISSIONER OF AMBALA (gURGAOn)
See EUSTACE

corfield, Sir Conrad Lawrence, I.C.S.,
Political Adviser to the Crown Rep¬
resentative 1945-7 17, 21-2, 43, 67,

74, 94, 100, 108, 124, 146, 150, 175, 196,
214, 239, 247, 260, 295-6, 369, 385,
401-3, 418, 427, 446, 559
Cornelius, Alwin Robert, I.C.S., Legal
Remembrancer and Secretary, Legis¬
lative Dept, Punjab 1943-6; Judge of the
High Court Lahore 1947 971
co star, Norman Edgar, Acting U.K.

co star (cont.):

High Commissioner in New Zealand
1947 492, 494, 512

Courtney, Air Chief Marshal Sir
Christopher Lloyd, Air Member for
Supply and Organisation in the Air
Council 1940-5; retired 1945 308

creech jones, Arthur, Secretary of
State for the Colonies from Oct. 1946
31, 42, 78, 118, 121, 165, 244, 322, 361,
443, 505

Crichton, Major Gerald Charles Law¬
rence, Counsellor, Kabul Legation 1943-
6; Joint Secretary, External Affairs
Dept, Govt of India 1946-7; Officiating
Secretary, External Affairs Dept April-
Aug. 1947 276

cripps, Sir (Richard) Stafford, M.P.
(Lab.) for Bristol East; Minister of
Aircraft Production 1942-5; carried
constitutional proposals to India March
1942; President of the Board of Trade
from 1945; Member of the Cabinet
Mission to India 2, 23, 32, 42, 99, 107,
112, 115, 118, 121, 182, 199, 244, 265,
281, 303, 322, 347, 360, 379, 421, 441,

443, 449, 458-9, 465, 478, 486, 564
croft, Sir William Dawson, Deputy
Under-Secretary of State, India Office
from Oct. 1941-7; on staff of Cabinet
Mission 132, 147, 244, 265-6, 282, 550
Cunningham, Sir George, I.C.S.,
Governor of North-West Frontier
Province 1937-46 and 1947-8 310, 399,
478

currie, Colonel Douglas Hendrie,
Military Secretary to the Viceroy
1944-7 108, 126, 196, 545

dalmia, Seth Ram Krishna, Industrialist
and Financier 124

dalton, Hugh, M.P. (Lab.) for Bishop
Auckland Division of Durham; Chan¬
cellor of the Exchequer from 1945 31,

42, 121, 244, 256, 265, 322, 347, 360-1,

443

994

INDEX OF PERSONS

das, Babu Akshay Kumar, a Member of
the Coimcil of Ministers, Assam 1945-6

86

das, Biswanath, Chief Minister, Orissa
1937-9; Member, Constituent Assembly

7

daud gha zna vi, Maulana, Member,
Legislative Assembly, Punjab 1946-7
305

DAULATRAM See J AIR AM DAS

daultana, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad
Khan, General Secretary of the Punjab
Provincial Muslim League; Member,
Punjab Legislative Assembly 232, 305,
339, 426

davies, Clement, M.P. (Lib.) for Mont¬
gomery from 1929; Leader of Liberal
Parliamentary Party from 1945 375

davy, Major Anthony Edward Gains,
Indian Political Service; Secretary to
Resident, Central India from 1945 427

de la F argue, Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley
Gordon Heriot, Chief Secretary to the
Govt of the North-West Frontier
Province from 1944 83
de valera, Eamon, Taoiseach (Prime
Minister) and Minister for External
Affairs, Govt of Eire since 1937 482
delargy, Captain Hugh James, M.P.
(Lab.) for Platting Division of Manchester
since 1945 482

DENING, Maberly Esler, an Assistant
Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign
Office from 1946 31

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, GURGAON see
BRENDON

DEPUTY IN SPEC TOR-GENERAL OF POLICE

(C.I.D.), Punjab see jenkin

DEPUTY PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE

viceroy see scott i.d.
dib din, Aubrey, an Assistant Secretary,
India Office from 1936 and Burma
Office from 1945 133

din mohammad, Khan Bahadur, Judge
of the High Court, Punjab 1936-46;
Member of the Punjab Boundary
Commission 317, 415

DIRECTOR OF ARCHIVES See SEN S.N.

dow, Sir Hugh, I.C.S., Governor of

Sind 1941-6; Governor of Bihar 1946-7
400

dungarpur, Maharawal of 43
durgadas, Special Representative of the
Statesman 1938-43; Joint Editor, the
Hindustan Times from 1944 66

ede, James Chuter, M.P. (Lab.) for
Mitcham Division of Surrey 1923, for
South Shields 1929-31 and from 1935;
Home Secretary from 1945 42, 322,

361, 443

eden, Robert Anthony (later first Earl of
Avon), M.P. (Con.) for Warwick and
Leamington; Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs 1940-5 375, 444

Edwards, Lieutenant-Colonel Cosmo
Grant Niven, Indian Political Service,
Resident, Madras States 1944-7 226,
47 6

elliot, Walter, M.P. (Con.) for Kelvin-
grove Division of Glasgow 1924-45
and for Scottish Universities since Nov.
1946; Secretary of State for Scotland
1936-8; Minister of Health 1938-40;
Rector of Glasgow University 1947
450

erskine crum, Lieutenant-Colonel
Vernon Forbes, Conference Secretary to
the Viceroy from March 1947 1-2, 5,

13, 17, 23, 26,28,35-6,39, 43, 70, 73, 81,
93, 100, 108, 124, 126, 175, 196, 200,
238-9, 306-8, 316, 344, 349, 389, 428,
430, 470, 478, 495, 499, 520-2, 545
eustace, Edward Arthur Rawlins, I.C.S.,
Commissioner of Ambala 1947 105,

137, 141, 162, 209, 299
evatt, Herbert Vere, Deputy Prime
Minister of Australia 1946-9; Minister
for External Affairs 1941-9 63, 494

faridkot, Raja of 22
fa zl A li, Sir Saiyid, Chief Justice, Patna
from 1943 369

INDEX OF PERSONS

995

FOREIGN MINISTER OF AFGHANISTAN
See ALI MOHAMED KHAN

foster, Air Vice-Marshal Robert
Mordaunt, Assistant Chief of Air Staff
(Policy) 1947 221

fraser, Peter, Prime Minister of New
Zealand from 1940 62, 166, 203, 313,
322, 492, 512, 531

gandhi, Devadas, fourth son of Mahatma
Gandhi; Editor of Hindustan Times
60, 84

gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand, known
as the Mahatma (Great Soul), called also
Bapu and Bapuji; his opposition to
Partition 2, 6, 12, 19, 39; favours the
Cabinet Mission plan 2, 91; Mount-
batten’s proposed references to him in
broadcast 2, 19, 30; requests replace¬
ment of Caroe 24, 148; observes his
rule of Monday silence during an
interview with Mountbatten 24, 27,
39; his speeches objected to by Liaquat
39, 53 5 tribute paid to in Nehru’s
broadcast 46; reported to be in an
unhappy mood 58, 69, 162; his inter¬
view with Mountbatten on 4 June 69-
70 ; his desire to go to Kashmir 69-70,

229, 385-7, 518, 530; his propaganda
against Mountbatten’s plan 91, 162,
281; his suggestions on how Mount¬
batten should talk to Jinnah on N.W.F.P.
and other matters 99, 118, 125, 139,
156; desires that H.M.G’s agreements
with Hindustan and Pakistan should not
differ 99, 161, 266, 345, 360, 376, 505;
his proposal that Jinnah should ‘woo’
the N.W.F.P. leaders 139, 156, 176-7,

230, 237, 239, 242, 253, 369; his letter to
Mountbatten of 10/11 June 139, 1 55 >
visits a refugee camp at Hardwar 300;
his letter to Mountbatten of 27/28 June
382, 389-90, 506; and referendum in
N.W.F.P. 396, 422, 442, 496, 515,
518, 530, 541; to be shown draft Indian
Independence Bill 408, 41 1, 423-5,

435, 506; also 4, 78, 108, 130, 342, 458,
515, 522, 537

gazdar, Muhammad Hashim, Haji,
Minister for Law and Order, Sind
1945-6 232

george vi, h.m., King-Emperor from
1936 2, 23, 79, 106, 114, 148, 154, 164,
182-4, 190, 211, 222-3, 241, 243, 275,
322, 373-4, 420, 425, 440, 457, 495,
499-500, 508-9, 523, 533, 538, 544,
562-4

GHAFFAR khan, Khan Abdul, called the
‘Frontier Gandhi’; half-brother of Dr
Khan Sahib; founder in 1930 of the
Red Shirt Movement (the Khudai
Khidmatgars), the Congress Volunteer
Organisation of the N.W.F.P. 14, 24,
99, 139, 176, 228, 230, 237, 239, 242, 253,
309, 321, 342, 369, 396, 422, 442, 496,
515, 518, 530, 541

ghazanfar ali khan, Raja, Member,
Council of All-India Muslim League;
Member, Interim Govt (Health) from
26 Oct. 1946 11, 95, 234-5

ghosh, Dr Profullah Chandra, Member
of the Constituent Assembly; sometime
Member of the Congress Working
Committee; leader West Bengal Con¬
gress Party from June 1947 394, 409-10
ghosh, Sudhir, sometime Personal
Assistant to Sir Jehangir Ghandy,
General Manager, Tata Iron and Steel
Co.; one of Gandhi’s entourage 502
ghulam ali of Amritsar, Punjab, Mem¬
ber of the Council of the All-India
Muslim League 130

GHULAM ALI talpur, Mir, Minister of
Food and Agriculture, Sind from 1945
232

GHULAM MOHAMMAD KHAN, Sardar,
Afghan Consul-General in India from
1945 309

GHULAM MUHAMMAD, Sir, Indian Audit
Dept; Additional Secretary, Dept of
Supply 1941 ; Finance Member, Hydera¬
bad 1942-7 210, 217
GLOUCESTER, h.r.h. the Duke of, third
son of King George V and brother of
King George VI 108

996

INDEX OF PERSONS

Gordon, Harry, Personal Assistant to
Sir Walter Monckton in India 1946 and
1947 261, 296

governor’s SECRETARY, BENGAL set
TYSON, J.D.

governor’s SECRETARY, PUNJAB set
ABBOTT

govind (gobind) singh, Guru (1666-
1708) the tenth and last Sikh Guru
72 fn

grady, Henry Francis, Ambassador of the
U.S.A. to India 1947 161

grafftey-smith, Laurence Barton,
Minister to Saudi Arabia 1945-7; High
Commissioner for U.K. in Pakistan
from 1947 92

greenwood, Arthur, M.P. (Lab.) for
Nelson and Colne (Lancashire) 1922-31
and for Wakefield from 1932; Lord
Privy Seal 1945-7 42, 322, 361, 443

griffin, Lancelot Cecil Lepel, I.C.S.,
Secretary to the Crown Representative
1944-7 267

gurmani, Nawab Mushtaq Ahmad,
Member, Legislative Assembly Punjab
193 0-42 ; Director, Publicity and Recruit¬
ment (Technical), Govt of India 1942-5;
Director-General of Resettlement and
Employment 1945-6; Dewan of
Bahawalpur from 1947 101, 124, 246,

354

had don, Lieutenant-Colonel T., The
Border Regiment 186
Halifax, 1st Earl of cr. 1944 (Edward
Frederick Lindley Wood), Viceroy
1926-31 as Lord Irwin; British Ambassa¬
dor, Washington 1941-6 222, 241
hall, 1st Viscount cr. 1946 (George Henry
Hall), M.P. (Lab.) for Aberdare Division
of Merthyr Tydfil 1922-46; Secretary
of State for the Colonies 1945-6; First
Lord of the Admiralty from 4 Oct. 1946
42

hankey, 1st Baron cr. 1939 of The
Chart (Maurice Pascal Alers Hankey),
Secretary, Imperial War Cabinet 1917;

Secretary General, Imperial Conference
1921, 1923, 1926, 1930, and 1937 488
hankinson, Walter Crossfield, Deputy
High Commissioner in Australia 1943-7

494

Harris, Ronald Montague Joseph, Private
Secretary to the Secretary of the
Cabinet 1939-43; Private Secretary to
the Secretary of State for India 1946-7
13, 133, 211, 266, 349, 373, 405, 440
hasrat mohan i, Maulana, Member of
the Legislative Assembly U.P.; Member
of the Council of the All-India Muslim
League 130

Henderson, Arthur, M.P. (Lab.) for
Kingswinford Division of Staffordshire
from 1935; Parliamentary Under¬
secretary of State for India and Burma
from 1945 32, 121, 132, 189, 244, 261,

265, 347, 360, 421, 465, 486, 564
Herbert, Sir Charles Gordon, I.C.S.,
Resident, Hyderabad 1946-7 150

hertz og, General James Barry Munnik,
Prime Minister of the Union of South
Africa 1924-39 488

hidayatulla, Khan Bahadur Sir Ghulam
Hussain, Premier of Sind from 1942
130

hitler, Adolf, Leader and Chancellor of
Germany 1933-45 232, 470
hoare, Sir Samuel see templewood
holland-martin, Edward, Director,
Bank of England from 1933 275

hollis, Major-General Sir Leslie Chase-
more, Senior Assistant Secretary in the
office of the War Cabinet I939~46;
Chief Staff officer to Minister of
Defence and Deputy Secretary (Military)
to the Cabinet from 1947 186, 221,

345-6

hopkinson, Arthur John, I.C.S., Poli¬
tical Officer in Sikkim 1945-7 245, 334
H u b b a c k, David Francis, a Principal at the
Cabinet Office from 1944 121, 244,
265

hydari, Sir Muhammad Saleh Akbar,
I.C.S., Secretary, Govt of India (Indus¬
tries and Supplies) 1943-5 ; Member for
Information and Broadcasting, Viceroy’s

INDEX OF PERSONS

997

HYDARI ( cont .):

Executive Council 1945-6; Governor
of Assam from 4 May 1947 15, 86, 182,

314, 344, 461, 478, 506
Hyderabad, the Nizam of 1 12, 150,
163, 199, 239, 260-1, 296, 308, 326, 369,

513, 525

Hyderabad, Prime Minister of see

CHHATARI

ikramullah, Mohammad, I.C.S., Joint
Secretary, Govt of India, Commerce
Dept 1947 210

ilahi baksh nawaz ali, Pir, Minister
of Education, Health and Local Self-
Government, Sind from 1945 232

INDIAN AMBASSADOR IN NANKING See
MENON, K.P.S.

Ingram, Dr George Skinner, a Church
Missionary Society missionary in United
Provinces, India from 1927 533

inman, 1st Baron cr. 194 6 of Knares-
borough (Philip Albert Inman), Lord
Privy Seal 1947 42

INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE,
PUNJAB See BENNETT

irwin, Major-General Stephen Fenemore,
Indian Army, Deputy Chief of General
Staff, India 1947 210

Isaacs, George Alfred, M.P. (Lab.) for
North Southwark 1929-31 and from
1939; Parliamentary Private Secretary
to the First Lord of the Admiralty 1942-
5; Minister of Labour and National
Service from 1945 42, 443

Ismail, Sir Mirza M., Diwan of Mysore
1926-41; Prime Minister of Jaipur
1941-6; President, Executive Council of
the Nizam of Hyderabad from 1946-7

43

ism ay, 1st Baron cr. 1947 (General
Hastings Lionel Ismay), Chief of
Staff to Minister of Defence 1940-6;
Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff 1947; at
Viceroy’s staff meetings 2, 5, 17, 26,
70, 93, 108, 126, 216, 239, 308, 344, 389,
478, 499; at Viceroy’s miscellaneous

meetings 73, 100, 175; at meetings of
Special Committee of Indian Cabinet
152, 217, 354; at meetings of the
Partition Council 367, 416; provides
Mountbatten with briefs for Conference
speech and talk with Jinnah 3 ; at
meetings with Indian leaders on 2 and 3
June 23, 39, 91; at meeting with the
States Negotiating Committee 43 ; his
talk with Gandhi about Jinnah and the
N.W.F.P. 99, 125, 230, 369; and

replacement of Caroe 106, 108, 114,
148, 161, 182, 211, 223; correspondence
with Monckton about Hyderabad ’affairs
1 12, 261, 296, 326; asks Monteath for
material about Dominion Status 117,
13 1, 149; notes on position of Mount-
batten as a constitutional Governor-
General 123 ; lists advantages of
Hindustan and Pakistan having a com¬
mon Governor-General 123; deputed
to ascertain Jinnah’s wishes about a
Governor-General for Pakistan 126;
dictates note on Mountbatten’s meeting
with Liaquat and Patel 153; corres¬
ponds with Monteath about Mount-
batten’s powers under the draft India
Bill 149, 167, 194; and Andaman and
Nicobar Islands 174, 284; his minute
on withdrawal of British forces 213,
239, 274, 308 ; and composition of troops
in Gurgaon district 234-5, 254> 275;
opposed to reconstruction of Executive
Council 239; holds meeting with
Gandhi, Jinnah and Badshah Khan 242,
253; and Gurkha negotiations 259,
369; makes recommendations about
Berar after discussion with Monckton
and Chhatari 260; his correspondence
with Nehru about the States 264, 288,
297, 340, 355, 403; and question of
showing Indian leaders the draft India
Bill 267 ; and appointment of Governor-
General and Governors 269, 295 ;

reports his long talk with Liaquat on
20 June 275 ; sends Mountbatten draft
replies about amendments to the India
Bill 283-6; and question of Burrows
going into Section 93 291-2, 301; and

998

INDEX OF PERSONS

ism ay {cont):

Baluchistan 298, 308; receives request
from Liaquat for British troops to
remain in Pakistan 275, 307; his views
on proposal for martial law in the
Punjab 328; correspondence with
Moon about the Sikhs 371, 474;
reports his long talk with Jinnah on
28 June 399; and terms of reference for
Boundary Commissions 398-9; in¬
formed of new title for Dominions
Secretary 451; and Jinnah’s wish to
be Governor-General of Pakistan 470,
506, 508, 564; and proposal for joint
administration of Armed Forces in
disputed area 473 ; is sent to London
506-8, 523-4, 551; takes to London
brief on appointment of Mountbatten
as Governor-General of India only
521-2, 557; makes statement at the
India and Burma Committee on the
Governor-General question 564; also
78, 94, 96, 101, 124, 159, 160, 214, 268,
276, 358, 412, 437, 477, 519, 535, 55b,
558, 562-3

iyer, Sir Alladi Krishnaswami see aiyer

jagjivan ram, a Congressman and
President, All-India Depressed Classes
League ; Member, Interim Govt (Labour)
from 2 Sept. 1946 90, 95, 182
j airamd as, Daulatram, journalist of
Hyderabad (Sind); Member, Working
Committee, Indian National Congress
1928-41; General Secretary, Indian
National Congress 193 1-4 7
jayakar, Dr Mukund Ramrao, Judge,
Federal Court of India 1937-9; Member
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council 1939-41 135

jefford, Commodore James Wilfred,
Royal Indian Navy; Flag Officer com¬
manding Pakistan Navy from 1947 210

jenkin, William Norman Prentice,
Deputy Inspector-General of Police,
C.I.D. Punjab 1947 455

jenkins, Sir Evan Meredith, I.C.S.,
Private Secretary to the Viceroy 1943-5 ;
Governor of the Punjab 1946-7; writes
to Mountbatten about the disturbed
state of the Punjab 12; informed of
procedure for ascertaining wishes of
legislature 1 5 ; and disorder in Gurgaon
16, 91, 105, 141, 209, 299, 305, 338-9; on
difficulties of forming a Coalition
Ministry in the Punjab 97, 540; has
talk with Abell on 5 June 98; on
dissatisfaction of the Services 98, 162,
209, 263 ; unwilling to continue as
Governor of either half of the Punjab
after transfer of power 98, 100, 354,
384, 406, 522; reports general situation
in the Punjab unsatisfactory 105; his
request for more troops for Gurgaon
137, I79; and replacement of Brendon at
Gurgaon 141, 299; and Mamdot’s
criticism of the proposed official machin¬
ery for partition 144-5, 162, 169, 180,
219; reports reactions to announcement
of Partition 209; his reply to Nehru’s
attack on British officials 218, 263,
370; his negotiations with party leaders
on partition arrangements 219, 233;
Muslim League’s demand for his recall
305 , 339; Jinnah wants firm statement
from him on suppression of disorder
3 1 1 ; on suggestion for establishment of
neutral zone 316; and proposal for
declaration of martial law 320, 327-8,
338-9, 369; explains nature of the
the disorders in Lahore and Amritsar
339, 383 ; on deterioration of the Services
339; asked to form Standing Security
Committee and to replace officials in
Lahore by men agreed upon by the
parties 343, 357, 416; considers legis¬
lation to provide for summary procedure
339, 383, 426; and question of apointing
two sets of advisers 379, 407, 426;
receives and comments on complaints
by Mamdot 455, 472; and Mamdot’s
resignation from Security Committee
472, 506, 527; reports Partition Council
working well 527; advises against
Radcliffe staying at Government House

INDEX OF PERSONS

999

JENKINS ( cont .):

529; also 2, 28, 82, 124, 152, 306, 344,
352, 367, 39i

jinn ah, Mahomed. Ali, President, All-
India Muslim League 1916, 1920 and from
1934; called Qaid-i-Azam (the Great
Leader); staff meeting decides against
threat to 2; brief for Mountbatten’s
talk with 3 ; invited to Conference of
Leaders 4 ; insists that Calcutta be a free
city 10; at Mountbatten’s meetings
with Indian leaders on 2 and 3 June
23, 27, 39-40, 91; his broadcast 47;
his broadcast objected to by Patel 51;
wants a referendum in Bengal 53, 91 ;
his acceptance of the Partition plan 60 ;
at Viceroy’s meeting on Administrative
Consequences of Partition 73, 100:
and Boundary Commissions 93, 101,
120, 175, 262, 311, 317, 393, 398-9;
Gandhi’s approach to on N.W.F.P. 99,
139, 156, 176-7, 230, 237, 239, 242,
253, 369, 396; and Arbitral Tribunal
101, 175, 3 1 1, 317; his interview with
Mountbatten along with Liaquat on
7 June 101; and appointment of
Governor-General for Pakistan 108,
112, 123, 126, 269, 275, 283, 308, 311,
457, 470-1, 483, 495, 499-500, 506,
508-9, 521-4, 544-5, 548, 564; urged to
prepare list of persons suitable for high
appointments 1 1 3 ; to be informed of
Caroe’s proposed replacement 1 14, 143
rejects view that Hindustan succeeds to
international position of India 115, 188,
244, 270, 420; empowered by League
Council to accept principles of Parti¬
tion plan 127, 129-30, 153, 160, 162; his
views on the position of States 175,
225, 369; and formation of regional
Ministries in Bengal 240, 253, 268,
291-2, 301, 369, 506; and referendum in
Baluchistan 276, 298, 308, 311, 369;
objects to proclamation under Section
93 in Bengal as ultra vires 291-2, 301,
3 1 1 ; and Kashmir 294 ; and Travancore
295 ; and permission to see the draft Bill
308, 311, 397, 411, 424-5, 439; and
withdrawal of British troops 315, 329,

335, 346, 354, 358, 362; protests at
Nehru’s remarks about N.W.F.P.
referendum 319; wants ruthless sup¬
pression of trouble in Lahore and
Amritsar 320, 369, 426; opposed to
idea of free Pathan State 321 ; reported
to want Pakistan to be a one-party
State 339; approves appointment of
Congress Ministers for West Bengal
with right of veto 354, 367; objects
on legal and other grounds to proposed
reconstruction of Interim Government

367, 369, 379, 399,404,412-13, 421, 433,
437, 447, 458, 506, 533, 545; and sug¬
gestion that Radcliffe should be Chair¬
man of Boundary Commissions 368-9 ;
and Gandhi’s proposed visit to Kashmir
385-6; anxious to have Cunningham as
Governor of N.W.F.P. 399; his desire
for a referendum on Purnea 399, 400;
present at meetings of Partition Council
416, 516; his favourable reaction to Bill
452; his choice of Governors 478; not
opposed to Mountbatten remaining
as Governor-General of India 495, 506,
545; addressed by Mountbatten about
the Sikhs 498; his interview with
Mountbatten on 5 July 533 ; objects to
allotment of Andamans to India 5 3 3-4,
536, 548; and lack of provision for
enforcement of arbitral awards 548,
558; his desire for wide powers 550;
also 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 33, 38, 41, 43, 48,
59, 65, 83, 102, 105, 196, 199, 206, 209,
305, 380, 382, 389, 405, 410, 440, 462,

465-6, 484-5, 517, 537, 557

jo witt, 1st Baron cr. 1945 (later 1st
Viscount and 1st Earl; William Allen),
M.P. (Liberal) for the Hartlepools
1922-4; M.P. (Lab.) for Preston 1929-31
and for Ashton-under-Lyne 1939-45;
Lord Chancellor from 1945 42, 59,

118, 135, 182, 186, 189, 224, 244, 265,
322, 347, 360-1, 421, 443, 482

Joyce, Alex Houghton, Adviser on
Publicity at the India Office from 1941;
Principal Information Officer to the
Cabinet Mission 1946 59-60, 78, 84,

108, 464, 542

1000

INDEX OF PERSONS

kak, Rai Bahadur Ram Chandra, Prime
Minister of Kashmir from 1945 43,

229, 294, 319, 369, 385-6, 533
kartar singh, Giani, Member, Punjab
Legislative Assembly; a leader of the
Akali party; collaborator with Master
Tara Singh 22, 91, 178, 371, 417, 474
kashmir, Maharaja of 161, 229, 294,
319, 369, 385-7, 422, 518, 533
katju, Dr Kailas Nath, Advocate;
Member of the United Provinces
Legislative Assembly and of the Con¬
gress Govt in U.P. 1937-9; Minister for
Justice, Industries and Labour, U.P. from

1946 502

kemp, Sir Kenneth McIntyre, Legal
Adviser to the Secretary of State for
India from 1938 404, 421, 465

key, Charles William, M.P. (Lab.) Bow
and Bromley Division of Poplar since
1940; Minister of Works from 1947
421

KHAN BROTHERS see KHAN SAHIB and
GHAFFAR KHAN

khan sahib, Dr, Chief Minister,
N.W.F.P. 1937-9 and from March 1945 ;
half-brother of Abdul Ghaffar Khan 14,
49, 52-3, 61, 65, 81, 91, 108, 114, 126,
136, 148, 170, 306, 309, 442, 475
kher, Bal Gangadhar, Premier of Bombay
1 93 7-9 and from 1946 220

KHIZAR (kHIZr) HAYAT KHAN

tiwana, Nawab Malik Sir, Premier of
the Punjab from Dec. 1942-March

1947 304, 339

killearn, ist Baron cr. 1943 (Miles
Wedderburn Lampson), British Ambas¬
sador to Egypt 1934-46; Special Com¬
missioner in South-East Asia from 1946
470, 478

KING, THE see GEORGE VI
king, William Lyon Mackenzie, Prime
Minister of Canada 1921-6, 1926-30
and from 1935 8, 63, 89, 166, 203, 313,

322, 488, 512, 531, 555
kripalani, Acharya J.B., General Secre¬
tary, Indian National Congress 1934-46;
President, Indian National Congress
from Oct. 1946 4, 6, 22-3, 27, 35,

38-9, 91, 97, 100, 108, 153, 160, 162, 175,
228, 236-7

krishnamachari, Sir Vangal Thiru-
venkatachari, Diwan of Baroda 1927-
44; Prime Minister of Jaipur from 1946
7, 43

LAHORE AREA COMMANDER see BRUCE

laithwaite, Sir (John) Gilbert, Private
Secretary to the Viceroy 1936-43 ;
Assistant Under-Secretary of State,
India Office 1943 ; an Under-Secretary
(Civil) of the War Cabinet 1944-5 ;
Deputy Under-Secretary of State for
Burma 1945-7 32, 121, 133

lari, Zahir-ul-Hasan, Member of the
Legislative Assembly, U.P.; member of
the Council of the All-India Muslim
League 130

lascelles, Sir Alan Frederick, Private
Secretary to the King from 1943 373—

4, 420

latimer, Courtenay Robert, I.C.S.,
Secretary to the Governor, N.W.F.P.
1946-7 541

LEGAL ADVISER TO THE FOREIGN
OFFICE See BECKETT

LEGAL REMEMBRANCER, PUNJAB See
NAWAB SINGH

liaquat(liaqat)ali KHAN,Nawabzada,
General Secretary, All-Indian Muslim
League from 1936; Deputy Leader of
Muslim League Party in the Indian
Legislative Assembly from 1940; Mem¬
ber, Interim Govt (Finance) from 26
Oct. 1946; at Mountbatten’s meetings
with Indian leaders on 2 and 3 June 23,
39, 91; at Viceroy’s miscellaneous

meeting on 5 June on ‘Administrative
Consequences of Partition’ 73 ; at
meetings of Indian Cabinet 95, 338,
493 ; at Viceroy’s miscellaneous meeting
of 7 June 100; at meetings of Special
Committee of Indian Cabinet 152,
217, 354, 546; at Viceroy’s miscellaneous
meeting on 13 June regarding States
175; at meetings of the Partition

INDEX OF PERSONS

1001

LIAQUAT A LI KHAN (cont) :

Council 367, 416, 516; his correspond¬
ence with Mountbatten about Gurgaon
disorders 11, 16; and Boundary Com¬
missions 93, 101, 275, 393, 398-9;
and Arbitral Tribunal 101, 275, 281;
has interview with Mountbatten on 7
7 June along with Jinnah and Nishtar
101; and League Council’s resolution of
9 June 127, 130, 153, 162; and replace¬
ment of Caroe 143 ; complains to
Mountbatten about Punjab appoint¬
ments to expert partition committees
145 ; did not wish to debate Hindustan’s
taking title of India 202, 405; seeks
assistance of Military in establishing
Karachi as Pakistan capital 231, 275;
bis request for more Muslim troops in
Gurgaon 232, 254, 275; and recon¬
struction of Executive Council 239,

379, 437, 545, 549, 5575 and appoint¬
ment of Governors and Governor-
General 269, 275, 509, 521-3, 544', has
long talk with Ismay on 20 June 275 ;
wants British troops to remain in
Pakistan 275, 307; invited to study
draft Indian Independence Bill 308,
397; bis views on disorders in Lahore
343; also 2, 4, 12, 26, 53, 98, 126, 270,
253, 369, 495, 506

Linlithgow, 2nd Marquess of (Victor
Alexander John Hope), Viceroy and
Governor-General of India 1936-43
112, 550

listowel, 5 tb Earl of (William Francis
Hare), Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State for India and Burma 1944-5;
Postmaster-General 1945-7; Secretary
of State for India and Burma from 23
April 1947 See note at head of this
Index.

lloyd, Sir Thomas Ingram Kynaston,
Permanent Under-Secretary of State
for the Colonies from 1947 132, 165

lo chia-lun, Dr, Chinese Ambassador
to India from 1947 91

lockhart, Lieutenant-General Sir Rob
McGregor Macdonald, Indian Army,
Military Secretary, India Office 1941-3;

Deputy Chief of General Staff, India
1944-5 ; Army Commander, India 1945-
7; Acting Governor of N.W.F.P. 26
June-13 Aug. 1947 96, 106, 108, 1 14,
142-3, 148, 154, 162, 181, 211, 223, 227,
308, 310, 342, 399, 422, 475, 496, 518
lothian, Sir Arthur Cunningham, I.C.S.,
Resident, Hyderabad 1942-Nov. 194b
478

lowis, Ross Henry Donald, Indian
Political Service, Secretary to Governor,
N.W.F.P. 1947 136, 170

luke, Stephen Elliot Vyvyan, Under¬
secretary, Cabinet Office from 1947
31-2, 118, 121, 244, 265, 347, 360, 421,
465, 486, 564

lyne, Major-General Lewis Owen,
Director of Staff Duties, War Office
from 1946 337, 388

macdonald, Malcolm John, U.K. High
Commissioner in Canada 1941-6;
Governor-General of Malaya and
British Borneo 1946-8 121

mc grig or, Vice-Admiral Sir Rhoderick
Robert, Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff
from 1945 221, 362

machtig, Sir Eric Gustav, Permanent
Under-Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs from 1940 89 fn, 117, 13 1

macmillan, (Maurice) Harold, M.P.
(Con.) for Bromley from 1945 ; Secre¬
tary for Air 1945 360, 375

mcneil, Hector, M.P. (Lab.) for Burgh
of Greenock from 1941; Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State, Foreign
Office 1945-6; Minister of State from
1946 182, 443

mahajan, Mehr Chand, Judge of the
High Court, Punjab from 1943; Mem¬
ber of the Punjab Boundary Commis¬
sion 207, 262, 415

mah bub ali khan, Nawab Sheikh,
Political Agent, Malakand 1946 310

MAHMUD (mahmood), Mir Maqbool,
Director, Secretariat of the Chamber of
Princes 43

1002

INDEX OF PERSONS

majumdar (mazumdar), Maulavi
Abdul Matlib, Minister for Agriculture,
Assam from 1946 86

malaya, Governor-General of see

MACDONALD

mamdot, Iftikhar Husain Khan, Nawab
of, Member of the Punjab Legislative
Assembly; President of the Punjab
Provincial Muslim League; Member,
Muslim League Working Committee
97, 144-5, 162, 169, 180, 209, 219, 233,
304-6, 327, 339, 426, 455, 472, 502, 527

mandal, Jogindar Nath, Minister, Judi¬
cial, Works and Buildings, Bengal 1946;
Member, Interim Govt (Law) from
26 Oct. 1946 23, 95, 319
manki, Pir of, Member of the Council
of the All-India Muslim League 130

matthai, Dr John, Professor of Indian
Economics, Madras University 1922-5;
Member, and later President, Indian
TariffBoard 1925*34; Director-General,
Commercial Intelligence and Statistics
1935-40; joined Tata Son Ltd 1940, a
Director 1944; Member, Interim Govt
for Finance from 2 Sept, and for
Industries and Supplies from 26 Oct.
1946, and for Transport and Railways
from 13 Jan. 1947 95, 338, 493, 546

maxwell, Sir Reginald Maitland, I.C.S.,
Home Member, Viceroy’s Executive
Council 1938-44; an Adviser to the
Secretary of State 1944-7 550
mayhew, Christopher Paget, M.P. (Lab.)
for South Norfolk from 1945; Parlia¬
mentary Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs from 1945 32, 12 1,

244, 265, 347, 421, 486, 564

mazhar ismail, Member of the Council
of the All-India Muslim League 130

med hi, Srijut Bishnarain, Minister of
Finance and Revenue, Assam from
1946 86

mehr chand khanna, Member,
N.W.F.P. Legislative Assembly; joined
the Indian National Congress 1945;
Finance Minister, N.W.F.P. from 1946

65

mellor, Andrew, Correspondent in
Delhi of the Daily Herald 1947 66

men on, Kumar Padma Sivasankara,
I.C.S, Indian Ambassador to China
from 1947 395

me non, Rao Bahadur Vapal Pangunni,
Reforms Commissioner to the Govt of
India from 1942 and also Secretary to the
Governor-General (Public) 1945-6; at
at Viceroy’s staff meetings 2, 17, 26,
70, 108, 126, 216, 239, 308, 344, 499, 545 ;
unsigned note by 20; advises employ¬
ment of British military officers for
referendum in N.WF.P. 49; and
question of uniformity of British
agreements with India and Pakistan 5 3 ;
99; his valuable help to Mountbatten
78; called in to Viceroy’s miscellaneous
meeting on 7 June 100; prepares draft
legislation enabling two Dominions to
have one Governor-General 123, 126;
his paper on reconstituting the Council
200, 339, 506; and international status
of new India 202; exchanges with
Turnbull regarding supplementary com¬
ments on India Bill 255, 280, 286, 290,
348, 550; on Baluchistan referendum
276, 308; his paper on arrangements for
the government of Bengal 306, 308;
his views on proposed ‘neutral zone’ in
Punjab 316; and destruction of con¬
fidential records 341; appointed Secre¬
tary of States Ministry 369; and draft
Standstill Agreement proposed for
circulation by Nehru 403 ; and Chitta¬
gong Hill Tracts 430; used by Mount-
batten as contact with Patel 458;
holds Press Conference on India Bill
542 ; drafts statement on the States 545 ;
also 55, 69, 80, 91, 93, 147, 201, 214, 249,
269, 293, 295, 319, 379, 397, 418, 429,
446, 473

me non, Vengalil Krishnan Krishna,
Secretary, India League 1929-47;
Borough Councillor, St Pancras 1934-7;
Special Representative of the Govt of
India at U.N.O. General Assembly
1946-7; High Commissioner for India
in the United Kingdom from Aug. 1947

INDEX OF PERSONS

1003

men on, Vengalil Krishnan Krishna

(cent.) :

58, 69-70, 80, 93, 182, 200-1, 436, 458,
502, 506

messervy, Lieutenant-General Sir Frank
Walter, Indian Army, G.O. C.-in-C.
Northern Command, India since 1946
12, 98, 209, 254, 275

mieville, Sir Eric Charles, Private
Secretary to the Viceroy 1931-6;
Private Secretary to the Duke of York
1936; Assistant Private Secretary to
King George VI, 1937-45; Principal
Secretary to the Viceroy from March
1947; at Viceroy’s staff meetings 2,
5, 17, 26, 70, 93, 108, 126, 216, 239, 308,
344, 499, 545 ; at Viceroy’s miscellaneous
meetings 73, 100, 175; at meetings of
Special Committee of Indian Cabinet
152, 217, 354; at meetings of Partition
Council 367, 516; at meetings with
Indian leaders on 2 and 3 June 23, 39,
91; at meeting with States Negotiating
Committee 43 ; records note on Ismay’s
meeting with Jinnah, Gandhi and
Badshah Khan 25 3 ; makes joint recom¬
mendation with Ismay about Berar
260; at Mountbatten’s meeting with
Jinnah on 23 June about Governor-
General for Pakistan, Boundary Com¬
missions etc. 3 1 1, 398; vainly tries to
get letter from Jinnah about ‘supreme
arbitrator’ 521, 523; also 94, 96, 101,
124, 157, 275, 495, 506, 557

miles, Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey John
Audley, Commander-in-Chief, Royal
Indian Navy from 1946 210, 506

MILLIT ARY SECRETARY TO THE VICE¬
ROY see CURRIE

mills, Air Commodore George Holroyd,
Director of Plans, Air Ministry 1946-8
187

MINISTER AT KABUL see SQUIRE

mitter, Sir Brojendra Lai, Advocate-
General of India 1937-45; Diwan of
Baroda from 1945 7, 43

MOHAMAD (MUHAMMAD, MAHOMED)

a li, Financial Adviser, Military Finance
1946-7 152, 162, 210, 216-17, 308,

354, 367, 397, 4i6, 463, 499, 506, 516,
521

mohammad naim, Sardar, Afghan
Minister in London from 1946 212,
272, 453, 486

monckton, Sir Walter Turner (later
1st Viscount), Director-General, Minis¬
try of Information 1940-41 ; Solicitor-
General 1945; advised Govt of Hydera¬
bad on constitutional matters 108, 112,
123, 126, 150, 168, 199, 216, 239, 249,
260-1, 296, 308, 326, 369, 399
M o n t e A T h, Sir David T aylor, Permanent
Under-Secretary of State for India and
Burma 1941-7, for Burma 1947 32,

106, 117, 121, 131-3, 149, 165, 167-8,
174, 182, 186, 194, 211, 244, 261, 265-6,
308

MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN, ISt VisCOUnt
(Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Mont¬
gomery), Chief of the Imperial General
Staff from 1946 161, 173, 259, 315,

329, 330-2, 335, 337, 347, 354, 358, 369,
388, 511

mookerjee, Baidyanath, a Member of
the Council of Ministers, Assam from
1945 86

moon, Edward Penderel, I.C.S. 1929-44
(resigned) ; Secretary, Development

Board, Govt of India 1946-7; Revenue
and Public Works Minister, Bahawalpur
State from April 1947 371, 474
moore, Sir Henry Monck-Mason, Gov¬
ernor and C.-in-C. Ceylon 1944-8 12 1

morley, Alexander Francis, appointed to
India Office 1930; seconded to Ministry
of Aircraft Production 1940-2; Assistant
Secretary in Burma Office 1945-7 32

Morrison, Herbert Stanley, M.P. (Lab.)
for Hackney (South); Home Secretary
and Minister of Home Security 1940-5;
Lord President of the Council and
Leader of the House of Commons from
1945 31, 42, 118, 322, 361, 443

mountbatten Viscountess Edwina,
wife of Viscount Mountbatten 88, 176,
227, 281, 299, 319, 330, 369, 506, 524,
545

1004

INDEX OF PERSONS

mountbatten, Rear-Admiral Viscount
(Lord Louis Francis Albert Victor
Nicholas), Viceroy of India March-
Aug. 1947. see note at head of this Index.
mudaliar, Diwan Bahadur Sir A.
Ramaswamy, Member for Commerce,
Viceroy’s Executive Council 1939-42;
for Supply 1943-6; President, U.N.
Economic and Social Council 1946-7;
Diwan of Mysore from 1946 43, 94
mudie, Sir (Robert) Francis, I.C.S., Home
Member, Viceroy’s Executive Council
1944-5; Governor of Sind 1946-7 15,

104

MUHAMMAD (MOHAMMAD) MUNIR,

Judge of the High Court, Punjab from
1942; Member of the Punjab Boundary
Commission 317, 415
mukherji, Bijan Kumar, Judge of the
High Court, Calcutta from 1936;
Member of the Bengal Boundary
Commission 207, 262, 415
mumtaz hasan, Indian Audit and
Accounts Service, Deputy Secretary,
Govt of India Finance Dept 1946-7 210
m UN shi, Kanhialal Maneklal, Home
Minister, Bombay 1937-9; resigned
from Congress July 1941; Member,
Constituent Assembly 7, 408, 41 1
murrie, William Stuart, Deputy Secre¬
tary (Civil), Cabinet Office 1947 31,

118

najibullah khan, member of Afghan
Foreign Office 309

nanak, Guru (1469-1539) the first of the
line of Gurus who formulated the
Sikh faith 417

narahari rao, Vyakarana, Indian
Audit Dept, Secretary, Govt of India,
Finance Dept 1946-7 210
narain, Jai Prakash, Founder and some¬
time General Secretary of the Congress
Socialist Party; Member, Congress
Working Committee 1946-7 126

nawab singh, Sardar, I.C.S., Legal
Remembrancer, Punjab 1946-7 180

N A wan A gar, Maharaja Jam Sahib of,
Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes
1937-44 43, 94

nazimuddin, Khawja Sir, Member,
Working Committee, All-India Muslim
League; Chief Minister of Bengal 1943-
5 289

negi, Hayat Singh, Indian Audit and
Accounts Service, Deputy Financial
Adviser, Finance Dept (Supply) 1945-7
210

nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal, President,
Indian National Congress 1929-30,
1936, 1937 and 1946; Member, Interim
Govt (External Affairs and Common¬
wealth Relations) from 2 Sept 1946; not
agreeable to independence of Bengal 2,
6; asked by Mountbatten to broadcast

3, 18, 23; requests Mountbatten to
invite Kripalani to conference of leaders

4, 91; Listowel’s comments on his

interview with Norman Cliff 6; and
means of ascertaining wishes of people
of Baluchistan 9, 17, 276, 308; has
conversation with Jenkins 12, 26; at
Mountbatten’s meetings with Indian
leaders on 2 and 3 June 23, 27, 39-40,
91; his broadcast 46; presses for
Caroe’s removal 61 ; his complaints
about the working of the Political
Department 67-8, 73-4, 94, no, 146,
175; and possible visit to Kashmir 69-
70, 385-7; at meeting on ‘Administrative
Consequences of Partition’ 73, 100;
his claim that Hindustan succeeds to
India’s international position 76, 115,
126, 188, 202, 244, 256, 270; his views on
Partition Councils 80, 93 ; and recon¬
stitution of Interim Government 80,
93, 200, 239, 379, 412, 421, 448-9, 458,
489, 506-7; and independent Pathanistan
81, 369; renews request for Caroe’s
removal 91, 148, at meetings of Indian
Cabinet 95 , 3 3 8 , 493 ; and appointment
of Mountbatten as Governor-General,
India 108, 308, 483, 521-4; sends

Mountbatten a note on Paramountcy
1 1 1 ; his proposal for a States Department
109, 175, 238, 264, 288, 297, 338, 355;

INDEX OF PERSONS

1005

NEHRU (1 cont .):

his desire to see draft India Bill 115-16,
132, 193, 244, 392, 397, 408, 411, 424,
435-6, 438-9; opposed to idea of com¬
plete independence of States 124, 175;
and Boundary Commissions 124, 128,
158, 162, 175, 207, 262; complains that
Muslim League Council has not accepted
Partition Plan 129, 161; and Arbitral
Tribunal 157, 175; on Thar Parkar
and Purnea districts 158, 399; threatens
resignation at Cabinet Meeting 162;
and question of Gurkhas 173, 259, 315,
330, 332, 337, 369, 388; his criticism of
British officials at AICC meeting 215,
218, 263, 369, 370; sends Mountbatten
a note on Kashmir 229, 242; informed
that Caroe is proceeding on leave 237;
and position of Berar 239, 260, 525 ; his
strong feelings on Kashmir 294; and
Tranvancore’s claim to independence
295 ; and disorders in Lahore and Amrit¬
sar 300, 320, 328, 338, 343, 369;
invited to see draft Bill 308; discusses
Kashmir at interview with Mountbatten
319; his discussions with Montgomery
315, 330-2, 335, 337, 354, 369, 388; and
withdrawal of British troops 315, 331,

335, 337, 34C 354, 358, 362, 369, 388,
5 1 1 ; sends Ismay draft ‘standstill’ agree¬
ment with States 340, 403; his sug¬
gestions regarding India Bill 356, 535;
and Chittagong Hill areas 430; and
joint control of disputed areas in Punjab
456, 473 ; gives names of Provincial
Governors 461-2, 478, 506; and

position of Sikhs 497, 547; wants

Slim as Commander-in-Chief India
519, 564; also 7, 35, 41, 43, 48-9, 53, 58,
60, 78, 97-8, 112, 139, 141, 182, 196,
206, 236, 310, 339, 365, 373, 423, 450,
495, 501-2, 505, 528, 537

Nepal, Maharajadhiraja of 259, 337

nicholls, Commander George, R.N.,
Deputy Personal Secretary to Lord
Mountbatten from March 1947 178,

542, 545

nishtar, Sardar Abdur Rab Khan,
Member, Legislative Assembly

N.W.F.P. from 1937; Finance Minister,
N.W.F.P. 1943-5; Member, Interim
Govt (Posts and Air) from 26 Oct. 1946;
Member, Working Committee, All-
India Muslim League 23, 27, 39, 73,
91, 95, 100— 1 , 152, 162, 175, 217, 309,

338, 354, 369, 379, 549

noel-baker, Philip J., M.P. (Lab.) for
Derby from 1936; Secretary of State for
Air 1946-7 42

noon, Malik Sir Firoz (Feroz) Khan,
Member for Defence, Viceroy’s Execu¬
tive Council 1942-5; Indian repre¬
sentative, British War Cabinet 1944-5
305, 339, 37i

nye, Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald
Edward, Vice-Chief of the Imperial
General Staff 1941-6; Governor of
Madras 1946-8 461-2, 471, 478, 506,

522, 557, 564

osman ali, Shujat, I.C.S., Deputy
Secretary, Viceroy’s Executive Council
from 1946 95, 217, 338, 354, 416, 493,
5id

pandit, Shrimati Vijaya Lakshmi (wife
of Ranjit S. Pandit), sister of Jawaharlal
Nehru; Minister of Local Government
and Health, U.P. 1937-9 and from
1946; Leader of Indian Delegation to
U.N. General Assembly 1946-7 162

panikkar, Kavalam Madhava, Prime
Minister of Bikaner from 1944 43,
446, 484

pant, Pandit Govind Ballabh, Premier of
U.P. 1937-9 and from 1946; Member,
Working Committee, Indian National
Congress 7

patel, Hiralal Muljibhai, I.C.S., Secretary,
Viceroy’s Executive Council 1947 95,
152, 162, 210, 217, 338, 354, 367, 372,
397, 416, 493, 516, 546

ioo6

INDEX OF PERSONS

patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai Jhaverbhai,
Member, Working Committee, Indian
National Congress; President of Con¬
gress 1931; Chairman, Congress Parlia¬
mentary Sub-Committee 1935-9; Mem¬
ber, Interim Govt (Home) from 2 Sept.
1946; at Mountbatten’s meetings with
Indian leaders on 2 and 3 June 23, 39,
91; at Viceroy’s miscellaneous meeting
on 5 June on ‘Administrative Conse¬
quences of Partition’ 73 ; at meetings of
Indian Cabinet 95, 338, 493; at Vice¬
roy’s miscellaneous meeting on 7 June
100; at meetings of Special Committee
of Indian Cabinet 152, 217, 354, 546; at
Viceroy’s miscellaneous meeting on 13
June regarding States 175; at meetings
of Partition Council 367, 416, 516;
suspected of wanting to use troops in
the Punjab to suppress the Muslims 12 ;
unsigned note on his views 20; takes
the Chair at Mountbatten’s meeting
with the Press 50, 59; complains of
Jinnah’s broadcast 51; sees no point in
reconstructing the Interim Goverment
70 ; critical of Muslim League Council’s
resolution 130, 153, 161-2; sends

Mountbatten copy of Muslim League
Council’s proceedings 130, 162; com¬
plains of conduct and asks for transfer of
Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon 141;
V.P. Menon’s influence with 147; and
reconstitution of Executive Council 200,
239, 379, 421, 437, 458, 500, 506; does
not intend to appeal to British officials
to stay on 215; and Arbitral Tribunal
275, 281, 516; put in charge of new
‘States Department’ 288, 338, 369;
invited to study draft of Indian Inde¬
pendence Bill 308, 397, 435; his views
on breakdown of order in Lahore 343,
369; and financial liability for compen¬
sation to Secretary of State’s officers
359, 493; and provision of printing
press for Pakistan 369; stresses import¬
ance of showing draft Indian Independ¬
ence Bill to Gandhi 41 1, 423; and
appointment of Mountbatten as Gover¬
nor-General of the Dominion of India

521-4, 564; and negotiations with the
Nizam 525; his statement on the
States 528, also 2, 4, 7, 11, 53, 78, 108,
124, 209, 218, 249, 339, 401, 403, 417,
446, 449, 513, 542, 550, 561
patiala, Maharaja of, Pro-Chancellor of
the Chamber of Princes 1946-7 and
officiating Chancellor from June 1947
43, 538

Patrick, Sir Paul Joseph, Assistant
Under-Secretary of State, India Office
from 1941 206

perry-keene, Air Vice-Marshal Allan
Lancelot Addison, Air Officer in charge
Administration, Air H.Q., India 1946-7
210

Perth, 1 6th Earl of (James Eric Drum¬
mond), British Ambassador to Italy
T93 3— 9 > Deputy Leader of Liberal
Party in House of Lords from 1946 78
pethick-lawrence, 1st Baron cr. 1945
(Frederick William Pethick-Lawrence),
Secretary of State for India and Burma
1:945-7; Member of the Cabinet Mission
to India 103, 192, 281, 525
pill ai, Sir (Narayana) Raghavan, I.C.S.,
Secretary, Govt of India, Commerce
Dept from 1942 338, 493

POLITICAL ADVISER See CORFIELD
POLITICAL OFFICER IN SIKKIM See
HOPKINSON

poult on, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry
Mortimer, Indian Political Service;
Resident for Central India 1947 478
prasad, Dr Rajendra, President, Indian
National Congress 1934 and 1939;
Member, Working Committee, Indian
National Congress; Member, Interim
Govt (Agriculture and Food) from 2
Sept. 1946; President of the Constituent
Assembly 95, 130, 152, 162, 171,

217, 338, 354, 367, 369, 379, 416, 493,
516

PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS See KRIPALANI
PRIME MINISTER, AUSTRALIA see
CHIFLEY

PRIME MINISTER, HYDERABAD See
ISMAIL OY CHHATARI

INDEX OF PERSONS

1007

PRIME MINISTER, KASHMIR see KAK

PRIME MINISTER, NEW ZEALAND see
FRASER

PRIME MINISTER, UNION OF SOUTH
Africa see SMUTS

prior, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Charles
Geoffrey, Indian Political Service,
Political Resident, Persian Gulf 1939-46;
A.G.G. Baluchistan 1946-7 9, 17, 26,
276, 308

PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE VICEROY
see ABELL

puran singh, notorious Punjab dacoit
12

queen, H.M. The (Elizabeth, wife of
George VI) 222, 241
qureshi, Shuaib, Minister in Bhopal
State 1932-48 427

radcliffe, Lady, wife of Sir Cyril
Radcliffe

510

radcliffe, Sir Cyril John, Director-
General, Ministry of Information 1941-
5; Vice-Chairman, General Council of
Bar from 1946; Chairman, Punjab and
Bengal Boundary Commissions 1947
182, 186, 224, 275, 281, 311, 354, 368-9,

378, 503, 5io, 529

rahman (rehman), Shaikh Abdur,
I.C.S., Acting Judge of the High Court,
Punjab from 1946; Member of the
Punjab Boundary Commission 317,
397, 415, 521

RAJA GOP ALA CHARI (-RIA, -RIAR and the
abbreviation rajaji), Chakra varti,

Prime Minister of Madras 1937-9*,
resigned from the Working Committee,
Indian National Congress April 1942;
Member, Interim Govt for Industries
and Supplies from 2 Sept. 1946, for
Education and Arts from 26 Oct. 1946
and for Industries and Supplies from
13 Jan. 1947 95, 106, hi, 130, 146,
281, 303, 338, 459, 493
ramamurty, Sir Sonti Venkata, I.C.S.,

Adviser to Governor of Madras 1943-6;
Acting Governor of Bombay 1947 90,
281

rance, Major-General Sir Hubert Elvin,
Director of Civil Affairs, Burma 1945-6;
Governor of Burma 1946-8 29, 78,

368, 505

ran ga chari, m.v., Indian Audit and
Accounts Service, Deputy Secretary,
Finance Dept 1945-7 210

rao, p.v.r., I.C.S., Joint Secretary, Home
Dept 1947 210, 346

rat nam, Sambamarthi Ayyar, Indian
Audit and Accounts Service, Deputy
Secretary, Finance Dept 1945-7 210

rau (rao), Sir Benegal Narsinga, I.C.S.,
Puisne Judge, High Court, Bengal
1938-44; Prime Minister, Kashmir
1944-5; on special duty in Governor-
General’s Secretariat (Reforms) 1945-6;
Constitutional Adviser to the Constitu¬
ent Assembly of India from July 1946
397, 408, 559

rees, Major-General Thomas Wynford,
Indian Army, Commander, 4th Indian
Division 1945-7 12

REFORMS COMMISSIONER see MENON,
V.P.

RESIDENT, KASHMIR See WEBB

RESIDENT, MADRAS STATES See EDWARDS

rowan, Thomas Leslie, Assistant and
later Principal Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister 1941-7 563

Rowlands, Sir Archibald, Adviser to the
Viceroy on War Administration 1943-
5 ; Finance Member, Viceroy’s Executive
Council 1945-6; Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Supply from 1946; Financial
and Economic adviser to Governor-
General, Pakistan Aug. -Dec. 1947 168,

399

r owl att, John, one of the Parliamentary
Counsel to the Treasury from 1937 25,
134, 244, 265, 347, 419, 421, 465, 486,
550

roy, Dr Bidhan Chandra, Vice-Chancellor
Calcutta University 1942-4; sometime
Member, Working Committee, Indian
National Congress 182

io o8

INDEX OF PERSONS

roy, Kiran Sankar (Shankar), Member,
Bengal Legislative Assembly since 1923
and leader of the Opposition from 1937
33, 77, 91, 240, 268, 289, 395
rudra, Brigadier Ajit Anil, Indian Army,
4/1 5th Punjab Regiment 388
rugby, 1st Baron cr. 1947 of Rugby
(John Loader Maffey), U.K. Representa¬
tive to Eire since 1939 482
rumbold, Horace Algernon Fraser,
Assistant Secretary, India Office 1943-7;
Assistant Secretary, Commonwealth
Relations Office 1947 265

s a char, Lala Bbim Sen, Finance Min¬
ister, Punjab Mar. 1946-Mar. 1947 97,
209, 219, 233, 305, 339, 426, 455, 472,
540

sachdev, Mulk Raj, I.C.S., Secretary,
Civil Supplies Department, Punjab from
1946 97, 144-5, 219, 233
sadiq hassan, Businessman of Amritsar
and keen Muslim Leaguer 426
saeed alam khan, Nawabzada Mir,
Indian Political Service, District and
Sessions Judge, Rajputana, Baroda,
Western India and Gujarat State
Agencies 1944-7 146
Salisbury, 5 tli Marquess of (Robert
Arthur James Gascoyne-Cecil), Secre¬
tary of State for Dominion Affairs
1943-5; Leader of the House of Lords
1942-5 78, 261, 375

samin jan khan, Muslim League leader
in the N.W.F.P. 14, 65
samuel, 1st Viscount cr. 1937 (Herbert
Louis Samuel), Liberal Leader, House
of Lords from 1944 375

savory, Lieutenant-General Reginald
Arthur, Adjutant-General, India 1946-7
182, 265

sco ones, General Sir Geoffry Allen
Percival, G.O.C.-in-C., Central Com¬
mand, India 1945-6; Principal Staff
Officer to the Secretary of State for
India 1947 132, 265, 329

scott, Charles Peter, I.C.S., Assistant

Private Secretary to the Viceroy from
1946 59, 146, 301

scott, Ian Dixon, I.C.S., Deputy Private
Secretary to the Viceroy 1945-7 2, 5,
17, 20, 26, 70, 93, 108, 126, 137, 146,
302, 308, 341, 344, 389, 394, 401, 478,
499, 529, 545

scott, Sir Leslie Frederic, M.P. (Con.)
Liverpool Exchange 1910-29; Solicitor-
General 1922; a Lord Justice of Appeal
1935-48 281

SECRETARY TO THE CABINET S€C BROOK

sen, Sardar D.K., Chief Minister, Mandi
I93 3—9 ; Foreign Minister, Patiala 1929-
32 and 1939-45 43

sen, Dr Sarendra Nath, Keeper of the
Records of the Govt of India from 1939;
Director of Archives 146
senanayake, Don Stephen, Leader of
State Council and Vice-Chairman,
Board of Ministers, Ceylon from 1942
121

shah nawaz, Begum, Parliamentary
Secretary (Education and Public Health),
Punjab 1937-43 12

shaukat hyat khan, Captain Sardar,
Minister of Public Works, Punjab
1943-4; a son of Sir Sikander Hyat
Khan 339

shaw cross, Sir Hartley William, M.P.
(Lab.) for St Helens from 1945; Attor¬
ney-General from 1945 350, 419

shin well, Emanuel, M.P. (Lab.) for
Seaham Division of Durham from 193 5 ;
Minister of Fuel and Power 1945-7 42,
322, 361, 443

shoaib, Mohammad, Financial Adviser,
Military Finance 1947 210
shone, Sir Terence Allen, British High
Commissioner in India from Nov. 1946
91-2, 126, 147, 173, 182, 259, 315, 318,

334, 337, 388, 526, 556
shoobert, Sir (Wilfred) Harold, I.C.S.,
Secretary, Govt of India, Dept of
Communications from 1946 493

SIKKIM, POLITICAL OFFICER IN SCC
HOPKINSON

simon, 1st Viscount cr. 1940 (John Allse-
brook Simon), Lord Chancellor 1940-

INDEX OF PERSONS

1009

simon (cont):

5 ; Chairman of Indian Statutory Com¬
mission 1927-30 375, 562
Simpson, Lieutenant-General Sir Frank
Ernest Wallace, Vice-Chief of Imperial
General Staff 1946-8 315, 329, 358,

362

simp son, John Alexander, Joint Secretary,
Military Dept, India Office from 1934
25, 244, 265

singh A, Diwan Bahadur S.P., Speaker,
Punjab Legislative Assembly 1946-7

304

sit aram ayya, Dr B. Pattabhi Bhagaraja,
Member, Working Committee, Indian
National Congress 1940-6 7
slim, General (later Field Marshal;
1st Viscount cr. i960) Sir William
Joseph, G.O.C.-in-C., 14th Army 1943-
5, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land
Forces, S.E. Asia 1945-6; Commandant,
Imperial Defence College 1946-7 91,
478, 519

smith, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur
Francis, G.O.C. Eastern Command,
India 1945-6; Chief of the General
Staff, India and Deputy C.-in-C. 1946-7
2, 137, 159, 210, 213-14, 217, 234-5, 239,
254, 275, 477

smuts, Field Marshal Jan Christiaan,
Prime Minister, Union of South Africa
from 1939 63, 66, 87, 166, 203, 313,

372, 53 L 555

spence, Sir George Hemming, I.C.S.,
Secretary, Govt of India Legislative
Department 1935-47; on special duty
in Reforms Secretariat June-Aug. 1947
102, 108, 214, 239, 255, 267, 290
spens, Sir (William) Patrick, M.P. (Con.)
for Ashford, Kent 1933-43; Chief
Justice of India 1943-7 28, 100, 108,
175, 369, 380, 478, 506, 516, 562
squire, Sir Giles Frederick, I.C.S.,
Minister to Afghanistan 1943-7 I4°,

212, 272, 309, 377, 395, 453, 493, 517
s riniv as an (sreeniv as an), M. A., Min¬
ister for Agriculture, Mysore 1945-6;
Vice-President, Executive Council,
Gwalior 1947 43, 94

Stanley, Oliver Frederick George, M.P.
(Con.) for Westmoreland 1924-45 and
for Bristol West from 1945; Secretary
of State for the Colonies I942~5 375

Stapleton, Group Captain Deryck
Cameron, Assistant Secretary (Air),
War Cabinet Offices 1945-6; Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee from 1947
186, 221

Stephenson, Sir John Everard, Deputy
Under-Secretary of State, Dominions
Office from 1940 122, 134

stevens, Captain John Felgate, R.N.,
Director of Plans, Admiralty 1946-7
187

s tim son, Robert, BBC’s special cor¬
respondent in India 1947 66
stork, Herbert Cecil, I.C.S., Secretary,
Legislative Dept and Legal Remem¬
brancer, Assam from 1946 506

strachey, Evelyn John St Loe, M.P.
(Lab.) for Dundee from 1945; Minister
of Food from 1946 42, 251, 265, 281,
322, 361, 443

suhrawardy, Huseyn Shaheed, Chief
Minister and Home Minister, Bengal
from 1946 2, 10, 17-18, 33, 54, 77, 9L
182, 240, 253, 268, 289, 291-2, 301-2,
306, 308, 336, 506

sultan ahmed, Syed Sir, Law Member,
Viceroy’s Executive Council 1 941-3;
Member for Information and Broad¬
casting 1943-5; Adviser to the Chamber
of Princes from 1945 43

sundaram, Kuther Vaidyanatha Kalyan,
I.C.S., Joint Secretary, Legislative Dept,
Govt of India from 1945 and also
Officer on Special Duty, Secretariat of
the Governor-General (Reforms) from
1946 201, 239, 290, 316, 415, 430, 478
sunder (sundar) singh, Chaudhri,
Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly

344

swaran singh, Sardar, Minister of
Development, Punjab from Sept. 1946-
Mar. 1947 12, 97, 144, 209, 219, 233,

305, 339, 426, 455, 472, 503, 540

1010

INDEX OF PERSONS

tara singh, Master, Leader of the Akali
Sikhs 12, 22, 6o, 72, 100, 371
tarzi, Sardar, Afghan Minister in
Nanking 1947 395

tedder, 1st Baron cr. 1946 of Glenguin
(Arthur William Tedder), Marshal of
the Royal Air Force; Chief of the Air
Staff from 1946 362
teja singh, Sardar, Judge of the High
Court, Lahore from 1943; Member of
the Punjab Boundary Commission 12,
207, 262, 415

templewood, 1st Viscount cr. 1944 of
Chelsea (Sir Samuel John Gurney
Hoare), M.P. (Con.) for Chelsea 1910-
44; Secretary of State for India 193 1-5;
British Ambassador to Spain 1940-4
375, 525

thakin nu, Vice-President of AFPFL
1945-7; President of Constituent Assem¬
bly, Burma 1947; Prime Minister, July
1947 121

Thompson, Dr Edward, author and
sometime missionary, Bankura College,
Bengal 124

Thompson, Joseph Herbert, I.C.S.,
Resident, Punjab States 1945-7; 011
special duty Political Department 1947
22, 108

tin tut, Maung, I.C.S., (resigned)
Adviser for Reconstruction to Burma
Govt in Exile 1942-5; Member for
Finance and Revenue in Governor’s
Council 1947 121

Tomlinson, George, M.P. (Lab.) for
Farnworth Division of Lancashire from
1938; Minister of Works 1945-7;
Minister of Education from 1947 42,
322, 361, 443

travancore, Maharaja of 226
t r 1 v e d 1, Sir Chandulal Madhavlal,
I.C.S., Secretary, Govt of India, War
Department 1942-6; Governor of
Orissa 1946-7 216-17, 239, 354, 369,
372, 416, 462, 464, 478, 506
trotsky, Lev Davidovich (1879-1940),
real name Bronstein, Russian revolu¬
tionary leader 91, 458
Turnbull, Francis Fearon, Private

Secretary to the Secretary of State for
India 1941-6; Secretary to the Cabinet
Mission to India 1946; Assistant Secre¬
tary, Political Dept, India Office from
Aug. 1946 25, 55, 76, 115, 122,

132-4, 189, 214, 244, 249, 255-6, 265-6,
280, 282, 286, 290, 347, 351, 353, 360,
373, 421, 486, 513, 532, 550, 564
tweedsmuir, Baron, of Elsfield (John
Norman Stuart Buchan) 450
tyson, Geoffrey William, Member,
Indian Legislative Assembly from 1945 ;
Editor of Capital , Calcutta 318
tyson, John Dawson, I.C.S., Secretary,
Govt of India (Education, Health and
Lands) 1940-5; Secretary to the Gov¬
ernor of Bengal 1945-7 301-2, 336,
379, 394, 409, 537

vaughan, Colonel (temporary Brig¬
adier) Edward William Drummond,
Commanding Delhi district 1947 16,

299

vellodi, Mullath Kadingi, I.C.S.,
Deputy High Commissioner in London
1945-7; Acting High Commissioner
1947 450, 502, 505

venkataraman, Swaminatha Adu-
thurai, I.C.S., Joint Secretary, Govt of
India, Industries and Supplies Dept
1947 210

VICE-CHIEF OF IMPERIAL GENERAL
STAFF see SIMPSON, F.E.W.

Wakefield, Edward Birbeck, I.C.S.,
Joint Secretary, Political Department,
India 1946-7 197-8, 250, 287
walmsley, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Hugh
Sidney Porter, Air Officer Command-
ing-in-Chief, India 1946-7 210, 511
ward, Major-General Alfred Dudley,
Director of Military Operations, War
Office 1947-8 221

INDEX OF PERSONS

101 1

waterfall, Sir Charles Francis, I.C.S.,
Chief Commissioner Andaman and
Nicobar Islands 1938-42; interned by
Japanese 1942-5 132

w A veil, Field Marshal Earl (Archibald
Percival Wavell), Viceroy and Governor
General of India 1943-7 74, no, 112,
175, 199, 271

webb, Mrs, wife of Lieutenant-Colonel
Webb 387

webb, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilfred
Francis, Indian Political Service, Resi¬
dent, Kashmir from 1945 387, 396,

422, 518, 530

weightman, Flugh, I.C.S., Secretary,
External Affairs Dept, Govt of India
1946-7 272

welles, Sumner, U.S. Under-Secretary
of State 1937-43 273

westwood, Joseph, M.P. (Lab.) for
Stirling and Falkirk from 1935; Secre¬
tary of State for Scotland 1945-7 42,
322, 443

whistler, Major-General Lashmer
Gordon, General Officer Commanding
British Troops in India 1947-8 329,

358

white ley, William, M.P. (Lab.) for
Blaydon Division of Durham 1922-31
and from 1935; Parliamentary Secretary
to the Treasury and Govt Chief Whip
from 1945 244, 265, 347, 360, 465

williams, Charles Frederick Victor,
I.C.S., Joint Secretary, Home Dept,
Govt of India 1945-7; Secretary to
Governor-General (Public) 1947 546
williams, Edward John, High Com¬
missioner for the U.K. in Australia from
1946 281, 481, 494

williams, Tom, M.P. (Lab.) for Don
Valley Division of Yorkshire from 1922;
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries
from 1945 42, 322, 361, 443
Wilson, Geoffrey Masterman, Assistant
Secretary, Cabinet Office 1947 32,

486, 564

Wilson smith, Sir Henry, Permanent
Secretary, Ministry of Defence 1947-8
25, 265

wylie, Sir Francis Verner, I.C.S., Poli¬
tical Adviser to the Crown Representa¬
tive 1940-1 and 1943-5; Governor of
the United Provinces 1945-7 12, 119

yahya khan, Muhammad, Education
Minister, N.W.F.P. from 1946 228
yakub shah, Indian Audit Dept,
Additional Secretary, Govt of India,
Finance Dept 1947 210, 233
young, Brigadier Desmond, Journalist
and writer 557

zafrullah khan, Chaudhuri Sir
Muhammad, Judge, Federal Court of
India 1 941-7; Constitutional Adviser
to Nawab of Bhopal 1947 273, 369
zahid husain, Indian Audit Dept.
Financial Commissioner, Railways 1943-
6; Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh University
1947 219, 305, 426

zakoori sharif F, Pir, Member of the
Council of the All-India Muslim League
130

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

The references are to Document Numbers

AFGHANISTAN

Afghan demands concerning N.W.F.P.
140, 212, 272, 309, 310 para. 2, 342, 377,

395, 43i, 442, 453, 486, 517 and n 4;
Nehru’s reaction to 493, 502
also 362 para. 11, 564 minute 2

alwar 11, 232, 300
amritsar see Punjab, disturbances in
ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ISLANDS
and question of Common wealth Defence
132, 162 para. 25, 165, 221, 554;
further references in context of drafting
of Indian Independence Bill 174, 189-
91, 239, 244 minute 4, 249 clause 16,
258, 259, 284, 323 para. 9, 324, 345-7,
353, 361, 365 para. 8, 373
Muslim League representations against
their inclusion in India 460, 463, 480,
484, 486, 514, 533 para. 9, 536
Congress reaction to League demand
501

also 162 para. 24

ANGLO-AFGHAN TREATY (1921) 453,

486, 517

A N G L O-A FGHAN WARS 272
ANNOUNCEMENT OF 3 JUNE see
PLAN OF 3 JUNE

appointedday (for transfer of power)
249, 271, 286 para. 2, 324, 347, 351-2,
365, 373, 428, 537

ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL 71, 80, 95, 100,

153, 167, 380, 522 enc. 2 para. 3, 562
chairmanship and/or composition of
101, 135, 157, 162 para. 20, 175 item 3,
182, 185, 194, 224, 275, 281 para. 9, 311
para. 2, 317, 354 minute viii, 368, 369
para. 19, 378, 478, 486, 516
League demand for provision in
Independence Bill for sanction to enforce
its awards 460, 480, 485, 514, 548,
558

Congress reaction to this demand 501
see also umpire(s), proposal for

ARMED FORCES, BRITISH

withdrawal of 108, 126, 159, 186, 213,
239 item 6, 274, 275, 307, 308, 315,

329, 335, 337, 346-7, 354, 358, 362, 369
para. 42, 381, 388, 464, 486, 511, 562
enc. para. 5, 564 minute 2
question of their use for internal
security purposes (in particular protec¬
tion of British/European lives) 159,
213 paras. 4(b) and 6, 274, 318, 329 para.
5, 335 paras. 2-4, 358 para. 2, 362, 511
para. 2, 562 enc. para. 6, 564 minute

2(0 .

question of their use to deal with
internal disorder in Indian States 476,
5 11 para. 2

ARMEDFORCES, INDIAN

division of 6, 28, 39, 53, 126, 152, 210
enc. 2, 216, 217, 275, 311, 354, 369 para.
43 ; note by Viceroy on 372; Partition
Council agreement on procedures for
416, 464; mentioned in Indian Inde¬
pendence Bill 428 clause 11; also 506,
564

continued service of British Officers
with 15, 23, 98, 210 enc. 2 para. 5(xi),
265, 312, 354, 358,470, 506 paras. 18-20,
522, 557, 564 annex

position of such Officers in event of

clashes with Indian States or between

two Dominions 477

demand for withdrawal of Indian Army

troops from Hyderabad cantonments

296

cruiser for Indian Navy 506 para. 18
invitation to Slim to become C.-in-C.
of Indian Army 519
see also staff colleges (u.k.),
attendance of Indian Officers at
armed forces reconstitution
committee see entries for armed
forces, Indian, division of
ASIAN RELATIONS CONFERENCE 245

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

1013

ASSAM 86,189-91,314,344,428

referendum in Sylhet 45, 59, 158, 319,
428, 506 para. 14

Australia 63n, 251, 265, 281 para.
13, 324, 347, 351-2, 354 minute i,
438, 494, 53i

bahawalpur 101, 124, 239 item 7,
246-7, 344, 354 minute viii

BALFOUR FORMULA 488, 555 n 2
BALUCHISTAN

method of ascertaining wishes of its
people 9, 17, 26, 45, 276, 298, 308,
311, 369 para. 21

voting in, to join Pakistan 506 para. 15
also 201, 428
BASES 6,23

see also Andaman and nicobar

ISLANDS; LACCADIVE ISLANDS
BENGAL I53, 182, 189-91, 428

and plan of 3 June 1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 15, 17,
18, 45, 53, 59, 9i

question of reconstruction of Govt in
18, 33, 54, 77, 162 para. 29, 240, 253,
268, 289, 291-2, 301-2, 306, 308, 311,
336, 354 minute ix, 367, 369 para. 15,
379, 394, 409-10, 506 paras. 9-10
titles of two new provinces to be formed
in 271 para. 3, 286, 323, 347, 351, 428
votes in Legislative Assembly on par¬
tition 277-8, 369 para. 7
see also boundarycommissio n(s) ;

PARTITION

BERAR 190, 239, 249, 256, 260, 308,
525, 542

BHARATPUR II, 232, 299

bhopal 17, 273, 369 paras 32-6, 376
para. 9, 427

BHUTAN 245
BIHAR

question whether Boundary Commis¬
sion would consider its boundaries 400
BIKANER 17, 246-7
BOUNDARIES

question of possible clash of operational
control over two armies in boundary
areas 354 minute vi, 456, 473

position of British officers in event of
border clashes between two new Do¬
minions 477

BOUND ARY COMMISSIOn(s) 2,3,23,

28, 35-6, 39, 44-5, 53, 59, 71, 73, 82, 98,
105, 126, 189-91; for subsequent refer¬
ences in context of draft India Bill see Ch. 4
in Summary of Documents ; also 219,
239 item 7, 354 minutes vi and viii, 400,
456, 497-8, 529

chairmanship and/or composition of
101, 120, 124, 128, 162 paras. 21-3, 175
item 2, 182, 195, 207-8, 262, 275, 281
para. 9, 311, 317, 344, 354 minute vi,

368, 369, 378, 415, 510 para. 4; see also
radcliffe in Index of Persons

terms of reference of 101, 108, 124,
126, 158, 162 para. 30, 311, 344, 364,

369, 393, 398-9, 415

proposal for separate Boundary Com¬
mission for Assam 314, 344
League demand for provision in Inde¬
pendence Bill to make B.C. awards
binding 480, 485, 486, 514, 548
Congress reaction to this demand 501
Jenkins expects trouble when Com¬
mission reports 540

BRITISH ARMY See ARMED FORCES,
BRITISH

BRITISH COMMERCIAL INTERESTS
318

BRITISH IMPERIAL AMBITIONS

Krishna Menon’s fears of 201
Nehru on 388 enc. para. 9
BRITISH LIVES

protection of 318; see also armed
forces, British, question of their
use for internal security purposes, etc.

BROADCASTS

by Mountbatten: text 44; also men¬
tioned 1-2, 5, 19, 21, 23, 30, 41, 417
by Indian leaders: text of Nehru’s 46,
of Jinnah’s 47, of Baldev Singh’s 48 ;
also mentioned 3, 18, 23, 41, 51, 78,
91 para. 28, 100
by Attlee: text 57

Burma 29, 78, 121, 133, 182 paras.
11-12, 368 paras. 5-6, 376 para. 10,
502 para. 5, 505

ioi4

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

BUTLER COMMITTEE III, 247, 264,

281 para, n, 340, 560

CABINET, BRITISH

Conclusions 42, 322, 361, 443
also 56, 75, 199

see also India and burma com¬
mittee

CABINET COMMITTEE ON COMMON¬
WEALTH RELATIONS
Minutes 31, 118

cabinet, INDIAN 139 para. 6, 141,
162 paras. 12-15 and 24, 435-6
Minutes 95, 338, 493; minutes of
special committee on Indian Services
546

Papers 93 n 4, 103 n 4, 288 enc., 359
for special (partition) committee of
Indian Cabinet see entry under parti¬
tion

see also interim government

CABINET MISSION PLAN 2, 3, 6, 7,

17, 23, 35, 36, 43, 44-5, 57, 59, 69, 86,
91, 124, 126, 127-8, 151, 162 para, io,
163, 205-6, 281, 303, 347, 369 para. 33,
466

CALCUTTA

question of its becoming free city 2,

10, 17-18, 20, 33, 91

question of referendum in 10, 17, 23,

53, 91 paras. 3 and 18

law and order situation in 162 paras.

6 and 29

Calcutta Riots Enquiry Commission,
winding up of 175 item 4, 506 para. 8
Canada 8, 63n, 89, 118, 251, 281 para.
13, 324, 347, 351-2, 354 minute i, 488,

53U 555

CENTRAL CONSTITUTIONAL COM¬
MITTEE (of British community in
India) 318

CEREMONIES ON TRANSFER OF

power 108, 308, 533 para. 6
ceylon 368 paras. 6-7

CHAMBER OF PRINCES 64, 68, 70

dissolution of 538

see also Indian states; para-

MOUNTCY, LAPSE OF

CHENAB RIVER 72n, IOOn, 105, 182
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE (u.K.)

Minutes 221

Papers 187, 362, 554

Secretary’s minutes to Defence Minister

345-6

see also chiefs of staff (u.k.) in
Index of Persons
china 334

CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS 363-4,
430

COMMONWEALTH

India’s membership of 6, 35, 53, 60,
84, 91 para. 23, 112, 164, 182, para. 8,
199, 222 enc. 1, 241, 251, 266, 522 enc.

2 para. 11, 564 annex

Attlee’s proposal for review of its
future structure 118, 13 1; see also
368 para. 6

see also dominion status; dom¬
inions; TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OF¬
FICE

naming and constitution of 31, 118,
166, 182, 313, 368, 443, 451, 510 para. 5,
526

communists 89 para. 5, 220, 273,
522, 561

CONGRESS, INDIAN NATIONAL

and plan of 3 June sccplanof3JUNE
and partition see partition
and Indian States see Indian states
and PARAMOUNTCY, LAPSE OF
and Indian Independence Bill see Ch.
4 in Summary of Documents
and question who should represent Con¬
gress at meeting of 2-3 June 4, 27, 91
text of A.I.C.C. resolution on plan of

3 June 205 ; on States 206
and Travancore 226
Bhopal on 561

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (iNDIA)

45, 205

Reports of Union Powers and Funda¬
mental Rights Committees 7, 273
for references in context of draft India Bill
see Ch. 4 in Summary of Documents;
defined in Clause 19(3) of Bill 428

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

1015

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (PAKISTAN)
proposal to hold its first meeting in
Delhi 3 1 1, 319, 369 para. 41
question of when it was to be summoned
533

for references in context of draft India Bill
see Ch. 4 in Summary of Documents;
defined in Clause 19(3) of Bill 428

CROWN REPRESENTATIVE’S POLICE

476

CRUISER

for Indian Navy 506 para. 18

DAILY HERALD 66
DAILY WORKER 78
DAWN 543
DEFENCE

of India and Pakistan 60
British military requirements in India
186, 221, 486-7, 554, 556, 562 enc.
para. 7, 564

see also Andaman and nicobar

ISLANDS; LACCADIVE ISLANDS
DISTURBANCES

question of use of force to suppress 5,
60

see also Punjab, disturbances in
DOMINION STATUS 3, 15, 23, 38, 43,
44-5, 53, 55, 59, 60, 6 3, 87, 104, 131,
133-4, 174, 189-91; for subsequent

references in context of draft India Bill
see ch. 4 in Summary of Documents;
also 209 para. 3, 266
denial of, to States 17, 112, 199, 216,
230, 261, 273, 369 paras. 33-5
Ismay’s request for material to dispel
Indian misunderstandings concerning
dominion status 117, 13 1, 149, 239
item 9, 264

and Burma 121, 133, 182 para. 12
exchange between Churchill and Attlee
on nature of dominion status 445, 504
see also commonwealth

DOMINIONS

correspondence with on:

change in Royal title 164, 184,
203, 322, 482

change of title of Dominions Office
166, 313, 443, 492

title of Indian Independence Bill
465, 481, 488, 492, 494, 512, 531, 555
DURAND LINE 140, 395, 43i, 493

EIRE Il8, 122, I33, 322, 482
see also Ireland

executive council see interim

GOVERNMENT

FARIDKOT 12
FLAGS

for new Dominions 308 item 8, 319,
369 para. 40, 533

FOOD SITUATION IN INDIA 171, 25I,
265, 268 para. 5, 281 para. 13, 336, 376
para. 7

FRENCH COLONIES IN INDIA 337 para.
10

GANDHI-JINNAH APPEAL 44
GOA 337

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935 428

clause 8, 550

GOVERNOR GENERAL’S BODYGUARD

275

governor(s)-general

appointment of 2, 3, 23, 60, 108, 123,
126, 183, 189-91, 239, 244, 256, 269
para. 1, 275, 308, 311, 366, 373-4, 420,
425, 428, 440, 457

Jinnah’s decision to become Governor-
General of Pakistan and question whether
Mountbatten should remain as Gov¬
ernor-General of India only 470-1,
483, 486, 495, 499, 500, 506 paras. 21-
34, 508-9, 521-4, 533, 544-5, 551, 557,
561-4

powers of, under Indian Independence
Bill 25, 108, 123, 149, 167, 189-91,
194; for subsequent references in context

ioi6

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

GOVERNOR (s) - GENERAL ( COtlt.):

of draft Bill see Ch. 4 in Summary of
Documents; also 562 enc.
powers Jinnah might wield under
Independence Bill 550, 562 enc. para. 4
powers of, in Commonwealth generally

131

designation of office of in draft Bill
133-4

governors, provincial, resignation
and appointment of 79, 98, 100, 113,
162 para. 32, 183, 190, 239 item 3, 256,
269 para. 2, 275, 311, 324, 347, 351-2,

354, 357, 365, 373-4, 384, 39U 40 6,
461-2, 478, 506 paras. 3 and 23, 510
para. 10, 522 enc. 2 para. 11, 564 annex
see also north-west frontier
province, change of Governors
gurgaon see entries under Punjab,
disturbances in and communal composi¬
tion of troops in Gurgaon
gurkhas 173, 259, 315, 330-32, 337,
347, 3b9 para. 42, 388, 554 para. 6(g)

hardwar 297, 300, 319, 369 para. 38
HINDUSTAN TIMES 84, 108n, III, 1 74,

543

honours 78, 161, 368 para. 9

Mountbatten’s proposal that Pakistani
citizens should be eligible for 533
HYDERABAD 17, 108, 112, 124, 150, I90,

199, 230, 261, 266, 273, 281 para.
11, 296, 308, 326, 360, 369 paras. 33-5,
513 n 6

Nizam’s firman stating that, with lapse of
paramountcy, he will in law become
independent 163; also 239
see also berar

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1926 108

item 2, 13 1, 488

INDIA

question of international status of new
Dominions 73, 76, 91 para. 31, 115-16,
126, 153, 188, 201, 202, 244 minute 2,
249, 270, 285, 413, 429, 463, 479-80,

484, 485, 486, 501, 502 para. 5, 514, 520,
535

statement to be made in parliamentary
debate on international status 532, 553
diplomatic representation of 162 para.
13, 182 para. 10

new Dominion of India set up in draft
Bill 189-91, 428

suggestion of royal visit to 222, 241
question whether Jinnah would object
to ‘Hindustan’ areas taking title of
‘India’ 405, 420, 441
food situation in see food situation

IN INDIA

INDIA AND BURMA COMMITTEE

Minutes 32, 121, 244, 265, 347, 360,
421, 465, 486, 564

Papers 6-7, 165, 188, 190, 192-3,
251-2, 323-6, 404, 525

INDIA OFFICE

future of 23, 31, 526

disposal of building and its contents and

Clause 1 9(2) (a) of draft Bill relating to

189-91, 249, 252, 265 minute 3, 282,

421

INDIAN ARMY See ARMED FORCES,
INDIAN

INDIAN CHRISTIANS 178
INDIAN CROWN 164, 184
INDIAN INDEPENDENCE BILL

text of Bill as first submitted to Mini-
isters 191, as shown to Indian leaders
428

for documentation on drafting of bill and
its consideration by Indian leaders see
Ch. 4 in Summary of Documents
legislative programme for 3, 15, 28,

43, 44, 45, 53, 59, 122, 189, 193, 244
no Congress objection to use of term
Dominion in 55

change of title from ‘Dominions’ to
‘Independence’ Bill 244, 256, 283 para.
7

Conservative opposition to title ‘Inde¬
pendence’ Bill 441, 443, 445, 465, 504;
see also dominions, correspondence
with on title of Indian Independence
Bill

press reactions to Bill 542-3

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

1017

INDIAN NEWS CHRONICLE 84, 3 19,
543

INDIAN SERVICES

question of continued service of British
officials in 23, 44, 59, 98, 162 para. 31,
209, 215, 218 para. 4, 354 n 5, 369 para.
37, 537

payment of compensation or pensions
to 103, 189-191, 244, 256, 359, 493
guarantee of terms of service of, in
draft Bill 249, 286 para. 8, 323 para. 11,

325, 347, 35U 361, 365, 373, 428-9,

463, 484;

decision of special committee of Indian
Cabinet on 546

Nehru’s reported remarks on British
members of 215, 218, 263, 369 para.
37, 370

disintegration of, in Punjab 209 para.
3, 339 para. 5(d) see also armed

FORCES, INDIAN; NON-SECRETARY
OF STATE’s/PROVINCIAL SERVICES

INDIAN STATES

for States generally see Ch. 5 in Summary
of Documents; for references in context of
lapse of paramountcy ^paramountcy,

LAPSE OF

and Plan of 3 June 17, 21, 45, 91, 273
Mountbatten’s meeting with Negotiat¬
ing Committee on Plan 43
question of H.M.G.’s future relations
with 17, 43, 199, 261, 281 para. 11,

326, 360; see also dominion status,
denial of, to States

questions on, at press conference 60,
84, H2n, 199, 216, 230
Monckton’s complaints on H.M.G.’s
policy towards 112, 199, 261, 326,
360

report of propaganda activities by
States in London 450
and question of Mountbatten remaining
as Governor-General of India only 499,
522 enc. 2 para. 7, 561, 564 annex
also 241, 243

see also chamber of princes
INDUS RIVER I40, 395, 43I, 493
INTELLIGENCE BUREAU I3O enc.

INTERIM GOVERNMENT

question of reconstitution of 3, 20,
28, 58, 70, 73, 80, 93, 139 para. 5, 200,
239 item 5, 306 para. 6, 308
meetings of Partition Committee and
Partition Council, 26-27 June, on
question of reconstitution 354, 367,
369 paras. 14-18, 379, 421
further consideration of reconstitution
399, 404, 412-13, 433, 437, 447~9, 454,
458, 4 65, 467-9, 478, 489, 493, 506
paras. 10-13, 507, 510 para. 2 and ps, 533
para. 11, 545, 549

text of Jinnah’s note objecting to

reconstitution 413

also 171, 175

see also cabinet, Indian

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFER¬
ENCE 90

IRELAND 60
see also eire

Jaipur 246-7
JODHPUR 246-7

JOINT COMMITTEE ON INDIA 182
para. 9

joint defence council 354 minute
vi, 372, 556 para. 3(b), 557
Partition Council agreement to establish
416

Jinnab’s willingness that Mountbatten
should be Chairman of 533, 545, 564
annex

JUNE 3RD PLAN See PLAN OF 3 JUNE

KARACHI

establishment of new Pakistan Govt at
231, 275, 354, 369 paras. 12-13

KASHMIR

question of visits to, by Gandhi, Nehru
or Mountbatten 69, 70, 369 paras.
29 and 31, 385-7

possible announcement of independence
by 108

ioi8

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

KASHMIR ( cont .):

Mouiitbatten’s visit to 161; references
to his discussions during visit 294, 319,
369 para. 30, 386
Krishna Menon on 201
Nehru on 229

Monckton under pressure to go to 296
report that Jinnah had urged Maharaja
to join Pakistan 533

KASHMIR NATIONAL CONFERENCE 229

khaksars 130 enc.

KHUDAI KHIDMATGARS 65, 32I, 54I

LACCADIVE ISLANDS 187, 221, 244

minute 4, 554

Lahore see Punjab, disturbances in

MAHASABHA 220

MEETINGS OF MOUNTBATTEN WITH
INDIAN LEADERS

2-3 j u n e (on 3 J une Plan) : minutes 2 3 ,
39; other reports 27, 32, 91; Ismay’s
brief for 3 ; question who should
represent Congress at 4, 91 ; also 20,
5 & 7 JUNE (on administrative machin¬
ery for partition) 73, 100
1 3 j u n e (on lapse of paramountcy) 1 75
see also cabinet, Indian; and entries
for Special (Partition) Committee and
Partition Council under partition

MIDNIGHT FOLLIES 368 para. 12
MINORITIES 60
MOUNT ABU 124
MUSLIM LEAGUE

and plan of 3 June see plan of 3 June
and partition see partition
and Indian Independence Bill see Ch. 4
in Summary of Documents
League acceptance of plan questioned at
press conference 60
text of League Council resolution on
plan 127; for other references to
resolution see under plan of 3 June
Punjab Muslim League resolution
demanding Jenkins’s recall 305, 339
para. 8

signs of dissension in 339 para. 8

also 1 19, 147, 162 paras. 12-13

see also north-west frontier

PROVINCE
MYSORE I7

NABHA 12

nagas 182 para. 11
NEPAL 388

see akso gurkhas

NEW ZEALAND 62-3, 492, 512, 53 1
NON-SECRETARY OF STATe’s/pRO-
vincial services 209 para. 3, 249
n 11, 325 para. 2, 351 para. 2, 365 para.

7, 373

discussion and decision of special com¬
mittee of Indian Cabinet regarding
their position 546

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

Attlee’s concern regarding adequacy of
troops available for its defence 564
minute 2

see also Afghanistan

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

Referendum 15, 45,47, 49,60, 61, 108,
126, 136, 170, 175 item 5, 201, 239, 306,
308 item 9, 399, 428
demand for independence/Pathanistan
option 14, 35, 53, 65, 81, 83, 91 paras.
23 and 33, 228, 236-7, 319, 321, 342,
369 para. 38, 442, 475; Nehru’s defini¬
tion of scope of this demand 502; see
also Afghanistan, Afghan demands
concerning N.W.F.P.

Gandhi’s suggestion that Jinnah should
visit N.W.F.P. to explain what Pakistan
‘really is’ 99, 125, 139, 156, 176-7,
230, 253, 369 paras. 22-25
Mountbatten’s correspondence with
Gandhi on conduct of referendum and
abstention of Redshirts from partici¬
pation in it 396, 422, 442, 496, 515,
518, 530, 541

change of Governors 24, 61, 81, 91,
96, 106, 108, 114, 142-3, 148, 154, 161,
162 para. 33, 181, 182, 211, 223, 227, 237,
281 para. 6

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

1019

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

(i cont .) :

League agitation in, called off 85;
mentioned in proceedings of League
Council 130 enc.
also 14, 47, 51

OPPOSITION (parliamentary) 3, 23,
59, 190, 244, 257, 261, 267, 279 n 2,
326, 347-8, 361, 375, 405, 419, 420, 437,
438, 449, 458, 461, 465
discussion with Opposition on draft
Bill 441, 443, 445, 465
and Governor-Generalship question
470, 508, 522 enc. 2 para. 8, 523, 562,
564 annex

Jinnah’s protests to, on Andamans and
Nicobars, and enforcement of Arbitral
Tribunal and Boundary Commission
awards 533 para. 9, 534, 536, 548, 558

PAKISTAN

for creation of Pakistan under 3 June plan
see plan of 3 june and partition for
international status of see India, question
of international status of new Domin¬
ions

U.K. High Commissioner in 92, 126
diplomatic representation of 93, 162
para. 13

mentioned in proceedings of Muslim

League Council 130 enc.

requests for British assistance 108, 215,

275, 329 para. 4, 399, 470, 490, 506 para.

23, 533 para. 8, 564 annex

new Dominion of Pakistan set up in

draft Bill 189-91, 428

and suggestion of Royal visit 241

and reports of an agreement with

Travancore 295

Nehru on future of Pakistan 337
para. 10

see also Karachi, establishment of
Pakistan Govt at

also 142, 175, 182 para. 4, 201, 21 1,
229, 266

PARAMOUNTCY, LAPSE OF

Nehru’s representations on 67-8, 100,
109-11, 124, 175, 2o6n, 264, 297, 355;
also 502

Corfield on 74, 94, 146, 175, 196
Jinnah’s views 101, 175, 225
Patel on 124

Rajagopalachari’s correspondence with
Cripps on 107, 281 para. 11, 303, 459
resolutions of States’ People’s Conference
on 151

Mountbatten’s meeting with Indian
leaders and Corfield on 175;
also 239 item 4

decision to establish States Dept 175,
197, 238, 239 item 4, 288, 297, 338, 369
paras. 26-7; Patel’s statement of 5 July
on coming into being of States Dept
528, 545

draft standstill agreement 198 ; arrange¬
ments for negotiating standstill agree¬
ments 287, 369 para. 28, 418, 427;
draft submitted by Nehru 340
A.I.C.C. resolution on States 206
conflicting views of Reforms Office and
Political Dept on question whether
agreements between States and para¬
mount power will lapse 246-7
Listowel outlines H.M.G.’s policy 281
para. 11, 349

Bhopal/Bhopal Govt on 402, 427
Mountbatten on 418
Panikkar on 446

PROVISIONS REGARDING LAPSE OF
PARAMOUNTCY IN INDEPENDENCE
BILL CLAUSE 7(l)(b) I9O-9I, 239,

244, 256 para. 20, 269 paras. 3-4, 279,
283 para. 8, 347, 349, 365, 373, 411, 428,
525, 559-60; Congress representations
on Clause 7(i)(b) 452, 466, 479, 484,

486, 513, 535; Muslim League comment
on 520

also 139 para. 7, 164, 192, 418, 522 enc.
2 para. 9, 542

see also berar; bhopal; chamber

OF PRINCES; HYDERABAD; INDIAN

states; travancore; and Ch. 5 in
Summary of Documents

1020

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION 382
PARTITION

establishment of administrative mach¬
inery for, at centre 28, 45, 53, 70, 80,
93, 102, 108, 155, 161, 162 paras. 15-20,
281 para. 9

Mountbatten’s meetings with Indian
leaders on 39, 73, 100
Indian Cabinet meeting on 95
SPECIAL (partition) COMMITTEE
OF INDIAN CABINET

Minutes 152, 217, 354
Papers 210, 312

replacement of Committee by Parti¬
tion Council 354 minute ii

PARTITION COUNCIL

Minutes 367, 416, 516
Paper 372

references to Partition Council
continuing after 15 August 73, 470,
522 enc. 2 para. 3, 545
Partition in the Punjab 97-8, 144-5,
152, 162 paras. 27-8, 169, 180, 209 para.
4, 219, 233, 304, 305, 316, 339 para. 7,
357, 369 para. 20, 503, 527, 540
composition of Punjab Partition Com¬
mittee 426

Partition in Bengal 152, 162 para. 29,
240, 277-8

Gandhi on partition 382, 389
also 60, 380, 490

see also arbitral tribunal; armed
forces, Indian, division of;

BOUNDARY COMMISSIOn(s) ; PLAN
OF 3 JUNE

PATHANISTAN See NORTH-WEST FRONT¬
IER province, demand for independ-
ence/Pathanistan option
patiala 300, 418

PLAN OF 3 JUNE

action to be taken should Jinnah reject
it 2

final amendments to 13
and Mountbatten’s meeting with Indian
leaders of 2-3 June 23, 27, 39, 91, 182
and the States 43, 91, 401

TEXT AS PUBLISHED 45

for broadcasts on Plan see under broad¬
casts; for Mountbattens press confer¬

ence see PRESS CONFERENCE (OF 4
JUNE)

Reactions to Plan
in Armed Forces 162 para. 7
in Assam 86
in Bengal 162 para. 29
in Bombay 220
of R. A. Butler 88
of Congress 35, 38-40, 53, 91 paras.
20-23

of Dominion Prime Ministers 62-3 ,
87, 89

of Gandhi 24, 58, 69, 91, 161-2,
382, 389

of Jinnah 38-40, 53, 91 paras. 18-19
of Muslim League 147
of Parliament 56, 78, 161
of Press 66, 78, 84, 88, 89
in Punjab 72, 209
of Sikhs 36, 38-40, 53, 72
in Sind 104
in U.P. 119

Nehru on reactions to plan 300 para.
10

Resolution of Muslim League Council
on Plan 101-2; text 127;
reactions to resolution of Nehru and
Patel 129-30, 162;

Intelligence Bureau report of Council’s
proceedings 130 enc., 162; question
of League acceptance of Plan 153, 160,
161-2, 281

Resolution of All-India Congress Com¬
mittee on Plan 201, 281; text 205
also 3, 12, 32, 34, 37, 40, 42, 163, 491

POLAND 232
POONA PACT 533
PRESS

reactions to Plan of 3 June 66, 78, 84,
88, 89

reactions to Indian Independence Bill
542-3

see also broadcasts; press con¬
ference (of 4 june); and entries for
individual newspapers

PRESS CONFERENCE (OF 4 JUNE)

Patel invited to take chair at 50
Mountbatten’s opening remarks 59;
also 249

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

1021

press ( cont.): :

Questions and Answers 60; also 82,
83n, 91 para. 29, H2n, 161, 199, 216
230

PRINCES See INDIAN STATES

printing presses 354 minute iii, 369
paras. 12-13, 490

PRIVY COUNCIL

appeals to 90, 255, 280, 505

PUNJAB

DISTURBANCES in 2, II, 12, 16,
72, 91, 105, 137, 139 para. 8, 141, 162
paras. 6 and 31, 179, 209 para. 5, 218,
232, 299, 300, 305, 311 para. 6, 338,
339, 369, 384, 426 paras. 5 and 10, 455,
506 paras. 6-7, 540
casualties in 204

communal composition of troops in
Gurgaon 11, 232, 234-5, 254, 275
demand for martial law in certain
districts 300, 320, 327-8, 338, 339
para. 6, 343, 369, 383
Jenkins’s proposals for speedier justice
339 para. 5(c), 383, 426 para. 9
formation of Security Committee and
proposal to replace officials in Lahore
and Amritsar 338, 343, 357, 369,
383, 426

Mamdot’s complaints against certain
actions taken by authorities to control
disturbances and resignation from
Security Committee 455, 472, 506
para. 7, 527

PARTITION OF 3, 6, 35-6, 45, 59, 60,
124, 126, 189-91, 428; see entry for
Partition in the Punjab under parti¬
tion

question of forming coalition ministry
in 97-8, 162 para. 27, 306
titles of two new provinces to be
formed in 271, 286, 323, 347, 351,
428

votes in Legislative Assembly on
partition 304, 369 para. 8
Jenkins’s proposal for neutral zone
in 316

proposal to appoint non-official
advisers in 367, 379, 383, 407, 426
para. 8, 527 para. 3, 540

Moon’s proposal for tripartite division
of Punjab to facilitate Sikh-Muslim
negotiations 371, 474
Baldev Singh’s proposal for joint
control of boundary areas pending
announcement of Boundary Commis¬
sion’s findings 456, 473
see also boundary commission(s) ;

SIKHS

PUNJAB STATES 418

PURNEA 2, 23, 124, 158, 399, 400

RECORDS, DISPOSAL OF

of Crown Representative 67, no, 146
enc. 3, 175, 250

of Governor General (Reforms) and
(Public) 341

of India Office see India office,
disposal of building and its contents etc.
refugees 299, 300 para. 12, 506 para. 17

REPORT OF THE INDIAN STATES COM¬
MITTEE, 1928-1929 (cmd. 3302) see
BUTLER COMMITTEE
ROYAL TITLE 8, I34, 164, 184, I90, 19I,
203, 239, 322, 482

ROYAL VISIT

Halifax’s proposal for Royal visit to
India 222, 241

RUSSIA, RUSSIANS See UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

SCHEDULED CASTES 10, 17, 23, 53, 91

paras. 3 and 18, 319 para. 2, 344, 354
minute viii, 533

SECRETARY OF STATE’S ADVISERS 189
enc. para. 13, 190 para, (xiii), 19 1
Clause I9(2)(a)

section 93 (in Bengal) see Bengal,
question of reconstitution of Govt in
SIKHS

and Plan of 3 June, partition of Punjab
and Boundary Commission 3, 23,

35-6, 44, 48, 59-6o, 72, 91, 100 n 7,
105, 162 para. 30, 175 item 2, 178, 182,
209, 316, 339 para. 8, 344, 417, 456, 473,
497-8, 547

1022

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

sikhs (cont.):

and possibility of an agreement with
Pakistan 22, 91 para. 26, 371, 474
and suggestions for transfer of population
and property 108 item 8, 124, 209,
339 n 14, 417, 497-8, 547
see also boundary commission(s);
partition; Punjab

SIMLA CONVENTION (1914) ON TIBET

334

SIND

question of transfer of certain areas 2,

23, 124, 158, 399, 400

reactions in Sind to 3 June plan 104

vote in Legislative Assembly to join

Pakistan 369 para. 9

mentioned in Indian Independence Bill

191, 428

socialists 126 item 2, 220, 273, 522
SOUTH AFRICA 87, Il8, 392, 438, 53 1,

555

SPECIAL (PARTITION) COMMITTEE OF

Indian cabinet see entry under

PARTITION
STAFF COLLEGES (u.K.)

attendance of Indian officers at 182,
368 para. 8

STAND STILL AGREEMENTS WITH
INDIAN STATES See PARAMOUNTCY,
LAPSE OF

STATEMENT OF 3 JUNE sec PLAN OF 3
JUNE

STATES DEPARTMENT

decision to establish see entry under
PARAMOUNTCY, LAPSE OF
STATES FORCES 175
STATES, INDIAN See INDIAN STATES
STATES NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE 43

see also Indian states
states’ people’s conference 151,
226, 229

STATESMAN 84,543

STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER (1931) Il8,

131, 164, 189, 203, 479, 531

STERLING BALANCES 39,103,192,244,

359, 480, 493 > 546 n 2

SUTLEJ VALLEY CANALS AGREEMENT

(1920) 246-7

sylhet see ASSAM, referendum in Sylhet

thar parkar see sind, question of
transfer of certain areas
Tibet 245, 334
TIMES OF INDIA 174
TIMES, THE 66

travancore 17, 226, 266, 281 para. II
Nehru on position of 295
Bhopal on agitation against 401
question of giving military assistance to,
before 15 August, to deal with internal
disorder 476

TREATY BETWEEN U.K. AND INDIA

for British military requirements in a
future treaty see defence, British
military requirements in India
see also tripartite agreement,
Gandhi’s proposal for, etc.

TREATY OBLIGATIONS

assumption of, by successor Govts 52,
115, 126, 188, 192, 244 minutes 1 and 3,
333, 429, 463, 479, 502 para. 5, 517 and

n 4

statement to be made in parliamentary
debate on 532, 553

tribal areas 189, 191, 249, 256 para.
17, 271, 283 para. 6, 286 para. 5, 310,
323 para. 11, 347, 362 para. 9, 428, 460,
479, 480, 484, 486, 520
statement to be made in parliamentary
debate on position of 539, 552

TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT

Gandhi’s proposal for, between H.M.G.
and new Dominions 69-70, 99, 101,
108, 125, 161, 266, 281 para. 4, 345,
360, 376, 505

umarkot see sind, question of transfer
of certain areas
umpire(s)

proposal for 73, 80, 91 para. 32, 95
see also arbitral tribunal
union of soviet socialist
republics 31, 188, 309, 395 para. 5,
561

UNITED provinces

reactions in, to 3 June Plan 119

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

1023

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 88, 395
para. 6, 431 para. 5, 453 para. 5, 561
American War of Independence 488

viceroy’s conference papers 1,
28, 35-6, 200, 238, 306-7, 316, 428, 495,
520-22

viceroy’s interviews

with Bahawalpur, Dewan of 101
Baldev Singh 417
Gandhi 24, 69, 230
Jinnah 101, 230, 311, 533
Kak 294
Kartar Singh 417
Khan Sahib 81

Kripalani 124
Liaquat 101, 153
Nehru 124, 319
Nishtar 101
Panikkar 446
Patel 124, 153

viceroy’s miscellaneous meetings
see meetings of mountbatten

WITH INDIAN LEADERS

viceroy’s personal reports 91,
162, 369, 506

viceroy’s staff meetings 2, 5, 17,
2 6, 70, 93, 108, 126, 216, 239, 308, 344,
389, 470, 478, 499, 545

ZALME PAKHTOON 321

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